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Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities of Civil Reserve Air Fleet. LCD-77-207; B-133025. April 6, 1977. 21 pp. + appendices (14 pp.).

Report to Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

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GAO reviewed an Air Force study which concluded that its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft through military aerial ports should not be changed despite a Senate Committee on Appropriations request that the Air Force consider contributions that could be provided by the use of commercial airport facilities. Findings/Conclusions: The Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the commercial terminals and the potential personnel savings resulting from their use. Use of the commercial terminal facilities for the movement of military cargo would reduce the Military Airlift Command's overall staffing requirements significantly. If, during full mobilization, all commercially compatible resupply cargo were transferred to commercial aerial ports, the staffing could be reduced by several hundred persons. Any operational problems caused by the rerouting of military cargo through commercial airports could be solved through advance planning. Recommendations: The Senate Committee on Appropriations should direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet cargo terminal facilities. (QM)

REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities Of Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers have a significant cargo processing capability which could be used during time of contingency operations. Use of this capability would reduce military aerial port staffing requirements and alleviate a current shortage in reserve aerial port personnel.

LCD-77-207

APRIL 6, 1977

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-133025

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request of May 26, 1976, we have evaluated the Air Force's assessment of the feasibility of using Civil Reserve Air Fleet terminal facilities to offset Military Airlift Command aerial port staffing requirements. We also inquired into the extent that reserve aerial port squadrons were considered by the Air Force and the Department of Defense when Public Law 94-286 was being formulated to facilitate activating the reserves.

At the request of your office we have also included certain adjustments to staffing requirements figures included in our February 2, 1976, letter to your Committee.

As specified by your office, we did not submit our report to the Department of the Air Force for formal comment but did discuss the results of our evaluation with Air Force officials in some detail. Their views on our evaluation are included in this report.

Sincerely yours,

Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

AIR FORCE CONTINGENCY PLANS SHOULD INCLUDE FACILITIES OF CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

D I G E S T

The Senate Committee on Appropriations asked the Air Force to consider contributions that could be provided by commercial airport facilities operated by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet as a possible offset to aerial port staffing by the Military Airlift Command. In its report of May 14, 1976, the Air Force concluded that its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft through military aerial ports should not be changed. (See pp. 1 and 3.)

However, the General Accounting Office found that the Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the commercial terminals and the potential personnel savings resulting from their use.

Use of the commercial terminal facilities for the movement of military cargo would reduce the Military Airlift Command's overall staffing requirements significantly, helping to ease a shortfall in the reserve airport personnel. It also would allow Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers to continue commercial cargo terminal operations which might otherwise be either stopped or reduced because of the Military Airlift Command's withdrawal of most of the carriers' long-range cargo aircraft for operation through military aerial ports. (See p. 3.)

Data provided to GAO by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers showed that substantial commercial cargo processing capability could be made available to the military during all stages of contingency operations. Public Law 94-286 was passed, however, which facilitated activating the reserves, and it appears that reservists could now be used during contingencies requiring part mobilization; the commercial facilities would not be needed

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until full mobilization. If full mobilization were required, more commercial capability would be available. (See p. 4.)

GAO estimates that if, during full mobilization, all commercially compatible resupply cargo were transferred to commercial aerial ports, the Military Airlift Command's overall staffing could be reduced by several hundred persons. This reduction would help to reduce the shortage of reserve aerial port staff, which, as of September 1976, was 900. (See pp. 5 & 8.)

GAO did not obtain formal written comments on its report but did discuss the results of its evaluation in some detail with Air Force officials. These officials again expressed the opinion that the potential advantages of using commercial air terminals for wartime resupply cargo would be outweighed by difficulties in managing the timely movement of the cargo diverted to these civil terminals. (See p. 12.)

GAO recognizes that the rerouting of military cargo through commercial airports would create some operational problems, but, after discussion with the military and carrier personnel who would be directly involved in such an operation, it believes that such problems could be solved through advance planning. GAO recommends that the Committee direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet facilities. (See pp. 8 & 16.)

Contents

ABBREVIATIONS

AFB	Air Force Base
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAC	Military Airlift Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Senate Committee on Appropriations, in its report on the 1976 Department of Defense appropriations bill, asked the Air Force to consider the contributions that could be provided by civil airport facilities operated by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) as a possible offset to Military Airlift Command (MAC) aerial port staffing requirements. On May 14, 1976, the Air Force reported on its assessment of CRAF cargo terminal capability. In a letter dated May 26, 1976, the Committee requested that we evaluate the Air Force study and also determine the extent to which reserve aerial port squadron activations were considered by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force in studies relating to possible uses of Public Law 94-286, dated May 14, 1976, a law facilitating the activation of reserves.

CRAF PROGRAM

MAC, the single agency for airlift services within DOD, is responsible for providing airlift to meet approved Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contingency plans. MAC plans to meet this responsibility through use of its own and CRAF aircraft.

The CRAF concept is a coordinated program to mobilize the Nation's airlift resources to meet DOD requirements. CRAF is composed of U.S. civil air carriers who contractually commit themselves to providing operating and support personnel, facilities, and aircraft to MAC under stated conditions. It makes commercial airlift resources available for both peacetime and wartime augmentation of military airlift capability. For planning purposes CRAF is organized into Domestic, Alaskan, and International--short range and long range--segments. As of June 30, 1976, CRAF included 21 air carriers with 316 committed aircraft. Most of the cargo airlift capability, including all of the long-range aircraft, was included in the international segment. A list of the carriers and aircraft included in the international CRAF is shown in Appendix I.

Incremental CRAF activation

The CRAF program involves three stages of activation:

1. Stage I, committed expansion, consists of airlift capability committed by contract to

MAC for service when the military airlift force cannot meet both deployment and other traffic requirements simultaneously.

2. Stage II, airlift emergency, provides additional expansion needed during a major airlift emergency not warranting national mobilization.

3. Stage III, national emergency, provides up to full CRAF capability during national emergencies declared by the President.

Airlift requirements for each CRAF stage are based on JCS approved contingency plans.

