

*Library*  
*091348*

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548



FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY  
Expected at 2:00 p.m.  
February 7, 1977

STATEMENT OF  
FRED J. SHAFER, DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS  
DIVISION

BEFORE

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

~~72-0280~~

**091348**

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES, I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE VIEWS ON CIVIL PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES. MY COMMENTS DEAL WITH CIVIL PREPAREDNESS POLICY AND WITH SOME OF THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RESULTING FROM OUR RECENT STUDY.

I THINK IT APPROPRIATE TO PREFACE MY STATEMENT WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND DEFENSE HAVE NOT BEEN PROMINENT AMONG NATIONAL PRIORITIES OR FUNDING. BUT OUR WORK SUGGESTS THAT THE SIZE OF THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS EFFORT IS NOT A CLEAR INDICATOR OF THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE. WE BELIEVE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SURVIVING A NUCLEAR ATTACK AND THE COSTS OF THE VARIOUS SURVIVAL ALTERNATIVES REQUIRE GREATER PUBLIC EXPOSURE AND DEBATE AS A BASIS FOR MORE COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FORMULATION. IT IS MY OPINION, THEREFORE, THAT THESE HEARINGS CAN PERFORM A GREAT SERVICE IN FOSTERING FURTHER DEBATE ON CIVIL DEFENSE POLICIES AND IN CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL INDECISION SURROUNDING THIS POLICY.

NEED FOR A CLEARER NATIONAL POLICY

THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ACT OF 1950, AS AMENDED, STATES A NATIONAL POLICY AND PRESCRIBES A SERIES OF ACTIONS WHICH WERE INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE NATION WITH A

SYSTEM TO PROTECT U.S. LIFE AND PROPERTY FROM ATTACK. THE ACT STATED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE SHALL BE JOINTLY VESTED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE STATES, AND THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. ALTHOUGH THE NATURE OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND THE THREAT TO THE NATION HAVE CHANGED, THE POLICY REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME.

THE 1950 ACT RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL DANGER TO THE UNITED STATES ARISING OUT OF THE FIRST SOVIET UNION ATOMIC DETONATION IN 1949. THE INITIAL FUNDS REQUESTED WERE FOR LARGE-SCALE BLAST SHELTER SURVEYS AND FOR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES TO PROVIDE BLAST PROTECTION. THESE MEASURES WERE PROPOSED AT A TIME WHEN THE FALLOUT THREAT WAS NOT A MATTER OF GENERAL PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND WHEN THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF SHELTER WAS PROTECTION FROM THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BLAST, HEAT, AND SHOCK.

DURING THE 10 YEARS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ACT OF 1950, CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION COMPLICATED ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE POTENTIAL AND THE LIMITATIONS OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE CONDUCTED, AND THE POSITION OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN A STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. IN SPITE OF CHANGING VIEWS, BASIC RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED, CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICES WERE ESTABLISHED, AND INITIAL PLANS WERE MADE FOR AN ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM, STOCKPILING OF MEDICAL AND OTHER SUPPLIES, AND CIVIL DEFENSE EXERCISES.

FOLLOWING THE SOVIET DETONATION OF A THERMONUCLEAR DEVICE AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE FALLOUT THREAT, THE U.S. OUTLOOK ON CIVIL PREPAREDNESS CHANGED. IT WAS FELT THAT ONLY NUCLEAR RETALIATORY STRENGTH WOULD DETER A POTENTIAL ENEMY. THESE VIEWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PREPAREDNESS POLICY ARE REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON MAY 25, 1961. THE PRESIDENT STATED:

"THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN LOOKING HARD AT EXACTLY WHAT CIVIL DEFENSE CAN AND CANNOT DO. IT CANNOT BE OBTAINED CHEAPLY. IT CANNOT GIVE AN ASSURANCE OF BLAST PROTECTION THAT WILL BE PROOF AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK OR GUARANTEED AGAINST OBSOLESCENCE OR DESTRUCTION. AND IT CANNOT DETER A NUCLEAR ATTACK."

