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Among programs to increase the ratio of combat troops to support forces without increasing overall U.S. military forces in Europe is one prescribed by the "Nunn Amendment" which requires conversion of headquarters and military support personnel to combat personnel. The Nunn Amendment required a reduction of 18,000 in authorized support personnel in the services in Europe during fiscal years (FYs) 1975 and 1976. Findings/Conclusions: Implementation of the amendment caused an increase in U.S. combat forces in Europe and a decrease in the authorized forces for headquarters and support services. Military services reduced support positions in Europe by 18,836, but many of these were merely "paper" reductions. Total military personnel in Europe actually increased during FYs 1975 and 1976 because there were more authorized spaces than people in Europe at the beginning of FY 1975. New combat units were drawn from elements of the Army's force structure. While more combat units and increased manpower provided added capability to meet the threat of a short war, there was a deterioration of some wartime combat support capabilities. Some support reductions have resulted in greater need for increased host nation support. Noncombat areas omitted from reductions in the amendment were U.S. military community support and noncombat positions at the decision level. Recommendations: The Secretary of Defense should require the Army in Europe to review community support positions of noncombat positions at the division level to identify those that will have less impact on wartime needs than reductions made under the Nunn Amendment. In considering future legislation dealing with similar changes in military manpower, the Congress should require the Secretary to describe expected results with respect to manpower implications for actual as well as authorized manpower levels, cost implications, and impact on combat capability. (HTW)

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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

Benefits And Problems Associated With Improving The Ratio Of U. S. Combat Troops To Military Support Personnel In Europe

The Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975 contained a provision which required the Secretary of Defense to reduce authorized support troops in Europe by 18,000 during fiscal years 1975 and 1976 and permitted him to increase combat troops up to the number of reductions made.

This report describes the implementation of this provision of the act and its impact on combat capabilities in Europe.



LCD-78-408A
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-146896

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is an unclassified version of our report which discusses the Department of Defense's implementation of Public Law 93-365, section 2 (known as the "Nunn Amendment"), which required a reduction of 18,000 authorized military support personnel spaces in Europe in fiscal years 1975 and 1976 and permitted the Secretary of Defense to increase authorized military support spaces equivalently. We evaluated DOD's compliance with the law and reviewed its effect on the combat support base in Europe.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent today to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on Armed Services; and the Secretary of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas R. Acheson".

Comptroller General
of the United States

D I G E S T

Because of continuing improvement in Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities in recent years--particularly to conduct "Blitzkrieg" warfare--the United States has undertaken programs to improve its combat effectiveness in Europe.

Some of these programs have increased the ratio of combat troops to support forces without increasing overall U.S. military forces in Europe.

One program to convert headquarters and military support personnel to combat personnel was prescribed by an amendment to the fiscal year 1975 Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Act. This amendment is referred to as the "Nunn Amendment" after Senator Sam Nunn, who was a moving force behind it. It required a reduction of 18,000 in authorized support personnel--contrasted to personnel onhand--in the services in Europe during fiscal years 1975 and 1976. (See p. 3.)

The Secretary of Defense was to allocate the reductions among the military services and had the option of increasing combat personnel up to the number of reductions in support forces.

CHANGES IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE

The Nunn Amendment caused an increase in U.S. combat forces in Europe, particularly in the Army and the Air Force, and a decrease in the authorized forces for headquarters and support services. The U.S. military services reduced authorized support positions in Europe by 18,836. How-

ever, many of these were "paper" reductions, not numbers of personnel actually leaving Europe.

Actually, total military personnel in Europe in combat and support positions increased by 8,646 during fiscal years 1975 and 1976. This was possible because there were 19,724 more authorized spaces than people in Europe at the beginning of fiscal year 1975. (See p. 12.)

In conjunction with these reductions, 13,435 combat spaces were added in Europe through the end of fiscal year 1976 by increasing personnel in existing units and by buying new combat units. An additional 4,100 combat spaces were added by the Air Force in fiscal year 1977.

New combat units were drawn from elements of the Army's force structure in the United States and provided

- two mechanized brigades,
- an attack helicopter company, and
- two field artillery battalions. (See p. 13.)

Air Force increases have resulted in

- a second wing of F-111 aircraft,
- retention of 66 F-4 aircraft in Europe, and
- deployment of a new tactical air control system. (See pp. 17 and 18.)

While more combat units and increased manning in existing units provided added capability to meet the threat of short, intense war, these gains were not achieved without a deterioration of some wartime combat support capabilities, particularly in the Army.

Some of the support reductions had a direct adverse impact on combat support capabilities.

Others, together with the shrinking U.S. support base over the past several years, have resulted in greater need for increased host nation support, including use of foreign national civilians and contractual support-- areas that could have a potential adverse impact on wartime capability.

Some noncombat areas were excluded by the Army from consideration for reduction. As a result, other support positions more essential to wartime needs were reduced.

SOME NONCOMBAT AREAS WERE
OMITTED FROM REDUCTION

In the early stage of planning for the Nunn Amendment, the Army decided not to reduce positions in two areas--U.S. military community support and noncombat positions at the division level. Community support includes many functions such as commissary and postal services, recreation, libraries, transportation services, and education programs for which there is little or no wartime need. At the time of GAO's review, there were 4,517 positions authorized for these purposes. GAO estimates there were between 10,000 and 15,000 eligible support positions such as supply and administrative services in the divisions, which were not considered for reduction. Community support was omitted to avoid lower morale and support to the soldier and his family. Omission of division level support was consistent with Department of Army emphasis on non-divisional reductions under mutual balance force reduction options. (See p. 10.)

The community support area in particular seems a good candidate for reductions to meet Nunn Amendment requirements. It appears that many of these functions could be accomplished under either contractual arrangements or performed by local nationals.

Excluding certain areas from consideration for reduction resulted in reducing other

support positions more essential to war-time needs. There is still an opportunity to convert less essential positions in the areas, which were not considered for reduction, to positions more essential to wartime operations.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the Army in Europe to review community support positions and noncombat positions at division level to identify those that will have less impact on war-time needs than reductions made under the Nunn Amendment. Any positions identified could be converted to other combat support positions more essential to wartime operations.

IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS ON COMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Over 11,000 reductions authorized by the Nunn Amendment have had minimal or no immediate adverse impact on combat support capabilities since many were paper changes with no effect on actual manpower levels. For example:

- Authorized but unfilled positions were reduced.
- Engineer units were redesignated as combat.
- Authorization of a Navy ship for Europe which was not deployed there was withdrawn. (See p. 20.)

In addition, about one-quarter of the Army's reductions were replaced with civilians.

However, changes in the military forces over the past 10 years and the requirements of the Nunn Amendment have added combat units while the support base has diminished--particularly in the Army.

During the Nunn Amendment period, Army evaluations of the impact of reductions in support personnel disclosed inadequacies in Europe in ammunition distribution, transportation,

and maintenance. In addition, GAO noted that support reductions also weakened the Army's ability to provide

--command and control of artillery firepower,

--supply line security,

--delivery of mines and obstacles to impede enemy armored vehicles, and

--deployment of augmentation forces. (See pp. 21 and 22.)

GAO did not find similar problems of the same magnitude for the Air Force and Navy in Europe.

INCREASED HOST NATION SUPPORT, INCLUDING CONTRACTING AND USE OF CIVILIANS

The United States is presently negotiating or has completed arrangements with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to receive various wartime support services, including procurement, telecommunications, transportation, facilities, construction, and airfield services. There are many problems to be resolved before this host nation support becomes reliable.

For example, some agreements state that priority for available resources will go to the host country. Also, military officials in Europe do not expect host nation arrangements to be completely resolved before the mid-1980s.

The Army and the Air Force contracted to replace some support personnel reduced in the areas of supply, security, and standby base maintenance. In addition, the Army replaced 3,368 military support positions with 2,700 non-U.S. civilian employees in such areas as transportation, supply, and security. There are serious questions about the value of non-U.S. civilians in wartime. For example:

- German laws governing the use of civilian employees take precedence over Army directives concerning local civilian manpower management. U.S. officials stated that there are no assurances that local civilians would be available to U.S. forces in case of war.
- The requirement to negotiate with Work Councils which represent the interests of civilians working for the U.S. forces hampers management flexibility.
- The Geneva Convention limits using civilians in wartime. (See p. 31.)

The Army presently employs about 47,000 non-U.S. civilians in Europe. Considering the increased emphasis on interdependence in NATO and the high cost of keeping U.S. forces in Europe, U.S. reliance on host nation support, contracting and use of non-U.S. civilians to augment a diminishing support base in Europe is undoubtedly necessary and desirable. However, until the problems created by such actions can be resolved, there is no assurance that U.S. forces will receive adequate wartime support.

An ongoing GAO review is addressing such questions as (1) is there a need for the Secretary of Defense to further develop a policy setting out U.S. goals for host nation support and (2) should the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to explain Department of Defense (DOD) goals and objectives on the application of host nation support, including the degree of assurance expected that such arrangements will work and the financial implications of such arrangements.

