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REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES



Need For Improved Headquarters Personnel Accounting-- Navy Pacific Fleet

Department of the Navy

During the last 4 years, the Department of Defense has been under a congressional mandate to develop a system that accurately accounts for personnel performing management headquarters functions. GAO recently surveyed the implementation of Defense policy for accounting for management headquarters in certain Navy Pacific Fleet organizational elements.

GAO believes the Navy has continued to understate the number of personnel performing management headquarters functions. In eight Pacific Fleet activities GAO recently visited, the Navy is not counting as management headquarters staff any of the 1,800 personnel assigned. It is estimated that about 600 of these personnel are doing management headquarters type work.



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-183257

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As requested in your September 29, 1976, letter, we are reporting our evaluation results of the Department of the Navy's implementation of the Department of Defense's policy for accounting for management in Pacific Fleet organizational elements.

We discussed this report with Department of the Navy officials, but as your office requested, we did not obtain their formal comments.

This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense which are set forth on page 8. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report. We will be in touch with your office in the near future to arrange for release of the report so that the requirements of section 236 can be set in motion.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James A. Stacks".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CNFK	Commander, Naval Forces, Korea
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMFAIRWESTPAC	Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific
COMNAVAIRPAC	Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific
COMNAVMARIANAS	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas
DOD	Department of Defense
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific
GAO	General Accounting Office
HSA	Headquarters Support Activity
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
TDC-----	Taiwan Defense Command
WESTPAC	Western Pacific

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

NEED FOR IMPROVED
HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL
ACCOUNTING--NAVY PACIFIC
FLEET
Department of the Navy

D I G E S T

GAO recently surveyed the organizational structure of a number of Navy headquarters elements in the Pacific Fleet to evaluate implementation of Department of Defense policy to account for management headquarters. The Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee has requested that he be provided the results of this survey. A recent Navy review was conducted to improve the accuracy of accounting for personnel performing headquarters type work. (See p. 1.)

In an April 20, 1976, report, titled "Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense" (FPCD-76-35), GAO concluded that accounting for management headquarters personnel under the current organizational approach is inadequate and can result in distorting the reported size of management headquarters.

GAO recommended that Defense gradually implement a system to account for headquarters personnel on the basis of the type of work performed. Defense does not agree; it insists that a functional approach to headquarters personnel identification offers no distinct advantages over the current method. (See p. 1.)

GAO believes the Navy has continued to understate the number of personnel performing management headquarters functions. In 8 Pacific Fleet activities GAO recently visited, the Navy is not counting as management headquarters staff any of the 2,800 personnel assigned. GAO estimates that about 600 of these personnel are performing management headquarters type work. (See p. 6.)

During the last 4 years, the Department of Defense has been under a congressional mandate to develop a system that accurately accounts

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for personnel performing management headquarters functions.

In March 1975, the Survey and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee reported on Defense's progress to establish such a system. The report was critical of the Navy's progress. (See p. 3.)

The report said the Navy had no centralized information system to determine which of its components were responsible for performing specific management headquarters functions. Neither could it accurately determine the total number of personnel who perform such functions.

The House Appropriations Committee investigation disclosed that data the Navy reported to the Office of the Secretary and the Congress concerning the total size and cost of its management headquarters was understated. These understatements occurred primarily because the Navy

- supplemented management headquarters staffs with personnel from organizations not designated as management headquarters, and

- insisted on designating as management headquarters only those organizations devoting at least 51 percent of their effort to management headquarters functions. (See p. 3.)

GAO says the current system does not accurately account for management headquarters personnel. (See p. 6.)

GAO has concluded that this occurred because:

- The criteria did not require specific functional accounting. It simply allowed those activities devoting over 50 percent of their resources to the performance of management headquarters to be designated as management headquarters if the activity in question did not clearly meet other available criteria. (See p. 7.)

--The Navy did not supplement the Defense criteria to cover its own organizational configuration, operational practices, and functional characteristics. (See p. 6.)

--Defense criteria were general and subject to varying interpretation. (See pp. 6 and 7.)

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense develop specific criteria to functionally account for personnel performing management headquarters tasks. (See p. 8.)

Despite the Secretary of Defense's position that accounting for headquarters personnel on the basis of the type of work they do may not be useful, GAO has shown by example in this report the need for such functional accounting.

In addition, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Navy continue to review headquarters functions and provide the Congress with more accurate information in time for its consideration of the fiscal year 1978 budget. (See p. 8.)