"WE WILL DETER AN ENEMY FROM MAKING A NUCLEAR ATTACK ONLY IF OUR RETALIATORY POWER IS SO STRONG AND SO INVULNERABLE THAT HE KNOWS HE WOULD BE DESTROYED BY OUR RESPONSE. IF WE HAVE THAT STRENGTH, CIVIL DEFENSE IS NOT NEEDED TO DETER AN ATTACK. IF WE SHOULD EVER LACK IT, CIVIL DEFENSE WOULD NOT BE AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE."

THE PRESIDENT STATED FURTHER THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED DETERRENT CONCEPT ASSUMED RATIONAL CALCULATIONS AND THAT THERE STILL REMAINED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IRRATIONAL ATTACK, A MISCALCULATION, AN ACCIDENTAL WAR, OR A WAR OF ESCALATION WHICH COULD NOT BE EITHER FORESEEN OR DETERRED. HE ALSO STATED:

"IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT CIVIL DEFENSE CAN BE READILY JUSTIFIABLE - AS INSURANCE FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN CASE OF AN ENEMY MIS-  
CALCULATION. IT IS INSURANCE WE TRUST WILL

NEVER BE NEEDED - BUT INSURANCE WHICH WE  
COULD NEVER FORGIVE OURSELVES FOR FOREGOING  
IN THE EVENT OF CATASTROPHE."

THEREAFTER, BLAST SHELTERS WERE DEEMPHASIZED AND  
SHELTERS FOR PROTECTION FROM FALLOUT ASSUMED THE MAJOR  
ROLE AS THE MOST FEASIBLE LIFE-SAVING PROTECTION AGAINST  
NUCLEAR ATTACK. EMPHASIS WAS ALSO PLACED ON COMMUNICATIONS  
AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE BASE AROUND WHICH THE SURVIVING  
POPULATION COULD COALESCE FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION.

THIS POLICY SEEMS TO BE THE BASIS FOR THE CONTINUING  
CIVIL DEFENSE AND PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS WE SEE TODAY. WITHIN  
THIS POLICY FRAMEWORK, HOWEVER, WE HAVE FOUND THAT VARIOUS  
THESES CONCERNING NUCLEAR ATTACK HAVE TENDED TO CLOUD THE  
NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY. THESE INCLUDE (1) THE  
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR OVERKILL THESIS, (2) THE  
SURPRISE-ATTACK THESIS, AND (3) THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF  
CIVIL DEFENSE THESIS. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS EACH THESIS  
BRIEFLY.

THE STRATEGIC DETERRENCE THESIS IS BASED ON THE ABILITY  
OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCE TO ABSORB THE ENEMY'S FIRST STRIKE  
AND STILL HAVE THE CAPACITY TO RETALIATE WITH A LEVEL OF  
FORCE SO DESTRUCTIVE AS TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ENEMY.  
SOMEHOW, THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE HAS TRANSLATED INTO A  
WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES THAT WE NOW HAVE  
MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION, i.e., THAT THE TWO MAJOR

NUCLEAR POWERS CAN COMPLETELY DESTROY ONE ANOTHER. INDEED PROponents OF THIS THESIS SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN NOW DESTROY EACH OTHER SEVERAL TIMES OVER--NUCLEAR "OVERKILL."

GIVEN THE CAPACITY FOR NUCLEAR OVERKILL, LOGIC THEN DICTATES THAT EXPENDITURES FOR CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK ARE SUPERFLUOUS, SINCE WHATEVER PREPAREDNESS IS CREATED WILL BE DESTROYED IN THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

AN OBVIOUS WEAKNESS IN THE DETERRENCE THEORY WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE 1961 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITIES OF IRRATIONAL ATTACK, A MISCALCULATION, AN ACCIDENTAL WAR, OR A WAR OF ESCALATION. AND A FACTOR NOT PRESENT IN 1961 IS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

A WEAKNESS NOT SO CLEAR IS THAT THE DETERRENCE AND OVERKILL THESIS MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE SHARED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER THOUGHT OF NUCLEAR WAR AS UNTHINKABLE. THIS SCHOOL VIEWS THE SOVIETS AS PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A WAR AND ASSURING THEY WILL WIN IT THROUGH A COMBINATION OF NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE OR RETALIATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY; POPULATION, AGRICULTURE, AND INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL; AND STRONG CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR POSTSTRIKE MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

UNDER THE SURPRISE-ATTACK THESIS, THE POPULATION MAY NOT HAVE TIME TO TAKE SHELTER AND CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS WOULD BE FRUITLESS. SUCH A THESIS ESTABLISHES THE WARNING TIME AS THE 15 TO 20 MINUTES BETWEEN LIFT-OFF AND DETONATION.

