BY THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Report To The Honorable Paul Findley House Of Representatives

Food Stamp Workfare – Cost Benefit Results Not Conclusive; Administrative Problems Continue

Through a demonstration project, the Departments of Agriculture and Labor have been testing the feasibility of food stamp recipients working in exchange for their benefits.

Data on the first year of the demonstration indicated that workfare could be cost-beneficial. This data, however, may not be reliable for predicting results of an ongoing program.

Problems in getting eligible participants to work as soon as possible continued during the extended (second year) workfare demonstration, which ended in December 1981. Job availability was not a problem.

The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 allows States or their political subdivisions to establish workfare programs. Changes under the act, administrative improvements, and innovations could provide different cost-benefit results and better evidence of the effect of workfare on Food Stamp Program expenditures.

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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

February 19, 1982

COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

B-206381

The Honorable Paul Findley
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Findley:

In response to your request, we reviewed the continuing operations and evaluation of the Food Stamp Workfare Demonstration Project administered jointly by the Departments of Agriculture and Labor. The demonstration project, authorized by the Food Stamp Act of 1977 and extended by the Food Stamp Amendments of 1980, was designed to test the feasibility of food stamp recipients working in return for their benefits. The extended demonstration, in which 14 locations participated, ended December 31, 1981. We briefed you on the results of our work in November 1981. This report, which contains the substance of that briefing, augments the information provided in two previous reports and our testimony last year on food stamp workfare.

Our first report in September 1980 (CED-80-129, Sept. 30, 1980) discussed Agriculture's difficulties in recruiting demonstration sites for both the initial and extended demonstration. The second report, "Insights Gained in Workfare Demonstration Projects" (CED-81-117, July 31, 1981), summarized our review of first year operations of the demonstration and recommended actions that the Congress and Agriculture should take to improve workfare operations. These recommendations were consistent with our testimony on the workfare demonstration before the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition, House Committee on Agriculture, in March 1981 and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry in April 1981.

The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-98 approved Dec. 22, 1981) authorized States and local jurisdictions to implement workfare as a permanent feature of the Food Stamp Program. In addition to ending the demonstration, the act contained many of the legislative changes we had recommended in our March and April 1981 testimony. The act strengthened workfare legislation by removing several of the exemptions for participation, eliminating the mandatory 30-day job-search period, and strengthening the penalty for not fulfilling workfare obligations. We had also recommended eliminating automatic exemptions for households based on earned income and student status. These recommended

changes were not fully enacted, but some change was made regarding the earned income exemption.

Our review of demonstration project operations during the extended period showed numerous opportunities to enhance operational efficiency and workfare program benefits; however, we are not making any recommendations at this time. The demonstration has ended and, as pointed out above, the recent legislation allows States and local jurisdictions new flexibility in implementing workfare if they so elect.

In addition, the conference report accompanying the recent legislation expresses the conferees' intent that, to the maximum extent practicable, political subdivisions be allowed to design and operate workfare programs for food stamp recipients that are compatible and consistent with similar workfare programs operated by those subdivisions. The report states that a political subdivision's compliance with a workfare program for the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program satisfies food stamp workfare requirements. Compliance with other workfare programs that the Secretary of Agriculture determines meet the protections and provisions of food stamp workfare legislation also constitute compliance with food stamp workfare requirements. As a result, we cannot be certain how many jurisdictions will establish workfare programs solely for food stamp recipients. We believe, however, that problems identified in this report can serve as a caution to Agriculture and workfare project officials to avoid the pitfalls that can detract from operational effectiveness and program benefits when designing workfare programs.

Our objectives for this latest review of the workfare demonstration project, which ended December 31, 1981, were to determine for four of the larger demonstration sites (San Diego County, California; Pinellas County, Florida; Vanderburgh County, Indiana; and Greenville County, South Carolina) whether the problems identified in our July 31, 1981, report still existed and reduced workfare program benefits. We wanted to find out if participating jurisdictions had developed enough workfare jobs to enable them to assign all eligible individuals to work and whether workfare officials were experiencing any difficulties such as transportation problems in getting participants to work at the job sites. In addition, we tried to identify any other emerging problems or program improvements warranting reporting. We also reviewed Agriculture's and Labor's efforts to evaluate the demonstration through a contract with Ketron, Inc.

EVALUATION OF WORKFARE COSTS AND BENEFITS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE

We reviewed Ketron, Inc.'s, cost and benefit evaluation of the first year demonstration project, and we agree with Ketron,

Inc., and Agriculture that the evaluation's results may not provide reliable predictions of results of an ongoing workfare program. Our review of the evaluation for the first year and the evaluation in process for the extended phase showed that it had many of the weaknesses common in attempts to determine costs and benefits for planned programs by measuring those experienced for demonstration programs. For example, during employees' learning phases, administrative costs could be higher and output lower. Conversely, employees who realize their work is under scrutiny might perform better than expected and increase output above what would be achieved under ongoing programs. Consequently, demonstrations do not always provide precise predictions of what results would be for ongoing programs.

These common weaknesses, combined with several specific features of this demonstration, limit what can be statistically inferred about workfare results. For example, unverified information and the low response rate (64 percent) on a questionnaire used in the evaluation pose some unanswered questions regarding the validity of results for the few participating demonstration sites.

First year results showed that workfare is administratively feasible with moderate administrative costs per client and, under some assumptions, benefits were comparable to or greater than the costs incurred. However, by allowing greater participation, recent congressional action would tend to increase work and program savings benefits. Administrative costs would also be likely to increase because of the need to process a larger caseload. Future tests under expanded eligibility criteria and improved administration could provide different conclusions regarding costs and benefits and more concrete evidence concerning the effect workfare has on Federal food stamp benefit expenditures.

PROGRAM DESIGN CONTAINED DEFICIENCIES AND ADMINISTRATION WAS WEAK

Our work confirmed conclusions in our earlier report that expanded workfare eligibility criteria, shorter job-search periods, stronger penalties for noncompliance, and better local administration would increase participation in the food stamp workfare program and provide additional program benefits. Because the recent legislative changes improving program design were not in effect for the demonstration, many workfare clients avoided some or all of their workfare obligation.

Improved administration would have resulted in more able-bodied persons working and would have reduced program costs by denying some benefits to households that did not complete workfare job obligations. One of the most important administrative

problems was local jurisdictions' delays in interviewing and assigning eligible participants to workfare jobs. These delays, coupled with slowness in penalizing individuals for not completing workfare obligations, continued to result in loss of benefits during the extended demonstration period.

SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKFARE AND WORK REGISTRATION IS DUPLICATIVE

Many clients at three of the four demonstration sites were interviewed twice, once because of the Food Stamp Program's work registration requirement and once because of the workfare requirement. New food stamp recipients had to satisfy the work registration requirement administered by the local office of the State employment security agency associated with the Department of Labor. This involved an interview to determine work capabilities and other matters related to finding a job. Separate workfare demonstration site offices also interviewed many of the same individuals to obtain similar information. We found that for the three locations that administered work registration and workfare separately, 26 percent to 78 percent of the workfare participants who had been interviewed by the workfare office had also been required to attend another interview with the employment service office regarding work registration activities.

At one of the demonstration sites, however, the local employment service office also handled several of the administrative details of workfare--including the interview. At this site, the only one of the 14 sites that administered workfare in this manner, clients satisfied interviewing requirements for workfare and work registration at the same time. This procedure showed that it was possible to have a local employment service office assume certain workfare functions, including the required interview for most new benefit recipients. At this time, it would be difficult to suggest any additional role for employment service offices since Federal funding has been reduced and States have reduced spending for job assistance activities.

ENOUGH JOBS EXISTED

Enough jobs had been developed for workfare participants at the sites we visited, but startup problems such as language and transportation difficulties prevented some job assignments.

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Our review is discussed in detail in appendix I. At your request, we did not obtain agency comments on the matters discussed in this report.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 2 days from the

date of the report. At that time, we will send copies to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor; the House Committees on Agriculture, Appropriations, Government Operations, and the Budget; the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Governmental Affairs, and the Budget; Ketron, Inc.; and other interested parties.

Sincerely yours,

Henry Eschwege

Henry Eschwege
Director

Contents

ABBREVIATION

AFDC-WIN	Aid to Families With Dependent Children-Work Incentive Program

FOOD STAMP WORKFARE

The Food Stamp Act of 1977 required the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor to test the workfare concept in 14 demonstration projects--7 urban and 7 rural. Food stamp recipients were to work in public service jobs or be assigned to nonprofit organizations to work for the value of their monthly food stamp benefits. However, the Department of Agriculture was able to secure participation by only seven locations--six rural and one urban--during the first year of the demonstration.

To obtain more conclusive results on the feasibility of implementing workfare on a wider scale in the Food Stamp Program, the Congress, in one provision of the 1980 food stamp amendments, extended the demonstration through September 30, 1981. To encourage wider participation, the Congress also authorized Agriculture to reimburse participating jurisdictions for 50 percent of their administrative expenses associated with workfare operations.

Based on this authority, Agriculture solicited participation and ultimately selected and completed grant agreements with 14 locations for the extended period. (See app. II for a list of the 14 demonstration sites.) Project operations started during December 1980 and January 1981. A 3-month extension resulted in the demonstration ending on December 31, 1981.

The most recent legislation on food stamp workfare occurred as the extended demonstration period was ending. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Public Law 97-98, approved December 22, 1981, authorized States or local jurisdictions to adopt workfare as a permanent feature of the Food Stamp Program. It also legislated specific changes in program design, including many that we had recommended in our report on the first year's demonstration. 1/ Also, the legislation allows participating jurisdictions to combine workfare operations arising from food stamp benefits with those from other workfare-type programs that States or local jurisdictions might already administer.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

In February 1981 Congressman Paul Findley asked us to continue our review of food stamp workfare demonstration project activities. In response, we made a limited review of demonstration project activities during the extension period as a follow-on to our assessment of the first year of the demonstration.

1/"Insights Gained in Workfare Demonstration Projects" (CED-81-117, July 31, 1981).

Our objectives were to determine whether the procedural and administrative problems identified in our July 31, 1981, report still existed and if they resulted in reduced workfare program benefits. The most readily identifiable workfare program benefits are the value of work performed and the total value of Food Stamp Program benefits withheld (sanctions) from noncomplying households. We also wanted to find out if participating jurisdictions had developed enough workfare jobs to enable them to assign all eligible individuals to work and whether workfare officials were experiencing any problems in getting participants to work at the job sites. In addition, we tried to identify any other emerging problems or program improvements warranting reporting. Finally, we reviewed Agriculture's and Labor's evaluation of the demonstration. Our review was made in accordance with our current "Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions."

We obtained information on the effects that legislative changes had on the extended period of the demonstration and monitored the progress of other pertinent amendments in the legislative process at the time of our review.

We interviewed officials of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service in Washington, D.C., and visited four demonstration sites (San Diego County, California; Pinellas County, Florida; Vanderburgh County, Indiana; and Greenville County, South Carolina) participating in the extended demonstration.

We selected these locations because they provided geographic distribution and because:

--San Diego County was the largest demonstration project; two of its nine food stamp districts had participated in the first year of the demonstration; and Agriculture had selected it as the location to implement a reduced 10-day job-search period.

--Vanderburgh County had a unique program feature in that part of the workfare job placement function was administered by the local office of the State employment service.

--Pinellas County was the second largest project. In addition, State legislators had encouraged State agencies to volunteer for this demonstration.

--Greenville County was one of the larger projects and, according to Agriculture officials, was considered to be one of the better administered locations in the demonstration.

In reviewing program operations, we relied heavily on interviews with local food stamp and workfare officials; however, we

also reviewed case files at the four sites to determine the timeliness of administrative actions to interview eligible individuals for workfare participation, assign them to jobs, and penalize those who did not complete their work assignments. The limited scope of our work prevented any projection of the results to individual sites or the demonstration in general.

For each of the four demonstration sites reviewed, we determined how many jobs had been developed for workfare assignments and converted these to hours available on a monthly basis. In connection with this work, we compared job assignment and completion statistics with available job time to find out if enough work opportunities were available. Further, we made a limited analysis of reasons eligible participants were excused from working to determine whether selected factors other than administrative delays were inhibiting job assignments.

We interviewed officials of the State employment service agencies at the four demonstration sites and Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration officials in Washington, D.C. These interviews focused on the feasibility of local employment service offices assuming responsibility for interviewing workfare participants and making job assignments. As part of that effort, we reviewed workfare records for food stamp households to determine whether workfare participants were being interviewed twice in association with Food Stamp Program requirements--once in conjunction with workfare and again to satisfy work registration requirements.

