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# REPORT TO THE CONGRESS



BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES

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UNITED STATES  
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

JUN 3 1976

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## Evacuation And Temporary Care Afforded Indochinese Refugees-- Operation New Life

Over an 8-month span, more than 140,000 refugees were moved from war-torn Indochina to peaceful environments in America and third countries. Certain management problems, however, resulted in some excessive costs and potentially wasteful practices in the refugee program.

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

During an 8-month period ending in December 1975, over 140,000 refugees were processed under the Indochina Refugee Program. These people were evacuated from Cambodia and South Vietnam; temporarily cared for at Department of Defense refugee camps in the western Pacific and the United States; and finally resettled in the United States, a third country, or repatriated to Vietnam.

This report is a followup to our report issued to the Congress on June 16, 1975, entitled "U.S. Provides Safe Haven for Indochinese Refugees," and contains information relevant to the evacuation and temporary care phases of the refugee program.

We did not request all agencies concerned with the Indochina refugees to review and provide written comments on this report. The Departments of State and Defense, as well as representatives of the President's Special Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees, have, however, reviewed the report and provided comments which have been incorporated where appropriate.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53) and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Attorney General; and the Administrator, Agency for International Development.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "James B. Heath".

Comptroller General  
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
GAO	General Accounting Office
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

EVACUATION AND TEMPORARY  
CARE AFFORDED INDOCHINESE  
REFUGEES--OPERATION NEW LIFE  
Multiagency

D I G E S T

In April 1975, about 163,000 Cambodians and Vietnamese who fled from their native countries were without homes. The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 and the related appropriation act passed in May 1975 provided immediate assistance to these refugees. The President's Special Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees was mandated to move refugees first to safe reception centers and then to initial placement with U.S. sponsors.

This report follows up GAO's June 16, 1975, report to the Congress, "U.S. Provides Safe Haven for Indochinese Refugees," and deals with the evacuation and temporary care phases of the Indochina Refugee Program.

The process of moving refugees to a settled and peaceful environment was effectively accomplished, using the resources of 18 Federal departments and agencies, 14 voluntary agencies, 10 State and local organizations, and the Task Force. However, certain management problems gave rise to some excessive costs and potentially wasteful practices. Daily management problems that confronted officials at the reception centers were handled on an ad hoc basis. Certain weaknesses in overall program coordination permitted improper claims for reimbursements from program funds and poor control of supplies and equipment.

To insure full compliance with the special evacuation appropriation act (Public Law 94-24) and the expressed concern of the Congress, GAO is recommending that the Departments of State and Defense

--review the validity, propriety, and correctness of claims for cost reimbursements from the special refugee funds and

--quickly identify usable supply and equipment items onhand when the refugee reception centers closed and implement action necessary for the U.S. Government to effectively use such items. (See p. 5.)

Task Force auditors, before the disbanding of the Task Force on December 31, 1975, had reviewed some transactions. The Departments of State and Defense are now considering the extent to which additional review work is necessary. Also, representatives of the General Services Administration and the Defense Supply Agency are in the process of determining how to dispose of supplies and equipment onhand.

By December 20, 1975, 140,676 refugees had been processed through the refugee program at a cost of over \$328 million. Of these, 129,792 settled in the United States, 6,632 resettled in other friendly countries, and 1,546 were repatriated to South Vietnam. Also, 544 refugees on parolee status were waiting for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to arrange for their repatriation back to Indochina. (See p. 8.)

Another estimated 23,000 Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees stranded in Thailand were being assisted by the Thai Government, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United States. (See p. 42.)

The Congress appropriated \$305 million to the Department of State and \$100 million to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the Indochina refugee program in May 1975. The State Department appropriation, plus the \$100.3 million made available from Agency for International Development funds, was earmarked to meet the costs of refugee evacuation, temporary care, and initial placement with sponsors.

The President's Task Force was responsible for coordinating all U.S. activities of the Indochina refugee program. The State Department managed the refugee funds. The Department of Defense provided logistical support for moving the refugees to safety and affording them temporary care until their initial

placement with U.S. sponsors or their departure to other countries. The Agency for International Development provided many employees, who had years of experience with Indochinese people, to assist at refugee reception centers, and many other Federal agencies assisted in carrying out the refugee program. (See pp. 17 to 19.)

#### CHARGES QUESTIONED

The Military Sealift Command overcharged the program an estimated \$4.26 million for transporting refugees. Based primarily on estimates, the State Department and the Agency for International Development paid the Sealift Command over \$15.7 million for transporting 179,000 Vietnamese refugees. In December 1975, after GAO had questioned the Command about certain charges against the program, the Command said the overcharges would be properly adjusted. (See pp. 20 and 21.)

In addition to its regular fleet, the Air Force Military Airlift Command flew some other planes to airlift refugees. The Command charged the refugee program \$2.03 million for the flying hours attributed to those planes. After GAO questioned the availability of other funds to cover those flying hours, the Air Force reviewed the cost computations and decided to cancel the charge against the refugee program and charge the costs against the Air Force annual flying hour program for fiscal year 1975. (See p. 23.)

The Navy charged the refugee program \$6.6 million for supporting the U.S. evacuation of South Vietnam. The Navy said that amount represented the extra steaming costs of 43 Pacific Fleet vessels incurred during April 1975 as a result of the evacuation.

Under Navy policy, Pacific Fleet vessels will not ordinarily steam more than 45 days during a quarter, so the Department of Defense concluded it was proper to:

- Determine the amount of fuel the 43 ships would ordinarily consume during a 15-day period versus the fuel they actually consumed during April 1975.
- Categorize the fuel difference as costs incremental to the refugee program.
- Claim reimbursement for those costs from the special refugee fund.

Pacific Fleet vessels reportedly transported about 14,000 people during the evacuation. One-half of these people were U.S. citizens and many others were dignitaries from friendly third countries, which indicates that the Pacific Fleet's primary mission was other than evacuation of refugees. Thus, GAO questions the Navy's \$6.6 million charge to the refugee program.

The Navy also identified as refugee program costs \$1.4 million, representing costs of evacuating Americans and their personal belongings from Vietnam. The State Department and the Navy concurred with GAO that the Navy may be due reimbursement for such costs, however, these charges were not proper refugee program costs. Adjustments were in process when GAO fieldwork ended. (See pp. 21 and 22.)


#### WEAKNESSES IN CONTROL OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Throughout the program's 8-month life, requests for supplies and equipment at reception centers were filled without considering cost, duration and importance of the need, or correctness of quantity requested. As the reception centers prepared to close, the Task Force and the State Department realized that considerable quantities of supplies and equipment would remain onhand.

In mid-January 1976, General Services Administration and Defense Supply Agency representatives were still determining which onhand items their supply systems could absorb and which items should be disposed of; the cost of these items had not been determined. However, the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps



had taken some items, valued at \$298,000, into supply systems and had made corresponding adjustments to outstanding reimbursements due from the refugee program. The State Department had also placed refugee program equipment costing \$600,000 into its regular stock inventory. (See pp. 24 to 26.)



CHAPTER 1

EVALUATION OF EVACUATION AND

TEMPORARY CARE OF REFUGEES

1 The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of  
2 1975 and the accompanying appropriation act specified that  
3 \$405 million--\$305 million appropriated to State Department 32  
4 and \$100 million to the Department of Health, Education, and 22  
5 Welfare (HEW)--of the amount authorized would be used to  
6 assist refugees who, because of persecution or fear of per-  
7 secution, fled from Cambodia or South Vietnam. The Agency  
8 for International Development (AID) transferred an additional 97  
9 \$100.3 million to the State Department for use in the refugee  
10 program.

11 Carrying out this legislation involved the combined ef-  
12 forts of 18 U.S. Government departments and agencies as well  
13 as many State and local government agencies and private or-  
14 ganizations. The Special Interagency Task Force for Indochina P. 012-45  
15 Refugees, established by the President on April 18, 1975, was  
16 charged with coordinating the activities of all U.S. groups  
17 participating in the Indochina refugee program.

