

**DOCUMENT RESUME**

07156 - [E2487514]

Profiles of Military Assistance Advisory Groups in 15 Countries. ID-78-51; B-165731. September 1, 1978. 126 pp.

Staff study by J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, International Div.

Issue Area: International Economic and Military Programs (600).  
Contact: International Div.

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -  
Military (except procurement & contracts) (051).

Organization Concerned: Department of Defense; Department of  
State.

Congressional Relevance: House Committee on International  
Relations; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Authority: International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L.  
95-92). Foreign Assistance Act.

Profiles are offered of military assistance advisory group (MAAG) operations in 15 countries as a supplement to the April 21, 1978 report, "Management of Security Assistance Programs Overseas Needs To Be Improved." Findings/Conclusions: Each profile contains information on: in-country security assistance programs, staff levels of the MAAGs and other in-country organizations performing security assistance program functions, duties performed by MAAG personnel in each primary function as well as other secondary functions, and advisory and training assistance provided by other than MAAG personnel. The views of MAAG and U.S. Embassy officials are included on the following: (1) the effect of Public Law 95-92 on MAAG operations, (2) the adequacy of advisory group staffing, (3) supervision and direction provided by Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions, (4) interactions between advisory groups and host countries on foreign military sales matters, and (5) means available to perform end-item inspections for equipment provided under the military assistance program and to preclude unauthorized transfers of equipment. (RRS)

7514

---

STUDY BY THE STAFF OF THE U.S.

# General Accounting Office

---

## Profiles Of Military Assistance Advisory Groups In 15 Countries

In its April 21, 1978, report, "Management of Security Assistance Programs Overseas Needs To Be Improved," GAO discussed the adequacy of the changes made in the operations of the military assistance advisory groups, as specified in the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-92).

This is a supplement to that report. It contains information on each of the 15 authorized military advisory groups.




## Preface

This is a supplement to our April 21, 1978, report, "Management of Security Assistance Programs Overseas Needs To Be Improved" (ID-78-27), which discusses the effect of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-92) on military assistance advisory group (MAAG) operations in 15 countries. This supplement contains a profile of each advisory group and includes information on:

- In-country security assistance programs.
- Staff levels of the MAAGs and other in-country organizations performing security assistance program functions.
- Duties performed by MAAG personnel in each primary function described in Public Law 95-92 as well as other secondary functions.
- Advisory and training assistance provided by other than MAAG personnel.
- The views of MAAG and U.S. Embassy officials on the (1) effect of Public Law 95-92 on MAAG operations, (2) adequacy of advisory group staffing, (3) supervision and direction provided by Chiefs of the U.S. diplomatic missions, (4) interactions between the advisory groups and host countries on foreign military sales matters, and (5) means available to perform end-item inspections for equipment provided under the military assistance program and to preclude unauthorized transfers of equipment.

We are sending copies of this supplement to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of State and Defense; and the appropriate congressional committees.

  
J. K. Fasick, Director  
International Division

## C o n t e n t s

	<u>Page</u>
Brazil	1
Greece	7
Indonesia	17
Iran	26
Jordan	38
Korea	45
Kuwait	54
Morocco	63
Panama	72
Philippines	79
Portugal	88
Saudi Arabia	94
Spain	103
Thailand	112
Turkey	120

## ABBREVIATIONS

CETS	Contract Engineering Technical Services
FMS	Foreign military sales
GAO	General Accounting Office
IMET	International military education and training
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MTT	Mobile Training Team
TAFT	Technical Assistance Field Team
TAT	Technical Assistance Team

## BRAZIL COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable John Hugh Crimmins

MAAG NAME: U.S. Delegation, Joint Brazil - U.S. Military Commission (JBUSMC)

JBUSMC CHAIRMAN: Rear Adm. William M. Callaghan, Jr.  
(U.S. Navy)

LOCATION OF JBUSMC: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Brazil, with over half the land area of South America, a 4,900-mile coastline paralleling strategic sea lanes, a fast-growing population already exceeding 100 million, vast natural resources, and a rapidly expanding industrial base, has the potential to be a world power. As Brazil continues to realize its economic potential and to expand its political ties and influence, it will become increasingly important to the collective resolution of critical issues involving international interdependence and world order.

U.S. security assistance is an important means of maintaining close relations with Brazil's Armed Forces which are the predominant power behind the Government. It is in the U.S. interest to facilitate the ability of Brazil's Armed Forces to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts and to the regional security arrangements established by the Rio Treaty. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military Assistance Program</u>	<u>Foreign Military Sales</u>	<u>International Military Education and Training</u>
	-----(millions)-----		
1977	-	\$14.3	\$0.06
1978 (note a)	-	-	-

<sup>a</sup>/Brazil terminated all U.S. security assistance programs in March 1977.

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 sales were primarily for F-5 aircraft support, torpedoes, air control radar, and ammunition.

International Military Education and Training: fiscal year 1977 funds provided incountry training for fire control maintenance, logistics staff planning, air combat maneuvers, and national mobilization.

STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

Fiscal year	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1977	38	36	6	6	26	25	70	67
December 12, 1977	32	27	6	6	26	25	64	58

Data was not available for fiscal years 1975 and 1976.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

During fiscal year 1977, Brazil obtained advisory and training assistance from teams in the following areas.

- Fire control maintenance
- Electronic countermeasures
- Sonar
- Search radar
- Underwater acoustics
- Logistics staff planning
- Air combat maneuvers
- National mobilization

The composition and duration of these teams are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years
1977	(a)	11	24	-	1	10	-	1	-
1976	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-

(number of teams)

a/JBUSMC did not separately identify each team; four teams were funded by IMET and the balance were purchased under FMS agreements.

JBUSMC PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management:

- Determine spare parts requirements and availability
- Follow up on spare parts orders
- Clarify item nomenclature on requisitions
- Provide liaison between service supply systems and Brazil's Armed Forces on delivery of ordered items

Receive and distribute technical data

Maintain MAP material status reports

Handle MAP material disposal and redistribution.

Transportation: monitor and coordinate delivery of ammunition and FMS items and redistribute excess MAP property.

Fiscal management: prepare annual budgeting and programming of IMET and FMS, obtain and update price and availability data, monitor mobile training team expenditures, and coordinate IMET funding and host services.

Contract administration: monitor and coordinate letters of offer and monitor use of FMS articles and services.

Other: responsible for supervision, administrative support, reports, and studies.

#### Changes in functions and duties

There has been no change in personnel functions since Public Law 95-92 was enacted.

The equivalent personnel <sup>1/</sup> and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties before those programs were terminated is as follows.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Total personnel involved</u>	
	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>
Primary:		
Logistics management	1.62	16.1
Transportation	1.10	11.0
Fiscal management	1.51	15.1
Contract administration	1.74	17.3
	<u>5.97</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Other	4.06	40.5
Total	<u>a/10.03</u>	<u>100.0</u>

<sup>a/</sup>JBUSMC also was charged with carrying out the provisions of the Brazil-U.S. cooperative defense agreement. The balance of the authorized personnel were involved in this area of responsibility.

---

<sup>1/</sup>Total of staff time charged to these functions and expressed in equivalent number of personnel.



## VIEWS OF JBUSMC OFFICIALS

Since JBUSMC is, in reality, not operating as a security assistance organization and is being phased out, the effects of Public Law 95-92 on its operations are largely academic. However, JBUSMC officials made the following comments.

### Adequacy of staffing

In September 1977, the Brazilian Government terminated all military agreements with the United States, including the JBUSMC accord. As a consequence of this and the earlier termination of security assistance, JBUSMC planned to phase out all personnel by the end of fiscal year 1978, as follows.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of personnel</u>
1977:	
December	7
1978:	
January	2
February	1
March	2
April	1
May	2
June	0
July	5
August	0
September	4

Reassignment problems and personnel considerations were given as the primary reasons for the phaseout rather than an immediate withdrawal. Nevertheless, we noted that the Congressional Presentation Document for the fiscal year 1979 security assistance program proposed a group of six military personnel in Brazil. Department of Defense officials told us that this group was needed to administer the undelivered FMS program, to maintain liaison with Brazil's military forces, and to maintain accountability of previously provided equipment.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

All programs are submitted for the consideration of the Chief of the diplomatic mission and are implemented only after his approval. This was also true before Public Law 95-92 was enacted.

## Interaction between JBUSMC and host country

Brazil maintains procurement officers in Washington D.C., but there is little direct interaction between them and the U.S. delegation and none with the training teams.

## Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Air Force has residual MAP equipment and there is a regular exchange of status reports. All three services use frequent visits and discussions with counterpart Brazilian officers to monitor use and location of FMS articles. JBUSMC, per se, cannot prevent transfers of MAP items to third parties; it can only report transfers if it becomes aware of them.

## VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

### Supervision and direction provided to JBUSMC

The President's recent letter to all Ambassadors was cited as reinforcing the authority of the Ambassador over the security assistance organizations in the country. JBUSMC activities are coordinated with the Embassy, and no problems were identified.

### Effectiveness of JBUSMC operations

The day-to-day involvement of JBUSMC has strengthened ties with Brazil's military forces and facilitated the exchange of doctrine and technology. The followup service provided by JBUSMC has been beneficial to Brazil in purchasing military equipment and supplies.

## GREECE COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Hawthorne Q. Mills (acting)  
MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Aid Group-Greece (JUSMAGG)  
JUSMAGG CHIEF: Maj. Gen. R. A. Bresnahan (U.S. Army)  
LOCATION OF JUSMAGG: Athens, Greece

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The security assistance program is predicated on encouraging the growth and development of Greece so that it will remain a viable partner for the West, politically, militarily, and economically. More specifically, security assistance (1) provides a continuing indication of U.S. support, (2) serves as encouragement for Greece to return to full military participation in NATO, (3) helps to modernize Greek Armed Forces, (4) helps to preserve compatibility of Greek and U.S. weapon systems, and (5) facilitates base arrangements for U.S. and NATO Forces.

Fiscal year 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	-----(millions)-----		
1977	\$33.0	\$207.3	\$1.0
1978 (estimated)	33.0	200.0	2.0

### EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal year 1977 MAP funds were used for tube launched-optically guided wire (TOW) missiles and launchers, ammunition, recovery vehicles, torpedoes, and spare parts. Fiscal year 1978 funds have been allocated for TA-7 aircraft, helicopters, torpedoes, ammunition, communication and radar equipment, bridge equipment, and spare parts.

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS sales agreements were primarily for aircraft spare parts, missiles and spare parts, ammunition, communication equipment, ground support equipment, ship spare parts, supply operations, technical assistance, and training. According to the

Congressional Presentation Document, Greece is expected to buy the same type of equipment and services in 1978.

International Military Education and Training: in fiscal year 1977, 144 Hellenic military personnel obtained professional training at the Naval Command College, post graduate schools, undergraduate navigator schools, and schools for logistics development, surface warfare, electronics repair, and ordnance/weapons repair. For 1978, about 134 personnel have received or are programmed for the same type of training. Personnel are also programmed for RF-4E aircrew and maintenance training.

STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1975	34	(a)	8	8	16	16	58	(a)
1976	34	(a)	7	7	16	16	57	(a)
1977	30	30	7	7	16	16	53	53
October 31, 1977	29	30	7	7	16	16	51	53
January 31, 1978	28	28	7	7	16	16	51	51

a/Information not available.

Total assigned personnel equals the authorized staffing level. However, the 28 military personnel includes one man in the Navy section whose position was deleted as a result of Public Law 95-92. He was relieved of security assistance functions and was granted permission by the Chief of Naval Personnel to remain in the country until his separation from service in February 1978. Otherwise, he would have been required to be reassigned out of the country by January 31, 1978, in accordance with Departments of State and Defense instructions regarding implementation of Public Law 95-92.

While the Navy section is currently over strength by one individual, the Army section is under strength by one individual. The vacant position is expected to be filled in April 1978.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned (note a)</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned (note b)</u>
1975	--	1	-	10
1976	-	1	-	10
1977	-	1	-	10
October 31, 1977	-	-	-	10
January 31, 1978	-	-	-	10

a/A Department of Defense civilian was a representative with the Weapons Systems Liaison Office and returned to the United States in May 1977.

b/Seven Hellenic officers serve as interpreters/liaison for the JUSMAGG staff. These positions, plus two local national secretaries, are provided by the Greek Government as assistance-in-kind. One other secretary supports the Weapons Systems Liaison Office under an FMS case.