We had numerous discussions with officials of the Food and Nutrition Service and Ketron, Inc., the evaluation contractor. We visited contractor officials at their offices in Wayne, Pennsylvania, and discussed their evaluation methodology for both the initial and extended demonstration periods. We also reviewed the Service's April 1981 summary report on workfare's costs and benefits and the evaluation contractor's more comprehensive draft report on workfare's impact on participants and detailed information on experienced costs and benefits.

RESULTS OF OUR REVIEW

Our review showed that:

--Agriculture's cost and benefit evaluation of workfare for the first year of the demonstration is not conclusive. However, based on that evaluation, workfare had moderate administrative costs per client and, under some assumptions, benefits were comparable to or greater than the costs incurred. Based on our review, we believe that workfare is administratively feasible and that future tests of costs and benefits under expanded eligibility criteria, shorter job-search periods, stronger penalties for noncompliance,

and improved administration might show substantial changes in the cost-benefit relationship.

--Legislative modifications in the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 improved program design of food stamp workfare by removing exemptions, eliminating the mandatory 30-day job-search period, and strengthening penalties for not fulfilling workfare obligations.

--Administrative deficiencies such as delays in interviewing individuals eligible for workfare continued to limit workfare program benefits.

--One demonstration site did not correctly report penalties imposed for workfare noncompliance to the evaluation contractor for use in assessing workfare costs and benefits.

--Combined administration of some elements of food stamp workfare and work registration programs, such as the interviews, would be more convenient for workfare participants and might yield savings by reducing duplicate functions. Additional testing of a coordinated arrangement would be needed to show what, if any, cost savings would result.

--Enough workfare jobs were available and more could be developed.

--Union opposition surfaced during the second year of the demonstration.

HOW WORKFARE OPERATED DURING THE EXTENDED DEMONSTRATION PERIOD

Food stamp recipients subject to workfare were identified by the food stamp office and referred to a workfare component that generally was to schedule new recipients for an interview after a 30-day job-search period (10 days at one project). At the interview, the recipient's skills, abilities, interests, and work experiences were assessed. Subsequently, recipients were scheduled for work in a public service capacity either with State and local government agencies or with private, nonprofit organizations. Workfare participants worked at the minimum wage rate ($3.35 per hour effective Jan. 1, 1981) for enough hours each month--but not to exceed 40 hours per week when combined with any other employment--to earn an amount equal to the difference between their household food stamp benefits and their household earned income, if any, for that month.

Referred recipients who failed to report for the interview or for work were referred back to the food stamp office to determine why they failed to report and, if appropriate, a penalty

was imposed. If a recipient had a good reason for failing to report, such as lack of transportation; illness; household emergency; or conflict with employment, training, or job search, the recipient was either exempted from workfare or rescheduled for an interview or work. If the recipient did not have a good reason, the food stamp office was to reduce household benefits for the following month. The penalty applied only to the person required to work. Thus, in food stamp households having more than one person, there would have been only a partial reduction of benefits.

EVALUATION OF WORKFARE COSTS AND BENEFITS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE

Ketron, Inc., the evaluation contractor, implemented the evaluation reasonably well. However, limits on the demonstration project and the associated evaluation prevent unrestricted use of the results of the first year's demonstration as a basis for policy deliberations on future workfare programs. Reasons for this caution include limitations (1) usually associated with any demonstrations and the associated evaluations and (2) unique to the first year and the extended period for which program costs and benefits are being measured.

Common weaknesses of demonstration projects

By definition, demonstrations involve new or unique activities and are often short term. Most cost-benefit evaluations of demonstration projects are performed to determine the results that would occur in an ongoing program. Yet the period when measurements of program costs and benefits are taken is of necessity the time when employees are learning new duties and procedures are being formulated. This tends to inflate costs and/or reduce benefits. On the other hand, while the project is under the scrutiny of evaluators, project officials may exert a maximum effort to show the success of the concept being studied. This may understate potential costs or overstate benefits. Although evaluators of demonstration projects try to reduce the impact of program newness when they measure costs and benefits, the "novelty" effect cannot be totally eliminated, nor can its effect be accurately measured.

Additionally, because data is collected for a relatively short period, long-term costs and benefits cannot be measured effectively. For example, the full impact over an extended time frame of penalties for not completing workfare obligations cannot be accurately discerned. We do not, however, mean to imply that short-term evaluations are not worth doing; rather, they have limitations and the results should be used with caution.

Limitations peculiar to the workfare demonstration project

Cost and benefit data obtained from the first year demonstration was unique to the seven participating jurisdictions and the program design used. In fact, in its April 1981 report to the Congress on the first year's operations, Agriculture noted several factors that would limit generalizing results to other locations. Its information showed that

--participating jurisdictions were neither randomly selected nor representative of the potential national workfare clientele;

--all participating jurisdictions had volunteered for the demonstration;

--only one of the seven sites was urban (and it had a highly mobile food stamp population), yet most food stamp participants reside in urban areas;

--three-fourths of the participant sample was concentrated in two counties (San Diego, California, and Muskingum, Ohio); and

--fewer than 20 persons fulfilled or partially fulfilled a workfare obligation in four of the remaining five sites during the first year of the demonstration.

Because of these factors, little can be statistically inferred from first year results, either on a site-by-site basis or for the Nation as a whole, about cost and benefit potential for workfare in the Food Stamp Program. Although 14 jurisdictions participated during the extended demonstration period, some of the same problems, such as the sites' volunteering for the demonstration, will continue to limit generalizing cost-benefit findings.

Agriculture did not try to analyze the effect that other workfare program approaches would have had on costs and benefits. Rather, its evaluation was designed solely to analyze from a historical perspective what occurred under one precise set of operating criteria. A demonstration can (and should) be an opportunity to learn how best to achieve an objective. Workfare policymakers could receive additional value from cost-benefit analyses that address alternative ways of implementing workfare and show how such changes would affect costs or benefits. The implications of "What if we did it differently?" can contribute to the efficiency of future workfare programs. The answers to many questions surrounding the workfare concept, such as "What happens when penalties are strengthened or eligibility criteria are expanded?" could not have been statistically established without a more extensive effort. However, we believe addressing questions such

as those posed above could provide valuable insights for increasing future workfare operating efficiencies and program benefits.

