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Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

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For many years, the Army relied on the draft to acquire a large, continuing supply of new personnel. Since the draft ended, it has pursued an aggressive program to recruit volunteers, paying bonuses to enlistees for critically needed skills. Although the Army has shortages of enlisted personnel in critically needed skills, it has substantial numbers of individuals qualified in those skills. It has had problems in maintaining an inventory of personnel with skills to match its needs. The Army needs a workable system for distributing, assigning, using, and accounting for its personnel.

Findings/Conclusions: Army personnel management policies, regulations, and instructions need to be made more specific to guide officials at headquarters and field installations in attaining the most effective distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable. The Army's combat mission capability has priority, but its peacetime role and demands on personnel are important. Headquarters has not officially recognized that its personnel management policies and instructions must also serve peacetime needs. There is little or no peacetime need for some authorized positions in garrison, but some garrison needs that do exist are not always met. The personnel distribution and assignment system often does not get the right people to the right place at the right time. In the absence of standard procedures, each installation manager must, to some extent, apply his own techniques and judgment to the allocation of skilled personnel.

Recommendations: The Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army, should: designate a single authority to prescribe and enforce policies and regulations and to issue specific instructions to guide officials at all levels; develop techniques for managing

enlisted personnel by skill to provide more effective control over the acquisition, distribution, assignment, and use of personnel, determine whether the policy for the payment of enlistment bonuses is administered prudently; clarify criteria to be used in measuring personnel readiness; codify the personnel reporting system to provide realistic data for each individual; and direct audit, inspection, and other evaluation organizations to intensify their examination of and reporting on the effectiveness of personnel management. (RKS)

5434



**UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE**

**Management And Use Of
Army Enlisted Personnel--
What Needs To Be Done**

Personnel resources are at least as important as money and should be as prudently managed.

Although the Army has shortages of enlisted personnel with critically needed skills, it does have many who are qualified in these areas. The Army needs a working system for managing and using its people as effectively as practicable.

Much has been accomplished; much is still to be done.



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-146890

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report summarizes our review of the Army's management and use of enlisted personnel with critically needed skills. We have informally discussed our findings with Army officials at headquarters and at Fort Carson.

The report contains recommendations to you. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of the Army. Copies are also being sent to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the House Committee on Government Operations, and to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.

We wish to acknowledge the courtesy and cooperation extended by your staff to our representatives during the review.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. L. Krieger".

H. L. Krieger
Director

D I G E S T

For years the Army has tried to distribute and manage its available personnel to operate effectively in a continually changing and complex environment. Much has been accomplished; much more can be done.

The time is past when military personnel could be thought of as a free resource. In fiscal year 1978 the Army will employ approximately 687,000 enlisted personnel costing about \$5.6 billion. As with any resource, officials at each level should be responsible for the proper use of personnel in much the same manner as for the expenditure of appropriated funds.

Although the Army has shortages of enlisted personnel with critically needed skills, it has many who are qualified in those skills. To use these persons as effectively as practicable, a workable system for their management is needed.

The Army's combat mission capability has priority, but its peacetime role and demands on personnel are important. Headquarters has not officially recognized that its personnel management policies and instructions must also serve its peacetime needs. (See p. 20.)

While there is little or no peacetime need for some authorized positions in garrison, some garrison needs that do exist are not always met. (See p. 27.)

Enlisted personnel must demonstrate their job proficiency every 2 years by taking a skills qualification test. GAO found no criteria for determining the experience needed to maintain proficiency or for evaluating the quality of experience individuals acquire. (See pp. 29 and 30.)

Personnel readiness reports are based largely on the reported number of persons with authorized skills and not on actual current proficiency of persons in their skills. The criteria for measuring personnel readiness should be evaluated and clarified. (See pp. 30 to 32.)

Distribution controls do not assure that available personnel are sent where they are most needed. (See p. 5.) There are no uniform criteria and procedures for determining the personnel needs of the various installations. (See pp. 11 and 12.) Analysis of this distribution is needed. (See p. 8.)

The Army has not adequately controlled its personnel inventory. It allowed certain skills, once in short supply, to become surplus. These cannot always be used effectively. (See pp. 9 and 10.)

Despite a personnel surplus Army-wide and a shortage in some units, the Army does not require installations to report all surpluses, and it has no effective controls for reassignment where it is needed. (See p. 14.)

Selected recruits may have been paid unnecessary enlistment bonuses for special skills in which there were already surplus personnel. This practice may not be consistent with the objectives of the bonus authority. GAO estimates that in six skills the Army may have paid unnecessary bonus payments of more than \$9.6 million. (See p. 15.)

More specific management policies, regulations, and instructions are needed at all levels to help officials make the most effective distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable. A single authority should have this responsibility. (See pp. 33 and 34.)

Audits, inspections, and surveys have not adequately assured the accuracy of reports to Army Headquarters on personnel use. The Army Audit Agency, the Inspector General, and other evaluation organizations should examine how effectively enlisted personnel are managed and used and should identify areas in which improvements can be made. (See p. 17.)

GAO discussed its findings with officials of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Military Personnel Center, and Fort Carson, Colorado, and has considered their informal observations and comments in this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army:

- Designate a single authority to prescribe and enforce policies and regulations and to issue specific instructions to guide officials at all levels. Under these regulations and instructions, officials should be held accountable for attaining the most effective acquisition, distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable.
- Develop techniques for managing enlisted personnel by skill (military occupational specialty) to provide more effective control over the acquisition, distribution, assignment, and use of personnel and a more realistic determination of the number needed in each skill.
- Determine whether the Army's policies and practices for the payment of enlistment bonuses are administered prudently and in accordance with the intent of the Congress. The policies and practices of the other military services should also be examined.

- Clarify the criteria to be used in measuring personnel readiness.
- Modify the personnel reporting system to provide realistic data for each individual on jobs in which he actually works, experience obtained to maintain proficiency in his skill (military occupational specialty), and other data needed by management officials for realistic assessment of combat readiness.
- Direct audit, inspection, and other evaluation organizations to intensify their examination of and reporting on the effectiveness of enlisted personnel management and use and to identify areas in which improvements can be made.
- Incorporate these improvements into the Personnel Deployment and Distribution Management System now being developed. (See pp. 36 and 37.)

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ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Army regulation
CONUS	Continental United States
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DOD	Department of Defense
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GAO	General Accounting Office
MILPERCEN	Military Personnel Center
MOS	military occupational specialty
ODCSPER	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
SIDPERS	Standards installation/division personnel system
TOE	Table of organization and equipment

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 1978 the Army will employ an estimated 687,000 enlisted personnel costing about \$5.64 billion in pay and allowances. The Congress expressed its interest in the management and use of people employed in the military services in 10 U.S.C. 3062.

"It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of-

"(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

"(2) supporting the national policies."

In view of the importance of this issue, we have made several studies of the use of military manpower. In 1971 we reported on the improper use of Army personnel. In 1975 we reported on problems in the Army's personnel assignment and distribution system, essentially, that it was not getting the right people to the right place at the right time.

The need for improved manpower management and use of Army personnel was stressed by the Defense Manpower Commission in 1976. Also, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, testifying at hearings on Department of Defense appropriations for fiscal year 1976, said that as of February 1975, 7.5 percent of the Army's enlisted personnel were assigned to positions which did not match or did not require their skills. This raised questions about the effectiveness of the Army's assignment and distribution system, its personnel management information systems, and the validity of reports on the status of readiness of its forces.

Because of the continued indications of Army personnel management problems, we wanted to find how effectively the Army is accounting for its available enlisted military personnel with critically needed skills and if it is using them in positions essential to accomplishing its mission.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed personnel management policies and practices at Army headquarters (the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel and the Military Personnel Center) and one Forces Command field installation, Fort Carson, Colorado, where the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and tenant organizations are located. We limited this review to the management of personnel with skills which the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel had designated as critical skills isolated for special management attention and to positions requiring those skills.

CHAPTER 2

HEADQUARTERS MANAGEMENT OF

ENLISTED PERSONNEL CAN BE IMPROVED

The Army's goal is to train and assign the right person to the right job at the right time. The Army has shortages of enlisted personnel in critically needed skills essential to its mission, although it does have substantial numbers qualified in those skills. The Army can improve the distribution and use of its scarce personnel resources. Critically needed personnel are not always distributed in accordance with authorized plans, and even in the current peacetime environment, installations frequently do not receive persons with required skills and grades in a timely manner. Shortages of personnel qualified in critically needed skills, or military occupational specialties (MOSs), can have an adverse effect on units' readiness to perform their missions.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DISTRIBUTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) establishes Army policy and provides guidance on personnel acquisition, distribution, assignment, and utilization. Procedures for implementing them are published in Army regulations (AR). (See app. I.)

The responsibility for managing and using enlisted personnel is disseminated among many Army organizational elements. Closer coordination among these managers is needed to assure that critically needed personnel are accounted for, that their skills are used to the maximum extent practicable, and that they maintain their proficiency in positions essential to the Army's mission.

The Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) recommends and executes military personnel policies and develops and supervises military personnel management procedures. It manages the Army-wide distribution of military personnel and coordinates the planning for acquisition of personnel with the recruiting and training commands. No single section, branch, or division in MILPERCEN has overall responsibility for the effective utilization of all enlisted personnel. (See app. II.)

Army personnel management officials control the distribution and assignment of enlisted personnel through three

elements: the Army Authorization Documents System, the Master Priority List, and personnel requisitions.

--The Army Authorization Documents System, managed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, is

"* * * an automated system for developing and documenting organizational structures, requirements, and authorizations of personnel and equipment necessary to support the assigned missions of Army units."

* * * * *

Its "* * * data are essential for Army resources planning and management at all echelons. They are used in planning, programming, budgeting, procuring, training, distributing personnel and equipment, and as a base in reporting unit readiness."
(AR 310-49)

--The Department of the Army Master Priority List, prepared annually by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,

"* * * is to provide clear guidance for the allocation and distribution of resources and to assure that the management of critical resources is accomplished in a manner consistent with the overall mission and objectives of the Department of Army." (Chief of Staff Regulation 570-1)

--Personnel requisitions are prepared by commands, agencies, activities, or installations.

"A personnel requisition identifies a requirement for an individual in a grade and with specific skills needed at a designated place during a particular month.

"A personnel requirement exists when there is a known or projected vacancy against a position authorized * * *." (AR 614-200)

MILPERCEN uses the Personnel Structure and Composition report, incorporating data produced by the Army Authorization Document System, to establish the number of persons

with particular skills that can be assigned to an organization. This plan limits the number of personnel that should be distributed and assigned to an installation.

In our study of MILPERCEN's distribution of personnel, we noted problem areas in which we believe improvements can be made. These are discussed below.

DISTRIBUTION AND ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Under the personnel distribution and assignment system, Army field installations prepare and forward requisitions to MILPERCEN for personnel needed in a particular month. MILPERCEN installation managers validate the personnel requisitions to assure that persons were requested only for authorized positions. Validated requisitions are entered into a computerized system which is programed to nominate available individuals to fill authorized positions.

If there are not enough qualified personnel to fill the authorized positions, the computer system is programed to allocate the available personnel to requisitioning installations according to unit priorities. Persons with skills that have not been requisitioned, who are available and awaiting reassignment, are assigned manually with no assurance that unit priorities are followed. Career managers also manually assign available persons if they consider them to be better suited to the needs of particular installations than the persons nominated by the computer system.

