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U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

STAFF STUDY

CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS RANGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFCUR	Air Force Continental Operations Range
AFTEC	Air Force Test and Evaluation Center
COR	Continental Operations Range
CORAG	Continental Operationa Range Advisory Group
DCP	Development Concept Paper
DURAE	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
lyd	Department of Defense
INSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
TUR	Electronic Warfare Juint Test
064	Operation and Haintenance
OTAE	Operational Test and Evaluation
PND	Program Hanagement Directive
PKP	Program Hanagement Plan
RUTSE	Research, Development, Teat and Evaluation
TAC	Tactical Air Compand
TEN	Test and Evaluation Hanagement Office
TESPO	Test and Evaluation Systems Program Office
TINC	Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base
W/R/D	Wendover, Hill and Dugway

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SUPEAKY

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The Continental Operations Range (COR) program was originated in 1972 to provide improved capabilities for operational testing, aircrew training, and limited developmental test and evaluation not available at other Department of Defense (DOD) ranges and test facilities. The program called for improving and integrating three existing range complexes located in the western part of the United States. COR was planned to provide a realistic combat environment where strike size air forces could be tested against a large scale multi-defended area.

The COR carability was to be developed incrementally in the following phases:

near-term (to be completed in fiscal year 1977)---consisted primarily of improvements to be made at the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (TFWC) test ranges at Kellis Air Force base adding ground targets, threat sinulators, extensive communications, and instrumentation to track multiple participants.

mid-term (fiscal years 1978 and 1979)---consisted of installation of instrumentation, communications, threat simulators and ground targets to the Hill Air Force Hase test range and the integration of the Mendover, Hill, and Dugway (W/H/D) test ranges with the TFMC complex. far-term (fiscal years 19d0 through 1982)---consisted of the

> addition of communications for purposes of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions using the Pallon Naval Air Station for staging purposes.

The Air Force was given the responsibility to define and manage the COR program which was estimated in Hay 1974 to cost about \$203 million, excluding required operation and maintenance and military personnel funding. (See Chapter 2)

STATUS AND COMING EVENTS

In December 1973, Congress denied fiscal year 1974 COR procurement funds. The Air Force later requested COR procurement funds as part of the NOD fiscal year 1974 supplemental request and Congress again denied the request. On September 18, 1974, Congress denied COR funding for fiscal year 1975. The Air Force now plans to request funding for the improvement of TFNC ranges, which was intended to be provided as a portion of the nearterm phase of COR. A total of \$15.3 million had been spent by the Air Force on COR planwing up to the time COR funding was denied.

Although the Air Force does not plan further range improvements under the COR program, it estimates that 542.6 million will be needed for improvements to the TFWC test ranges during fiscal years 1975 through 1970 to accompodate basic Air Force tactical mission requirements. (See Chapter 4 and Appendix 111)

ORIGINATION OF COR CONCEPT

The DOD and the Air Force have extensively studied the adequacy of test and evaluation since the early 1970's. Hany of these studies have pointed out a need for a test range having a large unrestricted area and a realistic environment for operational testing and training. Three major reports were issued; the DOD sponsored Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report of July 1970, the Air Force's "hAVE LDGE" report issued in October 1970.

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and the DOD Test and Evaluation Facility Base Review dated June 1971. All of these studies called for improved operational test capability. The NOD Test and Evaluation Facility Base Review recommended the location for a Continental Operations Range and represented the fract document that justified the need for a COR as it was later defined. (See Chapter 2) COR HAVAGEMENT PLAN

COR was originally conceived as a 100 range to provide previously unavailable operational test and evaluation and training capability for use by all three services. In the early planning stages, the Army and Navy discontinued their participation in OOK and the Air Force was given program management responsibility. Within the Air Force, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), as the primary user and owner of existing ranges in the COR area, was given overall management-and operating responsibility for CUR. TAC began the planning for COR with the establishment of a COR Group at Nellis Air Force Base and the writing of a COR development plan identifying tasks, responsibilities, and requirements. Later the primary planning responsibility was shifted to the Air Force Systems Cormand's Test and Evaluation Systems Program Office (TESPO) located at Kirtland Air Force Base. TESPO wrote a program namagement plan, divided the COR tasks functionally, and set up a management structure to handle the various tasks identified. There was participation by a number of other Air Force organizations in the planning of COR. At the time COR funds were denied by the Congress, limited participation by the other services in COR planning had begun and further involvement was planned. (See Chapter 3)

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CONGRESSIONAL DENIAL OF COR FUNDS

The Air Force requested \$3.8 million for fiscal year 1974 COR investment funds. This request was denied by a Congressional conference committee after the House committee recommended denial and the Senate committee recommended restoration of the funds. As part of the fiscal year 1974 HAD supplemental request, the Air Force spain requested the \$3.8 million and the conference committee denied the request after the House committee recommended denial and the Senate committee recommended restoration.

