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# Need To Assess Potential For Consolidating Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training

Department Of Defense B-157905

**UNITED STATES  
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE**

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MAY 3, 1974



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-157905

The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense 5

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is our report on the need to assess the potential for consolidating undergraduate helicopter pilot training in the Department of Defense.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Government Operations.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Forrest R. Browne".

Forrest R. Browne  
Director

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### ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
UHP	undergraduate helicopter pilot

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
REPORT TO THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NEED TO ASSESS  
POTENTIAL FOR CONSOLIDATING  
UNDERGRADUATE HELICOPTER  
PILOT TRAINING  
Department of Defense  
B-157905

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over \$100 million annually to provide undergraduate helicopter pilot training for its personnel. In recent years, the Congress has expressed considerable interest in the various helicopter pilot training programs of the military services, and, in particular, in economies and efficiencies obtainable through standardizing and consolidating this training.

Because of the significant expenditures involved and the congressional interest, GAO reviewed the services' undergraduate training and noted that it had declined. In view of this, GAO reviewed (1) DOD's efforts to reduce the resources committed to this training and (2) training alternatives which appeared to offer opportunities for greater economy and efficiency.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Since the phasedown of U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia beginning in 1969 (peak year for helicopter training), projected training rates show a 75-percent decline in undergraduate training. (See p. 5.)

Because of this decline the Army announced that it will close its training site at Fort Wolters, Texas, and consolidate training at Fort Rucker, Alabama in fiscal year 1974.

The Army also placed in storage 565 TH-55A training helicopters which exceeded its needs. The Navy announced it will reduce its undergraduate training sites from four to three. (See pp. 5 and 6.)

GAO questions whether the above steps would maximize economical and efficient use of DOD resources because:

- Fort Rucker will be used for only 55 percent of its capacity after the Army consolidates undergraduate training to this single site. Fort Rucker is capable of providing all undergraduate training for DOD, according to requirements through 1976. (See pp. 6 and 8.)
- The Navy plans to continue its fixed-wing training in its undergraduate program and to purchase 93 new fixed-wing aircraft costing about \$18 million. The Army has over 500 excess training helicopters, some of which could be used in a consolidated all-helicopter training program. (See p. 5.)
- The Navy plans to construct additional undergraduate training facilities costing \$1.5 million although Army facilities will be underused. (See p. 6.)

GAO considered whether the Navy should discontinue fixed-wing training in favor of an all-helicopter program which would permit the (1) use

of excess Army helicopters and (2) consolidation of undergraduate training at one site. (See p. 8.)

GAO believes DOD could use its present resources more economically and efficiently. The cost of undergraduate training can be reduced by requiring the Navy to discontinue fixed-wing training and consolidating all helicopter training at a single site.

The Navy includes fixed-wing training in its program for subsequent cross-training to propeller or jet pilot and for other reasons. However, the 126 flying hours training in fixed-wing aircraft represents a large portion of the Navy's training costs. (See p. 10.) Less than 10 percent of the Navy-trained helicopter pilots from fiscal year 1968 through 1972 were cross-trained.

In view of the cost of fixed-wing training, the relatively small number of helicopter pilots later cross-trained, and various other reasons discussed in chapter 4 of this report, the Navy should discontinue

fixed-wing training in its undergraduate program.

In addition, a one time expenditure of about \$19.5 million for aircraft and other facilities to support the Navy undergraduate training program could be avoided by consolidating training at Fort Rucker under a joint, all-helicopter program to fill the requirements of all services. This program would also offer an opportunity to reduce DOD's annual recurring cost for this training. (See p. 8.)

Although Army and Air Force officials had no objections, Navy officials were generally opposed to discontinuing fixed-wing training in favor of an all-helicopter program. (See p. 10.)

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider directing the Navy to discontinue fixed-wing training and move toward consolidating undergraduate training at one site under a joint, all-helicopter program.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing through 1970, the U. S. commitment to Southeast Asia increased the number of undergraduate helicopter pilots (UHPs) trained in the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army purchased hundreds of new training helicopters and constructed UHP training facilities costing millions of dollars to provide the needed training. UHP training began to decline in fiscal year 1971 but is still a large expense. In fiscal year 1972, the services trained 2,900 personnel at about \$113 million. In addition, facilities, aircraft, and other equipment valued over \$360 million were committed to this training.