Senior Lodger

When the CRAF program is implemented, carriers may be called upon to provide air traffic support at their commercial facilities. A principal air carrier, designated the senior lodger, controls this support at each civil airport and may obtain required assistance from other CRAF carriers at his station.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In performing the requested evaluation of the Air Force's assessment of CRAF cargo terminal capability, we discussed the assessment with Air Force and MAC officials and reviewed the MAC data which formed the basis of the Air Force study. We discussed appropriate segments of the assessment with Army, Navy, and Air Force officials of shipper service control offices which are responsible for clearing shipments for air movement and for providing routing instructions for such shipments. Finally, we discussed CRAF cargo terminal capability and the willingness of CRAF carriers to process DOD cargo during contingency operations with 13 of the 17 carriers in the international CRAF. These carriers, who provided us with data on their cargo terminals' processing capabilities, accounted for 253 of the 266 aircraft committed to CRAF.

We discussed the question of the extent to which DOD and the Air Force included reserve aerial port squadrons in their planning for Public Law 94-286 with officials in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Office of Air Force Reserves.

CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION OF THE AIR FORCE'S ASSESSMENT OF CRAF CARGO TERMINAL CAPABILITY

The Air Force concluded that use of CRAF terminal facilities would not be advantageous to the Department of Defense and that transfer of planned wartime workload to CRAF terminals would save only about 60 personnel spaces. They also felt that staff operational problems would arise leading to lessened aircraft utilization, shipper confusion, delays in moving cargo, and a massive new management structure.

The Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the CRAF terminals and the potential personnel savings resulting from their use. Although there would be operational problems associated with using the CRAF terminals, these problems could be resolved through advance planning.

Using CRAF terminal facilities would reduce MAC's overall staffing requirements and help reduce a shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel. It also would allow the CRAF carriers to continue operating terminal facilities which might otherwise have to be closed because of a shortage of aircraft with which to move commercial cargo.

CRAF CARGO TERMINAL CAPABILITY

The Air Force concluded there would be only minimal CRAF cargo terminal capability available to MAC during a contingency prior to full mobilization. However, we collected data from CRAF carriers which show that these carriers have a significant surge capability which could be available to MAC during all stages of CRAF operations. Furthermore, with the passage of Public Law 94-286, MAC would not need CRAF terminal facilities until full mobilization.

Air Force position

The Air Force stated that commercial airlines possess little or no surge capability in their terminal facilities. It assumed that since the planning of civil cargo terminal

capability is a function of economics, commercial airlines would invest in only those facilities and equipment needed to meet current market demands. They stated the diversion of commercial aircraft to MAC use during the early stages of CRAF activation (CRAF stages I and II) would not free any terminal capability for MAC use because the carriers would continue to move the same amount of commercial cargo as before the activation by better utilizing their remaining aircraft. They concluded that only during full mobilization (CRAF stage III), when the bulk of commercial cargo aircraft would be diverted to MAC use, would any significant amount of terminal capability be available to MAC.

CRAF carriers' positions

Although commercial airlines invest in only those facilities and equipment needed for forecasted demands, the scheduled air carriers informed us that they must have sufficient facilities, equipment, and personnel to meet peak workloads which occur during short periods of a day and leave their facilities underutilized for other periods. Therefore, the commercial airlines possess a substantial surge capability by fully utilizing their facilities, equipment, and personnel, including overtime. Carrier estimates of their surge capability--based on estimated maximum processing capability with present facilities, equipment, and personnel, and current workloads--are shown in Appendix II.

The withdrawal of aircraft from commercial operations further increases this inherent surge capability of the CRAF carriers. Several carriers informed us that MAC would require their entire cargo fleet during a Stage III activation. The carriers told us that under these circumstances, a large part of their cargo terminal capability would be available to MAC. Officials of all CRAF carriers expressed a willingness to participate in cargo terminal operations to the extent possible.

CRAF capability may not be needed until Stage II

A MAC official stated that since passage of Public Law 94-286 he expects reserve aerial port personnel to be available during the initial stages of any contingency operation. Because of the operational problems associated with the use of CRAF terminals, he expects that MAC would call up available reserves and make maximum use of their own facilities before using those of CRAF. Thus, it is possible that CRAF

facilities would not be needed or used until full mobilization. (See ch. 3 for a synopsis of MAC authority to call up reserves.)

AERIAL PORT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS COULD BE MET THROUGH USE OF CRAF TERMINALS

The Air Force concluded that a net reduction of 60 personnel positions would be possible during full mobilization by transferring cargo workloads from MAC aerial ports to CRAF terminals. In its study, the reduction of 394 personnel at MAC aerial ports was offset by an addition of 334 military liaison personnel at CRAF ports.

In contrast, our evaluation shows a possible reduction of 573 personnel at MAC aerial ports and a need for fewer military liaisons at CRAF terminals. We estimate that the potential net savings in personnel from handling cargo at CRAF terminals instead of MAC aerial ports could be as great as 500 positions. Even though dollar savings might be reduced somewhat by the installation of additional computer equipment, we believe savings would still be realized and more importantly, the reduction would help to lessen an anticipated shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel during full mobilization.

Reductions at the MAC aerial ports

Overall, aerial port staffing requirements were derived by applying MAC's computerized personnel standards to planned wartime workloads. Personnel reductions are based upon the transfer of planned wartime workload from MAC aerial ports to the CRAF terminals. A comparison of our estimate of total transferable workload and the related personnel reductions for each of the first two 30-day periods of the wartime plan with that of the Air Force is shown below.

	First 30-day period		Second 30-day period	
	Air Force	GAO	Air Force	GAO
CRAF flights transferred	836	399	1,076	665
Cargo transferred (tons)	17,295	32,060	29,406	40,741
Aerial port personnel reduction	a/394	479	a/636	573

a/These are the numbers shown in the Air Force study. However, since preparation of the Air Force study, MAC has changed the computer program by which it determines staffing requirements. Application of the new program to the Air Force and GAO estimates of transferable workloads are included in app. IV. Air Force estimates of possible personnel reductions are changed to 264 for the first 30-day period, and 406 for the second 30-day period.

The above differences in transferable workload resulted from different methods of computation used by GAO and the Air Force. (See app. III.) The major reasons for differences are:

--The Air Force overstated the number of transferable flights by assuming that all CRAF cargo flights would be transferred from MAC aerial ports to commercial ports. It did not relate these flights to the quantity of cargo which could be transferred. Our estimate included only those flights required to transport transferable cargo.