The Army's inventory of personnel qualified in many skills does not meet the requirements defined by authorization documents. Headquarters activities lack effective controls to assure that available personnel are distributed effectively.

- Army regulations do not focus on critical skills. They do not provide, or require commanders at appropriate levels to apply, specific guidelines or procedures to assure that critically needed enlisted personnel are distributed and used as effectively as practicable.
- Distribution plans are not effectively implemented. Headquarters also lacks effective controls over the payment of bonuses to persons recruited for skills which are overstrength.

Regulations on critical skills

Commanders apply considerable discretion in determining how they will use personnel assigned to their units.

AR 600-200 provides no special controls over the use of persons with critical skills.

ODCSPER periodically prepares a critical skills list which identifies MOSs for intensive management. The critical skills list in effect when we began our review is shown in appendix III. It directs every echelon of command to assure that persons with critical skills are used properly; but the critical skills list is not distributed to potential users. Consequently, managers outside ODCSPER do not know which skills are considered critical and therefore cannot apply special attention to them.

MILPERCEN officials said that, of 37 MOSs on this list, only 3--97B, 97C, and 97D--received any special management attention, as directed by AR 614-200, "Enlisted Personnel Selection, Training, and Assignment System." However, the special attention was not given to assignment, distribution, or utilization of enlisted personnel.

Implementation of distribution plans

The Army has a distribution plan which, if followed, should more effectively control the distribution of personnel and assure that scarce resources are sent where they are most needed. Some needed improvements in the use of the plan are discussed below.

Application of priorities

The Army plans to distribute its scarce personnel resources according to the priorities established in the master priority list. An ODCSPER official said that distribution of available personnel in accordance with the plan should result in relatively consistent MOS strengths among consecutive units on the priority list, decreasing from unit to unit as the priority decreases if the skill is in short supply.

During our review we noted that distribution did not follow the priorities consistently. For example, on June 30, 1976, Forces Command (FORSCOM) divisions, listed in the sequence of the priority list, reported strengths in five critical MOSs as shown on the following page.

Ratio of Actual to Authorized Strength

MOS	<u>13E</u>		<u>16P</u>		<u>17X</u>		<u>31G</u>		<u>82C</u>	
	Percent									
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>(note a)</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>
FORSCOM										
Division:										
A	84	84	46	47	46	52	32	54	67	62
B	146	99	306	93	92	75	62	69	68	75
C	123	75	321	75	161	107	63	64	85	70
D	176	107	280	73	107	64	59	56	103	74
E	104	79	304	73	107	81	50	58	87	70
F	115	74	126	103	82	65	46	44	63	103
G	98	91	218	89	74	88	56	85	85	112
H	53	51	114	56	53	82	38	60	52	75
Range (percent)	51 to 107		47 to 103		52 to 107		44 to 85		62 to 112	
Total Army strength	<u>92</u>		<u>79</u>		<u>82</u>		<u>72</u>		<u>80</u>	

a/Percent of authorized strength

The Army had a similar situation with specialties over-strength Army-wide. For six Army-wide overstrength critical MOSS, we compared inventories of available personnel with authorized levels to determine operating strengths as of February 1977.

Ratio of Actual to Authorized Strength

MOS	<u>11C</u>		<u>11D</u>		<u>11E</u>		<u>13E</u>		<u>16P</u>		<u>82C</u>	
	Percent											
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>(note a)</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Divisions in priority sequence												
A	438	96	267	94	886	105	162	76	144	147	150	221
B	934	98	126	113	417	132	178	104	230	79	14	84
C	778	108	567	137	1846	157	240	133	353	123	212	210
D	816	98	509	104	1677	142	144	65	287	96	107	207
E	719	100	150	97	1372	116	193	104	264	92	104	103
F	873	90	62	107	23	230	146	71	186	142	63	107
Range (percent)	90 to 108		94 to 137		105 to 230		65 to 133		79 to 147		84 to 221	
Total Army strength	<u>a/109</u>		106		112		105		104		104	
FORSCOM strength	106		113		123		115		106		107	

a/Percent of authorized strength

Although both the Army and FORSCOM were overstrength in these MOSS, significant shortages of personnel existed in some units.

The priorities intended to control distribution of enlisted personnel are maintained in the Centralized Assignment Procedures computer system. According to an ODCSPER official, MILPERCEN managers are not expected to consider unit priorities beyond those programed in the system. Many assignments are made manually. During a 21-week period in late 1976 and

early 1977, only about 41,600 (26 percent) of 158,680 distribution actions were made by the computer system. Managers used manual methods to process the other assignment actions, including those for about 70,250 recruits, but not necessarily according to the Army's distribution priorities.

Errors in validating requisitions also affect the application of priorities. The system applies priorities by filling a predetermined percentage of the requisitions in shortage MOSSs; therefore, invalid requisitions entered into the computer prevent the priority system from functioning as designed.

MILPERCEN does not analyze by MOS its distribution of personnel among all installations. For example, note the ratios of actual to authorized strength in the schedules on the previous page. Without such data, MILPERCEN lacks sufficient information to determine whether skilled personnel are being distributed according to plans or whether there is a need to reassign personnel, and the Army cannot adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its Army-wide distribution of personnel.

Personnel authorization documents

Both Army headquarters and major commands have authority to approve personnel authorization changes. MILPERCEN receives Army headquarters changes before the field does. However, an ODCSPER official estimated that MILPERCEN receives a FORSCOM-approved change 4 to 8 weeks after the field receives it.

Approved personnel authorization documents are required before appropriate distribution decisions can be made. Installation managers said that lack of a single source for personnel authorizations is a continuing problem. One manager found five different authorization figures from five sources for an installation, and he had no idea which was correct. Another manager said he would accept requisitions based on the field authorization data if the unit provided a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) change number, but he did not know a source at Army or FORSCOM headquarters for quickly confirming TOE changes.

For seven critical skills at Fort Carson, we compared the authorizations listed on two documents used by MILPERCEN installation managers with the authorizations used at the installation:

Authorization for December 1976 used by

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Position title</u>	<u>MILPERCEN</u>		
		<u>Fort Carson</u>	<u>COPO 45</u> <u>(note a)</u>	<u>COPO 89</u> <u>(note a)</u>
11C	Infantry indirect fire crewman	723	870	724
11D	Armor recon. specialist	418	521	419
11E	Armor crewman	1,141	1,426	1,145
13E	Field artillery cannon ops/fire direction assistant	231	302	241
16P	Chapparral crewman	288	315	289
52B	Power generation equipment oper./mech.	206	236	259
82C	Artillery surveyor	<u>100</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>100</u>
Total		<u>3,107</u>	<u>3,784</u>	<u>3,177</u>

a/COPO: Chief, Office of Personnel Operations

The managers used one authorization document until December 1976 when a new document that had been prepared in December 1975 was considered reliable enough to replace it. As shown above, the first document showed 677 more persons authorized in these MOSs, and the second document showed 70 more persons than the document used by Fort Carson. The two documents included different subunits, and installation managers could not readily determine which subunits were included in the authorization documents.

A single authority should be responsible for approving changes to authorization documents. Authorization documents should use the same field units.

Without reliable and timely authorization data, installation data, installation managers have no sound basis for validating field requisitions.

Control over recruiting and training

The Army's stated goal is to recruit and train only enough persons to maintain the projected fiscal yearend strength in each MOS. Each quarter MILPERCEN develops, and ODCSPER reviews and approves, the Army enlisted training program to accomplish this goal.

The Army has not properly controlled its inventory of personnel in shortage MOSs which have become overstrength. To control specialty strength, the Army can

--limit recruiting and bonus payments, when necessary, to the level needed to sustain the strength of a specialty (see page 15),

--retrain personnel surplus to requirements into short-age skills when necessary to balance years-of-service requirements (FPCD-77-42, Sept. 29, 1977), and

--manage attrition.

Lacking adequate controls, personnel in MOSs designated by the Army as critical have become surplus because of over-recruiting. These surpluses adversely affect personnel utilization. More persons are sent to installations than are needed, and the installations are unable to assign all of them in their primary, secondary, or substitutable MOSs, as required by Army regulations.

Six of the seven MOSs with the largest populations, which the Army had identified in late November 1975 for special management attention, developed overstrengths within 14 months, as shown below.

Ratio of Actual to Authorized Strength

MOS	Position title	November 1975	June 1976		January 1977	
		Percent (note a)	Actual	Percent	Actual	Percent
11C	Infantry indirect fire crewman (note b)	83	14,417	103	15,584	109
11D	Armor recon. specialist (note b)	85	7,277	97	7,853	106
11E	Armor crewman (note b)	94	17,508	103	19,701	112
13E	Field artillery cannon opr./fire direction assistant (note b)	78	3,388	92	4,441	105
16P	Chapparral crewman (note b)	60	3,893	79	5,019	104
52B	Power generation equip. oper./mech.	83	6,208	90	6,474	95
82C	Artillery surveyor (note b)	78	2,523	80	3,008	104

a/Percent of authorized strength

b/Combat arms MOS

These surpluses adversely affect personnel utilization since some persons must be used in jobs that do not require their MOSs. Continental United States (CONUS) installations must absorb a disproportionate share because of the personnel ceiling on the Army's forces in Europe.

In January 1977 the Army had 1,178 surplus personnel in MOS 11C and a 2,173 surplus in MOS 11E. MILPERCEN officials could not explain specifically what caused the surpluses since data necessary for such an analysis was not available.

Some officials explained that cyclical recruiting could cause surpluses. They explained that the heaviest recruiting occurs during summer months. Army strength decreases as persons who have completed their term of service are discharged. New recruits still undergoing training are not included in

the Army-wide strength for a specialty. However, as shown below, personnel strengths in MOSs 11C and 11E ranged from 102.6 to 107.4 percent of authorized strength in the summer months (June through September) when, according to this explanation, these MOSs should have been at their lowest levels of the year.

	MOS 11C			MOS 11E		
	Authorized	Actual Number	Percent	Authorized	Actual Number	Percent
June 1976	14,051	14,417	102.6	16,960	17,508	103.2
July	14,089	14,707	104.4	16,914	17,604	104.1
August	14,047	15,001	106.8	17,014	17,953	105.5
September	14,320	14,973	104.6	17,499	18,796	107.4
November	14,534	15,371	105.7	17,568	19,451	110.7
January 1977	14,406	15,584	108.1	17,528	19,701	112.0
April	14,420	15,646	108.5	17,505	19,917	113.8

Estimates of the number of recruits that will be needed at an installation are frequently overstated because installation managers lack adequate guidance and reliable data. Operating within the limits of the Army training program and training schedules and using data on estimated personnel needs and available personnel resources, installation managers establish quotas for the number of persons to be recruited and trained for specific skills for the installations they serve.

Army procedures require only that installation managers establish quotas for training enough recruits to meet the needs of their installations. An installation manager said that recruit training quotas are considered sufficient if they assure that authorized and actual personnel strengths will balance.

Each month MILPERCEN installation managers review and adjust the quotas. Recruiters and career counselors use these quotas to enlist recruits and to guarantee the recruits first assignments in the unit or skill of their choice. Analysis of data on persons recruited for January and February 1977 showed that 87 percent of the recruits who enlisted in critically needed skills were guaranteed a station or unit of their choice.