We reviewed UHP training programs in DOD to assess the (1) impact of the recent sharp decline in UHP training on the services' programs and (2) actions being considered to reduce the resources committed to this training. We also reviewed aspects of UHP training to see if there were feasible alternatives to the services' plans which offered opportunities for more efficient and economical training.

In UHP training the student learns basic flying skills, such as air-manship, spatial orientation, aerial discipline, and the relation of aircraft instruments to aircraft attitudes and position. The student also learns the basic flying techniques and procedures necessary to qualify as a helicopter pilot. Upon graduation from UHP training, pilots may receive follow-on training in advanced flying techniques and procedures applicable to specific types of helicopters or missions.

Presently the military services have two separate UHP training programs. At the time of our review, the Army program was 36 weeks long and included 210 flying hours in helicopters at Fort Wolters, Texas, and Fort Rucker, Alabama. Air Force students were being trained by the Army. The Navy program was 44 weeks long and included a total of 216 flying hours in both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The Navy program was conducted at four training sites in Pensacola, Florida. Marine Corps students were being trained by the Navy. Although the Navy program was 8 weeks longer, both programs provided essentially the same number of flight and academic hours of training.

The principal service organizations responsible for conducting UHP training are the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Navy's Chief of Naval Education and Training.

### CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN UHP TRAINING

There has been considerable congressional interest in UHP training, particularly in the need for the services to have separate programs and the need for fixed-wing training for a helicopter pilot. The House Appropriations Committee in its report on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1970 directed that the Navy and Air Force

discontinue fixed-wing training as a prerequisite for helicopter training. The Committee also suggested that the Navy and the Air Force seriously consider allowing the Army to train all helicopter pilots.

In response, the Air Force discontinued fixed-wing training of helicopter pilots and in October 1970 consolidated its program with the Army's. Navy officials said they strongly desired to continue their own training using both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters because it would cost less and at the same time they could get a pilot better suited to its needs. Navy officials also stated that, while sufficient fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were available to satisfy requirements using their program, additional training helicopters would need to be procured if the Committee insisted on replacing fixed-wing aircraft with helicopters. They told the Committee that fixed-wing training would probably be dropped in favor of an all-helicopter program when their aircraft required replacement.

### SCOPE

We made our review during 1972 and 1973 at each of the services' headquarters and UHP training sites. We examined records, reports, and statistics relating to

- the type and extent of training being provided,
- program costs for fiscal year 1972,
- past, current, and projected training requirements,
- resources committed to training,
- planned or anticipated program changes, and
- other matters relating to UHP training.

We discussed UHP training with responsible officials and obtained their views on current programs and various alternatives which we considered. We also discussed our findings on UHP training costs incurred in fiscal year 1972. The results of these discussions have been considered, where appropriate, in our report, and the activities visited are listed in the appendix.

## CHAPTER 2

### STATUS OF UHP TRAINING PROGRAMS

#### DECLINE IN TRAINING

The phasedown of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia beginning in 1969 resulted in a rapid decline in helicopter pilot training. DOD provided UHP training to nearly 8,000 pilots in fiscal year 1969, of which about 90 percent were trained by the Army. The number trained declined only moderately in 1970, but a sharp decline began in 1971 and continued through 1973. Projected training rates for 1974 through 1976 indicate that UHP training will level out at about 1,800 per year. The decline from the peak in 1969 to projected training rates for 1974 and beyond shows a reduction of over 75 percent. The number of helicopter pilots trained from 1968 through 1973 and estimates through 1976 are shown below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Army and Air Force</u>	<u>Navy and Marine</u>	<u>Total</u>
1968	4,689	828	5,517
1969	7,218	737	7,955
1970	6,969	597	7,566
1971	5,341	543	5,884
1972	2,666	651	3,317
1973	1,292	540	1,832
1974	1,114	516	1,630
1975	1,337	476	1,813
1976	1,262	490	1,752

Note: Includes foreign nationals, Coast Guard, and Reserve personnel.