--The Air Force assumed that only resupply cargo programed for CRAF aircraft could be transferred to commercial ports. We assumed that all commercially compatible resupply cargo, including that programed for MAC aircraft, could be transferred to commercial ports and moved on CRAF aircraft.

--GAO included workloads from two ports not included by the Air Force.

Although the transferable workload and related reductions in staff are greater during the second 30-day mobilization period than the first, the Air Force assumed that only the lesser number of personnel (394) could be eliminated from the total force. However, we found that the total workload and overall staffing requirements are

substantially less during the first 30-day period than during the second. Therefore, even if the 573 positions that can be eliminated from the peak overall staffing requirements during the second period were eliminated immediately, the remaining personnel would be sufficient to meet first period requirements.

Requirements for military liaison

The need for 334 military liaison positions cited in the Air Force study was based on a standard position-staffing formula. MAC assumed that, with minor variations at some locations, for 24-hour coverage two military aerial port management personnel to perform management liaison functions, and nine air traffic personnel to perform liaison functions on the working level would be required for each CRAF-operated cargo terminal at each of eight civil ports MAC expected to use. In applying this formula, MAC gave little consideration to the amount of cargo that would be transferred to the civil ports or the number of carriers' terminals which would be used.

MAC's application of the formula results in distortions. For example, MAC showed a requirement for 55 liaison personnel at Los Angeles International Airport to handle flights transferred from Norton AFB. However, we found that only four flights could be transferred during the first 60 days of the plan. In contrast, the total aerial port staff at Norton AFB during this period would be only 36.

Although the above is an extreme example, we believe that liaison requirements were generally overstated. Considering port capabilities and MAC requirements, MAC would not need all eight ports shown in its study. In our opinion, CRAF operations would be required at only five commercial ports. (See apps. V and VI.) Furthermore, we do not believe a liaison team would be needed at each cargo terminal within a commercial port. Since a centralized receiving point would be required at each civil port, only one liaison team per port would be required. We could not evaluate the team size because we were not able to determine the specific duties of the liaison personnel. However, assuming that the Air Force's 11-man team concept was accurate, the total requirement for liaison personnel would be 59. Comparing this figure to the 573 positions which we estimate could be eliminated at the MAC aerial ports indicates that a net saving of more than 500 positions might be possible rather than the 60 positions claimed by the Air Force.

Shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel

Although the MAC aerial port positions discussed in this report are generally reserve positions and do not cost as much as active duty personnel, a reduction in personnel requirements would benefit the Air Force in other ways. During our review, Air Force officials told us that they were having difficulties in recruiting reserve aerial port personnel. As of September 1976, MAC's reserve aerial port squadrons were more than 900 personnel below authorized strength. Although sufficient reserve personnel should be available to meet the requirements of a nonmobilization contingency, MAC's present overall staff would not meet the requirements for full mobilization. We believe, however, that use of CRAF terminals would help reduce this shortfall.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF CRAF PORTS

The Air Force assessment cited a number of operational problems and inefficiencies which would result from the use of CRAF ports. These problems were in the areas of:

1. Split operations between military and CRAF aerial ports.

2. Changes to established supply-distribution patterns.

3. Allocation and control of workloads at CRAF ports.

4. Interface of military and commercial documentation procedures.

We recognize these problems and inefficiencies, but we believe the major problems cited could be overcome with advance planning.

Split operations

The Air Force correctly pointed out that some wartime military cargo would require handling techniques which vary considerably from those of commercial operations. Commercial airlines generally lack the training, facilities, and equipment to handle the military's oversized and hazardous cargo which would still have to move through the MAC aerial ports. Data recently developed by MAC indicates that about

46 and 61 percent of the resupply and JCS-assured cargo moving during the first and second 30-day periods, respectively, of the wartime plan falls into one of these special handling categories. The remaining 54 and 39 percent would be nonhazardous, general bulk cargo which could be carried on CRAF aircraft operating through commercial ports.

The Air Force also pointed out that split operations would result in inefficiency due to (1) a need for rerouting LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS operations to include the civil ports and (2) a lack of bulk cargo at MAC aerial ports to mix as filler cargo with oversized shipments. LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS are domestic contract cargo airlift systems operated by the Air Force and the Navy, respectively, between various military installations, including industrial and supply activities and MAC aerial ports.

In contrast, we were told by shipper service control office personnel responsible for routing shipments into the aerial ports, that only a small portion of th total cargo introduced into the MAC system arrives at MAC ports via LOGAIR or QUICKTRANS. Most cargo is shipped to the ports by commercial service. Although our observations confirm this, we did not study it in detail.

Although some loss of efficiency might occur from MAC aerial ports not having all of the bulk cargo to mix with its oversized cargo, hazardous and other special handling bulk cargo would still move through the MAC ports and be available as filler.

Changes to supply distribution patterns

The Air Force stated that as a result of split operations, new supply distribution patterns would have to be developed, and detailed shipping and routing instructions disseminated to the many military and commercial shippers which ship cargo to the MAC aerial ports. They contended that the resulting confusion among the shippers regarding the proper port for their cargo could cause delays in delivering critical supplies to the combat zone.

Officials of the Army, Navy, and Air Force shipper service control offices, who perform the air clearance function and provide routing instructions for their respective services, told us that changes which occur to the supply distribution pattern would cause some problems

but these problems could be overcome by advance planning. For them to do this planning, MAC would have to tell them which civilian ports to use for specific overseas destinations and advise them of any restrictions on cargo moving through these ports. Officials said that all necessary planning done in advance would enable them to implement these plans with a minimum of disruption.

Allocation and control of workloads at CRAF ports

The Air Force asserted that a central receiving point would be required at the CRAF ports because most civil airports consist of multiple cargo facilities. From this central receiving point, some of the cargo would have to be moved to other terminals for consolidating, palletizing, and loading. The Air Force contended that this multiple handling would result in inherent inefficiencies that would add to the intransit time of cargo. The Air Force also stated that allocation and control of workload within an airport would be an extensive management challenge requiring the senior lodger to establish a central cargo control and movement agency.