JUSMAGG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: provide input to the Military Security Assistance Projection and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, formulate and develop the MAP and FMS programs, and assist Hellenic officials with problems arising from the interface between the U.S. and Hellenic supply systems.

Transportation: monitor MAP and FMS material shipping status and receive and distribute technical publications.

Fiscal management: handle fiscal matters related to planning and developing FMS, MAP, and IMET and maintain liaison with Hellenic officials on price increases, late contract payments and price and availability data requests.

Contract administration: act as intermediary on letters of intent and letters of offer and acceptance, perform liaison on such matters as altered delivery schedules and contract extensions and modifications, define the scope of work to be performed by mobile training teams and contract engineering technical service teams, and evaluate advisory and assistance teams' performances.

**Training management:** inform Hellenic officials of training funds available; compile and refine training requirements submitted by Hellenic Armed Forces; and prepare travel orders, conduct English language tests, and monitor student progress.

**Administrative duties:** perform clerical and support duties associated with JUSMAGG operations.

**MAP inspections:** conduct end-item use and inspection of MAP equipment.

**Liaison:** visit Hellenic National Defense General Staff and service general staffs and military units and installations. This is in addition to the liaison duties discussed previously.

**Visitor contacts:** coordinate visits from representatives of commercial firms, Hellenic military counterparts, Inspector General, etc.

**Protocol:** time devoted from job for such matters as national and military ceremonies and awards.

**Research:** obtain information requested on security assistance, other special projects and studies, and study the Greek language.

**Miscellaneous:** maintain and pilot the JUSMAGG aircraft, obtain area clearances for official Department of Defense visitors, and chauffeur JUSMAGG personnel.

**Idle time:** nonproductive time resulting from the need for specialists in certain areas. (See p. 14.)

### Changes in functions and duties

According to the Chief, JUSMAGG, the scope of operations was not directly affected by enactment of Public Law 95-92. However, there have been some procedural changes in JUSMAGG dealings with commercial representatives, and Greek military officials prior to Government-to-Government agreements on specific requests. Also, requests for letters of offer and acceptance, price and availability data, and planning and budgetary data on significant combat equipment are forwarded through Department of State rather than military channels. These procedural changes appear to emanate from the arms transfer policy guidelines against the promotion of arms sales rather than from Public Law 95-92.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance functions and duties. The data is an estimate based on JUSMAGG interpretation and understanding of the primary functions prescribed in Public Law 95-92.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number (note a)	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
<b>Primary:</b>								
Logistics management	6.65	25.0	-	-	2.66	17.9	9.51	19.1
Transportation	0.54	2.0	-	-	0.30	1.9	0.84	1.7
Fiscal management	1.24	4.7	-	-	0.15	0.9	1.39	2.8
Contract administration	1.18	4.4	-	-	0.30	1.9	1.48	3.0
	<u>9.61</u>	<u>36.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3.61</u>	<u>22.6</u>	<u>13.22</u>	<u>26.6</u>
<b>Other:</b>								
Training management	1.97	7.4	-	-	2.15	13.4	4.12	8.3
Administrative duties	2.49	9.3	6.65	95.0	3.41	21.3	12.55	25.3
MAP inspections	.03	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.1
Supervision	3.48	13.1	-	-	0.15	0.9	3.63	7.3
Liaison	0.10	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.10	0.2
Visitor contacts	0.66	2.5	0.10	1.4	-	-	0.76	1.5
Protocol	0.33	1.2	0.07	1.0	0.08	0.5	0.48	1.0
Staff meeting	0.93	3.5	-	-	0.21	1.3	1.14	2.3
Research	1.81	6.8	0.02	0.3	0.25	1.6	2.08	4.2
Personal	0.43	1.6	0.10	1.4	0.04	0.3	0.57	1.1
Community services	0.38	1.4	0.05	0.7	-	-	0.43	0.9
Miscellaneous	3.76	14.1	-	-	5.00	37.5	9.76	19.6
Idle time	0.67	2.5	0.01	0.2	.10	.6	0.78	1.6
	<u>17.04</u>	<u>63.9</u>	<u>7.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>12.39</u>	<u>77.4</u>	<u>36.43</u>	<u>73.4</u>
Total	b/ <u>26.65</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>7.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>16.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>49.65</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a/Does not include one military person still assigned to JUSMAGG but relieved of security assistance program duties.

b/Does not total to 27 assigned military personnel because the Chief, JUSMAGG, has other duties in addition to security assistance duties. He is also the senior U.S. military representative in the country and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, contact officer. These other positions require about 35 percent of his time.

## Technical qualifications of personnel

Based on our limited review and comparison of the specialties of key JUSMAGG officials with the technical qualifications required by their positions, it appears that the individuals are well suited for their positions.

In several instances, the incumbent's military occupation specialty did not agree with that specified in the joint manpower program for that position. However, we found no indications that this has adversely affected the performance of assigned duties.

## ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN JUSMAGG PERSONNEL

Mobile training teams, contract engineering technical services, and other assistance teams funded under IMET or FMS have provided technical and training assistance. Although the number of advisory and training personnel is limited, many contractor-provided technical services last for extended periods, ranging up to 9 years.

The fiscal years 1977 and 1978 technical assistance advice provided by these teams covered maintenance and/or operation of various aircraft, aircraft components, engines, and simulators; precision measuring equipment; aircraft logistics support; and bomb guidance and control units. Training assistance involved aircraft and weapons tactics, maneuvers, operations, and maintenance. In addition, technical teams made damage inspections and site surveys for proposed construction.

The composition and duration of the teams are shown below.

Fiscal year	Teams Type	Number	Number of personnel			Duration				Funding		
			Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	Unknown	FMS	IMET
			(number of teams)									
1977	MTT	4	10	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	3	1
1977	CETS	b/15	-	-	15	-	-	3	11	1	15	-
1977	Other	3	6	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-
1977 total (note a)		22	16	2	35	7	-	3	11	1	21	1
1978	MTT	3	9	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	2
1978	CETS	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
1978	Other	1	-	6	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
1978 total		5	9	6	1	3	1	-	1	-	3	2

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/Includes 10 teams that continued in fiscal year 1978



## VIEWS OF JUSMAGG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

To date, there have been no significant changes in JUSMAGG effectiveness, as most programs now administered were discussed, planned, and approved before Public Law 95-92 was enacted. Before the law was enacted, JUSMAGG regularly participated in discussions with Hellenic military decisionmakers about replacing or acquiring additional weapons systems. This was done only on request, and no attempt was made to market U.S. arms.

Public Law 95-92, however, did result in some minor procedural changes regarding JUSMAGG's relationships with their Hellenic counterparts. Even though JUSMAGG officials were guarded in their discussions with Hellenic officials before the legislation, there is now more emphasis on holding back any evaluations or recommendations which could be construed as encouraging acquisition of U.S. arms.

The Chief, JUSMAGG, said that another change which could affect JUSMAGG effectiveness is the restriction on exchanging information on the latest equipment. Previously, JUSMAGG, on request, provided the Greek military with descriptive and test data and other releasable information available from the Department of Defense which it desired for formulating recommendations for military procurement. The Greek military does not have the capability or access to develop such information in house. According to JUSMAGG officials, the new law seems to restrict this kind of military-to-military exchange prior to Government-to-Government approval for specific items of defense equipment. One advantage of military-to-military contacts was that JUSMAGG generally knew Greece's future acquisition plans, even for equipment from third countries.

Prior to enactment of Public Law 95-92, JUSMAGG officials, when requested by commercial representatives, would make appointments for them with Hellenic officials and would attend the meetings; this service is no longer provided.

### Adequacy of staffing

The Chief, JUSMAGG, believes that the present staff is adequate for its management functions. However, JUSMAGG does not have adequate staffing for end-item inspection of all MAP equipment. Through sampling techniques, JUSMAGG officials believe that they are able to perform a reasonably effective inspection.

Although JUSMAGG reported some idle time, officials believe that this occurs because of the specialization needed within the services. The idle time could possibly be reduced if individual staff members were cross-trained in other areas of expertise.

Supervision and direction provided  
by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Public Law 95-92 has not caused any substantial changes in the general guidance provided by the Ambassador, who has always been kept informed of significant JUSMAGG activities. He has always reviewed all JUSMAGG major planning documents and provided guidance on policy matters.

Since enactment of the law, however, requests for letters of offer and acceptance, price and availability data, and planning and budgetary data are forwarded through Department of State rather than military channels.

Interaction between JUSMAGG and host country

Greece has no procurement office in the United States, and its defense attaches in Washington, D. C., act as procurement agents for many FMS requests. JUSMAGG interaction with these offices is limited primarily to receiving copies of correspondence between the Greek forces and the attaches.

The attaches do not handle the larger FMS cases, particularly those involving weapon systems. Such requests are transmitted from the Government of Greece to the U.S. Embassy/JUSMAGG, which prepares justifications in the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization force requirements, regional balance of forces, and human rights aspects and sends them to the Department of State with copies to the Department of Defense. The approved letter of offer and acceptance received from Washington is forwarded to the Government of Greece for acceptance. Thereafter, JUSMAGG monitors the status of the requested items and coordinates their delivery to insure that support and training is available when needed.

Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

JUSMAGG receives annual reports of all MAP assets from the Greek military services and compares the balances

with JUSMAGG records. Discrepancies are discussed with Greek military counterparts. Periodic visits also are made to Greek installations, when permitted, to monitor the use and location of MAP items. However, it is not possible to make a complete inspection of all assets due to the thousands of items involved. Therefore, JUSMAGG uses a sampling technique for its periodic MAP inspections. Information on MAP assets is also obtained from incountry training teams, and, based on the teams' trip reports, MAP end-item use reports are prepared.

## VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

### Supervision and direction provided to JUSMAGG

The Ambassador directs and supervises the Chief, JUSMAGG, through weekly country team meetings and other meetings, as required. Although these meetings may not always concern security assistance matters, they do provide the Chief, JUSMAGG, with an insight on policy matters and the way the Embassy wants situations handled.

The Ambassador said that there has never been any question about who is responsible for overall guidance and supervision of JUSMAGG operations. He said that the Chief, JUSMAGG, has never tried to bypass the U.S. Embassy on security assistance matters and that it frequently requests the Embassy's position on situations requiring policy consideration.

Public Law 95-92 had little, if any, effect on the operations of JUSMAGG, since the Embassy always reviewed and approved all requests for arms sales. However, host-country requests, formerly transmitted through military channels, are now transmitted through Department of State channels.

### Effectiveness of JUSMAGG operations

The Ambassador said that he considered JUSMAGG very effective and that the present staff level is sufficient for required management functions. However, he added that, if the United States could convince the Government of Greece to establish an FMS procurement office in the United States, the staff level could be reduced. As the situation exists now, the Government of Greece makes extensive use of its military attaches in Washington for many FMS requests. However, the attaches are not equipped to handle major buys, such as weapons systems, and, consequently, these requests are channeled through the U.S. Embassy/JUSMAGG.

The Ambassador said there is little likelihood that the Greek Government would agree to establish a procurement office in the United States to handle all requests because it normally submits requests concurrently through its attaches, the Embassy/JUSMAGC, and commercial firms in an attempt to obtain the best price by playing one off against another. If the United States required Greece to submit all requests through one channel, it would probably see this as an attempt to limit its bargaining ability.

## INDONESIA COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Edward E. Masters

MAAG NAME: U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG)

USDLG CHIEF: Col. William A. Tombaugh (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF USDLG: Jakarta, Indonesia

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Indonesia's location, size, population, and potential natural resource wealth give it an important strategic and political position in Southeast Asia. Because of the security situation in Southeast Asia following the Communist victories in Indochina, the Indonesians have sought to modernize their Armed Forces to counter an anticipated Communist effort to infiltrate arms into the country or a possible confrontation over the contested and potentially oil-rich shelf areas in the South China Sea.

The security assistance program, consisting of the Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training programs (MAP, FMS, IMET), seeks to help Indonesia meet its minimal security requirements and to provide evidence of U.S. interest in fostering continued stability in Southeast Asia. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	—————(millions)—————		
1977	\$15.0	\$ 5.0	\$2.7
1978 (estimated)	15.0	125.0	3.1

### EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal years 1977 and 1978 funds were and are being used to procure helicopters, various small ships, tactical and commercial vehicles, small weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, support equipment, spare parts, and technical assistance.