#### STORAGE OF SURPLUS ARMY HELICOPTERS

In 1972 the Army had 565 TH-55A helicopters, used in the primary phase of UHP training, which were excess to training needs. Most of them are now in long-term storage at Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. These helicopters were purchased by the Army between 1964 and 1967 and had a service life of 10 years or more when they were placed in storage. An Army official advised us that these helicopters could be prepared for service at about \$1,000 each.

#### NAVY PLANS TO PURCHASE AIRCRAFT

The Navy is planning to invest in new fixed-wing aircraft for its UHP training. The T-34 and T-28 fixed-wing aircraft presently used have been in service since the 1950s and are approaching the end of their service life. After considering several alternatives the Navy,

in March 1973, awarded a contract for modifying two T-34 aircraft to test and evaluate the operational suitability of a modified T-34, known as the VTPX. The modification cost about \$800,000 which included installation of a turbine engine, airframe structural improvements, and more modern avionics equipment. In support of all UHP training programs, the Navy has tentatively approved the purchase of 265 VTPX aircraft during fiscal years 1975 through 1977 at an estimated cost of \$49.7 million. We estimate that 93 of these aircraft, costing about \$18 million, relate to UHP training.

#### STEPS BEING CONSIDERED TO REDUCE TRAINING COSTS

##### ARMY

The Army has announced that Fort Wolters, Texas, will be closed by June 1974, and all UHP training conducted at Fort Wolters will be transferred to Fort Rucker, Alabama. The Army estimated that it could save \$12 million annually by closing Fort Wolters and consolidating UHP training at Fort Rucker.

Army training officials advised us that, after consolidating UHP training at Fort Rucker, the Army will be able to train 2,400 helicopter pilots a year with present facilities. As shown on page 5, the Army's peak annual UHP training requirement through fiscal year 1976 is 1,337 pilots. Thus, only about 55 percent of the present training capacity at Fort Rucker will be used during the peak year.

The Army, by fiscal year 1975, plans to make much greater use of flight simulators for instrument training. Army officials estimated savings of about \$5.4 million by substituting flight simulators for 40 hours aircraft time.

##### NAVY

The Navy has announced plans to move the helicopter phase of its UHP training from Ellyson Naval Air Station, Florida, to Whiting Naval Air Station, Florida, thereby reducing the number of training sites from four to three. This action will consolidate the basic propeller and helicopter phases of training at Whiting. Basic flight training for propeller pilots will be moved from Whiting to Corpus Christi Naval Air Station, Texas, making Whiting almost totally dedicated to UHP training. The preflight and primary phases of UHP training will remain at Pensacola and Saufley Naval Air Stations, Florida, respectively. As part of this plan, naval activities at other locations will be moved to Ellyson to replace the UHP training. The Navy estimates that these changes, which are scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1974, will save \$5.7 million annually. To save this amount the Navy estimates that it will need to construct and modify facilities costing about \$1.5 million.

A Navy training official informed us that, following the above changes, the Navy will be able (during peace time) to train 625 helicopter pilots a year with present facilities compared with a projected training requirement of about 500 pilots.

To save an additional \$3.6 million annually, the Navy plans to make the following principal changes to its future UHP training program:

- Acquire the VTPX.
- Reduce the training required for helicopter pilots by 26 flying hours.
- Reduce the length of its program by 3 weeks.

## CHAPTER 3

### CONSOLIDATION POTENTIAL WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Although the Army and Navy are considering several steps to reduce UHP training costs, we do not believe they will use DOD resources to the maximum efficiency. To continue its fixed-wing aircraft training of helicopter pilots, the Navy plans to purchase over 90 fixed-wing aircraft costing about \$18 million. By eliminating this fixed-wing training and substituting additional helicopter training, the Navy could use some of the Army's 500 excess helicopters. Also, after the Army consolidates its facilities, Fort Rucker will be used for only 55 percent of its capacity (on the basis of projected training rates) while the Navy will continue to operate separate UHP training facilities. In view of this we considered whether the Navy should (1) discontinue fixed-wing training in favor of all-helicopter training and use some of the excess Army helicopters or (2) more effectively use DOD's resources by consolidating UHP training at one site under a joint program using helicopters exclusively.