Although it is true that civil aerial ports generally have multiple cargo facilities operated by different carriers and a central receiving point for military cargo would be desirable, we believe the Air Force is overstating the problem of operating under such a concept. Based upon the cargo processing capacity reported to us by the CRAF carriers and our estimates of volumes of military cargo that could be rerouted, we do not believe that all CRAF cargo terminals at each civilian aerial port would have to be used. By using only those terminal facilities which are required, the need for moving cargo within the port would be reduced.

Furthermore, CRAF carrier officials informed us that the inefficiencies and delays associated with a central receiving point should be minimal because the commercial airlines now handle interline cargo transfers on a regular basis and are used to moving shipments between terminals within the airport.

Documentation interface

The Air Force stated that military supply and documentation is standardized within DOD under Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures to facilitate the delivery of cargo and provide a level of control and intransit visibility over en route cargo. CRAF carriers

would be receiving cargo documented under these procedures for which they would be required to provide receipt, processing, and lift data. Under large volume operations, this can only be done efficiently with automated data processing systems. The Air Force stated that data systems and documentation vary from carrier to carrier and, as presently structured, do not interface with the military system.

While commercial airlines require control and intransit visibility for cargo moving in their commercial systems, not all carriers have automated systems for maintaining this control. Carrier officials informed us that their systems, as presently designed, could not directly interface with the DOD system. They believe, however, that visibility and control could be maintained without a direct interface between the DOD and commercial system through cross-referencing.

We recognize that documentation is an essential part of the DOD system and believe that either of two basic alternatives could resolve the military and commercial documentation interface problem.

--The Air Force, in its assessment, proposed positioning two minicomputers (one as a backup) at each CRAF port with a direct link to the central computer at MAC headquarters. Several carriers also proposed that MAC position a remote terminal at each senior lodger cargo facility with direct lines to the MAC central computer. MAC officials stated, however, that this would require expansion of their central computer capability as they are presently capable of receiving data from only 10 aerial ports.

--Several CRAF airlines proposed that since commercial airlines maintain the same degree of cargo visibility and control as MAC, MAC develop a cross-referencing system between the military transportation control number and the waybill number used by airlines. Hard copies of shipment receipt and lift data could be sent to MAC headquarters or nearby MAC aerial ports for input to the MAC computer. This would provide MAC with the required shipment status data while the airlines could retain their own responsibility and control for shipments. This approach would require additional MAC personnel to process the data received from the CRAF ports.

ADEQUACY OF MAC QUESTIONNAIRES

At the request of the Committee, we reviewed the MAC questionnaire which was used to solicit CRAF terminal capability information and the CRAF responses to the questionnaire. Because of limitations of the questionnaire and CRAF's limited response to it, MAC was unable to use it to measure CRAF terminal capability.

Instead of contacting all CRAF carriers, MAC sent the questionnaire to only the senior lodgers of the aerial ports they considered using. Each senior lodger was asked to provide detailed information on carrier operations, available terminal equipment, and work crews for all CRAF carriers at the aerial ports.

Only four of the eight senior lodgers provided any of the requested data. Of these four, only one attempted to answer MAC's detailed questions on operations and availability of equipment and crews for all CRAF carriers at its airport. Carrier officials told us the MAC questionnaire was too detailed, would have required extensive work on their part to complete, and would not have provided MAC with data to assess their cargo processing capability.

Due to the lack of CRAF officials' response, MAC used data obtained from other sources to estimate the CRAF carriers' terminal capability.

AIR FORCE OFFICIALS' COMMENTS AND GAO'S EVALUATION

We did not obtain formal written comments on our report but did discuss the results of our evaluation in some detail with Air Force officials. While these officials did not seek to defend the specific figures in their study, they again expressed the opinion that the potential advantages of using commercial air terminals for wartime resupply cargo would be outweighed by difficulties in managing the timely movement of the cargo diverted to these civil terminals.

Air Force officials expressed concern that a switch to commercial air cargo terminals in the early days of a war would create confusion which would delay the delivery of vitally needed high priority supplies. First, they stated that most of the CRAF aircraft would initially be used for combat force deployment direct from military bases and that the timing for diverting the growing air resupply flow from the MAC aerial ports to the civil terminals would have to

be timed to match the changing availability of aircraft to move the cargo. Second, they were concerned that since only general bulk cargo would go to the civil terminals, with hazardous and oversize cargo continuing to go to military ports, some of this high-priority cargo would be misrouted because hundreds or thousands of shippers would be required to follow new instructions.

The problem of shippers attempting to follow new instructions is greatly overstated. Each service has a shipper service control office that is responsible for clearing shipments for air movement and for providing routing instructions for such shipments. The problem of rerouting shipments from MAC to commercial aerial ports based upon availability of aircraft or type of cargo is one of coordination between MAC and the three control offices.

Although the problem of delayed deliveries resulting from misroutings was raised in the Air Force study, we found that it had not discussed the problem with shipper service control office personnel. These personnel informed us that they receive advance information on all air shipments before they leave the shipper and that, if preparations were made in advance, all shipments could be rerouted from MAC to commercial aerial ports with a minimum of disruption.

Air Force officials believe that the problems of revised routings and changing priorities, inherent in any wartime resupply operation, would require considerably more military management at each civil terminal used than that which the GAO review had assumed. While the Air Force agreed that the 334 liaison figure included in their study was overstated, they maintained that a team would be required at each CRAF carrier's facility within the aerial port to perform liaison functions, including documentation processing. They stated that our estimate of 59 liaison personnel was too low.

Although we agree there is a need for having military representatives at the commercial ports, we believe the liaison function could be carried on much more effectively by working through the central receiving points. Furthermore, based on the amount of cargo transferable and the commercial capability available, it appears that only two terminal facilities would be needed at two commercial ports, and only one facility at the other three ports. Thus, even if a multiple team concept were adopted, only seven teams would be involved, with no more than 81 liaison personnel being required.

Air Force officials stated that as the number of airfields used for resupply increases, it will become more difficult to maintain both a high flying hour rate and high load factors for all military and civil aircraft used.

As discussed earlier in our report, dividing cargo operations between MAC and commercial aerial ports could adversely affect the load factors on MAC aircraft due to the lesser amounts of bulk resupply cargo available at MAC aerial ports for use as filler on MAC flights. However, some bulk resupply cargo would not be commercially compatible and so would be moved through MAC aerial ports and be available as filler. With regard to flying-hour rates, contrary to the concern expressed by the Air Force, CRAF carriers believe that they could increase the flying-hour rates for their aircraft if they were operating through commercial aerial ports with readily available commercial service facilities. Furthermore, it appears that reduced congestion at the MAC aerial ports should facilitate improved utilization of MAC aircraft as well.