As noted in our July 31, 1981, report, the first year evaluation relied heavily on a questionnaire that had several design deficiencies. Major improvements were made in the questionnaire used during the extended period, but it still required respondents to recall past experience and behavior. The potential for error in recall data increases with the length of the recall period. In soliciting responses to this questionnaire, researchers interviewing workfare participants asked them to recall their monthly wages, hours worked, value of food stamps received, and other detailed data for an entire 18-month period. The irregular work experiences of some food stamp recipients and the length of the recall period suggest that the data gathered may not be totally accurate. Agriculture and evaluation contractor officials told us that they did not verify any of this information with data in their management information system that had been collected from the participating sites.

The evaluation methodology was implemented reasonably well; however, the response rate to the questionnaire was low during the first year evaluation and decreased somewhat for the extended period evaluation. During the first year evaluation the overall response rate was 66 percent, and for the urban county pair--San Diego County was the demonstration site and Orange County, California, was the comparison or control site--the rate dipped to less than one-half. For the extended period evaluation, the overall response rate was 64 percent.

Because respondents may have different attitudes and experiences than nonrespondents, potentially significant bias can be introduced in generalizations that are based only on information from the former and not the latter. The evaluation contractor analyzed nonresponse bias by comparing readily available data on the two groups (such as age, sex, household size, and length of certification period). 1/ Different results may have been obtained if the two groups had been compared on attitudinal rather than demographic variables. For example, potential respondents who refused or could not be interviewed may also have been less willing to work in the workfare programs. If this were true, the results of this evaluation may only relate to the more cooperative participants. Since the response rate dropped during the extended demonstration period, the issue of nonresponse bias remains very important.

1/The certification period is the number of months that the household is eligible to receive food stamp benefits.

Workfare benefits understated at one project

Not all program benefits were documented for the evaluation contractor's use in assessing workfare costs and benefits. The most readily identifiable workfare program benefits are the value of work performed and the total value of Food Stamp Program benefits withheld (sanctions) from noncomplying households. Because the Vanderburgh County project reported some of its sanction activity to the evaluation contractor on a wrong form, not all of the actual sanctions applied were included in the contractor's data. If correct data is not provided, Vanderburgh County workfare benefits will be understated on contractor records.

There is no assurance that Vanderburgh County will compile and forward accurate data to the evaluation contractor. Project officials knew about the improper reporting and had identified 176 cases for which sanction actions may have been reported improperly. However, further investigation is needed by the food stamp office to determine the exact cases that need to be corrected. The food stamp office supervisor told us that an investigation would take too much time and that the staff member who usually would be responsible for resolving this matter was leaving soon and would need to devote the remaining time to higher priority matters.

Salient points emerging from the evaluation

We believe that the cost and benefit implications of the first year evaluation are not markedly different from those presented by Agriculture in its April 1981 report to the Congress. That report, an interim summary, provided cost and benefit data from the Government's perspective but did not draw any conclusions from the perspective of the workfare participant. The report showed that, under some assumptions, workfare had costs below or comparable to the level of benefits obtained. On a per client basis, workfare costs (and benefits) for the sites studied, even allowing for error, were quite moderate.

Using evaluation contractor data, Agriculture's preliminary estimates of demonstration results from a Government perspective ranged from a net gain of $5 per person to a net cost of $9 per person referred to the Workfare Demonstration Project. Results differed depending on the treatment of (1) statistically nonsignificant findings and (2) results showing that sampled male participants had earned less after workfare participation. The following items comprised benefits and costs.

--Reductions in food stamp benefits, including sanctions imposed, and lower administrative costs ranged from $21 to $29 per person.

--Tax revenues ranged from an increase of $13 per person to a decrease of $9 per person.

--Net work benefits were about $21 per person ($23.50 less a 10-percent imputed cost for worksite supervision).

--Total administrative costs were about $50 for each person referred to workfare.

Changes in program policies, procedures, and practices (for example, the legislative changes recently enacted) could significantly alter the cost-benefit relationship. Finally, based on our observations during the initial and extended demonstration periods, we believe workfare is administratively feasible.

In the future, as additional communities participate in workfare, Agriculture should try to evaluate alternative program designs. This would require establishing and reporting on workfare goals that are explicit and measurable. These goals include (1) returning something of value in exchange for Government or community support, (2) introducing individuals to a work environment, and (3) deterring application for benefits by those who could work but choose not to work. This type of evaluation would help the Congress in its oversight responsibilities, as well as improve accountability for agency expenditures and activities.

PROGRAM DESIGN CONTAINED DEFICIENCIES AND ADMINISTRATION WAS WEAK

Our review of four demonstration sites confirmed the need for the legislative changes we had recommended in our March and April 1981 testimony before the House and Senate legislative committees responsible for the Food Stamp Program. In general, benefits were limited because the law had allowed too many exemptions, mandated longer than necessary job-search periods, and provided for an extremely weak sanction. However, in December 1981--after we completed our audit work--the Congress enacted the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, which among other things significantly strengthened the design of food stamp workfare. But because these changes were not in effect for the extended demonstration period, many workfare clients avoided all or part of their workfare obligations. As a result, potential program benefits, such as hours of work received and reductions in food stamp benefits paid, were reduced substantially.

Demonstration staff in the extended demonstration period, like those in the initial demonstration, also contributed to the loss of benefits by not administering the program as efficiently as possible. If administrative weaknesses continue, Agriculture will have difficulty measuring workfare's potential effect on participants or Food Stamp Program expenditures.

Recent legislative changes enhance workfare concept's effectiveness

Legislated changes to the workfare concept could increase workfare program participation levels and benefits. The Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution Amendments of 1981, title XIII of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, authorize States and local jurisdictions to implement food stamp workfare as a permanent feature of the Food Stamp Program. The 1981 act also amends the food stamp workfare program design by reducing exemptions, eliminating the mandatory job-search period, and strengthening the penalty for not fulfilling workfare obligations. Thus, the Congress addressed each of the three areas--exemptions, job-search periods, and sanctions--for which we had recommended design changes in our spring 1981 testimony. However, some exemptions that we had recommended be removed are still in effect.

Our review of the first year demonstration project showed that about 12 percent of all food stamp households in the seven demonstration projects were eligible for workfare. In our July 1981 report, we estimated that an additional 19 percent of the food stamp households would be eligible to participate if the Congress eliminated the four mandatory exemptions we identified. Although the 1981 act did not remove all of the exemptions we had recommended, it is a step toward expanding workfare program participation. The amendments removed the exemption for unemployment insurance benefit recipients and for certain participants in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children-Work Incentive Program (AFDC-WIN) involved in work training less than 20 hours each week. These changes should increase participation by able-bodied persons, but we have not estimated the potential increase. Households having weekly earned income of at least 30 times the minimum hourly wage rate and certain students still eligible for food stamp benefits would continue to be exempt from workfare.

