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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

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Training And Equipping The Army  
National Guard For Maintaining  
Order During Civil Disturbances

B-160779

Department of the Army

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES

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SEPT. 8.1972



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-160779

To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our report on training and equipping the Army  
National Guard for maintaining order during civil disturb-  
ances.

Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Ac-  
counting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and  
Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,  
Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense;  
the Secretary of the Army; and the Chief, National Guard  
Bureau.

*A. J. Kellens*

Acting Comptroller General  
of the United States

5  
2  
437

C o n t e n t s

		<u>Page</u>
DIGEST		1
CHAPTER		
1	CONTROL OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES: A MATTER OF NATIONAL CONCERN	3
	National Guard's responsibility for maintaining order	4
	National Guard's performance: praise and criticism	5
2	EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING FOR MAINTAINING ORDER--1967 THROUGH 1971	6
	Unit and individual training	6
	Training senior personnel	9
3	COMPARISON OF NATIONAL GUARD AND POLICE TRAINING FOR MAINTAINING ORDER	11
4	ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING FOR MAINTAINING ORDER	14
	Questionnaire results	15
	Army Audit Agency (AAA) report	15
5	IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT	19
6	AGENCY COMMENTS, GAO CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	21
	Conclusions	21
	Recommendations	23
7	SCOPE OF REVIEW	24
APPENDIX		
I	Comparison of civil disturbance training given to D.C. civil disturbance unit and the National Guard	27

APPENDIX

Page

- II Principal officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army responsible for administration of activities discussed in this report

29

ABBREVIATIONS

- AAA Army Audit Agency
- CDU civil disturbance unit
- CONARC Continental Army Command
- FTX field training exercises
- GAO General Accounting Office
- SEADOC Civil Disturbance Orientation Course

Photographs

The photographs included in this report were furnished by the Maryland National Guard.

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

The Army National Guard provides substantial assistance to local and State police in maintaining order during civil disturbances. Between January 1965 and October 1971 Guard units were used in 260 instances. In the 20 years prior to 1965 they were used in 88 disturbances.

Two Presidential commissions--the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) established after the 1967 Detroit riot and the Commission on Campus Unrest (Scranton Commission) established after the 1970 Kent State University disturbance--recommended that training in controlling civil disturbances be expanded and improved.

The Guard's primary mission is to provide organized units to augment the Active Army in time of national emergency. Maintaining order is a secondary mission. Therefore most training concerns the primary mission.

Because training is the key to preparedness for maintaining order satisfactorily, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the program of training for civil disturbance control given to guardsmen.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Since 1967 the Army and the Guard have taken action to improve civil disturbance control training. The Army made changes in response to lessons learned from disturbances and suggestions made by the Kerner and Scranton Commissions. (See p. 6.)

The amount of civil disturbance control training given to guardsmen compares favorably with training given local police civil disturbance units. (See p. 11.)

Guard officials and about 70 percent of the guardsmen GAO questioned believed they were trained adequately to maintain order. The remaining 30 percent did not feel adequately trained.

Guardsmen have been provided with face shields, flak vests, and riot batons. However, equipment is needed that will allow options between riot batons and rifles. (See p. 19.)

A June 1971 change in Army training policy may negate the recent improvements in the Guard's civil disturbance training program. (See p. 8.) This policy change discontinued the requirement for mandatory civil disturbance control refresher training and permits Guard unit commanders to determine how much refresher training, if any, should be given their guardsmen. Some units may not receive adequate training. The Army Audit Agency arrived at a similar conclusion in its review of selected Guard units during June through September 1971. (See p. 15.)

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense should

- require appropriate refresher training for all National Guard units with a civil disturbance control mission,
- establish an evaluation system to insure that units maintain adequate civil disturbance control capabilities, and
- require the Army to continue research on, and to conduct appropriate field training in the use of, special equipment and munitions. (See p. 23.)

#### AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

In June 1972 GAO discussed its findings and recommendations with officials of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Army, and the National Guard Bureau. They said consideration would be given to GAO's recommendations. It was agreed that this report would be sent to the Congress without obtaining the formal comments of the Department of Defense.

#### MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Army and the Guard have taken action in recent years to improve the training and equipping of the National Guard for maintaining order during civil disturbances. However, the Army's June 1971 training policy change may adversely affect these efforts.