The filled quotas determine the minimum number of recruits an installation will receive in various specialties. Installation managers said that in setting quotas they generally increase the estimated requirement by 10 percent for recruits in combat arms specialties which already are over-

strength. One manager said this assures FORSCOM divisions that they will have enough personnel to maintain their readiness reporting posture.

We reviewed training quotas established by the MILPERCEN installation manager for Fort Carson for 4 MOSSs: 11C, 11E, 13E, and 52B. In the summer of 1976 Fort Carson had estimated that in December it would be overstrength in two of the four MOSSs--11C and 11E--yet was required by MILPERCEN to prepare requisitions for 76 recruits. In December 1976 Fort Carson was overstrength by 676 persons in these two specialties. In March 1977 the installation manager established quotas for training 92 more persons than the estimated requirements in the two MOSSs.

Installation managers said they lacked reliable trainee attrition data necessary to project the number of trainees to be assigned to a unit. MILPERCEN recently developed a report that should provide this information.

There is a need to clarify and refine guidance for establishing recruiting and training quotas and to assure that installation managers understand and consistently follow the guidance. Supervisory spot checks of quota computations could provide assurance that quotas are established as required.

Guidelines for validating requisitions

Guidelines for use by MILPERCEN installation managers in validating requisitions sent in by field units do not specify whether some or all requisitions must be validated. Managers said they did not regularly validate all requisitions. Since no two installations are alike, each manager relied on his judgment or intuition and on his own criteria for selecting the requisitions and skills to validate. Managers could not use the critical skills list to select requisitions to validate since they do not receive it.

Delivery of personnel

CONUS units must submit requisitions 5 months in advance of the time the personnel will be needed, but they have no assurance that their requisitions will be filled. The six FORSCOM installations we reviewed received only about 47 percent of the personnel requisitioned for December 1976 and 44 percent for January 1977. See the chart on the following page.

Installation	December 1976			January 1977		
	Total re-quisitioned	Filled Number	Percent	Total re-quisitioned	Filled Number	Percent
Fort Bliss	451	240	53.2	648	396	61.1
Fort Campbell	1,061	611	57.6	577	261	45.2
Fort Carson	833	278	33.4	873	343	39.3
Fort Hood	2,211	1,030	46.6	2,813	1,035	36.8
Fort Lewis	124	60	48.8	617	290	47.0
Fort Riley	<u>1,466</u>	<u>660</u>	<u>45.0</u>	<u>854</u>	<u>480</u>	<u>56.2</u>
Total	<u>6,146</u>	<u>2,879</u>	46.9	<u>6,382</u>	<u>2,805</u>	44.0

Of the 419 persons in 8 MOSs requisitioned by Fort Carson for October, November, and December 1976 requirements, only 18 were delivered when they were needed, and 204 were not delivered at all.

MILPERCEN action	Personnel requisitioned for month of			Total
	October	November	December	
Delivered in:				
July 1976	2			2
August	15	3		18
September	5	10	3	18
October	<u>a/1</u>	3	15	19
November		<u>a/7</u>	66	73
December		9	<u>a/10</u>	19
January 1977		8	9	17
Total delivered	<u>23</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>166</u>
Canceled	26	110	68	204
Action undetermined	<u>7</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	<u>56</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>419</u>

a/Only 18 were delivered in the month for which they were requisitioned.

MILPERCEN also delivered persons with skill levels lower than requested and needed. Of the requisitions not delivered during the 3 months, 160 were for fully qualified, advanced journeymen or supervisors. During the same period MILPERCEN delivered 213 persons not requisitioned who were in the helper or entry level and 6 persons at advanced levels.

If requisitions are not filled when needed, the installations must prepare and resubmit new requisitions if they still need the personnel.

Control over surplus personnel

MILPERCEN should more effectively control surplus personnel. It does not require installations to report all personnel in excess of their needs, and it has no effective controls for reassigning surplus personnel to other installations where they are needed.

MILPERCEN relinquished an important control in May 1976 when it stopped requiring installations to report for possible reassignment all enlisted personnel who could not be used according to the Army's utilization criteria. Most major commanders had recommended that surplus reporting be continued. According to a MILPERCEN official, the reporting requirement was difficult to administer. He said installations reported as surplus those persons they could most afford to lose rather than those most eligible for reassignment. He agreed that an automated process could be implemented to identify periodically surplus personnel for possible reassignment.

In the past, use of the surplus report has resulted in many reassignments. In 1976, 3,695 persons were reported to MILPERCEN as surplus, and the center reassigned 3,657 to other installations. Since May 1976 installations have been required to report only bonus recipients in excess to their needs. As of November 1976 about 20,450 (about 22 percent) of the 93,380 personnel qualified in critical MOSS had received bonuses.

After the required surplus reporting was discontinued, MILPERCEN planned to monitor future personnel surpluses and to request career managers to reassign as appropriate those for whom requirements existed elsewhere. Career management officials said that reassignments because of improper utilization were infrequent. Installation managers said they did not reassign surplus personnel.

The Congress has a special interest in the use of bonus recipients and requires the Army to report semiannually on their use. This requirement has been temporarily suspended pending changes in the report format as we recommended in a March 31, 1977, report, "Need for Improved Reports for Maintaining the Enlisted Personnel Bonus Program" (FPCD-77-34).

If identifying and reporting surplus bonus recipients is considered necessary and useful, identifying and reporting all other surplus personnel also should be useful. It would provide MILPERCEN information on how well it has distributed personnel. Reliable and timely reporting of surpluses should enable MILPERCEN to make better distribution and assignment of personnel to avoid or reduce the accumulation of personnel at installations or in units where they are not needed or cannot be used effectively.

Payment of enlistment bonuses

The Army may have paid unnecessary enlistment bonuses to selected recruits for specialties in which it had more persons than authorized, even though this practice seems inconsistent with the stated purposes of the bonus authority.

The Congress authorized the Army to pay enlistment bonuses of about \$48 million in fiscal year 1977. The Secretary of the Army designates the critical skills eligible for bonus payments, subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense. As of February 1977 the Army was paying enlistment bonuses to recruits for 15 MOSs. Six of these MOSs were among those in which the Army had the largest number of persons and was overstrength. Unnecessary bonuses paid for these MOSs are shown below.

MOS	Actual strength	Strength, February 1977		Enlistment bonus paid in FY 1977			
		Percent of authorized personnel	Number excess	Estimated number of payments		Paid per person	Unnecessary bonus
				Total	Excess		
11C	14,424	108.5	1,221	1,814	1,221	\$2,500	\$3,052,500
11D	7,483	105.7	427	883	427	2,500	1,067,500
11E	17,551	112.3	2,154	1,784	1,784	2,500	4,460,000
13E	4,429	104.7	209	825	209	2,500	522,500
16P	4,865	104.3	210	782	210	1,500	315,000
82C	2,953	104.4	131	669	131	1,500	196,500
Total			<u>4,352</u>	<u>6,757</u>	<u>3,982</u>		<u>\$9,614,000</u>

Overrecruiting in these skills is costly and results in personnel malutilization. We estimate that, in addition to the more than \$9.6 million in unnecessary bonus payments, it cost the Army about \$48.7 million to bring these excess persons into the Army and keep them for a year. This estimate is based on accession cost per recruit, including training costs (cited by the Army in fiscal year 1977 hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services), pay, and

subsistence at the standard rates but does not include the cost of housing and various benefits. Some of this cost would have been incurred had nonbonus persons been brought into the Army instead of bonus recipients.

The Army may also have incurred substantial unnecessary costs for bonuses and other expenses for persons in eight of the nine other MOSs not covered in this review which, in total, exceeded authorized strength by more than 4,900 persons.

Overrecruiting has contributed to problems installations have faced in effectively using their personnel. Fort Carson's experience is discussed on p. 22.

The Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974, Public Law 93-277, May 10, 1974, 88 Stat. 119, 37 U.S.C. 308 and 308a, authorizes payment of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for critical skills. The act does not define critical skills. The stated purpose of the law is to provide authority to grant enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for critical and shortage skill requirements in the armed services in an all volunteer environment. (H.R. Rep. No. 857, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess.) The law authorizes the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations for administering the bonus program.

Department of Defense Directive 1304.21 prescribes policies governing the award of bonuses. The directive says

"In enacting Public Law 93-277, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense considerable flexibility in the use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses as incentives in meeting Defense manpower requirements. It is incumbent on the Department of Defense to exercise this authority in the most cost-effective manner. Bonuses are intended primarily to control personnel inventories in specific situations where other, less costly, methods have proved inadequate or impractical. Therefore, in solving inventory control problems, the Department of Defense must consider bonus employment in relation to overall skill, training and utilization requirements. To authorize bonuses when less costly actions could be used with equal effectiveness would be inefficient and wasteful; failure to employ bonuses in a timely

and effective manner when they are the only recourse would be ineffective management. Monetary enlistment and reenlistment incentives are only one element of personnel inventory control; they are not a substitute for good planning and management."

* * * * *

"Normally employment of an Enlistment Bonus will be authorized only when a Military Service has been unsuccessful in attaining its total accession objectives, when a manning shortage exists in pay grades E-1 through E-4 within those year groups that constitute the period of initial obligated service, and only for those skills whose accession objective attainment percentage is significantly below the total accession objective attainment average of the Military Service."

AUDITS, INSPECTIONS, AND SURVEYS

Audits, inspections, and surveys have not adequately assured the accuracy of reports to Army headquarters on the use of personnel. In one case, coverage was limited to bonus recipients, in another to nontactical units. Audit and inspection units are not required to review the use of personnel or report their findings to Army officials above the field level.

Army Audit Agency

The Army Audit Agency issued 16 reports referring to assignment, distribution, and utilization of enlisted personnel during the year ended June 30, 1975. Since then it has issued no reports on these areas. In 1975 the Inspector General and Auditor General decided that the agency would concentrate its audit efforts on supply, maintenance, administrative, and financial functions rather than tactical activities.

Our July 26, 1977, report, "Why the Army Should Strengthen Its Internal Audit Function" (FGMSD-77-49), said that excluding the Army Audit Agency from examining tactical activities meant that the agency had been prevented from auditing any of the activities related directly to the Army's basic mission even though the Army devotes most of its resources to those activities. Consequently, the Army Audit Agency had been limited to auditing administrative and support activities.

Testifying before a congressional subcommittee on July 27, 1977, the Deputy Secretary of the Army for Financial Affairs commented on the Army's response to congressional correspondence and on a draft of the above report. He said

"These responses stressed that the USAAA's [Army Audit Agency] independence will be assured and that the USAAA will be unrestricted in its selection of audits to be performed and the scope of audits undertaken. The scope of internal audit includes all DA organizations, programs, activities and functions and covers transactions, records, and documentation of all kinds. AR-36-5, Internal Auditing in the Department of the Army, is being revised to clarify that the USAAA has complete independence and there are no restrictions on audit scope or the areas subject to audit."

Inspector General

The Inspector General has provided specific guidance to his staff for inspection of military police operations, headquarters, and tactical units. However, inspectors are not required to follow these procedures when reviewing the assignment and use of enlisted personnel. Responses to our inquiries to the Inspector General on reports issued since June 30, 1974, indicate that personnel utilization was not covered by inspectors at headquarters, FORSCOM, or Fort Carson. Headquarters inspectors said that when they inquire about personnel utilization, they interview commanders and unit staff about their use of personnel but do not interview the individuals.