COST OF CONVERTING SUPPORT TO COMBAT TROOPS

The language of the Nunn Amendment does not indicate whether the Congress expected its implementation to result in greater or lesser costs. Additional costs associated with more use of civilians, contracting, and increasing

the combat component during fiscal years 1975 and 1976 were over \$150 million, consisting of about \$34 million for recurring costs and \$117 million for non-recurring costs. (See p. 36.)

Conversion of noncombat to combat troops alone will not likely result in overall savings, particularly when noncombat functions are carried on by civilians or provided under host nation support agreements.

Increasing the ratio of combat to support forces can, however, result in a greater "bang per buck" if excess support personnel can be eliminated and the support necessary to offset other reduced military support spaces can be obtained through less costly means than use of military personnel.

In considering future legislation dealing with similar changes in military manpower, the Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to describe expected results with respect to

- manpower implications for actual as well as authorized manpower levels,
- cost implications and
- impact on combat capability.

Legislation should reflect the results expected.

AGENCY COMMENTS

GAO did not request DOD's written comments on this report but discussed it with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They generally agreed with the report, which was revised where appropriate to incorporate many of their suggestions.

ABBREVIATIONS

ALO	authorized level of organization
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
BENELUX	Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GAO	General Accounting Office
LORAN	long range radio navigation
LS	labor service
MBFR	mutual balance force reduction
MP	military police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
UK	United Kingdom
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
WARSCAP	wartime support capability

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION


Increases and improvements in Soviet ground, naval, and air forces in Europe over the last 10 years are a continuing concern of both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders and the U.S. Congress. These include:

- The introduction of new tanks, mechanized infantry vehicles, and the shift from towed to self-propelled artillery gives the Warsaw Pact ground forces the capacity to conduct "Blitzkrieg" warfare.
- The apparent restructuring of Soviet air forces from a defensive to an offensive role enhances the capability of the Warsaw Pact to strike vital targets throughout NATO countries.
- For years, the Soviet Navy was concerned primarily with defending its own shores. Now the force consists of a modern, efficient Navy with offensive potential which operates worldwide.

The relative increase in Soviet military personnel in non-Soviet Europe beginning about 1967 is demonstrated in the graph on the following page.

The Congress has repeatedly expressed concern about the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Europe and about the large number of support troops, compared to combat forces, stationed in Europe. U.S. military manpower costs in Europe are estimated at about \$6.8 billion in fiscal year 1978, about 13 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) total active manpower costs.

Generally, the Congress monitors but does not control directly the level of U.S. military manpower in Europe. DOD manages the deployment of its manpower resources in Europe within the constraints of the overall military and civilian force levels authorized worldwide by the Congress in the annual Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization



SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Act. At the end of fiscal year 1976, about 13 percent of DOD's authorized active duty military and civilian personnel were in Europe, as shown in the following table.

	Number of personnel authorized		Percentage of Europe to worldwide share
	<u>Worldwide</u>	<u>Europe</u>	
Army	785,000	193,115	25
Navy and Marines	724,954	44,371	6
Air Force	590,000	69,918	12
Total military	<u>2,099,954</u>	<u>312,404</u>	15
DOD civilian	<u>1,058,000</u>	<u>84,398</u>	8
Total military and civilian personnel	<u>3,157,954</u>	<u>396,802</u>	13

Considering the increased Soviet threat and the substantial costs of stationing U.S. forces in Europe, the Congress, through an amendment to the fiscal year 1975 Defense Appropriation Authorization Act (Public Law 93-365, section 302) of August 1974--the "Nunn Amendment"--sought to achieve both improved military manpower efficiency and more combat power from available resources.

THE NUNN AMENDMENT

In February 1974, at the request of the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn visited Europe to investigate issues regarding U.S. troop deployments. He reported to the Chairman that:

"Top priority must be given to restructuring NATO forces, in particular, U.S. forces in Europe to produce more combat capability out of the resources that are available."

Senator Nunn's report noted that U.S. forces are structured for a long war and as an expeditionary force, meaning they have their own logistics support and can operate autonomously. The report suggested that considerable savings in support troops and costs might be achieved by relying on more host nation support. However, the report cautioned that such a move would sacrifice some U.S. autonomy over these areas.

After making his report, Senator Nunn proposed an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of fiscal year 1975 to require a 20-percent reduction (about 23,000) in Army headquarters and support military personnel in Europe over a 2-year period. Before the act was finalized, much debate occurred in the Congress about such areas as the U.S. military position in Europe and its relation to the NATO Allies, the mutual balance force reduction (MBFR) negotiations, and the Soviet threat. Some amendments being proposed at that time would have required unilateral reduction of up to 125,000 U.S. troops overseas.

As ultimately accepted by the Congress, the Nunn Amendment required reduction of 18,000 headquarters and noncombat military personnel in Europe DOD-wide to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1976. (See app. I.) Of these reductions, 6,000 had to be completed by June 30, 1975. The amendment also defined what could be considered "combat" by each military service and allowed the Secretary of Defense to addback combat personnel up to the number of support personnel reduced.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed actions by the military services to plan and implement the military support personnel reductions required by the Nunn Amendment and evaluated their impact on U.S. combat support capability.

We conducted our review at:

- Headquarters, United States European Command;
- Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe;
- Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe; and
- Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

It would have been impractical to visit each unit to evaluate individually the impact of the more than 20,000 support reductions under the amendment. However, we discussed the total reductions with the respective service headquarters and with officials at various echelons in over 20 units directly affected by the amendment reductions. We also discussed our observations with responsible officials of the U.S. European Command Headquarters and Army and Air Force Headquarters and Navy officials.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We did not request DOD's written comments on this report but discussed it with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They generally agreed with the report, which was revised where appropriate to incorporate many of their suggestions.

CHAPTER 2

PLANNING FOR REDUCTIONS OF NONCOMBAT PERSONNEL

In wartime fighting units must be adequately supported to survive and to sustain combat operations. In peacetime, support is necessary to maintain a high rate of readiness to fight. Some of the more obvious vital goods and services provided by support units, which are necessary to sustain readiness, include

- maintenance of combat equipment,
- resupply of expended ammunition and fuel, and
- communications to coordinate the operation of various combat units.

The Nunn Amendment specified the total number of support reductions to be accomplished and provided the military services with definitions of combat-type units by service. It did not, however, indicate how to allocate these reductions among the services and did not discuss planning to accomplish desired results. These decisions were left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. The amendment also permitted the Secretary to adback combat forces equal to the number of support forces reduced.

General guidance for planning Nunn Amendment reductions was provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the headquarters level of the military services, both in Washington and in Europe. Identification of the actual reductions was left to subordinate unit commanders in Europe.

DOD GUIDANCE

DOD planning guidance for implementing the Nunn Amendment stressed the following:

- Consistency with the Secretary of Defense's Program Decision Memorandum for Europe and the total forces.
- Use of existing U.S. bases and facilities with estimated costs of any new construction required as a result of combat adbacks.
- Retention of current overall authorized force levels (319,000 authorized military positions), including

the U.S. MBFR level for the Army Deleted authorized military positions) and the Air Force (34,000 authorized military positions) under NATO guidelines.

- Reductions should take advantage of civilianization, NATO rationalization, headquarters consolidation, and the proposed unified command plan changes.
- Combat additions should emphasize antiarmor capability.

In planning and implementing the Nunn Amendment, the military services needed to consider the effect of specific reductions on wartime readiness and the broader implications of the legislation on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. forces in Europe. Questions the services also needed to consider when planning to implement the amendment included:

- What kind of support was being provided and would its reduction result in reduced combat readiness?
- What support positions, units, and functions could be reduced or eliminated with minimum adverse effect on readiness for wartime operations?
- What could be done to compensate for possible loss of needed support capabilities?
- What use could be made of opportunities to increase combat personnel up to the number of support reductions?

Answers to these and other questions about the Nunn Amendment implementation are covered in chapters 3 through 6.

ARMY PLANNING UNDER THE NUNN AMENDMENT

The United States Army, Europe's (USAREUR's) stated objective in achieving Nunn Amendment reductions was to "reduce 13,503 Army support troops in Europe with the least degradation of combat readiness, morale and support to the soldier and his family * * *."

In selecting support reductions, USAREUR planners focused on support categories Deleted 14,200 support reductions, including various proposals to convert, reduce, and consolidate

units and military personnel, some of which had already been implemented.

Deleted

The specific units and activities to be reduced were tentatively selected from the general support areas identified in MBFR planning. Maximum reductions were to be planned in those areas having the least peacetime impact. This was followed by military position reductions in which civilianization appeared appropriate and civilians with needed skills were available. 1/

The Department of the Army (DA) worked closely with USAREUR to develop the list of proposed support reductions. In response to a DA request for reduction recommendations, USAREUR organized a special study group to, among other things, develop alternatives for accomplishing the required support reductions and to develop proposed increases in combat forces to offset the reductions.