Air Force officials believe that some of the CRAF carriers' estimates of surge capability presented in appendix II may be overstated.

While we did not verify the figures supplied to us by the carriers, we reviewed them and in each case checked back with the carrier to determine their reasonableness. Furthermore, if use of CRAF terminal facilities is delayed until full mobilization, surge capability becomes largely a meaningless question as substantially more capability would be available due to withdrawing CRAF-committed aircraft from commercial cargo operations.

Air Force officials doubted that withdrawal of long-range cargo aircraft committed to MAC during a full CRAF activation would curtail the carriers' commercial cargo operations. They believe that much domestic commercial cargo would continue to move in short-range aircraft or in the lower compartments of passenger aircraft.

While it is true that some domestic commercial cargo would continue to move, it should be noted that much of the terminal capability shown in appendix II is provided by carriers which have little or no domestic passenger traffic and have committed virtually all of their cargo aircraft to MAC.

Carriers who operate domestically informed us that if CRAF were activated, their commercial operations would be sharply curtailed. In summary, there appears to be little doubt that sufficient terminal capability would be available to handle any rerouted MAC cargo.

CONCLUSIONS

CRAF carriers possess a substantial cargo processing capability which could be made available to MAC during all stages of contingency operations. Use of the CRAF terminal facilities and personnel during full mobilization could enable MAC to reduce its maximum aerial port staffing requirement by several hundred personnel which would help to reduce a shortfall in reserve strength.

Using CRAF facilities during full mobilization would also permit some carriers to continue operating facilities which they might otherwise have to either close or curtail because of the commitment of their cargo aircraft to CRAF.

In summary, under the planning concepts presently used by MAC, all cargo for both MAC and CRAF aircraft must move through MAC aerial terminals. Under this concept, the present reserve requirements seem valid.

However, we believe that MAC could reduce its reliance on reserves if it made the plans and studies necessary to use both the MAC and CRAF aerial cargo terminals. This would not only reduce the requirement for and cost of reserves but would also add the commercial cargo terminals to the military base capability of the Nation. Since there is no guarantee that a potential enemy would not attempt to neutralize MAC's terminals in time of conflict, planning to use the commercial terminals would give MAC alternatives not presently available.

As this report points out, there are problems involved in integrating the commercial terminals into the MAC system. Documentation and computer-compatible data would have to be developed. Cargo routing instructions and patterns would have to be changed and handling procedures between different carriers' facilities at the same terminal would have to be worked out. Procedures for assuring the best cargo mix between the MAC and commercial terminals to maximize aircraft utilization would also have to be worked out. We believe, however, that studies and planning, proven by a live test of the use of commercial terminals, would pay off.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above, we recommend that the Committee direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use CRAF cargo terminal facilities.

Until such plans and testing are completed, we believe that if the Congress were to reduce the current reserve authorizations, MAC, restricted by its plans to use only its own terminals, may not meet its airlift requirements for full mobilization.

CHAPTER 3

RESERVE AERIAL PORT SQUADRONS COULD BE ACTIVATED UNDER PUBLIC LAW 94-286

The Committee specifically asked us to inquire into the extent that reserve aerial port squadrons were considered by the Air Force and the Department of Defense when Public Law 94-286 was being formulated. Although reserve aerial port squadrons were not cited in material obtained from DOD, Air Force and DOD officials informed us that they consider reserve aerial port squadrons available for activation under Public Law 94-286.

Public Law 94-286 is an act which enables the President to activate up to 50,000 reservists for up to 90 days without declaring a national emergency. The law is an essential element in the "Total Force Policy" which dictates that all available forces--active and reserve--be considered in meeting future contingencies. The law enables the President to increase active forces during a crisis without the national and international implications of declaring a national emergency.

In testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense and other DOD officials stated that the augmentation of strategic airlift forces was a good example of the intended use of this law. A booklet, prepared in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, cited examples of the reserve forces which might be activated under this law. Among the many examples it cites strategic airlift forces and states

> "* * * mobilization of 2,500 Associate Unit Reservists (4 squadrons and maintenance personnel) would allow the C-5 force to surge to 10 hours per day. This would be a significant factor in a major resupply effort."

Reserve aerial port personnel were neither included in strategic airlift forces nor mentioned among the other examples in this booklet. However, the official who prepared the booklet told us the examples cited were not intended to be all inclusive. He and other DOD officials stated that under this law, DOD wanted and obtained complete flexibility to activate any units required to meet an emergency. They stated that reserve aerial port squadrons could

be activated under this law. A MAC official stated that, under this law, they expect reserve aerial port personnel to be available for contingency operations.

Due to the availability of reserve aerial port personnel, CRAF cargo terminal facilities apparently would not be needed until full mobilization.

CHAPTER 4

ADJUSTMENT TO PEACETIME STAFFING FIGURES IN EARLIER GAO REPORT

On February 2, 1976, we transmitted to the Committee our evaluation of an Air Force study entitled "Air Force Analysis of Aerial Port Manpower Requirements." We reported that the overall requirement for 7,232 active duty military and civilian personnel cited in the study exceeded by 1,727 the 5,505 personnel we considered sufficient to handle peacetime workload. As a result of our evaluation, the Committee eliminated 1,700 positions from the aerial ports.

Since reporting to the Committee, we have met with Air Force officials on several occasions, at their request, to further clarify differences between our requirement figures and theirs. These meetings have shown a need for certain adjustments to the peacetime staffing figure in our February 1976 report.

Adjustments are necessary in order to eliminate certain positions included in the Air Force study and in our requirement figures, which are properly chargeable to base transportation management offices rather than to aerial ports, and to reinstate certain data and records processing positions which were mistakenly omitted from the aerial port at Charleston AFB. The required adjustments are reflected in the following table.