18 The refugee program was composed of (1) evacuation of  
19 140,676 refugees, (2) temporary care of refugees while they  
20 awaited permanent resettlement, and (3) resettlement of ref-  
21 ugees in the United States or third countries where they  
22 were to begin a new life. The first two phases of the pro-  
23 gram were successfully completed on December 20, 1975, when  
24 the last 68 refugees departed the reception center at Fort  
25 Chaffee, Arkansas. However, the short time frame and the  
26 emergency conditions under which this humanitarian endeavor  
27 was accomplished, as well as the magnitude of the Indochina  
28 refugee program, gave rise to certain management problems  
29 which affected the program's efficiency and economy.

30 The resettlement phase of the program included the re-  
31 location of 132,421 refugees in American communities as well  
32 as support and followup services designed to deal with prob-  
33 lems, generated after they were relocated. The Department of  
34 Health, Education, and Welfare assumed responsibility for  
35 that phase of the overall program in January 1976.

36 GAO is currently reviewing the implementation of se-  
37 lected segments of the resettlement phase.

## SUCCESSFUL MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

The President's Special Interagency Task Force, the Departments of State and Defense, voluntary agencies, and State and local groups are to be commended for their parts in the successful movement of more than 140,000 refugees from war-torn South Vietnam and Cambodia to safety and the arrangements for their resettlement in the United States or another country of their choice. Confronted with such a task in April 1975, Federal, State, and private resources were immediately made available and, employing Defense's logistics capability, effectively used.

About 94 percent of these refugees (132,421) were afforded temporary care at U.S. military facilities before being released in the United States. About 6,000 refugees were released from the program even before they reached the continental United States.

The following graph shows the progress in moving the refugees toward permanent resettlement after June 8, 1975.

The program began under emergency conditions and was carried out with extreme urgency within only 8 months.

## PROGRAM WEAKNESSES

The uniqueness of the program, the urgency with which evacuation and temporary care phases were carried out, the diversity and number of groups involved, and the unusual funding arrangement all contributed to the following management problems which we identified in our review.


--Problems of overall program coordination (pp. 12 to 13).

--Absence of adequate review of reimbursement claims (pp. 20 to 23).

--Weak control of supplies and equipment (pp. 24 to 25).

The total financial effect of these program weaknesses cannot be effectively measured until all claims for reimbursement are audited and the value and disposition cost of all unused and serviceable supplies and equipment are determined. Even this data may not identify the value of waste and pilferage which occurred during the temporary care phase. Therefore, the complete impact of program weaknesses may never be known.

**REFUGEES**



- REFUGEES AT CONUS RECEPTION CENTERS AND IN WESTERN PACIFIC STAGING AREA AWAITING RESETTLEMENT
- REFUGEES RELOCATED IN THE U.S. (INCLUDES DEATHS AT RECEPTION CENTERS AND 1807 AMERICANS REPATRIATED FROM INDOCHINA)
- REFUGEES RELOCATED IN 3RD COUNTRIES.
- REFUGEES REPATRIATED TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

a/ REMAINING 6 REFUGEES DEPARTED THE WESTERN PACIFIC STAGING AREA (GUAM) ON NOV. 7, 1975

b/ CONUS RECEPTION CENTERS' ACTIVITIES CEASED WHEN THE LAST REMAINING 68 REFUGEES DEPARTED FORT CHAFFEE ON DEC. 20, 1975

During our review we made a number of inquiries concerning selected program obligations. Various agencies are adjusting program reimbursements downward by about \$7.7 million, and the following agencies have adjusted program costs.

<u>Reduction in claims</u>	
(millions)	
Military Sealift Command (p. 21.)	\$4.26
Military Airlift Command (p. 23.)	2.03
Navy Material Command (p. 23.)	.76
State Department (p. 23.)	<u>.68</u>
	<u>\$7.73</u>

The Navy contends that \$6.6 million charged for the fuel costs of Pacific Fleet vessels was a proper incremental cost to the program; however, we do not believe the information furnished to us fully supports this contention. Moreover, we feel that the \$6.6 million was paid from refugee funds to cover fuel costs that normally would have been paid from Navy's annual appropriation.

Because the President's Special Interagency Task Force did not have the time necessary to insure efficient and economic implementation of the program, the ad hoc style of problem solving was followed.

We believe that because many Federal agencies were involved in the urgent refugee program, clear lines of responsibility for monitoring the efficiency and economy of the program were not established or discernible. In our opinion, this condition contributed to the program's economic weaknesses.

The first two phases of the refugee program which required the resources of many Federal agencies have ended, and the President's Special Task Force for Indochina Refugees was formally disbanded on December 31, 1975. Proper action has been, or is being, taken on most of the program charges which we questioned.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We understand that State and Defense internal review groups are considering additional examinations of selected program activities, including the disposition of supplies and equipment onhand at program's end and other questionable matters. However, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Departments of State and Defense:

- Review the validity, propriety, and correctness of claims for cost reimbursements from the special refugee funds.
- Quickly identify usable supply and equipment items onhand when the refugee reception centers closed and implement action necessary for the U.S. Government to effectively use such supply and equipment items.

#### OTHER PROBLEMS

Our June 1975 initial review of the Indochina refugee program identified several potential problem areas, most of which, except for the cost-related problems discussed earlier in this chapter, have been resolved. We pointed out in our June 1975 report that the safety and health of refugees in tents on Guam was endangered by the approaching typhoon season; those at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and Camp Pendleton, California, by the inclement fall and winter weather. We also discussed problems in obtaining security clearance and sponsorship for all refugees.

The reception center at Eglin was closed 8 days before Hurricane Eloise struck it on September 23, 1975, considerably damaging tent structures still standing at the center. Also, the Task Force's quick reaction in altering the method used early in the crisis to obtain security clearances for refugees resolved a large refugee program bottleneck. Sponsorship and security clearances were obtained, and the last refugees were initially resettled on December 20, 1975.


We are now reviewing both sponsorship and resettlement of refugees.

## CHAPTER 2

### EVACUATION AND RELOCATION

In March 1975, Communist forces began an onslaught against the Governments of South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic (Cambodia); in April both governments collapsed and thousands of refugees were seeking safety in the United States. By June 8, more than 130,000 refugees had entered the U.S. program specifically designed to resettle them in the United States or third countries, <sup>1/</sup> and by December 20, a total of 140,676 refugees had moved in and out of the program. The following graph depicts the rapid movement of refugees from the four U.S. reception centers. (See app. I for detailed information on refugees processed through the program.)

WEEKLY RELEASES OF REFUGEES FROM CONUS RECEPTION CENTERS  
MAY 11 THROUGH DECEMBER 20, 1975



Note: About 14,000 refugees had been released prior to May 11, including 5,750 released from Travis Air Force Base.

<sup>1/</sup>See our report to the Congress, "U.S. Provides Safe Haven for Indochinese Refugees," June 16, 1975, (ID-75-71).



Immediate manpower resources, drawn from many Federal agencies, and special funding authorization by the Congress were required to carry out a program to effectively evacuate the large number of refugees, provide them with temporary care, and ultimately resettle about 94 percent of them in the United States.

The President established the Special Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees to coordinate all U.S. activities for providing transportation and safety for South Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees and for developing and implementing a major refugee resettlement program. Although 18 Federal agencies and many other State and private organizations directly participated in carrying out the program, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Agency for International Development; and 9 American voluntary agencies provided the major thrust of implementation efforts.

Also assisting were the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (See app. II for a list of program participants and apps. IV, V, and VI for services provided and costs incurred by these participants.)

#### REFUGEE REPATRIATION

Throughout the program's implementation, continuous efforts were made to assure refugees that the United States would actively sponsor the repatriation of those who wished to return home. As a result, on December 11, 1975, 116 refugees were placed temporarily in a halfway house while the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees attempted to obtain their respective government's official acceptance of them as repatriates. As of December 30, 1975, an additional 428 refugees, who had accepted sponsorship and resettled in the United States, were waiting for the U.N. High Commissioner to arrange for their return to Indochina.