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CHAPTER 1

CONTROL OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES: A MATTER OF  
NATIONAL CONCERN

Civil disturbances, in the form of urban riots and campus demonstrations, occurred with increasing frequency during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between January 1965 and October 1971 Army National Guard units were used in 260 instances to assist local and State police in maintaining order. In the 20 years prior to 1965, the Guard was used in only 88 disturbances.

In August 1965 a riot in the Watts section of Los Angeles, Calif., resulted in 34 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and approximately \$35 million in damages. This was the beginning of a period of civil unrest unmatched in recent American history. During 1966, 43 disorders and riots were reported and in 17 of them guardsmen were used. Police and more than 4,000 guardsmen were used to restore order in Chicago, Ill. About 2,000 Ohio guardsmen were mobilized for riot duty in Cleveland. During a 1967 Detroit riot, more than 8,000 Michigan guardsmen were used. In April 1968 civil disturbances occurred in more than 125 cities across the country. In Washington, D.C., rioting within a few blocks of the White House resulted in 11 deaths and millions of dollars in property damage.

During the period 1968-70 college campuses became centers of civil disturbance. At Kent State University violent disruptions ended in the fatal shooting of four students by Ohio guardsmen. This event focussed nationwide attention on the Guard--its training and leadership and the guidelines under which it operated when called to maintain order on campus.

During most of 1971 a period of relative calm prevailed, but in April and May 1972 disturbances occurred in many States.

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NATIONAL GUARD'S RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR MAINTAINING ORDER

The Guard's primary mission is to provide organized units to augment the Active Army in time of national emergency. The Guard has been called upon many times to serve in this capacity. According to Guard and Army officials, this mission will become even more important if, as is currently planned, the draft is ended and a volunteer Army is established in 1973. The Guard's responsibility for maintaining order is a secondary mission. However, most of the nearly 380,000 men in the approximately 3,000 Guard units in the United States have been assigned a civil disturbance control mission by State Governors.

The number of Air National Guard units with a civil disturbance control mission is relatively small, and their involvement generally is restricted to guarding Air Force bases.

Usually the first authorities at the scene of a disturbance are local police. If the situation warrants, the State Governor can order the State police to assist. When the scope of a civil disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and State police, the Governor has authority to mobilize the State's National Guard. If a disturbance is beyond the Guard's capability to restore order, Active Army units may be called by the President. Only four times in the last 39 years have Governors requested Federal forces to help quell civil disorder; the last time was in Baltimore in 1968.

Until June 30, 1969, the President was authorized to use the Army Reserves in controlling civil disturbances. At that time the authorizing legislation expired, and it has not been renewed. The only way Army Reserves now can be committed in a civil disturbance is under a "declaration of a National emergency," something Army officials told us was most unlikely. A recent Army study has concluded that in the next few years there is a diminishing likelihood for committing Active Army forces but that the Guard probably will continue to have a major responsibility for maintaining order.



NATIONAL GUARD'S PERFORMANCE:  
PRAISE AND CRITICISM

The Guard generally has been praised for its handling of disturbances, but some criticisms have been made, notably by two Presidential commissions.

In July 1967 the President established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) to study the urban riots of the 1960s. The Commission's report, dated March 1, 1968, said that:

"The performance of Guard forces in certain disorders, particularly in Newark and Detroit, raised doubts regarding their capabilities for this type of mission."

The report said also that some guardsmen assigned to restore order in the Detroit riot never had received riot control training. On August 10, 1967, prior to release of its report, the Kerner Commission issued an interim recommendation to "improve and expand riot control training of the Army National Guard." Other recommendations relating to training were contained in the final report.

After the disturbance at Kent State University in 1970, the President appointed the Commission on Campus Unrest (Scranton Commission). This Commission's report, issued September 26, 1970, said that the Guard had improved somewhat in response to the recommendations of the Kerner Commission but that the "Guard urgently needs to improve further." The Commission recommended "much more training in controlling civil disorders."

## CHAPTER 2

### EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING

#### FOR MAINTAINING ORDER--1967 THROUGH 1971

##### UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

An individual who enlists in the Guard assumes a commitment to serve 6 years. Guardsmen generally receive 5 or 6 months of active duty training then return to civilian life with a 5-1/2-year commitment to meet 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks for summer camp each year.