Peacetime staffing of 21 aerial ports per GAO report of February 2, 1976	5,505
Additional data and records processing positions for Charleston AFB	33
Less transportation management office positions	-432
Total adjusted staffing of 21 aerial ports	5,106

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

During our meetings Air Force officials also mentioned several peacetime staffing requirements which were not included in the Air Force study submitted to the Committee or in our evaluation. The functions and the Air Force's estimate of required staffing are as follows:

Staffing of 31 en route and other locations not reflected in study	350
Average personnel on temporary duty away from home base in support of JCS exercises	143
Personnel required for increased anti-hijacking surveillance	250
	743

The Air Force justification for these positions and our comments follow.

Staffing of en route locations

The 350 personnel, including 135 personnel at Scott AFB, Illinois, are generally stationed at locations other than the 21 strategic aerial ports covered by the Air Force study and our evaluation. Although there appears to be little doubt that staffing is required at these locations, we were told that staffing standards are generally unavailable and so we did not attempt to evaluate the stated requirements. A detailed listing of positions by location was provided by the Air Force and is included as appendix VII.

Temporary duty personnel

Air Force officials told us that during calendar year 1975 an average of 143 aerial port personnel were away from their bases in support of MAC and JCS exercises. (See app. VIII.) While we believe temporary duty demands constitute a valid personnel requirement, because of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the fall and evacuation of Vietnam and their impact on temporary duty personnel, we question the validity of 1975 as a representative period upon which to base staffing requirements.

We believe that any additional personnel intended to reflect temporary duty requirements should be based on a more representative time period.

Anti-hijack personnel

As a result of acts of terrorism at civil airports, such as the bomb explosion incident at La Guardia Airport, the Air Force has increased terminal security at all MAC aerial ports with a resulting increased requirement for personnel.

(See app. IX.) While we do not question the need for security at the aerial ports, review of readily available data indicates that the staffing requirements cited by the Air Force for some locations are unreasonably high.

For example, Air Force officials told us they needed 30 positions at each of the three major passenger terminals in the United States--Travis AFB, McGuire AFB, and Charleston AFB. This level of staffing, requiring 81 additional positions to the 9 positions included in the Air Force study, would be needed to operate two baggage-X-ray machines 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, we noted that during fiscal year 1975, each of these terminals handled the equivalent of only 2 or 3 originating passenger flights a day.

Based on the above, we believe the Air Force should reassess the number of positions it needs for anti-hijacking protection.

APPENDIX I

SCHEDULE OF CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT COMMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL CRAF AS OF JUNE 30, 1976

Carrier	Aircraft (note a)	Type (note b)	Number of aircraft at stage I	II	III
Airlift International	DC-8-54F	V	2	2	2
	DC-8-63F	V	1	2	3
			3	4	5
Alaska Airlines	B727C	V	-	-	4
American Airlines	B707-323C	C	-	-	11
	B707-323C	V	-	-	3
	B747-100F	C	-	-	1
	B747-100	P	-	-	6
			-	-	21
Braniff Airways	DC-8-62F	V	-	-	1
	B747A	P	-	-	1
	B727C	V	-	-	4
			-	-	6
Capitol International Airways	DC-8-63F	V	2	2	2
Continental Air Lines	DC-10-10CF	V	-	-	8
Eastern Air Lines	B727C	V	-	-	23
The Flying Tiger Line	DC-8-63F	V	11	11	11
	DC-8-63F	C	-	6	6
	B747-100F	C	-	-	3
			11	17	20
Northwest Airlines	B707-351C	V	2	3	3
	B747-51	P	4	7	15
	DC-10-40	P	2	4	12
	B747F	C	2	3	3
			10	17	33

APPENDIX I

Carrier	Aircraft (note a)	Type (note b)	Number of aircraft at stage I	II	III
Overseas National Airways	DC-8-63F	V	1	1	3
	DC-8-61F	V	2	2	2
			3	3	5
Pan American World Airways	B707-321C	V	5	5	5
	B707-321C	C	5	10	10
	B707-321B/C	P	1	2	7
	B747-21	P	7	13	30
	B747-100F	C	1	1	1
	B727C	V	-	-	2
			19	31	55
Seaboard World Airlines	DC-8-55F	V	1	1	1
	DC-8-63F	V	2	5	7
	DC-8-61F	V	3	3	3
	B-747-200F	C	2	2	2
			8	11	13
Trans International Airlines	DC-8-61CF	V	-	2	2
	DC-8-63F	V	1	3	6
	DC-10-30CF	V	3	3	3
			4	8	11
Trans World Airlines	B707-331C	C	-	-	15
	B707-331B	P	-	-	3
	B-747	P	-	-	10
			-	-	28
United Air Lines	DC-8-54F	C	-	-	15
	B747-22	P	-	-	7
			-	-	22
Western Air Lines	B707-300C	V	-	-	1

APPENDIX I

Carrier	Aircraft (note a)	Type (note b)	Number of aircraft at stage I	II	III
World Airways	DC-8-63F	V	-	3	5
	B747	V	2	2	2
	B727C	V	-	-	2
			2	5	9
Total 17 carriers			62	98	266

a/All aircraft shown are long range types except the B727C.

b/Symbols shown for type aircraft are as follows: C = cargo; P = passenger; and V = convertible.

APPENDIX II

CARRIER ESTIMATES OF THEIR CARGO

TERMINAL SURGE CAPABILITY (tons per month)

Carrier	New York	Chicago	San Francisco	Miami	Seattle
Airlift International					
Maximum capability	5,000	1,875	2,813	3,750	-
Current workload	2,500	750	1,250	2,250	-
Surge capability	2,500	1,125	1,563	1,500	-
American Airlines					
Maximum capability	13,652	12,711	15,162	-	-
Current workload	13,138	9,322	9,368	-	-
Surge capability	514	3,389	5,794	-	-
Continental Air Lines					
Maximum capability	-	1,550	320	1,100	2,665
Current workload	-	1,072	215	679	1,705
Surge capability	-	478	105	421	960
Eastern Air Lines					
Maximum capability	3,336	1,822	-	3,523	-
Current workload	2,566	1,458	-	3,203	-
Surge capability	770	364	-	320	-
Flying Tiger					
Maximum capability	7,176	7,688	7,161	-	4,551
Current workload	4,600	4,300	3,900	-	2,400
Surge capability	2,576	3,388	3,261	-	2,151
Northwest Airlines					
Maximum capability	8,110	4,020	950	1,180	9,800
Current workload	4,050	4,020	475	590	4,900
Surge capability	4,060	0	475	590	4,900