The specific Army spaces reduced were ultimately selected by the USAREUR planning staff in coordination with representatives of USAREUR's major subordinate commands. A group consisting of the major USAREUR directorates convened regularly to discuss alternatives, problems, and progress in implementing the reductions. Recommendations concerning the proposed reductions were prepared by USAREUR's major directorates, subordinate commands, and the affected units and forwarded to USAREUR's planning team for review and consideration.

Planning for combat addbacks began with the assumption that credit would be taken for increases in the manning of existing units (2,500 spaces) and the addition of two mechanized brigades (7,500 spaces), leaving only options for increasing the force structure by an additional 3,500 combat spaces. USAREUR developed a number of alternatives for using the remaining spaces, which are discussed further in chapter 3.

1/USAREUR's initial planning for support reductions was based on DCD authority to hire up to 7,000 local national civilians to replace Nunn Amendment military reduced spaces. However, only 2,720 spaces were subsequently authorized.

Although increased host nation support subsequently became important, little mention of it appeared in the planning documents given to us during our review. A discussion of host nation support and its role in U.S. military readiness in Europe is discussed in chapter 5.

AIR FORCE PLANNING UNDER THE NUNN AMENDMENT

An important factor in the initial planning stages of the Nunn Amendment reductions was the definitions of combat and support under the amendment. The U.S. Air Force Headquarters was required by DOD to define its total force in Europe in terms of combat and support.

It divided combat and support as follows:

Combat

Tactical fighter	Tactical control
Tactical airlift	Strategic airlift
Tactical reconnaissance	Aerospace defense

Support

Airbase units	Office of special investigations
Combat support	Medical
Communications	Activities outside the Air Force
Airlift support	Miscellaneous support
Intelligence	Management headquarters
Weather	
Rescue and recovery	

Air Force officials in Europe told us that Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, had problems applying the Nunn Amendment to its combat and support operations. In their view, the amendment was primarily directed at the Army.

As a result, some Air Force units, not defined as combat units in the legislation, were administratively determined by the Air Staff to be combat and therefore not subject to reduction under Nunn. For example, the tactical control, strategic refueling/reconnaissance units, and the long range radio navigation (LORAN) D System were classified as combat for Nunn purposes. Strategic refueling, however, was not accepted by DOD Headquarters as properly coded combat. The Air Force

included tactical control because the system is actively involved in directing command and control of a tactical fighter wing. The LORAN System was also determined to be combat by the Air Staff and therefore was placed under the wing, which was classified entirely as combat by the Nunn Amendment.

Air Staff planning for support reductions was closely coordinated with DOD, major air command, and operating agencies. The losing parent command was allowed to evaluate and comment on each proposed reduction. At the U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE), level, a Nunn Amendment working group was formed consisting of representatives from each major Air Force unit in Europe. Recommendations for specific reductions were formulated and passed on to the Air Staff in Washington.

The Secretary of the Air Force or his designated representative had final approval authority for all reductions. The final Air Force military support reduction was 4,857, which represents approximately 27 percent of DOD reductions.

Planning for Air Force combat addbacks was somewhat different than for the other services. A programmed reduction in combat spaces was approved for fiscal year 1975 and by the end of fiscal year 1976 the Air Force had net addbacks of 480 spaces resulting from the Nunn Amendment. An additional 4,100 combat addbacks were made in fiscal year 1977. The Air Force addbacks included four new squadrons of F-111s in the United Kingdom (UK), three squadrons of F-4s, which were relocated within Germany rather than transferred to the United States as planned, and new tactical control units in various locations in northern Germany. Specific information regarding combat addbacks for all services, together with their missions and capabilities, is discussed in chapter 3.

NAVY PLANNING UNDER THE NUNN AMENDMENT

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations provided subordinate commands with the Secretary of Defense's reduction guidelines and requested each command to prepare a list of nominees. In addition to furnishing the Chief of Naval Operations a list of proposed reductions within its own command, U.S. Navy, Europe, also recommended support reductions for other Navy commands in Europe and nearby areas.

Deleted

Impact statements on proposed reductions were developed, and the Chief of Naval Operations subsequently selected 1,804 final support reductions from the major Navy commands in Europe.

Deleted

SELECTED NONCOMBAT AREAS WERE
OMITTED FROM POSSIBLE REDUCTION

In the early stages of planning for implementing the Nunn Amendment, the Army decided not to reduce community support positions and noncombat positions at division level. The decision not to reduce community support was apparently based on USAREUR's stated objective of implementing the amendment with the least degradation of morale and support to the soldier and his family. The decision not to reduce noncombat positions at division level was consistent with DA guidance in recently completed MBFR options to emphasize nondivisional reductions.

Community support includes a wide variety of basic support functions, such as commissary and postal services, recreation, libraries, transportation services, and education programs. In December 1975, there were 4,517 positions authorized for Army military communities in Europe.

It appears that many of the community support functions could be accomplished either under contractual arrangements or performed by local nationals. Such arrangements would seem particularly appropriate for many of the functions for which there is little or no wartime need.

Support within the division eligible for reduction includes such functions as supply and transportation; communications; and administrative services, such as personnel and finance. Based on information provided to us, we estimate 10,000 to 15,000 such support positions in Europe were not considered for reduction.

CONCLUSION

We believe that excluding community support positions and division level noncombat positions in the Army resulted in the reduction of other types of support positions more essential to wartime needs. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5 some of the support reductions resulted in actual or potential adverse impacts on wartime combat support capabilities.

We believe an opportunity still exists to identify less essential positions in areas which were not considered for reductions. Any positions so identified could be converted to positions more essential to wartime operations.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Army in Europe to identify community support positions and division level noncombat positions that will have less impact on wartime needs than other positions reduced under the Jann Amendment. The Army should then convert these positions to more essential combat support positions.

CHAPTER 3

ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE NUNN AMENDMENT

In fiscal years 1975 and 1976, DOD reduced authorized headquarters and noncombat military personnel spaces in Europe and related areas by 20,164 1/ as shown in the following table:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Reduction reported</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	6,550	6,953	13,503
Air Force	1,569	3,288	4,857
Navy	1,108	696	1,804
Total	<u>9,227</u>	<u>10,937</u>	<u>20,164</u>

However, reductions reported are not relatable to numbers of support personnel leaving Europe largely because the Nunn Amendment required reductions in authorized rather than on-hand personnel. Actually, total military personnel in Europe in both combat and support positions increased by 8,646 in fiscal years 1975 and 1976. This was possible because there were 19,724 more authorized spaces than people in Europe at the beginning of fiscal year 1975. A list of each of the specific types of units from which reductions were made is shown in appendixes II, III, and IV.

We believe that DOD satisfied the requirements of the Nunn Amendment. However, some reductions lessened wartime support capabilities in a number of functional areas or resulted in the need for increased reliance on host nations and foreign nationals for support. Our evaluation of the direct impact of support reductions made pursuant to the Nunn Amendment and prior manpower programs is contained in chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses increased reliance on host nations and foreign nationals for support.

In conjunction with the reductions of support personnel, DOD used the opportunity afforded by the amendment to increase the combat component. A net total of 13,435 combat

1/Includes 1,328 support reductions to compensate for support positions added with the deployment of Brigades 75 and 76 to Europe, providing total net support reductions of 18,836.

positions was added in fiscal years 1975 and 1976 to the services in Europe by deploying new combat units and increasing manning in existing combat units. Details on increases in the combat component in Europe follow.

ARMY COMBAT INCREASES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

Under the provisions of the Nunn Amendment, the Army increased its combat strength in Europe by 13,683 spaces as follows:

Two mechanized brigades (note a)	7,563
Attack helicopter company	250
Two field artillery battalions	1,042
Authorized level of organization increases in existing units	2,488
Three construction engineer battalions--converted from support to combat	<u>2,340</u>

Total combat personnel increases b/13,683

a/Includes 1,328 support positions for Brigades 75 and 76.

b/Army combat increases exceed the support reductions shown in ch. 2 by 180 spaces.

New units added

The new Army units deployed to Europe under the Nunn Amendment were drawn from elements of the Army's force in the United States. For example:

- Brigade 75, which began deploying to Europe in March 1975, was the 3d Brigade of the 2d Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas. It was temporarily stationed in three major training areas in Germany: Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken. Eventual plans called for the permanent stationing of Brigade 75 in the northern area of Germany.
- Brigade 76, a brigade of the 4th Infantry Division Mechanized from Fort Carson, Colorado, deployed in March 1976 and is stationed in the V Corps area at Wiesbaden, Germany.
- The 235th Attack Helicopter Company based at Giebelstadt, Germany, deployed from Fort Knox, Kentucky, between March and June 1976 and is assigned to USAREUR's 3d Infantry Division (VII Corps).

--Two field artillery battalions arrived in Europe in October 1976 from Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Both battalions are stationed in Augsburg, Germany, and are assigned to the 210th Field Artillery Group (VII Corps).

Army officials reported positive impact from deploying these units. For instance, the arrival of the two mechanized brigades increased USAREUR's force by about two-thirds of a division; the addition of the TOW 1-Cobra helicopters, considered to be one of the most effective antiarmor weapons in USAREUR's arsenal, doubled VII Corps' tank killing capability; and the field artillery additions provided needed conventional firepower to defend the corps area against self-propelled Warsaw Pact firepower.