The training given to guardsmen reflects the priorities assigned their missions. Most training concerns the primary mission to augment the Active Army in time of national emergency. Only 20 hours of the 6-month training received by a recruit entering the Guard are devoted to the secondary mission of maintaining order. Generally only 1 weekend, or 16 hours, of the 12 weekend meetings held annually and none of the 2-week summer camp is devoted to this type of training.

Prior to 1967, training for maintaining order to be provided to guardsmen was not uniformly prescribed and there was no training for high-level personnel in coordinating planning for control of civil disturbances. During the period August 1967 to June 1971, Army officials--notably from the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the Office of Reserve Components, and the National Guard Bureau--took action to improve the Guard's civil disturbance control training program.

As recently as July 1967 the States determined the amount of civil disturbance control training to be provided to guardsmen and their units. Army Regulations required some civil disturbance control training for Guard units but did not specify the amount of training to be given. Annual training varied from 6 hours for Guard units in one State to 32 hours for units in another State.

Because of the problems Guard units had experienced in coping with riots in cities such as Detroit and Newark, in

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July 1967 the President directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new standards for training in riot control procedures to be provided to Guard units across the country. An interim recommendation for increased riot control training had been made by the Kerner Commission.

In complying with the President's directive, the Army issued a requirement that Guard units receive a 33-hour program of riot control training and 18 hours of command and staff training. By the end of October 1967, all Guard units with a civil disturbance control mission had received this training. The Kerner Commission report commended the Department of Defense, the Army, and the National Guard Bureau for their prompt action.

In 1968 the Guard presented a 32-hour block of instruction on civil disturbance control to approximately 10,000 lieutenants.

In 1969 the Army initiated a mandatory 16-hour annual unit refresher training program. This action implemented another Kerner Commission recommendation that riot control training be a continuing part of the Guard's training program to insure familiarity with established procedures and to train incoming recruits. It was decided that, in addition to receiving the unit refresher training, each recruit should receive 8 hours of individual training when he joined his unit.

Changes were made in the training program in 1971. A 3-hour orientation on civil disturbance matters was added to the 6-month basic training program provided to each recruit when he received his active duty training. It also was decided to conduct a one-time 24-hour training program during 1971 in addition to the usual 16 hours of refresher training. This consisted of 8 hours of additional refresher training for all guardsmen and a 16-hour leadership course for selected officers. The additional training was given in anticipation of possible large-scale civil disturbances during 1971.

In April 1971 an Army study, undertaken to determine how the Guard could more effectively maintain order, resulted in several changes in training which implemented recommendations of the Scranton Commission.

One change was a requirement that all guardsmen complete 20 hours of civil disturbance control training after the basic combat training portion of their 6-month active duty training. The 20 hours replaced the previously required 3 hours of civil disturbance control training taken during basic combat training and the 8-hour individual preparatory training required of all recruits when they first joined a unit. Another change was a requirement that all squad leaders, platoon leaders, and company commanders receive 8 hours of civil disturbance control leadership training. The number of hours of unit training required for units newly assigned a civil disturbance control mission was increased from 33 to 40 hours. This change did not apply to units which previously had been assigned a mission of maintaining order.

The Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum on June 30, 1971, to the Active Army and the Reserve components (which includes the Guard), announcing changes in the Army's training policy. The key change was that the existing policy of specifying certain refresher-training subjects and hours as mandatory would be discontinued. Army training directives now may include suggested hours of instructions and frequency as a guide but most state clearly that the duration and frequency are not binding upon subordinate commanders.

The Army official primarily responsible for writing the June 30 memorandum told us that the new training policy included the Guard's 16-hour civil disturbance control refresher training program. The 16-hour refresher training course previously established by CONARC was carefully designed and modified on the basis of lessons learned in past disturbances and contains a balance of classroom and field training.

Under the new policy there no longer will be any assurance of uniformity of civil disturbance control refresher training given to guardsmen. Some unit commanders may decide to provide only the field training exercises (FTX), but other commanders may elect to provide only the classroom portion of refresher training or no refresher training at all.