A CONTRASTING VIEW AND ONE GAINING IN PROMINENCE IS THAT A NUCLEAR ATTACK WILL NOT BE A SURPRISE. THIS VIEW HOLDS THAT ADVANCE WARNING TIME OF 2 TO 3 DAYS CAN GENERALLY BE EXPECTED AND THAT CERTAIN CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIONS COULD GREATLY INCREASE POPULATION SURVIVABILITY.

SUPPORTING ANOTHER THESIS ARE A GROWING NUMBER OF ANALYSTS WHO ARGUE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS POSTURE IS ITSELF A STRATEGIC DETERRENT. THESE ANALYSTS SUGGEST THAT ANY INCREASE IN THE SURVIVAL OF BOTH HUMANS AND INDUSTRY WOULD ALSO INCREASE THE DESTRUCTION NEEDED FOR A "SUCCESSFUL" FIRST STRIKE, THUS TENDING TO DISCOURAGE THE FIRST STRIKE.

ARRAYED AGAINST THIS THESIS ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT CIVIL DEFENSE DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO AVOIDING OR WINNING A WAR; THEREFORE, CIVIL DEFENSE FUNDS WOULD BE BETTER SPENT ON MILITARY DEFENSE. COMPLEMENTARY TO THIS LINE OF THOUGHT ARE VIEWS THAT EXPANDING CIVIL DEFENSE MIGHT ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE AND THAT TAKING CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIONS DURING A CRISIS MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS A BELLIGERENT ACT AND TRIGGER AN ENEMY ATTACK.

THE ADMINISTRATORS OF U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE HAVE HAD TO DIRECT THEIR ACTIVITIES--AND WE HAVE MADE OUR STUDY OF THOSE ACTIVITIES--IN THE FACE OF THE DISSENSION AND UNCERTAINTY DESCRIBED ABOVE AND WITH MODEST BUDGETS.

THE CURRENT U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

AS YOU KNOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETED A STUDY OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND HAVE SENT COPIES OF OUR DRAFT REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES FOR THEIR COMMENTS. OUR STUDY CONCENTRATED ON THE DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (DCPA), AND WE ALSO DID SOME WORK AT GSA'S FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (FPA) AND HUD'S FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. IN ADDITION, WE VISITED SEVERAL STATES AND COMMUNITIES.

I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE FOR YOU THE STUDY RESULTS WHICH WE HAVE PRESENTED TO THE AGENCIES.

THE CURRENT CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR A FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL STRUCTURE TO PLAN FOR AND CARRY OUT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, SUCH AS MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE TO FALLOUT SHELTERS, WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. MORE RECENTLY, ON THE PREMISE THAT SOME PREATTACK WARNING TIME MAY BE POSSIBLE, PLANS ARE BEING DEVELOPED FOR EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION TO "SAFE" AREAS.



THE CURRENT PROGRAM IS DIRECTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TOWARD PREATTACK PREPAREDNESS AND DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER (AND MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY FUNDED TO CONSIDER THE NEED FOR) POSTATTACK PREPAREDNESS. INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE ATTENTION IN THE UNITED STATES, EVEN THOUGH CONTINUED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WOULD BE CRITICAL TO THE OUTCOME OF A WAR SHOULD HOSTILITIES CONTINUE AFTER THE NUCLEAR ATTACK. IN ADDITION, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE HOMEFRONT ECONOMY TO ENABLE RAPID RECOVERY FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK. BUT MANY OF THE NATION'S INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ARE LOCATED IN THE HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHERE THEY ARE LIKELY TO SUFFER FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS' DIRECT EFFECTS, SUCH AS BLAST AND HEAT.

