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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

APR 1 1976



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Advertising For Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?

Advertising expenditures for military recruiting have increased from \$6.7 million in fiscal year 1970 to \$96.1 million in fiscal year 1974.

The purposes of military advertising, in addition to obtaining recruits, are to improve the people's attitudes toward the military and improve the images of the services.

This report shows that few recruits can be traced to advertising and that the attitudes toward and images of the military have not changed greatly for better or for worse.

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

We reviewed the military services' recruiting activities for the all-volunteer force. This report discusses the services' advertising programs.

In addition, GAO has prepared three other reports: (1) "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits," (2) "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," and (3) "Overview of Military Recruiting Activities." These reports are being issued under separate covers.

We have made our study pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Lucas A. Steil

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

A and I	Army Advertising and Information
A&P	advertising and publicity
AVF	all-volunteer force
BAR	Broadcast Advertisers Report, Incorporated
DOD	Department of Defense
DRC	District Recruiting Command
GAO	General Accounting Office
JADOR	Joint Advertising Directors of Recruiting
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PSA	public service announcements
RRC	Regional Recruiting Command
SRI	Stanford Research Institute
SSN	social security number
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command

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D I G E S T

To support the military services' intensified recruiting efforts for the all-volunteer force, expenditures for advertising increased over the past 4 years from about \$7 million annually to \$96.1 million.

Several factors have influenced the services' recruiting success advertising increased, recruiting forces were expanded and improved, salaries were raised, and bonuses were added. Questions of whether less advertising would produce less recruits and whether a different approach might produce more for less were unanswered. The total number of potential recruits was not expanded, although the advertising campaigns were greatly expanded from 1970 through 1974.

When the services conduct large advertising programs they may be only competing with each other for the same potential recruit. GAO's review found considerable evidence of uncontrolled, duplicative, or inconsistent practices that offer considerable potential for reducing cost and increasing advertising programs' effectiveness. (See pp. 12 to 22.)

Each of the services have been left on its own as to how the money should be spent. Research has shown that the things that attract youth are common in all services; i.e., pay, educational benefits, training opportunities, travel, and the advertising of the services, with occasional exceptions, of a particular service as perceived by young people appears to be the single most influential factor in their enlistment decision. (See p. 41.)

An analysis of studies done for and by the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense showed that attitudes toward the military had changed little in a 4-year period. (See p. 32.)

Although no one really knows how much free time is being received, most people agree that paid radio and TV will cost the services a large part of the free time now being received. (See p. 10.)

Recruiting research for the all-volunteer force has lacked central direction and control. Much research done was duplicative while, at the same time, needed research was not being accomplished.

The Joint Advertising Directors of Research appeared to have recognized this problem early in 1974. Their recommendations went largely unheeded, until recently when the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognized the problem and began actions to make improvements. (See p. 32.)

GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense include the following:

- Defense and the four services should undertake research programs that have potential for greatly improving the advertising program.
- The Department of Defense should identify additional research that is common to the entire recruiting effort.
- Some mechanism should be established so that research performed by the services in common areas is not duplicative and is made available to those have use for it.
- The services and Defense should begin to experiment with various advertising approaches such as: (1) Defense military service advertising, (2) four

service advertising, and (3) controlled test advertising to determine the effect of various media such as direct mail and magazine advertising.

--Before pursuing any type of paid broadcast advertising, the services should determine how much public service announcement time is now being obtained, how effective this media is, and how much of this time could be lost if the services went to paid broadcasting.

--Defense should examine the policy of using all response type media, especially the more costly popup cards considering the number of leads that can be traced to enlistments.

GAO also found that all advertising costs relating to the overall military recruiting campaign are not fully disclosed and reported by the services consistently. Without such information, program managers are not in a position to carry out their responsibilities in formulating effective plans and making sound decisions. (See p. 57.)

The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issues instructions and guidelines to the services for reporting advertising costs that will be helpful to management.

Defense agreed with most of GAO's recommendations. It stated that it had begun efforts to improve Defense's ability to measure advertising effectiveness which included controlled experimentation in the enlistment market.

In addition, a consolidated market research program has been developed to improve DOD's market and advertising research capability and eliminate market research redundancy within the Department.

The Congress reduced Defenses' military advertising budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 35 percent.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To promote the military during the draft the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps employed advertising agencies and used posters, pamphlets, give-away items, public service advertising on television and radio, and free space in newspapers, magazines, and outdoor billboards. Due to the draft, a large advertising campaign was not necessary and expenditures were relatively low. The advertising agency's primary role was to advise the services and design the materials for their campaign.

In 1969 the President announced his intention to shift from the draft to an all-volunteer force (AVF). The Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), and independent organizations and individuals conducted many studies on ways to attract young men and women into an AVF. These studies recommended changes such as increasing military personnel pay and allowances to comparable civilian levels, authorizing various enlistment bonuses, recruiting more women, and reducing irritants associated with military life. One of these studies was the Presidentially created Gates Commission Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Force.

This report recommended that the services expand their advertising campaigns to promote changes in the military environment and improve the military image in the civilian population. The Gates Commission report estimated that an additional \$10 to \$20 million would be enough to effectively promote the attractions of Army life and to prevent widespread ignorance of changes that were occurring. The study indicated smaller increases would be needed in the other services' ad budgets to meet the challenge of an AVF.

In 1971, resulting from (1) the President's determination to end the draft and establish an AVF and (2) the Gates Commission Report, the Army was the first service to use paid media. The initial campaign was a 3-month experiment using primarily radio and TV media. This \$10.6 million experiment successfully created awareness of the Army and increased traffic in the recruiting stations. However, because of congressional criticism the Army discontinued paid radio and television advertising and instead used paid print media, mostly magazines, to promote the Army's message. The Army continued to use radio and television on a public service time basis as it had in the past.

In March, April, and May of 1971, the Air Force missed its non-prior service recruiting goals for the first time in several years. Air Force officials attributed this to reduced draft pressure and began developing an advertising campaign to replace the lost awareness of the Air Force. The Air Force started using paid print advertising in late fiscal year 1971.

The Navy was the next service to use paid advertising, the reasons being the President's plans to end the draft and shortfaling in late fiscal year 1972. Navy officials also stated that the Army and Air Force, their largest competitors, were using paid advertising and were cornering the market. Officials felt that if they did not initiate a paid advertising campaign immediately, they would fall far behind in getting qualified individuals.

The Marine Corps was the last of the four services to enter paid advertising in late fiscal year 1974. Official reasons cited were they were shortfaling; the 55 percent minimum high-school graduate limitation imposed by Congress; recruiters lack of salesmanship skills; and the inability to compete with the Army, Navy, and Air Force advertising campaigns on their present budget. At the beginning of the major campaigns the services relied on advertising agencies to develop the advertising campaigns and promotion strategies.

The media used in advertising the AVF has remained the same except for expansion and the majority of newspaper, magazine, and outdoor advertising has become paid advertising rather than free. The services, except for limited tests, have not used paid radio and TV advertising. All advertising on these mediums is free public service time with the only cost to the services being producing the films or tapes.

The main objectives of military advertising are (1) create awareness of the military as a career, (2) improve attitudes of youth and their influencers toward the military, (3) identify specific individuals who would be interested in a military career, and (4) maintain or improve the prospective service image. Parameters of these objectives include among other things (1) the target market--those to whom the advertising would be addressed, (2) the reach--the number or percentage of the target market that would be exposed to the advertising, (3) the frequency--the number of times the message would need to be advertised to be effective, and (4) the advertising vehicle best suited to convey the message.

In September 1974 the services advertising directors formed the Joint Advertising Directors of Recruiting (JADOR) which, until the spring of 1975 provided the principal central direction to the ad programs. Since the spring of 1975 DOD has had more input to the services ad campaigns. The JADOR charter showed that the military services' advertising goal for fiscal year 1974 was awareness, public acceptance, and prospect traffic. According to the charter a mutual understanding in striving to meet the services recruiting goals had become ever more important. The specific purposes of JADOR follow.

1. Exchanging management and advertising ideas to achieve recruiting goals. Informal agendas and proceedings were to be planned with this objective in mind.
2. Identifying courses of action in marketing and research which would be helpful to all services in recruiting active force and reserve components.
3. Cooperating in media and marketing studies, such as the Broadcast Advertisers Report, Incorporated (BAR), for mutual benefit of all services.
4. Developing selective programs for public service time on radio and television without infringing on the individual service's proprietary information.
5. Broadening the recruiting base in fiscal year 1974 and subsequent years through interservice advertising.
6. Reviewing contracts and other related areas and procedures for further improvement of fiscal management.
7. Reviewing local advertising resource applications for optimum effectiveness and reach.

The goal of the JADOR charter was to maintain a channel of communications between the services' advertising headquarters and discuss problems in sustaining an adequate supply of quality volunteers.

The following is a schedule of the active duty military advertising budgets for fiscal year 1970-76 supplied to us by DOD and the services.

Schedule Of Advertising Budgets
Fiscal Years 1970-76

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>DOD market research</u>	<u>(millions of dollars)</u>				<u>Total DOD</u>
		<u>Army (note a)</u>	<u>Navy (note a)</u>	<u>Marines (note a)</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
1970	-	2.6	1.5	.9	1.7	6.7
1971	-	18.6	1.5	1.0	1.4	22.5
1972	-	22.4	7.1	4.0	7.1	40.4
1973	-	26.7	23.0	6.7	12.7	68.8
1974	2.4	38.3	26.8	^b 11.9	16.8	96.1
1975	7.0	43.1	29.8	^c 7.2	15.0	102.1
1976	7.0	45.8	25.8	13.8	13.2	^d 104.0

We have reviewed various aspects of the military services' recruiting efforts concerning AVF. Also, Senators James Abourezk and George McGovern asked us to look into certain recruiting improprieties. Because of the review's complexity, four reports were prepared: (1) "Overview of Military Recruiting Activities," (2) "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits," (3) "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," and (4) this advertising report which discusses the services' ad programs' effectiveness and possible efficiencies.

^a Budgets for the Navy and Marine Corps include funds for the Regular, Retention, and Reserves.

^b Includes \$6.6 million which was reprogramed at the end of FY 1974 to purchase the Marine Corps initial paid advertising for FY 1975.

^c Total amount of advertising which appeared in FY 1975; \$10.5 budgeted for FY 1975, \$1.3 reprogramed Reserves FY 1974, and \$5.3 reprogramed Regular.

^d The Congress reduced DOD's military advertising budget request for fiscal year 1976 to \$67 million or about 35 percent.

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY'S USE OF MEDIA FOR ADVERTISING

The advertising media's objectives are to (1) create awareness, (2) inform potential recruits and influencers of opportunities, and (3) generate leads through response advertising techniques. During fiscal year 1974 the four services were using public service announcements (PSA) on radio and TV, magazines, direct mail, billboards, and newspapers as media to influence potential recruits into AVF. Additionally, the services allocated funds to the recruiting commands to distribute to the district commands and recruiting stations for use at the local level. The Marine Corps informed us that its only involvement in paid-print media for fiscal year 1974 consisted of \$727,000 of scholastic magazine advertising only. The authority for the Marines to advertise in the paid-print arena was received on May 21, 1974. Actual funds were not provided until June 25, 1974. This meant that \$5.3 million regular dollars and \$1.3 million reserve dollars, reflected in the fiscal year 1974 budget, actually purchased most of the first half of fiscal year 1975 paid advertising.

The services gave us the costs breakdown of the various advertising media, as shown on the following page. Because of inconsistencies in the way the services budget and account for costs, as discussed more fully in chapter 7, the \$59.5 million only approximates the total costs. The \$59.5 million is about 62 percent of the reported advertising cost of \$96.1 million for the fiscal year.

As discussed in the subsequent chapters, we believe the present system ineffectively measures the contribution of advertising to the success of AVF. This is clearly evident in the way the media money has been spent.

Great differences of opinion exist as to what works and what doesn't. Also there is considerable duplication in the ad messages, and actions are being taken that could do more harm than good.

Congress reduced DOD's military advertising budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 35 percent.

PSA AND PAID BROADCASTING

The use of TV and radio for military advertising has been limited to free PSA, provided by the stations in recognition of their public service responsibilities. The only costs to the services for PSA has been for production materials estimated to be \$3.8 million in fiscal year 1974.