During March and May 1974, Subcommittees of the house and Senate Appropriations Committees held hearings on the fiscal year 1975 DOD appropriations. The Air Force's fiscal year 1975 request for COR investment funds amountel to \$29.6 million. In August 1974, house and Senate committee reports were issued. The House report recommended denial of all fiscal year 1975 funds associated with COR. The Senate report recommended restoration of COR funds. A conference report issued on September 18, 1974 upheld the denial of COR funds proposed by the House. (See Chapter 4)

COR TERMINATION AND AIR FORCE PLANS TO ACQUIED CORTYPE CAPABILITIES

On December 19, 1974, the Department of the Air Force forwarded a message to COR participants that stated that all planning actions, agreements, organizations, and other activities directly related to the COR program were terminated. The message further stated that since the COR program encompassed a broad scope of Air Force range activities, functions, and interagency agreements which existed prior to initiation of the COR

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planning or muld have evolved as a result of revised management concepts. only those specific items that could be clearly differentiated from the COR program were to be retained or revised as appropriate.

Although fiscal year 1975 funding for COR has been denied and the Air Force does not plan to request COR funding in the future, improved range capabilities at existing operational ranges, which were started under the COR program, are still planned. Improvement of the TEVC and W/H/P Ranges during the period 1974 through 1976 will result in significant improvements in instrumentation (e.g., threat, scoring, tracking, and time-space-position-information systems) and communications. (See Chapter 4)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDURATION

The Air Force still feels that many of the improved test range capabilities planned for COR are urgently needed for Air Force operational testing and training requirements. Since the Congress eliminated COR funding, it may want to closely review current Air Force plans for obtaining similar capabilities. The Congress may also want to obtain information comcerning the loss in operational test capability with the cancellation of COR, the effect on future weapon system operational testing, and the Air Force's plan to satisfy future test requirements.

CUESTICS

Although not fully developed in this staff study we believe there are some matters relating to test and evaluation which warrant further attention. The following questions are provided for use by the Congressional committees during fiscal year 1976 hearings.

- What is the feasibility of centralizing the direction and management of operational test and evaluation (OT&E) activities of the military services to achieve the maximum OT&E capability at minimum cost?
- With the dissolution of TESPO (see page 23), how does the Air Force intend to provide for management of its OT&E capabilities meeded in the future?
- 3. What is the nature and cost of planned range improvements during the next five years at the Hill, Wendover, and Dugway Ranges? How will the capability derived from these improvements compare with that which was to be developed or acquired during mini-term COR?

AGENCY REVITY

A draft of this study was reviewed by Department of Defense officials associated with the management of the program, and their comments were incorporated in this report as we believe appropriate. We know of no residual difference with respect to the factual material presented herein.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Continental Operations Kingle (COE) was to be formed by the improvement and integration of the existing range complexes at Sellis Air Force Ease, Las Vegas, Nevada, the Wendover, Hill and Bugway (2/H/D) Banges mear Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Fallon Haval Air Station range near Eano, Nevada. COR was planned to provide a realistic combat environment where strike size forces could be fully exercised against a large scale multi-defended area. COR was to provide a capability to perform operational test and evaluation, aircrew training and limited developmental test and evaluation not available at other Department of Defense (DOD) ranges.

The missions to be performed on Cok were to include tactical, strategic and operational support missions including offensive strike, air defense, reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, combat airlift, and cormand and control. These integrated mission areas would include most types of weapon employment such as air-to-air, air-to-ground, electronic warfare, drene and remotely piloted vehicles, helicopter, and airlift.

The most important capability to be provided by COS was improved operational test and evaluation. Operational test and evaluation is that testing carried on by an organization independent of the developer, in a realistic environment, to show a system's probable military utility and operational effectiveness. Operational test and evaluation usually follows development test and evaluation, which is conducted by the developer to prove that a system technically meets the requirements placed upon the developer. The second major capability to be provided by COR was improved training. In terms of sorties or flights, 80 percent of initial COR utilization was to be training and only 20 percent was to be testing. In terms of workload and resources expenditure, 60 percent of the range usage was-to be testing and 40 percent training.

The planning for COR began in fiscal year 1972 with the development of COR planned to run through fiscal year 1982. In late 1973, Congress denied an Air Force request for \$3.8 million for fiscal year 1974 GaK investment funds and in late 1974 Congress denied \$22.2 million directly attributable to the development of COR for fiscal year 1975. In December 1974, the Air Force terminated all planning, agreements, organizations, and activities directly associated with the COR development and acquisition program.

Although fiscal year 1974 and 1975 COR funding was denied and the Air Force does not plan to request COR funding in the future, the Congress approved funds for improved operational test and evaluation and the Air Force plans continuing improvement of the TFWC and W/H/D Kanges. Improvement of the TFWC ranges during 1974 and 1975 will result in the ranges having a significant improvement in range capability similar in nature but reduced in scope to that planned to be developed during mear-term COK. Integration of the W/H/D Ranges to a single major test facility under the Department of Defense is under study. This could result in significant future improvements to these ranges.