POSTATTACK RECOVERY ALSO DEPENDS ON CONTINUED GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PLANS FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL, SOME OF THESE PLANS ARE OUTDATED AND PLANS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS OF THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE EMPHASIS. WE HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN A SEPARATE STUDY ON FEDERAL CONTINUITY-OF-GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

WHILE FPA HAS THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS POLICYMAKING AND COORDINATING ROLE, THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS OPERATING ROLE IS SHARED BY DCPA AND THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS, AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE EXISTS TO RESPOND TO AND PREPARE FOR EMERGENCIES. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE ORGANIZATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN FORMED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE DCPA'S CONCEPT OF DUAL-PURPOSE PREPAREDNESS--THAT IS, PREPAREDNESS FOR BOTH NUCLEAR ATTACK AND NATURAL DISASTERS--ENCOURAGED THEIR FORMATION. DCPA BEGAN TO PROMOTE THIS CONCEPT IN THE EARLY 1970S, THUS RECOGNIZING THAT THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT WILLING TO FUND NUCLEAR ATTACK PREPAREDNESS SYSTEMS AND THAT EMERGENCY SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE USED BOTH IN PEACETIME EMERGENCIES AND IN A NUCLEAR ATTACK WERE MORE ECONOMICAL AND MORE EASILY ACCEPTED BY THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

WE HAVE FOUND THAT STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY ON NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND OTHER PEACETIME EMERGENCIES AND THAT NUCLEAR ATTACK PREPAREDNESS HAS BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN A SIDE BENEFIT. BUT FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT, WE BELIEVE THE DUAL-PURPOSE CONCEPT REMAINS THE BEST MEANS OF DEVELOPING THE STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE

THAT EXERCISING PLANS AND EQUIPMENT DURING NATURAL DISASTERS IS A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR SURVIVAL CAPABILITIES.

ALTHOUGH THE JOINT FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE HAS STRENGTHENED THE PROGRAM BY INVOLVING THE ENTIRE NATION IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT, IT ALSO HAS WEAKENED THE PROGRAM BY ALLOWING NATIONAL GOALS AND PRIORITIES TO BE FRUSTRATED BY STATE AND LOCAL DISINTEREST OR DISAGREEMENT.

ONE QUESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED, IN OUR OPINION, IS WHETHER A CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM BASED ON VOLUNTARY STATE AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION CAN BE FULLY EFFECTIVE.

AS FOR PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS FROM A NUCLEAR ATTACK, THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN ANY PROGRAMS TO CONSTRUCT SHELTERS THAT WOULD PROTECT AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS' DIRECT EFFECTS. OVER THE LAST 5 YEARS, HOWEVER, DCPA HAS IMPROVED ADMINISTRATION OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM BY SETTING CERTAIN PRIORITIES ON THE BASIS OF EXPECTED RISK. THIS IS EVIDENCED BY ITS DESIGNATION OF HIGH-RISK AREAS, THE NEW EMPHASIS OF THE SHELTER SURVEY ON THESE AREAS, AND THE PLANNED SHELTER MARKING IN THE HIGHEST RISK (COUNTERFORCE) AND "HOST" AREAS.

WITH THE HELP OF THE STATES AND THE APPROVAL OF FPA, DCPA DEVELOPED MAPS SHOWING ABOUT 400 LIKELY MILITARY AND POPULATION TARGETS AND GROUPED THEM INTO THREE PRIORITY

LEVELS ON THE BASIS OF EXPECTED RISK. IN DESIGNATING THE HIGH-RISK AREAS, DCPA ASSUMED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE OF THE TYPES CAUSING THE SEVEREST DAMAGE AND HEAVIEST FALLOUT.

CURRENT DCPA PLANS CALL FOR RELOCATING PEOPLE FROM HIGH-RISK AREAS TO SAFER "HOST" AREAS IF A 2- TO 3-DAY PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION PRECEDES AN ATTACK. IF NO CRISIS PERIOD PRECEDES AN ATTACK, PLANS CALL FOR SHELTERING PEOPLE IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS NEAR THEIR HOMES OR WORK LOCATIONS.

MANY STUDIES MADE IN THE PAST HAVE POINTED OUT THE POTENTIAL LIFESAVING CAPABILITIES OF VARIOUS CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS. DCPA BASES ITS PROGRAMS ON STUDIES INDICATING THAT AN ALL-OUT ATTACK WOULD CAUSE 125 MILLION FATALITIES IF NO PROGRAMS EXISTED. IF EXISTING FALLOUT SHELTERS WERE USED, DCPA ESTIMATES 30 MILLION OF THESE PEOPLE WOULD BE SAVED. AND IF 70 PERCENT OF THE HIGH-RISK POPULATION HAD TIME TO MOVE TO SAFER AREAS AND RECEIVED FALLOUT PROTECTION, 100 MILLION PEOPLE WOULD BE SAVED.