Costs Applicable to Media FY 1974

<u>Description</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u> <u>(000 Omitted)</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
PSA production and solicitation	1,644	756	998	357	3,755
Commissionable media (note a)					
Magazines	6,600	4,827	4,288	2,905	18,620
Billboards	5,300	3,233	2,757	1,304	12,594
Newspapers	2,200	964	599	1,151	4,914
Miscellaneous	200	58	357	1	616
Direct mail	2,400	2,516	178	970	6,064
Local advertising (funds controlled at the local level)	4,035	1,271	1,336	701	7,343
Incentive/recruiter giveaways	<u>411</u>	<u>3,789</u>	<u>1,067</u>	<u>299</u>	<u>5,566</u>
Total	<u>22,790</u>	<u>17,414</u>	<u>11,580</u>	<u>7,688</u>	<u>59,472</u>

^aCommissionable media is managed by the national ad agencies and their billing to the service includes a placement commission.

During fiscal year 1974 there were about 8,000 radio and 1,000 TV stations authorized to broadcast in the United States. The services had a contract with BAR to measure and monitor the value of PSA being received from the TV stations. BAR reported that the services obtained about \$5.6 million of PSA TV time in fiscal year 1974.

The BAR report, however, monitors and measures announcements aired by only about 260 TV stations which serve the top 75 U.S. TV market areas. No measurement was being made of the other TV stations or the 8,000 radio stations. The services estimated value of PSA received varied widely. The Air Force estimated it received about \$13 million PSA radio and TV time. The Navy estimated about \$5 million and the Army and Marine Corps did not provide the information.

The Army conducted one paid TV and radio test from March to May 1971 costing \$10.6 million. This represented the first large investment in paid advertising by any service. Reports on the results were mixed. According to Army studies, the broadcasts improved traffic at the recruiting station, but, according to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives report in May 1972, no evidence of a large increase in enlistments results from the paid advertising program to justify the costs. The Army started a second paid radio test in 17 major markets on May 1, 1975. DOD officials stated that all the services planned an extensive test of paid radio which started in September 1975.

Opinions as to the potential loss in PSA time is also mixed. Knowledgeable officials in the advertising industry said that if the services go to paid broadcasting, 60 to 90 percent of PSA broadcast time would be lost. The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, in a Special Subcommittee Report on Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel, reported in May 1972:

" * * * The paid advertising program created an inequity for those stations which had provided free time for recruitment advertising. As a result of this inequity, a number of radio and television stations indicated in writing that they would cease all transmission of public service military recruiting advertising. There is no estimate as to how many additional stations might reduce their public service broadcasting of Army recruiting ads if paid advertising were reinstated."

However, in a test made for DOD, radio and TV executives were quoted as saying that they did not believe PSA time would be lost.

Measuring and monitoring

Interviews with advertising officials, recruiters, and military advertising personnel indicated that the broadcast media's recognition of public service responsibility and the quality and frequency of airing time depends largely on broadcast station officials' awareness of the need and importance of achieving an AVF at minimum costs. The recruiters and the ad agencies' district representatives are responsible for obtaining PSA time. The recruiters generally deal with the smaller stations while the district representatives deal with the larger metropolitan stations.

During the latter part of fiscal year 1973 the Navy contracted with BAR on behalf of all the services, on a shared-cost basis, to monitor public service spot announcements on the TV media, and to submit monthly reports, referred to as the BAR report. The contract provided for monitoring and measuring of announcements aired by only about 260 TV stations which serve the top 75 U.S. TV market areas. The table on the following page is a summary of monthly BAR reports for fiscal year 1974 showing the number and dollar value of spot announcements and the time of day when aired.

The BAR reports deal only with spot announcements, aired by 260 of the 1,000 TV stations and does not include radio programs such as talk shows, recruiter interviews, and 30-minute TV programs similar to the National Football League pre-game highlight programs which are also aired on public service time. According to recruiters, advertising personnel, and research studies the smaller and more rural radio and TV stations are fairly cooperative in donating such spots, but the larger and more metropolitan stations are more reluctant because their spots are expensive and in heavy demand. Therefore, the amount and value of public service time provided the services by TV and radio stations could be much more than the BAR reports indicate.

We asked the services to estimate the total value of their free TV and radio announcements. The Air Force estimated that the total value of the PSA time to them was about \$13 million for fiscal year 1974 as compared to the \$1.8 million shown in the BAR report. The Navy estimated about \$5 million. The Army and Marine Corps would not estimate the value of their PSA.

Estimated Spot Announcements (Free) Provided
the Services by the Top 75 U.S. TV
Markets During FY 1974

	Value of time (million)	Percent of value by service	Number of spot announcements	Time period of spots				
				6:00 AM	5:00 PM	7:30 PM	11:00 PM	After
				5:00 PM	7:30 PM	11:00 PM	11:30 PM	11:30 PM
Army	\$1.5	27	15,281	57%	15%	8%	1%	19%
Air Force	1.8	32	14,774	55	15	11	2	17
Navy	1.4	25	13,454	52	16	10	1	21
Marines	<u>.9</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>7,476</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>20</u>
Total	<u>\$5.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>50,985</u>	55%	15%	10%	1%	19%

According to ad agency officials the basic complaint regarding the PSA broadcasts is they are not aired on prime time. Also there is a loss of control when materials are released to the broadcast stations.

Effectiveness of PSA

Intermediate level managers said that PSA effectiveness is difficult to assess at the local level because no system for measuring its effectiveness exists. However, most managers who commented felt, based on informal feedback from recruiters, that PSA was effective. Of 26 managers commenting, 16 said PSA was effective, 3 said it was not, and 7 said they had no basis for assessing the effectiveness. Also, of 149 recruiters commenting on PSA's effectiveness, 94 (63 percent) said it was effective in their area.

It may be possible to determine, through random sampling techniques and questionnaires, how often and at what time announcements are being aired. As far as we know, this technique has not been tried.

Tests of Paid Broadcasting

The Army conducted a special paid TV and radio broadcast from March 1 through May 31, 1971. This was to determine the effectiveness of paid broadcasting because the Army felt that the advertising provided by PSA and other media would not be adequate to meet their recruiting objectives if and when the Nation went to an AVF.

The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) was engaged to evaluate the effectiveness of the Army's special paid broadcast-media test program.

SRI, in its report dated December 1971, summarized its findings and conclusions.

"To summarize the Institute's major findings and conclusions, the Spring 1971 Army's paid broadcast-media recruitment advertising (1) was very effective in increasing awareness of Army advertising among young male Americans without prior military service, (2) was effective in motivating some of these young men to the action represented by making personal inquiry about Army service for themselves, (3) was accompanied by increases in levels of Army enlistments beyond those that past enlistment trends would indicate, and (4) was accompanied by more pronounced increases in levels of Army enlistments in the geographic section of the United States where the advertising was most intensified."

Concerning the Army's test, the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, in a Special Subcommittee Report on Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel, reported in May 1972:

" * * * The Army experiment. The Army expended some \$10.6 million between March 1 and May 30, 1971 on an experimental paid prime time television and radio advertising campaign, a departure from past military recruiting advertising practices.

"It is conceded that public service recruiting advertising often missed the age group at which it was aimed. Due to the loss of advertising revenue, stations rarely aired military recruitment commercials as a public service during prime time. However, we found no evidence of a sufficient increase in enlistments as a result of the paid advertising program to justify the costs involved."

As a result of the complaints made, the fiscal year 1972 DOD appropriation bill barred using funds for paid advertising in the broadcast media. Although this provision applied only to fiscal year 1972 funds, DOD continued the policy of expending no funds for paid broadcast advertising until May 1975. During discussions with DOD and service officials in April and May 1975 we were told that the Army had started a test of paid radio on May 1, 1975, at an estimated cost of \$600,000. We were also told that all the services plan to conduct an extensive test of paid radio in September 1975.

Of all the services, the Army wants to go to paid broadcasting the most. The services' advertising people feel that the Army is the only service whose current budget is adequate to support paid broadcasting. An Army advertising agency official stated that paid broadcasting in the advertising programs would make their advertising program more effective without changing the budget.

The Army's fiscal year 1974 advertising budget included \$16.7 million for paid media. According to Army ad agency officials, a budget of \$16 to \$20 million for paid media would only produce an average advertising job depending on the objectives and product. The officials stated that if the Army went to paid broadcasting they would recommend using 40 percent of the media budget, or about \$7 million, to purchase broadcast time (75 percent TV, and 25 percent radio). The \$7 million to purchase paid broadcast time would come from eliminating outdoor advertising and reducing about 25 percent of the direct mail program.

According to advertising officials of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines these services do not have the flexibility to implement an effective paid broadcasting program because of their present budget. Both the military and their advertising personnel for all the services, except the Army, stated that generally the PSA time they are presently getting is adequate, and they would prefer not going to paid broadcasting.

The advertising officials stated that if the services go to paid broadcasting, 60 to 90 percent of their PSA broadcast time would be lost. The Media Director of the Air Force's advertising agency stated that, if the services go to paid broadcasting, the Air Force alone would lose \$12 million annually in PSA time.

COMMISSIONABLE MEDIA

The military services use several types of advertising for which their advertising agencies receive commissions for placing the advertisements. These commissions are contractually agreed upon by the individual services and their respective ad agencies. During fiscal year 1974, the services used commissionable media primarily in the form of magazines, billboards, and newspapers. In the following section, magazine advertising is discussed in depth. Billboards and newspapers, which are tied into the advertising campaign at the local level, are covered in general in the local advertising section starting on p. 21.

Magazines

During fiscal year 1974 the four services spent about \$18.6 million placing ads in about 160 magazines, periodicals, and journals. The \$18.6 million is approximately 31 percent of all the media costs and does not include the agencies production or design costs for the ads.

The military services were using magazine media to reach the general 17- to 24-year-old target market, special interest groups, such as doctors and influencers of the 17-24 year olds. The selection of magazines varied from a special interest type periodical, such as American Journal of Nursing, to a general interest type, like Readers' Digest.

The Army's magazine campaign was directed at both the 17- to 24-year-old readers and their influencers. The Army's campaign was the most costly of the services, and the Army was advertising in more magazines and more frequently than any other service. The Marine Corps' campaign, because of limited

funds, was generally attempting to reach the 17- to 24-year-old readers. The Air Force's and Navy's campaigns were attempting to reach the 17- to 24-year-old readers and their influencers but not in as many magazines and not as frequently as the Army.

The ad agencies and the services, to justify the selection of the magazines and the frequency of the ads, were monitoring the number of leads generated by an ad and a cost per lead. They were also making advertising awareness studies. There was no evidence that traffic at the recruiting stations increased or that images of the services were improved by magazine advertising. In addition, although the services were spending 31 percent of their media dollars on magazines, research indicated that magazines may not be the most effective media. It appears that the overall extent of each service's magazine campaign depended on the available funds.


The results of the Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., study, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in the All-Volunteer Force - Results from National Surveys Conducted Between May 1971 and November 1973" indicated that the youth ranked magazines third behind TV and posters as a recruiting information source. As the chart on the following page taken from the study shows, there has been a gradual decline in most advertising media as a source of recruiting information. It also shows that television, apparently PSA time, was the best source of information.

Of 32 nationwide publications, 5 were selected in which at least 3 services advertised during the year. Our review of the five magazines showed that all the services were generally advertising job and training opportunities and the benefits of military life. The differences in the ads were in the specific image of the particular service and the ad theme. Also, the one time that the services did a joint ad in a magazine, it appeared to be successful on a cost per response basis.

Number of ads and content

Generally, the military services have used magazine advertisements to reach two markets, the potential recruits (17 to 24 years old) and their influencers. In this regard, the services and their ad agencies were concerned with the reach and frequency of their advertising. Reach is the percentage of the target market that will be exposed to or reached by a particular magazine ad campaign. Frequency is the number of times an individual will be exposed to the advertising during a given time frame.

PERCENT OF YOUTH REPORTING EXPOSURE TO ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF RECRUITING INFORMATION



The service's advertising agency along with the service determines an appropriate reach and frequency based on past experience and funds available. Specific magazine placements are based on the demographics of their circulation population, the money available for advertising, and on past experience in selecting magazines for similar target markets.