As a part of our continuing program of reviewing major acquisitions, we selected the COR program for review during 1974. In Lite July, field

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work was began at the principal COR program management office, the Air Surge's Teat and Evaluation Systems Program Office (TESPO) in Albuqueique, New Mexico. Audit work was also conducted at the Tactical Fighter Weapons 'Center at Nollis Air Force Base, Newada.

CHAPTER 2

MIE COR CONCEPT

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force in a number of atudies established that there was a need for a range providing a large operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and training environment emphasizing operational realism beyond the capability of any present facility. Three major studies were done; the IADD sponsored Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report, the IOD Test and Evaluation Facility Ease Review, and the Air Force "EAVE EDGE" atudy. Following these conceptual studies, a developmental concept paper was written which specifier the COR area and the general capabilities COR would provide. The first detailed capability requirements were defined by the Tactical Air Command, Later, COR capability requirements were further defined and developed by the TESPO.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Famel Report, dated July 1970, was the result of a year-long study of the Department of Defense by a panel of prominent individuals. The report concluded that within 10D, 076E had been too infrequent, poorly designed and executed, and generally inadequates. The report stated that existing ranges were parginally adequate to support the OT6E which had been performed, and expressed doubt that they were adequate for 076E which should have been but was not performed. The report pointed out that, although in wast actual coubat environments the United States must conduct combined operations, there were no effective methods for conducting 074E which cuts across service lines.

In early 1966, the Air Force developed a general concept for an integrated air offensive/defeasive test environment. Humerous in-house

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and contractor supported studies were done including a joint Air Force/ contractor effort known as "HAVE EDGE" issued in October 1970. "HAVE EDGE" called for the creation of a very sophisticated facility covaring a large area including the air space over most of Utah and Ne ada with the Hill Air Force Base and Dugway ranges as its cunter. Fost estimates for acquiring and operating the "NAVE EDGE" ranges varied from about \$481 million to \$1.5 billion over a 20-year period and it was rejected by the Air Force as being too expensive.

As a result of the Blue Ribbon Defense Fanel Report, the DOD directed a detailed study of existing test facilities in order to determine a logical approach to implementing the panel's recommendations. This study, called the DOD Test and Evaluation Facility Base Review, dated June 1971, was a separate but coordinated action with the Air Force "HAVE EDGE" effort. The study defined areas of the country where suitable OT&F could be conducted and recommended the creation of several ranges by tying together existing ranges. One of these was the Continental Operations Range.

The first-specific capability requirements for COR were developed by Tactical Air Command (TAC) as the manager of the COA program, the manager of existing ranges, and one of the major range users. Later, when TESPO took over prime management responsibility, an effort was made to involve other major Air Force range users in the requirements determination effort. Standard missions to be run on COR were identified and from these, capability requirements were to be derived. OT&K meeds of specific future weapons systems were not identified and used in the COR capability requirements definition effort. Other services had no direct participation in identifying COR requirements. As defined in the April 1973 Cok Development Concept Paper (DCP), COR was to provide

--- a range facility which would permit operational test and evaluation of equipment and strike-sized air warfare clements in a realistic combat environment,

--large land and simplace areas where unconstrained exercises can be conducted to train military air warfare elements in a realistic but simulated combat environment, and to evaluate tactics, performance, and capabilities of those elements, and

-- a combat-like environment for selected development test and evaluation which cannot be accomplished at existing research and development ranges.

The DCP specified that the COR would be developed in the Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, Reno area since the western United States is the only geographical area in the Continental United States that has the land and air space necessary and which is sufficiently free from encroachment and electromagnetic interference to support the COR concept.

Broad mission areas were defined in the NCP in terms of all types of weapons employment involving supersonic/subsonic, air-to-air, air-toground, electronic warfare, remotely piloted vehicle, reconnaissance, helicopter, and airlift missions. The missions were to be conducted during continuous day and night, all-weather range operations. The facility would support live, inert, captive, and simulated weapons deliveries. While . ~ Mor CCR activity would be operational test and training designed to

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accommodate the offensive mission, other missions such as air defense, embed search and reacue, combat airlift, and exercise of the Tactical Air Control System including the Airborne Warning and Control System would also be accommodated.