Local inspector generals are not normally required to send copies of reports to Army headquarters. They send copies to higher headquarters of the organization examined only if corrective action is required by those headquarters, or if they are directed to do so.

Personnel management assistance teams

Personnel management assistance system teams provide Army headquarters with only a limited review of personnel utilization. Team procedures suggest that, in examining assignment and use, the individual's duty MOS should be compared with his primary, secondary, or substitute MOS.

We reviewed 12 reports on visits by the FORSCOM team during the 6 months ending January 31, 1977. The reports commented only on the use of selective reenlistment bonus recipients and advanced noncommissioned officer educational system graduates, a small part of the enlisted population. MILPERCEN officials said review of the use of those graduates was discontinued in October 1976 because the program goals had changed and few misutilized graduates had been identified.

Manpower surveys

Major commanders are responsible for making manpower surveys of their subordinate units and activities. These surveys appear to be directed primarily toward determining the number of positions to accomplish a unit's or activity's mission, and secondarily to the use of personnel in their proper positions.

The Inspector General and Auditor General is responsible for making manpower management surveys of major command headquarters, their staff support agencies, and field operating agencies of the Army staff. Manpower management survey procedures provide that personnel utilization matters need be directed only to the attention of the commander of the activity or unit surveyed.

CHAPTER 3

FIELD MANAGEMENT AND USE OF

ENLISTED PERSONNEL CAN BE IMPROVED

Circumstances, practices, and policies at one Army installation may not be representative of all installations, but there should be some commonality of personnel management practices among installations. Conditions similar to those at Fort Carson could exist at other Army installations.

Proper assignment and use of personnel is the responsibility of all commanders, but it is secondary to their overriding responsibilities for unit performance. This should present no serious problems when a unit is staffed with persons qualified for the required positions.

Problems arise when combat units perform peacetime functions. The Army's personnel utilization policy and Fort Carson's utilization reporting system are designed for combat. Division units are authorized positions and personnel on the basis of combat requirements. In peacetime, however, unit commanders must use personnel with combat skills to accomplish peacetime or garrison missions which require different skills. At the same time, commanders are expected to maintain a high level of personnel and unit combat readiness.

MANAGEMENT AND USE OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

In our study of Fort Carson's management and use of enlisted personnel, we noted problem areas where the following improvements can be made.

- More realistic determination of personnel needs.
- More effective reassignment of surplus personnel among units.
- Emphasis on coordinated practices for controlling and reporting actual personnel use rather than on reporting personnel assignments.

Determination of personnel needs

In order to maintain the full complement of authorized personnel, each month Fort Carson prepares requisitions

identifying individuals by grade and skill who will be needed 5 months in the future. The controlling Army regulation, AR 614-200, requires that requisitions be based on known or projected vacancies. This regulation gives the requisitioning activity commander (Commanding General, Fort Carson) responsibility for consolidating, editing, and submitting requisitions to MILPERCEN.

Fort Carson consolidates individual requisitions to provide a flexible means for the commander to distribute personnel according to changing priorities, requirements, and mission. The requisitions are based on total expected position vacancies without regard to the specific skills of the persons needed to fill particular positions. This procedure fails to recognize that replacements may not be required for positions filled by persons assigned in their secondary or other military occupational specialties.

Of requisitions for 129 persons in 6 MOSs submitted by Fort Carson for June 1977 delivery, 60 were incorrect.

<u>Reasons for incorrect number requisitioned</u>	<u>Not required but requisitioned</u>	<u>Required but not requisitioned</u>
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Failure to consider:

Recruits	22	-
Surplus personnel in substitutable MOSs	7	-
Mathematical and clerical errors	<u>31</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	<u>60</u>	<u>9</u>

We understand that supervisors now review requisitions before submitting them and that recruits have since been included in requisitions. Officials also said they intended to consider using surplus personnel with substitutable MOSs before preparing requisitions for additional personnel. During our review they began considering surplus personnel in lower grades and entry levels in filling requirements. This should improve estimates of the number of persons that will be needed.

Incorrect requisitions, if not caught by MILPERCEN, can result in the delivery of more or fewer persons than

needed. After MILPERCEN validated Fort Carson's requisitions for July 1977 needs for 85 persons in 7 MOSs, we found that these should have been reduced by between 28 and 47 persons in some MOSs, increased by between 9 and 55 persons in other MOSs, and unfilled requisitions for 8 persons should have been canceled, depending on whether the authorization documents used by headquarters or by the field were correct.

Requisitioning problems should be resolved by the automated Personnel Deployment and Distribution Management System currently being developed. Until the system becomes operational, greater care is needed to assure that requirements are more realistically estimated.

Reassignment of surplus personnel

Reports showed that Fort Carson had about 2,000 more enlisted personnel than authorized at December 31, 1976. Among these surplus persons were 673 in three MOSs at the entry level. Many of these persons had been paid enlistment bonuses of at least \$2,500 each--a total of nearly \$1.7 million.

MOS	Position	Number		
		<u>On board</u>	<u>Author- ized</u>	<u>Surplus</u>
11C1	Infantry indirect fire crewman	546	465	81
11D1	Armor reconnaissance specialist	329	281	48
11E1	Armor crewman	<u>1,163</u>	<u>619</u>	<u>544</u>
		<u>2,038</u>	<u>1,365</u>	<u>673</u>

AR 614-200 requires that commanders make every effort to reassign surplus personnel to other units of their command. Further, unit commanders are to identify and report to MILPERCEN for reassignment any remaining surplus personnel who were paid bonuses. Reporting of other surplus personnel is optional.

We reviewed eight MOSs with 403 surplus or improperly assigned persons for possible reassignment into 273 positions requiring their skills which had been reported improperly filled or vacant as of December 31, 1976. More than two-thirds of the positions could have been filled by available persons at Fort Carson, half of them within the same battalion or squadron. For example, qualified persons were available

and could have been used in 57 infantry indirect fire crewman (11C1) positions and 48 armor reconnaissance specialist (11D1) positions that were vacant or improperly filled.

Correct reassignment of surplus personnel could contribute not only to more realistic determination of personnel needs but also to improved personnel utilization.

Reporting surplus personnel

Although surplus bonus recipients are to be reported to MILPERCEN for reassignment, Fort Carson reported none in fiscal year 1977. An official said Fort Carson did not consider bonus recipients surplus unless the number in an MOS exceeded the total number authorized regardless of how many nonbonus recipients with that MOS were also on hand. AR 614-200 requires reporting as surplus those in the grade and MOS who have been assigned longest to the installation.

Bonus recipients are to be used in their MOSs or reported surplus. Fort Carson improperly reported some surplus bonus recipients as being assigned to authorized positions, thus displacing nonbonus persons who were then considered surplus personnel. However, the installation was not required to report the nonbonus recipients to MILPERCEN. For example, in 1/10 Cavalry, 4 nonbonus persons were replaced by 4 bonus recipients on the unit manning report and were shown as surplus. A Fort Carson official said that often the nonbonus persons continued to work in their jobs even though the records showed their jobs were filled by bonus recipients.

Failure to report surplus personnel denied both Fort Carson and MILPERCEN important information they could have used to assess and improve personnel distribution, assignment, and utilization.

Fort Carson officials agreed that surplus reporting is an important element of Army-wide management of personnel and that they would institute a more active reporting program. They said that projected needs must be considered before reporting surplus personnel and that Army headquarters was aware of current surpluses and projected personnel strength.

Use of personnel

We interviewed a random sample of 262 persons with critical skills and 260 persons assigned to positions requiring

their skills to test the actual use of enlisted personnel and the reliability of utilization reports. At December 31, 1976, Fort Carson reported 1,145 (about 28 percent) of 4,133 enlisted personnel with critical skills as unassigned. (See app. IV.) Of the remaining 2,988 persons, we estimated that about 1,150 (38.6 percent) were not working in their assigned positions and were improperly used according to Army criteria. (See app. V.) However, Army criteria do not recognize that there is insufficient need for combat skills in peacetime to enable commanders to productively use all personnel and that garrisons have need for certain unauthorized support activities.

Persons working outside their authorized skills or positions, or in unauthorized but necessary peacetime positions, are considered to be improperly used. MOS mismatch, the most serious form of improper utilization, occurs when a person's duties do not require the use of the skill in which he is officially qualified, that is, in his primary, secondary, or substitutable MOS. We estimate about 9.4 percent were mismatched. (See app. V.) For example:

--An E-4 power generator operator/mechanic (MOS 52B2) worked as a golf course greenskeeper.

--An E-5 battery team chief (MOS 05C4) worked as a reenlistment noncommissioned officer.

Interviews with persons assigned to positions requiring critical skills disclosed similar differences between reported and actual use. (See app. VI.) For example:

--An E-3 enlisted man assigned to an ammunition bearer position (MOS 11C1) worked as a mail clerk.

--An E-5 enlisted man assigned to an armor reconnaissance specialist position (MOS 11D3) worked as a noncommissioned officer-in-charge of urinalysis testing.

Controlling and reporting the use of personnel

Fort Carson's personnel management reports are often inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading. They provide no analysis of situations in which persons are assigned in one job and working in another, and reports identifying MOS mismatches are not based on duties actually performed.

These reports all rely heavily on the duty MOS which is reported to MILPERCEN. In 1976 MILPERCEN modified the reporting system to make the duty MOSs for persons in their initial assignments the same as the MOSs authorized for the positions to which personnel were assigned.

Had Fort Carson used data on actual duties rather than recorded assigned duties to determine improper utilization, we estimate that 38.6 percent would have been reported improperly used rather than 9.2 percent. Also, the MOS mismatch rate reported would have been 9.4 percent instead of 1.6 percent.

The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) has a standard review procedure which, had it been applied, should have disclosed the incorrect data. The procedure requires that periodically a sample of randomly selected personnel records, including duty MOS data, be verified against individual personnel files and verified with the individuals. This was not done, and errors in reported duty were not identified. The extent of improper utilization, including mismatches, was not known. Fort Carson officials said they had started following this procedure after our review, even though four other installations they contacted were not following it.

Personnel qualification records are sent to individuals for verification of data, including their assigned positions and duty MOSs. Fort Carson personnel officials said the records were not prepared from August 1976 through January 1977 because they lacked forms.

Officials said the personnel qualification forms have been distributed to all units with a detailed checklist to provide specific guidance to review and verify each item. Reliance on this procedure is of questionable value, however, because some persons do not receive the forms, may not understand them, or do not know what their recorded assigned positions are.

Fort Carson officials disagreed with our views on recording and reporting the duty MOS. They said a commander can report a duty MOS different than that of a person's assigned position. They also said that personnel reports reflected improper utilization and mismatches in accordance with the governing regulations and with data available within the system. They felt the reports were useful to management because they provide recognition of available personnel resources in relation to authorized positions.

Personnel assigned to positions
they are incapable of performing

When a person is physically incapable of fully performing duties in his MOS, he is referred to as a profile case. During our review, Fort Carson identified 450 profiled personnel.