During our review, we analyzed issues of five particular magazines (National Future Farmer, Ebony, Senior Scholastic, New England Journal of Medicine, and Sports

Illustrated) from the 32 nationwide publications in which at least three services advertised during the year. We selected these magazines primarily because they address various segments of the target market: Ebony is directed primarily toward the black population; Senior Scholastic to the high school student; the New England Journal of Medicine is published for the medical profession; Sports Illustrated is directed toward the male adult, both prospective recruits and influencers; and National Future Farmer for the agricultural community.

--The Air Force, Army, and Navy ran a total of 33 advertisements in the 12 issues of Ebony in fiscal year 1974. All of the the ads in this group were attempting to inform the reader of the various job and technical training opportunities available in each of the services. Fringe benefits also played a major role in the ads.

--Some of the ads were more specialized--directed to those individuals interested in officer training or particular career opportunities such as the Navy's nuclear power program. But for the most part, the ads were more general--assuring the reader that he or she would learn a skill and be guaranteed a job that would be beneficial to them even after they leave the service.

--The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps ran 31 ads in the 6 issues of the bimonthly National Future Farmer in fiscal year 1974. All of the services, except the Marine Corps, ran ads like those that appeared in Ebony. These ads mentioned the numerous job and technical training opportunities, as well as the various fringe benefits. The opportunity to continue education was usually included as one of the benefits.

--The Marine Corps ads were more concerned with the Corps' image rather than job and training opportunities available.

The results of our review of the issues of Senior Scholastic, New England Journal of Medicine, and Sports Illustrated were generally the same as for Ebony and National Future Farmer.

The majority of ads we looked at were attempting to inform the reader of numerous job and training opportunities and fringe benefits. We did note that each service's image and theme portrayed by the ads were different.

The Navy ads usually had pictures of ships or something else directly related to sea life. The theme in the Navy ads generally related to seeing the world. The Air Force ads most often depicted individuals working with or flying aircraft. The theme related to being looked up to. The Marine Corps ads were concerned with individual toughness and courage and ads emphasized the quality of the recruits with a major theme being "quality not quantity" of men. No distinct image was portrayed by the Army ads. No one particular skill or group of related skills are directly associated with this particular service. The theme emphasized joining others in the Army.

During fiscal years 1973 and 1974, three services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, jointly ran ads for the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program in numerous health magazines. The ad described the opportunities and benefits offered by the Armed Forces Health Care. An interested individual could send in the attached coupon, on which he or she designated the field of medicine and service he/she was interested in. This ad ran two times during each fiscal year. The advertising agency for the Air Force which was in charge of the ad, believed this ad campaign was successful. During fiscal year 1973 the services received 4,545 responses, with an average cost per response of \$28.69. The first run of the ad in fiscal year 1974 produced 3,588 responses with a \$30.83 per response cost. These costs compare favorably to the cost per response reported by the Army in Media Industry Newsletter.

Direct Mail

The four services spent about \$6.1 million on direct-mail campaigns in fiscal year 1974. The services generally rent names and addresses of potential recruits from companies specializing in renting mailing lists. Letters are sent to potential recruits describing the benefits of a particular service. Interested prospects return a preaddressed card to the services' fulfillment house where the cards are screened and questionable names are eliminated. The fulfillment house then sends the requested information to the remaining prospects and notifies the nearest recruiter so that he can make direct personal contact with the prospect. Generally the initial mailing is followed by a followup letter.

Military and ad agency officials said that although direct mail is more expensive than other media, such as magazines, it has certain unique advantages which makes it a

valuable recruiting tool. It was explained that, psychologically, direct mail creates a positive attitude in the prospective recruit because of its personal nature. Also, the sender of direct mail has complete control over the format and copy of the literature, timing of its release, and the specific market group to whom it is directed. Moreover, an individual receiving direct mail has fewer distractions competing for his attention.

During our review, list rentals and direct-mail campaigns were being handled separately by each service. Most of the campaigns were to male high school seniors, medical and legal personnel, and reserve officer training candidates. The services reported that they mailed about 30 million letters or booklets to potential recruits during fiscal year 1974 costing about \$6.1 million.

Repetitive mailings

Generally, the four branches of the military services are working independently of the others to contact and recruit personnel into their branch of service. Since all the branches are interested in the same three or four million persons which direct-mail authorities have estimated to be prospective recruits, it is unavoidable that people are being contacted several times.

The table below shows the most important types of mailing lists rented by the services in fiscal year 1974 and the number of names rented.

<u>Mailing List</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marines</u>	<u>Total</u>
Male High-School Seniors	2,992,220	^a 1,071,000	2,439,914	2,136,267	8,639,401
ROTC	650,000	^a 409,000	604,733	495,024	2,158,757
Medical	-	^a 450,000	-	-	450,000
Law	-	-	6,655	45,000	51,655

^aAll Air Force data is for FY 1973-74 combined.

An executive of a direct-mail company stated that repetitive contacts occur to varying degrees in different market categories and to the greatest extent when mailing to male high school seniors.

All four services consider the approximately 1.5 million male high school seniors in the United States to be their prime target market. As shown in the previous table, over 8.5 million pieces of direct mail were sent to male high school seniors indicating that each student may have received up to 6 or more letters from the military. These names were rented by the services from three major suppliers. Officials of advertising agencies and two major list suppliers stated that lists of male high school seniors are 90 to 95 percent duplicative and the services could not avoid renting some of the same names for their separate direct mail programs. The officials also stated that for the other lists the duplication was not as great but it did exist.

No evidence was found that the services or DOD had attempted to determine what effect receiving five or six mailings from the services had on the male high school seniors. It is possible that receiving so many letters may have an adverse effect on the student's image of and attitude toward the military. In any event, repetitive mailings are bound to lose their impact and become commonplace.

Unique features of direct mail

Advertising officials said that one of the most important attributes of direct mail is its personal approach to recruiting. We reviewed 28 sample letters representing all types of letters used by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to contact prospects and influencers. Our examination was to determine what the letters were emphasizing and to what extent they appeared to present a personal approach. Our analysis showed that:

- The Army appeared to be strongly emphasizing the pay scale. They were also stressing the opportunity to travel; educational opportunities; job and skill training; choice of job; choice of location; and the challenge, responsibility, and experience of the job itself.
- The Navy mailouts mentioned job training most often. In addition, the literature stressed challenge, responsibility, experience of the job, educational opportunities, the high calibre of personnel required, and the many job opportunities in the Navy.
- The Marine Corps literature stressed job training more heavily than other benefits. Also mentioned repeatedly were challenge, responsibility, experience of the jobs, educational opportunities, pay

scale, high quality of Marine recruits, choice of job, location and training, and the ability to use a skill learned in the Marine Corps to obtain a civilian job.

--In its direct mail the Air Force appeared to emphasize greatly educational opportunities. They also frequently mentioned job and skill training; challenge; responsibility; experience of the job; medical, housing, clothing, vacation, and other benefits; and the many available job opportunities.

Most of the benefits and opportunities discussed above were mentioned by all the services in the samples. A summary of the benefits and opportunities predominant in the samples we reviewed is shown in the following table.

BENEFITS	NUMBER OF TIMES MENTIONED				Total (28 letters)
	Army (8 letters)	Navy (7 letters)	Marines (5 letters)	Air Force (8 letters)	
Job/skill training	18	25	11	3	57
Challenge, responsibility, experience	15	19	9	4	47
Educational opportunities	19	12	7	8	46
Pay scale	26	7	7	2	42
Travel opportunities	21	6	3	3	33
High calibre personnel	2	12	6	3	23
Choice	18	3	5	3	29
Job opportunities	11	12	2	4	29
Medical, housing, clothing, vacation and other benefits	12	6	4	4	26
Use of skill as a civilian	11	3	5	1	20
Guaranteed choice contract	2	8	3	3	16
Delayed entry	7	6	0	0	13
Service to country	9	1	1	0	11
Plan for future	4	1	1	1	7

In reviewing the letters, we also noted two features unique to each service--ad themes ("Join the People Who've Joined the Army" - Army, "Be Someone Special" - Navy, "One of the Finest, One of the Best" - Marines "Look Up be Looked Up To - Air Force") and occasional programs found only in one branch of the service such as Nuclear Propulsion in the Navy. Other than these two features, military direct-mail letters generally appear to be repetitive, mentioning the same benefits and opportunities offered by all military services and repetitive of other ad media.

Because the services are aiming at most of the same market segments and using similar benefits to persuade the prospect to enlist, it appears feasible that DOD could achieve the same results with a letter emphasizing the benefits common to all services. The letter, while generally stressing a military career's benefits, could also point

out certain advantages unique to each service so that individual images would be maintained. To permit the potential recruit to respond to the service that interests him, a response card could be included which would be mailed directly to the services for followup action.

To determine the potential savings of a DOD mailing, we projected the mailing costs of the services for mailings to male high school seniors in fiscal year 1974. All services combined sent over 8.5 million items to male high school seniors during the year. Advertising agency officials estimated that the production cost for each item was between 8 and 15 cents and the rental fee for each name was about 2-1/2 cents. Using an average total cost of 14 cents for each item mailed, the services mailings to male high school seniors in fiscal year 1974 cost about \$1.2 million. If DOD had mailed two letters to every male high school senior about 3-million pieces of mail would have been sent with an estimated total cost of about \$420,000. Trying the suggested method could save about \$770,000 in mail outs to male high school seniors. Additional savings are also possible in other mail out programs depending on the degree of commonality of the mailing lists.

During our review DOD was considering buying a consolidated list of male high school seniors. Under this alternative, the three major list compilers of male high school seniors would be asked to submit their lists to an independent firm which would consolidate the lists and eliminate duplicates. DOD would then pay the three compilers \$160 per thousand names on the consolidated list (details of the transaction would be settled by DOD and the three companies). The compilers provide monthly updates to the independent firm maintaining the list.

As each service conducted a direct mail campaign they would rent the list from the maintenance company at a rate of \$1.50 per thousand names and also pay DOD a portion of the purchase price for each usage. DOD estimated that the list would be used 12 times resulting in a total DOD cost to the services of about \$15 per thousand. In fiscal year 1974 however, the services sent letters to reach each male high school senior only five or six times which is half the number of times expected by this alternative under consideration by DOD. If the list was used 12 times, it would mean that every male high school senior on the list would receive 12 letters from the military. It appears that if DOD adopts this proposal, the increased costs of producing the additional literature would greatly reduce if not eliminate any savings made possible by buying a consolidated list.

Local advertising

The services were advertising on billboards, in local newspapers, college and high school newspapers, annuals, and at sports programs and community events.

The national advertising campaign funds the commissionable media, such as the billboards and national newspaper advertisements. The funding for the rest of the local advertising is allocated by the recruiting commands to the intermediate command levels for further allocation to the services' recruiting stations. Recruiting commands and intermediate commands' awareness of how the funds are actually spent by the recruiters varies between the services as well as within the same service. The Army, at the district recruiting command level, merely monitors the local ad placement. The other three services required the recruiters to obtain approval for their spending from the next command level. Few recruiters were permitted to place ads solely on their own, except when they were spending their own money (i.e., Marine Corps recruiters paid for classified ads with personal funds until May 1974 when the Corps began funding newspaper advertising).

Almost all recruiters we interviewed felt that more advertising funds are needed at the local level. Most of them were spending their own money, up to \$25 a month, to supplement local funds. The Army and Navy recruiters stated they have the greatest need for more local advertising funds. The average advertising expenditures by the Army recruiters was \$400, of which \$100 was out-of-pocket expenditures. This contrasts with Air Force spending, where recruiters spent an average of \$600 on advertising, all funded by the service. The Marine Corps didn't find local advertising funds necessary. An average of \$30 was spent on local advertising, all from the recruiters' personal funds.

Both the Air Force and the Army use local advertising agencies to run local campaigns. The Marine Corps and the Navy do not use local ad agencies but do have representatives from the national ad agencies available for recruiters' questions.

Our review showed that opinions as to the effectiveness of local advertising differed. Advertising agency officials felt local advertising funds provided by the recruiting commands had little effect on getting recruits. Two firms believed local funds were being spent haphazardly.

An earlier charter for JADOR, dated September 20, 1973, showed that one of its purposes was to review the local advertising resource applications for optimal effectiveness and reach. The charter was amended in August 1974. One of the group's functions under the current charter is to share local advertising and marketing information to obtain maximum effectiveness and reach. DOD, the services, or their ad agencies made no formal evaluation of the local program.