At the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, GAO did not obtain formal comments from the Navy but informally discussed the report with Navy officials and considered their views where appropriate.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We recently reviewed the civilian and military staffing of (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), (2) the Civilian Secretaries of the military departments, and (3) the immediate staffs of the military departments. The results of this review were presented to the Congress in an April 20, 1976, report titled, "Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense" (FPCD-76-35). We concluded that accounting for management headquarters personnel under the organizational approach as required by Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.73 is inadequate and can result in distorting the reported size of DOD management headquarters. We also stated that full functional accounting is essential for the identification and accounting of management headquarters support personnel. Accordingly, we recommended that Defense gradually implement a system to account for headquarters personnel on the basis of the type of work performed. OSD's position was basically that the implementation of a full functional approach to headquarters personnel identification offered no distinct advantages over the organizational method.

More recently we surveyed the organizational structure of a number of headquarters elements in the Pacific Fleet. The Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee has requested that he be furnished the results of this survey. One major objective was to evaluate the Pacific Fleet's participation in a recent management headquarters review--which was a result in implementing DOD Directive 5100.73 and a more accurate accounting for personnel performing headquarters functions.

SCOPE

This report was compiled by reviewing Navy organizational charts, functional statements, policy and guidance directives, and other documents furnished by Navy officials. We obtained additional information and supporting data from studies, reports, and interviews of Navy command officials.

We made our study at the following Pacific Fleet locations:

U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, Yokosuka, Japan
Headquarters, Fleet Air, Western Pacific, Atsugi, Japan
U.S. Naval Forces, Korea, Seoul, Korea
U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, Subic Bay, Philippines
Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific, Subic Bay, Philippines
Fleet Coordinating Group, San Miguel, Philippines
U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, Guam
Headquarters Support Activity, Taipei, Taiwan

CHAPTER 2

MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

ACCOUNTING NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED

Although persistent congressional attention has stimulated reductions in the number of personnel assigned to management headquarters, control over such functions requires accounting for what people do as well as where they are assigned. The Congress has previously criticized the Navy for understating the size of its management headquarters, yet the Navy has continued to understate the number of personnel performing management headquarters functions. This occurred because:

- The DOD criteria did not require functional accounting. It allowed those activities devoting over 50 percent of their resources to the performance of management headquarters tasks to be designated as management headquarters if the activity in question did not clearly meet other criteria.
- The Navy did not supplement the DOD criteria to cover its own organizational configuration, operational practices, and functional characteristics.
- The DOD criteria was general and subject to varying interpretations.

The lack of functional criteria and the 50-percent rule allowed the Navy to avoid counting personnel assigned to organizations that devote less than 50 percent of their resources to management headquarters functions. Also, the criteria was interpreted to exclude headquarters support activities, organizations that were extensions of management headquarters.

Thus, the Navy is not counting as management headquarters staff any of the 1,800 personnel assigned to 8 Pacific Fleet activities we recently visited. We estimate that about 600 of these personnel may be performing management headquarters functions. (See p. 6.)

BACKGROUND

During the last 4 years DOD has been under a congressional mandate to develop a system that accurately accounts for personnel performing management headquarters functions. In March 1975, the Survey and Investigations Staff of the

House Appropriations Committee reported on the progress of DOD's efforts to establish such a system. The report was critical of the Navy's progress.

The report stated that the Navy had no centralized information system whereby it could determine which of its components were responsible for performing specific management headquarters functions. Neither could it accurately determine the total number of personnel who perform such functions. Thus, OSD officials were not in a position to assure the Congress that budget submissions regarding Navy management headquarters were meaningful. Furthermore, without an accurate accounting system the Navy's ability to properly manage and control the size, identification, and cost of its headquarters activities was limited.

The House Appropriations Committee investigation disclosed that the Navy understated the total size and cost of its management headquarters to OSD and the Congress. These understatements occurred primarily because the Navy (1) supplemented management headquarters staffs with personnel from organizations not designated as management headquarters and (2) insisted on designating as management headquarters only those organizations devoting at least 51 percent of their effort to management headquarters functions.

It was recommended that the Navy institute a department-wide review of its field activities to identify the ones performing headquarters functions. Then, additional efforts were to be made to ascertain how many personnel were performing these functions. The spaces for these personnel were to be included in the total headquarters personnel strength of the Navy.