The Congress also eased job-search requirements and strengthened sanctions for noncompliance generally consistent with our recommendations. Deleting the mandatory 30-day job-search period--the period may now range from no search period up to 30 days at the operating agencies' discretion--should also augment participation, especially by those with relatively short certification periods (for example, less than 3 months) who previously may not have had to participate. Finally, the stronger sanction--withholding program benefits from the entire household for 2 months--will be a more effective tool for either encouraging completion of the work assignment or deterring application for benefits by those unwilling to work. In either event, workfare

benefits would be enhanced through either more work accomplished or fewer food stamp benefits paid.

Administrative inefficiencies continued to reduce workfare potential

Like the initial demonstration, the extended demonstration had administrative deficiencies and scarce personnel resources that further limited realizable work benefits and applications of sanctions for noncompliance. We found the following:

--Project officials granted 30-day job-search periods to some recipients who should have been assigned to work immediately upon becoming eligible for workfare participation.

--One demonstration project was initially overly lenient in accepting participants' reasons for not reporting for interviews.

--Workfare offices did not always interview eligible participants and assign them jobs promptly.

--Workfare offices sometimes delayed notifying food stamp officials when recipients did not work and thus were subject to sanctions.

--Food stamp officials did not always apply sanctions or sometimes waited too long to apply them.

Individuals already registered with employment service offices were allowed job-search periods

Demonstration project officials at all four locations allowed some recipients more than one job-search period. They did not immediately assign workfare jobs to new food stamp applicants eligible for workfare who had already been registered with the State employment service for at least 30 days. Project officials from three of the four sites we reviewed were unaware that some new workfare referrals had already been registered. As a result, some of these individuals were allowed an additional job-search period, were interviewed twice, and, in effect, avoided part of their workfare obligation.

Agriculture's guidelines specified that some new workfare participants could be assigned workfare jobs immediately without job-search periods. In a set of informational questions and answers dated May 7, 1981, Agriculture said that its guidelines allowed the workfare 30-day job-search period to be considered already satisfied if the individual had previously registered under AFDC-WIN, unemployment insurance, or another process that

fulfilled the Food Stamp Program's work registration requirements and such status had existed more than 30 days. These guidelines did not indicate whether an individual's voluntary registration for work also would have satisfied the workfare requirement.

In Vanderburgh County, the workfare jobs function was administered jointly by the local office of the State employment service and the personnel department for Evansville, Indiana. The State employment service was responsible for workfare interviews and workfare job assignments. Because the employment service's local office also interviewed individuals under other work registration programs, its officials were aware that some workfare eligibles were already registered for work under the Food Stamp Program. Nevertheless, a State employment service official told us that the service had decided, after discussions with Agriculture and Labor officials, to disregard the job-search period already available under other work registration provisions and allow a separate 30-day job-search period for all new food stamp applicants referred to workfare.

The other three workfare demonstration projects we reviewed were not aware of any previous work registration by workfare participants with the local office of the State employment service because coordination between these units was not required nor performed. As a result, previously registered individuals subsequently eligible for food stamp workfare were similarly allowed an additional 30-day job-search period instead of being interviewed and assigned to a job site immediately.

Absences excused for claimed nonreceipt of interview notice

Early in the extended demonstration, Vanderburgh officials excused many eligible workfare participants who claimed that they had not received mailed notices to report for an interview. As a result, many recipients did not have to work and were not subject to sanction even though local officials expressed some doubt that recipients actually had not received the notices. This policy was changed in May 1981 to drop nonreceipt of the mailed notice as a valid reason for not appearing for an interview.

A comparison of county statistics for April and May 1981 reveals the effect of the policy change. During April 1981, 169 eligible participants were excused and 74 were to be sanctioned because they did not have acceptable reasons for not fulfilling workfare obligations. Although project officials did not know exactly how many of the 169 excused participants had claimed nonreceipt of notices, they told us that most had been for that reason.

Because they believed workfare eligibles were abusing this otherwise valid excuse for not showing up for the interview, in

early May 1981 Vanderburgh officials decided to discontinue accepting such claims as valid excuses. For May, only 64 individuals were excused while the number of unexcused absences climbed rapidly to 177. County officials told us that most of these 177 had claimed not receiving notices. The new policy eliminated abuse of this often-cited excuse; however, it does not recognize that some households may not have received the notices, thus pointing out the difficulty of easily distinguishing between those who had and had not received notices.

Administrative delays resulted in loss of work benefits and sanction opportunities

Each of the four demonstration sites we reviewed lost available workfare benefits because of administrative delays. Workfare officials did not always interview and assign clients as soon as referred, and they did not consistently tell food stamp offices of failed obligations soon enough to allow efficient imposition of the available sanction. Food stamp offices, after being advised that individuals had not worked, often did not sanction noncomplying individuals quickly enough.

We reviewed 125 cases at the three sites having mandatory 30-day job-search periods (Pinellas--49, Greenville--36, and Vanderburgh--40) to determine the timeliness of administrative actions from the time of referral for workfare through the sanction process. At San Diego, where the job-search period was 10 days, we reviewed 80 cases.

Program guidance did not specify how soon individuals eligible for workfare must be interviewed after applying for food stamp benefits. Unless the interviews were timely, however, the relatively short certification periods could result in some individuals receiving benefits but never working. Legislation in effect during the demonstration generally required that new applicants be provided a 30-day job-search period. Agriculture determined that this period should start with the date households applied for benefits. Recipients of food stamp benefits who were eligible for workfare were to cooperate by reporting for scheduled interviews and completing the hourly work requirement. Failure to cooperate was to result in imposition of the sanction--withholding of benefits for the individual who did not complete either the interview or the actual work requirement. However, it is important to note that during the demonstration, recipients could not be sanctioned for failure to cooperate during their job-search periods.

At two of the four sites, interviewing delays and other procedures led to delays in assigning recipients to jobs. Agriculture's instruction manual allowed the workfare interview to be completed as part of the food stamp benefit application process;

however, participating jurisdictions were not required to interview participants as part of the application process or even within the job-search period. We made a limited analysis of whether recipients were interviewed during their job-search period. Our review of 120 cases at San Diego and Vanderburgh showed that 74 were not interviewed within this period.