Incentive items

The services employed incentive items, or "giveaway items" as they are sometimes called, to aid the recruiters' efforts to promote military service. These items are used to (1) attract potential recruits into the recruiting station, (2) serve as "icebreakers," a lead-in for conversation, and (3) serve as a reminder after talking to the recruiter. The services attempt to use items which potential recruits can identify with and which are functional. Some examples of incentive items are frisbees, ice scrapers, pens, watch calendars, and T-shirts. Each item carries a message or service slogan which serves as a reminder of that particular service when used.

At the national level, the services spent approximately \$8,266,000 on incentive items in fiscal year 1974. The dollar amounts ranged from the Marine Corps' \$299,000 to \$3,789,000 for the Navy. Incentive items were also purchased at the intermediate and local levels with local advertising funds. Incentive items were also being purchased by the ad agencies, unit of choice and station of choice units. A record of the total cost of advertising funds spent on incentive items was not maintained by any of the services' recruiting commands or at any other command level. In addition to these expenditures, funds were also spent for items for influencers and others who helped promote the individual service.

We interviewed several recruiters from each of the services to determine their impressions of the incentive items. From these interviews mixed feelings were found on the incentive items' effectiveness. In general, the majority of the responses of the recruiters were distributed among (1) incentives items are valuable (24 percent), (2) incentives items have some value (31 percent), and (3) these items have no value (33 percent) in enlisting an individual.

Army recruiters stated that several incentive items had low appeal and therefore were ineffective, while others appeared to be unsuitable for the target market. Advertising

officials stated that while recruiters liked incentive items their practical effect was nil.

We did not find any evidence where the services have done research to evaluate the incentive items' effectiveness. Officials of two services stated that it would be difficult to measure the effectiveness of these items because to them the whole concept of incentive items is intangible. Also, it is hard to separate the effect of this particular recruiting device from the effect of the total recruiting program.

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While we did not look into billboards as part of our review we did not find any evidence that DOD, the services, or their ad agencies had satisfactorily evaluated billboards' effectiveness.

CHAPTER 3

POOR RECRUITING RESULTS FROM ADVERTISING LEADS

During our review the services were using various response type advertising to obtain the names of potential recruits. The advertisements contained coupons, tear-out cards (popup cards), and telephone numbers for the potential recruit to fill out or call. The services established computerized systems to monitor and follow up these responses.

Essentially, the systems are designed to (1) collect responses to advertising, (2) send the interested party literature regarding the service, and (3) supply a recruiter with the inquirer's name. The recruiter then contacts the inquirer to try to obtain an enlistment. The organizations which do this are called fulfillment houses.

We reviewed the fulfillment houses' operations to determine how many advertising leads resulted in enlistments. The military services received over 900,000 leads during fiscal year 1974. Of the 550,000 people recruited into the military service, only 39,000 can be traced to people who sent in leads. Of the 39,000 leads that eventually entered the service, only about 20,000 actually entered the service to whom they sent the lead. Except for the Army, more people joined other services than the one to which they sent the lead.

What this all seems to mean is that only a few people who enter the services can be traced to advertising leads. More than 500,000 of the 550,000 who enlisted in any service never sent in a lead. It also means that advertising leads are not a good source of recruits and not a good measure of advertising effectiveness. Of the 900,000 leads only about 4 percent can be traced to any service and only about 2 percent to the service to which they sent the lead.

The evidence also does not appear to support the Navy's heavy investment in a toll-free telephone answering service. The services enlisted only about 2,700 recruits that could be directly traced to telephone leads, people who called up and then did enlist. More than half of these are traceable to the Air Force which has the cheapest system. The Navy, whose system is 12 times as expensive as the Air Force's and about 3 times anyone else's, does not show any appreciable number of recruits from its system.

THE SYSTEMS

Each service has a slightly different system to accumulate responses to their advertising. They all have subcontractors to their advertising agencies, who accumulate mailed responses, and start recruiter followup in motion. Telephone responses for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army are handled by the same subcontractor which handles mail responses. The Navy uses recruiters to staff its telephone answering service. The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force systems started in July 1972, July 1973, October 1973, and March 1974, respectively.

Each service screens the received response. This screening is to review the data provided by the inquirer and to categorize the inquirer by eligibility in terms of age. The Navy, Army, and Marine Corps systems include further screening to eliminate duplicative names, fictitious names, and persons who have requested that their name be removed from mailing lists. After screening, the people who are not eliminated are sent a letter or literature depending on their interest or eligibility. The Air Force does not send literature to the inquirer. Their theory is that selling should be done on a face-to-face basis.

Except for the Navy, the toll-free answering services are adjuncts to fulfillment houses. These answering services obtain enough information from the caller to furnish the response to the fulfillment house for processing. The Navy answering service is a separate military operation. When the Navy telephone answering service considers a lead worth pursuing, the local recruiting station is notified of the lead by telephone and information on the lead is sent to the fulfillment house. Navy personnel claim they can have a local recruiter in touch with a telephone lead within 15 minutes.

Costs of the services' fulfillment and telephone answering operations are as follows:

<u>Fulfillment</u> (note a)		
<u>Service</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Army	7/ 1/73 - 6/30/74	^b \$414,000
Navy	9/15/73 - 6/30/75	^b 497,000
Marine Corps	1/ 1/73 - 6/30/74	^b 103,000
Air Force	7/ 1/73 - 6/30/74	^c 68,000

<u>Telephone Answering</u>		
<u>Service</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Army	12/15/73 - 6/30/74	^b \$ 62,000
Navy	7/ 1/73 - 6/30/74	^c 350,000
Marine Corps	6/24/74 -10/29/74	^b 33,000
Air Force	7/ 1/73 - 6/30/74	^c 27,000

^aWe attempted to get cost data for fiscal year 1974 but the data was not readily available.

^bDoes not include applicable commissions of advertising agencies who are the prime contractor.

^cNo commissions of advertising agencies are applicable to these amounts.

Leads resulting in recruits

From each of the services' fulfillment houses we obtained a file of leads generated in fiscal year 1974. From the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) we obtained a file of the transactions that occurred at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station for the period July 1, 1973, through September 30, 1974. The USAREC file contains enlistments as well as other transactions.

Initially we planned to match the advertising files and the USAREC file by social security number (SSN); however, the Navy and Marine Corps records on the advertising files did not have SSNs. Therefore, we created two matches, one with records that have SSNs and one with records that do not have SSNs. For those records that had no SSN we matched last name, first initial, and zip code.

Match of social security number file

The USAREC file contained 551,243 enlistment records. The advertising file contained 385,264 records. We compared by SSN the advertising file to the USAREC file and found 21,095 leads which resulted in enlistments. The matches by advertising house are as follows:

		<u>Matches</u>		
	<u>Leads</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Other</u>
			<u>(note a)</u>	
Worldwide Direct Marketing (Army)	266,589	16,048	11,079	4,969
Dialogue Marketing (Air Force)	<u>118,675</u>	<u>5,047</u>	<u>2,103</u>	<u>2,844</u>
Total	<u>385,264</u>	<u>21,095</u>	<u>13,182</u>	<u>7,813</u>

^aEnlistment in the same service for which the lead was obtained.

We also found that only 1,592 of the 21,095 matches resulted from telephone inquiries. All the 1,592 inquiries were from the Air Force advertising house.

Match of name file

The USAREC and advertising name file were sorted into name and zip code sequence. USAREC had 551,243 records representing enlistments and the advertising file had 549,875 records.

We compared, by name and zip code, the advertising file to the USAREC file and found 17,761 leads resulting in enlistments. The matches by fulfillment house are as follows:

	<u>Leads</u>	<u>Matches</u>		
		<u>Total</u>	<u>Service</u> <u>(note a)</u>	<u>Other</u>
Worldwide Direct Marketing (Army)	169,696	4,072	2,479	1,593
Dialogue Marketing (Air Force)	23,722	653	247	406
LCS Industries (Navy)	281,674	8,601	3,644	4,957
Dart Industries (Marines)	<u>74,843</u>	<u>4,435</u>	<u>1,343</u>	<u>3,092</u>
Total	<u>549,935</u>	<u>17,761</u>	<u>7,713</u>	<u>10,048</u>

^aEnlistment in the same service for which the lead was obtained.

We found that telephone inquiries accounted for 1,271 of the matches.

A breakdown by advertising house follows:

Worldwide Direct Marketing (Army)	248
Dialogue Marketing (Air Force)	236
LCS Industries (Navy)	<u>787</u>
Total	<u>1,271</u>

There may be problems with using enlistments as a measure of advertising effectiveness. The Army's Director of Advertising and Sales Promotion replied to a Media Industry Newsletter, a business magazine newsletter, on December 10, 1974, that conversion rate and cost-per-enlistment data had serious limitations. He wrote:

"A special problem presents itself in development of 'conversion rates,' and a major deficiency in completeness of the data tends to invalidate their use for analytical purposes. The problem is that persons filling out inquiry cards rarely use their complete names, as those names will appear in enlistment records. Only about a third of all respondents include social security numbers. Many do not give their correct address of record as it will appear in the enlistment records. Because of these facts computer matching of inquiries against

enlistment data substantially understates the record of conversion."

The Army official also stated that:

"Since many of the magazines on the schedule were chosen for the long range purpose of changing the Army image in middle and upper income homes into a 'success story' and not the 'home for the disadvantaged' or 'employer of last resort'--the 'influencer' advertising--* * *the same efficiencies in drawing large number of responses and immediate enlistments were not expected, and they have not, in general, materialized."

In their newsletter dated December 20, 1974, Media Industry Newsletter stated that:

"One can grant that the cost-per-enlistment figure is 'substantially' understated. But surely, with the sophisticated statistical techniques that are available, and indeed used daily in the physical sciences, one should be able to state the 'substantially' with more precision. Precision should be the byword with the Army since \$43-million is being spent on advertising activities in the current fiscal year. As for the 'analytic' uses of these statistics, one can presume that the variables in the computer matching of inquiries against enlistment data will probably be the same for all magazines in the same class, and perhaps, very little different for all magazine respondees as a group; that is, the persons who fill out a card for Time will probably have the same incidence of left-out social security numbers, incomplete names, mis-matched addresses, etc. as the people who fill out cards for Newsweek; and further, that this incidence of unmatchable 'inquiry' vs. 'enlistment' data that applies for the Time or Newsweek respondee does not differ substantially from the Jet, Reader's Digest or Car Craft respondee."

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marined Corps
answering service

All the toll-free answering services used by the services are similar and all have the same purposes; answering telephones, identifying leads, forwarding leads to a re-

cruiter for follow up, and taking action to have information sent to the inquirer. The ways the answering services accomplish their objectives differ slightly. The Navy's answering service operated by Navy recruiters, immediately contacts the local recruiter to furnish him the lead. The other services use their subcontractors to answer the telephones and leads are forwarded to the recruiter by mail through the fulfillment house.

The Navy established the Navy National Recruiting Information Center at Macon, Georgia to perform the answering service function. Recruiters staff this activity, answering calls 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The direct costs of this activity were estimated as follows:

<u>Cost element</u>	<u>Cost</u>	
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
Salaries of staff	\$211,000	\$221,000
Rental of phone lines	126,000	123,000
Miscellaneous	6,000	6,000
Total	<u>\$343,000</u>	<u>\$350,000</u>

The Naval Audit Service reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that a commercial contractor could run the operation at a cost of \$24,000 a year with savings of \$319,000 on the 1973 operation cost. The Navy did not agree that this approach was adaptable to their needs. They believed there are real advantages to having Navy personnel answer the telephone.

The Navy feels that its recruiters are better at screening responses. As pointed out earlier, we identified only 787 Navy leads that could be matched to enlistments. The Navy's system costs about \$350,000 or about 6 times more than the Army's system which is the next most expensive. None of the other services have chosen to set up in-house operations for the telephone answering service. The Air Force had the most telephone enlistments, 1,828, during the fiscal year at a cost of \$27,000, or \$323,000 less than the Navy. The Air Force considered using the Navy's approach but decided against it because of the high cost.

Combined operation of
telephone answering services

The subcontractors operating the telephone answering services for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps stated that they believe that a combined answering service is feasible. Commercial answering services exist which handle many clients who use the same toll-free telephone number in their advertising.

It is apparent to us that savings could result from combining telephone response systems. The amount of savings would be contingent upon the services developing common work requirements.