On October 16, 1975, 1,546 Vietnamese refugees demanded and were given free use of the Vietnam Maritime Ltd. cargo ship, "Thuong Tin I," on which to return to Vietnam. These refugees were mostly military people who claimed they never intended to leave Vietnam. Their demands had reached riotous proportions in August and early September; barracks at Camp Asan, Guam, were burned down on August 31, and U.S. marshalls were sent to Guam to help maintain order.

Confronted with this situation, the United States prepared the "Thuong Tin I" to carry the Vietnamese

refugees to South Vietnam at a cost of about \$700,000. The ship left Guam manned by refugees with prior naval experience and reached its destination near Saigon on October 24, 1975. The Provisional Revolutionary Government allowed the 1,546 refugees to disembark; however, it publicly denounced the United States for unilaterally sponsoring the refugees' attempt to reenter Vietnam without formal approval.

Attempts by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, including the September and December visits to Vietnam and discussions with Provisional Revolutionary Government authorities, to obtain official acceptance of the refugees seeking repatriation have been to no avail, ostensibly because the Provisional Revolutionary Government cited more pressing matters at hand. It is still not known when the 116 refugees at the halfway house and the 428 who have accepted sponsorship will be allowed to return. The United States has agreed to give the High Commissioner \$500,000 for expenses and travel costs of refugees being repatriated.

#### U.S. REPATRIATES

Among the people referred to as Indochina refugees are 1,807 U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. These refugees were eligible for temporary assistance for repatriated Americans for 90 days (administered by HEW). None of them are currently receiving this type of assistance.

On June 28, 1975, Public Law 94-44 amended section 1113 of the Social Security Act to make permanent the temporary assistance program for U.S. citizens returning from abroad but limiting the amount of such assistance and the period during which an individual can be given the assistance.

#### THIRD-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT

The Task Force originally estimated that 20,000 Indochina refugees would resettle in third countries. However, when the Fort Chaffee reception center closed on December 20, 1975, ending Task Force resettlement efforts, 6,632 refugees had moved to 27 third countries--about 5,800 of them to Canada and France.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration assists refugees in arranging travel to and from third countries. The Task Force estimated that such costs incurred by the Committee will be about \$7.4 million.

#### REFUGEES ON PAROLEE STATUS

Of the 132,421 refugees in the United States, 129,792 are under a parolee arrangement; that is, they are on an

indefinite voluntary departure status. They do not have access to the full range of benefits available to U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. For instance, the 19,000 refugees who had worked for the U.S. Government in Vietnam and the 20,000 who had worked for the South Vietnamese Government (15,000 military) can neither be employed by the U.S. Civil Service Commission nor enlist in the U.S. military services.

California, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, Washington, Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Oklahoma, and Virginia were chosen by about 54 percent of the refugees to resettle in and to begin new lives in the United States.

The following map shows the distribution of refugees in various States at October 17, 1975.

Nine American voluntary agencies have assisted 111,160 refugees in obtaining sponsorship in U.S. communities. Each agency was to receive \$500 from the State Department for each refugee initially resettled. (See app. III.) Another 4,663 refugees obtained sponsorship through various State and local resettlement organizations.

In January 1976, HEW assumed overall responsibility for U.S. programs to provide aid to the refugees. Departure from refugee reception centers is only the beginning of a long process of resettlement. To permanently resettle in the United States, parolees must become permanent resident aliens, the first step toward becoming U.S. citizens.



## CHAPTER 3

### PROBLEMS OF OVERALL PROGRAM COORDINATION

The President's Special Interagency Task Force was responsible for coordinating the overall administration and implementation of the Indochina refugee program. Under the program, receiving, processing, temporarily caring for, and relocating large numbers of refugees in the United States within a short timespan was successfully carried out. However, during our review we saw indications of certain overall coordination problems, mostly in the early stages of the program. We believe similar problems can be mitigated if steps are taken to insure that lessons learned in the Indochina refugee program are considered in planning for future refugee evacuation and resettlement programs.

Because of the (1) emergency nature of the Task Force mission, (2) number and diversity of public agencies and private organizations which had to be marshalled to support the program, and (3) geographic expanse of the program, maximum flexibility to use existing expertise was important. Therefore, the Task Force asked established Federal agencies and private organizations to use their own planning and managerial capabilities to carry out the quickly developed refugee program. The following agencies, organizations, and groups were most directly involved in the program.

- The Department of State was responsible for controlling funds for the evacuation, temporary care, and initial resettlement. Refugee funds of \$305 million were appropriated, and \$100.3 million were transferred to State from the Agency for International Development. Even though State assigned an official to the Task Force in September to function as the controller of refugee funds, it continued to be accountable for those funds.
- The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was responsible for controlling funding for, and management of, the transition of resettled refugees into U.S. society. The amount of \$100 million in refugee funds was appropriated to HEW. HEW also provided the Task Force program with support services at both the Washington headquarters level and the reception centers. Such support services were funded from Department of State funds.
- The Department of Defense was responsible for physical evacuation, transportation, and temporary care of refugees and for support and security at refugee processing facilities.

--Voluntary agencies were responsible for obtaining sponsors for refugees and coordinating resettlement activities. Each agency functioned under the guidance of its own headquarters.

--Task Force civil coordinators at Defense staging areas and reception centers were responsible for organizing and administering the reception centers and for overall processing.

Many other Federal agencies, including the Departments of Labor and Justice and the Agency for International Development, and private organizations, such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Travelers' Aid, etc; also provided manpower and additional program support.

From its inception, the Task Force was active in coordinating refugee-related activities and it resolved major program implementation problems, particularly, those related to the major mission of resettling the refugees quickly. As the program progressed from its initial stages, the Task Force established some broad program guidelines to assist participating agencies and groups.

Although the Task Force and participating agencies made a concerted effort to carry out the refugee program smoothly, we observed some management problems involving the Task Force's need for more direct authority at the operating level, particularly in the early stages. We believe there was a need for uniform and authoritative implementation of program policies at the staging and reception centers. The following problems were prevalent in program management.

--The Task Force provided broad program guidelines, but direction and responsibilities were not clearly defined at the operating levels. This led to uncertainties among personnel engaged in refugee processing and support functions.

--Many implementation problems were dealt with on an ad hoc basis, so much of the decisionmaking was geared to resolving problems rather than preventing them. Decisionmaking efforts were exerted as early as May and June with regard to disposition of program supplies and equipment. However, only after the reception center at Eglin Air Force Base closed in September was the determination made that properties onhand belonged to the Department of State and that, therefore, only those items not needed by State worldwide would be subject to normal Federal supply disposition procedures.

- The Task Force monitored overall program expenditures, but experienced difficulties controlling costs early in the program. Reliance was placed on participating agencies' normal operating procedures and, to a large extent, determinations relative to incurring reasonable costs were left to the discretion of those agencies.

The actual impact of the overall coordination problems is difficult to measure. However, we believe that sufficient manpower and financial resources under the control of the Senior Civil Coordinator at the sites could have mitigated the improper claims and supply problems discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this report.

Many program officials at operating levels shared our views that these were overall coordination problems, but they believed that personnel commitment and dedication to program objectives offset the adverse effect of these problems. Generally, they attributed coordination difficulties to the urgency of the program, its unusual funding arrangement, and the large number of agencies and organizations involved.

Even though the Indochina refugee program was successfully carried out in only 8 months, we believe that correcting the several program defects described in this report would benefit planning for future large-scale interagency programs. Therefore, we suggest that in the future, consideration be given to:

- Delineating clearly the lines of authority and responsibility among participating agencies.
- Providing authority commensurate with the responsibility delegated to officials or agencies carrying out the program. In the refugee program, the Senior Civil Coordinators were responsible for organizing and administering overall temporary care and processing activities at refugee staging areas and reception centers. However, they had no allotment of, or direct access to, funds for fulfilling their responsibilities. Neither did they have control over refugee funds being expended by other agencies to carry out the program at the staging areas and reception centers.
- Limiting automatic procurement authority to specific types of supply and equipment items, particularly when one agency's purchases are funded from another agency's appropriation.

--Providing for the agency to which funds are appropriated to implement fund control procedures, including reviews of the validity and propriety of obligations at or near the location(s) where most of the expenses will accrue.