SOME PROBLEMS HAVE LIMITED THE PROGRESS OF THE SHELTER AND RELOCATION PROGRAMS. FOR EXAMPLE:

--THE NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED SHELTER SPACES DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THE POPULATION DENSITY. THIS PROBLEM BECOMES CRITICAL IF A WARNING PERIOD PERMITS PEOPLE

TO RELOCATE TO SAFER AREAS, BECAUSE SOME OF THE SAFER AREAS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH SHELTER SPACES FOR THEIR OWN POPULATIONS.

--MANY IDENTIFIED SHELTER SPACES ARE NOT LICENSED OR MARKED, SO THEY WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND WITHOUT A WARNING PERIOD BEFORE ATTACK.

--ALTHOUGH DCPA EXPECTS COMMUNITIES TO DEVELOP PLANS FOR MARKING AND STOCKING SHELTERS IN A CRISIS PERIOD, FEW PLANS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. ALSO, THE CONCEPT OF CRISIS MARKING AND STOCKING IS INCONSISTENT WITH DCPA PLANS TO USE THE NEAREST SHELTERS WHEN A CRISIS PERIOD DOES NOT PRECEDE AN ATTACK. WE BELIEVE THAT, IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO RELOCATE PEOPLE FROM HIGH-RISK AREAS, THERE ALSO WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO MARK, STOCK, AND UPGRADE SHELTERS.

--MANY LOCAL PLANS MATCHING PEOPLE WITH EXISTING SHELTERS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED OR ARE OUT OF DATE.

--RELOCATION PLANNING PROJECTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT FOR INDIVIDUAL AREAS, RATHER THAN REGIONS, SO THE PLANS MAY BE UNWORKABLE IN THE COUNTRY'S DENSELY POPULATED AREAS, SUCH AS THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR.

--EVEN THOUGH THE SUCCESS OF THE RELOCATION AND SHELTER PLANS DEPENDS ON STATE AND LOCAL ACTIONS, STATE AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY. IN 1976, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE REFUSED TO APPROVE THE RELOCATION CONTRACT WITH DCPA, EVEN THOUGH NO STATE FUNDING WAS REQUIRED.

THE LARGEST CHUNK OF DCPA'S BUDGET IS DIRECTED NOT TOWARD THE SHELTER AND RELOCATION PROGRAMS BUT TOWARD THE STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS. OF DCPA'S \$82 MILLION BUDGET IN FISCAL YEAR 1975, ALMOST \$40 MILLION WAS GIVEN TO STATES AND COMMUNITIES IN THE FORM OF MATCHING FUNDS. IN THE SAME YEAR, STATES AND COMMUNITIES SPENT ABOUT \$68 MILLION OF THEIR OWN FUNDS ON CIVIL PREPAREDNESS.

DCPA SPENDS MORE MONEY ON MATCHING THE COST OF STATE AND LOCAL SALARIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES THAN IT DOES ON ANY OTHER PROGRAM. THE FUNDING PROCESS BEGINS WHEN DCPA ALLOCATES FUNDS TO EACH STATE ON THE BASIS OF A FORMULA WHICH CONSIDERS THE NUMBER OF RISK AREAS, NUMBER OF CRITICAL SUPPORT AREAS, POPULATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM. HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL FUNDS PROVIDED TO EACH STATE DEPEND ON THE FUNDS WHICH THE STATE AND ITS COMMUNITIES CAN MATCH. AS A RESULT, FUNDS ARE NOT ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE AREAS MOST IN NEED OF EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES.

DCPA DOES NOT GIVE PRIORITY TO COMMUNITIES IN HIGH-RISK AREAS OR TO HEAVILY POPULATED COMMUNITIES. IF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DECIDE NOT TO GIVE ANY FUNDS TO THEIR CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS, DCPA CANNOT GIVE THEM ANY FUNDS.

TO DETERMINE WHETHER STATES AND COMMUNITIES ARE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE MATCHING FUNDS, DCPA REQUIRES THEM TO SUBMIT ANNUAL PROGRAM PAPERS. LOCAL PROGRAM PAPERS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE STATE BEFORE THEY ARE SENT TO DCPA FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL. HOWEVER, MANY STATES HAD NO WRITTEN CRITERIA FOR APPROVING OR DISAPPROVING THE PAPERS AND SELDOM QUESTIONED THE PAPERS' CONTENTS.