The June 30 memorandum also stated that individual training records no longer would be required as official

documents and that if records were maintained, they would not be subject to inspection or audit. Therefore, although units still may be inspected for readiness, it will be difficult to determine whether a unit has received civil disturbance control training and to evaluate its capability of maintaining order.

The following schedule shows the changes in the number of hours of civil disturbance control training required for guardsmen in fiscal years 1967 through 1972.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Initial unit training</u>	<u>Training received during 6 months of active duty</u>	<u>Individual introductory training</u>	<u>Annual unit refresher</u>	<u>One-time additional unit refresher</u>	<u>One-time junior leadership training</u>
Pre-1967 (note a)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aug. 1967	33 <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	18
1968-70	-	-	8	16	-	32
1971	-	3	8	16	8 <sup>c</sup>	16 <sup>c</sup>
1972	40 <sup>b</sup>	20 <sup>d</sup>	-	16 <sup>e</sup>	-	8

<sup>a</sup>Prior to August 1967 Army Regulations required Guard units to conduct riot control training but specified no particular number of hours.

<sup>b</sup>Hours of unit training required when unit was first assigned a civil disturbance mission by the State Adjutant General.

<sup>c</sup>Proposed by the Secretary of the Army in 1970.

<sup>d</sup>Reduced to 16 hours effective February 25, 1972.

<sup>e</sup>A change in Army policy made 16 hours of civil disturbance refresher training optional at the discretion of unit commanders.

### TRAINING SENIOR PERSONNEL

In addition to developing the program of unit and individual training provided to Guard officers and enlisted personnel, the Army has developed a course of instruction that brings together senior personnel of Federal, State, and municipal agencies to exchange information and coordinate planning for civil disturbance control operations. This program is called the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (SEADOC). The SEADOC program was started in February 1968 and is in accordance with a Kerner Commission recommendation that the Army establish a school to train senior personnel for command during riot situations; special emphasis is given to the political, sociological, and legal problems involved.

From February 1968 to April 1969, more than 4,000 senior personnel completed 56 1-week SEADOC courses. Among those completing the course were 1,221 civilian police, including 111 police chiefs and 253 other civilians, such as district attorneys; civil defense personnel; and public safety officials. Additional senior officer attendees included 971 from the Guard, 371 from the Army Reserve, and 1,294 from the active military services.

SEADOC was suspended in April 1969 because of declining interest. Subsequently renewed interest was generated because of the growing problem of civil disturbances throughout the Nation. The recognized need for such training led to the reinstatement of SEADOC in May 1970. The new SEADOC instruction continued stress on interagency planning and coordination but placed new emphasis on civil disorder management concepts and techniques.

SEADOC now presents those principles and considerations which have been developed through lessons learned from coping with past disturbances. This approach provides a means for discussion and better understanding of the respective capabilities, resources, and responsibilities of those agencies involved in the difficult task of controlling civil disorders.

CHAPTER 3

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL GUARD AND POLICE TRAINING  
FOR MAINTAINING ORDER

The police departments of American cities have primary responsibility for handling civil disturbances. Local police handle many disturbances that do not require Guard assistance. For example, in 1966 the Guard was called to help in only 17 of 43 disturbances and riots reported.

We compared the civil disturbance control training provided to guardsmen with the special training given to several city police forces throughout the country. Since the police in Washington have been called upon to respond to disturbances more frequently than police in most cities, we paid particular attention to the training given Washington's 1,000-man civil disturbance police unit. The following chart summarizes the hours and major subject areas of initial unit training and annual refresher training provided to the Guard and Washington police. A more detailed outline of the training is shown in appendix I.

<u>Subject area</u>	<u>Hours of training</u>			
	<u>National Guard</u>		<u>Police</u>	
	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Refresher</u>	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Refresher</u>
Introduction to civil disturbance control	1	-	1	-
Causes of disturbances and crowd psychology	2	-	2	-
Crowd control tactics	2	6	7	-
Use of agents, munitions, and equipment	3	2	7	-
Crowd control formations	2	4	5-1/2	4-1/2
Riot baton training	2	-	-	-
FTX	4	4	-	-
Bomb identification and safety	-	-	5	-
<b>Total</b>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>27-1/2</u>	<u>4-1/2</u>
Weapons training	(a)	-	13-1/2	15-1/2
<b>Total</b>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>20</u>


<sup>a</sup> Guardsmen receive weapons training as part of their primary mission training.