We believe management control and fiscal accountability of future programs would be enhanced by the use of these management tools.



## CHAPTER 4

### PROGRAM FINANCING AND FUNDS USED

The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, enacted on May 23, 1975, requires the President to submit reports to the Congress at 90-day intervals until September 30, 1977, on the status of refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Department of State is accountable for refugee funds. The summary below shows the Task Force's December 15, 1975, report on these funds and its projection to the end of the program of all costs to be charged against State Department funds.

	Obligations as of <u>Nov. 30, 1975</u>	Projections to end of <u>program</u>
		(as of Mar. 31, 1976)
Total funds available	\$405,277,454	\$405,277,454
Obligations	<u>328,155,145</u>	<u>357,005,969</u>
Funds remaining available	\$ 77,122,309	\$ 48,271,485

An additional \$100 million was appropriated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and as of November 30, 1975, total obligations were \$30.8 million.

#### FINANCING

Funds made available to the State Department for the refugee program came from Agency for International Development accounts and from special appropriations passed by the Congress on May 23, 1975 (Public Law 94-24).

AID loan funds transferred to State	\$ 2,277,454
AID Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds allotted to State	98,000,000
Special congressional appropriation	<u>305,000,000</u>
Total	<u>\$405,277,454</u>

#### AID loan funds transferred

Based on Presidential Determination 75-13 dated April 8, 1975, as authorized in section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, AID transferred \$5 million from its loan receipts accounts--loan principal repayments and interest collections--to the accounts of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State,

for assistance to Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees. In the early days of the Indochina refugee crisis, \$2.3 million of this money was obligated for urgent Indochinese refugee needs.

In August, the remaining \$2.7 million was removed from the refugee program for Cambodians and Vietnamese and made available for assisting Laotian refugees. This action was authorized by Presidential Determination 76-2 dated August 5, 1975.

Although Laotian refugees will be counted as part of the quota for Indochinese parolees allowed to enter the United States, evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement services for them will not be financed from funds made available specifically for Cambodians and Vietnamese. The handling of Laotian refugees is part of the regular program of State's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs.

#### AID Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds allotted

As we previously reported (ID-75-71, June 16, 1975), AID allotted, in three installments ending May 2, 1975, \$98 million in Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to State for financing the refugee program. These refugee funds were in addition to the AID funds spent in Vietnam during the final days of the Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Program.

#### Special congressional appropriations

On May 23, 1975, the Congress passed Public Law 94-24, thereby appropriating \$305 million, with which the State Department was to reimburse the various agencies for costs incurred in the evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement of the refugees, and another \$100 million for HEW's role in the transition of Indochinese refugees into U.S. society. This report deals only with matters related to funds appropriated to the State Department.

When the Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee evacuation problem became a reality in April 1975, the Congress immediately recognized the need for prompt additional funding. However, considerable concern arose as to the validity of State and Defense estimates in support of the request for new obligation authority of \$382 million. (HEW requested an additional \$125 million.)

At congressional hearings before the enactment of Public Laws 94-23 and 94-24, the Congress was not assured that the number of refugees ultimately remaining in the United States would correspond with the number used to compute estimated costs nor that the refugees would, in fact, need Federal assistance to the extent estimated.

The Senate Committee on Appropriations also expressed great concern about the types of costs the Congress intended to be covered by the proposed bill. The Committee's concern centered on a point of prudent management of Federal funds--that money appropriated for emergency assistance to Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees should not be used for such costs as personnel services, equipment, and supplies already provided for in other appropriations. The Congress passed the appropriation act but reduced State's request for new obligation authority by \$77 million and HEW's by \$25 million.

FUNDS USED

The Department of State allowed the Task Force to administer the special funding for refugee evacuation, temporary care, and initial placement. However, a number of other agencies and organizations, primarily Defense, provided program support on a cost-reimbursement basis. (See app. II.) The Task Force estimated that the reimbursable amounts totaled \$328 million as of November 30, 1975. Below is a general summary of these amounts as reported by the Task Force to the Congress on December 15.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total obligation</u>
Evacuation, transportation, and temporary care by Department of Defense	\$223,006,000
Administration, processing, and other support services by Government agencies (except Defense) and private organizations	18,302,065
Placement and resettlement by voluntary agencies, State and local governments, international organizations, and Federal agen- cies	<u>86,847,080</u>
Total	<u>\$328,155,145</u>

Appendixes IV, V, and VI contain discussions of these major program costs.

As of March 31, 1976, the total program obligations were reported as \$333.3 million, and an additional amount of \$23.7 million was projected through the end of the program. Of the remaining \$48.3 million, the State Department transferred \$43 million to HEW on March 31 to cover assistance being provided to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. State estimated that the other \$5.3 million will be returned to the U.S. Treasury.

Evacuation, transportation,  
and temporary care

Defense was primarily responsible for carrying out the evacuation, transportation, and temporary care phases of the refugee program, with the services concentrated in the following areas.

<u>Service</u>	<u>Primary areas of responsibility</u>
Navy	Sealift of refugees, protective support of the evacuation, and operation of the major Pacific staging area.
Marine Corps	Protective support of the evacuation and operation of the Camp Pendleton reception center.
Air Force	Airlift of refugees and operation of a Pacific staging area and the Eglin reception center.
Army	Operation of reception centers at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indian-town Gap and a small facility in the Western Pacific staging area.

The services also assisted in various forms of logistical, personnel, and medical support which was provided from military installations located throughout the world.

Administration, processing, and  
other support services

The Department of State was responsible for overall program funding. Also, a special National Advisory Committee

was established to advise the President on refugee matters. Several other Federal agencies--Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service, HEW, and the Department of Labor--actually processed refugees at the various refugee camps; however, considerable administrative work was done in Washington, D.C.

The processing generally consisted of insuring that refugees met U.S. entry requirements, were placed under proper control, obtained basic medical services, and were familiarized with various Government programs. Program administration consisted of the operation and security of the refugee camps, coordination of agency activities, and overall program management.

Many voluntary organizations, including the American Red Cross, YMCA, Baptists, and Salvation Army, also provided services for the refugees. The cost of these services, paid for by the program, included provision for comfort items, recreation activities, language training, locator services, and others.

#### Placement and resettlement

This area includes obligations associated with placing refugees with sponsors and transporting them to resettlement locations. The largest single cost element is the value of the 18 resettlement contracts with voluntary agencies and State and local governments. According to the December 15, 1975, Task Force report, these obligations totaled \$68,485,000. However, they have subsequently been adjusted downward to \$67,765,000 in accordance with amounts stated on the contracts. (See app. III for a list of these contracts.)

## CHAPTER 5

### CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT QUESTIONED

In our June 1975 report on Indochina refugees, we suggested that much effort was needed to establish and maintain accounting procedures to control refugee program costs. Except for points discussed here and in chapter 6, we found that the accounting procedures had been established by the various agencies and that the amounts reported for the refugee program appeared reasonable.

The Congress intended that the Department of Defense be reimbursed only for refugee program costs not covered by other appropriations. Defense defined incremental costs as those actual and/or estimated costs incurred over and above normal operating costs of personnel and forces involved in an operation.

We questioned various costs reported for reimbursement under the refugee program, because they did not appear to be incremental to normal agency activities.

#### SEALIFT

The Navy Military Sealift Command evacuated about 179,000 Indochinese refugees, including those moved within South Vietnam. The Command normally provides sea transportation services to other U.S. Government agencies at established uniform rates. For services provided to the refugee program, the Command billed the Department of State and the Agency for International Development for costs totaling \$15.7 million. The costs were computed by applying the established Government rates and adding extraordinary costs not recoverable through these rates, including:

- Extraordinary overtime, other crew benefits, etc., which would not be recovered under the normal Government rate. Officials at Command headquarters established this estimate at 30 percent of the costs recovered under Government rates, for a total of about \$1.6 million.
- Refit costs to repair the seven contractor vessels and three Government ships damaged during the evacuation. Command officials estimated this figure to be \$300,000 per ship, for a total of \$3 million.