Foreign Military Sales: Indonesia made no major FMS purchases during fiscal year 1977. In 1978 it has initiated letters of offer and acceptance for M-16 rifle coproduction, F-5E aircraft and support, and T-34 aircraft. Indonesia would like to fund these purchases with fiscal years 1977 and 1978 FMS credits of \$23.1 million and \$40 million, respectively, as well as with any future FMS credits made available.

International Military Education and Training: during fiscal year 1977, 208 Indonesians received training, primarily in resources management, middle and upper level professional development, and technical skills. Plans call for 233 Indonesians to receive training in 1978. IMET funds also have been used to support an incountry language-training program. Two incountry mobile training teams are programmed for 1978.

STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1975 (note a)	56	51	5	4	22	20	83	75
1976 (note a)	56	51	6	6	22	19	84	76
1977 (note a)	54	49	6	4	22	19	82	72
October 31, 1977	33	47	4	3	19	19	56	69
December 13, 1977	33	42	4	3	19	19	56	64

a/ As of July 1.

As of December 13, 1977, the USDLG had nine military personnel over the staff level authorized. These individuals were reportedly removed from assistance-related functions as of October 1 and were scheduled to leave Indonesia on or before January 31, 1978, as required by Departments of State and Defense instructions.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

Other incountry Department of Defense elements support the security assistance program, as shown below.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1975	2	2	5	5	7	7
1976	2	2	4	4	6	6
1977	2	2	4	4	6	6
October 31, 1977	2	1	4	4	6	5

The two military personnel are warrant officers, who provide procurement and installation support services for the Indonesian communications project. The total cost for the project, including the attached personnel, will be about \$18 million. It was funded with fiscal years 1976, 1977 transition quarter, and 1977 MAP funds and is scheduled to be completed in December 1979.

The four U.S. civilians are English-language training advisors from the Defense Language Institute. The positions are IMET-funded at about \$120,000 annually and are programed through fiscal year 1979, provided funding is available.

USDLG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: formulate, submit, and modify MAP and FMS programs; coordinate deliveries; and monitor receipt, use, disposal, and redistribution of the programs' materiel.

Transportation: all activities associated with transporting security assistance program materiel and personnel.

Fiscal management: allocate MAP funds available under existing authorizations.

Contract administration: assist host-country counterparts in formulating and executing contracts with U.S. Government or commercial suppliers of military equipment and services.

Administration: internal functions of USDLG that are unrelated to management of the security assistance program.

Advisory and training assistance: provide advice and technical assistance for establishing management and maintenance programs for U.S. equipment and services.

Training management: formulate, submit, modify, execute, monitor the IMET program.

Planning: formulate plans for executing the security assistance program as well as plans required by higher headquarters (Military Security Assistance Projection and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan).

Liaison/coordination: all activities relating to interaction with host-country counterparts, both business and social.

### Changes in functions and duties

According to USDLG officials, Public Law 95-92 reduced the number of USDLG personnel but did not change the scope or type of functions to be performed. Thus, the remaining personnel have more responsibilities and less time for any given function, such as end-item inspections, liaison with Indonesian officials, and review of letters of offer and acceptance.

The table below shows the equivalent personnel and the percent of time they devote to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	6.85	20.8	0.30	10.0	-	-	7.15	13.0
Transportation	0.78	2.4	-	-	-	-	0.78	1.4
Fiscal management	2.37	7.2	-	-	-	-	2.37	4.3
Contract administration	0.15	0.4	0.10	3.3	-	-	0.25	0.5
	<u>10.15</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>0.40</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>10.55</u>	<u>19.2</u>
Other:								
Administration	10.95	33.2	1.10	36.7	19.00	100.0	31.05	56.5
Advisory and training	3.85	11.7	1.30	43.3	-	-	5.15	9.4
Training management	2.39	7.2	-	-	-	-	2.39	4.3
Planning	2.65	8.0	-	-	-	-	2.65	4.8
Liaison coordination	3.01	9.1	0.20	6.7	-	-	3.21	5.8
	<u>22.85</u>	<u>69.2</u>	<u>2.60</u>	<u>86.7</u>	<u>19.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>44.45</u>	<u>80.8</u>
Total	a/ <u>33.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>3.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>19.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>55.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a/Does not include military personnel in excess of authorized staff level.



## Technical qualifications of personnel

USDLG personnel appear to be qualified for their positions. For example, five of the seven key officials have had Indonesian-language training and formal security assistance courses. The personnel are experienced in logistics management and maintenance, which are the primary areas of effort in Indonesia.

## ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN USDLG PERSONNEL

During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, technical assistance teams (TATs), contract field services (CFS) teams, and mobile training teams (MTTs) have been or will be used to give the Indonesian Armed Forces

- advice, assistance, and training in (1) parachute inspection and repair, (2) supply management, (3) aircraft and aircraft armament systems, (4) avionics, (5) helicopter, jet engine, propeller and life-support equipment maintenance, and (6) development of a manpower management system;
- assistance in establishing electronics and machine repair systems;
- assistance in installing avionics and communications equipment; and
- instruction in shipyard and fleet repair and maintenance, destroyer escort warfare principles, and communications equipment repair and maintenance.

The following table shows the composition, duration, and funding for these teams.

Fiscal year	Teams Type	Number	Number of personnel			Duration				Funding		
			Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	FMS	MAP	
											(number of teams)	
1977	TAT	6	5	2	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	
	CFS	3	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	3	-	
1977	total (note a)	9	5	2	3	6	-	3	-	3	6	
1978	TAT	3	1	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	
	CFS	2	-	-	3	1	-	1	-	-	2	
1978	total (note b)	5	1	2	3	4	-	1	-	-	5	

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/Two IMET-funded MTTs and two MAP-funded TATs were also programed for 1978, but their composition had not been determined.

## VIEWS OF USDLG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

USDLG's overall mission effectiveness has decreased because of Public Law 95-92 personnel reductions. All security assistance program duties were affected by these reductions. Considerable adverse impact is expected on the capability of USDLG to monitor and report on end-item use of MAP-provided equipment.

### Adequacy of staffing

A wait-and-see attitude was expressed regarding the adequacy of staffing. However, officials said that further large staff reductions would preclude equipment-use inspections and assurance that the Indonesians buy only what they need and can afford.

The original functional requirements for four positions will have been fulfilled or the functions transferred to other personnel attached to the USDLG by the end of fiscal year 1978. Accordingly, it would seem that personnel strength could be reduced at the end of fiscal year 1978 without adversely affecting security assistance program operations. However, USDLG officials would like to convert these positions to perform other functions. We believe that they should be eliminated as their current functions are completed or transferred to other individuals. The following is a brief description of these positions.

- A military OV-10 aircraft instructor pilot is teaching Indonesian air force personnel how to use the aircraft and maintain a viable squadron. This function will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1978.
- A U.S. civilian assistant for management sciences provides direct technical advice and assistance in developing Indonesian resource allocation systems, including equipment requirements and selection, and sea control studies. This position will be deleted at the end of fiscal year 1978.
- The duties of a communications and electronics noncommissioned officer position will be transferred in August 1978 to a warrant officer attached to USDLG from the U.S. Army Communications Command under the MAP-funded Indonesian Communications project.
- A U.S. civilian logistics supervisor position has been vacant for several months. The duties of this position are being performed by a Navy storekeeper who has the same duties. The USDLG division chief stated that one of these two positions will be eliminated, depending on whether he can obtain a qualified person for the civilian position.

There are two other USDLG advisory positions involving (1) a U.S. civilian equipment specialist who is attempting to establish a vehicle maintenance management system and (2) a U.S. military aircraft maintenance supervisor who provides technical assistance, including recommending operating and shop procedures, to aircraft maintenance shop personnel.

Supervision and direction provided  
by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Public Law 95-92 had no significant effect on the degree of direction and supervision provided by the Ambassador to USDLG operations. All substantive security assistance matters were reviewed and approved by the Embassy's political section before being transmitted.

There were some minor procedural changes. For example, prior to Public Law 95-92, messages went through Defense Department channels but now they are sent through State Department channels, with copies to appropriate military commands.

## Interaction between USDLG and host country

Indonesia has two procurement officers attached to the Indonesian Defense Attache Office in Washington, D.C., to handle both commercial and FMS transactions. USDLG and the two procurement officers do not coordinate with each other, and officials were unsure exactly what functions the procurement officers performed.

## Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

USDLG has implemented the procedures of the Military Assistance Sales Manual regarding end-item use of MAP-provided equipment and, within the resources available, insures the proper use of such equipment by the host country. USDLG personnel make periodic inspections when they visit host-country installations. Yearly inventories are made by host-country personnel and the results are reported to USDLG, which compares them to the selected item summary list provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency to identify any discrepancies.

To date, there have been no indications of unauthorized transfers of MAP or FMS equipment. If such transfers were detected or suspected, the Chief, USDLG, would notify the host country that such transfers were not approved. If such transfers continued, the Ambassador would inform host-government officials of the possible consequences--termination of assistance or other congressional actions deemed appropriate.

## VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

### Supervision and direction provided to USDLG

Public Law 95-92 reinforced the Ambassador's role of insuring that security assistance program operations are in line with U.S. political and policy objectives. As discussed previously, USDLG message traffic is routed through the political section and substantive matters must be reviewed and approved by the Ambassador. Furthermore, the political officer attends all meetings between USDLG and the Indonesian Military Joint Command. Also, the USDLG Chief, as a member of the country team, meets with the Ambassador on a regular basis.

Effectiveness of USDLG operations

The Ambassador stated that USDLG is an effective organization politically and manages the security assistance program efficiently.

IRAN COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan, Jr.  
MAAG NAME: Military Mission with the Iranian Army and  
Military Advisory Group to Iran (ARMISH-MAAG)  
ARMISH-MAAG CHIEF: Maj. Gen. Philip C. Gast (U.S. Air Force)  
LOCATION OF ARMISH-MAAG: Tehran, Iran

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

According to the Congressional Presentation Document, security assistance to Iran is predicated on the following:

- Strengthening Iran to deter possible aggression by the Soviet Union along the 1,100 mile common border and by allies of the Soviet Union, namely Iraq.
- Assuring a continued source of crude oil.
- Supporting Iran's determination to promote military stability in the Persian Gulf and to promote political stability, economic development, and regional cooperation in the area stretching from Turkey to India.

The Embassy's political/military counselor said that Iran presently has good relations with its neighbors.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>FMS</u>
	(millions)
1977	\$5,803.1
1978	3,000.0

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER FMS

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS purchases consisted primarily of F-16 aircraft; aircraft spare parts; ammunition; Maverick, Phoenix, Sidewinder, and TOW missiles; training; and technical assistance.

As of December 31, 1977, fiscal year 1978 FMS purchases totaled \$846 million, most of which was for seven airborne warning and control systems aircraft and spare parts. According to the Congressional Presentation Document, the Iranians may also purchase additional F-16 aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, a nationwide air defense and air traffic control radar system, and military training.

As of December 31, 1977, ARMISH-MAAG was managing 1,314 active FMS cases valued at \$18.8 billion.

### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

Fiscal year (note a)	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author- ized	Assigned	Author- ized	Assigned	Author- ized	Assigned	Author- ized	Assigned
1976 (note b)	191	161	18	22	39	40	248	223
1977 (note b)	c/186	156	23	19	40	36	249	221
October 31, 1977	c/187	163	27	16	51	35	265	219
December 31, 1977	c/186	166	23	17	51	35	260	218

a/1975 staffing levels were not available at ARMISH-MAAG headquarters.

b/Assigned level as of Dec. 31, 1975 and 1976, respectively.

c/In 1977, six positions were authorized to be funded by the United States and the remainder by Iran. While only three positions were shown as being funded by the United States as of Dec. 31, 1977, fiscal year 1978 planning envisions a total of six positions being funded by the United States.

ARMISH-MAAG's staff levels are below authorized levels for military, civilian, and local national personnel because:

--Program development and progress did not keep pace with expectations, thereby delaying personnel actions.

--There were gaps between the departure of assigned personnel and the arrival of replacement personnel.

--New requirements may have been identified, resulting in an approximate 6- to 9-month time lag between development and filling of positions.

--The Iranian Armed Forces attained self-sufficiency in a particular program phase, thus reducing the number of U.S. personnel required to carry out the remaining program phase.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

Other Department of Defense elements support the security assistance program, as described below.

Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command (TSARCOM)--provides program management, contract administration, procurement, production, military qualification, and configuration control of Bell Helicopter Company Model 214A helicopter and associated systems and the AH-1J helicopter for the Government of Iran.

Missile and Materiel Readiness Command (MIRCOM)--monitors all U.S. Army Development, Acquisition and Readiness Command actions for the I-Hawk Program and all Missile and Materiel Readiness Command actions for systems in the country.

Detachment 30 (PEACE LOG) San Antonio Air Logistics Center (D 30)--provides program management and contract administration of the PEACE LOG Program. The program's main objective is the transfer of logistics management technology to the Imperial Iranian Air Force in order to build a logistics command that will become self-sufficient in supply and transportation, materiel management, maintenance, procurement, and data automation.

Detachment, Electronic Systems Division (ESD)--provides incountry support of the FMS program in Iran, assigned to Electronic Systems Division (Air Force Systems Command). Facilitates cooperation and flow of information between the ESD Systems Program Office, ARMISH-MAAG, and the Government of Iran.

Defense Contract Audit Agency--provides contract audit accounting and financial advisory services for contracts and subcontracts to all Defense Department components.

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU)--provides advice and assistance in support of weapons systems.

Weapons Systems Liaison Office (WSLO)--provides assistance and advice on materiel and services needed and policies and procedures to use in support of weapons systems.



Defense Language Institute (DLI)--provides advice and assistance to the Iranian Armed Forces in English-language training and administration of the respective services' English-language schools and programs. Assists the Imperial Iranian Air Force in developing a bilingual military force.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations, District 72 (OSI)--is responsible for U.S. military and other Defense Department-related elements concerning counterintelligence matters, major fraud/criminal investigations, personal security inquiries, and protective services operations.

Defense Audit Service-Iran (DOD AUDIT)--audits Defense Department activities and programs in Iran and provides audit service to Commander in Chief-Europe and Chief, ARMISH-MAAG.

Local nationals work at the Embassy on personnel and administrative matters associated with using foreign service labor in the security assistance program.

Detachment 8, 1141st U.S. Air Force Special Activity Squadron (D 8)--provides full personnel and financial support for all Air Force officers and enlisted personnel assigned in Iran.

U.S. Support Activity-Iran (USSA-I)--provides logistical support to all Defense Department activities in Iran.

USA Commissary-Iran--provides subsistence support to authorized commissary patrons in accordance with regulatory requirements.

Medical Activity (MEDDAC)--provides primary hospitalization and other health service support to eligible U.S. personnel in Iran and, as directed, to those in other specified locations in the Middle East and Africa.

U.S. Army Communications Command-Iran (USACC-I)--provides teletype and voice communications for all Defense Department agencies in the greater Tehran area; operates and maintains a network control station in support of technical assistance field teams; provides maintenance and installation service to all stations within the network; operates and maintains a transportable digital subscriber terminal which is leased to the Government of Iran and provides direct support to the Central Treaty Organization.

Air Force Post Office, 7025th Air Post Squadron USAF (APO)--provides postal services to active duty military

personnel, Defense Department civilians, Department of State personnel, and other authorized personnel in Iran.

The table below, shows personnel authorized for fiscal year 1978 and assigned as of December 31, 1977.

Organization	Military		Civilian		Local and third-country nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
Security assistance program functions:								
TSARCOM	7	3	48	39	1	1	56	43
MIRCOM	2	2	27	17	-	-	29	19
D30	10	8	25	16	-	-	35	24
ESD	8	3	4	1	-	-	12	4
DCAA	-	-	7	7	-	-	7	7
NAESU	-	-	5	5	-	-	5	5
AFWSLO	-	-	6	5	-	-	6	5
NAVY WSLO	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	1
ARMY WSLO	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	1
DLI	-	-	6	2	-	-	6	2
	<u>27</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>111</u>
Support programs (note a):								
OSI	14	13	1	1	1	1	16	15
DOD AUDIT	-	-	5	2	-	-	5	2
EM MASSY	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	5
D8,1141	11	12	-	-	-	-	11	12
USSA-I	110	101	24	28	291	269	425	398
COMMISSARY	11	9	1	1	89	82	101	92
MEDDAC	70	59	16	17	57	57	143	133
USACC-I	20	67	-	-	7	6	87	73
APO	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	-	-	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>
	<u>309</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>455</u>	<u>425</u>	<u>811</u>	<u>747</u>
Total	<u>336</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>456</u>	<u>426</u>	<u>971</u>	<u>858</u>

a/Support security assistance program indirectly by providing services to organizations which perform security assistance functions. These organizations also service incountry organizations which do not perform security assistance functions. Personnel strengths shown include only those personnel who provide support to security assistance program functions.

### ARMISH-MAAG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: coordinate with Iranian counterparts to provide advice and make recommendations concerning logistics problems and development of logistics systems.

Transportation: assure that FMS items are properly transported from the United States to host-country recipients. This management function also includes the administration of incountry transportation support for technical assistance field teams.

Fiscal management: review, validate, and process FMS billings and transmit the billings to appropriate Government of Iran payment offices.

Contract administration: monitor actions and progress of program managers, administrative contracting officers, and contracting officers' representatives assigned to FMS contracts. This is done to assure that milestones under statements of work and delivery schedules are achieved in compliance with the objectives stated in the FMS cases. For those FMS cases not under the purview of an incountry program manager, administrative contracting officer, or contracting officers' representative, ARMISH-MAAG processes (1) requests for letters of offer and acceptance, (2) notifications of price increases, (3) billing statements, (4) reports of item discrepancies, and (5) actions associated with case closures.

Advisory and training: work with Iranian counterparts to develop sound procedures and programs in such areas as maintenance and supply management; develop personnel requirements for the above programs and recommend that properly trained Iranian personnel be available to fill the requirements. To accomplish this, ARMISH-MAAG helps the Iranian Armed Forces develop and monitor incountry training programs to insure that the personnel are properly trained. Training in the United States is also offered in certain specialized fields. For training programs in the United States, ARMISH-MAAG helps the Iranians determine the number of students needing such training, make travel arrangements for the students, and monitor their progress while in the training program.

Other: manpower planning; personnel management; followup on Inspector General reports; support activities coordination; and preparation of Defense Department requirements, system analysis, and operational studies.

#### Changes in functions and duties

Public Law 95-92 had no direct effect on the ARMISH-MAAG functions. Certain changes in operations had been made prior to its enactment. (See pp. 33 and 34.)

ARMISH-MAAG has initiated a review of its organization, functions, goals, and objectives to identify changes to assure

compliance with the law. The first phase of this review is to more precisely define Public Law 95-92 stated functions and to obtain Defense approval of recommended definitions.

The equivalent military personnel and percent of time devoted to each security assistance program function, as reported by ARMISH-MAAG, are shown below. Data was not available for civilian and local national personnel.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>
Primary:				
Logistics management	40.14	24.2	40.14	24.2
Transportation	4.57	2.8	4.57	2.8
Fiscal management	12.64	7.6	12.64	7.6
Contract administration	29.42	17.7	29.42	17.7
Advisory and training	62.81	37.8	62.81	37.8
Other	<u>16.42</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>16.42</u>	<u>9.9</u>
Total	<u>166.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>166.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>

### Technical qualifications of personnel

According to ARMISH-MAAG officials, personnel requisitions to fill vacant positions are forwarded to the appropriate military personnel centers requesting individuals with specific skills, experience, and educational backgrounds. Within the availability of personnel eligible for reassignment, the centers normally provide personnel with a primary, secondary, or alternate military occupation specialty which satisfies the skills required.

Before the personnel arrive, the centers normally send advance notification of their skills and backgrounds. If these do not satisfy ARMISH-MAAG requirements, the centers are so notified.

Because of the number of personnel involved in ARMISH-MAAG operations, we could not verify whether they met the requirements of their positions, but on the basis of discussions with the Chiefs and others of the Army, Air Force, and Navy service sections, it appears that the personnel are qualified.

### ADVISORY AND TRAINING FUNCTIONS PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN ARMISH-MAAG PERSONNEL

Iran has used FMS agreements to procure needed training and technical assistance through mobile training teams (MTT), technical assistance teams (TAT), contract engineering technical services (CETS), contract management services (CMS), and

technical assistance field teams (TAFT). These teams provide classroom and hands-on training as well as technical advice on

- supply support, maintenance, and operations of various weapon systems, including missiles and aircraft;
- facilities engineering;
- ammunition renovation and maintenance;
- development of incountry training capabilities;
- development of resources management systems; and
- military tactics and exercises.

The following table shows the composition and duration for these teams.

Fiscal year (note a)	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration				
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	Unknown
1977	MTT	7	31	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1977	TAT	5	9	10	-	6	-	1	-	-
1977	CETS	3	-	-	166	4	1	-	-	-
1977	CMS	9	-	-	457	4	-	1	2	-
1977	CFS	5	-	-	102	-	-	2	3	-
1977	TAFT	b/1	671	32	-	-	-	-	5	-
Total for 1977		30	711	43	725	14	1	4	11	-
1978	TAT	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
1978	CETS	2	-	6	585	1	-	-	-	-
1978	CFS	3	-	-	c/41	-	-	-	-	2
Total for 1978		6	-	10	626	1	-	3	-	2

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/Twenty-three subgroups performing 23 separate functions for various periods under a single TAFT. All fiscal year 1977 TAFT functions carried over to fiscal year 1978. The fiscal year 1978 TAFT strength was reduced to 426 military and 10 civilians.

c/An additional 185 contractor personnel are authorized for one of the CFS teams.

## VIEWS OF ARMISH-MAAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Public Law 95-92 had little effect on the scope or effectiveness of operations. Actions taken prior to enactment of the law had much more of an effect. For example, in 1976 ARMISH-MAAG was reorganized to reorient efforts from advisory/training to program management. It is still involved in advisory/training functions, but more at the headquarters than at the unit level.

According to ARMISH-MAAG officials, personnel are or soon will be mainly involved in the four primary functions described in Public Law 95-92. Local interpretation of Public Law 95-92 is that advisory/training functions may be performed for planning, programing, budgeting, program management, logistics management and concepts, data automation, and other matters which are broad, general, or long term in nature. Furthermore, with the magnitude of the Iranian security assistance program, advisory assistance will be required for the foreseeable future.

Another change which predated the enactment of Public Law 95-92 and affected the scope of ARMISH-MAAG's operations was the President's arms-transfer policy. This policy statement reemphasized that Defense Department personnel were not to encourage arms purchases. To prevent initiation and maturing of arms-sales proposals outside of State Department policy channels, all Defense personnel in the country were again advised that they should not convey to Iranian officials any information (including planning data, which might elicit or influence a purchase request for significant combat equipment unless it was fully approved by the executive branch.

Under this policy, all Government of Iran FMS requests for significant combat equipment and all acquisitions of \$25 million or more are forwarded by the American Embassy to the State Department for action instead of through MAAG channels to the Department of Defense. For these requests, the American Embassy and MAAG prepare and forward to the Department of State a detailed country team assessment to assure a thorough policy consideration by the U.S. Government.

### Adequacy of staffing

Each service section has a TAFT organization. Although TAFT personnel are not assigned to ARMISH-MAAG, they are semipermanent in that they are assigned for 1 to 2 years, depending on whether it is an accompanied or unaccompanied

tour. The staffing level of a TAFT fluctuates, depending on the progress of the programs. As one phase of the program is completed, personnel may be transferred to another TAFT program element, to a vacant position in the MAAG, or out of the country.

ARMISH-MAAG officials said that future manning requirements will depend to a great extent on future FMS approvals for Iran. If the program remains at approximately the currently approved magnitude, it is envisioned that staffing requirements will not change appreciably through 1980. TAFT manning levels must be adjusted in accordance with program requirements, and, based on recently approved acquisitions, Air Force TAFT manning levels will probably increase.

#### Supervision and direction provided by the Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

The Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, has traditionally been the military advisor to the Ambassador and a member of the country team. The Ambassador receives periodic briefings from, discusses major programs with, and makes recommendations to the Department of State.

All major FMS purchase requests are now forwarded through Embassy channels to the Department of State, and other FMS requests are either coordinated with the Embassy or the Embassy is given an information copy. Policy and procedure correspondence is coordinated with the Embassy. The Embassy reviews and approves all visit requests and is the principal contact for commercial contractors.