Changes in the existing force structure


The authorized level of organization (ALO) of various combat units--the number of personnel spaces permitted to be filled in relation to total spaces authorized for wartime--was increased by 2,488 spaces in fiscal years 1975 and 1976. We discussed the effect of these increases on combat capability with key officials of the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division (forward), 2d and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments and the 3d Infantry Division. Units assigned to these organizations received more than one-half of the total ALO combat space increases under the Nunn Amendment.

Examples of ALO increases and comments of military officials interviewed on the effect of such increases on combat capability follow:

- Tank crews increased the antiarmor firepower and provided a greater opportunity for battalion commanders to use division artillery resources and improve command and control in the forward battle areas. 2/
- Track vehicle mechanics improved and expanded maintenance capability.


1/TOW is a missile. It means "tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided."

2/USAREUR-wide personnel space increases provided an estimated additional 69 tank crews.



BRIGADE '75—ASSAULT LANDING VEHICLE BRIDGE BEING LOADED FOR TRANSPORTATION TO GRAFENWEHR TO SUPPORT BRIGADE '75 TROOPS.

(U.S. ARMY PHOTO)



A REAR VIEW OF THE COBRA ATTACK HELICOPTER

U.S. ARMY PHOTO)

- Liaison officers improved integration of battalion firepower and coordination of movement to target areas.
- Radar operators increased surveillance capability to detect threat and insure survivability of the Battalion.
- Artillery crews increased capability to provide 24-hour operation of howitzer elements.
- Armor vehicle launch bridges/personnel increased the unit's bridging capability threefold.
- Attack helicopter pilots provided the necessary pilots to insure full manning of existing TOW-Cobra anti-tank helicopters.

General orders were issued with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to convert three USAREUR engineer battalions (2,340 spaces) from support battalions to combat battalions. The conversion of these battalions to combat engineer battalions (heavy) added a wartime mission and related equipment to the battalions. While the newly designated battalions will retain their peacetime missions, they will also have the wartime missions of combat engineer support, reinforcement for division engineers, and infantry combat operations as required. These battalions have been authorized added firepower, principally antitank weapons, small arms, and communications gear.

USAFE COMBAT INCREASES

The net Air Force combat increases totaled 4,580 positions during fiscal years 1975 to 1977.

Even though authorization had been given for combat addbacks to equal the number of reductions associated with the Nunn Amendment, USAFE actually decreased its combat positions in fiscal year 1975 by 1,272 as a result of previously approved programmed actions. In fiscal year 1976, the combat position was increased by 1,752 spaces. The chart below shows the manpower levels by type of combat unit in USAFE at the beginning and end of the Nunn Amendment period. Changes in these levels resulted in a net increase of 480 spaces.

USAFE Combat Addbacks
by Type Units
Fiscal Year 1974-Fiscal Year 1976

<u>Combat units</u>	<u>Fiscal year</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>Fiscal year</u> <u>1976</u>	<u>Change</u>
Tactical fighter	29,632	30,311	679
Tactical airlift	4,647	4,988	341
Tactical reconnaissance	6,710	5,867	-843
Tactical control	4,069	4,543	474
Strategic airlift	628	505	-123
Aerospace defense	<u>1,107</u>	<u>1,059</u>	<u>-48</u>
Total combat	<u>46,793</u>	<u>47,273</u>	<u>480</u>

Source: We prepared this chart from information from Air Force Headquarters in Europe.

An additional increase in USAFE tactical airpower in Europe was planned during the Nunn time frame but was not completed until the latter part of 1977. This involved some 4,100 spaces and included various actions, as described below.

F-111 aircraft

A second wing of F-111 aircraft (84) was positioned at RAF Lakenheath with the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing. These are in addition to the wing currently stationed at RAF Upper Heyford. The F-111 has increase Allied adverse weather and low level penetration capabilities, including interdiction and close air support. Military personnel increases resulting from this action are estimated at about 600 spaces.

F-4 aircraft

Following conversion of Bitburg Air Base from F-4s to F-15s, the F-4s previously programed for transfer to the United States were instead relocated within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in accordance with a timetable to reduce personnel turbulence and maintain operational commitments. Actually, this involves 66 aircraft and added Phantom Squadrons to the 50th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Hahn Air Base, the 86th TFW, Ramstein, and the 52nd TFW, Spangdahlem Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany. Since these aircraft are nuclear capable, their retention in theater improves the potential combat capability of each of the above wings and USAFE as a whole.

Tactical Air Control System

In September 1975, USAFE offered NATO six Tactical Air Control System mobile radars for the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) area (northern Germany). The offer was accepted to enhance NATO's command and control capability. The first unit, consisting of three radars, a control reporting post and two forward air control posts, were positioned at Hessisch-Oldendorf, about 38 miles southwest of Hanover, West Germany. A similar unit was located with the U.S. Army at Bremerhaven in fiscal year 1977. To provide command and control of these and other USAFE resources in 2d ATAF, a U.S. command and control facility is being located at Kalkar, Germany. This facility, which has been designated a NATO Operations Support Cell, will use communications links from the national communications nets of other NATO nations to connect the Commander-in-Chief, USAFE, with his 2d ATAF assets. The mobile radar units and the NATO Operations Support Cell will provide back-up for NATO's fixed radar coverage and enhance both the NATO and USAFE command and control networks in northern Germany.

NAVY COMBAT INCREASES

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However, we noted 600 increases were planned, as follows.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Increases</u>
1975	310
1976	<u>290</u>
Total	<u>600</u>

CONCLUSION

The Nunn Amendment resulted in improvements in the "teeth-to-tail" ratio of U.S. forces in Europe, that is, the combat component increased while authorized positions for headquarters and support units decreased. More combat units and increased manning in existing combat units provided added capability to meet the threat of a short, intense war. However, we found that gains in the combat component were not achieved without a deterioration of some wartime combat support capabilities. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the immediate and potential impact of the reductions on combat support capability.

CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS ON COMBAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Over 11,000 of the 20,164 reductions made by the military services pursuant to the Nunn Amendment had minimal or no immediate adverse impact on combat support capability because

- reductions taken prior to the amendment or as a result of ongoing manpower surveys were credited,
- support units were redesignated as combat units,
- a unit which was not deployed to Europe was counted, and
- reductions were made from units which were not essential to combat support.

The following schedule shows the distribution of these reductions by services.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prior reductions/ ongoing surveys	2,780	1,953	434	<u>a/5,167</u>
Unit redesignations	2,340	-	-	2,340
Unit not deployed	-	-	699	699
Positions not essential to combat support	465	1,795	-	2,260
Overstaffed command reductions	252	-	-	252
Miscellaneous	<u>b/133</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>c/167</u>	<u>300</u>
Total	<u>5,970</u>	<u>3,748</u>	<u>1,300</u>	<u>11,018</u>

a/These reductions were from positions which were authorized but not manned or already identified as excess through manpower surveys.

b/Unfilled VII Corps positions reduced under Nunn. USAREUR records were not maintained so that other unfilled spaces could be readily identified.

c/Reductions resulting from changes in political environment in Greece.

Further details on these reductions are contained in appendix V.

Some of the reductions had a direct adverse impact on combat support capabilities. Others, together with the shrinking U.S. support base over the past several years, have resulted in greater need for increased host nation support, including use of foreign national civilians and contractual support--areas that could have a potential adverse impact on wartime capability. This chapter discusses those areas where reductions had a direct adverse impact. The implications of greater use of host nation support are discussed in chapter 5.

ARMY COMBAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ADVERSELY AFFECTED

Force structure changes over the past 10 years and the requirements of the Nunn Amendment have altered the composition of USAREUR. As a result of the Nunn Amendment, USAREUR formed a capabilities study group to examine the impact of the amendment on its capabilities to fight a Deleted conventional war. The group's evaluation identified weaknesses in ammunition distribution, transportation, and maintenance. As a result of its findings, the Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, requested that the Department of the Army Concepts Analysis Agency determine whether USAREUR could execute its wartime mission. A major objective of the Concepts Analysis Agency study, called the USAREUR Wartime Support Capability (WARSCAP) study, was to identify and measure imbalances between wartime demands and critical support capabilities. The study, initiated in December 1974, was completed in November 1975 and considered the personnel changes that would be made in compliance with the Nunn Amendment.

A major observation of the WARSCAP study was that:

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The study noted that Deleted of war would affect such things as (1) ammunition handling capability, (2) tracked vehicle maintenance, (3) antitank missile system maintenance, (4) petroleum distribution, and (5) hospital and medical evacuation activities. The study identified the following actions which could be taken to strengthen combat support capabilities and thereby to improve force effectiveness:

- Revising priorities for earlier deployment 1/ to Europe of planned support structure spaces, specifying top priority to ammunition companies.
- Increasing host nation support.
- Selective trading of combat for additional support units in USAREUR's mobilization day force.