DOD MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL
ACCOUNTING CRITERIA

On April 11, 1975, shortly after the investigation results were released, OSD issued DOD Directive 5100.73 which established revised criteria for designating an activity as a management headquarters or a headquarters support activity.

The DOD criteria required that organizations be designated as management headquarters activities when as their primary mission they perform the following functions for lower echelon organizations.

1. Policy development and guidance.
2. Long-range planning, programing, and budgeting.

3. Management and distribution of resources.

4. Program performance review and evaluation.

Organizations whose primary mission was to provide direct support to a designated management headquarters were to be designated as management headquarters support activities. This included staff extensions, agencies, activities, centers, and other types of organizations which may have been organizationally separate from the management headquarters, yet provide it with support integral to its effective operation. Generally, direct support may take the form of providing analysis for or assisting in the formulation of policies and procedures, or in otherwise providing professional, technical, administrative, or logistical support essential to the execution of the management headquarters mission.

Where the nature of an organization cannot be readily determined, and it does not clearly meet the criteria cited in the two previous paragraphs, it should be designated as either a management headquarters or a headquarters support activity if a simple majority (50-percent rule) of its work is devoted to the activities described above. This criterion, however, was only to be used as a last resort.

NAVY DEPARTMENT REVIEW

Based on the above criteria, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed major Navy commands to provide him with an accurate accounting of all personnel assigned to management headquarters and headquarters support activities. He emphasized that this effort was necessary to insure the integrity of the Navy's headquarters management efforts before the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. CNO directed a two-phased review on June 26, 1975, to accomplish this objective.

Phase I

Phase I required a complete inventory of existing manpower used in assigned headquarters activity functions. It also required necessary manpower allocation adjustments to reflect true headquarters manpower requirements. Phase I was directed only at currently designated management headquarters. It basically required (1) a revalidation of all headquarters billets (jobs) to insure personnel assigned to headquarters were actually spending over 50 percent of their efforts in the assigned billet and (2) that personnel also assigned responsibility for work in other organizations were spending less than 50 percent of their efforts in the additional duty function.

Phase II

On November 13, 1975, CNO directed that phase II of the review begin. Its basic objectives were to identify

--nonheadquarters functions performed by headquarters staffs and the feasibility of reassigning such functions and manpower to a nonheadquarters activity and

--all Navy headquarters and headquarters support activities for potential additions and deletions to the current OSD-approved management headquarters activity listing.

PACIFIC FLEET PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS REVIEW

On June 28, 1975, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) directed its five type commands, the 3d and 7th Fleet, and Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific (FOCCPAC) to provide the data required for Phase I of the review. This data was forwarded by Pacific Fleet to CNO on August 4, 1975. This effort was only directed at currently designated management headquarters activities and resulted in minor manpower authorization changes being recommended to CNO. In total, designated Pacific Fleet headquarters activities will increase by 128 positions that are to be transferred to them from organizations not designated as headquarters. Most of the transfers involved two organizations--Pacific Fleet and Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet. Pacific Fleet headquarters will gain 89 military billets and 13 civilian positions. Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, will gain 6 military billets and 39 civilian positions.

On November 22, 1975, CINCPACFLT directed that Phase II begin. CINCPACFLT reported the results of its Phase II review to CNO in five separate messages from December 16 through 28, 1975. CINCPACFLT recommended that its headquarters, all the type command headquarters, and 3d Fleet Headquarters continue to be designated as headquarters activities. However, it recommended that 7th Fleet Headquarters and FOCCPAC be dropped from the headquarters activity listing. We learned recently that Naval Districts are also being recommended for deletion by CNO.

A DOD official testified before the Congress that fiscal year 1977 budget data was to be based on implementation of the revised DOD criteria. However, as of August 1, 1976, a new OSD management headquarters listing had not been finalized. Indications are that 7th Fleet Headquarters may be deleted.

Navy officials expect that the revised list will be approved for publication shortly.

CINCPACFLT also recommended that several smaller activities either be designated as headquarters or merged with CINCPACFLT. It deferred to CNO concerning the status of a few others. However, for the majority of activities reviewed, CINCPACFLT was satisfied with their nonheadquarters designation.

We visited eight field activities which were not on the headquarters activity listing but which were reviewed by the Pacific Fleet to determine if they met the criteria for designation as a headquarters activity. (See app. I, pp. 9 to 11.) These 8 activities were authorized about 1,800 people (896 military and 921 civilians). CINCPACFLT did not recommend to CNO that any of the eight activities be added to the headquarters listing.