#### Interaction between ARMISH-MAAG and host country

The Government of Iran does not maintain an FMS procurement office in the United States, so FMS requests are channeled through ARMISH-MAAG. However, the Imperial Iranian Air Force and Navy maintain procurement offices in the United States for direct commercial acquisitions. There is limited and indirect interaction between the purchasing missions and the MAAG-TAFT for commercial acquisitions that support FMS programs.

#### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Iranian Armed Forces are required to provide annual reports on the quantities and condition of MAP material still

in their inventory for verification against MAAG records. Iranian responses have been negligible, despite overtures by ARMISH-MAAG in response to direction by the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, Inspector General in March 1977. ARMISH-MAAG requested a waiver to MAP reporting and accountability for Iran based on an analysis of available data and problems associated with monitoring MAP material. A partial waiver was granted, but ARMISH-MAAG is still required to report on major weapons systems which are relatively easy to observe.

According to ARMISH-MAAG officials, the MAAG cannot physically prevent unauthorized third-country transfers but has taken steps to assure that the Government of Iran is aware of the requirement for approval prior to third-country transfer. If an apparent unauthorized third-country transfer were detected, the MAAG mission would report the situation to the Departments of State and Defense for executive branch review. MAAG staffing does not permit detailed review and certification of Government of Iran inventories to insure nondiversion of material. However, it appears that the Government of Iran is honoring its obligation because ARMISH-MAAG has received numerous requests for transfer approval during the past year.

#### VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

##### Supervision and direction provided to ARMISH-MAAG

The political/military counselor said the Embassy is heavily involved in ARMISH-MAAG operations, particularly as they relate to FMS policy matters and significant requests for weapon systems, such as the sale of seven airborne warning and control aircraft. He said that the Ambassador meets frequently with the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, on FMS program matters. In essence, the political/military counselor reiterated the views of the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, on this subject.

The Ambassador expressed concern over what appears to be a contradiction between the President's letter to Ambassadors outlining their role and responsibility to incountry elements and Defense's interpretation of certain provisions of Public Law 95-92.

The Ambassador said that the President's letter clearly states that the Ambassador has full responsibility for the direction, supervision, and coordination of all Department of Defense elements in the country. This includes all U.S. Government programs and activities in the country. The only exceptions are personnel assigned or detailed to international



organizations and personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander. However, Defense's interpretation of the MAAG's role as it relates to the primary function of contract administration is that, primarily, it is one of monitoring the actions and progress of program managers, administrative contracting officers, and contracting officers' representatives assigned to contracts implementing FMS cases, to assure that milestones and delivery schedules are achieved. For FMS cases not under the purview of an incountry program manager, administrative contracting officer, or contracting officers' representative, the MAAG's duties include (1) processing requests for letters of agreement, (2) processing notifications for price increases, (3) matching material deliveries with billing statements, (4) processing reports of item discrepancies, and (5) processing actions associated with final case closures.

In addition, a potential problem arises when the Ambassador tries to delegate to the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, as his representative, command authority over incountry program managers, administrative contracting officers, and contracting officers' representatives. These individuals are not assigned to ARMISH-MAAG and report to their parent commands in the United States. Because of the division in the commands, the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, could not direct these individuals to stop payments to contractors or to take other actions if he were not satisfied with contractor performance. His recourse would be to effect corrective action through the individual's U.S. command.

The Ambassador said that, if the Congress intended the MAAG to perform contract administration duties (as defined in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations) rather than those duties as interpreted by the Department of Defense, then the MAAG would require personnel with expertise in contract administration.

#### Effectiveness of ARMISH-MAAG operations

The political/military counselor said that he could not think of anything specific ARMISH-MAAG needed to do to improve its effectiveness. He stated that before Public Law 95-92 was enacted, major changes which emphasized program management had already taken place.

## JORDAN COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering  
MAAG NAME: Military Assistance Programs-Jordan (MAP)  
MAP CHIEF: Col. Lawrence D. Thompson (U.S. Army)  
LOCATION OF MAP: Amman, Jordan

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The United States supports the existence of a moderate and pro-Western Jordan as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and as essential to a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The security assistance program helps Jordan to maintain a credible defense, achieve a sense of confidence in its ability to exist, and operate more independently of its neighbors. U.S. military equipment and training provided is geared toward modernizing Jordan's Armed Forces and supporting its internal and external defensive requirements.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
1977	\$55.0	\$117.0	
1978 (estimated)	55.0	75.0	\$1.0 1.6

### EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal year 1977 funds were used to purchase antitank missiles, fuel trucks, machine-guns, grenade launchers, spare parts, ammunition, F-5 aircraft and spare parts, support equipment, and transportation services. Fiscal year 1978 MAP funds have not been obligated but are expected to be spent for antitank missiles, spare parts, ammunition, and transportation services.

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS agreements covered the purchase of howitzers, helicopters, personnel carriers, night-vision equipment, tank transporters, communications and engineering equipment, ammunition, F-5 engines and

spare parts, support vehicles, and supply support arrangements. Possible fiscal year 1978 FMS purchases include armored vehicles, artillery, armed helicopters, aircraft engines, and general-purpose vehicles.

International Military Education and Training: fiscal year 1977 IMET funds were used to train 292 Jordanian military personnel in the United States and Europe. The training program included various elementary and advanced courses in Air Force operations, courses at the Naval Command College and various Army programs. IMET funds also were used for training aids and mobile training teams. Fiscal year 1978 funds are expected to be used primarily to provide individual training to 272 Jordanian military students in the United States.

### STAFFING LEVELS

#### Personnel authorized and Assigned to Security Assistance Programs

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1975	8	8	1	1	4	4	13	13
1976	10	10	2	2	5	5	17	17
1977	10	10	2	2	5	5	17	17
October 31, 1977	a/10	a/10	2	2	5	5	17	17
December 31, 1977	a/10	a/10	2	2	5	5	17	17

a/Does not include Chief, MAP, who also functions as the Defense Attache.

#### Other Overseas Personnel Performing Security Assistance Functions

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1977 (note a)	5	5	3	3	-	-	8	8
October 31, 1977	5	5	3	3	-	-	8	8
December 31, 1977	5	5	3	3	-	-	8	8

a/Ae of Sept. 30, 1977.

The I-Hawk project field office, located in Amman, Jordan, monitors the contractor's performance under the I-Hawk contract and provides advice to the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The U.S. military and civilian employees working in the field office are funded under FMS.

#### MAP PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: answer correspondence on FMS, MAP, and IMET programs; maintain data files on all security assistance programs; maintain liaison with Jordan's military officials on logistics matters; and provide administrative support to mobile training teams, quality assurance teams, inspectors, and official visitors.

Transportation: transport personnel between the Embassy and Jordan's military headquarters and bases, prepare and review Military Airlift Command and surface cargo manifests and correspondence, support aircraft and cargo-handling operations, manage U.S. Air Force transportation and cargo-handling equipment, and help Jordan Petroleum to collect fuel bills for visiting aircraft.

Fiscal management: amend, revise, and reprogram approved FMS, MAP, and IMET programs and plan future programs in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy and Jordan's Armed Forces, monitor the financial status of security assistance programs, and provide input to Departments of State and Defense on such planning documents as the Military Security Assistance Projection and Congressional Presentation Document.

Contract administration: administer U.S. Government contracts and monitor contractor performance.

Advising and training assistance: advise Jordan's military officials on U.S. security assistance policy and procedures; advise and recommend improvements in Jordan's management of logistics support for U.S.-provided aircraft, equipment, and training; and advise of unsafe or wasteful operation, use, or support of the aircraft.

Representational activities: participate in ceremonial functions, social affairs, and protocol activities.

Ambassadorial support: provide input, respond to requests, and discuss security assistance program matters with U.S. Embassy officials.

Administration: support the security assistance program through typing letters, messages, plans, reports, orders, and forms; filing correspondence; processing incoming and outgoing correspondence; and translating documents.

Overall program management: supervise the security assistance program through liaison, internal management, and reading message traffic as it pertains to the entire program.

Changes in functions and duties

According to MAP officials, security assistance program functions did not change as a result of Public Law 95-92. Personnel were performing in a management role prior to enactment of the law. However, a minor procedural change which resulted was that MAP personnel no longer assist commercial businessmen to sell equipment to Jordan.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	4.55	42.6	-	-	-	-	4.55	25.7
Transportation	1.10	10.3	-	-	3.0	60.0	4.10	23.2
Fiscal management	1.64	15.4	-	-	-	-	1.64	9.3
Contract administration	0.05	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.05	0.3
	7.34	68.8	0	0	3.0	60.0	10.34	58.5
Other:								
Advising and training	0.36	3.4	-	-	-	-	0.36	2.0
Representational activities	0.30	2.8	-	-	-	-	0.30	1.7
Ambassadorial support	0.25	2.3	-	-	-	-	0.25	1.4
Administration	1.79	16.8	2.0	100.0	2.0	40.0	5.79	32.8
Overall program management	0.63	5.9	-	-	-	-	0.63	3.6
	3.33	31.2	2.0	100.0	2.0	40.0	7.33	41.5
Total	a/10.67	100.0	2.0	100.0	5.0	100.0	17.67	100.0

a/Does not total to 11 assigned military personnel because it includes the Chief, MAP, who also functions as the Defense Attache. He and the Chief of the Air Force Section devote 33 percent of their time to Defense Attache activities.

## Technical qualifications of personnel

Based on our examination of the qualifications and previous experience of the 10 military personnel assigned to the MAP, all appear to be qualified to perform the duties of their positions. For example, the four military personnel in the Air Force Section have attended the Military Assistance and Advisory Course, and each is working in a position related to his prior assignment.

## ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN MAP PERSONNEL

During fiscal year 1977, mobile training teams, a technical assistance team, and a contract field service team have advised and trained Jordan's Armed Forces. One mobile training team was programmed for fiscal year 1978. These teams provide advice and training in nursing administration and education procedures, Vulcan gun and telescope operations and maintenance, air control tactics, resources management, and F-5 aircraft-spin procedures.

The composition, duration, and funding of these teams are shown below.

Fiscal year	Teams Type	Number	Number of personnel			Duration				Funding		
			Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	FMS	MAP	Unknown
----- (number of teams) -----												
1977	MTT	3	12	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	2	-
	TAT	1	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
	CFS	1	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
		<u>5</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
1978 total	MTT	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>

## VIEWS OF MAP OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Public Law 95-92 had no impact on MAP operations, staffing levels, functions, and program control by the Ambassador.

However, there has been a procedural change in that MAP personnel no longer assist commercial representatives in making appointments with Jordan's military officials. As a result, MAP officials believe they have lost some oversight of the military picture in Jordan. This is not considered serious now but could present problems in the future if Jordan buys equipment from commercial sources which is incompatible with the logistical and training objectives of the security assistance programs.

#### Adequacy of staffing

According to MAP officials, the Ambassador insists that MAP maintain a low profile and a small staff. The Chief, MAP, said that the current staff is sufficient to accomplish security assistance program objectives.

#### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

MAP officials said that the Ambassador has a strong personal interest in the military assistance program and thus insures that it is developed and coordinated with other appropriate members of the country team. The Ambassador gives the Chief, MAP, and the Embassy Arms Control Officer guidance and direction on policy matters affecting the security assistance program. In addition, he has requested Jordan's Armed Forces to route all letters of offer and acceptance and requests for pricing and budgetary data through the Embassy for his review.

The Ambassador has also directed that MAP personnel are not to be involved in advisory and training functions and that such functions are to be performed by non-MAP personnel.

#### Interaction between MAP and host country

Jordan has no FMS procurement office in the United States; however, its military attache in Washington does get involved in purchases from commercial sources.

FMS requests are usually received by the MAP service sections, where they are reviewed in conjunction with security assistance objectives before being sent to the Chief, MAP, for his review and approval. The request is then sent to the Embassy staff sections for final review before being sent to the Department of State or the appropriate military service department.

Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

End-use monitoring of MAP equipment and methods for detecting unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS equipment include

- comparison of inventory records provided by Jordan with records maintained by MAP;
- observations by MAP personnel during visits to units and installations;
- comparison of request for spare parts with equipment reported on the inventory records;
- information obtained through various intelligence sources; and
- frequent reminders to Jordan that transfers require U.S. approval.

MAP officials said that unauthorized transfers cannot be prevented; however, there are no indications that any such transfers have occurred.

VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

Supervision and direction provided to MAP

Principal Jordanian officials, including the King and his defense minister, often deal directly with the Ambassador on security assistance matters, so it is imperative that he be abreast of program details. The Ambassador stated that there are two priority programs in Jordan, the security assistance and the AID programs, both of which require his constant attention and control because they are an integral part of U.S. foreign policy for Jordan.

Effectiveness of MAP operations

The Ambassador stated that the MAP is effective and is viewed by Jordan as an important vehicle for accomplishing its military modernization program. He said that the security assistance program should be and is managed by as few personnel as possible. This, he believes, increases efficiency and facilitates a low American profile.



KOREA COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Richard L. Sneider  
MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group - Korea  
(JUSMAG)  
JUSMAG CHIEF: Maj. Gen. Harry A. Griffith (U.S. Army)  
LOCATION OF JUSMAG: Seoul, Korea

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The primary U.S. policy objective for the Republic of Korea (ROK) is to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. A means of accomplishing this objective is through maintaining a rough balance of power between North and South Korea. The U.S. security assistance program is designed to support ROK self-defense efforts and to help overcome the Armed Forces deficiencies and strengthen the deterrent to possible North Korean aggression. The improvement of ROK self-defense capabilities is particularly important in light of the announced withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
1977	\$1.2	\$654.0	\$1.4
1978 (estimated)	1.3	700.0	1.5

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: modest amounts of MAP funds were programed to defray delivery costs for previously funded MAP material.

Foreign Military Sales: JUSMAG had approximately 1,500 active FMS cases as of January 1978; 433 of them generated during fiscal years 1977 and 1978. The cases comprised 178 operating cases valued at \$269 million and 255 investment cases valued at \$674 million.

Operating cases cover follow-on spare and replacement parts support, equipment overhauls, various munitions, and limited training and technical support. Investment cases

include procurement of major end-items; initial spare parts, support, and test equipment; conversion kits for upgrading major end-items; tool kits; and training and technical assistance. Below are some of the major investment cases.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>	<u>Total value</u>
Procurement and upgrading of M48A1 tanks	20	\$97,325,569
Procurement of UH-1H helicopters	1	20,517,197
Procurement of F-5F aircraft, spares support equipment, and management services	8	66,914,099

International Military Education and Training: fiscal years 1977 and 1978 programs provide for 387 Koreans to attend 642 training courses on logistics management, computer sciences, financial management, operations research/systems analysis, and professional military and career subjects. Also, \$847,000 in training aids and devices were provided to support ROK incountry schools.

#### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author-ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	159	207	41	47	53	93	253	347
1976	155	141	45	42	50	50	250	233
1977	155	155	44	43	50	49	249	247
October 31, 1977	130	138	38	39	50	47	218	224
December 27, 1977	130	134	38	36	50	47	218	217

As of October 1977, all military personnel in excess of those authorized were either assigned to nonsecurity assistance program functions within JUSMAG or loaned temporarily to other U.S. military units in Korea. As of January 1978, 131 military personnel were assigned to JUSMAG; one was scheduled for transfer on January 30, 1978, and one was being held to face a court martial.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Civilian (note a)</u>
U.S. Army Missile Material Readiness Command (MIRCOM)	1
Letterkenny Army Depot	3
U.S. Army Logistics Assistance Office-Korea (LAO-K)	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>5</u>

a/As of January 1978.

The MIRCOM civilian serves as the technical advisor and contracting officer representative for the U.S. project to establish a ROK missile maintenance activity. This individual began work in Korea in February 1976 and the ROK Government has extended the position to February 1980. This position is paid for through an FMS contract.

Letterkenny Army Depot personnel are conventional ammunition, program planning, and logistics advisors in support of a project. The program planner and logistics advisor positions are for 2 years, ending July 1, 1978. The conventional ammunition advisor position has been extended to 2 years by the ROK Government, through August 1979. These positions are reimbursed through FMS contracts.

Since October 1977 the LAO-K civilian has been assigned temporarily, at no cost, to JUSMAG. He assists in updating part numbers and manuals on MAP-provided Vulcan guns. The Vulcan guns provided to ROK are the only basic Vulcan gun systems left in the worldwide inventory. The gun system does not include product improvement modifications; consequently, part numbers and manuals vary and some requisitions submitted by ROK for Vulcan parts had become invalid,

requiring an update of part numbers and manuals to match the Vulcan gun system currently in the U.S. inventory.

#### JUSMAG-K PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Security assistance program management functions:

- Assist in developing, implementing, and executing FMS cases and developing ROK logistics support capabilities for these cases.
- Facilitate the flow of technical information.
- Develop input to the Military Security Assistance Projection and the Joint Strategic Objective Plan.
- Monitor ROK coproduction and production activities and MAP and FMS equipment use and disposition.
- Compile, analyze, and evaluate ROK acquisition programs.
- Coordinate joint U.S./ROK exercises.
- Provide advice to the U.S. Embassy and the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea.
- Develop overall security assistance program data for briefings and reviews.
- Maintain liaison functions.

Fiscal management: interpret and perform comparative studies of ROK economic conditions and analyze the ROK defense budget; provide computer support for JUSMAG planning, programing, and training divisions; analyze ROK Force improvement plan for phasing and costing; and planning security assistance to support ROK Force modernization.

IMET management: develop, administer, and execute the IMET program.

Advising: advise ROK personnel on the overall development of a resources management system, including life-cycle costing, integrated automatic data processing systems, program planning and budgeting, contract administration, repair parts management, and cataloging. Also provide technical advice on operations, maintenance, and logistics procedures and "trouble shooting" and alternative solutions to technical problems at ROK production, coproduction, and maintenance/overhaul activities.

Administrative: provide clerical, secretarial, and administrative support; internal logistics support; personnel functions; liaison with external audit groups; and supervise administrative personnel and individuals handling nonprogram administrative matters.

### Changes in functions and duties

There has been no change in the functions of JUSMAG-K as a result of Public Law 95-92. Position reductions required to meet worldwide MAAG manpower restrictions were planned prior to and not as a result of the law and were accomplished through internal reorganization.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Security assistance program management	41.90	32.33	6.30	16.58	11.15	22.30	59.35	27.22
Fiscal management	8.55	6.58	1.50	3.95	.20	.40	10.25	4.70
	50.45	a/38.81	7.80	20.53	11.35	22.70	69.60	a/31.93
Other:								
IMET management	2.80	2.15	.90	2.37	.65	1.30	4.35	2.00
Advisory/technical assistance	34.10	26.23	9.15	24.08	0	0	43.25	19.84
MAAG management	11.00	8.46	0	0	0	0	11.00	5.05
Administrative	31.65	24.35	20.15	53.03	38.00	76.00	89.80	41.19
	79.55	61.19	30.20	79.48	38.65	77.30	148.40	68.08
Total	130.00	100.00	38.00	a/100.01	50.00	100.00	218.00	a/100.01

a/Does not add due to rounding.

Although we did not identify any tactical or operational advisors, we did find that JUSMAG is deeply involved in providing advisory assistance to ROK. We identified 60 positions (U.S. military and civilian) in which the personnel were doing quantifiable amounts of advising in the development of a resources management system and in technical areas, as discussed above. Of these, 50 positions encompass primarily advisory functions and the combined time allocated to advising equated to 43 full-time JUSMAG positions. An Embassy representative stated that, based on the description of duties performed, he had categorized 66 positions as primarily

advisory; however, he noted that none of the advising is in the "hands-on" category but rather at managerial levels.

The planned withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces from Korea requires that ROK defense self-reliance be increased and Military Forces modernized so as to increase stability in the region and insure the maintenance of peace and security on the peninsula. Force modernization will be accomplished primarily through equipment transfers. However, both JUSMAG and Embassy officials stated that direct advisory assistance to ROK in the development of its resources management systems and technical advice on developing defense industrial capabilities are necessary to accomplish ROK defense self-reliance.

JUSMAG and Embassy officials believe that, to fulfill U.S. security commitments and objectives, an exception to both the Arms Export Control Act and Public Law 95-92 needs to be granted to Korea. The Embassy provided the following position on the need for continued direct JUSMAG advisory assistance to ROK.

"In placing an American command staff in charge of all forces in Korea, we accept both a moral and a practical responsibility for maintaining these forces at a level intended to deter attack. Where doing this involves transfer of arms or technology, the U.S. component's responsibility to recommend weapons acquisitions it feels necessary becomes inseparable from the larger responsibility for assuring the security of the ROK.

"Further, our command responsibility as well as our national security interest require that we furnish a substantial amount of advice to the ROK Forces, particularly in the management area. The ROK Forces are growing, not so much in size as in the quantum leap from a force equipped with relatively simple weaponry to one reliant on modern military technology and the much more difficult tactics and organization that go with it. The ROK military does not have the capability now to manage large, complex systems effectively in an integrated fashion. They are not likely to develop such a capability in the foreseeable [sic] future without substantial outside assistance. Such assistance, in practice, involves highly-qualified people working directly with ROK counterparts to inculcate the skills necessary to the management of major enterprises. If this assistance is not furnished by the U.S.

side, it will not come from any other source, and the task lies beyond domestic capabilities. Our security treaty with the ROK commits us to come to Korea's defense in case of attack; it is in our direct interest to help develop military forces which can uphold as much as possible the national-defense responsibility. Moreover, it is an inseparable part of our command responsibility in the ROK to assist in the building of as capable a force as possible."

ADVISORY AND TRAINING FUNCTIONS PROVIDED  
BY OTHER THAN JUSMAG PERSONNEL

During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, mobile training teams (MTTs), technical assistance teams (TATs), and contract engineering technical services teams (CETs) have:

- Made a study of and recommended actions to correct Report of Item Discrepancy problems.
- Instructed and advised on the operation, maintenance engineering, installation, and/or repair of jet engines; the TOW system and equipment; and the F-4 aircraft, general systems, and components.
- Provided technical assistance to ROK's first improved Hawk missile battalion.
- Provided program management and technical specialists to assist in establishing a missile maintenance depot.

The composition and duration of the teams are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year (note a)	Teams (note b)		Number of personnel			Duration				Unknown
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	
(number of teams)										
1977	MTT	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	TAT	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
	CETS	14	-	-	16	-	1	7	5	1
1977 total		<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
1978	CETS	5	-	-	7	1	2	2	-	-
1978 total		<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/One TAT was MAP-funded, all other teams were FMS funded.

## VIEWS OF JUSMAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

JUSMAG personnel reductions were planned prior to Public Law 95-92 and accomplished by eliminating unnecessary review levels and functions in which the ROK agencies had attained self-sufficiency.

### Adequacy of staffing

JUSMAG is adequately staffed to meet current U.S. security assistance objectives. Although officials believe the current manpower levels should be maintained, they are developing plans in the event that future reductions are made; the positions most likely to be eliminated would be those providing logistics systems advice at field logistics centers. JUSMAG would then concentrate on providing the needed advice at the department level, thereby requiring ROK to assume more self-reliance in logistics management.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Public Law 95-92 and President Carter's October 25, 1977, letter simply reaffirmed the 1969 Nixon letter and statements by former Secretaries of State, so there has been no change in the JUSMAG-Embassy relationship. The Ambassador meets regularly with the JUSMAG Chief to provide guidance and direction in addition to that effected through staff meetings and unscheduled conversations.

### Interaction between JUSMAG and host country

The JUSMAG Programs Division coordinates fully with ROK defense agencies on FMS. ROK maintains a "Logistics Service Mission" in Washington, D.C., that assists in FMS procurements when directed to do so by the defense agencies. The Programs Division directs copies of all FMS correspondence to the Logistics Service Mission. The ROK mission is supposed to send copies of its FMS correspondence to JUSMAG, but has not always done so. The Plans Division has made the ROK mission aware of this situation.

### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The annual "Ministry of National Defense Grant Aid-FMS Inventory Report" (first received in October 1977) and



various Defense Department, command, and local instructions are used to monitor the use and location of MAP and FMS items. JUSMAG personnel are stationed at field logistics centers throughout the country and are responsible for monitoring ROK defense industry production and coproduction. The manning of JUSMAG, however, has made it impossible to perform complete inventories.

JUSMAG cannot prevent all unauthorized transfers to third parties. Unauthorized transfers might be discovered after the fact by ROK/JUSMAG personnel in the performance of other duties. JUSMAG personnel might come across an item of grant aid/FMS being transferred to a third party. They might then bring the unauthorized use to the attention of the ROK service and request that the item be returned to the ROK Government.

### VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

#### Supervision and direction provided to JUSMAG

The Ambassador is very conscious of and involved with JUSMAG operations. However, he is cognizant of the unique responsibility of the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, for the defense of the Korean peninsula and, therefore, recognizes the necessity of working closely with the JUSMAG Chief and the Commanders to provide JUSMAG with supervision and direction in accomplishing U.S. goals and objectives. Officials acknowledged that a situation in which the Ambassador and the Commander were uncooperative would seriously hamper JUSMAG effectiveness.

Although there have been no conflicts over "supervision and direction," the Embassy is now establishing specific JUSMAG goals and objectives desired by the Ambassador and ground rules on the chain of command with the Ambassador as the program director. The establishment of written ground rules on this matter is seen as a step toward precluding any misunderstandings.

#### Effectiveness of JUSMAG operations

Staff reductions have not impaired JUSMAG's operational effectiveness; however, there is a possibility that in the future, staffing may be inadequate to meet objectives, particularly in assisting ROK to obtain self-defense capabilities. An Embassy objective is to minimize staffing, but to also maintain it at the level necessary to achieve U.S. security commitments on the Korean peninsula. The current staff size is consistent with program objectives and requirements.

## KUWAIT COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Frank E. Maestrone  
MAAG NAME: U.S. Liaison Office, Kuwait (USLOK)  
USLOK CHIEF: Col. William W. DeWitt (U.S. Army)  
LOCATION OF USLOK: Kuwait, Kuwait

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

According to the Embassy's political officer, the U.S. interest in Kuwait centers on its oil reserves, not so much for U.S. purposes but for the other industrialized nations. For that reason it is important that Kuwait remain independent.

The primary threat to Kuwait is from Iraq, with which there has been a border dispute for a number of years. Because of its small size (about 1 million people) Kuwait can never hope to achieve military parity with its neighbors. Thus, Kuwait's strategy is to arm itself to the extent that such arming will deter potential aggressors, and, if invaded, delay the aggressors long enough for friendly nations to come to its assistance.

Any invasion of Kuwait would have regional as well as worldwide implications in that the flow of oil could be disrupted, which, in turn, could adversely affect industrialized nations. Thus, it is in the United States interest to encourage stability throughout the region.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>FMS</u> (millions)
1977	\$ 27.7
1978 (estimated)	110.0

## EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER FMS

Fiscal year 1977 FMS sales were primarily training provided by the Army, Air Force, and Navy; A-4 aircraft repairables; a technical assistance field team; and I-Hawk and TOW missile equipment.

Fiscal year 1978 FMS as of January 1978, totaling about \$7.1 million, have been primarily training, contract engineering technical services, I-Hawk ground support equipment, and Sidewinder missile repairables. Sales are also expected to include field artillery pieces and related support equipment, ammunition, and spare parts; command, control, and communications equipment; air defense equipment; and combat support equipment.

As of January 1978, USLOK was responsible for administering 81 active FMS cases.

### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	9	3
1976	9	3
1977	9	3
October 31, 1977	9	6
January 26, 1978	9	7

Note: No civilians or local nationals were assigned to USLOK.

As shown, the authorized staff for USLOK is nine and the assigned strength is seven. However, there is a nine-member technical assistance field team which the Chief, USLOK, considers an integral part of USLOK. The teams, as well as six of the assigned USLOK personnel, are funded under an FMS contract which prescribes the duties, qualifications, and length of tour of these personnel. The chief, USLOK, is funded by the U.S. Government.

According to the 1975 bilateral agreement which established USLOK, all U.S. military and civilian personnel sent to Kuwait to perform defense services under an FMS case shall be considered a part of USLOK. Therefore, in a technical sense all 15 personnel funded by the Government of Kuwait could be considered as assigned to USLOK.

The majority of the 15 personnel perform military advisory and training assistance duties in such functional areas as supply, maintenance, and logistics for U.S.-procured aircraft, tactical vehicles, and missile systems. However, some personnel also perform other security assistance program duties, such as FMS case management contract administration, coordination of training in the United States for Kuwait military personnel, and administrative support of USLOK.

The Chief, USLOK, stated that he has sought guidance from the European Command as to whether the personnel should be considered as assigned to USLOK, a technical assistance field team, or some other category. To date, the situation remains unresolved. The Chief said that a request will probably be submitted recommending that the authorized staffing level for fiscal year 1979 be reduced significantly--possibly to one position.

#### OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

The Kuwait Missile Project Liaison Office, consisting of five military persons and two civilians is responsible for insuring orderly delivery, deployment, and integration of the I-Hawk missile system into the Kuwait air defense system. This includes planning and preparing schedules for monitoring logistics, training, contract support, personnel, construction, operational concepts, and equipment to provide a coordinated effort. The office also coordinates with the USLOK project management office in the United States and Kuwait air defense forces.

The Weapons System Liaison Office consists of two U.S. civilians responsible for security assistance functions related to U.S. Navy-sponsored FMS programs. This includes monitoring and coordinating the delivery of FMS material and services; acting as liaison with various organizational elements within the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Navy, and Kuwait air force; and advising and assisting the Kuwait air force on supply policy and procedures.

Overseas Personnel Performing Security Assistance Functions

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	-	-	-	-	-	-
1976	5	1	4	-	9	1
1977	5	4	4	-	9	4
October 31, 1977	5	5	4	4	9	9
January 26, 1978	5	5	4	4	9	9

USLOK PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: procure and transfer materials provided under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act.

Transportation: assist in the proper delivery of articles provided under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act.

Fiscal management: administer funds related to the procurement of equipment or services under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act.

Contract administration: insure that U.S. Government contracts for security assistance programs are executed in accordance with agreed terms and conditions.

Other duties: provide administrative support for security assistance management; provide recommendations or instructions on procedures or actions to effect more efficient operation(s); support the advisory and training effort; supervise and direct functions which do not involve the direct management of a specific FMS case but rather many cases.

Changes in functions and duties

Public Law 95-92 did not affect USLOK operations. The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Military</u>	
	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>
Primary:		
Logistics management	0.41	2.7
Transportation	0.30	2.0
Fiscal management	0.50	3.3
Contract administration	<u>0.05</u>	<u>0.4</u>
	1.26	8.4
Other:		
Support of management function	1.00	6.7
Advisory and training function	11.10	74.0
Support of advisory and training function	0.60	4.0
Indirect management	0.80	5.3
Miscellaneous efforts	<u>0.24</u>	<u>1.6</u>
	<u>13.74</u>	<u>91.6</u>
Total	<u>15.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>

This includes eight military personnel assigned as of January 24, 1978, to a technical assistance field team. The table does not include one individual who arrived January 25, 1978. Therefore, as of January 26, 1978, the team totaled nine.

Technical qualifications of personnel

All but 2 of the 15 personnel assigned or attached to USLOK possessed the primary job code required for their positions; the other 2 had the secondary job code required for the positions.

ADVISORY AND TRAINING FUNCTIONS PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN USLOK PERSONNEL

Kuwait has purchased technical assistance field teams and contract engineering technical services under FMS during fiscal years 1977 and 1978 to give advice and/or training in supply support and maintenance of U.S.-procured equipment and materials, aircraft, maintenance and operation, contract administration, and logistical support to the I-Hawk missile program.

The following table shows the composition and duration for these teams.

Fiscal year (note a)	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years
1977	TAFT	1	8	-	-	-	-	1	-
1977	CETS	6	-	-	38	-	-	6	-
1977 total		7	8	-	38	-	-	7	-
1978	CETS	1	-	-	3	-	-	1	-

(number of teams)

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

VIEWS OF USLOK OFFICIALS

Effectiveness of operations

Public Law 95-92 had little effect on USLOK operations. USLOK did, however, achieve a higher degree of effectiveness as a result of the additional personnel provided for under an FMS case which predates the enactment of Public Law 95-92. The additional personnel are primarily involved in advisory and training assistance, but certain individuals are from time to time involved in the overall management effort, thus relieving the Chief, USLOK, of the total burden.

### Adequacy of staffing

With the addition of personnel under the FMS case, USLOK for the first time achieved an adequate staffing level. Before the 14 additional personnel arrived, during May through November 1977, there were only 2 officers and 1 enlisted man to perform USLOK duties.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

According to the Chief, USLOK, the Ambassador has total control over all policy matters pertaining to USLOK operations. However, the Ambassador has delegated to the Chief, the operational control of the Kuwait Missile Project Liaison Office and Kuwait Weapons System Liaison Office.

The Chief also said that all initial FMS requests are reviewed and approved by the Ambassador before being sent to the Department of State. Subsequent requests under an FMS case, depending on the nature and type of items requested, may or may not be reviewed by the Ambassador before being sent to the appropriate Defense Department agency.

These methods of operation were implemented about 18 months ago when the Ambassador arrived. Thus, Public Law 95-92 had no impact on the way USLOK does business.

### Interaction between USLOK and host country

Kuwait has no FMS procurement office in the United States, so all requests are channeled from the Kuwait ministry of defense through the U.S. Embassy/USLOK. The Chief, USLOK, said that a request is evaluated in terms of (1) whether the requested item is within the U.S. policy guidelines on arms transfers, (2) the legitimate defense needs of Kuwait, and (3) whether Kuwait can use, maintain, and support it. The request, along with the Ambassador's recommendation, is then forwarded as an Embassy message to the Department of State. Conversely, when the approved letter of offer and acceptance is received from Washington, USLOK reviews it to insure that it contains the items of equipment and services ordered by the Government of Kuwait and then forwards it to the ministry of defense for acceptance.



Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

According to the Chief, USLOK, Kuwait has received no MAP equipment, so end-item inspections and verification of location does not apply. He said that, by virtue of the fact that USLOK and the other Defense Department personnel are located throughout the Kuwait Armed Forces, any attempt to transfer a significant quantity of equipment would be noticed. Furthermore, ministry of defense officials are periodically reminded of third-country transfer regulations.

To date, no unauthorized transfers have been noted, and any violation detected would be reported to the appropriate Departments of State and Defense authorities.

VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

Supervision and direction provided to USLOK

The Ambassador provides direct supervision and guidance to the Chief, USLOK, on the security assistance program, and the Chief refers all policy matters relating to security assistance to the Ambassador and/or the political officer. In fact, all FMS correspondence is transmitted or received through the Embassy. When FMS requests are received from the Government of Kuwait, the Ambassador combines USLOK's assessment of Kuwait's need and capability to use and maintain such equipment with the Embassy's overall political and policy considerations. The overall assessment is the basis for the Embassy's recommendation which accompanies FMS requests sent to the Department of State.

The Ambassador has delegated his responsibilities for other Defense Department elements in the country which perform security assistance functions to the Chief, USLOK, including the Kuwait Missile Project Liaison Office and the Weapons System Liaison Office. Memorandums of understanding have been signed with these organizations which spell out their duties, responsibilities, and relationships to the Embassy and the Chief, USLOK.

Effectiveness of USLOK operations

The Ambassador is satisfied with the effectiveness of USLOK operations and, therefore, had no specific

recommendations for changes. He said that the staffing level is sufficient to accomplish USLOK responsibilities. However, it is envisioned that the staffing level will be reduced as the assigned tasks under FMS contracts are completed.

## MOROCCO COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Robert Anderson

MAAG NAME: Morocco-United States Liaison Office (MUSLO)

MUSLO CHIEF: Col. Charles D. Beaumont (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF MUSLO: Rabat, Morocco

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The major threat to Morocco is from Algeria, which has a numerical advantage in tanks, aircraft, and anti-aircraft systems. The two countries' armies and air forces are comparable in numbers, but Algeria has an organizational advantage in the number of combat units and equipment.

Algeria has equipment homogeneity, since the Soviet Union supplies most of its equipment, whereas Morocco has a mix of equipment from France, the United Kingdom, Spain, West Germany, the United States, plus some Soviet Union equipment for which spare parts cannot be obtained. In comparison to Algeria's equipment, Morocco's is older and less sophisticated.

According to the Ambassador and Defense Attache, the likelihood of war is limited because both countries realize that neither could win a protracted conventional conflict due to inadequate logistic support systems. However, a guerilla group backed by Algeria makes frequent raids into the southern part of Morocco, the Spanish Sahara, and Mauritania.