--Subsistence costs of providing food to refugees aboard ship. Command officials estimated this cost at \$2 million.

Although estimating these costs may have been an appropriate management procedure for projecting total program expenditures, the estimates should not have been used as the basis for reimbursement. The Sealift Command said that the estimates were used for billing purposes to prevent a possible cash flow problem.

A subsequent analysis of some actual costs in these areas indicated that these estimates were significantly overstated. We brought this matter to the attention of the Sealift Command, which began a process of determining the actual costs; the work had not been completed at the time of our review. However, we estimated that the program was overcharged by \$4.26 million, as follows.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Adjustments</u> <u>(in process)</u>  (millions)
Extraordinary costs	\$0.79
Refit costs	2.47
Subsistence	<u>1.00</u>
Total	<u>\$4.26</u>

The Command has already refunded \$2.2 million to the refugee program and estimates an additional \$2 million will be refunded when actual costs are determined.

#### STEAMING COSTS

During the evacuation of South Vietnam in April 1975, the Pacific Fleet reportedly provided 34 warships to support refugee sealift activities on the South China Sea. Sometime after November 1975, the Navy found that nine other ships had assisted in the exercise. According to a Defense official, approximately 14,000 people from Indochina were evacuated on Pacific Fleet vessels; about half of them were Americans and the remainder were foreigners, many of whom were dignitaries from third countries as well as from Indochina.

The Navy subsequently billed the Department of State \$5.7 million for reimbursement of steaming costs incurred by the 34 warships, because such costs were considered to be incremental and therefore chargeable to the refugee

program. We were advised in February 1976 that an additional \$858,000 would be charged to the refugee program for the excess fuel consumed by the other nine vessels.

The Navy stated that Pacific Fleet vessels' steaming activities are ordinarily restricted to 45 days each quarter during a fiscal year and that there is a corresponding limit on funds available to meet fuel costs. In accordance with this stated restriction, the Navy computed the fuel costs the 43 warships would have incurred had they operated 15 days during April 1975 for 18 hours a day. The \$6.6 million billed to the refugee program as steaming costs represented the difference between the amount computed, based on the 50-percent factor, and the actual cost of fuel consumed by the 43 vessels during April.

The Navy stated that its activities in protecting the U.S. Government's interest must be carried out within the availability of funds budgeted and appropriated. The Department of Defense contends that the \$6.6 million for steaming costs is a proper charge to the Indochina refugee program and that that amount is part of the Pacific Fleet's \$7.4 million deficit in fuel funds for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1975.

We believe Defense's position on the steaming costs is questionable. The Pacific Fleet was in the South China Sea during April 1975 to protect U.S. Government interests in that area, and a major portion of that interest was the safety and well-being of the Americans working in Vietnam at that time. The fact that about half the people moved aboard Pacific Fleet vessels were Americans and that many others placed onboard were dignitaries from friendly third countries strongly indicates that the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet was other than evacuation of refugees. Therefore, we believe that the Navy's position that special refugee funds should bear the costs of extra fuel consumed by Pacific Fleet vessels during April 1975 needs to be re-examined by State and Defense.

The State Department has also questioned the propriety of the Navy charging steaming costs against the refugee program. State contends the Pacific Fleet was in the South China Sea on a military mission and therefore the special refugee funds should not be used to pay Navy fuel costs.

#### AIRLIFT

The airlift of Indochinese refugees was accomplished by the Air Force Military Airlift Command, which provides air transport services to U.S. Government agencies at



established rates. The Airlift Command billed the Department of State for services at the established Government rates and for other costs which were not recoverable under the rate structure.

We found that, in addition to the regular Command airlift, other Air Force aircraft had participated in the airlift. The cost of using these planes was billed to the State Department, based on hours flown in excess of hours planned for the final quarter of fiscal year 1975. The Air Force reviewed the cost computations in October 1975 and decided to absorb all the hours flown as annual flying hours budgeted for training during fiscal year 1975. This resulted in a downward adjustment in refugee program costs of \$2.03 million.

#### EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS

Many U.S. citizens were evacuated from South Vietnam with the refugees. According to a Department of State official, the cost of evacuating U.S. citizens was not reimbursable under the special refugee funding, since existing appropriations include funds for this purpose. Unfortunately, the nature of the evacuation made it difficult to separately identify all such costs.

In reviewing evacuation costs identified by the Naval Material Command, we found two items for reimbursement involving evacuation of U.S. citizens which we believe should not be charged against the special refugee funds.

- Necessary modifications costing \$680,000 were made on Navy helicopters for the expressed purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens. This cost included component parts, repairs, and field team support.
- Personal belongings of U.S. Embassy personnel were transported to the United States at a cost of about \$756,000.

The State Department agreed that, although Defense may be due reimbursement for these costs, they were not reimbursable from the special refugee funds.

We understand State will make an adjustment for the extraordinary helicopter costs. The Navy has submitted the bill for \$756,000 through the normal Department of State channels and is not seeking reimbursement from the special refugee funds.

## CHAPTER 6

### WEAKNESSES IN CONTROL OVER

#### SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The Task Force did not institute uniform controls for managing supplies and equipment purchased for the program but relied instead on the Department of Defense supply system as the mechanism for managing such assets. For the most part, the Task Force was not involved in the actual procurement process.

The military services provided most of the logistical support to the refugee processing centers through the established supply activities of the installations where the centers were located. Usually, military personnel, with some Task Force coordination, determined what was needed, requisitioned or procured it, and coordinated its distribution. Records of supplies and equipment issued were maintained, and periodic billings were made to the Department of State for reimbursement.

Defense reported that as of November 28, 1975, supplies and equipment costing about \$70 million had been purchased for the program. Based on reported data, we estimate that about one-third of that cost was for refugee subsistence supplies.

This system was generally adequate for quickly acquiring supplies and equipment needed in the refugee program. However, some weaknesses in supply procedures evolved.

- Because of the immediate urgency of supply and equipment needs almost any item could be purchased. Individual items of supply and equipment were not usually identified on the billings to the program and the Department of State and the Task Force were not always aware of supplies and equipment purchased or onhand.
- Some high-cost items were purchased even though the program was expected to have a short life. Such items included garbage trucks, recreation items, special books and periodicals, and specialized office and communications equipment. Defense officials said that, although cost effectiveness was involved in the decisionmaking process, too many uncertainties existed to make definitive cost comparisons.

- Some expendable items were purchased in excess of requirements because actual requirements were not determined or errors were made in requisitions. Types of items overpurchased included trash bags at Eglin Air Force Base, table napkins and polaroid film at Indiantown Gap, and plastic cups at Fort Chaffee. Defense recently advised us that excesses are being returned to supply channels for full credit and that this will preclude significant losses.
- Supplies were not adequately guarded. Defense said that the transient character of the refugee center populations made pilferage difficult to control and that the emphasis on processing refugees out of the camps overrode the need to account for supplies, resulting in a significant loss in small, portable items.
- Uniform criteria were not established for identifying "major" items of equipment for which Defense would not charge, but would loan to the refugee program. Officials at the reception center at Eglin Air Force Base said an item valued at \$1,000 constituted a major piece of equipment, but no formal criteria was established at other centers. However, Defense defined major items as "ships, aircraft, and items of this type, the purchase of which necessitated Task Force approval." Therefore, equipment items such as large trucks, radio equipment and some other high-cost items were purchased and billed to the refugee program.

The Task Force did not formulate a disposition plan for supplies and equipment charged to the program until September 1975 and was still modifying it as late as November. The Pacific staging sites and some reception centers were closed before the disposition plans were finalized. The final disposition procedures, summarized below, were contained in instructions to the remaining reception centers on November 13, 1975.

1. After the civil coordinators at the reception centers determined that items were no longer needed, the Department of State had first choice of any assets for which it had normal operational requirements. State made no reimbursements to the program for these items but paid all shipping costs associated with their movement.