OUR ASSESSMENT

If the Pacific Fleet's input to the management headquarters review is indicative of the entire Navy, the objectives of the CNO's review were not accomplished. Not all personnel performing management headquarters functions were accounted for as directed. We estimate that at least 600 personnel performing management headquarters functions may not be properly accounted for at the 8 activities visited.

The revised DOD criteria did not require a functional accounting of personnel performing management headquarters tasks even though that was proposed by the Congress as far back as 1972. The Surveys and Investigations staff of the House Appropriations Committee again made the same recommendation to the Navy on March 26, 1975. As stated on page 1, we agreed with the recommendation to account for personnel functionally.

In addition, we believe many individuals performing management headquarters functions were not accounted for because DOD guidance for performing the review was general and subject to varying interpretation. Navy officials in Hawaii and the Western Pacific agreed that the directive was somewhat vague. Further, the Navy did not supplement the directive as required in the DOD directive. A DOD official testified before the Congress that each DOD component was required to develop written internal instructions which specifically interpret the management headquarters definition and functions in terms of its own organizational configuration, operational practices, and functional characteristics.

Since the revised criteria did not require functional accounting and was general in nature, it resulted in a large number of Pacific Fleet personnel not being counted as doing management headquarters functions. Without functional accounting criteria, only personnel assigned to activities which devote more than 50 percent of their resources to management headquarters functions need be included in statistics reflecting the size of management headquarters. Further, the general nature of the criteria allows much latitude in judging whether an activity is a management headquarters. Since it is advantageous for organizations to maintain a low headquarters profile, it is not surprising that the general criteria were interpreted accordingly.

CINCPACFLT used the 50-percent criteria in five of the eight activities we visited, although this was done only as a last resort. In one case an organization had over 50 percent of its resources devoted to a function considered to be a management headquarters-type function--area coordination. However, CINCPACFLT was not sure whether area coordination should really be considered a management headquarters function. It left the final decision with CNO.

In other instances the Pacific Fleet was able to rationalize, because of the general nature of the criteria, why organizations that are extensions of headquarters should not be designated as management headquarters while admitting that they were a headquarters-type activity.

In summary, CINCPACFLT provided comments to CNO on the headquarters status of six of the eight field activities we visited. It did not forward comments to CNO on two activities--Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific and Commander, Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific--although each were reviewed. Of the six activities commented on, three received recommendations to continue designation as nonheadquarters. CINCPACFLT did not make a final recommendation concerning three others.

CONCLUSIONS

The Navy has continued to understate the number of personnel performing management headquarters functions, because the current system does not promote the desired accuracy. The criteria were general, but more importantly did not require functional accounting for personnel performing management headquarters tasks as required by the Congress. Accordingly, many personnel devoting less than half their effort to management headquarters functions were not counted. This, together with not counting extensions of management

headquarters as support activities have resulted in the Navy understating the number of personnel assigned to headquarters-type organizations. We estimate that at least 600 individuals were not counted at the 8 activities visited as part of the Navy headquarters structure.

Also, the proposed deletion of naval districts would not be consistent with prior Navy decisions. Recent OSD testimony before the Congress supported the inclusion of naval districts in the management headquarters lists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the Secretary of Defense's position that accounting for headquarters personnel on the basis of the type of work they do may not be useful, we have shown by example in this report the need for such functional accounting. We therefore again recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop specific criteria to functionally account for personnel performing management headquarters tasks.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Navy continue to review his headquarters functions and to provide the Congress with more accurate information in time for its consideration for the fiscal year 1978 budget.

GAO'S ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS INTHE PACIFIC FLEET'S EVALUATION OFHEADQUARTERS STATUS

The following is our analysis of the Pacific Fleet's evaluation of the headquarters status of four of the eight activities we visited. None of these organizations are designated as management headquarters. They contain about two-thirds of the 600 personnel we believe are not being properly counted as management headquarters.

COMMANDER, FLEET AIR, WESTERN PACIFIC

The mission of Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific (COMFAIRWESTPAC) is to perform command functions throughout the Western Pacific. This includes assigned shore activities to provide the entire 7th Fleet, including Marine Corps units, with aviation logistic, operational and training support. It is actually an extension of AIRPAC, being its WESTPAC representative. COMFAIRWESTPAC is authorized a staff of 192 personnel.

The Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific, in commenting to CINCPACFLT on whether COMFAIRWESTPAC should be designated as a management headquarters, recognized that COMFAIRWESTPAC performed a variety of the delineated command headquarters functions and that it is, in fact, a headquarters. It was reasoned that it did not qualify as a management headquarters because its responsibilities did not extend to policy development or long-range planning, programming, and budgeting. Concerning whether it should be a headquarters support activity, the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific, stated that it is a matter of interpreting DOD policy guidance. COMFAIRWESTPAC did not participate in the evaluation. CINCPACFLT did not provide comments to CNO on whether COMFAIRWESTPAC should be designated as a management headquarters.

COMFAIRWESTPAC at least meets the criteria for designation as a management headquarters support activity. Therefore, all of the staff should probably be counted as management headquarters.

COMMANDER, NAVAL FORCES, KOREA

The Commander, Naval Forces, Korea (CNFK) participated in Phase II of the review and in a message to CINCPACFLT concluded that it (1) was correctly designated as a non-

management headquarters, (2) expended the majority of its resources as an extension of CINCPACFLT, and (3) was a headquarters support activity.

CINCPACFLT did not forward these conclusions to CNO verbatim. CINCPACFLT stated that if its assignment of immediate area coordination to CNFK is also considered direct management headquarters support, then citing CNFK as a headquarters support activity (HSA) may be warranted. In this connection, CNO recognized that area coordination functions are similar to functions of other activities currently designated as management headquarters.

Even under the last resort criteria, CNFK should be designated as HSA because 70 percent of its efforts is devoted to area coordination and support of the unified command in Korea, a designated management headquarters. CNFK is authorized a staff of 164 personnel.

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES,
MARIANAS

To determine if the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas (COMNAVMARIANAS) should be classified a management headquarters CINCPACFLT requested it estimate the percentage of workload devoted to area coordination, fleet support, and general areas. COMNAVMARIANAS estimated that 55 percent of its efforts was devoted to area coordination. COMNAVMARIANAS did not express an opinion as to whether or not it should be designated as a management headquarters.

Also, CINCPACFLT only stated in a message to CNO that if the performance of area coordination is a criterion for inclusion in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) list then COMNAVMARIANAS should be considered as a candidate since more than half its manpower resources/workload involves area coordination. COMNAVMARIANAS is authorized a staff of 88 personnel.

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT ACTIVITY,
TAIPEI

The mission HSA Taipei, is to provide administrative and logistic support to the Headquarters, U.S.-Taiwan Defense Command (TDC), the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Republic of China, and other activities and units, as designated by CNO. It is authorized a staff of 480 personnel.

CINCPACFLT, in commenting to CNO on the status of HSA Taipei, stated that it could be considered a management

headquarters support activity because its primary mission is to support two management headquarters. CINCPACFLT also added that HSA Taipei would not be a management headquarters support activity under the last resort criteria because the number of personnel assigned to TDC and MAAG represents less than 8 percent of the total population supported. However, the 8-percent figure does not include Navy personnel support management headquarters other than TDC and MAAG. The 13th Air Force Headquarters is on the OSD Management Headquarters listing, and there are several detachments of this activity in Taiwan. In addition HSA Taipei provides support to American Embassy personnel. It also supports various establishments in Taiwan, such as the commissary store, USN Hospital, and school units, that would probably not exist were it not for TDC and MAAG. None of the Navy people at HSA Taipei supporting these organizations was considered. Yet all these organizations and more were included in the base used to arrive at the 8-percent figure. Also HSA Taipei does not provide the same level of support to everyone in Taiwan. Many of the organizations in Taiwan provide some of their own support. This indicates that there may be many more people in Taiwan support headquarters-type activities that are not being accounted for. Thus, our estimate of about 600 people not being counted may be a conservative figure.

CINCPACFLT did not recommend to CNO if HSA Taipei should be designated as a headquarters support activity. In our opinion, HSA-Taipei personnel in direct support functions should be classified as management headquarters support activity personnel because they clearly meet the required criteria. The criteria states that organizations whose primary mission is to provide direct support to a designated management headquarters will be designated as management headquarters support activities.

Other Activities

Generally, as a result of liberal interpretation of the headquarters directive and use of the last resort criteria, similar headquarters accounting discrepancies (about 200) also exist in these four activities.

- Commander, Naval Forces, Japan
- Commander, Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific
- Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines
- Fleet Coordinating Group, Philippines