During our review, we noted support reductions actually made which resulted in

- less engineer resources to deliver bridge replacement spans and barrier material, 2/
- fewer personnel to integrate command and control of artillery firepower resources,
- fewer military police to provide supply line security and execute traffic control and movement, and
- less reception group personnel to facilitate employment of incoming forces.

Details of these matters follow.

Deactivation of a panel bridge company

USAREUR's nondivisional engineers supporting the corps are organized into two engineer brigades. The 7th Engineer Brigade, a VII Corps unit, deactivated its 809th Panel Bridge Company (101 spaces and equipment) in June 1976 as a Nunn Amendment reduction.

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1/We did not evaluate USAREUR'S implementation of actions suggested in WARSCAP to compensate for support structure problems cited in the study, except for planning-increased host nation support, which is addressed later in this chapter.

2/Material such as mines and obstacles to impede the progress of enemy armored fighting vehicles.

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Some VII Corps units for which the 7th Engineer Brigade provides barrier haul do not know how this shortfall will be covered. According to the 7th Engineer,

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Ability to adequately command and control
corps artillery assets has been reduced

In addition to the artillery assets assigned to the various divisions, each of USAREUR's two corps has its own artillery. Within each corps, the artillery battalions are subordinate to field artillery groups. The groups responsible for command and control of each battalion in turn

report to a single corps artillery headquarters which is under the command of a general officer, the corps artillery commander.

In view of manpower reductions called for by the Nunn Amendment, USAREUR proposed to reduce 440 spaces at the group level. However, the V and VII Corps Commanders maintained that the group's role to command and control assigned battalions during wartime is essential and therefore suggested eliminating 355 spaces at the Corps' Artillery Headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, approved this alternative and the Corps' Artillery Headquarters, both V and VII Corps, were deactivated in June 1975.

A residual force consisting of a fire support element was retained to provide corps artillery commanders with sufficient command and control to coordinate artillery fire. However, the residual force is apparently insufficient to provide that mission. Command and control, a function of the headquarters prior to the deactivation, was transferred to the groups. The corps artillery commanders must also rely on the group staff to conduct effectiveness evaluations, thus placing an increased burden on the group staff.

According to the VII Corps Artillery Commander, Army doctrine specifies that each group should command and control from three to four battalions. We were told that each group presently has six assigned battalions. Corps officials also indicated that each group may receive an additional artillery battalion in fiscal year 1978. This proposed addition, coupled with the diverse fire support missions of the battalions and their wide geographic placement throughout the corps' area, compounds the group's problem of command and control. The VII Corps Artillery Commander also noted that the group can no longer rely on headquarters' staff for assistance in artillery training.

We believe that the foregoing indicates a possible overextension of the group's span of control. That is, increasing the workload without additional personnel could adversely affect the group's ability and that of its battalions to perform effectively in wartime.

This point was further discussed in VII Corps' 1975 Annual Report which indicates that headquarters deactivation caused some degradation of the artillery capability needed to provide required fire support to the corps, a lack

of responsiveness in implementing new doctrine, and a degradation of the corps' ability to plan and conduct corps-wide artillery exercises. According to one general officer, the artillery can still do its job. However, the deactivation of the headquarters has been detrimental to corps artillery readiness.

In discussing this reduction with Headquarters, USAREUR officials, we were told that the effect of the headquarters deactivation would not be known until a time of war. They also commented that there is currently some talk of obtaining an additional group for each corps.

Military police reductions

USAREUR reduced 470 military police (MP) spaces in fiscal year 1976 in V Corps, VII Corps, and the 21st Support Command because of the Nunn Amendment. The USAREUR Provost Marshal reported that

"* * * the decision to plan for a reduction in MP spaces within this command was made only after all other options had been carefully reviewed. The fact that over 13,000 combat support and combat service support spaces had previously been recommended for reduction before MP spaces were considered is an indicator of the importance this [Headquarters] HQ assigns to the law enforcement mission especially within the communities."

In general, the impact on peacetime operations appears minimal. For example, we were told by a division provost marshal that MPs in one company are now working longer hours and conducting fewer patrols. A VII Corps MP commander stated that community law enforcement was not terminated but has lessened.

However, our discussions with MP officials indicated that existing shortages of MP and the MP reductions under the Nunn Amendment have had an adverse effect on wartime capabilities. Before the Nunn Amendment reductions, the following MP shortages were reported. The 21st Support Command was reported to be Deleted short to perform its wartime mission of providing lines of communication security and traffic management. In addition,

one of V Corps MP battalions, also responsible for providing lines of communication security and traffic management in wartime, was reported to be [Deleted] short. The same V Corps battalion which was reduced by one MP platoon under the Nunn Amendment appears to be relying on receiving reinforcements shortly after hostilities erupt as a means of fully carrying out the wartime missions of the battalion.

Deactivation of the U.S.
Army Reception Group, Europe

The U.S. Army Reception Group, Europe, was eliminated under project CHASE and afterward credited as a Nunn Amendment reduction. Its mission was assumed by units within the 4th Transportation Brigade. The Reception Group's mission was to coordinate the arrival of deployed units to Europe in [Deleted] and peacetime. According to officials of the 4th Transportation Brigade, the coordination and movement of deployed units to Europe during the latest REFORGER 1/ exercise was slow. Officials said that the [Deleted] To alleviate these difficulties, the brigade is identifying individuals in Europe who can be used to form reception teams.

AIR FORCE COMBAT SUPPORT
FUNCTION ADVERSELY AFFECTED

We noted that reductions of about 400 spaces were made as a result of the Nunn Amendment in the European Mobile Communications Group and these spaces were realigned to the United States. This reduced the response time for the unit to provide

- emergency communications support to USAFE for national disasters (floods, storms, and so forth),
- communications for contingency operations, such as support of U.S. withdrawals from foreign countries, and

1/An acronym for "Redeployment of Forces from Germany". an annual military exercise provided for under the 1967 British-U.S.-German Bilateral Agreement.

--communications to support the mobile tactical air control centers during emergencies.

The reductions resulted in

--an impairment of responsiveness capability and

--the loss of capability to perform both emergency and mobile tactical air control missions simultaneously in theater.

We were told that plans are being developed to add back about 70 spaces to compensate for the loss of intheater mission capability.

CONCLUSION

We found that certain combat support functions needed for wartime, particularly by the Army in Europe, are considered inadequate by some military officials. As discussed in chapter 5, plans are underway or completed to improve the support base by increasing host nation support, including civilianization of some military positions and increased contracting. These actions, however, create problems that can also adversely affect combat support capability.

CHAPTER 5

INCREASED RELIANCE ON HOST NATIONS

AND FOREIGN NATIONALS FOR SUPPORT

The Army in Europe is planning or has already acted to improve the support base in Europe primarily through increased host nation support, including foreign national civilians and contracting. The Air Force has increased contracting to provide for maintenance for standby Air Force bases. Details of these actions and some of their implications are discussed below.

PLANS TO INCREASE HOST NATION SUPPORT

In view of the shrinking support base in Europe and the magnitude of its support requirements, USAREUR is looking more to other NATO Allies for needed support. The United States has already entered into or is negotiating many arrangements with the UK, Federal Republic of Germany, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX) countries to receive a wide variety of wartime support, including procurement, telecommunications, transportation, facilities, civilian labor, construction, and airfield services.

To widely extend services received from FRG, USAREUR and USAFE completed a major assessment of wartime host nation support requirements in Germany in November 1977. FRG is currently analyzing these requirements to identify areas where host nation support can be provided. An FRG steering committee, which meets periodically, has established three working groups to address the planning methods of refining U.S. support. USAREUR has also planned a 52 man office for host nation support development.

There are many problems to be resolved, however, before host nations in Europe will become reliable support for U.S. combat units in wartime. For example, the question of NATO logistics control has not been resolved. One feature of many U.S./NATO country agreements states that priority for available resources will go to the host country. As discussed later in this chapter, the use of local nationals during a military emergency remains uncertain and is expected to be a problem throughout Europe. In general, planning for civil-military cooperation has been slow, and gaps in the planning exist.

Although USAREUR believes that host nation support can provide a larger variety of services, the exact potential remains in doubt. U.S. military officials in Europe with whom we have discussed the matter believe the host nation support arrangements will not be resolved before the mid-1980s.

We are nearing completion of an ongoing review which addresses this subject in depth.

INCREASED ARMY AND AIR FORCE CONTRACTING

The Army's 5th Signal Command is using contractor personnel to offset some of its military reductions credited toward the Nunn Amendment. The 5th Signal's Area Maintenance Supply Facility was eliminated, reducing 460 military support positions. Certain of these functions were assumed by contractors to replace the reductions.

In the Air Force, support positions in a security squadron at Sinop, Turkey, were reduced and replaced with contractor personnel. Maintenance by support personnel reduced at the standby air base at Moron, Spain, has been continued by expanding the existing base maintenance contract with a private firm. The maintenance of three standby bases in UK, where military support personnel were reduced, has been continued by expanding existing support arrangements with the British Ministry of Defense. Also, the standby bases have been made satellites of nearby main operating bases, and support personnel at the gaining main operating bases have been increased as required.