2. After State's requirements were satisfied, the reception centers attempted to return the assets to Defense or General Services Administration supply channels, which were to credit the program for items returned. Any costs associated with the return of these assets (repacking, repairing, etc.) were to be paid from the special refugee funding.
3. Assets not returned to supply channels and credited to the refugee program were to be turned over to Defense or the General Services Administration for distribution to other U.S. Government, State, local, and private agencies (at no reimbursement) or sold as salvage (with net returns going to the Treasury).

As of mid-January 1976, the Air Force, Marines, and Army had taken into their inventories small amounts of supplies and equipment from reception centers and had made corresponding adjustments of about \$298,000 to the refugee funds. The State Department had also taken equipment valued at an estimated \$600,000 into its inventory.

The total value of materials on hand at the centers, including Guam, when refugee activities ceased was unknown in January 1976. The value of items remaining at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap which could be reentered into the Defense Supply Agency and the General Services Administration supply systems were being determined at that time. The Defense Supply Agency was also inventorying the items already transferred from such locations at Eglin Air Force Base, Camp Pendleton, and Guam to various supply depots, such as Ogden, Utah, and Richmond, Virginia.

When these two organizations have completed their inventories and when final determinations on the disposition of items onhand have been made, final credits can be applied to the overall cost of the refugee programs. At that time, the degree to which these weaknesses affected the program can be assessed.

## CHAPTER 7

### PHASEOUT OF REFUGEE PROGRAM

The Congress, before it passed the authorization and appropriation legislation in May 1975, expressed concern over the timespan required to resettle the Indochina refugees in the United States. During congressional hearings, concern was expressed that the program should not develop into a long-term Federal undertaking similar to the Cuban refugee program. Therefore, the appropriation act for special assistance to the Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees specified that the \$305 million provided to the State Department and the \$100 million provided to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would remain available for obligations only until June 30, 1976.

The President's Special Interagency Task Force has continuously and diligently strived to move refugees out of the federally managed facilities by obtaining their initial placement with sponsors. In July, when nearly 80,000 refugees were still at centers in the Western Pacific and the United States, the Task Force pledged to have all centers closed by December 31, 1975. Even the influx of an additional 10,000 refugees from August through the end of October did not alter the projected closing date. All centers were closed on December 20, when the last 68 refugees departed the reception center at Fort Chaffee.

The social, economic, and humanitarian impact of admitting the Indochina refugees on U.S. society can only be determined at some future date.

### CLOSING THE CENTERS

Since April 23, 1975, when the first refugees moved through Guam, more than 140,000 refugees have been processed through U.S. centers located in Thailand, the Philippine Islands, Guam, Wake Island, and Hickam Air Base in Hawaii as well as through four reception centers and Travis Air Force Base in the continental United States.

Over a 32-week period from May 11 to December 20, 1975, an average of 4,000 refugees were released from the refugee program each week. (See p. 6.) Early in August, the weekly release rate peaked at 5,792. It dropped to a low of 1,617 in the last week of activities at Fort Chaffee. However, the rate did not drop below 4,000 until after facilities at the Eglin Air Force Base closed nor below 3,000 until after Camp Pendleton closed.

Appendix I shows the number of refugees released from each center and the date on which each center closed.

#### TASK FORCE TERMINATION

The President's Special Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees became defunct 11 days after the center at Fort Chaffee closed on December 31, 1975.

On October 31, the international aspects of the program were transferred to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. These aspects relate primarily to the estimated 71,000 Indochina refugees stranded in Thailand. A State Department official said those eligible for entry into the United States will travel directly from Thailand to U.S. sponsors. He said American voluntary agencies help process and relocate eligible refugees into the United States.

On December 31, 1975, the Task Force Director returned to her regular position with HEW. A small number of Task Force personnel were reassigned to State's Office of Refugee and Migration to account for and close out claims outstanding against the \$405 million in refugee funds.

On January 1, 1976, the HEW Task Force for Indochina Refugees assumed all responsibility for domestic programs previously carried out by the defunct Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees. This assumed responsibility deals with coordinating continuing Federal and State programs available for refugees in the United States. HEW is also now responsible for preparing future reports to the Congress on the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975.

## CHAPTER 8

### SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed authorizing legislation; accumulated and reviewed pertinent data on evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement activities; and held discussions with Inter-agency Task Force officials, including its internal auditors. We also obtained data from and talked with officials of the Departments of Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; Justice; Labor; and State; and the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.

During August, September, and October, we visited western Pacific staging areas in Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand; the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii; refugee reception centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, Eglin Air Force Base, and Fort Indiantown Gap; and the Military Airlift Command Headquarters at Scott Air Force Base. We obtained and reviewed pertinent data, observed the implementation of the program, and talked with appropriate officials at these locations, including representatives of voluntary agencies.

Our work was directed primarily toward (1) examining procedures used to insure that program costs incurred complied with the intent of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 and the related appropriation act and that data was fairly presented in the financial statements included in the President's reports to the Congress, (2) identifying problems affecting the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy with which the program was being carried out, and (3) updating information on program operations and problems described in our June 1975 report to the Congress.

This review concentrated on the evacuation and temporary care phases of the refugee program. The resettlement phase, which begins when refugees leave the reception centers, is currently under review.

REFUGEES PROCESSED THROUGH  
THE PROGRAM AT DECEMBER 20, 1975

	<u>Date closed</u>	<u>Refugees processed</u>
Refugee centers:		
Thailand	Oct. 31, 1975	148
Subic Bay	July 6, 1975	76
Clark Air Base	Aug. 22, 1975	131
Guam	Nov. 7, 1975	5,030
Wake Island	Aug. 3, 1975	72
Hickam Air Base	Sept. 3, 1975	600
Camp Pendleton	Oct. 31, 1975	48,418
Fort Chaffee	Dec. 20, 1975	50,135
Eglin Air Force Base	Sept. 15, 1975	8,665
Fort Indiantown Gap	Dec. 15, 1975	21,651
Travis Air Force Base	May 7, 1975	<u>5,750</u>
Total		<u>140,676</u>
Destinations:		
U.S. communities		<u>a/132,421</u>
Third countries		6,632
South Vietnam (repatriated)		1,546
Deceased (at centers)		<u>77</u>
		140,676
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens	-1,807	
Births at centers	-822	
Releases to third countries	-6,632	
Repatriated	-1,546	
Deceased (at centers)	<u>-77</u>	<u>-10,884</u>
Total refugees paroled in United States		<u>a/129,792</u>

a/Includes 544 refugees who have requested repatriation and are waiting for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to arrange their return to Indochina.



SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY  
DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS  
 (INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT OF DEC. 15, 1975)

Federal departments and agencies:		
State (Task Force):		
Administrative and support services	\$2,514,148	
Placement and resettlement costs	<u>7,532,080</u>	\$ 10,046,228
Defense		223,006,000
Health, Education, and Welfare		870,779
Customs		37,470
Labor		179,094
Agency for International Development		4,708,204
U.S. Information Agency		71,050
Immigration and Naturalization Service		3,027,000
U.S. Marshall Service		984,000
Others (note a)		40,000
National Advisory Committee		<u>35,000</u>
		\$243,004,825
Private U.S. Organizations:		
Travelers Aid		300,000
American Red Cross		5,276,560
YMCA		303,360
Baptists		33,500
Washington International Center		7,900
Salvation Army		214,000
Voluntary agencies		<u>b/65,030,000</u>
		71,165,320
State and local government organizations		3,455,000
International organizations:		
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration		7,400,000
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees		<u>3,130,000</u>
		<u>10,530,000</u>
		<u>b/\$328,155,145</u>

a/Other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Agriculture, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.

b/Does not show a recent downward adjustment of \$720,000.