The Army has no control or time standards to insure prompt processing of profile cases or guidelines on how to use persons with physical limitations while their cases are being processed. We noted that some profiled persons at Fort Carson had been assigned to positions which they could not perform for more than 1-1/2 years after incapacitation. For example, a range inspector (MOS 11E3) who was given a physical profile in June 1976 had not worked in his specialty since May 1975, according to his commanding officer.

A profile originally results from a medical decision that a person has physical limitations which may be temporary or permanent. After an individual has been profiled, officials must decide whether he should be given limited assignments, a different MOS, or discharged from the Army.

Medical personnel make the official profile determination. The Army requires that this information be routed to unit personnel officers or to the involved individual's commander, but there is no requirement that it be logged into a profile control list at any level. All units may not be notified about individual profiles.

Although there is no assurance that commanders know about an individual's profile, commanders are responsible for initiating action to process profile cases. AR 600-200 provides no controls to insure that commanders take action. Consequently, profiled personnel may be assigned to positions they cannot perform, and some may have been counted as combat ready in readiness reports.

According to a division official, a new system at Fort Carson may limit some processing delays. It provides for screening incoming personnel and for medical officials sending documentation of individual permanent limitations to division personnel offices for controlling and monitoring profiles and for advising commanders on further actions they must initiate. The new procedures do not apply to temporary profiles.

Other unmatched personnel authorizations and needs

The Army allows personnel to be temporarily used in special duty jobs for which no permanent positions or personnel have been authorized. There are needs, other than those represented by special duty, which the Army has not officially recognized or authorized. To meet these needs, Fort Carson commanders used enlisted personnel, when not engaged in training, to fill a variety of unauthorized jobs, including building repairmen, maintenance clerks, and reenlistment noncommissioned officers.

In addition, there are some authorized combat positions for which there is little or no need in garrisoned situations. Some persons, such as generator operators, mechanics, repairmen, radio telephone operators, mortar carrier drivers, and ammunition carriers assigned to authorized positions had little or no work. In the case of generator operators, the largest of these groups, public utilities are used as a peacetime power source instead of generators.

We are planning a separate study to determine the feasibility of using garrisoned personnel in noncombat activities which may improve their effectiveness and productivity and reduce operating costs. The primary concern is that combat personnel receive training and experience needed to maintain proficiency in their basic skills. Consequently, non-combat activities should complement or supplement combat duties to the extent practicable.

Personnel management procedures and techniques

AR 600-200 requires major and intermediate commanders to establish procedures to assure efficient use of personnel in their commands. These procedures are to be based on the Army policy which requires that personnel be properly assigned and perform their assigned duties.

The Army has four SIDPERS computer files which assist commanders in assigning personnel properly. Instead of these, Fort Carson uses a system developed locally with FORSCOM's permission which consolidates information from the four standard files. Contrary to AR 600-200, this system permits assigning persons in a reverse career progression pattern and to jobs for which their MOSs are not substitutable. The system does not provide for assigning persons to jobs for which their MOS is substitutable, and

it allows a qualified but improperly assigned or unassigned person to remain in one unit even though another unit needs his skill. (See p. 22.)

There seems to be a tendency to equate personnel assignment with personnel utilization. However, a person can be recorded as properly assigned but still be improperly utilized. Although fairly detailed instructions and procedures have been provided as an aid to proper assignments, there is little Army-wide guidance to assure effective or efficient use of individuals.

In the absence of comprehensive standard and routine procedures, each commander must develop his own techniques for accomplishing his unit's mission with the personnel available. The more than 100 company-level unit commanders at Fort Carson use many different methods to decide personnel assignments, as demonstrated by the following summary of techniques reported by 12 commanders.

	<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Battalion</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of commanders	2	4	6	12
Management technique:				
Staff personnel visit subordinate units	2	2	-	4
Staff reviews unit manning reports	1	2	-	3
Staff reviews SIDPERS utilization reports	-	3	-	3
Commander reviews unit manning reports	-	-	5	5
Commander reviews SIDPERS utilization reports	1	1	1	3
Commander visits and talks with soldier	2	2	1	5
Commander issues verbal instructions	1	3	-	4
Commander receives verbal reports	1	3	1	5

The Army and Fort Carson have not only provided few controls or specific instructions to be applied on personnel use, but also may be underemphasizing its importance. Fort Carson officials said that commanders' evaluations are based on their units' performance and ability to accomplish their missions and that the division commander assures his commander of proper personnel use by maintaining mission capability.

During our review Fort Carson attempted to improve guidance. In March 1977 it initiated personnel utilization procedures requiring commanders to report and justify to the division commander those persons properly assigned but used in other jobs.

PERSONNEL PROFICIENCY AND READINESS

Military personnel are required to demonstrate their job proficiency every 2 years by taking the recently implemented skills qualification test consisting of written examinations, physical performance, and supervisory observations. The Soldier's Manual sets out criteria a person must meet to be considered proficient. However, there are no criteria on how commanders should assure that their personnel maintain proficiency in the period between tests.

The Army recognizes the need for its personnel to maintain proficiency in their skills. AR 600-200 requires that persons normally spend no more than 90 days on special duty, followed by a minimum of 120 days in their assigned jobs. The Army Audit Agency has reported on the importance of rotating people to their units to assure that they can perform their military jobs with minimum orientation. We interviewed unit commanders who said that persons not working in their MOSSs could lose job proficiency and could get low test scores and that this could affect promotion and reenlistment opportunities. Fort Carson officials also agreed that it is important to rotate personnel to their units to maintain skill proficiency.

Fort Carson personnel did not work in their assigned jobs for periods greatly in excess of 90 days. Ninety-nine of 256 persons we interviewed were not working in their authorized, recorded positions. Of the 99,

--24 were in jobs which did not require their skills, and 12 of these had not worked in their MOSSs for 6 months or more, and

--57 had not worked in their authorized positions in 1976, although 30 had been at Fort Carson more than 6 months and 16 had been there a year or more.

Except for some special duty rosters, we found no reports identifying persons working outside their assigned jobs, no record of how long it had been since they worked in their jobs, or any indication of how much or what kind of actual experience they had received. A Fort Carson

official said that the Army had discontinued maintaining detailed training records.

We found no standards or guidelines to gauge the minimum experience or training a person should have or the frequency of experience necessary to maintain proficiency in his authorized MOS. Nor did we find provisions for reports or other means of assessing individuals' experience in their skills and jobs or systematic procedures for rotating personnel among related jobs. Although it seems to be a fairly common practice to rotate people in jobs such as tank crew positions, we found no evidence of systematic procedures for, or records of, the rotation, experience, or cross training of individuals.

Reporting personnel
readiness status

Reported personnel readiness status is based on statistics from battalions and some company-size units. The statistics comprise two figures--operating strength and MOS qualification--for each of the reporting organizations and the division. Operating strength is determined by dividing the total number of personnel on hand by the total number authorized. MOS qualification indicates how many persons the unit has with appropriate MOSs. The lower of these figures determines an organization's personnel readiness status. In our review we were concerned primarily with the MOS qualification.

AR 220-1 on readiness reporting is contradictory on whether persons must be assigned to, or simply be qualified for, positions to be counted in combat readiness computations for MOS qualification. Appendix B on "Personnel Data" says " * * * consider personnel MOS qualified when they can be used in their primary MOSC." Appendix A on "Readiness Criteria and Codes" says MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) strength will be measured by:

"* * * personnel in the operating strength who are qualified to perform the duties of the position to which assigned." (Emphasis added.)

Fort Carson applies the first measurement criterion--that qualified personnel need only to be available in units--although in December 1975 the units had been instructed that personnel were to be assigned to positions requiring their skills before they were counted. The criterion used

by the division assumes the best use of personnel. Although the second criterion would result in a lower readiness rate, it suggests that assigned personnel actually worked in assigned positions.

If the Army required an additional readiness computation based on actual duty positions of personnel and their proficiency in their MOSs, the readiness rate would be even lower. For example, in December 1976 Fort Carson reported an overall 94-percent MOS qualification. Using the three different criteria, which showed the readiness status to be 96 percent, 81 percent, and 76 percent respectively, we computed readiness, for the critical skills only, during that period.

	Based on		
	Personnel availability (note a)	Reported duties	Actual duties
Authorized positions	3,488	3,537	<u>b/3,537</u>
Less:			
Vacancies reported in SIDPERS	132	529	529
Jobs reported filled by persons with wrong MOS	-	131	-
MOS of authorized posi- tion not being performed by assigned person	-	-	<u>307</u>
Positions for which an available person is MOS qualified	3,356	-	-
Positions for which assigned person is MOS qualified	-	2,877	<u>b/2,701</u>
MOS qualification percent	96.2	81.3	76.4

a/Personnel availability figures are from February 1977 when divisionwide personnel readiness was also at 94 percent, as in December 1976. Data for these specific skills were not available for December.

b/Includes those who were not working in the jobs to which assigned but were working in their MOS.

Fort Carson officials said that it was not the intent of the readiness regulation to measure or control the assignment and use of personnel in garrison. They said that to disqualify an improperly assigned or utilized person from the qualification statistics would distort the true readiness picture of a unit.

Although we do not disagree with this interpretation of the intent of the readiness regulation, inclusion of improperly assigned or improperly used personnel in the readiness computation without assurance of their proficiency in combat skills does not permit a realistic assessment. Readiness condition would be more realistically shown if the actual duties and skill proficiency of the personnel were considered.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

In recent years the Army has experienced profound changes affecting its management and use of personnel. Except for a short period, for many years it relied on the draft to acquire a large, continuing supply of new personnel. Since the draft ended it has pursued an aggressive program to recruit volunteers, paying bonuses to enlistees for critically needed skills. After years of training, maintaining, and moving a large force, primarily for combat duty, its force has been drastically reduced in size, and it operates in a peacetime environment to maintain its garrisoned forces in a state of combat readiness.

The time is past when military personnel could be thought of as a free resource. As with any resource, officials at each level should be responsible for the proper use of personnel in much the same manner as for the expenditure of appropriated funds.

Although the Army has shortages of enlisted personnel in critically needed skills, it has substantial numbers qualified in those skills. It has had, and probably will continue to have, problems in maintaining an inventory of personnel with skills to match its needs. To use the skilled personnel it has as effectively as practicable, the Army needs a workable system for distributing, assigning, using, and accounting for its personnel.

We recognize that the Army has tried for years to find techniques by which it can effectively distribute and manage its available personnel in the continually changing and complex environment in which it operates. Much has been accomplished, but further improvements are needed and can be achieved.

Although our review focused on the management and use of personnel with skills the Army identified as critical, improvements in this area should enhance the management and use of all Army enlisted personnel.

The Army's combat mission capability has priority, but its peacetime role and demands on personnel are important. Army headquarters has not officially recognized its peacetime needs and incorporated them into its personnel management policies and instructions.

Our review showed that Army personnel management policies, regulations, and instructions need to be made more specific to guide officials at headquarters and field installations in attaining the most effective distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable. We believe a single authority should be assigned to initiate guidelines and monitor compliance with them, and should prescribe the data and records to be maintained and reports to be prepared.

Army headquarters and Fort Carson have formulated criteria, procedures, and controls for distributing and assigning personnel at their respective levels, but we found few specific criteria, procedures, or controls for the actual utilization of personnel. The Army cannot be assured that each person is effectively used or acquires sufficient training and experience to maintain competence in both his combat skill and his peacetime job.