COR was to be developed incrementally permitting termination at any given level and still provide an increased capability for testing and training. COR development was to take place in three phases; near-tern, which was originally scheduled to be completed during fiscal year 1976 and later slipped to fiscal year 1977; mid-tern, which was originally scheduled for complication during fiscal year 1978 and later slipped to 1979; and far-term, scheduled for completion during fiscal year 1982, NEAR-TERM PRASE

Near-term development was to be concentrated within the Kellis area with some improvements beginning at W/H/D. The TENC ranges consist of a North Range, the South Range, and the Caliente Range. Improvements to be made to the North Range included the additional ground targets, threat simulators, and instrumentation to track multiple participants. The South Range was to receive additional ground targets and instrumentation to track multiple participants. The Caliente Electronic Warfare Range was to receive additional threat simulators, multiple participant tracking capability, and communications to the to a control center to be added at Nellis. Drone/remotely piloted vehicle routes were to be established between TEWC Ranges and the W/H/D area along with a backbone communications system.

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COR near-term operations were to continue existing air-to-ground missions conducted on the TFWC South Kange; initiate electronic warfare and air-to-air on the North Range; expand tactical defense suppression training on the Caliente Kange; and continue drone/recotely piloted vehicle operations on the W/H/D Ranges. MID-TUEM PHASE

Preliminary planning for COR mid-term called for the addition of threat simulators to the Hill Range and the addition of multi-participant tracking and communications to each of the W/H/D Ranges. A data link connecting TFWC ranges with W/H/D Ranges, and with Hill Air Force Base as well as a local range control center for the W/H/D Range complex were to be completed. Special gap filler radars were to be added to provide extended coverage of the drone/remotely piloted vehicle corridor.

During mid-term COR, the same type missions as outlined for mearterm were to be run on the TFWC Ranges with increased use of the TFWC-W/H/D corridor. The Wendover, Hill, bugway ranges were to be used for expanded air-to-air, air-te-ground, and drone/remotely piloted vehicle missions, and refined electronic warfare testing. Integrated air and ground operations with strike size forces were to be conducted.

FAR-TERM PHASE

During far-term COR, the ranges at Fallon Naval Air Station were to be linked with the other COR ranges with communication and an air corridor. Operational arrangements between the Navy and Air Force were to be expanded to allow the Air Force to use Fallon ranges.

The far-tern COR phase would provide for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions using the Fallon ranges principally as staging areas as well as previously described missions on the other COR ranges.

COR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The OUR development plan written by TAC primarily addressed nearterm COR and included a definition of specific capability requirements for land and air-space, threat environment, evaluation, and range data. These requirements were developed using the "NAVE PDGE" Report, aircraft performance data, weapon systems performance data, data from completed OT&E evaluations, and a TAC list of outstanding 0T&E requirements.

PROGRAM MAGAGEMEINT PLAN

The program management plan (PMP) written by TESPO after they assumed overall management responsibility for COR included an annex devoted to the identification of COR requirements. In preparing the requirements annex, the DCP and the TAC development plan were used as beginning points. To further identify requirements potential Air Force COR users were surveyed. The results of preliminary survey work were included in the requirements annex to the PMP.

FIELD VISITS

Field visits to major Air Force cormands were rade to further identify user requirements. Between May and September 1974, TESPO developed a number of OT&E and basic or standard training missions using the information received from the commands. The missions developed were strategic penetration, air superiority, defense suppression, integrated strike search and rescue, close air support, airlift, interdictior, and fighter/ bomber defense, OT&E of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons systems, and training. The missions were divided into phases with the actions taking place in each phase identified in detail, so that an analysis of each mission could be made to develop specific capabilities meeded for

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COR. This work was mearing completion at the time COR funding was cancelled.

INPUT BY THE AIR FORCE TEST AND CUALUATION CENTUR

A second major source of requirements for OTAE was to be the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC). AFTEC began operations in 1974 and was chartered with managing the Air Force's OTAE program. AFTEC was still in the process of identifying OTAE requirements for sujor weapons systems being developed at the time COR funding was denied and had not yet had a major imput to the definition of COR requirements. In contrast to the basic or standard missions identified for COR as a basis for requirements, the capability media identified by AFTEC would have been related directly to specific weapons systems.

MR WSTS

In hearings before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, in September 1973, the Air Force estimated that the total investment cost of COR through fiscal year 1982 would be \$162.8 million. This included \$75.2 million in research, development, test and evaluation (EDT&L), \$79.. million in other procurement, and \$5.2 million in military construction. OUR mear-term and mid-term were estimated to cost \$112.8 million through fiscal year 1978, with an additional \$50 million required to complete OUR far-term.

TESPO identified capability requirements in some detail for incorporation into the Hay 1974 program management plan. The cost of these requirements was estimated by TESPO to be in excess of \$267 million. A budget ceiling of \$207.9 million for the total program was imposed by Headquarters Air Force and TESPO prepared a COR acquisition program on this basis. Requirements to be funded were based on a priority list prepared by TESPO. In hearings before Congress in the 1974, the Mr Force testified that the estimated total investment cost of COE would be S207.9 efficien consisting of S34.1 efficient for ROTAE, S109 million in other procurement, and S14.3 uillion in military construction. Air Force explained the increase in the cost estimates to have resulted from a further definition of requirements and a refinement of costs, and to represent increased cost of material and labor and more precise estimates based on detailed systems engineering.