DCPA ALSO HAD NO SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR APPROVING THE PAPERS. DCPA ACCEPTED ALMOST ALL PAPERS APPROVED BY THE STATES, ALTHOUGH MANY PAPERS CONTAINED INACCURATE OR CONFLICTING INFORMATION. SOME PAPERS, FOR EXAMPLE, STATED THAT THE LOCAL DIRECTORS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS INSPECTING AND LICENSING SHELTERS, UPDATING EMERGENCY PLANS, AND CONDUCTING EXERCISES. MOST LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS WE VISITED, HOWEVER, WERE CONCERNED WITH PREPAREDNESS FOR ORDINARY EMERGENCIES AND NATURAL DISASTERS, NOT WITH NUCLEAR PREPAREDNESS.

WE ALSO FOUND SOME PROBLEMS IN THE TYPES OF POSITIONS THAT WERE SUPPORTED BY MATCHING FUNDS. ALTHOUGH ONLY STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MANAGING POSITIONS WERE TO BE FUNDED, DCPA FUNDED SOME POSITIONS THAT APPEARED TO CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO CIVIL PREPAREDNESS. IN ADDITION, MANY COMMUNITIES THAT RECEIVED MATCHING FUNDS HAD NOT MET DCPA'S MINIMUM STAFFING STANDARDS. THESE STANDARDS HAD BEEN SET ON THE BASIS OF POPULATION.

BEGINNING IN FISCAL YEAR 1977, DCPA REVISED ITS PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDS. WE BELIEVE THE NEW PROCEDURES WILL HELP TO CORRECT MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WE FOUND. HOWEVER, DCPA STILL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FUND HIGHLY POPULATED AND HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES UNLESS THE COMMUNITIES THEMSELVES APPROPRIATE THE MATCHING FUNDS.

#### TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, IN OUR OPINION, IS ONE OF THE MANY LINKS IN MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS. THE CURRENT PROGRAM, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN CIVIL DEFENSE ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS--A LOW-PROFILE PROGRAM WHICH INSURES THAT SOME PLANNING FOR PROTECTING CIVILIANS EXISTS BUT WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF FUNDING OR EFFORT.



OUR DRAFT REPORT PRESENTS SEVERAL TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMENT BY DCPA AND FPA. I WILL SUMMARIZE THESE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR YOU, BUT FIRST I WANT TO EMPHASIZE WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE OUR MOST IMPORTANT PROPOSAL. THAT IS, A NATIONAL DEBATE IS NEEDED TO FULLY EXPLORE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE NATION IS WILLING TO FUND A CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, THE PRIORITY WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN TO SUCH A PROGRAM, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE BASED ON VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION. OUT OF THIS DEBATE SHOULD COME A POLICY WHICH PROVIDES CLEAR GUIDANCE FOR THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

UNTIL A CLEAR POLICY IS FORMULATED, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT PROGRAM. WE PROPOSED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT DCPA AND FPA REQUEST LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW GRADUATED FEDERAL FUNDING ACCORDING TO AN AREA'S EXPECTED RISK, ITS POPULATION, AND ITS RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL CIVIL PREPAREDNESS NEEDS. SUCH LEGISLATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTY WHICH DCPA HAS IN PROVIDING MATCHING FUNDS ACCORDING TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND IN VIEW OF ITS LIMITED FUNDING LEVELS.

WE ALSO PROPOSED THAT DCPA AND FPA MORE CLOSELY COORDINATE THEIR PREPAREDNESS PLANNING. SINCE TWO OF DCPA'S FEDERAL REGIONAL CENTERS--WHICH WILL SERVE AS RELOCATION SITES FOR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN AN

ATTACK--HAVE NOT BEEN CONSTRUCTED UNDERGROUND TO WITHSTAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS' DIRECT EFFECTS, EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE IDENTIFICATION AND COMPLETION OF THESE CENTERS. ALSO, FPA SHOULD EMPHASIZE COMPLETION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' PLANS FOR USING THE CENTERS.