The Deputy Comptroller for Audit Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in November 1973, recommended that the services consider combining their toll-free lines under commercial contracts. OSD, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, agreed to consider the recommendation. No action was taken on this recommendation.

CHAPTER 4

ATTITUDES AND IMAGES OF THE MILITARY HAVE NOT CHANGED

Since 1970 the military services have contracted for and conducted numerous research studies to determine (1) attitudes toward joining the services, (2) awareness of the military and their advertising campaigns, (3) the image of one service in relationship to another, (4) the kinds of benefits and other key factors that encourage enlistment, and (5) the number of people qualified to join the services.

These studies, referred to as situation research, generally involved a series of penetration or tracking studies and were conducted by interviewing a sample of male youths ages 16 through 21 and their influencers, i.e., coaches, guidance counselors, brothers and sisters, and parents. We made a list of such studies that were made from 1970 through 1974 by various research firms for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and OSD that we estimated cost about \$4 million.

The analysis of the studies showed that attitudes and images of the military, or the individual services in relationship to each other, had changed very little over the 5-year period. In short, the percentage of youths that were likely to join the service had not changed in any significant way, and the service they were most and least likely to join had not changed. This is important because a principal goal of advertising is to influence attitudes. The analysis also showed that to a large extent, the studies covered the same ground and were largely duplicative of each other. There was no systematic gathering and analyzing of the studies or exchanging the studies among the services. We were told that there was an informal exchange system that worked with mixed success. We believe that if DOD had made an analysis of the study results it would have logically led to a re-consideration of the advertising program.

GILBERT YOUTH SURVEYS, MAY 1971 TO NOVEMBER 1973

The Directorate for Manpower Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, contracted for a continuing study of youths' attitudes towards the military. The survey was done at 6-month intervals beginning in May 1971 by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc. Additional tabulations, data analysis, and report preparation were accomplished by the Human Resources Research Organization. Each 6-month report summarized the results of

not only the most recent study, but all previous reports. The following is a summary of the May 1974 report, which included data gathered through November 1973.

The percent of the sample that would definitely or probably enlist was 11 percent in May 1971 and 12 percent in November 1973. The highest percent obtained was 15 percent in May and November 1972. Of those persons indicating a possibility of entering the service the major incentives included (1) learn a trade or skill applicable to civilian life; (2) travel, excitement, and new experience; (3) choice of service or branch; (4) opportunity for advanced education and training; (5) opportunity to serve country; and (6) overall benefits. Of the major incentives mentioned, overall benefits increased by the largest percentage, followed by learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life, and then by travel, excitement, and new experiences. Of the total sample the incentives most mentioned that would most likely induce enlistment was 4 years of college in return for 4 years service.

The largest portion of the male youth population do not indicate any desire to join the military. The most often cited reason for not enlisting in the first four surveys was the high risk of injury. This reason fell to third place in the 1973 surveys, undoubtedly due to the cessation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. More frequently mentioned in 1973 were strict discipline and/or training conditions and extended time away from home. These two reasons were also the only conditions besides high risk of injury to be consistently mentioned in earlier surveys by more than 40 percent of the respondents.

Another important topic dealt with extensively in the Gilbert surveys is knowledge of the military. A series of questions used in each survey involved vocational training, benefits, and pay. There were consistent positive statements dealing with the quality and types of training in the military. Medical and dental care and general references to the GI Bill were the most frequent answers to the question about military benefits in November 1973. A third response to this question, which had been mentioned most often in November 1971 and May 1972 but declined in subsequent surveys, related to the military's educational benefits provided.

In each survey the respondents were asked to choose which of the military services was best described by a list of nine statements dealing with various positive characteristics of military life. The results showed little meaningful variation across surveys. In general, the Air Force was most often mentioned as best in pay, family living conditions,

chance to get ahead in a career, chance to learn new and useful skills, and chance to use one's skills and abilities. The Navy ranked above the other services in foreign travel opportunity and exciting life. The Marine Corps had the best image regarding proving manhood and having the most attractive uniform. The Army was not ranked first in any of the nine statements.

SERVICES' STUDIES ON IMAGES,
ATTITUDES, AND INCENTIVES

We contacted those organizations responsible for conducting penetration and tracking studies and obtained from them a synopsis of studies each had conducted for the calendar years 1970 through 1974. In all we were able to identify 76 such studies dealing with images, attitudes, and incentives. We randomly selected 22 of these studies (8 Army, 7 Navy, 5 Air Force, and 2 Marine Corps) in addition to the Gilbert surveys for detailed review.

The studies showed that the services' images have not changed since 1971. The Air Force has been the first choice for those who planned to enlist since 1965 and is considered the prestigious or elite service. The Navy was the second choice for those who planned to enlist and is considered the best service for foreign travel and exciting life. The Marine Corps and the Army generally were ranked as tied for third. The Marine Corps was perceived as demanding toughness; physical capabilities; and offering masculinity, prestige, and physical action. The Army was perceived as the biggest, oldest, and most basic of the services.

The studies showed that the most often mentioned enlistment incentives were training, travel, and preparing for later life. The major deterrents mentioned in the studies included dislike of discipline, loss of identity, and restricted freedom. The benefits most often mentioned were pay and fringe benefits.

Excerpts from four of the studies we reviewed follow:

--According to a 1971 Army study among young men aged 17 to 21, about 17 percent were generally favorable toward entering the military. About half of all young men were distinctively hostile while most remained more neutral but tending to the negative. When asked for their preference among services, about 30 percent chose the Air Force, another 30 percent chose the Navy, while 20 percent chose the Army, and 15 percent the Marine Corps. The two most important motives for enlistment were self-development and

training. Other motives mentioned were patriotism, travel, adventure, and excitement. The major deterrent to enlisting in the Army was danger or the fear of being killed or wounded. Other deterrents were dislike of discipline, loss of identity, restricted freedom, and lack of choice over training and duty assignment. Benefits mentioned included medical and dental care and job security. Pay was mentioned as an important factor but only in conjunction with other incentives.

--A 1972 study for the Air Force showed that compared to 1971 the image of the Air Force seemed somewhat richer in detail related to training and education. The images of the other three branches were essentially unchanged. The Marines were perceived as wanting "a few good men" and as demanding toughness; physical capabilities; and offering masculinity, prestige and physical action. The Navy image was more complex, involving rather romantic ideas about travel, the sea, good living, as well as opportunities for training in career skills. The Army also had a complex image--the biggest, oldest, and most basic of the services. It offers opportunities for learning also, but it is the service which is easiest to get in and least demanding of physical or mental skills. Young men, on the average, did not speak of it with much enthusiasm. The results on overall exposure to military advertising were essentially unchanged from last year except for a 5 percentage point increase in advertising seen for the Navy. However, there were small increases in exposure for all branches. The Army, whose exposure increased the least, continues this year to be the branch for which advertising was most often reported seen.

--A Navy study dated November 1973 analyzed the attitudes and awareness of young males during four different time periods (May 2 to 15, 1972, September 18 to 30, 1972, March 26 to April 5, 1973, and September 18 to 29, 1973). The awareness of military advertising noted during the four time periods is as follows:

<u>Total advertising awareness</u>	<u>Percent of total sample</u>			
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Navy	67	69	73	72
Air Force	69	69	71	67
Army	81	81	77	81

The attitudes of overall interest in joining the military and a particular service is shown on the following chart.

	<u>Compared to the Navy</u>					
	<u>Air Force</u>		<u>Army</u>		<u>Marines</u>	
	<u>Lower</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Lower</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Lower</u>	<u>Higher</u>
Wave 1		0%	6%			12%
Wave 2		26	7			14
Wave 3		3	10			14
Wave 4		3	7			10

The overall interest in joining each branch is shown on the following table.

	<u>Percent of total sample</u>			
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Navy				
Very/extremely	9	7	9	8
Somewhat/rather/quite	24	28	25	25
Not at all interested	67	65	66	67
Air Force				
Very/extremely	10	11	11	9
Somewhat/rather/quite	23	26	26	27
Not at all interested	67	63	63	64
Army				
Very/extremely	5	5	6	5
Somewhat/rather/quite	22	23	18	21
Not at all interested	73	72	76	74
Marine Corps				
Very/extremely	6	4	4	5
Somewhat/rather/quite	15	17	16	18
Not at all interested	79	79	80	77

--A 1974 study for the Army compared the attitudes towards and awareness of the military in 1971 and 1973. There has been no real improvement in young men's perceptions of military service for themselves. Non-college men, as a group, express less interest in going into the military today than in 1971. This is due largely to a decline in the acceptance of the military among whites. The ranking of the four services' overall attractiveness was: (1) Air Force and Navy on top, close together, with a slight edge for the Air Force over the Navy; (2) Army and Marines at the next level, very close in positive votes, but the Army receiving considerably less criticism than the Marines. The perceived main attraction of the Army compared to the Air Force and Navy was that it is better or safer to serve on the ground than in the air or on the water. Compared to the Marines the Army life is not as brutal; there is less physical hardship involved in the Army's basic training. Major disadvantages of the Army compared to the Air Force and Navy are that the Army's training program is not as good, does not offer as much technical job training and there is more hand-to-hand fighting in the Army. Compared to the Marines there is no disadvantage. Top motivators to enlistment in the Army are (1) civilian job training, (2) chance to decide what to do later in life, (3) personal growth and maturing, (4) travel opportunities, and (5) chance to obtain college-type schooling. Patriotic considerations and the chance to be with people one can respect, on the other hand, have a more limited appeal.

POTENTIAL FOR A SINGLE STUDY

It appears reasonable that all the services could use one study to track the attitudes, awareness, motivations, and images of youth toward the military. We talked to numerous people in OSD, the services, and their ad agencies about the potential for such a study. There was almost unanimous agreement that a single study should suffice, with the caveat that from time-to-time, some peculiar aspect of a particular service might require special study. Most people agreed that many of the previous studies were unnecessary. The principal problems that have created the large number of studies are (1) disenchantment with the Gilbert surveys and (2) insufficient information as to what studies had been or were being done by other organizations.

Concerning the Gilbert surveys, there was almost unanimous agreement that this was not the proper vehicle. Criticism of it was not always the same, and sometimes appeared invalid. We were told that quality and depth were lacking, the peer group method of interviewing was not a good one, and the wrong questions were being asked. However, we noted no major differences in the results of the Gilbert surveys and other studies. Delay in obtaining the results was the criticism most often expressed and did appear valid. We noted that reports were not issued for 6 months or more after the survey was made. This problem appears to be largely a product of the way the study is produced. One contractor, Gilbert, makes the survey while a second, Human Resources Research Organization, analyzes the data and prepares the study. The study must then be approved by OSD. OSD officials stated that the Gilbert surveys had been canceled.

We obtained an incomplete list of studies from the Defense Document Center. We became aware of several studies done by a particular service that contained data and information on all the services. However, we found that people in other services or their contractors who could have used the information were not aware of them. There was no systematic method for gathering and analyzing data, or assuring that it was exchanged among the services.

OSD has been aware of this problem for some time and has recently launched an effort to redesign a study that hopefully will satisfy most of the services' needs. We believe that this effort, if successful, will solve the problem.

AWARENESS OF ADVERTISING

The services, and particularly ad agencies, rely on awareness of advertising to determine the effectiveness of advertising. Two techniques are used to measure advertising awareness: (1) penetration or tracking studies (sometimes done as a part of other studies) which attempt to determine whether the ads are being read, and (2) the number of coupons and cards from ads that are sent in expressing interest in additional information. (See ch. 4.)

All of the services or their ad agencies have conducted advertising awareness studies from time to time. The Navy, for instance, through its ad agency, conducts an annual tracking study, which measures people's awareness levels of Navy advertising. These studies show that there is a correlation between increased advertising and people's awareness of it. However, they do not show that awareness of advertising

correlates with a better attitude toward the military or a particular service. In fact, the studies, taken together, seem to be saying the opposite, i.e., that although advertising awareness is increasing, attitudes toward the service are not improving. In some cases, the study says clearly that the advertising awareness increased but attitudes did not.

A strong correlation also exists between increased advertising and increased responses. However, there is little correlation between responses and actual enlistment. Our test showed that only a small fraction of those who responded actually enlisted. (See ch. 4.)