AR 600-200 describes policies and procedures for the utilization of enlisted personnel. Two basic requirements are that persons be used in their MOSs, with permissible exceptions, and that they be assigned to and work in authorized positions. Authorized positions are based on combat requirements only. In peacetime, training and experience to maintain proficiency in combat skills often requires relatively little time and provides insufficient work to keep all persons productively occupied. On the other hand, there are many peacetime work requirements for which no provisions have been made.

Field installations are responsible for assigning military personnel to specific positions and for the actual utilization of personnel. In the absence of an Army-wide system to integrate combat and peacetime requirements, commanders need instructions which not only assure that personnel are prepared for combat duties but also provide the commanders flexibility in using their personnel effectively to do necessary peacetime work.

We are planning a separate study to determine the feasibility of using garrisoned personnel in noncombat activities which may improve their effectiveness and productivity and reduce operating costs, as well as provide opportunities for them to maintain proficiency in their basic skills.

The personnel distribution and assignment system often does not get the right people to the right place at the right time. In the absence of standard procedures, each

MILPERCEN installation manager must, to some extent, apply his own techniques and judgment to determine the validity of requisitions, compute recruiting and training quotas, and allocate available skilled personnel for assignment. The automated personnel distribution system is not designed to distribute surplus personnel, and the methods employed result in a distribution that is unbalanced in terms of needs and priorities.

Each type of distribution problem indicates a lack of central personnel inventory control by skill. In our opinion, more effective control by MOS would provide headquarters with information on the status of each MOS at each installation, and where they are most needed and when. We believe required skill strengths could be more nearly attained, stability could be better maintained, surpluses avoided, and planned distribution could be more nearly achieved.

Lack of adequate controls by MOS may contribute to over-recruiting and paying of bonuses to enlist persons for skills that the Army already has in excess of requirements. For six of the critical skills we reviewed in which available personnel exceeded authorized strength, we estimated that in fiscal year 1977 the Army may have paid unnecessary bonuses of more than \$9.6 million to about 4,000 persons and incurred costs of about \$3.7 million to bring them into the Army.

In considering bonus legislation in March 1974, the House Committee on Armed Services said that prudent administration of bonus authority is mandatory and that wasteful practices cannot be tolerated. The Committee noted that the practice of paying bonuses in shortage skills to persons assigned outside those skills was contrary to the intent of the Congress. In administering the bonus program, the Army does not appear to be following the intent of the Congress which was that bonuses be used only to attract personnel for critical and shortage skills. We believe that the payment of bonuses to persons in skills with more personnel than needed and, consequently, who cannot be used in their MOSs, is unnecessary and should be discontinued.

Utilization and reporting practices result in showing personnel performing in their assigned positions without regard to whether they actually are working in those jobs. Although reports show how many qualified persons are available to fill combat positions, they do not show whether persons assigned or qualified for those positions have acquired experience needed to maintain proficiency in their skills.

The newly implemented Skill Qualification Test is designed to evaluate proficiency. However, we are aware of no criteria for determining the experience needed to maintain proficiency or for evaluating the quality of the experience individuals acquire. Without objective criteria and recorded experience data, the Army appears to have no sound basis for accessing whether its personnel are getting enough experience in their combat skills and whether they are combat ready.

Since personnel readiness reports are based largely on the reported number of persons in authorized MOSs, not on persons' actual current proficiency in their skills, in our opinion Army headquarters has no assurance that the reported personnel readiness condition is a realistic assessment of that condition or that problems are identified. We believe the criteria for measuring personnel readiness should be evaluated and clarified.

A personnel reporting system based on records of personnel duty and experience in combat skills should enable the Army to establish objective standards and to insure that it is maintaining its desired level of personnel readiness. At the same time it should enable the effective use of personnel in needed peacetime duties which are not now authorized after the persons have worked in their authorized positions for the time needed to accomplish current combat-type mission goals and to maintain proficiency.

In view of the Army's huge investment in and dependence on its personnel, we believe the Army Audit Agency, the Inspector General, and other evaluation organizations should devote continuing attention to effective enlisted personnel management and use, and to identifying areas in which improvements can be made.

We discussed the substance of our findings with officials of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Military Personnel Center, and Fort Carson, and we have considered their informal comments in this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of opportunities for improving the Army's management and use of enlisted personnel, including those with critically needed skills, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army:

- Designate a single authority to prescribe and enforce policies and regulations and to issue specific instructions to guide officials at all levels. Under

these regulations and instructions, officials should be held accountable for attaining the most effective distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable.

- Develop techniques for managing enlisted personnel by MOS to provide more effective control over the acquisition, distribution, assignment, and use of personnel, and a more realistic determination of the number needed in each skill.
- Determine whether the Army's policies and practices for the payment of enlistment bonuses are administered prudently and in accordance with the intent of the Congress. The policies and practices of the other military services should also be examined.
- Clarify the criteria to be used in measuring personnel readiness.
- Modify the personnel reporting system to provide realistic data for each individual on his job, experience obtained to maintain proficiency in his MOS, and other data needed by management officials for realistic assessment of combat readiness.
- Direct audit, inspection, and other evaluation organizations to intensify their examination of and reporting on the effectiveness of enlisted personnel management and use and to identify areas in which improvements can be made.
- Incorporate the improvements made into the Personnel Deployment and Distribution Management System now being developed.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR PERSONNEL FOR POLICIES GOVERNING
THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Personnel distribution and utilization policies cut across the spectrum of command and staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCSPER), Commander, Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), and field commanders all play a part--DCSPER as the policy promulgator, the Commander of MILPERCEN as the implementer through the mechanics of distribution and assignment, and the field commander as the user.

DCSPER is responsible to the Chief of Staff for all functions performed by his Army staff agency, which includes submitting reports, making recommendations, and implementing guidelines. DCSPER promulgates policy within his area of responsibility. This includes planning, developing, evaluating the use of personnel, and modifying policies when necessary. Regulations stipulate the procedures to implement headquarter's policies.

Army Regulation (AR) 600-200, "The Enlisted Personnel Management System," dated March 1965 and subsequently amended, says that "* * * effective utilization is a responsibility of every commander, supervisor, and unit personnel officer." It also says that "* * * major and intermediate commanders will establish procedures to insure efficient utilization of soldiers within their command." This regulation does not place any responsibility outside the chain of command for insuring that enlisted personnel are properly used.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) officials said the commander's role is the most difficult because the commander is responsible for accomplishing those missions assigned him with available resources. Local conditions or mission requirements sometimes dictate that a commander use personnel outside their assigned positions or their MOSSs.

GAO note: The substance of this summary was reviewed by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel officials, and some revisions have been made to recognize their observations and suggestions.

AR 10-5 dated April 1, 1975, "Organization and Functions of the Department of Army," gives the ODCSPER general staff the responsibility for management of military personnel, which specifically includes personnel distribution and utilization.

Chief of Staff Regulation 10-21 dated December 3, 1976, "Organization and Functions of the ODCSPER," assigns personnel management responsibility at the Army staff level to the Director, Military Personnel Management, ODCSPER. For enlisted personnel, this responsibility is assigned to its Enlisted Division. The only document specifying any responsibilities within this division is the ODCSPER organizational chart. The division chief said that the Structure and Sustainment Branch generally has utilization responsibility unless malutilization affects unit readiness; in that case, responsibility resides in the Distribution and Readiness Branch, which is also responsible for distribution.

DCSPER does not have a direct role in policing the system. This responsibility rests within the chain of command, which is where direct management is accomplished. ODCSPER involvement is on a management-by-exception basis. Detailed analysis of a problem situation is made only after it comes to the attention of the Enlisted Division. Techniques used to identify problem situations include visits to field units and reviews of unit readiness reports submitted by major commands. None of its branches has been assigned specific responsibility for regularly monitoring Army-wide personnel distribution or utilization by MOS.

Officials said that ODCSPER used the MOS mismatch report (DCSPER 373) as a monitoring device until it transferred responsibility for the report to MILPERCEN. MILPERCEN now provides the Enlisted Division with summary statistics from the mismatch report. ODCSPER officials said that no one within their office verifies the accuracy of the data provided in the report since MILPERCEN's Personnel Information Systems Directorate has this responsibility. ODCSPER staff attend MILPERCEN monthly staff briefings at which action may be planned to correct assignment and distribution problems.

ODCSPER also relies on checks and balances within the chain of command, as addressed in AR 600-200. In addition, inspections by a higher command and/or the Inspector General may uncover violations, or a person may report his/her malutilization.

ODCSPER has no standard procedures for corrective action after personnel malutilization problems have been identified and does not maintain a comprehensive log of actions that have been taken. ODCSPER resolves problems only if a situation is so unique that it cannot be resolved by the command or by reassignment of a person by the Commander, MILPERCEN.

Using Army-wide strength data and other available information, ODCSPER seeks to identify causes of problems and formulate solutions. ODCSPER has no direct authority over line commanders, but it may advise, recommend, or coordinate actions to improve use of personnel. ODCSPER is not required to report any problems to the Chief of Staff.

ODCSPER officials said that AR 10-5 assigns personnel management responsibility to MILPERCEN when it identifies MILPERCEN as an agency that has the primary mission of executing policy. MILPERCEN is under the supervision of Headquarters, Department of the Army, but is not a major Army command or part of a major Army command.

DCSPER Regulation 340-2 dated May 14, 1976, clarifies the staff relationship between DCSPER and MILPERCEN and defines the MILPERCEN mission and functions as follows:

- Execute and recommend military personnel policies, systems, and programs.
- Develop and supervise procedures applicable to military personnel management and development and those directly related services, including personnel information systems, in support of the soldier and the chain of command.
- Execute the functions delineated in MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5.

The MILPERCEN Commander is responsible for planning and implementing policies, evaluating the use of personnel, and recommending modification of policies as appropriate.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INSTALLATIONS

According to MILPERCEN officials, the following regulations set out all criteria limiting the reassignment of enlisted personnel:

- Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1315.7, "Rotation and Stabilization of Military Personnel Assignments."
- AR 614-5, "Stabilization of Tours," dated November 12, 1973.
- AR 614-6, "Permanent Change of Station Policy," dated January 3, 1975.
- AR 614-30, "Overseas Service," dated March 16, 1976.
- AR 614-200, "Enlisted Personnel Selection, Training and Assignment System," dated June 1970 and subsequently amended.

AR 614-6 gives MILPERCEN the authority to approve reassignments. AR 614-200 says that the Army's needs are the overriding consideration in selecting individuals for reassignment.

The regulations include many restrictions that seem to apply in only a small number of cases. Major restrictions prohibit:

- A second permanent change of station within the same year unless covered by exception or approved by headquarters.
- An involuntary assignment overseas within 1 year after returning from an overseas assignment.
- Nonadherence to provisions of DOD Directive 1315.7

GAO note: The substance of this summary was reviewed by Military Personnel Center officials, and some revisions have been made to recognize their observations and suggestions.

DOD Directive 1315.7 establishes assignment policies prescribing the number of assignments and the tour length for first term and career soldiers. MILPERCEN officials said these policies are predicated on budgetary constraints imposed by the Congress and restrict the number of permanent change-of-station moves.