Most of these were in San Diego, where workfare officials mailed notices for workfare interviews after receiving eligibility notices from food stamp officials. San Diego workfare officials pointed out that it would not be appropriate to label their cases as delays simply because the individuals were not interviewed within the 10-day job-search period. They correctly noted that the start of the 10-day period--or the initial work registration date--occurred when the food stamp eligibility worker interviewed the applicant. At that time, applicants would not yet have been determined eligible for food stamp benefits, and in fact the eligibility worker may have had up to 30 days after the initial interview for benefits to make a final determination of eligibility. Also, food stamp offices did not refer individuals eligible for workfare to the workfare office until they had approved the application for benefits. Under this operating approach, it would not always be possible to interview workfare eligibles within a 10-day or even 30-day job-search period.

To determine if workfare officials contributed to interviewing delays, we obtained additional details for 32 San Diego households having workfare obligations. For 13 of these cases, workfare officials had scheduled interviews 12 to 30 days after the date they acknowledged receiving the eligibility notice from food stamp officials.

The Pinellas demonstration project also lost benefits because it was unable to interview and assign all clients within 30 days of their initial work registration date in the early months of the demonstration. Project officials gave two reasons--many referrals and allowing 45 minutes for each interview. This combination coupled with limited staff resulted in many clients being scheduled for interviews up to 15 days after their 30-day job-search period ended. This delay resulted in excusing some clients from the second month of their workfare obligation as well as from the first month, which would normally be excused because of the job-search provision. Project officials solved this problem by (1) overscheduling interviews and (2) reducing the allotted interview time.

Pinellas and Greenville officials were not sanctioning all noncomplying households promptly. For the 85 cases we reviewed, 1/ we found that delays in sanctioning 10 clients had resulted in 13 lost opportunities to withhold food stamp benefits within households' current certification periods. 2/

Both food stamp offices and workfare offices at the Pinellas and Greenville demonstration projects contributed to these delays. Workfare offices did not consistently advise food stamp officials of the need for sanctions, and local food stamp offices allowed sanction recommendations from workfare offices to accumulate before acting on them. As a result, investigations to determine whether sanctions should have been applied were not completed soon enough, thus allowing some clients' certification periods to expire before sanctions could be applied.

Opportunities exist for more participation in workfare

Our reviews of the demonstration activities have shown that additional opportunities besides those provided by the recently enacted legislative amendments are available to expand participation in food stamp workfare. Results of a 10-day job-search period tested in San Diego during the extended demonstration may have already provided some indication of how shorter job-search periods can affect workfare operations. Although legislative actions have made more participation possible, State and local administration is also an important factor in determining participation levels. For example, local initiatives to accelerate the interviewing and job assignment functions would boost participation.

Reduced job-search period in San Diego may have boosted participation

The Food Stamp Amendments of 1980 modified food stamp workfare by reducing the mandatory 30-day job-search period to 10 days in at least one location to be designated by the Secretary. Agriculture allowed one location--San Diego--to implement this provision during the extended demonstration period.

1/These were from the universe of all food stamp households referred for workfare participation, not solely noncomplying households subject to a sanction.

2/Efficient administrative operations would have enabled workfare officials to sanction some households more than once during their certification periods.

Our analysis of Agriculture's evaluation and conversations with agency and contractor officials did not reveal any firm plans or intentions to evaluate how the reduced job-search period would influence participation or improve program administration. The December 1981 legislation would allow future participating jurisdictions to adopt job-search periods of up to 30 days or to eliminate them.

Data on completed assignments and sanctions for San Diego during the extension period indicates that the reduced waiting period increased the chance of eligible households either completing work obligations or being sanctioned. But other factors, demographic and administrative, also might have affected--perhaps more so--the results achieved.

The San Diego workfare director believed the decreased job-search period had allowed the project to react faster in assigning and sanctioning households. A comparison of San Diego's average monthly operating results for the first year when only two food stamp districts participated and the extended demonstration when all nine districts participated follows.

Average Monthly Operating Results

Demonstration period	Approximate number of households participating in the Food Stamp Program	Households completing obligation	Households sanctioned
Initial demonstration (2 districts)	5,600	27	35
Extended demonstration (9 districts)	43,800	409	374

The above operating results for the nine districts participating during the extension period show considerably more completed obligations and sanctions imposed than would have been expected if the first year's results had simply been multiplied by a factor representing the increased caseload--7.82. If households had continued completing workfare obligations and food stamp officials had penalized noncompliance at the same rate as during the first year of the demonstration, an average of 211 (compared with 409) would have worked for their benefits and 274 (compared with 374) would have been sanctioned each month. This represents increases of 94 percent for completed obligations and 36 percent for sanctions imposed.

San Diego's workfare director observed, however, that the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the seven added districts are not necessarily parallel with those of the two districts that participated in the initial demonstration period.

First year participants included many mobile residents of beach communities while the seven additional districts spread over the rest of the county had what the director described as more stable characteristics. We could not compare operating results of the two districts that had participated in both programs because project data was not maintained for each district during the extended demonstration period.

The difference in district profiles might have contributed to higher than expected rates of work completion, but it does not explain the increased sanctions. However, another factor--more experienced staff hired during the extended period--might have added more efficiency to the sanction process.

More efficient administration could increase participation

Efficient administration is an important element of the workfare concept. As highlighted in a September 9, 1981, Congressional Research Service issue brief entitled "Workfare in AFDC and Food Stamps," the support for the workfare concept by the State or local government administering unit is very important in determining the rate of program participation. This analysis pointed out that studies on workfare in California and Massachusetts concluded that poor program implementation had been a major factor in the low rate of work assignments under workfare.

Although we cannot project by what amount better administration could improve participation, the potential exists for increasing the percentage of able-bodied persons who actually work. For example, during the first year demonstration, less than 1 percent of all food stamp households, about 6 percent of those eligible for workfare, ever completed a workfare obligation.

One way to increase participation and/or the deterrent effect of workfare would be to revise interviewing procedures. Client failure to report for interviews has been a problem. Changing interview procedures could eliminate failure to appear for the interview as an administrative problem. As pointed out in our July 1981 report, we believe that requiring eligible individuals to report to the workfare office for interviews and work assignments as an integral part of the benefit application process would improve the effectiveness of workfare. Under these circumstances, if the eligible household member did not complete the interview, the household would not receive food stamp benefits.