WE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT DCPA:

- ELIMINATE THE INCONSISTENCIES IN PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE-RESPONSE USE OF SHELTERS BY REQUIRING STATES AND COMMUNITIES TO MAKE CERTAIN PREPARATIONS NOW, RATHER THAN IN A CRISIS PERIOD.
- RECONSIDER RELOCATION PLANNING IN THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR AND IN OTHER DENSELY POPULATED AREAS IN LIGHT OF THE ADVANTAGES OF PLANNING ON A REGIONAL BASIS.
- ESTABLISH CLEAR CRITERIA FOR THE STATES TO USE IN APPROVING LOCAL PROGRAM PAPERS AND SPOT-CHECK THE STATES' REVIEWS OF LOCAL PAPERS.

IN ADDITION TO THESE TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, CERTAIN QUESTIONS COULD BE POSED IN REGARD TO THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND THE PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES.

FOR EXAMPLE, CAN THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM BE EFFECTIVE IF STATE, LOCAL, AND INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM IS VOLUNTARY? IF CRISIS RELOCATION PLANNING,

AS AN ILLUSTRATION, IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST FEASIBLE MEANS OF PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS' DIRECT EFFECTS, CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERMIT CERTAIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TO DECIDE AGAINST SUCH PLANNING? OR, TO PREVENT A NATIONAL PROGRAM FROM BEING FRUSTRATED BY A STATE OR COMMUNITY, SHOULD THE ENTIRE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM BE MADE A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY?

IF THE PROGRAM WERE FEDERALIZED, NATIONAL PRIORITIES COULD MORE EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED. FUNDS COULD BE REDIRECTED TOWARD READINESS IN THE HIGH-RISK AND EXTREMELY POPULATED AREAS, AND EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS COULD BE BUILT AND UPGRADED ON A PRIORITY BASIS. HOWEVER, THIS OPTION HAS ITS DRAWBACKS; WITHOUT STATE AND LOCAL INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY PLANS MIGHT NOT BE AS QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT AS NECESSARY. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD INCREASE THE FEDERAL COST FOR CIVIL PREPAREDNESS.

ANOTHER QUESTION TO BE ASKED IS WHETHER CIVIL DEFENSE COULD BE MORE CLOSELY TIED TO MILITARY DEFENSE. COULD THE NATIONAL GUARD AND/OR THE RESERVES, FOR EXAMPLE, BE RELIED ON AS A COST-EFFECTIVE BRIDGE BETWEEN PEACETIME AND WARTIME READINESS? MOST GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS ALREADY HAVE THE RESOURCES--AS WELL AS THE TRAINING--FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AND ARE OFTEN THE FIRST ON THE SCENE OF NATURAL DISASTERS. ALTHOUGH THIS OPTION WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE THE LEAST COST,

IT MIGHT PRESENT PROBLEMS TO THE STATES AND COMMUNITIES WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR OWN EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND IT COULD AFFECT THE CONTINGENCY MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE RESERVES.

A THIRD QUESTION, IN LINE WITH THE FIRST, CONCERNS PRIVATE INDUSTRY'S INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL PREPAREDNESS. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUIRE OR ENCOURAGE PREPAREDNESS MEASURES BY PRIVATE INDUSTRIES? IT APPEARS TO US THAT, SINCE THE NATION'S RECOVERY DEPENDS ON INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL, THIS QUESTION NEEDS MUCH MORE EMPHASIS. AT THE VERY LEAST, CRITICAL INDUSTRIES COULD BE IDENTIFIED, THEIR SURVIVAL AND DISPERSAL CHARACTERISTICS STUDIED, AND A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS STARTED.

CERTAIN MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN IN EXISTING ABOVEGROUND FACTORIES TO IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES OF SURVIVAL. FOR EXAMPLE, TESTS SHOW THAT EVEN LARGE MACHINES, IF PROPERLY PROTECTED, COULD SURVIVE IF THEY WERE A FEW HUNDRED FEET FROM A 40-KILOTON NUCLEAR BLAST OR 2,000 FEET FROM A 1-MEGATON BLAST.

WE DO NOT PRETEND TO HAVE THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS I HAVE POSED. FULL CONSIDERATION OF SUCH QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ASSIST IN CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY AND IN MORE EFFECTIVELY MEETING THE PROGRAM'S OBJECTIVES.

THAT CONCLUDES MY STATEMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS OR TO PROVIDE ANSWERS FOR THE RECORD.