AR 614-6 establishes restrictions on permanent change-of-station assignments which are to be authorized only as necessary. It also says that if strict adherence to stabilization policy

"* * * impairs operational readiness or appears to cause illogical personnel situations, major commanders will submit a request for exception, including justification to Headquarters, Department of the Army."

Officials of the proponent for this regulation, that is, the organization assigned primary responsibility for the subject matter, said this language provides the basis for commanders to request that malutilized individuals who are surplus to their installations be reassigned.

MILPERCEN officials said that MILPERCEN does not use special management techniques to make certain that personnel with Army-defined, critical skills are properly used. Also, MILPERCEN does not monitor or control the use of personnel to determine or make certain that individuals work in their assigned positions.

AR 600-200, "The Enlisted Personnel Management System," dated March 1965 and subsequently amended, says that "* * * effective utilization is a responsibility of every commander, supervisor, and unit personnel officer * * *" within prescribed policies and procedures.

MILPERCEN is responsible for the conduct and supervision of all enlisted personnel functions and programs. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Regulation 340-2, "Staff Relationship with Commanders, USADA and MILPERCEN," dated May 14, 1976, says that MILPERCEN will execute functions delineated in MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5, "Organization and Functions," dated July 1, 1976.

MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 says that MILPERCEN's Commanding General executes and recommends military personnel policies and develops and supervises procedures applicable to military personnel management. The Director, Enlisted

Personnel Management Directorate, MILPERCEN, is responsible for the worldwide distribution, assignment, and professional development of enlisted personnel.

MILPERCEN officials said no single section, branch, or division in MILPERCEN has overall responsibility for the effective utilization of all enlisted personnel. However, MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 indicates that:

- The career branches, Assignment Support Branch, Personnel Inventory and Analysis Branch, Monetary Incentives Management Branch, and the Schools Branch have some responsibilities for monitoring enlisted personnel utilization.
- The Personnel Management Assistance Systems Branch has responsibility for providing guidance and coordination to Personnel Management Assistance Systems Teams which carry out certain projects addressing utilization of personnel.

AR 614-200 says the Assignment Support Branch is the single contact point where field units report surpluses.

No other offices have responsibilities for monitoring or controlling the utilization of personnel assigned to a field installation.

CAREER DIVISIONS AND BRANCHES

MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 assigns branches of the three career divisions (Combat Arms, Combat Service Support, and Combat Support) responsibilities for monitoring assignments of Noncommissioned Officer Education System graduates to insure effective Army-wide distribution and opportunities for career progression. Officials in the three career branches we visited (Inventory/Armor, Field Artillery/Air Defense, and Transportation/Aviation Maintenance) said the career branches are also responsible for directing the assignments of individual soldiers. Officials said this is accomplished by reviewing assignment nominations to insure compatibility between the nominee and the qualifications specified on the requisition.

Branch personnel review career management information files on all personnel in grades E-6 and above and on some other individuals each time a personnel action occurs, such as promotion or change of station. These files contain information on primary, secondary, and duty MOSs.

Records are not uniformly maintained in the various branches for personnel in grades E-5 and below.

According to officials, these records, which include a comparison of individuals' primary and duty MOSSs, are reviewed periodically in each of the branches. If primary and duty MOSSs differ, the branch may send a letter (1) to the commander advising him of the situation, the controlling regulation, and the adverse impact the malutilization may have on the soldier or (2) to the malutilized soldier advising him of the possible impact on his career. The branches cannot require commanders to take corrective action, but they can require a response identifying actions taken.

Another technique rarely used is either to (1) consider malutilized personnel with needed MOSSs as filling an installation's current requisitions or (2) refuse to fill open requisitions for MOSSs in which personnel are malutilized. Officials also said a career branch can reassign a malutilized individual if the individual meets certain criteria, but this authority is rarely exercised.

Reporting of mismatch statistics to a higher level is not required. However, data on a limited number of MOSSs is provided each week to the Deputy Director, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate.

ASSIGNMENT SUPPORT BRANCH

The Assignment Support Branch submits reports of surplus personnel to the Systems Coordination Branch for input into the Centralized Assignment Procedures computer system. Reassignments of surplus personnel are to be made according to personnel distribution priorities and assignment policies. MILPERCEN's objective is to reassign the most eligible individual from among those with the needed MOS and grade, thus equalizing desirable and undesirable assignments. The regulation says that selection of surplus personnel will follow selection of qualified volunteers when filling overseas requirements.

• Before December 1976, AR 614-200 provided that enlisted personnel be reported surplus if they could not be used in

- accordance with the Army's utilization criteria,
- primary MOS while receiving shortage MOS pay, or
- primary MOS when it appeared as a shortage MOS in reclassification guidance.

Since December 1976 field commanders must report only surplus bonus recipients in grades E-1 through E-8 under certain conditions to the Assignment Support Branch. Field commanders may report nonbonus personnel at their discretion.

PERSONNEL INVENTORY AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 assigned responsibility for monitoring MOS mismatch to the Personnel Inventory and Analysis Support Branch. It describes the branch's function as monitoring the MOS mismatch program to assure that personnel utilization and MOS imbalances are maintained within acceptable limits. The branch has no formal operating procedures. Branch officials described how these responsibilities are implemented.

The branch monitors the MOS mismatch program by summarizing, analyzing, and communicating information obtained from the DCSPER 373 mismatch report series prepared by the Personnel Information Systems Directorate. Each month the branch receives parts 2, 3, and 10 of this report, which contain summary data on the number of MOS mismatches by command, MOS, and grade for nonbonus, enlisted bonus, and selective reenlistment bonus personnel. The branch summarizes the data, compares it with previous data to identify trends, and verbally communicates its analyses to the Structure and Sustainment Branch in ODCSPER and to the Forces Command. This information is not communicated to a higher level in MILPERCEN unless the mismatch rate increases significantly. Although available to all commands, only three other commands have infrequently requested the data. The Personnel Inventory and Analysis Branch does not require any feedback on how, or if, the data is used.

The Personnel Inventory and Analysis Branch sends part 9 of the DCSPER 373 mismatch report quarterly to major commands without review. It contains MOS mismatch data by field unit. The field does not provide MILPERCEN feedback as to how this data is used.

MONETARY INCENTIVES MANAGEMENT BRANCH

The Monetary Incentives Management Branch monitors the Army's special policies concerning the proper utilization of bonus recipients. AR 600-200, paragraph 9-2, says that bonus payments are intended to induce members to serve their full enlistment or reenlistment period in the skill for which the

bonus was paid. It also says that all malassigned bonus recipients will be monitored at all command levels and reported through ODCSPER to the Congress.

Special criteria regulate the use of bonus recipients. An individual who receives a bonus will be used in:

- The primary MOS for which the bonus was paid, which includes normal skill/career progression.
- A comparable MOS approved by MILPERCEN.
- Any MOS directed by the Secretary of the Army.

These criteria differ from utilization criteria for nonbonus recipients, which essentially require that a soldier be used in a primary, secondary, or substitutable MOS.

MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 gives the branch responsibility for monitoring the field's use of enlisted bonus recipients and submitting a related semiannual report to the Congress through ODCSPER, Office of the Secretary of the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are not aware of any additional formal instructions which clarify these responsibilities.

Branch officials said they monitor the use of bonus recipients through the DCSPER 373 mismatch report and control movement out of bonus MOSs by exercising approval authority over MOS redesignations. AR 600-200, paragraph 2-31, prohibits redesignating or changing a bonus recipient's primary MOS during the period of service covered by the bonus, with certain exceptions, including changes caused by promotions in the normal career progression, reclassifications, or MOS test failure. Except for promotions within the normal career progression, the branch must concur in such actions before an individual can move out of a bonus MOS. Officials estimated that the branch approves no more than about 15 of 300 requests annually.

The DCSPER 373 mismatch report series provides the branch information necessary for intensively managing the assignment and use of bonus recipients and for preparing the required semiannual reports. The DCSPER 373 report can also be used to identify trends and highlight problem areas, but this has not been done. The DCSPER 373 report provides the branch summary malutilization data each month and by-name malutilization data each quarter.

In preparing the semiannual report to the Congress, the branch sends listings by name of malutilized bonus recipients to the various Army installations for

- verification or correction of data,
- reassignment of malutilized soldiers when possible,
and
- reporting changes back to the branch.

The branch reviews the reported changes and modifies the report to reflect the changes. Branch officials said they neither verify the accuracy of the annotated data nor require action on those uncorrected cases of malutilization.

The branch prepares the report. The Chief, Enlisted Procedures and Force Management Division, reviews the report and sends it to the Director, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate for informal review. He, in turn, sends the report to the Director, Military Personnel Management, ODCSPER.

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR/SERGEANT MAJOR'S OFFICE

The Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major's Office is responsible for directing the selection and assignment of all E-9 and promotable E-8 personnel. The office has no written procedures for implementing its stated responsibilities.

An official told us that the office controls how Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Majors are used. A field unit must request the office's permission if one is to be reassigned within the installation or reassigned outside his primary MOS. The professionalism of each individual Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major assures that he will report if he is malutilized. However, reassignments are not made solely because one is used outside his primary MOS, and few reassignments are made for this reason. They are usually reassigned when a position opens on another installation.

This office provides no written or oral reports to higher levels on the use of personnel under its management unless requested by the Director, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate. This rarely occurs.

SCHOOLS BRANCH

According to MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 the Schools Branch is responsible for assuring proper utilization of enlisted personnel who have completed civilian schooling. The branch maintains a file on each student. Upon graduation the branch awards the individual an MOS corresponding with the training received and assures that the graduate's first assignment is to a unit requiring his new skill. The Schools Branch notifies the appropriate career branch of the individual's new credentials, and the career branch assumes all future responsibility for managing the individual's career.

As of March 31, 1976, only 64 enlisted personnel were attending civilian schools. The program was terminated by the Congress in 1976.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE SYSTEM BRANCH

AR 600-61, "Personnel Management Assistance System," established Personnel Management Assistance Teams at

- MILPERCEN,
- Forces Command (FORSCOM),
- Training and Doctrine Command,
- U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, and
- Eighth U.S. Army.

AR 600-61 says that MILPERCEN is responsible for

- monitoring the operation of the Army-wide personnel system,
- insuring the accomplishment of personnel projects as directed by the Department of the Army, and
- operating a Department of the Army Personnel Management Assistance Team.

MILPERCEN officials identified team and Inspector General investigations as its only management tools for determining whether enlisted personnel actually are properly utilized.

According to MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5, the teams:

- Visit field installations to evaluate personnel practices and procedures.
- Recommend corrective actions.
- Coordinate identification and resolution of problems requiring assistance or corrective action by Army headquarters.
- Report findings to Army headquarters' staff agencies.

Teams make two types of visits--assistance and inspection. In each type of visit a team identifies personnel management problems. In an inspection visit it evaluates situations without determining the causes of problems. In an assistance visit it provides onsite assistance to eliminate the causes of problems. AR 600-61 recommends that all FORSCOM team visits be assistance visits, and a team official said that they are. All European visits are inspections.

AR 600-51 requires that teams visit field activities at least annually. MILPERCEN teams conduct assistance visits at installations under major commands that do not have their own team. Also, a member of the MILPERCEN team accompanies each major command team on visits to:

- Learn of problems in implementing the personnel management system.
- Provide assistance in resolving problems requiring headquarters action.
- Advise team members of policy changes.
- Insure coordination between headquarters and the field team to resolve policy questions.
- Furnish headquarters staff with report extracts relevant to their functions or responsibilities.
- Provide major commands with feedback on problems resolved through team visits.