San Diego used this procedure for several months at the beginning of the extended demonstration period. Although stationing workfare staff in food stamp offices facilitated this practice, failure of those interviewed to report for their work assignments led San Diego officials to revise the interview

process. They believed that the no-show rate for those given workfare job assignments did not justify interviewing all potential workfare participants. They believed that calling eligible participants in for an interview after the 10-day job-search period would reduce their administrative costs. They thought that they could overschedule interviews based on the no-show rate, thereby needing fewer interviewers.

The effect of workfare eligibles being interviewed and receiving a job assignment before receiving benefits, as in San Diego's initial procedure, would be difficult to measure without a controlled test. Without such a test, Agriculture will not know if this practice would increase hours worked or if advance knowledge of the "certainty" of a work assignment (as this policy becomes known in the community) would result in some applicants who are not willing to work withdrawing their applications for benefits or possibly deterring applications by other able-bodied individuals not inclined to work.

SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKFARE AND WORK REGISTRATION IS DUPLICATIVE

We found substantial overlapping of interviews for food stamp workfare and food stamp work registration. Because eligibility criteria for workfare participation and the work registration/job-search requirements were very similar, many food stamp clients participated in both programs. Both programs required interviews covering very similar areas such as determining the referred individual's skills and prior work experience.

We reviewed records for a limited number of workfare clients interviewed during June and July 1981 at the three demonstration projects that were administering workfare and work registration separately. Our analysis showed varying degrees of duplicate interviews. For example, at Pinellas and Greenville, about 78 percent and 54 percent, respectively, of those interviewed for workfare were also interviewed by the employment service offices to satisfy work registration requirements. At the third project, San Diego, about 26 percent of the workfare eligibles were interviewed under both programs.

Employment service officials in San Diego told us that the percentage of clients interviewed twice would have been higher but staffing shortages prevented them from interviewing as many work registrants as they should have. They told us that staffing increases envisioned earlier in the year did not materialize due to budget cutbacks; thus they only interviewed those who seemed to have good placement potential. The details on duplicate interviews appear below.

Demonstration project	Workfare cases reviewed	Duplicate interviews	
		Number	Percent
Greenville	45	35	77.8
Pinellas	46	25	54.3
San Diego	90	23	25.6

Eliminating duplicate interviews could lessen client burdens and might save administration costs. It has been established that the State employment service office has the ability to assume some of the functions of otherwise independently established workfare offices within the local government. In Vanderburgh County, employment service officials were performing part of the workfare function. They were interviewing eligible participants, assigning them to available positions, and reporting clients who failed to report for interviews to support local food stamp office sanction actions. This was the only project of the 14 extension period demonstrations operating in this manner.

Vanderburgh officials told us that they included the local employment service office as part of the jobs component function because the office already had the capability to interview and assist individuals required to register for work under the Food Stamp Program. Since such an organization would necessitate only one interview for clients eligible for both workfare and work registration, they believed that, overall, they would be able to restrain costs.

Employment service personnel at Greenville, Pinellas, and San Diego told us that it would be feasible and economical to have some elements of the workfare program, including the interview, administered by their offices. They believed (1) the employment service already had the organizational services for performing some of the same functions and (2) that through the additional client contact afforded through workfare administration, the employment service might achieve more success in obtaining private sector employment for workfare participants, thus reducing either the number of individuals receiving food stamps or the amount of their food stamp allotments. However, adopting this method would place additional administrative demands on State employment service offices. In fact, reduced Federal funding for employment services and closure of some offices have restricted State capabilities to maintain existing services.

ENOUGH JOBS EXISTED; MORE WERE AVAILABLE

Discussions with demonstration project officials and review of available workfare positions showed that each of the four demonstration projects we visited had developed a variety of jobs and had enough workfare job opportunities to assign tasks to eligible individuals. Each site made a concerted effort to develop jobs when the demonstration began. To a lesser extent, they continued developing additional jobs as the demonstration proceeded. Our interviews also revealed that additional opportunities for employing workfare participants existed. Having enough jobs could be an important issue in the future since the new legislation's reduced exemptions and other improvements in workfare could lead to substantial increases in participation.

Language and transportation problems prevented making some job assignments but did not appear to be a major problem. Additionally, some union opposition to workfare assignments surfaced at the Pinellas and Vanderburgh projects; however, these objections did not prevent participation by eligible recipients.

The following schedule shows the number of hours available monthly at public service and nonprofit organization job sites and the average hours assigned and worked each month.

	Hours available monthly (note a)			Average hours participants required to work monthly (note b)			
Project	Public service	Non-profit	Total	Number	Percent of available	Average hours worked (note c)	Residual hours not assigned
San Diego	116,291	27,876	144,167	27,660	19.2	9,044	116,507
Pinellas	24,975	24,014	48,989	4,152	8.5	1,985	44,837
Greenville	4,728	10,730	15,458	5,677	36.7	2,554	9,781
Vanderburgh	7,145	2,100	9,245	5,834	63.1	2,575	3,411

a/Based on job availability during May and June 1981.

b/Based on average hours of work assigned monthly for the 4-month period March 1 through June 30, 1981.

c/Based on average hours worked monthly for 4-month period March 1 through June 30, 1981.

As shown above, the number of hours that participants were required to work varied from 8.5 percent to 63.1 percent of the total hours available, and at each site, less than half of the assigned hours were completed. For example, in San Diego the completion rate was less than a third of the hours assigned and only 6 percent of the hours available. In Pinellas County only 4 percent of the potential assignments were filled.

A variety of jobs were available

San Diego, the largest project, also had the greatest variety of jobs--17--ranging from laborer to artist. The other three projects had 8 to 10 of the same job categories. Appendix III contains a list of job categories at each project.

Transportation and language barriers prevented some job placement

Available data for January through June 1981 showed that 182, or about 1 percent, of those eligible for workfare in the four demonstration projects we reviewed were excused due to lack of transportation to workfare job sites. In San Diego and Pinellas Counties, many eligible clients lived in outlying areas although most job sites were near the downtown areas. The opposite situation existed in Greenville and Vanderburgh Counties. As participating locations become familiar with the areas where they need more jobs, transportation should become even less of a factor.