#### CONSOLIDATE UHP TRAINING AT ONE SITE

One of the present UHP training sites--Fort Rucker--is capable of providing all UHP training for DOD. Since the present capacity at Fort Rucker is 2,400 pilots a year, 1,813 pilots, the maximum DOD requirement, could be trained by using only 75 percent of its capacity. Army officials advised us that Fort Rucker's capacity could be expanded to 2,600 pilots a year by adding a staging field at an estimated cost of \$250,000. An Army official further advised us that Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, could be reactivated and used to train an additional 3,800 pilots a year if needed to meet unforeseen requirements.

Navy officials advised us that, with Ellyson closed, Navy UHP training sites have a capacity of 625 pilots a year at peace time and 690 pilots a year under emergency conditions.

#### One-time savings

The Navy would not need to spend \$18 million for the VTPX aircraft if it consolidates its UHP training with the other services and adopts an all-helicopter program. It could also avoid costs of about \$1.5 million for new facilities at Whiting to support UHP training.

#### Potential recurring savings

More money could be saved by having a single larger scale program at one site as opposed to separate smaller programs at several sites. A difference of about \$10,500 a pilot in fiscal year 1972 in the Army and Navy programs was due to many factors, but in part, to the Army having a larger scale program. For further details of costs see p. 10.

The differences between fiscal year 1972 costs for the Army and Navy UHP training programs do not necessarily indicate savings that may accrue from a consolidated program. Changes have occurred since fiscal year 1972 which will affect future program cost. Also, the disposition of fixed and variable costs of ongoing programs must be known before the cost of a consolidated program can be determined.

Consolidating UHP training may not reduce all costs at the training sites losing the training, but it offers an opportunity to reduce DOD's cost. For example, under the Navy's plan to realign its UHP training (see p. 6), Whiting will be used almost exclusively for UHP training. Therefore, if the Navy's UHP training is consolidated with the other services at Fort Rucker, the costs associated with maintaining Whiting could be reduced or eliminated.

CHAPTER 4  
SERVICE VIEWS

ARMY

Army officials advised us that they had no objections to a consolidated UHP training program for DOD. They further advised us that the Army had the training facilities, aircraft, and other resources to train all helicopter pilots for DOD.

AIR FORCE

As noted in chapter 1, the Air Force has consolidated its UHP training with the Army's. Air Force officials advised us that they were satisfied with the UHP training being provided under the consolidated program and plan to continue to use it to satisfy their training requirements.

NAVY

Comments of Navy officials on UHP training center around two basic issues:

- The advantages of a UHP training program which provides flight training in both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters versus one that provides only helicopter flight training.
- The advantages of the Navy providing its own UHP training rather than receiving it under a consolidated DOD program.

Consolidated all-helicopter program

Before our review, the Navy believed its combined fixed-wing and helicopter program was less costly than an all-helicopter program. During hearings on DOD's appropriations for 1971 before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Navy officials presented a cost comparison of a hypothetical all-helicopter program and the program they were using, which indicated that their program was less costly. The Navy, in computing the costs for the all-helicopter program, substituted TH-57 and TH-1 (Huey) helicopters for the T-28 fixed-wing aircraft. We noted, however, that both of these helicopters are more expensive to operate than the TH-55A helicopter the Army uses in the early training phase of its program.

Our analysis of fiscal year 1972 costs showed that the Army's all-helicopter program cost about \$37,600 a pilot and the Navy's combined fixed-wing and helicopter program cost about \$48,100, or about \$10,500 more a pilot. Flight costs were about \$12,000 a pilot for the Army and \$15,700 for the Navy. The lower operating cost of the TH-55A helicopter was one of the principal reasons for the lower Army flight cost. For example, the Army's program required 100 hours in the TH-55A

for which the Army incurred an average cost of \$40 a flying hour, whereas the Navy's program required 100 hours in the T-28 for which the Navy incurred an average cost of \$67 an hour. Fuel cost for the T-28 was about twice that of the TH-55A on an hourly basis, and maintenance costs were about 60 percent higher.