APPENDIX II

Carrier	New York	Chicago	San Francisco	Miami	Seattle
Pan American World Airways					
Maximum capability	18,750	850	3,225	3,000	525
Current workload	10,000	750	2,150	2,400	300
Surge capability	8,750	100	1,075	600	225
Seaboard World Airlines					
Maximum capability	12,000	1,500	1,500	-	-
Current workload	8,000	376	255	-	-
Surge capability	4,000	1,124	1,245	-	-
Trans World Airlines					
Maximum capability	7,000	6,250	5,200	-	-
Current workload	7,000	5,000	4,000	-	-
Surge capability	0	1,250	1,200	-	-
United Air Lines					
Maximum capability	7,500	24,000	10,500	-	3,520
Current workload	6,000	22,000	9,500	-	3,000
Surge capability	1,500	2,000	1,000	-	520
Total capability	82,524	62,266	46,831	12,553	21,061
Current workloads	57,854	49,048	31,113	9,122	12,305
Surge capability	24,670	13,218	15,718	3,431	8,756

APPENDIX III

COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES USED BY MAC AND GAO TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF CRAF FLIGHTS AND QUANTITIES OF CARGO TRANSFERABLE TO CRAF TERMINALS

The basis for both analyses was a 1974 classified MAC Wartime Aerial Port Manpower requirements study of the JCS workloads for a conventional-type war in Europe. From this report, the following data for each MAC aerial port was used to determine transferable workload: total number of flights by CRAF aircraft; total number of passengers to be processed; and total quantities of cargo by initial deployments, resupply, retrograde, and JSC-assured.

MAC	GAO
Step 1. Determine the number of cargo flights.	Step 1. Determine the number of CRAF cargo flights.
a. As all pasengers are expected to move aboard CRAF aircraft, MAC divided the total passengers for each port by 337--the weighted average seating capacity for passenger aircraft committed to CRAF. This gives the number of flights needed to carry passengers.	a. Same as MAC.
b. Based on their interpretation of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 76-2, MAC applied a 75-percent utilization factor to the passenger flights and thereby increased the number of flights required to carry the given number of passengers.	b. Air Force Regulation 76-2 states that, for planning purposes, a 75-percent factor will be applied to the maximum Aircraft Cabin Load of "floor loaded cargo aircraft." This 75 percent factor was intended for passenger flights so we did not apply it to our data. Furthermore, in this plan of mass troop movements, we cannot envision these aircraft moving with only 75 percent of their capacity used.
c. The difference between the total CRAF flights scheduled for a port and the number of passenger flights required by step 1, (b) gives the number of CRAF cargo flights available.	c. Same as MAC except we determined the number of passenger flights required by step 1, (a).
d. MAC used this figure for the number of CRAF cargo flights that could be transferred.	d. As this number of flights is not related to the amount of cargo to be transferred, we computed the CRAF flights transferred as shown in step 2.

APPENDIX III

MAC	GAO
Step 2. Determine the amount of cargo that could be transferred to CRAF terminals (MAC assumed that only bulk resupply, retrograde, and JCS-assured cargo could be transferred).	Step 2. Determine the amount of cargo that could be transferred to CRAF terminals. (We assumed that only bulk resupply, retrograde, and JCS-assured cargo could be transferred.)
a. Using the average palletized payload factors for CRAF aircraft in AFR 76-2, MAC determined a weighted average payload per CRAF cargo flight based on the CRAF inventory.	a. To separate totals of resupply (including JCS-assured) and retrograde, we applied a factor of 54 and 39 percent for the first and second 30-day periods, respectively, to determine the amount of bulk, nonhazardous resupply cargo. a/ This gives the amount of cargo that could be transferred to the CRAF terminals.
b. This weighted average multiplied by the number of flights determined in step 1, (c). gives the cargo capability of all CRAF cargo flights.	b. We divided the resupply cargo that could be transferred to the CRAF terminals by a weighted average payload per CRAF flight--determined in the same manner as MAC step 2, (a)--to give the number of CRAF flights needed to carry this cargo.
c. MAC assumed that both MAC and CRAF aircraft would be carrying resupply cargo. Therefore, they applied a factor (based on the percentage of resupply--including retrograde and JCS-assured--to total port cargo) to the capability developed in step 2, (b). This gave the amount of cargo MAC assumed would be carried on CRAF aircraft and could be transferred to CRAF ports.	c. We then checked the number of cargo flights needed against the number of cargo flights available--as determined in step 1, (c)--to see that sufficient flights were available. As the total of available flights exceeded the total required flights for transferable cargo, we assumed that all nonhazardous bulk resupply and retrograde cargo could be transferred. b/

a/These were the best estimates that MAC could provide to us and are based on 1976 JCS planning documents which MAC is currently analyzing.

b/For three ports during the second 30-day period only, the required flights exceeded the available flights. However, as the total available exceeded the total required, we assumed that some flights could be rerouted to these ports.

COMPARISON OF MAC-AND GAO-COMPUTED

WORKLOADS TRANSFERABLE FROM EACH MAC PORT (FIRST 30 DAYS)

MAC aerial port	Number of flights transferred			Tons of cargo transferred			Manpower savings		
	MAC	GAO	Difference	MAC	GAO	Difference	MAC	GAO	Difference
Charleston AFB, South Carolina	106	102	-4	2,155	8,982	6,827	32	133	101
Dover AFB, Delaware	623	165	-458	11,793	14,165	2,372	147	181	34
McChord AFB, Washington	13	49	36	888	2,565	1,677	14	37	23
McGuire AFB, New Jersey (note a)	-	11	11	-	564	564	-	9	9
Norton AFB, California	2	2	-	84	84	-	36	36	-
Scott AFB, Illinois (note b)	-	45	45	-	4,095	4,095	-	59	59
Travis AFB, California	92	25	-67	2,375	1,605	-770	35	24	-11
	836	399	-437	17,295	32,060	14,765	264	479	215

a/The MAC study indicated that the number of flights scheduled for McGuire AFB far exceeded those needed for the given workload. As MAC was unable to account for this situation, it did not transfer any of the McGuire AFB workload.

b/Scott AFB is not presently functioning as a MAC port of embarkation. Therefore, MAC did not include Scott AFB in its study. However, the MAC Wartime Aerial Port Manpower Requirements Study shows cargo moving through Scott AFB. As Scott AFB is not a supply center, we transferred the planned Scott AFB wartime resupply workload.