Language barriers also prevented some assignments. San Diego did not have enough job sites with Spanish-speaking supervisors to assign about 400 Cuban refugees between June and August 1981. Most of these eligible participants were excused. Since then, the workfare office had developed additional Spanish language job sites and was in the process of developing more.

Some indication of union opposition

Food stamp workfare legislation includes provisions to safeguard the job security of regularly compensated employees. By regulation, workfare participants may not be assigned to a job site having employees on "lay-off" status who formerly performed the same or equivalent tasks. Identical restrictions apply for hiring freezes unless open positions resulting from the freeze occurred because of lack of funds to sustain former staff levels, not solely because workfare participants were available.

Despite the above safeguards, there was some union resistance to local government offices allowing workfare participants to work in units that also employed union members. Our limited discussions of this issue revealed isolated objections in Pinellas and Vanderburgh Counties. We were advised that when unions objected--even though the available workfare assignments were

not functions usually performed by regular personnel--workfare directors and the job sites yielded to union insistence that assignments not be made to those organizations.

The Pinellas County workfare project director obtained an agreement from the local transit authority on January 26, 1981, to make 80 hours per week available for assigning workfare participants. On February 6, 1981, a local transit union advised the transit authority that it did not believe the transit authority should participate in the workfare program because

--the upward mobility of current employees could be limited,

--the temporary nature of the work involved and the nature of the work itself would not enhance the employability of individuals through the development of good work habits and basic work skills, and

--employment of this nature does not result in securing unsubsidized employment for or by a participant.

As a result, the local transit authority cancelled its agreement to become a workfare job site.

In Vanderburgh County, union resistance prevented some workfare job development and was instrumental in terminating three already functioning job sites. The workfare project director told us that to prevent problems with the unions, the project's policy was not to push job development at sites experiencing union resistance. Previously, the project had made an agreement with two major unions to assign workfare personnel at some sites. At one job site, at least 20 assignments had been made in 2 months. Initially, the jobs involved cleaning the grounds surrounding an old firehouse that had been converted to a bus maintenance facility. Later, the assignments included keeping the floors clean and washing buses. According to job site officials, the bus washing assignments initiated the objections because union members became upset at having to work with workfare participants. Consequently, no workfare assignments were made to the site after April 1981. Two other sites were terminated about May 1981 because a union objected to having workfare participants at sites experiencing a substantial layoff of paid employees.

Resistance by local unions may be a natural reaction stemming from an increasing awareness of financial austerity in local government and a motivation to maintain or expand employment opportunities. Similar problems could occur at other locations or on a larger scale at these locations if workfare operations were expanded. We cannot say that it actually would. We also cannot predict whether public officials in other locations would be more insistent on assigning participants under similar

situations. We do know, however, that because the four demonstration projects we visited had enough jobs--although lack of transportation to some jobs could provide legitimate excuses for not working--union resistance did not significantly affect their ability to assign eligible participants to jobs.

FUNDING PROBLEMS DURING THE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

Administrative costs posed problems for two of the sites we visited. Vanderburgh County suspended operations temporarily before deciding to continue through December 1981. Pinellas County halted operations on September 30, 1981.

The Vanderburgh County workfare program temporarily suspended operations on September 24, 1981, about 1 week before the extended demonstration period was originally scheduled to end. Project officials had planned to continue participating through December 1981 but decided not to after food stamp and employment service officials performing the jobs component functions told them that they would not continue beyond the original ending date of September 30, 1981, unless funding for additional staff could be provided. They said that they had participated during the first 9 months without Federal funding assistance for the food stamp and workfare office functions related to the demonstration but could not continue because of decreased staffing and large workloads.

Our discussions with the county workfare director indicated that Vanderburgh had submitted a very conservative budget request for the demonstration. Its officials had not requested the 50-percent Federal cost sharing that was available for food stamp and employment service offices' demonstration activities. Local authorities subsequently increased their budget request for the remaining 3 months to cover workfare activities in these offices.

Pinellas County discontinued program operations because of monetary constraints and local views. The Florida Legislature had encouraged the State agencies to participate in food stamp workfare. With some reluctance, county officials had agreed to apply for and participate in the demonstration. County officials told us that they had been committed to workfare in fiscal year 1981 but, in view of their projected $23 million revenue shortfall for fiscal year 1982, they could not justify funding their share of workfare costs for another 3 months. Pinellas officials told us that they would have continued participating if 100-percent Federal reimbursement were available.

SCHEDULE OF WORKFARE

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN EXTENSION PHASE

	Location	Type	Date started	Food stamp households (note a)
1.	Yuma, Ariz.	Rural	12/15/80	2,563
2.	Lonoke Co., Ark.	Rural	1/07/81	1,341
3.	Sebastian Co., Ark./ Crawford Co., Ark.	Urban/ Rural	1/07/81	2,120/ 1,360
4.	San Diego Co., Calif.	Urban	b/1/09/81	46,084
5.	Pinellas Co., Fla.	Urban	1/15/81	14,230
6.	Vanderburgh Co., Ind.	Urban	1/12/81	4,803
7.	Montgomery Co., Md.	Urban	1/29/81	5,144
8.	Grand Rapids, Mich.	Urban	1/12/81	c/11,131
9.	Green Co., Mo.	Urban	1/01/81	5,246
10.	Nashua, N.H.	Urban	1/07/81	(d)
11.	Berkeley Co., S.C.	Rural	12/01/80	2,971
12.	Greenville Co., S.C.	Urban	12/29/80	7,928
13.	Utah Co., Utah	Rural	1/12/81	(d)
14.	Tazewell Co., Va.	Rural	12/01/80	1,659

a/Households participating in Food Stamp Program as of August 1980.

b/Continuation from initial phase for entire county.

c/This figure is for Kent County in which Grand Rapids is located. No figure is available for the city of Grand Rapids.

d/Data not available.

JOB CATEGORIES AT THE FOUR WORKFARE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN OUR REVIEW

Job category	Projects: Vanderburgh County	Greenville County	San Diego County	Pinellas County
Artist	X		X	
Clerical	X	X	X	X
Child care	X	X	X	
Custodial	X	X	X	X
Food service		X	X	X
Gardening	X	X	X	X
Housekeeping		X	X	
Laborer	X	X	X	X
Lifeguard			X	
Maintenance	X	X	X	X
Nurses aid			X	
Public relations			X	
Recreation		X	X	X
Security			X	
Social service aide	X	X	X	
Teachers aide			X	X
Technical	—	—	X	—
Total	8	10	17	8

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