As the chart indicates, the major subject areas for the Guard and the Washington police are, for the most part, similar. Both groups receive indoctrination on the causes of civil disturbances and an insight into why mobs behave as they do. Stress is given to using only the minimum force necessary to achieve control, as recommended by the Kerner Commission. Guardsmen and police are trained to avoid overreacting to provocative situations and to use special formations and equipment to control and disperse crowds.

The subject matter taught in the classroom--mob psychology, control of crowds, protection of firemen, and handling of snipers and looters--is applied through FTX. To inject realism into these exercises, at times some guardsmen act as rioters while others apply the training they have received.



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Maryland National Guard at the University of Maryland

## CHAPTER 4

### ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING

#### FOR MAINTAINING ORDER

We talked with a number of high-ranking Guard officers, including State Adjutant Generals and unit commanders, and obtained responses from more than 1,300 enlisted members to our questionnaire on the adequacy of training for maintaining order. The consensus of all ranks of guardsmen questioned was that the training they had received had prepared them to perform this mission effectively.

Almost without exception, the unit commanders said they believed their men were prepared to handle their civil disturbance control duties. Some Army officials said that even though annual refresher training was limited to 16 hours, 20 to 25 percent of a guardsman's primary mission training was related to and supplemented the civil disturbance control training. Training in such areas as communications, formations, gas mask drill, antisniping measures, and first aid prepared guardsmen for both their primary and their civil disturbance control missions.

Any unit commander who believes his unit needs additional civil disturbance control training may request permission from CONARC to conduct such training. We noted several instances where such additional training had been requested and that no requests had been denied, as shown below.

- The Adjutant General of Michigan requested and received approval for all units of the Michigan National Guard to conduct 4 to 6 hours of additional training in the use of the riot baton during 1970.
- The Adjutant General of Delaware was permitted to provide all Delaware units with 8 additional hours of refresher training during 1970 and 1971.
- The Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard, has received permission to conduct civil

disturbance control training whenever he deems it necessary.

--Three units in West Virginia requested and received approval of an increase in annual refresher training from 16 hours to 33 hours for training years 1970-71 and 1971-72.

--A unit in Ohio requested and received approval to conduct 12 hours of additional civil disturbance control training during 1970.

#### QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

We distributed questionnaires to more than 1,300 guardsmen in units in six States to obtain the opinions of a sample of guardsmen as to the adequacy of the civil disturbance control training they had received. Many of the guardsmen had participated in controlling civil disturbances and knew the importance of the training. Responses to the questionnaire showed that about 70 percent of the guardsmen believed themselves adequately trained to cope with civil disturbances.

The statements of Guard officers and the questionnaire results supported a recent Army evaluation of the Guard. During fiscal year 1971 the Army evaluated the Civil disturbance control capability of all Guard units with a mission of maintaining order. Inspections were made of each unit's plans and operations, training, and logistics. As of June 1, 1971, all units had been evaluated and only about 2 percent were judged to be marginal or unsatisfactory. Action was taken to correct the deficiencies noted for these units.

#### ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA) REPORT


In a report dated December 14, 1971, AAA concluded that the Guard had effectively met the requirements of its civil disturbance control program. This conclusion was based upon a review at 14 Guard units from June through September 1971. There were four problem areas which AAA believed warranted further consideration:

- Differences in National Guard Bureau and CONARC guidance which resulted in varied interpretations by the States as to their prerogatives in designating and training units in civil disturbance control operations.
- Need for current and complete alert rosters for use in immediate callup of units during civil disturbances.
- Failure of units to keep records which identified personnel absent from civil disturbance control training sessions and those who had not made up the scheduled training.
- Failure to assign some individuals to weapons or equipment teams. Some who were assigned were not trained in the use of the equipment.

The National Guard Bureau told AAA that:

- It had furnished additional guidance to each State concerning designating units for civil disturbance control missions.
- It would bring to the attention of each State the problems relating to alert procedures, but it did not agree that standardized rosters were necessary.
- It would emphasize during training conferences and in revisions to existing Bureau regulations the importance of making certain that each individual soldier was properly trained in civil disturbance control operations, including special weapons and equipment, if the need should arise.
- It had not prescribed procedures for makeup training because the State Adjutant Generals realized the significance of having thoroughly trained troops.