Appendix II shows the investment costs presented to Congress as later modified by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRLE) and the Air Force to distribute some of the funds into fiscal year 1001 and 1982. Although the costs presented to Congress were shown to be incurred only through fiscal year 1980, some of the costs were planned to be deferred to fiscal years 1981 and 1982.

When COR operations and maintenance costs and military personnel costs attributable to COR estimated to be incurred through fiscal year 1982 are added to the investment cost of \$207.9 million a total cost of \$354.3 million results. These costs, by year, are shown in Appendix II.

At the time Congress denied COR funding in September 1974, the Air Force had sperm a total of \$15.3 million in the COR planning effort.

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As discussed in Chapter 4 of this report, TFWC ranges will continue to operate and be improved in the future. Appendix III shows a comparison of costs planned to be incurred for COR with those estimated to be incurred at TFWC after concellation of the COR programs through fiscal year 1979.

CHAPTER 3

HAMAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

COR was originally conceived as a DOD range to provide proviously unavailable operational test and evaluation capability for use by all three services. In the early planning states, the Air Force was given responsibility for the program. Within the Air Force, TAC, as the primary user and exact of existing ranges in the CDR area, was given overall nanagement and operating responsibility for COR. TAE becan the planning for COR with the establishment of a COR Group and the writing of a COR development plan identifying tasks, responsibilities. and requirements. Later the primary planning responsibility was shifted to TESPO. TESPO wrote a program management plan, divided the GOR tasks functionally, and set up a management structure to handle the various tasks identified. There was participation by a murber of other Air Force organizations in the planning of CDS. At the time COR funds were desired by the Congress, limited participation by other services in ORE planning had begun and further involvement was planned.

Following the recommendations of the 1971 DOD Test and Evaluation Facility Base Peview that a COR be established, the DOD Tri-Service Coordination Cocclitee for Integrated Offensive/Detensive Test Environment bergin work on a DCP for CDR. On May 5, 1972, DDR&E dissolved the Tri-Services Coordination Committee and assigned

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completion of a draft DCP for COR to the Air Force. The Air Force draft, dated July 1972, resulted in the final DCP issued in April 1973.

The Air Force was the prime mover around the services in emtablishing COR and with the drafting of the DCP became responsible for planning and managing COR development and operation. DDR&E's role became one of monitoring the Air Force's planning and hudgeting for COR. Overall responsibility for the management and operation of COR was assigned to TAC with the Air Force Systems Corrand charged with the responsibility of supporting TAC by development and acquisition of necessary COR hardware. The assignment of TAC as the supervisor of the COR program was on the basis that TAC was the principal operating cormand responsible for Air Force tactical OTAE and training exercise functions and was the major owner and operator of the equipment and facilities which would be integrated during neartern COR.

To carry out their respective responsibilities TAC established a COR Group at Nellis Air Force Ease and Systems Command established a Test and Evaluation Management Office (TEMO) in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

In Hay 1972, the thief of Staff, Air Force directed TAC to prepare a development plan for COR to include near-term improvements for OT&E/training and far-term development of COR. The TAC AFCOR Development Plan 72-1 was published in response to this direction. In June 1973, Headquarters, Air Force, issued a program management directive (PHD), directing TAC to implant?: COR near-term. This PHD assigned overall responsibility for managing and operating near-term COR to TAC, assigned development, acquisition, and technical responsibility to Systema Cormand, and identified support to be provided by other commands to TAC and Systems Cormand.

In Angust 1973, TAC with assistance from other commands updated the original plan in consonance with the June 1973 PHD and redesignated it, AFCOR Development Plan 73-1. This plan dealt with requirements, acquisition schedules, costs, manpower and organizational structure, implementation schedules, and major milestones for COR.

During 1973, questions were raised within the Air Force as to the approach being used to manage the acquisition of COR. Some officials felt that near-term ODR was being developed without sufficient long term planning or consideration of the workload of all other Air Force commands. In November 1973, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that acquisition of COR would be done as a normal systems acquisition by Air Force Systems Command. This direction was formalized in a program management directive, dated February 1974. Although TAC was no longer the management of the promram, they were to continue to operate the ranges at Nellis.

With the shift in primary COR development and acquisition responsibility to Systems Command, TESPO (formerly TESP) became

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the centralized management agency responsible for COR development and acquisition. In May 1974, TFS:0 issued a program management plan (PMP) for the development and acquisition of COS. The PMP categorized the program into reveral management areas and discussed in some detail the management of each.

The PMD called for the establishment of 14 working groups to provide the needed interface between the large number of participating organizations concerned with COR. The working group charters specified the Air Force organizations and in some cases the other services to be represented on the working groups. Array or Navy participation was specified for the facilities, intelligence, safety, target, threat simulator, and project officers working groups. Participation by other services in the facilities and safety areas concerned the Array's Dugway Range which was to be included as part of COR.