The mission of a standby base is essentially to act as a reception area for augmentation forces in times of hostilities. We were told that the general role of the personnel eliminated was both to maintain the bases and to provide wartime support. The impact of these changes depends on the success of the changeover from U.S. military personnel to other contracting and host nation arrangements. As with any new system, there may be some problems to resolve.

ARMY INCREASE IN NON-U.S. CIVILIANS IN MILITARY JOBS

About one-fourth of the Army's military support personnel reductions (3,368 authorized positions) were replaced by about 2,700 foreign national civilians. (See app. VI.)

The Navy did not employ any and the Air Force only employed a few civilians to replace their Nunn reductions. There are currently about 47,000 foreign nationals employed by USAREUR, not including those paid from nonappropriated funds.

There are some aspects of civilianization which have serious implications on readiness. For example, there are limitations on how and where civilians can be employed in peacetime and wartime. In addition, the FRG emergency legislation, which partially applies to civilians in wartime, lacks sufficient implementation procedures, causing some uncertainty about the availability of civilians in wartime. We believe the implications of these problems are significant because of the potential effect civilianization with foreign nationals can have on support capabilities in peacetime and wartime. The implications affect not only the foreign national civilians employed because of the Nunn Amendment but all of the 47,000 non-U.S. civilians employed in Europe by USAREUR.

USAREUR's foreign national employees consist of two general types.

Labor service employees

Labor service (LS) and civilian labor groups are referred to collectively as labor service forces or labor service employees. LS employees differ from other non-U.S. civilian employees in that they are organized as mobile units which are assigned to and perform support missions for parent U.S. military units. Such employees, although primarily German citizens, also include some third country nationals, Stateless persons, and refugees. Their role, which is intended to be basically the same in wartime as in peacetime, is to provide support in areas such as logistics, transportation, maintenance, and physical security.

As of December 1976, there were about 8,000 labor service personnel serving 13 commands or other U.S. Army organizations in Germany. Labor service personnel represent about one-sixth of the non-U.S. civilians working for the U.S. Army there. Appendix VII shows the growth of LS personnel from fiscal year 1970 to fiscal year 1977.

Other foreign nationals

Other foreign national employees (German citizens and third country nationals) are referred to in this report as

local nationals. They generally perform in administrative, medical, and financial roles. This category includes about 39,000 employees.

Uncertainties regarding civilians

If Europe were to become a war zone, no one really knows how many foreign national civilians would remain in their jobs with the U.S. forces. Some of the problems of employing civilians are discussed below.

Limitations on use of civilians and loss of management flexibility

Military commanders can use military personnel as they deem necessary. However, there are many restrictions on how civilians may be used which reduce the options available to Army commanders in wartime and peacetime. We visited several organizations where military spaces were civilianized. Battalion level officials noted the following restrictions related to using civilians:

- Local German laws governing the use of civilian employees. For example, West German laws take precedence over Army directives in matters concerning local civilian manpower management. U.S. officials stated that, in a NATO war, there are no assurances that local civilians will be available to U.S. forces.
- Requirement to negotiate with work councils which represent the interests of civilians working for the U.S. forces hampers management flexibility.
- The Geneva Convention limits the use of civilians in wartime.

In peacetime, if a backlog in maintenance of a particular item was increasing at an unacceptable rate, a manager could relocate military resources to that area to reduce the backlog. Civilians, however, are tied to job descriptions, and as a result, the manager cannot require a civilian to help with a problem outside his prescribed job area. We were told by headquarters and subordinate command officials that in wartime civilians generally cannot be expected to be used in a potential live-fire area. Additionally, by law, civilians, with the possible exception of LS employees which are intended as part of mobile units, cannot be displaced

beyond a certain distance. Therefore, a military manager might have to find an alternative to accomplish a certain task.

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The lack of management flexibility over civilians is particularly troublesome in the medical area. For example, officials at the U.S. Medical Command, Europe, which replaced 462 of its military personnel pursuant to the Nunn Amendment with a like number of civilians, said that civilians are more difficult to use than military personnel. They work a normal 40-hour week, whereas, the health area mission requires 7-day, around-the-clock performance. Therefore, a large amount of overtime is required or the burden of night call and odd-time work must fall on the ever decreasing number of military personnel.

Medical Command officials further believe there is a reduction of wartime capability in their area when military persons are replaced with civilians. They are not available for field exercises, contingencies, or wartime missions and cannot perform military functions such as alert calls and officer of the day duties. Because civilians do not perform these functions, the remaining military personnel must work longer hours to meet these requirements.

FRG emergency legislation--
effects on civilianization

Much U.S. war planning is apparently based on the expectation that enough local civilian employees will be on duty to enable the units to carry out their missions. However, since civilian availability during wartime is not assured, such an assumption may not be valid.

If war or a state of heightened tension occurs, U.S. military officials expect German emergency legislation to be enacted. Once the emergency legislation is enacted, the civilians would first have the right to volunteer for

their current job. Another emergency provision would involuntarily freeze civilians who are subject to conscription in their employment. That provision may be used to permit the German and Allied forces to secure needed labor. However, as civilians, such persons would be considered noncombatants who cannot be used in hostile fire areas.

There are several questions and uncertainties regarding the FRG emergency legislation. A major question involves lack of sufficient procedures for implementing the law. The FRG Government is aware of the problem and is working on an implementation directive to correct it. However, if and when the directive will be enacted remains open.

During our end-of-job conference with Army command officials in Europe, the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, also acknowledged the problem regarding civilian availability in wartime. For example, he noted that the labor service issue is still being negotiated, but as of now, in the event of war, U.S. forces could lose their civilian labor service personnel. Such personnel might be taken into the German Bundeswehr or might just return home.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States is relying heavily on host nation support, including foreign national civilians and contracting, to augment a shrinking U.S. military support base in Europe. With the increasing emphasis on interdependence of the members of the NATO alliance and the high costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe, such actions are undoubtedly necessary and desirable. However, it must be recognized that until the problems they create can be resolved, adequate support of U.S. forces in wartime cannot be assured.

Our ongoing work on planning host nation support, referred to on page 29, has disclosed that the U.S. Government has not specifically affirmed its commitment to the policy of host nation support or expressed its intentions regarding payment for such support. Further, DOD has not assured itself that host nations are willing to pursue host nation support, as viewed by the United States, nor has it issued internal policy to guide the services in arranging host nation support.

Without DOD policy guidance, the services must decide the extent to which they will apply host nation support and to determine the degree of risk acceptable in such arrangements.

Without DOD guidance there is also

--inconsistent application of host nation support in U.S. force planning,

--conflicting priorities for force deployments, and

--inconsistent representation of host nation support needs to host nations.

Our ongoing review, which will soon be reported separately, is addressing such questions as:

--Do needs exist for a policy which clearly sets out U.S. goals for host nation support of U.S. forces in Europe and acceptable approaches for acquiring such support?

--Should the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to explain (1) DOD goals and objectives regarding wartime host nation support, (2) the expected degree of assurance that such arrangements will work in wartime, and (3) the financial implications of such support arrangements?

CHAPTER 6

COST OF CONVERTING SUPPORT TO COMBAT TROOPS

The language of the Nunn Amendment does not indicate whether the Congress expected its implementation to result in greater or lesser costs. We found that additional costs associated with civilianization, contracting, and increasing the combat component during fiscal years 1975 and 1976 were about \$34 million for recurring costs and about \$117 million in nonrecurring costs.

CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN MILITARY MANPOWER COSTS

Congressional discussions surrounding and leading up to the Nunn Amendment partially focused on manpower costs. For example, in its report on the fiscal year 1975 Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Bill (Report No. 93-884), the Senate Committee on Armed Services observed that the United States is

"* * * in a period that demands more than ever a lean and combat-effective military establishment. Headquarters staffs, non-combat units and manning levels that are inefficient or that are not absolutely essential must be reduced to improve the combat effectiveness and reduce the cost of the military departments."

The Senate Armed Services Committee report further stated:

"It is of real interest and concern to the Committee that action be taken to realize the following objectives that the size, structure, and deployment of U.S. NATO forces be as efficient and economical as possible. * * *"

A few months prior to the passage of the Nunn Amendment, Senator Nunn addressed the Senate in connection with issues relating to reducing support troops in Europe. He identified certain goals as the focus of his and certain other troop reduction amendments under congressional consideration at that time. These included:

- Streamlining U.S. military forces in Europe to improve the combat-to-support ratio and to "provide more bang per buck."
- Improving the combat effectiveness of the U.S./European alliance and reducing the U.S. cost and manpower requirements.

ADDITIONAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MANPOWER CHANGES DURING THE NUNN AMENDMENT PERIOD

We identified total additional costs of over \$150 million associated with (1) deployment of new combat units (2) increased civilianization, and (3) new contracting during fiscal years 1975 and 1976. All of these costs are associated with changes reported by the Department of Defense pursuant to the Nunn Amendment. However, all of the costs cannot be directly attributed to the requirements of the amendment because some of the manpower changes credited during the period were planned before the amendment was proposed and would probably have occurred anyway.