APPENDIX IV

COMPARISON OF MAC-AND GAO-COMPUTED

WORKLOADS TRANSFERABLE FROM EACH MAC PORT (SECOND 30 DAYS)

MAC aerial port	Number of flights transferred			Tons of cargo transferred			Manpower savings		
	MAC	GAO	Difference	MAC	GAO	Difference	MAC	GAO	Difference
Charleston AFB, South Carolina	31	77	46	1,010	4,752	3,742	15	76	61
Dover AFB, Delaware	900	375	-525	24,149	23,218	-931	296	284	-12
McChord AFB, Washington	17	29	12	666	1,494	828	8	21	13
McGuire AFB, New Jersey	-	3	3	-	161	161	-	3	3
Norton AFB, California	2	2	-	84	84	-	36	36	-
Scott AFB, Illinois	-	115	115	-	7,144	7,144	-	96	96
Travis AFB, California	126	64	-62	3,497	3,888	391	51	57	6
	1,076	665	-411	29,406	40,741	11,335	406	573	167

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX V

COMPARISON OF CARGO TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM MAC AERIAL PORTS WITH CAPABILITIES OF NEARBY CRAF PORTS

MAC aerial port	Cargo (tons) to be transferred First 30 days	Second 30 days	CRAF port to which transferred	Cargo surge capability of CRAF port (tons per month)
Dover AFB, Delaware	14,165	23,218	New York	
McGuire AFB, New Jersey	564	161	New York	
	14,729	23,379		24,670
Norton AFB, California	84	84	San Francisco	
Travis AFB, California	1,605	3,888	San Francisco	
	1,689	3,972		15,718
McChord AFB, Washington	2,565	1,494	Seattle	8,756
Scott AFB, Illinois	4,095	7,144	Chicago	13.218
Charleston AFB, South Carolina	8,982	4,752	Miami	a/3,431

a/While the surge capability of 3,431 tons per month does not equal the tonnages transferred, the maximum capability of CRAF carriers at Miami is 12,553 tons per month which exceeds the tonnage transferred.

APPENDIX VI

COMPARISON OF AIR FORCE- AND GAO-DETERMINED REQUIREMENT FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL

CRAF port	Air Force	GAO	Difference
New York	55	11	-44
Miami	29	11	-18
Boston	20	-	-20
Dulles International, Washington	10	-	-10
Seattle	66	11	-55
San Francisco	66	11	-55
Baltimore-Washington	29	-	-29
Los Angeles	55	-	-55
Chicago	-	11	11
MAC (note a)	4	4	-
Total	334	59	-275

a/MAC authorized two liaison positions each, for the 21st and 22d Air Forces under its command.

APPENDIX VII

AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF

STRATEGIC AERIAL PORT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

AT OTHER THAN MAIN AERIAL PORTS

REQUIREMENT: Listed below are locations other than main strategic aerial ports where aerial port operations and terminal services functions for movement of personnel, cargo, and equipment; aeromedical airlift support; and coordination of airlift operations in Europe and the Pacific are performed. Scope of functions vary from supervision of MAC-controlled terminal services and surveillance of commercial contracts to the full operation of small air terminal operations. Requirements listed below are associated with peacetime readiness support at each location.

Location	Requirement	Location	Requirement
Addis Ababa	2	Naples	3
Altus	13	Pago Pago	1
Aviano	14	Pisa	4
Beirut	2	Prestwick	12
Buckley	2	Ramstein (note a)	8
Christchurch	2	Rhein Main (note a)	32
Cubi Point	1	Richmond	5
Dhahran	5	Rota	5
Eielson	12	Scott (note b)	135
Galena	3	Shemya	5
Hickam (note a)	12	Sigonella	2
Howard	11	Taegu	11
Johnston Island	1	Taipei	13
Kelly	2	Tehran	5
Kwan Ju	8		
Kunsan	17	Total	350
Maxwell	2		

a/Spaces not directly collocated with Strategic Aerial Ports at listed locations. Spaces at Hickam are assigned to the 61st Airlift Support Wing and are required for coordination of aerial port operations in the Pacific Theater. Spaces at Ramstein and Rhein Main are assigned to the 435th Airlift Wing and are required for coordination of aerial port operations in the European Theater.

b/A 24-hour air terminal operation is necessary due to basing C-9 air evacuation and administrative support fleet at Scott. Included in the 135 staffing requirement are 65 for the passenger reservation center, 38 for servicing the air evacuation and administrative support aircraft, and 32 in air terminal services and records.

AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF STAFFING FOR OFF-STATION SUPPORT OF MAC/JCS EXERCISES

REQUIREMENT: During calendar year 1975, an average of 3,005 staffdays per month were used in support of Military Airlift Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises. This equates to an average of 143 personnel drawn from MAC strategic aerial ports which are required for off-station support for these exercises.

Location	Requirement
Andersen	2
Athens	2
Charleston	11
Clark	3
Dover	13
Elmendorf	3
Hickam	3
Incirlik	4
Kadena	7
McChord	15
McGuire	12
Mildenhall	1
Norton	18
Osan	4
Ramstein	2
Rhein Main	11
Torrejon	2
Travis	22
Yokota	8
Total	143

APPENDIX IX

AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF STAFFING FOR INCREASED ANTI-HIJACK AND TERMINAL SECURITY PROCEDURES AT STRATEGIC AERIAL PORTS

REQUIREMENT: Acts of terrorism at civil terminals, such as the La Guardia incident, have prompted the Military Airlift Command to increase terminal security procedures at all MAC aerial ports. This includes more thorough passenger and baggage screening procedures at all locations to include the use of X-ray equipment at most major strategic aerial ports.

Location	Requirement
Andersen	14
Athens	9
Charleston	28
Clark	12
Dover	4
Elmendorf	7
Hickam	11
Incirlik	9
Kadena	13
Lajes	5
McChord	14
McGuire	27
Mildenhall	8
Norton	13
Osan	9
Ramstein	10
Rhein Main	11
Torrejon	9
Travis	26
Yokota	11
Total	250