Note: The Departments of the Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and Interior and the Office of Management and Budget also contributed to the refugee program; however, we saw no evidence of requests for reimbursement by them.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY BY PRIVATE  
VOLUNTARY AND STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

	Anticipated refugee sponsorships (Dec. 19, 1975) (note a)	Department of State contracts (Nov. 30, 1975) (note a)
Private voluntary agencies:		
U.S. Catholic Conference	48,332	\$25,090,000
International Rescue Committee	18,139	7,680,000
Church World Services	16,950	10,150,000
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service	15,823	10,150,000
United HIAS Services, Inc.	3,500	5,090,000
Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.	3,051	2,090,000
American Council for Nationalities	4,000	1,500,000
American Fund for Czechoslovaks	817	1,060,000
Travelers-Aid International	<u>548</u>	<u>1,500,000</u>
Total	<u>111,160</u>	b/ <u>64,310,000</u>
State and local government agencies:		
Department of Emergency Services, State of Wash- ington	1,570	1,000,000
Employment Security Commission, State of Iowa	633	250,000
Department of Institutions, Social Aid Rehabilita- tive Services, State of Oklahoma	362	500,000
Division of Community Services, State of Maine	167	150,000
Governor's Cabinet Secretariat, State of New Mexico	141	250,000
Don Bosco Community Center, Jackson County, Missouri	220	125,000
Indianapolis Area Chapter American Red Cross	80	100,000
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of Los Angeles	838	930,000
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of New York	72	150,000
Church of the Latter-Day Saints	<u>580</u>	<u>(c)</u>
Total	<u>4,663</u>	b/ <u>3,455,000</u>
Total	<u>115,823</u>	a/ <u>\$67,765,000</u>

a/Final settlement of State Department contracts will be based on actual number of refugees initially resettled rather than on amount stipulated on contract.

b/The difference between these amounts and those in app. II was properly adjusted after issuance of the Task Force report of Dec. 15, 1975.

c/No contract was let between the Church of the Latter-Day Saints and the State Department.

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS FOR  
EVACUATION, TRANSPORTATION, AND TEMPORARY CARE

Defense's major cost categories as contained in the President's report of December 15, 1975, to the Congress, are described below. The \$223,006,000 reported by the Interagency Task Force represented obligations accumulated by the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. (See pp. 17 and 32.)

EVACUATION AND MOVEMENT--\$100,231,000

Shipping (Pacific Fleet)--\$7,277,000

During the evacuation of South Vietnam, the Navy's Pacific Fleet provided 34 warships to support refugee evacuation activities in the South China Sea. The Navy subsequently billed the Department of State \$5.7 million for reimbursement of the 34 ships' incremental steaming costs. The balance of Pacific Fleet claims (\$1,577,000) was for other incremental costs related to the evacuation and movement of refugees. The Navy advised us on February 18, 1976, that an additional nine warships participated in the evacuation exercise.

These Navy vessels moved about 14,000 people--7,000 Americans and 7,000 foreigners, including dignitaries from third countries--in addition to providing protective support for the overall evacuation exercise (see ch. 5).

Shipping (Sealift)--\$8,354,000

The sealift of refugees to staging areas in the Pacific was conducted by the Navy's Military Sealift Command. Approximately 179,000 refugees were evacuated by the Command over a 49-day period, including those moved within South Vietnam.

The Military Sealift Command performs sealift services for Defense and other Government agencies at established uniform rates. For the refugee program, the Command billed the Department of State for services performed at the prescribed Government rates and for certain extraordinary costs the Command claims were not recovered through these rates.

In addition to the \$8.4 million the State Department paid the Military Sealift Command from the special refugee funds, the Agency for International Development paid the Command \$7.3 million out of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds for sealifting refugees prior to April 18, 1975 (see ch. 5).

Airlift--\$84,600,000

The airlift segment of the refugee evacuation was composed of (1) movement of refugees to safe havens within South Vietnam, (2) movement from South Vietnam to Pacific staging areas, (3) movement from staging areas to reception centers within the United States, and (4) transportation of supplies, equipment, and nonrefugee personnel. The airlift was conducted by the Air Force's Military Airlift Command, using both Government-owned and chartered aircraft.

The Command provides services to Defense and other U.S. Government agencies at uniform rates. The \$84.6 million shown in the Task Force report is based on Command airlift services performed at prescribed Government rates. The Military Airlift Command also incurred and billed the Department of State for certain extraordinary costs which were not charged to the refugee program.

CAMP ESTABLISHMENT AND  
REFUGEE MAINTENANCE--\$122,775,000

Camp setup--\$12,923,000;  
Daily maintenance--\$104,177,000

These claims include all Defense obligations for the refugee program except those related to sealift, airlift, medical, and camp closeout costs. Camp setup charges of \$12.9 million are for erecting facilities and establishing organizations at staging areas in the Pacific and reception centers in the United States early in the program. Daily maintenance costs of \$104.2 million represent the ongoing support to refugees and processing personnel at these facilities through November 21, 1975.

These costs as reported in Defense's weekly obligation reports include personnel overtime, temporary hires, transportation and travel, printing and reproduction, contracted services, refugee food, supplies, and equipment.

Camp closeout--\$1,375,000

Camp closeouts are costs identified as being directly related to the phaseout of reception centers. The closeout figure in the Task Force report is based on estimated costs received from reception centers at Guam, Eglin, Camp Pendleton, and Fort Indiantown Gap. Because only partial estimated total closeout costs have been received from Indiantown Gap and none from Fort Chaffee, the final camp closeout figure will be greater than presently indicated.

Medical--\$4,300,000

In the early stages of the refugee program, the Task Force and Department of Defense negotiated special rates to cover the cost of medical treatment for refugees at military installations. These rates were \$23.89 per patient day for inpatient care and \$2.76 per patient visit for outpatient care. All Defense installations were instructed to accumulate charges at these rates.

The special medical rates included allowances for standard medical supplies as well as basic medical treatment. In some cases, extraordinary items, such as the cost of temporary personnel, overtime, and special supplies and equipment, were billed in addition to the normal rates.

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS FORADMINISTRATION, PROCESSING, AND SUPPORT SERVICES

These obligations are attributed to program services by the agencies and organizations other than Defense. The \$18,302,065 shown in the President's December 15, 1975, report to the Congress consists of the following amounts. (See pp. 17 and 32.)

FEDERAL AGENCIES--\$12,466,745Immigration and Naturalization Service--\$3,027,000

This agency's basic role in this program was to insure that all refugees met proper entry requirements and were processed in accordance with established immigration procedures. To do this, the agency used processing teams at Pacific staging areas and at the four reception centers in the United States. Incremental costs of these activities primarily involved overtime, travel, and temporary employees.

Customs Service--\$37,470

Early in the refugee program, Customs Service personnel were detailed to the staging area in Guam to process refugees entering the Indochina Refugee Program. This processing consisted of obtaining declarations on possessions, checking baggage, etc. These are normal Customs functions when performed in the United States; however, by dispatching personnel to Guam, Customs incurred nonbudgeted costs, such as overtime and travel, for which reimbursements from the State Department were due.

Bangkok-Canberra Refugee Care (State Department)--\$560,000

The Department of State allotted funds to the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland, for support of temporary refugee camps in Thailand and in Canberra, Australia, for Cambodians and Vietnamese who fled their countries by means other than the U.S. sealift and airlift. These camps served as short-term lodging for refugees in transit to U.S. reception centers.

U.S. Marshall Service--\$984,000

For various reasons, approximately 2,000 refugees who entered the system requested they be returned to their home countries. Some requestors of repatriation who had reached the United States were returned to Guam. The repatriates on Guam were segregated from other refugees and required special handling. A total of 176 U.S. Marshalls were used on a rotation basis from June 26 through October 16, 1975, to provide security for the areas where the repatriates were camped. Except for some temporary assistance in the reception center at Camp Pendleton, this was the extent of the Marshall Service participation in the refugee program.

National Advisory Committee--\$35,000

In May 1975, President Ford established a National Advisory Committee on Refugees to act in an advisory capacity on refugee matters. This 17-member council was composed of persons from various social, economic, and religious backgrounds. Most of the costs consisted of administrative and travel expenses.

Department of State (Interagency Task Force)--\$1,954,148

Department of State participation in the refugee program was quite extensive. Staffing as well as other support services were furnished to the Task Force by State. Specifically, the types of costs incurred include such items as rental of office space, office equipment, general administration, overtime, temporary employees, travel, and contract services.