A Continental Operation: Range Advisory Group (CORAG) was established as an executive group to review program management decisions and make recommendations to Systems Command and TAC prior to the commitment of resources. The CORAG was comchained by the Commanders of the Special Weapons Center (the parent organization of TESPO) and the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (the parent organization of the COR Group) and met quarterly to review the statue of mlans and actions occuring in the development and implementation of COR.

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In an effort to obtain the involvement of the other services in the planning of COR, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development in an April 1974 memo to his Army and Eavy counterparts requested participation by appropriate Army and Havy officials in the CORAG. The Air Force considered this to be an initial step toward achieving and objective of full time participation by working level personnel.

In July 1974, representatives of the Arry and Navy participated in the CORAG meeting and expressed interest in placing representatives on the COR working groups. In August 1974, TESPO formally invited membership by the Army and Navy in several working groups. With the denial of fiscal year 1975 COR funding in september 1974, no further efforts were made toward tri-service coordination. <u>TESPO RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING COR CANCELLATION</u>

Following the cancellation of COP funding, TFSPO was left with its basic mission of improving Air Force test and evaluation canability. A headquarters Air Force directive, dated November 15, 1974, designated Systems Cormand as the implementing cormand for the development of equipment designed to improve Air Force canability to conduct OTAE. TESPO program objectives set out in the directive were to provide an improved capability to conduct operational test and evaluation and training at existing Air Force test ranges and to establish a continuing ROTAE program.

TESPO officials stated that efforts in fiscal year 1975 would be in line with the November 15, 1974, directive as follows: -a threat definition study which consolidates threat intelligence information as it applies to OT&R ranges with emphasis on the Nellis ranges.

-- participation in the procurement of an air combat maneuvering instrumentation system.

--participation in the acquisition of a Time-Space-Position-Information System.

-an electromymetic compatibility study in support of the development and acquisition of emmitting test and training equipment.

In February 1975, Systems Command stated that it planned to disband TESPO at the end of fiscal year 1975. The functions of TESPO would be transferred to the Armament Development and Test Center, Elgin Air Force Base, Florida.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND FUTURE RANCE LUBROUNDINTN

CHECNOLOGY OF CONCRESSIONAL ACTIONS SPLATING TO CON

For fiscal year 1974, the Air Force requested \$3.5 million for COR procurement funds. The House Appropriations Committee recommended that the appropriation be delayed until completion of a Con assignat staff review of military plans, requirements, and alternations to COR. The Senate Appropriations Committee report recommended restoration of the \$3.8 million. A conference report, issued on December 19, 1973, upheld the deletion of COR funds proposed by the Pouse.

The Air Force again requested the \$1.8 million as part of the DOD fiscal year 1974 supplemental request. Again the House Cormittee recommended deletion of the funds, the Senate condities restored the funds, and the conference condities upheld the House position.

During March and May 1974 the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings on fiscal year 1975 DOD appropriations. COR funds for fiscal year 1975 were part of the funds requested by the Air Force. In August 1974, committee remorts were issued by the House and the Senate. The House committee report addressed the issue of COR megatively and recommended denial

of

-- the S12.9 million requested for other procurement, Air Force, -- the entire S4.2 million request for CDR - remearch, development, test and evaluation (RDTiF), and

A conference report, which was a joint effort of the House and Senate cormittees, was issued on Sentember 18, 1974. This report upheld the original denial and deletion of COR funds as proposed by the Nouse.

Burine May 1974, the subcornittees of the House Condities on Appropriations held hearings on the fiscal year 1975 military comstruction appropriation. The House condities report dated November 19, 1974, denied the Air Force request for \$5.2 million at various locations to provide facilities in support of the proposed factical operations range. This report stated that it became clear during the hearings that the concept of a tri-service range was not based on meet and that both the Navy and Army stated that no requirement existed for such a range.

The Senate committee report dated December 3, 1974, stated that the committee recognized the importance of COR. However, the committee restricted its approval for funding to provide \$1.2 million for tactical operations range facilities at TFVC without regard to the COR concept.

In a conference report dated December 17, 1074, the Nouse and Senate condities agreed to provide the \$1.2 million for the tacrical operations range facilities. The remaining portion of the \$5.2

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million requested by the Air Force was not formed. BUIER RANCE I PROVEMENTS AT THE WE WANT RANGES

Although fiscal year 19.5% and 1975 GNR funding has been denied and the Air Force does not roban to request GNR funding in the future, improvement of the TFVC and W/M/N Ranges is planned. Improvement of the TFVC Ranges during 19.7% through 1977 will result in the ranges having a significant improvement in range capability similar to that planned to be developed during near-term COR. Integration of the V/M/N Ranges to a simple major test facility under the Department of Defense is under study.