We believe the problem areas discussed by AAA are of particular significance in view of the June 30, 1971, memorandum from the Army Chief of Staff referred to on page 8.



National Guardsman Equipped for Civil Disturbance Training

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Maryland National Guard Troops Ready for Action

CHAPTER 5

IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT

In addition to training, proper equipment plays an important part in helping guardsmen maintain order. The Scranton Commission reported that lack of defensive equipment, such as face shields, subjected guardsmen to risk of personal injury, which in turn increased the danger that guardsmen would overreact to threatened harm. The Commission also said that the Guard urgently needed effective nonlethal weapons so that rifles or other lethal weapons would not be improperly used in campus disorders.

The Army took action to correct this situation. Guardsmen were equipped with face shields, flak vests, and riot batons during 1971. Riot batons can be used by guardsmen for protection from rioters and to disperse crowds without using undue force and without creating the psychological effect on mobs that may accompany using rifles and bayonets. However, a major gap exists in the force options available between riot batons and rifles.

The face shields, flak vests, and riot batons distributed to guardsmen during 1971 were allocated on a priority basis. The States were categorized as high, medium, or low priority, primarily on the basis of the number of past disturbances. High-priority States were equipped on a basis of one piece of equipment for every two guardsmen. Medium-priority States were equipped on a basis of one piece for every four guardsmen. Low-priority States were equipped on a basis of one piece for every six guardsmen.

The Army has been conducting research into special equipment and munitions to improve capabilities to identify and neutralize offenders and to provide additional protection for personnel and equipment. Ammunition of reduced lethality, such as beanbags, soft pellets which flatten on impact, and fragile containers filled with liquid, are being researched. However, we were told that as of June 1972 such items had not been tested by any units called to cope with civil disturbances.

A requirement for water projectors to disperse water, dyes, or chemical agents in a burst, spray, or stream is being prepared. Research on projectiles containing dye to mark individuals for later identification and apprehension is also being considered.

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## CHAPTER 6

### AGENCY COMMENTS, GAO CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On January 20, 1972, we met with Army and Guard officials to discuss the results of our review. We recognized that in recent years the Guard had taken action to improve its civil disturbance control training program. We expressed our concern, however, that eliminating mandatory refresher training authorized by the Army Chief of Staff memorandum of June 30, 1971 (see p. 8), could result in abandoning or curtailing the standardized 16-hour civil disturbance control refresher program by Guard unit commanders.

Army and Guard officials agreed that unit commanders would have such authority but said they could not determine the effect this policy change would have on future civil disturbance control training. The officials believed, however, that Guard unit commanders in States where disturbances were most likely to occur--high- and medium-priority States--probably would continue to provide their troops with the full 16 hours of refresher training to be certain their troops were trained in the event they were needed.

On June 12, 1972, we discussed our findings and recommendations with officials of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Army, and the National Guard Bureau. These officials said that consideration would be given to our recommendations. It was agreed that this report would be sent to the Congress without obtaining the formal comments of the Department of Defense.

### CONCLUSIONS

Since 1967 the Guard has taken action to improve its civil disturbance control training program and to more adequately equip personnel. The amount of training compares favorably with training provided to local police civil disturbance units. Guard officials and most guardsmen we questioned believed themselves adequately trained to maintain order.

The Army policy change eliminating mandatory refresher training programs could result in reducing training for some

Guard units. Because records of the training provided will not be maintained, it will be more difficult for Army and Guard officials to determine the kind and amount of training their guardsmen have received. AAA arrived at a similar conclusion. (See p. 15.)

Army officials contend that Guard unit commanders in high- and medium-priority States will probably continue to provide 16 hours of refresher training. However, there is no assurance that this will be done. Refresher training for maintaining order now must compete with training for the Guard's primary mission, and there may be a tendency on the part of some unit commanders to downgrade training for maintaining order in favor of emphasizing primary mission training, particularly in those States which have not experienced recent disturbances.

In addition, about 30 percent of the guardsmen who responded to our questionnaire did not feel adequately trained even with the full 16 hours of refresher training. Any decrease in refresher training may have a corresponding increase in lack of confidence among guardsmen concerning their ability to cope with a disturbance.