Ad agencies tend to argue that there are many factors over which they have no control that may influence people to join the service and form their attitude toward it. Therefore, if people are reading the ads and responding to them, this constitutes the best measure of advertising success. Although this may be valid from the ad agencies' standpoint, we do not believe it is a valid measure from the standpoint of the military recruiting program. The purpose of the military program is to influence attitudes, improve images, and to obtain recruits, and we believe that the services need better measures of how advertising is accomplishing these objectives.

NEEDED RESEARCH NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED

We noted several recommendations for research programs that have been suggested but not accomplished. In early 1974 JADOR's research subcommittee made recommendations that they believed would improve the research program. One was for a single study of attitude and awareness for all the services to use. They also recommended a study to determine whether a broader approach to DOD advertising might be successful. This approach would involve an attempt to interest a larger number of youths in military service as distinguished from any particular service and presumably, if successful, would lead to a DOD-wide campaign that would benefit all the services. They also made other recommendations for research projects that would benefit all the services.

As previously indicated, a need to improve the methods of measuring advertising accomplishments also exists. The present methods rely on a general belief that advertising is useful and on measurements of awareness of advertising and responses to advertising. These methods do not answer such basic questions as the extent that (1) advertising has

improved (or kept from decreasing) the youths' attitudes toward the military and (2) advertising has been successful in attracting qualified youths to the military service.

The University of Pennsylvania has been conducting research to develop improved methods of measuring advertising for more than 10 years. The essence of this technique is to isolate advertising as a variable in controlled market areas, and then to vary it up and down in the controlled areas. The results are then measured in terms of the end objective (i.e., recruiting people to the military services) to determine the effects of advertising.

We discussed the approach with a professor who has been in the forefront of marketing research for many years. He said that the research had been quite successful. He cited us the example of a nationally known beer manufacturer which had successfully reduced its advertising by more than half, at the same time increasing sales and market percentage. The methodology and results of this research were reported in the Sloan Management Review (Winter/1975). He also said there had been several other successful applications of the technique. Although there are obvious differences between selling a life style and selling a product, he believes that the research methodology is applicable to both.

We believe that DOD could and should conduct research into better methods of measuring the effectiveness of its advertising program.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The AVF recruiting effort has been successful, and it has been assumed that advertising contributed substantially. However, all the available evidence indicates that this contribution has been modest at best. Several factors have influenced this recruiting success--the recruiting forces were expanded and improved, salaries were raised, and bonuses were added. This leaves unanswered the question of whether less advertising would produce poorer results. It also raises the question of whether a different approach might produce more for less. The total number of potential recruits was not increased by expanded advertising campaigns from 1970 through 1974. When the services conduct large advertising programs, they are only competing with each other for the same potential recruit. Advertising Age, an advertising industry trade magazine, stated in an editorial commentary dated April 7, 1975, that the military advertising accounts are too big.

As the preceding chapters of the report show, there is considerable evidence of uncontrolled, duplicative, or inconsistent practices that we believe offer considerable potential for reducing cost and increasing effectiveness. In some cases, immediate action could be taken while in others additional research is needed.

Each of the services have been left pretty much on their own as to how the money should be spent. The rationale behind this approach appears to have been that the unique nature of each of the services would require them to tailor ad programs that gave their special message. Research has shown that the things that attract youth are common in all services, i.e., pay, educational benefits, training opportunities, travel, etc. The advertising of the services with occasional exceptions contain these basic messages. The image of a particular service as perceived by young people appears to be the single most influential factor in his enlistment decision. The Air Force, for instance, is perceived to offer the best training opportunities and has had the highest image in the eyes of youth since the early 1960s. The Army's image in relation to the Air Force has remained unchanged in spite of the fact that the Army has probably spent three or four times as much as the Air Force on advertising education and training benefits.

An analysis of studies done for and/or by the services and DOD showed that attitudes toward the military had changed little in a 4-year period. The studies also showed that advertising had little effect on the image of the services in relationship to one another. One of the principal purposes of advertising is to improve attitudes of youth and their influencers.

Although no one really knows how much free time is being received, most people agree that paid radio and TV will cost the services some large part of the free time now being received. The services and DOD do not have a clear cut estimate on the total free time they are receiving. Since some large part of this will be lost if the services go to paid radio, we believe that some better assessment should be made of the overall impact of paid radio before any extensive program is undertaken. The clear possibility exists that a paid radio and TV program stands a good chance of reducing the overall effectiveness of radio and TV advertising.

It appears that the overall extent of each service's magazine campaign has depended on the available funds. Although the services are pumping 31 percent of their media dollars into magazine advertisements, the services and their ad agencies have yet to determine how effective this medium is. Research shows that magazines rank behind TV and posters as a source of recruiting information.

From our analysis of five magazines used by at least three of the services, we concluded that all the services were advertising the same general features such as job and training opportunities and fringe benefits. The basic differences in the advertisements were the images and themes brought forth by the individual services.

Our review also showed that the services have done some work in joint service advertising in magazines. This effort was done in connection with the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program.

We believe that under the present method of operation there is substantial duplication in the direct-mail program. In addition we did not find any evidence to show that the services or DOD know whether receiving five or six letters from the military during a year may or may not be harmful to the overall recruiting effort.

The mail outs from all the services are generally emphasizing the same opportunities and benefits. The only unique items in the mail outs seem to be slogans and special programs.

There are dollar savings available by using alternative methods in the direct-mail program. Specifically, DOD could save about \$770,000 by sending one letter and followup letter describing all services to male high school seniors instead of having each service run its own campaign for male high school seniors. Additional funds could be saved by using the same methods in other areas where all services are aiming at the same market segment.

At present, all four services are using local advertising, incentive items, and billboards as part of their recruiting advertising program. It appears that the services do not know the effectiveness of these items.

At the same time it appeared that few people who enter the service can be traced to leads generated through the advertising media used by the services. More than 500,000 of the 550,000 who enlisted never sent in a lead at all. It appears that advertising leads are not a good source of recruits and are not a very accurate measure of advertising effectiveness because few leads result in recruits.

The cost of the Navy's telephone operation is not justified on the basis of telephone leads. More than half of the telephone leads are traceable to the Air Force which has the cheapest system. We believe that great savings could be affected by combining the telephone operations of the services.

In addition, recruiting research for the AVF has lacked central direction and control. The result has been that much of the research done was duplicative while at the same time needed research was not being accomplished. JADOR appeared to have recognized this problem early in 1974 and formed a subcommittee to make recommendations concerning the research effort. However, until recently, their recommendations went largely unheeded apparently because DOD was preoccupied with the broader problems of achieving a successful AVF.

Recently DOD has recognized this problem and has taken actions that should result in improvement. A coordination for the overall advertising effort, including research, has been established in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As a first step, several areas have been identified where a common research program, including attitude and awareness, could suffice for all the recruiting needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now that the AVF has basically been established, the military services can and need to critically evaluate their

present recruiting-advertising programs. The services and OSD should coordinate their efforts to evaluate their present advertising programs and to experiment with various media.

We recommend to the Secretary of Defense that:

- DOD and the four services should undertake research programs that improve advertising programs by devising better methods for measuring advertising effectiveness.
- If the research supports the findings and conclusions of studies done in the past, the services, with the help of DOD, should reassess their advertising programs in terms of meeting their objectives--to determine why the youth attitudes towards the military as well as their images of the individual services have not changed significantly.
- DOD should identify additional research that is common to the entire recruiting effort and make arrangements for such research to be performed in a common way and made available to all who need it.
- Some mechanism should be established to assure that research performed by the services in common areas is not duplicative of research being done and is made available to those who have use for it.

In addition, the services and DOD should begin to experiment with various advertising approaches such as: (1) DOD military service advertising, (2) four service advertising, and (3) controlled test advertising to determine the effect of various media such as direct mail and magazine advertising.

- The concept behind DOD military service advertising would involve a military service career pitch, selling the military as a viable alternative for job training, education, and/or career. This concept could be similar to the ads for milk and orange juice--advertising the general product versus a specific brand of the product. This approach could be useful in direct mail, magazine advertising, and electronic broadcasting (TV and radio).
- The services have already done some work in joint service advertising. With the apparent success of the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program advertising effort, the services should

test using this type of advertising for recruiting in other areas which are common to all the services.

- Additionally, the services should be experimenting with the quantity and type of advertising done. Using control and test markets, the services can experiment by increasing and decreasing various advertising media within a region keeping other factors constant. In this vein, we feel DOD should consider seriously adapting and testing the variable advertising approach that has been developed. This would aid in determining the effectiveness of local advertising, incentive items, billboards, and public service announcements in relation to the money spent. This approach could also be used nationally with magazine advertisements.
- The services should look at the individual incentive items to determine which are most suitable to their needs.
- Before pursuing any type of paid broadcast advertising, the services should determine how much PSA time is now being obtained, how effective this media is, and how much of this time could be lost if the services went to paid broadcasting.
- DOD should examine the policy of using all response type media especially the more costly popup cards considering the number of leads that can be traced to enlistments.
- DOD, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, should take action on the November 1973 recommendation that the services consider combining their toll-free lines under commercial contracts. In any event, the Navy should reassess its use of the toll-free telephone answering service which does not appear to be cost effective.

These recommendations are possibilities to test and improve the effectiveness of military advertising. GAO does not advocate eliminating advertising, but we do recommend research and experimentation as means of evaluating the present advertising campaigns and for determining optimal ad programs. We do believe some of these actions could reduce the individual efforts and costs of the services by supplementing the individual service campaigns and by promoting a DOD military service advertising campaign.

DOD COMMENTS AND PLANNED ACTIONS

DOD stated that:

- Efforts are currently underway by the services and DOD for measuring advertising effectiveness. In addition, all services and DOD have conducted various advertising effectiveness studies. An element of the consolidated DOD market research program which has recently been implemented is the development of an improved advertising effectiveness measurement.
- The current joint DOD/service study of the effectiveness of paid radio advertising should provide added insight into advertising's effectiveness in support of recruiting. The study is experimental and will attempt to relate advertising to intermediate communications and behavioral measures and to contracts for accession.
- Another study in the consolidated DOD market research program should improve DOD's ability to track advertising effects. This study will provide information on awareness, attitudes, and motivation of the enlistable population every 6 months. Within the limitations of such survey research, the study has been designed to meet the in-common needs of the services for advertising tracking information.
- The recommended research program must consider the state of the art in advertising effectiveness research. Measuring advertising's precise contribution as part of a total marketing effort has always been a difficult and complex task. There is much controversy as to whether advertising objectives should be stated in terms of communication or sales (accessions). Progress in measuring advertising effectiveness has been slow due to the difficulty and expense of isolating advertising from other variables having a bearing on sales (accessions). Measuring the direct effect of advertising on accessions poses unusual problems of cost, data availability, and control over the other important variables impacting upon the enlistment decision process.
- DOD agreed to reassess their advertising programs if research supports the need. DOD also stated that the arguments used to establish the need to improve advertising effectiveness measurement should also serve as a caution against using the apparent lack

of significant positive attitude changes as a basis for criticism of advertising. Also, relatively constant attitudes may not indicate a lack of advertising effect.

--DOD agreed to identify common research, make it available to those who need it and determine a method to eliminate duplicative research. It stated that the ongoing consolidated DOD market research program has been designed to define the in-common research needs of the services and DOD, to accomplish the research, to eliminate redundancy in the total DOD market research effort, and to make the findings available to all users in DOD. This research program will not eliminate the need for certain service specific information which will continue to be fulfilled via service-unique research.

The program is in operation. The first three primary research efforts have been defined, contracted for, and initiated in the field. These studies have resulted from iterating, condensing, and reordering the research requirements developed by JADOR. The studies are an awareness attitude and motivation tracking study built around commonly defined service tracking areas, a study on the recruitment of medical professionals, and a study of the market potential among minority groups. These studies are presently in the data collection stage. Action is also being taken to define additional in-common information needs.

A mechanism for insuring that duplicating market research efforts is eliminated has been established which involves regular updating and communication of completed, ongoing, and planned market research efforts in DOD (the Coast Guard is also included). Additionally, action has been initiated to provide additional staff expertise for the definition, design, and analysis of in-common market research efforts. OSD also plans to formalize a market analysis and research committee (similar to JADOR) which will be made up of service and DOD market research and analysis representatives. This committee will identify common market information needs, review technical proposals, and provide coordination and guidance to insure the effectiveness of the consolidated DOD market research program.