A direct comparison of minaned TPN improvements to CON improvements is not possible since decisions on improvements to be made are not firm and COR planning was not completed. What follows is a discussion of the improvements made or minaned for the TBNC and W/P/D Rannes and the memoral capabilities that were to be added during COR. TEAD Parses

During 1974 a major joint test under the sponsorship of DOD was conducted on the TENC Bannes. This test, called the Electronic Narfare Joint Test (EMJT), involved the Air Berce and Navy. A comsiderable amount of DOD and Navy owned equipment was novel into the Nellis area for the tests. Additionally, an Army system for testing of vegoons systems was noved to Wellis and used to enhance the TENC capabilities. Following completion of DEET in late 1974, the

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Navy equipment was removed from Wellie; however, the Air Force retained custode of much of the DO examl equipment and the Army equipment.

During near-tern CNR, the TFAC ranges were to receive multiple participant tracking canability at the North, South, and Caliente Ranges, threat simulators at the North and Caliente Ranges, and additional ground targets at the North and South Ranges. A large central control facility was to be built at Yellis and communications were to be provided between this facility and each of the TFNC ranges, and the U/R/D Ranges.

A building at Wellis was converted into a central control facility for WJT. Data collection and reduction canability and communications were installed in the range central using DDD and Army furnished equipment. TENC has retained the range central and its combilities following FLAT. This facility provides much of the capability which was planned to be added during mean-term COS but has limited growth potential. To obtain the full capability planned for CDR, the present range central would have to be enlarged or a new building built and additional equipment added.

Multiple marticipants tracking capability has been added at Nellis with DDD and Army emulpment obtained during ELJT. Additional capability to track and score air-to-air multiple engagements will be added with the acquisition of new air combat naneuvering instrumentation being purchased by the Air Force.

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Several threat simulators were purchased during 1974 for delivery to TFWC in 1974 and 1975. With the exception of one simulator which might have been delivered to COR but now will be delivered to Eplin AFR, Florida, the threat simulators received by TFMC will be the same as those planned for near-term COR.

Wendover, 1111, and Dugway Ranges

Improvements planned for mid-term COR included the addition of threat simulators to the Hill Range and the addition of multiparticipant tracking and communications to each of the W/H/D Eanges. A local range control center was to be established and special gap filler radars were to be added. The ranges were to be used for expanded air-to-air, air-to-ground, drone/remotely piloted vehicle missions, and refined electronic warfare testing.

In fiscal year 1973, the Air Force began improvements at Dill Air Force Base and the N/E/D Ranges in support of the drone/repotely piloted vehicle program managed at Dill Air Force Base. Semulative of a hutbling at Dill into a range central facility was become. The facility was to serve as a surge control and data gathering and reduction facility. Will was planning the producement of a multiple narticipant tracking system and improved communications equipment for the ranges. These improvements and others proposed through fiscal year 1977 were in addition to the COP to permit early support of the drone/remotely piloted vehicle program.

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APPENDIX T Face 1

COE CHRONOLOGY

The Slue Eibbon Defense Panel Report, July 1970

This report was the result of a year-long study aronsored by the DOD. The report concluded that within DOD OTAR had been too infrequent. poorly designed and executed, and generally inadequate. The report stated that existing ranges were marginally adequate to support the OTAE which had been performed, and expressed doubt that they were adequate for OTAF which should have been but was not performed. "HAVE EDGE" Study, Detober 1970

This study called for the creation of a very sophisticated test facility covering a large area including the air space over most of Utan and Nevada with the Hill Air Force Base and Dugway ranges as its center. Cost estimates for acquiring and operating the "HAVE FRGE" ranges varied from about \$499 million to \$1.5 hillion over a 20-year period of operation and it was rejected by the Air Torce as being too expensive.

non Test and Evaluation Excility Base Review, June 1971

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As a result of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report, DOD directed a detailed study of existing test facilities in order to determine a logical approach to implementing the panel's recommendations. The study defined areas of the country where suitable OTAE could be conducted and recourended the creation of several ranges by tying together existing ranges. One of these was the Continental

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Operations Range.

TAC AFCOP Development Plan 72-1, July 1972

This plan was published in response to a Maw 1972 Chief of Staff, Air Force, directive to TAC to prepare a development plan for CME to include near-term improvements for OT&F and training and far-term development of COR.

Draft Development Concept Paper, July 1972

Following the recommendations of the 1972 DOD Test and Publication Facility Base Peview that a COR he established, the DOD Tri-Service Coordination Conmittee for Integrated Offensive/Defensive Test Environment becan work on a development concept paper for CDF. On May 5, 1972, DDRAF dissolved the Tri-Service Coordination Committee and assigned completion of a draft DCP for CDF to the Air Porce. Systems Command Directive, February 1973

Systems Command gave the Air Force Special Meapon Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, the responsibility of organizing a Test and Evaluation Management Office to be responsible for improving the operational test and evaluation capability of using

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commands in the Sellis Air Force Tase area, and Matisfying Systems Command's inmediate development, test and evaluation capability modes in the Wendover/Hill/Dugway area.