We are concerned about the amount of training unit commanders will provide to their men in low-priority States. Guardsmen in low-priority States may be given less refresher training if their unit commanders are lulled into a false sense of security. This feeling may be supported by the Army's policy of distributing equipment to low-priority States on a basis of one piece of equipment for every six guardsmen as opposed to one piece of equipment for every two guardsmen in high-priority States.

Civil disturbances do occur in low-priority States. One low-priority State, Oklahoma, had a civil disturbance in May 1970 that required the assistance of 756 guardsmen. In New Mexico, another low-priority State, four disturbances required the use of a total of 1,614 guardsmen in 1971.

The Kerner Commission documented the consequences of entrusting the responsibility for maintaining order to guardsmen who had not received sufficient training in its report on the Guard's role in handling the 1967 Detroit riot.

We believe the most practical means of preventing recurrence of such consequences is to insure that Guard units with a mission of maintaining order receive appropriate mandatory training each year.

With regard to equipment, guardsmen now have better protection than in prior years, but they are still limited to using either riot batons or rifles in maintaining order. We believe that research and testing of additional equipment and munitions should be accelerated to increase the force options available to guardsmen.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Because some Guard units with a mission of maintaining order may not receive annual refresher training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Army:

- Require appropriate refresher training for National Guard units with a civil disturbance control mission.
- Establish an evaluation system to insure that an adequate civil disturbance control capability is maintained.

Because of the importance of proper equipment in maintaining order, we recommend also that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Army continue research on, and conduct appropriate field training in the use of, special equipment and munitions.

## CHAPTER 7

### SCOPE OF REVIEW

Because training is the key to the Guard's preparedness and because both the Kerner and Scranton Commissions recommended that training in controlling civil disturbances be expanded and improved, we reviewed the program of training given to guardsmen for maintaining order. The review included evolution of civil disturbance control training from 1967 and a comparison of the changes made with changes the Commissions recommended.

To coordinate our respective efforts, we met with AAA representatives. We reviewed the training provided to guardsmen and compared it with the training given to selected State and city police civil disturbance units.

Our review was made at the National Guard Bureau, the Directorate of Military Support, and the Office of Reserve Components, Washington, D.C.; Headquarters, CONARC, Fort Monroe, Va.; and a number of locations throughout the country.

In Washington we reviewed the civil disturbance control training regulations prescribed by the Army and CONARC and talked with Army and Guard officials responsible for shaping Army civil disturbance control training policy and the Adjutant General of the District of Columbia. We met with the Chief of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department's Special Operations Division to discuss training given the special 1,000-man civil disturbance unit.

For their views on civil disturbance matters, we interviewed the Adjutant Generals, or their representatives, of the Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, Kansas, and California National Guard. We also visited appropriate local officials, such as mayors and police chiefs, or their representatives, at the following locations.

Georgia:

Atlanta, Columbus, Augusta, Athens

Kansas:

Lawrence, Topeka

Missouri:

Kansas City

California:

Berkeley, Sacramento, Alameda County

North Carolina:

Raleigh, Wilmington, Henderson

Interviews and informal conversations were held with officers responsible for the readiness of their units. Questionnaires on civil disturbance control training and readiness were distributed to more than 1,300 enlisted guardsmen. Units visited included:

Pennsylvania:

28th Division Artillery, Harrisburg

Georgia:

182d Military Police Company, Macon  
Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 3d Brigade,  
30th Infantry Division, Macon  
1148th Transportation Company, Augusta  
Company C, 878th Engineer Battalion, Lyons

Kansas:

1st Battalion, 127th Artillery (five batteries)

California:

Company B and C, 149th Armor, Berkeley  
Headquarters Company and B Company, 159th Infantry,  
Berkeley  
Battery A, 143d Artillery

North Carolina:

Headquarters Company, 1/120th Infantry Battalion  
Battery C, 3/111th Artillery Battalion  
5/113th Artillery Battalion  
Company A, 1/325 Battalion, 2d Brigade  
Company B, 1/505 Battalion, 3d Brigade

Florida (note a):

Co. A, 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, Clearwater  
Battery A, 2d Battalion, 116th Artillery

<sup>a</sup>Questionnaires were not distributed to these units.