--DOD concurred that it should begin to experiment with different advertising approaches. It stated that JADOR has made a great contribution in setting

standards for and implementing media buying procedures, in the sharing advertising cost information, and in coordinating joint experimentation. The coordination between DOD and the services via the Joint Education Liaison Directors of Recruiting has resulted in joint sales support efforts aimed at providing information about service opportunities for jobs, training, careers, and education, as well as information about enlistment qualifications and military life to the educational community.

DOD agrees that DOD and four service advertising approaches should be evaluated to determine if they offer cost effective methods of supplementing service specific advertising. Currently, JADOR is planning to conduct a test of cooperative direct-mail advertising.

DOD plans further testing of the cost effectiveness of joint advertising in support of the individual services' recruiting and advertising. If joint advertising proves cost effective, it would be used in combination with individual service advertising.

DOD agrees that experimentation in the marketplace is the means that offers the best opportunity to establish the existence of causative relationships between advertising and its impact on accessions. Opportunities for experimentation are now and will continue to be considered as an element of the consolidated DOD market research program and service specific research efforts. Experimental design, however, as a means to evaluate advertising and recruiting efforts in the marketplace does have serious practical limitations. It is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate and control all the variables influencing measures of effectiveness. It may impact negatively upon field personnel subjected to the experimental controls and demands to participate in data collection. Design, data collection, and analyses of market experiments are very costly.

--DOD agreed that the services should look at individual incentive items. It stated that each of the military services has closely monitored the incentive item program, and management action has been taken by the services to improve the program which includes reductions in the incentive program in the Navy and Marine Corps and institution of improved control procedures in the Army. DOD will continue to stress the need to

determine the suitability of incentive items and to provide items at least cost.

--DOD concurred with our recommendation about PSA time. It stated that DOD since 1971 has refrained from using paid broadcast advertising on a regular campaign basis, without the consent of the Congress to do so. As a result of the unavailability of paid broadcast advertising, combined with the tremendous challenge of implementing the AVF, the present media advertising of the military services reflects a greater dependence on PSA and other substitutes for paid broadcast advertising (such as billboards) than would most likely exist if paid broadcast advertising had been available. Service media planning has been constrained. The possibility exists that without this constraint more efficient or economic media schedules could be designed.

DOD prefers to have unrestricted access to the available advertising media, so that all media can be evaluated in the media planning process. However, before employing paid broadcast advertising on a campaign basis, DOD has been executing a process of evaluation of paid broadcast which includes an evaluation of PSA impacts should paid broadcast be employed. This evaluation process has included a media analysis with audience delivery capability a dollar as the criterion variable. This study also attempted to estimate the value of current PSA as well as probable impacts on PSA support of a move to paid broadcast on a campaign basis. This analysis indicated that further evaluation of paid broadcasting in the marketplace was warranted. Subsequently, an Army and an all-service paid radio field test program was designed and implemented. These field tests aim to measure the relative cost effectiveness of paid radio as an element of the service media mixes. They go beyond the media audience delivery analysis to include the impact on communication and accession criterion variables. The results of these studies will be used to determine the advisability of entry into paid broadcast advertising and will provide the basis for any request to the Congress by DOD for unrestricted access to paid broadcast advertising. An element of the field test designs has been the monitoring of impacts on public service advertising support.

In summary, in the course of the evaluation of paid broadcast advertising, DOD has estimated the amount of PSA time being obtained and its effectiveness. Further, DOD is attempting to assess the amount of

PSA time which could be lost if any of the services should decide to employ paid broadcast advertising.

--DOD agreed with our recommendation on response type media. It stated that DOD will continue to stress evaluation of the use of response type media. The Army and the Navy, as a result of service evaluations, have reduced the use of response type media in their advertising programs.

Recognizing the uncertainties associated with advertising effectiveness measurement, DOD believes that changes in inquiry rates should not be used alone as the total advertising effectiveness measure. This would understate the overall impact of advertising and, in particular, it ignores the probable impact of advertising on those enlistees who have not inquired using the formal service inquiry mechanisms.

--DOD generally agreed with our recommendation on toll-free telephones. It stated that the issue of combining toll-free telephone service under one contract is under consideration by JADOR and will be evaluated by DOD.

The Navy in commenting on its toll-free telephone lines disagreed that its system was 12 times as expensive as the Air Force's. The Navy stated that its system was only five times as expensive as the Air Force's. Considering DOD's planned action, we have no further comment.

CHAPTER 6
THE MILITARY'S USE OF
ADVERTISING AGENCY FIELD REPRESENTATIVES

All the services, except the Air Force, use field representatives of their national advertising agency to assist in their local advertising efforts. In general, the field representatives provide advice and guidance in advertising, public affairs, community relations and publicity, and in other areas relating to recruiting.

During fiscal year 1974 the Army used a total of 69 field representatives, 1 at each of its 5 regional recruiting commands and 1 at each of its 64 district recruiting commands. The Navy uses a total of seven field representatives, one at each of its area commands. The Marines use a total of seven, one at each district. The field representatives were used for both the active and reserve forces advertising on what the advertising industry considered a full-time basis.

The table below shows, by service, the total costs of field representatives for fiscal year 1974.

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Total costs for field representatives:				
Personal services	\$1,807,000	\$214,000	\$359,646	
Travel and overhead	<u>493,000</u>	<u>92,000</u>	<u>31,941</u>	
Total	<u>\$2,300,000</u>	<u>\$306,000</u>	<u>\$391,587</u>	N/A
Number of field representatives	69	7	7	N/A

The Air Force used, along with its own advertising and publicity personnel, the assistance of local advertising agencies on a when-needed basis for obtaining media space and time. Comparable costs and other data for the Air Force's method were not readily available.

NEED AND EFFECTIVENESS

During the review we noted that a review had been made to evaluate the continued need for the use of and

effectiveness of the Army's advertising agency field representatives in early 1973. There had been no studies of the Navy and Marine Corps' field representatives.

The U.S. Army Audit Agency, in its report issued in April 1973, questioned the need for field representatives, and concluded that the field representatives performed routine tasks to a large extent and duplicated functions of 169 personnel within the Army's recruiting commands. To eliminate duplicating the functions, the U.S. Army Audit Agency recommended that:

1. Field representatives be eliminated at the District Recruiting Commands (DRC), and a reduced number be used at the Regional Recruiting Commands (RRC), to advise Army personnel on specialized advertising, marketing, and public relations problems.
2. The use of field representatives be monitored and evaluated for cost effectiveness.
3. The fiscal year 1974 contract with the advertising agency be changed to provide not only a reduced number of field representatives assigned to DRCs, but a precise definition of the services they would perform.

USAREC disagreed with the recommendations, but indicated a study would be made to determine the proper military-civilian mix and grade structure for DRCs and the appropriate definition of what services are to be provided by the advertising agency field representatives.

As of the completion of our review, USAREC had not followed any of the U.S. Army Audit Agency's recommendations, nor had it followed the actions it agreed to take.

Through interviews, we found it is the opinion of many Army Advertising and Information personnel (A and I), that field representatives provided a lot of expertise and were generally helpful. They were particularly helpful in obtaining PSA broadcast time, because they work for a prestigious firm and are able to get free media time more easily than Government personnel.

We found also through interviews, however, that many A and I personnel felt they were competent enough in the advertising field to assume the duties of the field representatives. An example given to us which demonstrates the competent feeling of some A and I personnel was a request by

one of the DRCs not to refill the position of the field representative that had been unoccupied during the summer of 1974.

Some of the DRC commanders we interviewed, who viewed the duties of field representatives as being duplicative of his own A and I personnel, felt the number of field representatives should be reduced. Similarly, one of the field representatives we interviewed suggested that field representatives should only be assigned to regions and eliminated at the district level.

Our comparison of the position guide for the Army's field representatives with the job description for the DRC's A and I chiefs showed some areas of duplication.

The commander of one RRC, in commenting on the duplication of effort between his DRC's A and I personnel and field representatives, stated that there had been problems in the past in obtaining well-qualified A and I chiefs at the DRCs. While this problem existed, the field representatives played a major role in the Army's advertising and there was very little duplication of effort. He stated that at present his DRC's A and I chiefs and supporting staffs are essentially well-qualified and duplication of effort is increasing between the field representatives and the A and I chiefs and will continue to increase as the A and I chiefs gain experience. The commander felt that in the near future the number of field representatives in his RRC could be reduced from its present level of 12 down to 2 or 3. These two or three field representatives would work out of the RRC. The A and I chief at one of the DRCs stated that any DRC A and I shop, fully staffed with qualified individuals, as his was, could do without a field representative without any adverse effect on the Army's recruiting mission.

In an August 1974 letter report to the Commander of USAREC, the Inspector General, commenting on the basis of interviews with 13 field representatives and their commanders, recommended that:

1. It be recognized that the field representative is a vital and necessary member of the recruiting team.
2. Consideration be given to allocating the services number of field representatives to DRC based on need.

We interviewed recruiters to get their opinions and views of field representatives. Of the 60 Army recruiters interviewed, all were aware of the existence of field representatives, but only half of the recruiters had any idea as to what the functions and duties of these particular people were. Although it was the opinion of 75 percent of the recruiters that the field representatives were readily available to them, it was not clear how they might use their service.

It was noted that if USAREC were to eliminate the field representatives at the DRCs, a savings of about \$2,133,000 would be possible.

AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES

The Air Force has an Advertising and Publicity Division within each of its recruiting groups and detachments staffed with their own military and civilian personnel who manage and control the local advertising, including coordinating the local advertising with its national advertising programs. The other services also have similar staffs having the same responsibilities and performing similar duties. Therefore, since the field representatives operate in an advisory capacity only, they are considered to be in addition to and not instead of the services' local advertising and publicity staffs.

Although the Air Force does not use any advertising agency field representatives, we noted that they have less of an image problem, have not had a problem in meeting their enlistment quota, and obtained more public service broadcast time in fiscal year 1974 (a vital function alleged to be more capably done by field representatives).

It is the contention of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps that the national advertising agency field representatives with their expertise are in a position to better identify the "advertising gap" not covered by the nationally controlled programs and to communicate and coordinate the locally created advertising with the national programs.

Experience has shown that the Air Force's advertising and publicity personnel are capable of identifying the advertising gap not covered by their nationally controlled programs and to communicate and coordinate the locally created advertising with the assistance of local advertising agencies on a when-needed basis to obtain media time and space.

RATES OF FIELD REPRESENTATIVES

The services' payments to its national advertising agency for the services of field representatives during fiscal year 1974 were reduced to the following hourly rates:

Army	\$17.50
Navy	24.00
Marine Corps	42.00

The rates used from the Army and the Navy are composite rates based on actual salary payments to all field representatives plus a percentage to cover overhead costs and profits to the advertising agency. The hourly rate of \$42.00 used for the Marine Corps is the maximum rate specified in the Marine Corps' fixed price contract with its national advertising agency, a rate to be used in computing in-house labor costs in negotiating a fixed price on delivery orders.

Our comparison of documents on the responsibilities and duties of field representatives showed no discernible differences among the three services.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe that Army, Navy, and Marine Corps may have needed the field representatives' assistance upon entering the AVF concept of recruiting at a time when the recruiting forces were not up to strength and when their own personnel were inexperienced in the advertising area. Now that the recruiting forces are adequately trained and at full strength and the services' personnel have gained experience in advertising, the further need and effectiveness of national advertising agency field representatives on such a broad scale in light of the costs involved and other alternatives available is questionable.

The adequacy of the recruiting force and advertising experience of the services' personnel is attested to by the fact that all the services are currently meeting their recruiting goals and have had little difficulty since inception of the AVF recruiting policy on July 1, 1973.

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps spent a total of \$3 million in fiscal year 1974 and had plans to spend even more in fiscal year 1975 for field representatives, but have not determined their continued need and/or effectiveness, particularly on such a broad scale as in the case of the Army. There are strong indications that many of the duties performed

by field representatives are to a large extent routine and duplicative of those already being done by the services' personnel. Experience has shown that the Air Force is capable of handling its own local advertising mission without the advice and guidance of any advertising agency field representatives.