APPENDIX 1

COR Nevelopment Concept Paper, April 1973

The COR Development Concept Paper specified that the COR would be developed in the Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, Reno area since the vestern United States is the only geographical area in the Continental United States that has the land and air space necessary and which is sufficiently free from encroachment and electromagnetic interference to support the COR concept. It also discussed the issues of why there should be COR, and how soon should a COR capability be achieved.

Readouarters Air Force Directive, June 1975

This directive pave TAC responsibility for implementing neartern COR as well as the overall responsibility for managing and operating COR. It assigned development, acquisition, and technical support responsibilities to Systems Command.

TAC AFROR Development Plan, 73-1, September 1973

In August 19/3 TAC with assistance from other commands undated the original TAC AFOOR Development Plan 72-1, in consonance with the June 1973 directive. This plan dealt with requirements, acquisition schedules, cost, manpower and organizational structure, implementation schedules, and major pilestones for COR.

House Appropriations Subcondities Perrines, Sentember 1973

In testimony the Air Force estimated that the total investment cost of CDR through fiscal year 1982 would be \$162.5 million. This included \$78.2 million in RDTEE, \$79.4 million in other producement, and \$5.2 million in military construction. COR near-term and mid-term were estimated to cost \$112.6 million through fiscal year 1978, with an additional \$59 million required to complete COR far-term.

Headquarters Air Force Directive, February 1974

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In November 1973, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, directed that acquisition of COR would be done as a normal systems accuisition by Air Force Systems Command. In a Meadquarters Air Force program management directive, dated February 15, 1974, Systems Command was designated the implementing corrund for the development and acquisition of COR. TAC was designated the COM operator pending a Chief of Staff Air Force decision on the final COR management system. Air Force Systems Command Directive, March 1974

In Earch 1974, Systems Cormand designated TESPO as the lead organization for the development and acquisition of (OP. TESP) was given responsibility for preparing a program management plan (PMP) for COR. In addition, TESPO was to be the responsible test organization for the program.

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TESM Program "inacement Plan, "Try 1975

In May 1974, TESPO issued a TH for the development and acquisition of COR. The PMP categorized the program into several management areas and discussed in some detail the management of each. It set out requirements in some detail based on surveys of using communds. House Appropriations Subcommittee Wearines, May 1975

In testimony, the Air Force estimated that the total investment cost of COR through fiscal year 1950 would be \$297.9 million. This included \$34.1 million for EDTER, \$199 million in other procurement, and \$14.8 million in military construction. The Air Force explained the increase in the cost estimates from the previous year to have resulted from a further definition of requirements and a refinement of cost.

Development Concept Paper Pevision A, July 1974

This was the first revision to the April 1973 DCP and revised completion dates for the three CCC phases. "ear-tern COR completion was set for end of fiscal year 1977, mid-term for fiscal years 1978 and 1979, and far-term for fiscal years 1980 through 1982. Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) Briefing, July 1974 In July 1974, TESPO gave a DSARC briefing covering CDR planning and costs. DSARC approved the DCP and approved the CDR program.

Congressional Conference Report, September 1974

On September 18, 1974, Congress dented COR funding for fiscal year 1975. As presented in a conference report of the Committee of Conference, House of Representatives, the amount of funding denied was: other procurement \$12.9 million, EDTAR \$4.2 million, and O&M \$1.1 million.

Meadquarters Air Force Directive, November 1974

Systems Command was designated the implementing command for the development of equipment designed to improve Air Force capability to conduct OTAE. TESPO program objectives set out in the directive were to provide an improved capability to conduct operational test and evaluation and training at existing Air Force test ranges and to establish a continuing RPTOF program.

Congressional Committee Reports, "overher and Number 1974

The House consister report dated Wovember 10, 1974, denied the Air Force request for \$5.2 million for Military Construction at various locations to provide facilities in support of the promosed tactical operations range. The Senate consister report dated December 3, 1974, restricted its approval for funding to provide \$1.2 million for ongoing tactical operations range facilities at TPVC without regard to the ODR concept.

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Congressional Conference Report, Recember 1974

The House and Senate committees agreed to provide \$1.2 million for the tactical operations range facilities. The remaining portion of the \$5.2 million requested by the Air Force was not funded. <u>Message from Chief of Staff, USAF, to COR Participants, December 1974</u>

The message dated Fecenber 19, 1974, specified, among other things, that all planning actions, agreements, organizations, and other related activities directly associated with the COR development/acquisition program very terminated. The message further stated that only those specific items that can be clearly differentiated from the COR program may be retained as appropriate.

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APPENDIX III