A detailed breakdown of costs showing units or functions involved is contained in appendix VIII. The following schedules summarize additional costs in terms of recurring and nonrecurring costs.

Recurring costs

Estimated Annual Cost of Civilians
Hired as a Result of the Nunn
Amendment Support Reductions

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Number of civilians at end of fiscal year</u>	<u>Average yearly pay rate (note a)</u>	<u>Total cost</u>
			(millions)
1976	2,695	\$10,442	\$28.14

a/Average yearly pay rate was derived by using an average of actual pay rates between local, national, and labor service categories of civilians.

Estimated Annual Cost of Contracts
As a Result of the Nunn Amendment
Support Reductions

<u>Description</u>	<u>Cost</u> (millions)
5th Signal Command area maintenance supply facility contract	\$3.0
Maintenance contract for standby bases in Spain (estimated annual rate) (note a)	.9
Anticipated increase in existing U.S./UK arrangement governing the use of standby bases in the UK to cover its increased maintenance of those standby bases	<u>2.3</u>
Total	<u>\$6.2</u>

a/The total contract cost is estimated at \$2.3 million for the remaining life of the contract (31 months.)

Nonrecurring costs

Estimated Costs of
Deployment of Additional Combat Units in
Europe Under the Nunn Amendment

<u>Military service</u>	<u>Cost</u> (note a) (millions)
Army	\$ 83.4
Air Force	33.8
Navy	-
Total	<u>\$117.2</u>

a/Cost data was provided by military service headquarters in Europe. These costs do not include costs attributable to a new helicopter company, two additional field artillery units, ALO increases, and certain Air Force combat increases since the development of additional data was beyond the scope of our review.

CONCLUSION

Overall costs increased as a result of the Nunn Amendment. Conversion of noncombat troops to combat troops alone would probably not result in overall savings, particularly when noncombat functions are civilianized or provided under host nation support agreements, unless there is an overall reduction in total U.S. force levels. Increasing the ratio of combat to support forces could, however, result in a greater "bang per buck" if excess support personnel can be eliminated and the necessary support to offset other reduced military support spaces can be obtained through less costly means than using military personnel.

The Nunn Amendment had the effect of increasing the ratio of combat to support forces in Europe. We did not attempt to determine whether it actually resulted in a greater "bang per buck."

RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

In considering future legislation dealing with similar changes in military manpower, the Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to describe expected results with respect to

- manpower implications for actual as well as authorized manpower levels,
- cost implications, and
- impact on combat capability.

Legislation should reflect the results expected.

TEXT OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT

Public Law 93-365, Section 302 (a) and (b) provides, as follows:

"SEC. 302. (a) The United States military forces in Europe can reduce headquarters and noncombat military personnel relative to the number of combat personnel located in Europe. Therefore, except in the event of imminent hostilities in Europe, the noncombat component of the total United States military strength in Europe authorized as of June 30, 1974, shall be reduced by 18,000. Such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1976, and not less than 6,000 of such reduction shall be completed on or before June 30, 1975; however, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to increase the combat component strength of United States forces in Europe by the amount of any such reduction made in noncombat personnel. The Secretary of Defense shall report semi-annually to the Congress on all actions taken to improve the combat proportion of United States forces in Europe. The first report shall be submitted not later than March 31, 1975.

"(b) For purposes of this section the combat component of the Army includes only the infantry, cavalry, artillery, armored, combat engineers, special forces, attack assault helicopter units, air defense, and missile combat units of battalion or smaller size; the combat component of the Navy, includes only the combat ships (aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer, submarine, escort and amphibious assault ships) and combat aircraft wings (fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and patrol); the combat component of the Air Force includes only the tactical fighter reconnaissance tactical airlift, fighter interceptor and bomber units of wing or smaller size."

U.S. ARMY MANPOWER POSITION REDUCTIONSPURSUANT TO THE NUNN AMENDMENTFISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976

<u>Functions involved</u>	<u>Reported reductions</u>	<u>GAO verified reductions</u>
FY 1975:		
Credits for CHASE, WHEELS, and manpower actions	2,780	(a)
Headquarters	200	179
Bands	86	86
Non-USAREUR (includes 5th Signal Command)	450	(b)
Sedan drivers	80	c/40
Corps artillery headquarters	360	355
Psyops battalion	64	64
Cooks' helpers	306	293
Supply retail	58	59
Quartermaster	291	291
Engineer unit	85	85
Depots	102	109
Adjutant general services	65	65
Converting engineer construction battalions	780	780
Truck companies	273	267
Medical units	93	93
Finance	89	89
POMCUS	347	356
Data processing functions	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>
Total--FY 1975	<u>6,550</u>	<u>3,252</u>
FY 1976:		
Converting engineer battalions	1,560	1,560
Headquarters and administration support	540	489
Engineer units	239	239
Non-USAREUR (includes 5th Signal Command)	860	(b)
Military police	470	470
Medical/dental	853	857
Maintenance/supply	1,758	1,725
Transportation	19	19
POMCUS	642	642
Quartermaster	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>
Total--FY 1976	<u>6,953</u>	<u>6,013</u>
Total Nunn reduction for Army	<u>13,503</u>	<u>9,265</u>

a/Reductions took place in fiscal year 1974, and documentation is no longer available.

b/Manpower actions were not directed by USAREUR. Parent commands are located in the United States.

c/Documentation has been lost, according to a USAREUR official, on the other 40 reductions.

USAF SUPPORT REDUCTIONSBY TYPE UNITFISCAL YEARS 1974-76

<u>Support units</u>	<u>Authorized strength fiscal year 1974</u>	<u>Authorized strength fiscal year 1975</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Authorized strength fiscal year 1975</u>	<u>Authorized strength fiscal year 1976</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Air base	3,023	2,539	(484)	2,539	1,301	(1,238)
Combat support	-	-	-	-	28	28
Communications	5,137	4,936	(201)	4,936	4,168	(776)
Intelligence	5,717	5,567	(150)	5,567	5,499	(68)
Airlift support	1,352	1,702	350	1,702	1,033	(669)
Weather	302	275	(27)	275	198	(77)
Aerospace rescue and recovery	33	31	(2)	31	1	(30)
Office of Special Investigations	227	231	4	231	230	(1)
Medical	3,885	3,683	(202)	3,683	3,685	2
Activities outside AF (note a)	2,546	2,382	(164)	2,382	2,348	(34)
Miscellaneous support	2,353	2,068	(285)	2,068	1,807	(261)
Management headquarters	<u>2,104</u>	<u>1,696</u>	(408)	<u>1,696</u>	<u>1,524</u>	(172)
Total support	<u>26,679</u>	<u>25,110</u>	(1,569)	<u>25,110</u>	<u>21,822</u>	(3,288)

a/Air Force personnel assigned to non-Air Force organizations such as SHAPE, NATO, and various DOD organizations.

U.S. NAVYNUNN AMENDMENT SUPPORT REDUCTIONSFISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976

<u>Support units</u>	<u>Reported reductions</u>	
Fiscal year 1975:		
Headquarters reduction	83	
Repair ship elimination	699	
Keflavik Base	20	
Training Command, Morocco	43	
Intelligence	137	
Communications	<u>126</u>	
Fiscal year 1975		<u>1,108</u>
Fiscal year 1976:		
Naval Station, Keflavik	155	
Fleet Support Office, Athens, and related activities	167	
Naval Air Facility, Naples	8	
U.S. Naval Forces, Azores	3	
Previously programed minor changes	30	
Reductions planned fiscal year 1977 taken in fiscal year 1976	95	
Defense Communications Agency (Navy)	12	
Military communications	<u>226</u>	
Fiscal year 1976		<u>696</u>
Total fiscal years 1975 and 1976		<u>1,804</u>

DETAILS OF REDUCTIONSWITH NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ONCOMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIESCREDITING PRIOR REDUCTIONS/ONGOING SURVEYS

With the approval of DA, USAREUR took credit under the Nunn Amendment for 2,780 positions which had been reduced before the effective date of the amendment. These reductions had been made under previous manpower reduction programs, referred to as Project CHASE, Project WHEELS, and ongoing manpower surveys. While USAREUR documentation showed these actions caused minimal impact on combat readiness, we noted one instance involving reductions in the U.S. Army Reception Group, Europe, in which certain CHASE reductions had some impact. (See p. 26.)

Project CHASE (Consolidation of Headquarters and Area Support Elements) reduced about 1,000 spaces. USAREUR credited 745 of these reductions toward the Nunn Amendment. The remaining spaces were either returned to support or were distributed to combat units prior to fiscal year 1975. Project WHEELS reduced about 1,550 transportation spaces. Fifteen hundred of these reductions were credited toward the Nunn Amendment.