The responsibilities and duties of field representatives are similar among the services; but the rate of \$42 an hour used for payment of Marine Corps' national advertising agency field representatives is unreasonable when compared to the rates of \$17.50 and \$24.00 used for the Army and Navy. The Marine Corps informed us that it has renegotiated its contract for services of field representatives for fiscal year 1975. The new rate equates to about \$29 per hour.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take action to determine the continued need for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps' national advertising agency field representatives. The reviews should include a monitoring of the actual duties done by field representatives and evaluated for uniqueness in terms of whether such duties are beyond the capability of the services' own personnel.

DOD COMMENTS AND PLANNED ACTIONS

DOD agreed to review the continued need for national advertising field representatives including costs and contractual relationships.

CHAPTER 7

ADVERTISING COST DATA

NEEDS TO BE FULLY DISCLOSED

IN A CONSISTENT MANNER

During our review the services provided us with advertising cost data concerning the areas covered in this report and other related advertising areas. The statements we requested and received from each of the services totaled \$96.1 million and \$102.1 million for fiscal years 1974 and 1975, respectively.

Our analysis of the cost data provided showed that what each service included as advertising costs varied widely. It seems that when the services are requested to submit advertising cost data to DOD or the Congress, each service uses its own discretion in selecting the format and in determining what costs should or should not be included. There are no DOD or interservice guidelines for the services to follow when reporting their advertising cost data. Without an all-inclusive and comprehensive picture of the services' total advertising costs presented in a consistent manner, program managers and especially DOD managers are not in the best position to formulate effective plans and make sound decisions.

DOD agreed with the need for cost guidelines and stated that they would be developed.

ADVERTISING COST DATA

The table on the following page classifies the advertising costs discussed in this report. The cost data was provided by the services.

Our compilation of readily identifiable advertising cost data show total costs for the overall military advertising to be at least \$118.6 million and \$126.2 million for fiscal year 1974 and 1975, respectively. However, this compilation is probably not all-inclusive because of lack of criteria and classification of advertising costs.

The House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations in its November 1973 report showed concern for full disclosure and uniformity of budget information when they tried to compile a total recruiting request for fiscal year 1974 in which advertising was addressed. The compilation contained

COST ANALYSIS OF MAJOR REPORT AREAS

FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975

Description of item	Army FY		Navy FY		Air Force FY		Marines FY		DOD FY		FY 74 Total	FY 75 Total
	74	75	74	75	74	75	74	75	74	75		
(000 omitted)												
Commissionable media:												
Magazines	\$ 6,600	\$ 8,300	\$ 4,827	\$ 4,890	\$ 4,288	\$ 2,432	\$ 2,905	\$ 1,769	-	-	\$ 18,620	\$ 17,391
Billboards	5,300	3,000	3,233	4,437	2,757	2,617	1,304	451	-	-	12,594	10,505
Newspapers/local ads	2,200	1,000	964	3,047	599	406	1,151	-	-	-	4,914	4,453
Miscellaneous	200	200	58	-	357	100	1	243	-	-	616	543
Direct mail	2,400	3,000	2,516	3,951	178	125	970	1,034	-	-	6,064	8,110
District representatives	2,300	2,400	207	191	-	-	398	351	-	-	2,905	2,942
Production/solicitation of PSA time	1,644	2,176	219	1,493	998	815	357	361	-	-	3,218	4,845
Local advertising	4,035	4,100	1,271	3,047	1,336	1,243	a/(701)	a/(907)	-	-	6,642	8,390
Incentive--recruiter give away items	411	202	3,789	2,280	1,067	515	299	25	-	-	a/(701)	a/(907)
Research	519	184	757	-	25	40	65	119	-	-	5,566	3,022
Fulfillment house	644	879	665	669	163	242	155	430	-	-	1,366	343
DOD market research (institutional)	3,400	a/(3,400)	a/(1,525)	a/(1,800)	a/(856)	1,800	-	-	\$2,381	\$7,000	1,627	2,220
Remaining items not specifically addressed in this report	8,647	17,659	3,205	715	1,041	1,501	4,288	2,415	-	-	5,781	8,800
Reserve	a/(6,060)	a/(5,400)	4,548	4,383	1,279	810	a/(2,600)	a/(1,400)	-	-	a/(2,381)	a/(5,200)
ROTC	a/(5,095)	a/(5,095)	174	371	1,807	1,671	-	-	-	-	5,827	5,193
Academy	a/(153)	a/(97)	-	50	410	259	-	-	-	-	1,981	2,042
Unit of choice/station of choice advertising	(a,b)	a/, c/(469)	(b)	(b)	(b)	(b)	(b)	(b)	-	-	a/(5,095)	a/(5,095)
National Guard	a/(3,638)	a/(3,124)	(b)	(b)	a/(800)	a/(800)	(b)	(b)	-	-	410	309
Retention	Included in above		320	246	462	424	-	-	-	-	782	670
Military salaries	Not included		Not included	Not included	Not included	Not included	a/(455)	a/(735)	-	-	a/(455)	a/(735)
Total (included in general advertising budget)	38,300	43,100	26,753	29,770	16,767	15,000	11,893	7,198	2,381	7,000	96,094	102,068
Total other identifiable costs	14,946	17,585	1,525	1,800	2,246	1,750	3,756	3,042	-	-	22,473	24,177
Total service advertising costs	\$53,246	\$60,685	\$28,278	\$31,570	\$19,013	\$16,750	\$15,649	\$10,240	\$2,381	\$7,000	\$118,567	\$126,245

a/Amounts not included in general advertising budget.

b/Not available.

c/Estimated.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

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in the report was qualified by the following statement

"The data on the tables should probably be looked upon as 'floor' for recruiting manpower and dollar costs since there are a number of indications that all costs have not been identified."

On May 1 and 2, 1975, respectively, we advised the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, that we were reviewing the advertising phase of military recruiting and had found that the services were inconsistent in including certain costs in their advertising budgets and that in addition no guidelines had been established by DOD or the services to insure comparable use of the data. Both committees expressed interest in the matter and felt that a need to establish guidelines for standardized reporting existed.

Because of the large sums of money being spent on advertising for the AVF, and the need for studying the cost effectiveness of this program, we believe there is a growing need for the services to report advertising costs in all-inclusive manner.

We found that the cost data provided us by the services varied widely among the services. For example--the Navy's statement included costs for their reserve forces recruiting, the other services' statements did not; the Navy and Air Forces' statements included costs for their ROTC program, the Army's statements did not; the Marine Corps' statements did not include their local advertising costs nor the costs of their retention program, the other services' statements did include these costs; the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps' statements include costs for toll-free telephone contract services, the Navy used their own military recruiters for this purpose, but its statements do not include these costs. Also, the Marine Corps reported direct-mail costs of \$970,000 for 2.7 million pieces of mail while the Army reported direct-mail costs of \$2.4 million for 3.6 million pieces of mail.

In addition to the above-mentioned inconsistencies in the statements of advertising costs, we also noted a lack of uniformity among the services in their reporting of major line items. The costs shown on the services' statement are not classified in a comparable manner, and in most instances, we found it impossible to make any meaningful comparisons of similar costs among the services. Because of the lack of established criteria, at least one of the services reduced the amount of their advertising cost 19 percent by removing various items and transferring them to other cost areas.

Their rationale was that other services did not include these items, therefore they were eliminating them from their advertising costs. This transfer may or may not have been valid, but the fact remains that there is no criteria and there can be certainly no comparability of cost data presented by the services as long as similar actions of this kind are available.

We also noted that the funds in support of a service's advertising as well as its other recruiting functions come from different appropriations and different budgets within an appropriation. In addition, there were allocations of funds to lower level commands and separate accounting; therefore, with inadequate or no feedback on how the funds were being spent. These conditions seem to be some of the reasons why the services do not report all advertising costs. However, the problem of the services not fully disclosing and reporting their advertising costs consistently can be solved by promulgating and implementing well-conceived guidelines.

We recognize that to provide advertising cost data in a manner that would be useful to management, the promulgation of any such guideline should include (1) criteria for determining what constitutes advertising costs, (2) a listing of the recruiting areas among the services with like or similar characteristics, (3) a format for the classification of cost data in a manner that would best serve management, and (4) a requirement that each service report all applicable costs by each of the defined recruiting areas. For example, some of the recruiting areas which probably have like or similar characteristics for each service are (1) enlisted personnel for their active forces, (2) officer personnel for their active forces, (3) enlisted personnel for their reserve forces, (4) officer personnel for their reserve forces, (5) retention of onboard personnel, (6) ROTC, and (7) academies.

CONCLUSIONS

All advertising costs relating to the overall military recruiting campaign are not fully disclosed and reported by the services in a consistent manner. We believe that without such reporting of advertising costs program managers are not in a position to best carry out their responsibilities in formulating effective plans and making sound decisions.

No DOD guidelines were issued for use by the services for the reporting of advertising costs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue instructions and guidelines to the services for reporting advertising costs in a manner that will be useful to management. We further recommend that these guidelines include (1) criteria for determining what constitutes advertising costs, (2) a listing of the recruiting areas among the services with like or similar characteristics, (3) a format for classifying the cost data in a manner that would best serve management, and (4) a requirement that each service report all applicable costs by each of the defined recruiting areas.

DOD COMMENTS AND ACTIONS

DOD stated that it will develop improved guidelines for the reporting of advertising costs.

CHAPTER 8

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review dealt with current and proposed advertising programs of the four services, their advertising agencies, and their subcontractors. During our study we looked into (1) the research conducted by OSD, the four services, and their advertising agencies concerning attitudes toward and awareness of a military career and the advertising campaigns' effectiveness and (2) the services' overall advertising programs--including each service's budget, media used, response systems, etc.

We interviewed officials in the Department of Defense, military services, their advertising agencies, and their subcontractors:

DOD	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Manpower and Reserve Affairs Data Analysis Center.
Army	Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., Recruiting Command (USAREC); the Recruiting Regions; the Districts; and randomly selected recruiters. N.W. Ayer and Son, Inc.; the Ayer Direct Division and its subcontractor World Wide, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Air Force	Recruiting personnel from the Recruiting Commands; the Recruiting Groups; the Detachments; and randomly selected recruiters. D'Arcy-MacManus and Masius Advertising, New York. Dialogue Marketing, Peoria, Illinois, a D'Arcy-MacManus subcontractor.
Navy	Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., Recruiting personnel from the Recruiting Commands; the Areas; the Districts; and randomly selected recruiters.

Grey Advertising, Inc., New York.

LCS Industries, Pelham Manor, New York,
a subcontractor of Grey Advertising.

J.F. Small, Inc., New York.

Navy National Recruiting Information
Center, Macon, Georgia.

Marine Corps

Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington,
D.C., Recruiting personnel from the
recruiting commands; the District
Headquarters; the Stations; and ran-
domly selected recruiters.

J. Walter Thompson, New York.

Market Compilation Research Bureau, a
subcontractor of J. Walter Thompson
Company.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DOD</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Donald H. Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Present
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975
William P. Clements (acting)	May 1973	July 1973
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
William P. Clements	Jan. 1973	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
William K. Brehm	Sept. 1973	Present
Carl W. Clewlow (acting)	June 1973	Aug. 1973
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Martin R. Hoffmann	Aug. 1975	Present
Norman R. Augustine (acting)	July 1975	Aug. 1975
Howard H. Callaway	May 1973	July 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Donald G. Brotzman	Mar. 1975	Present
M. David Lowe	Feb. 1974	Jan. 1975
Carl S. Wallace	Mar. 1973	Jan. 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. Fred C. Weyand	Sept. 1974	Present
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams	Oct. 1972	Sept. 1974
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
J. William Middendorf II	Apr. 1974	Present
John W. Warner	May 1972	Apr. 1974

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (cont.)ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):

Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.	Sept. 1973	Present
James E. Johnson	June 1971	Sept. 1973

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:

Adm. James L. Holloway III	July 1974	Present
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	July 1970	July 1974

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:

Gen. Louis H. Wilson	July 1975	Present
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	Jan. 1972	June 1975

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

Thomas C. Reed	Dec. 1975	Present
John L. McLucas	May 1973	Dec. 1975

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AF-
FAIRS):

David P. Taylor	June 1974	Present
James P. Goode (acting)	June 1973	June 1974

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Gen. David Jones	Aug. 1974	Present
Gen. George S. Brown	Aug. 1973	July 1974
Gen. John D. Ryan	Aug. 1969	July 1973

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