Indirect costs for support activities were considerably higher in the Navy program. The Navy incurred indirect costs in fiscal year 1972 of about \$17,100 a pilot, whereas the Army incurred costs of \$9,500 for comparable support activities. The Army operated two UHP training sites, and the Navy operated four. This undoubtedly accounted for some of the difference between the two programs' indirect costs. Also, the smaller size of the Navy program resulted in a larger pro rata share of certain costs for each pilot. Although the programed flight and academic hours were about the same, the Navy program took 8 weeks longer to complete, which added to the Navy's support cost.

Service officials generally agreed that our cost determinations for fiscal year 1972 represented comparable training activities within the two UHP training programs. Navy officials, however, were concerned that fiscal year 1972 costs might be used as the sole basis for a decision to consolidate UHP training and that this might prove costly to DOD. They felt that a more detailed study is essential if a responsible decision is to be made on this matter.

We recognize the limit of using fiscal year 1972 costs as the sole basis for deciding whether to consolidate UHP training. However, it is obvious that fiscal year 1972 costs do not support the Navy officials' view that their combined fixed-wing and helicopter program is less costly than an all-helicopter program when the TH-55A aircraft is used in UHP training.

#### Cross-training costs

The Navy believes that the cost to cross-train a helicopter pilot to a propeller or jet pilot will be greater under an all-helicopter training program than it will be under its combined fixed-wing and helicopter program.

In fiscal year 1972 the Navy program for training helicopter pilots provided for 126 flying hours in fixed-wing aircraft. On the basis of fiscal year 1972 costs, fixed-wing training costs were about \$27,000. Thus, it costs an additional \$27,000 to provide a helicopter pilot, who is trained exclusively in helicopters, with the same fixed-wing training he would have received in the Navy's UHP program.

We question whether all 126 flying hours are necessary since certain basic flying skills learned in a helicopter should have a carryover value in learning to fly another type of aircraft.

Also, the number of helicopter pilots that have been cross-trained to other aircraft has been relatively small. During fiscal years 1968 through 1972 about 300 Navy and Marine Corps helicopter pilots were cross-trained, which is less than 10 percent of the 3,356 helicopter pilots the Navy trained during this period. The additional cost for cross-training such a small number of pilots must be weighed against (1) the \$18 million for the VTPX aircraft which the Navy must have to continue to provide fixed-wing training to its helicopter pilots and (2) the potential savings that should accrue from a consolidated all-helicopter program.

We noted that the Air Force whose pilots are being trained in an all-helicopter program plans to let its helicopter pilots who desire to make the Air Force a career enter the jet pilot program when they have completed their first tour.

### Flight screening

Navy officials said their program provides better flight screening. The present Navy aviator flight program begins with 26 hours in the T-34 aircraft. The student learns rudimentary flying techniques and solos for the first time. This process screens out those students who are psychologically unsuited or do not possess the innate psychomotor skills for flying. It also provides a basis for identifying the students' flying skill which may or may not qualify them for the more demanding jet pilot program.

The Army and Air Force have a similar requirement to screen out students who are unsuited or do not possess the necessary skills for flying. This is accomplished during the early phases of flight training. The Army and Air Force select personnel for UHP training on the basis of nonflight testing and other factors. Neither consider it necessary to provide flight screening before UHP training.

### Aerodynamics and meteorology training

Navy officials said that a Navy-trained pilot, as a result of his fixed-wing training, has a more thorough understanding of aerodynamics and meteorology.

We agree that, having flown both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, a Navy-trained pilot would likely have a broader understanding of these subjects. However, neither the Army nor the Air Force have found it necessary to teach their helicopter pilots the aerodynamics of fixed-wing aircraft as a basis for understanding meteorology. If the Navy pilot needs a more thorough understanding of these subjects they could be included in a consolidated program or as a part of the pilot's normal follow-on training.

### Instrument training

Navy officials said the Army could not train pilots to meet both Navy and Marine Corps requirements for instrument flying; a pilot must meet a fleet requirement to fly in all types of weather.

The Army did not provide standard instrument training before fiscal year 1972. Students in the Army and Navy are now trained alike except for one Navy instrument system which the Army does not use. The Navy, however, provides about 55 more instrument flight hours (30 hours in aircraft and 25 hours in simulators).