DA Pamphlet 600-7, "Personnel Management Assistance System Visit Procedures," dated September 1976, suggests but does not require comparing the position MOS with an incumbent's primary, secondary, or substitute MOS to determine enlisted personnel assignment and utilization. Procedures also require that Army-directed projects be carried out if

time permits. Of 13 Army-directed projects, only the selective reenlistment bonus and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Educational System projects directly addressed personnel utilization. The latter project was discontinued in October 1976 because the program goals had changed and few malutilized graduates had been identified.

Records maintenance is addressed in the Survey of Consolidated Military Personnel Activities Operations Project. This project is intended primarily to determine the accuracy of personnel data through personal interviews, but it is also intended to address personnel utilization through interviews and review of records.

At the conclusion of a visit, commanders at local, intermediate, and major commands are required to take action to resolve problems that have been found. Information on any problems field officials cannot resolve is forwarded to MILPERCEN's Field Activities Division for resolution.

"Personnel Management Assistance System Branch Procedures," dated November 1976, provide that the branch coordinate special problems identified during field visits with the proponent agency and the responsible action officer. Officials said that the headquarters team representative gives the project proponent in headquarters an oral briefing and a document summarizing the findings of the visit.

The team prepares a report on its visit and forwards copies to the military personnel officer at the activity visited, installation commander, major command, and a headquarters representative. The branch receives the report and forwards it to the Chief, Field Activities Division, for review.

The branch procedure is for the team to provide the inspector general of the local, intermediate, and major command with reports of inspection visits and to suggest areas that may merit further inspection. Also, the branch's operations manual provides that summaries of findings be prepared bimonthly for the headquarters Inspector General, Field Activities Division, and the Personnel Management Systems Directorate. These summaries do not identify the installations visited.

Branch officials said they are not required to follow up, and do not follow up, findings to ascertain corrective actions taken until the team's next scheduled annual visit. The proponent is responsible for making certain that corrective action is taken.

Branch officials identified the Monetary Incentives Management Branch and the Noncommissioned Officer Educational Systems Branch as the proponents for the selective reenlistment bonus and educational system projects, respectively. The proponent action officer for the bonus project said that team reports assist the Personnel Management Assistance System Branch in identifying problems but are not used for implementing corrective action on an individual basis. He also said that an additional function of the report was to remind field installations that MILPERCEN is concerned about the proper use of bonus recipients. The proponent action officer for the discontinued Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Educational System project said the branch might advise commanders to take corrective action if a high rate of malutilization of graduates was identified.

PROFFESIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION BRANCH

MILPERCEN Regulation 10-5 says that the Professional Development and Evaluation Branch is responsible for administering, maintaining, and controlling policies and procedures concerning the utilization of enlisted personnel. According to a branch official, the branch's only concern is formulating policy. The branch has requested that the Inspector General make personnel utilization an item of interest during inspections but has received no recent reports on this matter.

Reporting with MILPERCEN on personnel utilization takes various forms:

- Normal (written) or informal (verbal).
- Required or not required by regulation.
- Periodic or special event.

The following table reflects the types of reports used and includes all cases where a branch or office has a specific reporting requirement.

<u>Type of report</u>	<u>Branch</u>	<u>Subject matter</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
Formal, required, periodic	Monetary Incentives Management Branch	Use of bonus recipients	Through ODCSPER and Offices of Secretary of Army and Defense, to the Congress
Formal, not required, periodic	Career Branches	Reports on specified MOS	Deputy Director, Enlisted Personnel Management Systems Directorate
Formal, required, exception basis	Personnel Management Assistance System Branch	a. Assistance visit b. Report extract and oral briefing on assistance visit	Installation commander Headquarters' proponent
Formal, not required, exception basis	Personnel Management Assistance System Branch	a. Assistance visit b. Summaries of findings of team visits	Field activities division Department of the Army, Inspector General, Field Activities Division, and Personnel Management Systems Directorate
Informal, required, periodic	None	None	None
Informal, not required, periodic	Personnel Inventory and Analysis Branch	Mismatch statistics	ODCSPER
Informal, required, exception basis	None	None	None
Informal, not required, exception basis	Personnel Inventory and Analysis Branch	Significant increases in mismatch rate	Higher organizational levels in Enlisted Personnel Management Systems Directorate

ARMY CRITICAL SKILLS LIST
IN EFFECT IN NOVEMBER 1976

MOS

05C (note a)	Radio Teletypewriter Operator
11C (note a)	Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman
11D (note a)	Armor Reconnaissance Specialist
11E (note a)	Armor Crewman
12E (note a)	Atomic Demolitions Munitions Specialist
12F	Combat Engineer Tracked Vehicle Crewman
13E (note a)	Field Artillery Cannon Operations/Fire Direction Assistant
15D (note a)	Lance Missile Crewman
15F	Honest John Crewman
15Z	Field Artillery Missile/Rocket Senior Sergeant
16D	Hawk Missile Crewman
16E (note a)	Hawk Fire Control Crewman
16J	Defense Acquisition Radar Crewman
16P (note a)	Chapparral Crewman
17K (note a)	Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman
22N	Nike-Hercules Missile - Launcher Repairman
24C	Improved Hawk Firing Section Mechanic
24G	Improved Hawk Information Coordination Central Mechanic
24H	Improved Hawk Fire Control Repairman
24J	Improved Hawk Pulse Radar Repairman
24K	Improved Hawk Continuous Wave Radar Repairman
24V	Improved Hawk Maintenance Chief
26C	Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairman
27B	Land Combat Support System Repairman
27E	Wire Guided Missile Repairman
27H	Shillelagh Missile System Repairman
31G	Tactical Communications Chief
35L	Avionic Communications Equipment Repairman
35R	Avionic Radar Equipment Repairman
46D	Improved Hawk Mechanical Systems Repairman
52B	Power Generation Equipment Operator/Mechanic
52D	Power Generation Equipment Repairman
76S	Automotive Repair Parts Specialist
82C (note a)	Artillery Surveyor
97B	Counter Intelligence Agent
97C	Area Intelligence Specialist
97D	Military Intelligence Coordinator

a/Enlistment bonus was paid to enlistees for this skill as of March 1977.

FORT CARSON, COLORADOENLISTED PERSONNELWITH CRITICAL SKILLS REPORTEDAS OF DECEMBER 31, 1976

MOS	Position Title	Total	Unassigned	Assigned	Assigned	
					Properly	Improperly
05C	Radio Teletypewriter Operator	35	10	25	12	13
11C	Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman	813	200	613	594	19
11D	Armor Reconnaissance Specialist	467	125	342	326	16
11E	Armor Crewman	1737	579	1158	1112	46
12E	Atomic Demolitions Munitions Specialist	21	5	16	15	1
13E	Field Artillery Cannon Operations/ Fire Direction Assistant	144	25	119	112	7
15D	Lance Missile Crewman	1	1	0	0	0
15F	Honest John Crewman	2	2	0	0	0
16D	Hawk Crewman	2	2	0	0	0
16J	Defense Acquisition Radar Crewman	16	2	14	13	1
16P	Chapparal Crewman	226	41	185	163	22
17K	Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman	83	13	70	63	7
17M	Unattended Ground Sensor Specialist	1	1	0	0	0
26C	Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairman	9	1	8	7	1
27B	Land Combat Support System Test Specialist	8	0	8	6	2
27E	Wire Guided Missile Repairman	11	4	7	7	0
27F	Light Air Defense Electrical System Repairman	20	4	16	15	1
27H	Shillelagh Missile System Repairman	13	0	13	4	9
31G	Tactical Communications Chief	55	8	47	47	0
35L	Avionic Communications Equipment Repairman	13	10	3	2	1
35R	Avionic Radar Equipment Repairman	6	4	2	2	0
45N	Tank Turret Repairman	27	3	24	20	4
52B	Power Generation Equipment Operator/Mechanic	265	59	206	193	13
52D	Power Generation Equipment Repairman	57	12	45	33	12
82C	Artillery Surveyor	91	33	58	55	3
97B	Counter Intelligence Agent	9	1	8	6	2
97C	Area Intelligence Specialist	1	0	1	1	0
	Total	<u>4133</u>	<u>1145</u>	<u>2988</u>	<u>2808</u>	<u>180</u>
	Percent of total	100	27.7	72.3		
	Percent of total assigned			100	94.0	6.0

GAO note: Critical skills taken from lists effective in November 1976.

COMPARISON OF RECORDED AND ESTIMATED ACTUALUSE OF PERSONNEL WITH CRITICAL SKILLSAS OF DECEMBER 31, 1976

<u>Condition (note a)</u>	<u>Recorded</u>		<u>Projected number</u>	<u>Actual</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>		<u>Sample error percent</u>	<u>rate (note b) plus or minus</u>
Improper use shown in Fort Carson's recorded assignments	180	<u>c/6</u>	-	-	-
Improper use because assigned job not being done, and soldier is:					
MOS mismatched for his actual duties	-	-	281	9.4	3.4
Performing a job in his secondary MOS	-	-	81	2.7	1.9
Working at a different skill level than authorized	-	-	314	10.5	3.6
Working in a job for which he is otherwise qualified	-	-	<u>478</u>	<u>16.0</u>	<u>4.3</u>
Total	180	6	1,154	38.6	
Properly used	<u>2,808</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>1,834</u>	<u>61.4</u>	
Total assigned	<u>2,988</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>2,988</u>	<u>100.0</u>	
Unassigned	<u>1,143</u>		<u>1,143</u>		
Total personnel	<u>4,131</u>		<u>4,131</u>		

a/Improper use of personnel is based on terms used in Army regulations.

b/Error rate with 95-percent confidence is based on results of interviews of a sample of 256 enlisted personnel having critical skills.

c/Not the same as Fort Carson's reported rate of 9.2 percent, which was based on local criteria. (See p. 25.)

COMPARISON OF RECORDED AND ESTIMATED ACTUALSTATUS OF CRITICAL POSITIONSAS OF DECEMBER 31, 1976

<u>Condition (note a)</u>	<u>Recorded</u>		<u>Actual</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Projected Number</u>	<u>Sample error rate (note b) Percent</u>	<u>Plus or minus</u>
Improperly filled according to Fort Carson's recorded assignments	230	7.6	-	-	-
Improperly filled, assigned soldier performing in another job, and he is:					
MOS mismatched			307	10.2	3.6
Qualified in his SMOS			117	3.9	2.3
Working at a different skill level than authorized			177	5.9	2.8
Otherwise qualified			<u>602</u>	<u>20.0</u>	4.7
Total	230	7.6	1,203	40.0	
Properly filled	<u>2,778</u>	<u>92.4</u>	<u>1,805</u>	<u>60.0</u>	
Total filled	3,008	<u>100.0</u>	3,008	<u>100.0</u>	
Unfilled	<u>529</u>		<u>529</u>		
Total	<u>3,537</u>		<u>3,537</u>		

a/Improperly filled positions are based on improper use of people as defined in Army regulations.

b/Error rate with 95-percent confidence is based on interviews of a sample of 255 enlisted personnel assigned to positions requiring critical skills.