We were told that both CHASE and WHEELS manpower actions, which were planned before the Nunn Amendment, were designed to reduce support positions and add combat strength to USAREUR. This strength was to be enhanced by increasing ALO of existing combat units. According to USAREUR officials, the support reductions were implemented in fiscal year 1974, and the savings became undistributed spaces. On June 30, 1974, these spaces were still authorized but not designated for any specific function. The spaces were converted to combat positions in fiscal year 1975.

We were also told that USAREUR is constantly performing manpower surveys which reduce or increase a unit's authorized spaces based on mission changes or other requirement changes. At the time of the Nunn Amendment, these actions had resulted in about 535 undistributed but authorized spaces. These reduced spaces were also credited to the Nunn Amendment.

The Navy took credit for 434 positions under similar circumstances. These reductions had been made as a result of a previous Navy decision to reduce support spaces and a

DOD-directed reduction effort to reduce Navy headquarters spaces in Europe.

Air Force ongoing surveys resulted in reductions of 1,953 positions. These are Air Force "fact-of-life" reductions which result from constant evaluation of changes in personnel resources versus requirements.

REDESIGNATING SUPPORT UNITS AS COMBAT UNITS

The Army in Europe converted three engineer battalions from engineer construction to combat engineer battalions (heavy). This action was credited as both a support reduction and a combat increase involving 2,340 positions. The conversion involved increasing the small arms in the unit, adding antitank weapons, and changing the mission of the units to employ them in a combat zone.

COUNTING A UNIT WHICH WAS NOT DEPLOYED TO EUROPE

The Navy reduced 699 authorized spaces on a repair ship which was not deployed with the fleet. According to DOD, the ship was added to the total Navy units deployed before the Nunn period to keep Navy strength near its allocated share, but that specific ship was never deployed in theater.

REDUCING POSITIONS NOT ESSENTIAL TO COMBAT SUPPORT

Army reductions of 465 are mostly associated with the marching bands and cooks' helpers. In the Air Force, an exchange and reorganization of certain Wiesbaden and Kaiserslautern support facilities, Military Airlift Command reductions, and postal group reductions account for most of the 1,794 reductions in this area.

MISCELLANEOUS REDUCTIONS

Military units in Europe are often not manned at 100 percent of authorized strength. Therefore, when a requirement is levied to reduce strength levels, some of that reduction could include unfilled spaces. For example, we found that the Army's VII Corps made 133 reductions from unfilled spaces. USAREUR records were not such that other unfilled spaces could be readily identified. Further, discussions with Air Force personnel officials indicated reductions in this area undoubtedly occurred.

We also noted that the Navy took credit under the Nunn Amendment for 167 positions which were eliminated when certain of its operations were discontinued in Athens, Greece. We were told that these reductions resulted from a change in the political environment. The Navy justified taking credit for the reductions because European manpower resources were used to staff the Athens operation.


OVERSTAFFED COMMAND REDUCTIONS

The 5th Signal Command replaced most of its 712 reductions with contracted personnel. However, 252 of the Command's total reductions represented overstaffing and were not replaced with contracted personnel.

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE,
CIVILIAN HIRES AS A RESULT OF
THE NUNN AMENDMENT
FISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976

<u>Functional categories</u>	<u>Military reductions</u>	<u>Civilian hires</u>
Fiscal year 1975:		
Headquarters	10	10
Car companies	80	80
Supply reorganization (wholesale)	147	78
Adjutant General Services	65	65
Truck companies	267	231
Finance	39	14
Combat equipment	356	243
Supply reorganization (retail)	59	58
Brigade 75 support at temporary station	-	68
Fiscal year 1975 total	<u>1,023</u>	<u>847</u>
Fiscal year 1976:		
Car companies	40	40
Finance	81	85
Combat equipment	642	495
Other general support companies	724	489
Engineer company	138	91
Ordnance	69	69
Military police	189	119
Medical	462	462
Fiscal year 1976 total	<u>2,345</u>	<u>1,848</u>
Total	<u>3,368</u>	<u>2,695</u>

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE LABOR SERVICE EMPLOYEE STRENGTH BY YEAR FISCAL YEARS 1970 TO 1977



SOURCE: LABOR SERVICE AGENCY (LSA), EUROPE, A STAFF AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USAREUR LS PROGRAM.

SELECTED ADDITIONAL COSTSASSOCIATED WITH MANPOWER CHANGESDURING FISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976 (note a)

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>Estimated cost</u>
	(thousands)
<u>COSTS INCIDENTAL TO STATIONING BRIGADES 75 AND 76 IN EUROPE</u>	
Fiscal year 1975	\$ 6,351.3
Fiscal year 1976	<u>12,746.5</u>
	\$ 19,097.8
<u>ONE-TIME PERMANENT STATIONING COSTS FOR BRIGADE 75</u>	
Military construction, Army	\$12,692.0
Operation and maintenance, Army	2,627.8
Construct school classrooms	11,775.0
Military family housing	29,602.0
Other procurement, Army	769.0
Bachelor housing furnishings	2,921.0
DOD Dependent Schools, Europe	1,900.0
Troop Support Agency	<u>2,016.0</u>
	<u>64,302.8</u>
Total Army one-time costs identified (note a)	83,400.6
<u>ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS RELATED TO NEW ARMY CONTRACTS</u>	3,000.0
<u>ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMY'S HIRING OF CIVILIANS</u>	
2,695 civilians at an average yearly pay rate of \$10,442 (note b) per year	<u>28,140.0</u>
Total Army	<u>\$114,540.6</u>

AIR FORCEEstimated
cost

(thousands)

COMBAT ADDITIONS

Creek Dirk (F-5 Beddown) (note c)	\$ 1,887.3	
Creek Realign II (F-4 realignment)	10,958.8	
Creek Swing (F-111, Beddown)	12,565.9	
Creek North (2 ATAF TACS- Hessisch-Oldendorf)	3,478.4	
Creek Brahman (2 ATAF TACS- Bremerhaven) (note d)	4,482.7	
601st Tactical Air Control Elements	<u>442.4</u>	
Total Air Force one-time costs identified		\$ 33,815.5
<u>ONE-TIME COST RELATED TO NEW AIR FORCE CONTRACT</u>		<u>2,300.0</u>
Total Air Force (note e)		\$ <u>36,115.5</u>

NAVYUSNAVEUR

(note a)

TOTAL ALL SERVICES		<u>\$150,656.1</u>
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a/These costs are not intended to portray the total cost of the Nunn Amendment. For example, costs associated with the Navy's reductions and combat additions were not readily available in Europe. The costs attributable to the Army Helicopter Company, two additional field artillery units, authorized level of organization increases, and certain Air Force changes, resulting from the Nunn Amendment, were also not included in this schedule because development of such cost data was beyond the scope of our review. On the other hand, we did not attempt to determine whether any additional planned expenditures were avoided at U.S. installations as a result of the transfer of these units to Europe.

b/Mid-point of the average salary of the two major types (local national and labor services) of civilian employees added as a result of the military support reductions. Based on 1976 labor costs data.

c/Creek Dirk, Creek Swing, etc., are program names assigned by the Air Force.

d/\$3.2 million of this amount is for facilities construction and is to be paid for from NATO United States Special Program funds.

e/These costs do not include the anticipated increase in an existing U.S./UK arrangement governing the use of standby bases in the UK to cover increased UK maintenance of those bases on which U.S. personnel were reduced.

SOURCE: We prepared this table from data provided by the military services European headquarters.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Dr. Harold Brown	Feb. 1977	Present
Donald H. Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Jan. 1977
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, AND LOGISTICS):		
Dr. John P. White	May 1977	Present
Dale R. Babione (acting)	Jan. 1977	Apr. 1977
Frank A. Shrontz	Feb. 1976	Jan. 1977
John J. Bennett (acting)	Mar. 1975	Feb. 1976
Arthur I. Mendolia	June 1973	Mar. 1975
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EUROPE:		
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	Nov. 1974	Present
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster	May 1969	Oct. 1974
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.	Feb. 1977	Present
Martin R. Hoffmann	Aug. 1975	Jan. 1977
Howard H. Callaway	July 1973	Aug. 1975
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. Bernard W. Rogers	Oct. 1976	Present
Gen. Fredrick C. Weyand	Oct. 1974	Oct. 1976
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. ARMY, EUROPE:		
Gen. George S. Blanchard	July 1975	Present
Gen. Michael S. Davidson	May 1971	July 1975
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.	Feb. 1977	Present
J. William Middendorf	Apr. 1974	Jan. 1977

Tenure of office
From To

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (con't)

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:

Adm. James L. Holloway III July 1974 Present

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. NAVY,
EUROPE:

Adm. David H. Bagley May 1975 Present

Adm. Harold E. Shear May 1974 May 1975

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

John C. Stetson Apr. 1977 Present

Thomas C. Reed Jan. 1976 Apr. 1977

James W. Plummer (acting) Nov. 1975 Jan. 1976

Dr. John L. McLucas June 1973 Nov. 1975

CHIEF OF STAFF:

General David C. Jones July 1974 Present

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE,
EUROPE:

Gen. William J. Evans Aug. 1977 Present

Gen. Richard H. Ellis Aug. 1975 Aug. 1977