APPENDIX I

COMPARISON OF CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINING  
GIVEN TO D.C. CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT  
AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

NATIONAL GUARD

<u>Subject content</u>	<u>Hours of training</u>	
	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Refresher</u>
1. <u>Introduction to Civil Disturbance Control Operations</u> --Learn to identify causative factors, psychological factors influencing crowd behavior, and policies and legal considerations governing commitment of military forces.	1	-
2. <u>Individual Responsibility and Standards of Conduct</u> --Learn to recognize agitator techniques, exhibit professionalism, establish good working relationship with civilians, and preclude possible liability in civil and criminal proceedings.	Incorporated in 1, 3, and 4	1
3. <u>Stress Training</u> --Learn to identify dissident actions that create stress and the psychological factors that influence behavior.	1	-
4. <u>Application of Force</u> --Learn primary rules of minimum force.	1	1
5. <u>Operational Tasks and Techniques</u> --Learn what the guardsman may have to do in an actual situation. It includes instructions on patrols; crowd observation; show of force; use of formations; use of riot control agents; controlled individual and unit firepower; suspect apprehension; and neutralizing such special threats as arson, looting, and sniping.	2	4
6. <u>Riot Control Agents and Their Application and Usage</u> --Learn familiarity with protective masks and a number of different types of dispersers.	3	2
7. <u>Riot Control Formations</u> --Learn basic rifle positions and formations the squad and platoon use.	2	4
8. <u>Riot Baton Training</u> --Learn proper use of the 36-inch riot baton.	2	-
9. <u>Civil Disturbance Control Operations Field Training Exercise</u> --Learn to perform as a member of a unit in a practical exercise.	4	4
Total	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>

# APPENDIX I

## D.C. CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT

<u>Course content</u>	<u>Hours of training</u>	
	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Refresher</u>
1. <u>Introduction</u> --a brief history of the civil disturbance unit (CDU) and its purpose and scope.	1	-
2. <u>Individual Group Behavior in Civil Disturbances</u> --types of crowds, psychological factors affecting crowds, and the various methods of agitation demonstrators use.	2	-
3. <u>The Police Response to Mob Behavior</u> --basic riot control principles, police countermeasures to mob activities, and the task force concept.	1	-
4. <u>Riot Formations</u> --types of formations and their use and effectiveness.	3	4-1/2
5. <u>Civil Disturbance Principles of Control</u> --principles and methods of control used by the CDU.	1	-
6. <u>Equipment Available to the CDU</u> --examples of all equipment except chemical agents.	1	-
7. <u>Chemical Munitions</u> --brief history of the use of chemical munitions and examples of different types available.	3	See No. 15
8. <u>Use and Maintenance of Gas Mask</u>	1	-
9. <u>Field Arrests and Handling of Property</u>	2	-
10. <u>Barricaded Criminal Procedures and Sniper Tactics</u> --departmental orders and procedures, correct methods of gassing buildings, communications, and the command post.	1	-
11. <u>Explosive Ordnance</u> --bomb identification and safety course.	4	-
12. <u>Assisting Fire Fighters in Civil Disturbances</u>	1	-
13. <u>Booby Traps and Clandestine Devices</u>	1	-
14. <u>Control Communications</u>	1	-
15. <u>Weapons training, including 3-1/2 hours on gas training</u>	18	15-1/2
Total	<u>41</u>	<u>20</u>



PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES  
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Melvin R. Laird	Jan. 1969	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): Roger T. Kelley	Feb. 1969	Present
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS): Theodore C. Marrs	Apr. 1970	Present

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: Robert F. Froehlke	July 1971	Present
Stanley R. Resor	July 1965	June 1971
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE ARMY: Kenneth E. Believ	Sept. 1971	Present
Thaddeus Beal	Mar. 1969	Sept. 1971
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): Hadlai A. Hull	May 1971	Present
DEPUTY FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS: Arthur W. Allen, Jr.	Apr. 1968	Present

APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU:		
Maj. Gen. F. S. Greenlief	Sept. 1971	Present
Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson	Sept. 1963	Aug. 1971
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:		
Maj. Gen. LaVern E. Weber	Oct. 1971	Present
Maj. Gen. F. S. Greenlief	Apr. 1970	Aug. 1971