Agency for International Development--\$4,505,653

One of the major difficulties in conducting the refugee program was obtaining qualified personnel to serve in management positions at staging areas, reception centers, and Task Force headquarters. This problem was alleviated significantly by AID's agreement to provide personnel returning from Indochina assignments to the Task Force on an extended basis. AID provided the Task Force an average of 150 employees from April through December 1975. They provided services for the Task Force ranging from Civil Coordinators at centers in the United States and Guam to administrative work at the headquarters in Washington, D.C. AID's expenditures on this program covered salaries and such other items as overtime, personnel benefits, and travel.

U.S. Information Agency--\$71,050

Agency support of the refugee program primarily involved providing a small number of administrative personnel and contractual services of translators in the reception centers.

AID Disaster Relief--\$202,551

Although AID Disaster Relief stocks are normally used in natural disasters, some supplies and equipment (including tents, blankets, dining packets, and cots) valued at \$202,551 were drawn from warehouses on Guam for the western Pacific staging area. This was done as a matter of expediency, with the understanding that AID stocks would be quickly replenished.

Department of Labor--\$179,094

Support provided by Labor included job coding services and personnel at reception centers who acquainted refugees with procedures necessary to obtain employment. Labor expenditures were primarily related to travel and overtime pay.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare--\$870,779

HEW received a special appropriation for the Indochina Refugee Program, but several HEW agencies provided services for refugees while they were in camps. Costs of these services were reimbursable by the Department of State. HEW's Office of Education awarded contracts to the California, Florida, and Pennsylvania Departments of Education for organizing and conducting English classes and cultural orientation programs at Camp Pendleton, Eglin, and Indiantown Gap. The Social and Rehabilitative Service revised and clarified policies on financial and medical assistance for Indochinese refugees. The Social Security Administration assisted refugees to obtain Social Security cards. The Public Health Service assisted in health screening of refugees at reception centers. Types of costs incurred by HEW included overtime pay, temporary employees, travel, transportation, and miscellaneous contracts.

Other Federal agencies--\$40,000

Some other Federal agencies that incurred costs in support of the refugee program are the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Agriculture, Drug Enforcement Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, etc. The types of costs incurred were mainly limited to travel and overtime.



PRIVATE ORGANIZATION SERVICES--\$5,835,320American Red Cross--\$5,276,560

The Red Cross provided a variety of services at all U.S. reception centers and Guam, including locator, travel-related services, health, communication, distribution of clothing and comfort items, etc. The Red Cross also conducted family services programs which consisted of casework, counseling, family reunification, and verification of relatives of refugees who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens.

National Council of YMCA in the United States--\$303,360

The YMCA established and coordinated recreation programs, child-care center operations, language classes, counseling centers, etc., at all U.S. reception centers.

Salvation Army, Guam, and Others--\$214,000

The Salvation Army organized and conducted English and vocational classes, provided counseling services, and distributed clothing to refugees at U.S. reception centers. The Salvation Army contract (\$184,000) primarily covered personnel and travel costs.

The remainder (\$30,000) represents the value of a contract with the Black Construction Company on Guam for temporary care of about 80 Koreans who fled South Vietnam during its downfall. The Black contract expired December 31, 1975, and was not renewed.

Baptist Committee for Refugee Relief--\$33,500

The Baptists provided various services at the U.S. reception centers, including conducting English classes, counseling, and cultural orientation programs. The types of costs incurred were limited mainly to personnel and travel.

Washington International Center--\$7,900

The Washington International Center was under contract to visit the four U.S. reception centers and to observe ongoing orientation and education programs for the ultimate purpose of making recommendations for improving such programs.

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS FOR  
REFUGEE PLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

The refugee placement and resettlement obligations of \$86,847,080 incurred by the various organizations were reported on page 142 of the President's December 15, 1975, report to the Congress. This consists of the following breakdown. (See pp. 17 and 32.)

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES--\$65,030,000

In the early stages of the refugee program, it was determined that the resettlement of refugees would be coordinated by selected voluntary agencies experienced in such activities. The agencies were responsible for finding sponsors and overseeing resettlement and for providing followup support to facilitate the assimilation of the refugees into U.S. society to preclude sponsorship failures.

The Department of State negotiated contracts with each voluntary organization, guaranteeing a \$500 payment for each refugee resettled. The total value of the contracts was based on the total number of anticipated resettlements. However, it was recognized that adjustments would be necessary to reflect the number actually resettled under each contract.

The 111,160 refugees had been resettled through the closing of the center at Fort Chaffee on December 20, 1975. The Task Force is in the process of reconciling all contract amounts with the final number of refugees resettled by each agency. (See p. 19). After this reconciliation is completed, appropriate adjustments will be made.

STATE AND LOCAL RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES--\$3,455,000

The refugee sponsorship program was expanded to include certain State and local governments. Five States, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Washington, and two local governments (city of Indianapolis and Jackson County, Missouri) and three private nonprofit organizations offered resettlement programs. The arrangement made with these States and local organizations was consistent with the agreement made with the voluntary agencies.

As of December 19, 1975, these organizations had helped 4,663 refugees to resettle in the United States.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION (STATE DEPARTMENT)--\$6,832,080

After the refugees obtained offers of sponsorship in the United States, they were transported from reception centers to resettlement locations. Although the cost of the transportation was sometimes borne by the sponsor or the refugee (if either had the ability to pay), much of the inland transportation was paid by the Task Force. Generally, these payments were for standard fares billed by commercial carriers.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION--\$7,400,000

From the inception of the refugee program, the Task Force sought third-country resettlement for many refugees. In June 1975, the Task Force estimated that up to 15,000 refugees may resettle in other countries. As a part of this effort, the Intergovernmental Committee agreed to arrange and pay, on a reimbursable basis, for all international travel of refugees traveling to and from third countries. To make these payments to the Committee, the Department of State allotted \$7.4 million to the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland.

As of December 20, 1975, 6,632 refugees in the system had gone to other countries. The Committee has handled the travel of all Indochinese refugees both to and from third countries. This includes the Cambodians and Vietnamese leaving Thailand.

U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES--\$3,130,000

Funds were allotted to the U.S. Mission in Geneva to meet two types of costs incurred by the U.N. High Commissioner. First, it was allotted \$500,000 to aid in repatriating refugees already in the United States. This arrangement was made because the United States was unable to work directly with officials in Cambodia and Vietnam in resolving the repatriation problem.

As of December 30, 1975, the U.N. High Commissioner made two trips to Indochina to discuss repatriation of refugees and was providing temporary care for 116 refugees in a halfway house in Philadelphia. The High Commissioner will continue to attempt to arrange repatriation for those 116 as well as for 428 refugees located with U.S. sponsors but who wish to return to Indochina.

Second, a \$2,630,000 grant was authorized to the High Commissioner for temporary care of Vietnamese and Cambodians in refugee camps in Thailand. In recent months, the number

of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees located there has risen to approximately 23,000.

OTHER PLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT  
ASSISTANCE--\$1,000,000

Traveler's Aid--\$300,000

Traveler's Aid assisted refugees en route to U.S. sponsorship locations and reception centers. Travelers's Aid representatives met refugees at airport terminals or other public transit stations. This \$300,000 was obligated to cover reimbursable costs incurred by Traveler's Aid.

Repatriation Ship--(State Department)--\$700,000

This represents an estimate of costs incurred by the U.S. Navy for repairing and provisioning the Vietnamese freighter that transported 1,546 repatriates from Guam to Vietnam in October 1975. (See p. 8.)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLEFOR ACTIVITIES REVIEWED

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCEFOR INDOCHINA REFUGEES

## DIRECTOR:

Julia Vadala Taft	May 27, 1975	Dec. 31, 1975
Ambassador L. Dean Brown	Apr. 18, 1975	May 27, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## SECRETARY OF STATE:

Henry A. Kissinger	Sept. 1973	Present
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## COORDINATOR FOR HUMANITARIAN

## AFFAIRS:

James M. Wilson	Apr. 1975	Present
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Donald H. Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Present
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975

## DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

## (Indochina Refugee Program):

Roger E. Shields	Sept. 1975	Present
Eric F. von Marbod	Apr. 1975	Sept. 1975