A consolidated UHP training program could provide more instrument training, if needed, since the total flight-related hours in the Army and Navy programs are about the same.

### Proficiency flying

Navy officials stated that one advantage of flying fixed-wing aircraft as part of UHP training is that it permits proficiency flying in fixed-wing aircraft if the helicopter pilot is assigned to a location where there are few helicopters, such as Washington, D. C. The Navy could not cite how often this situation occurs.

In view of the decline in UHP training, the DOD inventory of helicopters is sufficient to overcome this problem. Recent changes in DOD policy have reduced proficiency flying.

### Orientation and indoctrination

Navy officials said if another service trained their helicopter pilots it would not add to the Navy or Marine Corps officers' knowledge and understanding of the environment, operating procedures, terminology, tactics, and capabilities of the Navy or Marine Corps for which he is being trained.

Service orientation and indoctrination are given during the various officer commissioning programs. For example, the Air Force maintains a small detachment of personnel at the Army UHP training sites for orientation and indoctrination in procedures, terminology, command structure, and other matters peculiar to the Air Force. A consolidated UHP training program could also meet these needs in a similar fashion.

### Flexibility in assignment

Navy officials stated that one advantage of both fixed-wing and helicopter training is that it permits greater flexibility in assignment when needed.

Pilots who are trained as helicopter pilots ordinarily fly helicopters during their first tour. We found no need for such flexibility during the

first tour. Flexibility in assigning second-tour or career officers, to the extent needed, comes from cross-training. Further, the flexibility that fixed-wing training provides is limited since the Navy's UHP training program does not produce a fully qualified fixed-wing pilot. Additional training must be given before the helicopter pilot can be given an operational assignment in which he is required to fly fixed-wing aircraft.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

#### CONCLUSIONS

The Army and Navy have taken, or are planning, changes in UHP training within their own service which should reduce costs. These changes will not use DOD's resources to the maximum efficiency. The Navy will be buying \$18 million worth of fixed-wing aircraft for its UHP training, while the Army has hundreds of helicopters in storage which could be used in a consolidated all-helicopter program. Further, the Army and Navy will continue to have separate training programs at multiple sites even though one site can accommodate all UHP training for DOD.

The cost of the Navy UHP training program could be reduced by requiring the Navy to discontinue fixed-wing training in favor of all-helicopter training. This step would permit the Navy to avoid spending money for new fixed-wing aircraft and would make use of present DOD helicopters.

Although recurring savings cannot be ascertained until decisions are reached on such matters as the training curriculum to be used and facilities and personnel requirements, consolidating UHP training could reduce DOD's overall annual training cost.

We recognize that the services' requirements in UHP training may not be identical and differences in requirements might preclude either of the present UHP programs for fully satisfying the needs of all services without some changes. However the basic requirements and purposes of the services' program are common. In UHP training, the student learns basic flying skills, techniques, and procedures necessary to qualify as a helicopter pilot. Advanced flying techniques and procedures applicable to specific types of helicopters or missions are taught in various follow-on training programs. Therefore, a common training program would satisfy most of the services requirements. Truly unique requirements could be satisfied by developing a joint program with a modular concept. For example, if one of the services needs to emphasize certain portions of the training or needs to satisfy a unique requirement, it could do so by using additional modules without significantly diminishing the potential benefits of a joint program.

#### RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense consider directing the Navy to discontinue fixed-wing training and move toward consolidating UHP training at one site under a joint, all-helicopter program.

## ACTIVITIES VISITED

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, D. C.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Schools and Education Division and Budget Division), Washington, D. C.

Army Training and Doctrine Command (formerly Continental Army Command), Fort Monroe, Virginia

Headquarters, United States Army Primary Helicopter Center/School, Fort Wolters, Texas

United States Army Aviation Center/School, Fort Rucker, Alabama

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Training Programs Division), Washington, D. C.

Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas

Headquarters, Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY:

Office of Director, Naval Education and Training (Aviation Training Division), Washington, D. C.

Chief of Naval Education and Training (formerly Chief of Naval Training), Pensacola, Florida

Chief of Naval Air Training, (Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs), Corpus Christi, Texas