Other reasons cited in the Congressional Presentation Document for continued security assistance to Morocco are:

- Morocco controls the southern side of the Strait of Gibraltar, the access to the Mediterranean.
- The United States and Morocco have complementary views of the world and its problems, particularly, the Middle East.
- The United States has benefited from Morocco's support in the United Nations on questions concerning Korea, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Angola.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	(millions)	
1977	\$35.7	\$0.8
1978 (estimated)	40.0	1.3

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Foreign Military Sales: in fiscal year 1977, Morocco purchased aircraft, ammunition, Sidewinder missiles, tank conversion kits, bomb assemblies, spare parts, radar sets, and supply support for F-5 and C-130 aircraft.

Fiscal year 1978 FMS purchases have consisted primarily of rocket motors, ammunition, a radar antenna, communication equipment, spare parts, electrical supplies, aircraft supply support, Vulcan training, contract engineering technical services, and publications. Morocco is also expected to purchase elements of an air defense radar system during 1978.

International Military Education and Training: in fiscal year 1977, 78 Moroccan military personnel received training in the United States, primarily in the English language, missile operations and maintenance, air defense systems maintenance and track vehicles, and field artillery operations and maintenance. In fiscal year 1978, 208 Moroccans have or will receive training in the English language; Chaparral and Vulcan weapon systems operations and maintenance; operator training on other missile systems; and tank turret, field artillery, and track vehicle maintenance.

STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown in the following table.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	12	12	2	2	5	5	19	19
1976	19	13	2	2	6	4	27	19
1977	19	14	2	2	6	6	27	22
October 31, 1977	16	17	2	2	6	6	24	25
January 9, 1978	16	14	2	2	6	6	24	22

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	12	12	2	2	5	5	19	19
1976	19	13	2	2	6	4	27	19
1977	19	14	2	2	6	6	27	22
October 31, 1977	16	17	2	2	6	6	24	25
January 9, 1978	16	14	2	2	6	6	24	22

The Chief, MUSLO, stated that the one excess military person was removed from security assistance program functions as of October 1, 1977, and, as shown above, was transferred out of MUSLO before January 31, 1978, as required by Departments of State and Defense instructions.

#### MUSLO PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

**Logistics management:** manage logistical administration, monitor delivery schedules, check and tally equipment received through the Defense Transportation Service, maintain case histories, and negotiate supply support arrangements.

**Transportation:** monitor all FMS shipments, submit reports of item discrepancies, arrange transportation to the proper destination for misdirected FMS equipment and parts, and arrange transportation for IMET students.

**Fiscal management:** manage the IMET program budget and monitor and maintain liaison with government officials concerning FMS payment schedules.

**Contract administration:** evaluate requests for letters of offer and acceptance in light of country needs, impact on regional arms balance, and compliance with U.S. arms transfer policy; translate approved contracts into French; and resolve contract difficulties over delivery dates and payments.

**Training management:** supervise and administer the IMET program and FMS mobile training teams and discuss training needs with government officials.

**Coordination:** plan the security assistance program with the Ambassador and other country team members.

Liaison: visit government officials to discuss the security assistance program.

Plans and analysis: analyze supply support arrangements and government training needs and plan input for the Military Security Assistance Projections and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

Advisory training assistance: provide "on-the-spot" advice and assistance to Morocco's field units to solve equipment maintenance problems.

Reports and inspections: coordinate the work of and follow up on reports prepared by inspection teams.

Non-MUSLO duties: manage the Unit Welfare Fund and perform theater noncommissioned officer responsibilities.

MUSLO administration: military and civilian personnel functions; fiscal management of the MAP operating budget; distribute publications, correspondence, and messages; and procure office equipment and supplies.

MUSLO support: provide clerical, translation, transportation, and housing services to support MUSLO personnel.

#### Changes in functions and duties

At one time, MUSLO personnel introduced and made appointments for commercial representatives with appropriate government officials and occasionally accompanied them on their visits. However, by early July 1977, this practice was eliminated, and commercial representatives now are given only general background information on Morocco and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, and, when requested, the names and telephone numbers of government officials. Commercial representatives are being referred to the Economic and/or Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy for specific guidance in dealing with government officials. This guidance is outlined in the President's Arms Transfers Policy Guidelines dated May 1977 and Department of State's interpretation of the policy.

Public Law 95-92 has not significantly affected the scope of MUSLO operations. The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	2.43	17	-	-	-	-	2.43	11
Transportation	0.39	3	-	-	-	-	0.39	2
Fiscal management	1.31	9	-	-	-	-	1.31	6
Contract administration	2.53	18	-	-	-	-	2.53	12
	6.66	47	-	-	-	-	6.66	31
Other:								
MUSLO support and administration	3.70	27	2.00	100	6.00	100	11.70	53
Training management	1.60	11	-	-	-	-	1.60	7
Advisory training assistance	0.06	1	-	-	-	-	0.06	-
Coordination	0.20	1	-	-	-	-	0.20	1
Liaison	0.96	7	-	-	-	-	0.96	4
Plans and analysis	0.52	4	-	-	-	-	0.52	2
Reports and inspections	0.15	1	-	-	-	-	0.15	1
Non-MUSLO duties	0.15	1	-	-	-	-	0.15	1
	7.34	53	2.00	100	6.00	100	15.34	69
Total	14.00	100	2.00	100	6.00	100	22.00	100

### Technical qualifications of personnel

All MUSLO personnel appear to be qualified for their positions. The MUSLO Chief, service section heads, and logistics officers were all French-language qualified, had attended either foreign area officer or security assistance management courses and were graduates of Command and General Staff Colleges. In addition, two are foreign area specialists, one is a career logistician, and one is a maintenance officer.

### ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN MUSLO PERSONNEL

During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, to date, Morocco, through two mobile training teams purchased under FMS cases, has obtained training in self-propelled howitzers and in operating and maintaining night vision devices. The composition and duration of the teams are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of Personnel			Duration			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years
	(number of teams)								
1977	MTT	1	5	-	-	1	-	-	-
1978	MTT	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-

## VIEWS OF MUSLO OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

The major thrust of MUSLO's effort is and will continue to be directed toward resolving problems affecting logistics management, fiscal management, and contract administration. Some of the problems in logistics management and contract administration concern misdirected FMS shipments, changes in scheduled delivery dates, and numerous contract amendments. Fiscal management problems often arise because Morocco's bureaucracy causes late payments, which result in delayed contract implementation. According to the Chief, MUSLO, emphasis on establishing sound management practices and techniques in conjunction with training the Moroccans in establishing a logistics support system should lay the groundwork for the day when MUSLO staffing can be reduced.

### Adequacy of staffing

The current staff is able to carry out management functions and duties and to concentrate on establishing sound management procedures and problem solving techniques.

The Chief, MUSLO, expressed the desire that the staff level not be reduced until after fiscal year 1979, because about \$500 million in FMS equipment bought in 1974 and 1975 as part of the army modernization is scheduled for delivery in fiscal years 1978 and 1979, as shown below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Equipment</u>
	(millions)	
1978	\$145.9	Air defense weapons, armored personnel carriers, 155 mm howitzers
1979	104.8	Antitank munitions
After 1979	90.1	Residual end items and spare parts



The Chief, MUSLO, also said that if staffing were reduced before fiscal year 1979, the ongoing negotiations for establishing a supply support arrangement for end items purchased under the army modernization program would be hampered. This arrangement could exceed \$25 million, and it is not expected to be negotiated and implemented before fiscal year 1979.

A supply support arrangement would enable Morocco to support the equipment throughout its life cycle; basically it would allow Morocco to buy into the U.S. logistics system and thus insure sufficient spare parts over the life of the equipment. In the absence of a supply support agreement, Morocco cannot be assured of a steady flow of spare parts to meet its requirements.

#### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

According to the Chief, MUSLO, the Ambassador gives MUSLO guidance and direction for the security assistance program. The Ambassador has regularly scheduled country team sessions and frequent meetings with the Chief. He personally decides all significant questions concerning security assistance policy or arms sales. All FMS requests, which include significant combat equipment on the U.S. munitions list which is sold under contract for \$7 million or more and other items sold under contract for over \$25 million, must be reviewed by the Ambassador and submitted to the State Department as an Embassy message. Other FMS requests not necessarily meeting the above criteria, but considered significant by the Chief, MUSLO, are also coordinated with the Embassy before being sent to the Department of Defense.

The Chief, MUSLO, works on planning with other country team members under the Ambassador's supervision. Consequently, MUSLO's operating policies reflect direct guidance from the Ambassador. This arrangement predates the enactment of Public Law 95-92.

#### Interaction between MUSLO and host country

Morocco does not maintain a procurement office in the United States, and all government requests for FMS letters of offer and acceptance are submitted through MUSLO.

Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

According to the Chief, MUSLO, the requirement for verifying end-item use or location of equipment provided under MAP was waived by annual Presidential determinations through fiscal year 1967--the last year MAP equipment was provided to Morocco. Consequently, the government does not provide reports to MUSLO on this subject.

It is possible to monitor the location but not the use of air force materiel during the routine performance of duty because few aircraft were received under MAP or FMS. However, this is not possible for the large numbers and many different types of army equipment. With respect to major items, MUSLO does know where most major items of new army equipment being purchased under FMS go, either from observation or as reported by Moroccan military personnel.

Each time Morocco signs an FMS contract, it agrees that materiel purchased will not be transferred to a third country without U.S. approval. All high-level military officials are well aware of this agreement and of the consequences of violation. Any suspected violation would be reported to the Ambassador.

VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

Supervision and direction  
provided to MUSLO

The Ambassador stated that Public Law 95-92 had no effect on the degree of supervision and direction provided to MUSLO. He said that he reviews and approves all substantive messages concerning FMS requests or policy matters before they are sent to the State Department. Furthermore, the Chief, MUSLO, consults with him on all policy matters that could affect U.S.-Moroccan relations.

The Ambassador said that security assistance is one of his priority interests and that when he meets with government officials on the subject, he takes the Chief, MUSLO, with him.

Effectiveness of MUSLO operations

The Ambassador expressed the opinion that MUSLO is very effective in administering the in-country security assistance

program and has established a good relationship with Morocco's military officials. This relationship could prove to be very useful, since it represents the United States' major access to Morocco's military, which would be the country's primary source of power should anything happen to the King.

The Ambassador said that the MUSLO staff is sufficient for the present time but that it could be reduced, eventually to six, after fiscal year 1979. In 1973 a survey team came to Morocco to identify its defense needs, and as a result of the survey, the government signed FMS contracts totaling about \$500 million to reequip, expand, and modernize its military forces. Deliveries of these buys are increasing and are expected to peak in fiscal years 1978 and 1979, at which time MUSLO staff reductions could be effected. Staff reductions before this could affect the successful completion of the army modernization program, and they could be perceived as a lessening of U.S. interest in Morocco.

PANAMA COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable William J. Jordan

MAAG NAME: U.S. Military Group - Panama (MILGP)

MILGP CHIEF: Col. Paul P. Coroneos (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF MILGP: U.S. Embassy, Panama City, Panama

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

It is in the overall national interest of the United States for the Panama Canal to be maintained as a safe, efficiently operated, and neutral waterway, since it serves as a major logistical artery for the U.S. Armed Forces.

Panama's national guard is an important political factor in the country, and the United States has traditionally been the source of the national guard's military equipment and training. The U.S. security assistance program provides a close working relationship with Panama's military and political leaders and a means for the national guard to acquire the U.S. military equipment needed to maintain its limited defensive capability. Under a new Panama Canal treaty, an increased defense role is expected for Panama, with respect to the Canal. The compatibility of arms and equipment enhances the United States' ability to use assistance from Panama in the defense of the Canal. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	————(000 omitted)————		
1977	\$225	\$202	\$399
1978 (estimated)	5	700	500

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: the grant material program ended in 1977. Previously funded material consisting of about \$240,000 in vehicles and secondary items will be delivered in 1978.

Foreign Military Sales: FMS has virtually ceased because of Panama's financial situation. Over half of the fiscal year 1977 FMS credit was used to pay FMS debts that have been in arrears since 1972. The balance of unused credits and future credits will be used to improve the military forces' capabilities to participate in the defense of the Panama Canal.

International Military Education and Training: IMET funds primarily have been used to train students at U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities in the Canal Zone; 234 received training in fiscal year 1977. An IMET-funded incountry technical assistance training team also was provided in 1977. The 1978 program calls for training 80 students in Canal Zone schools and 5 students in the United States, as well as providing 2 Air Force mobile training teams.

STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
1975	9	9	1	1	1	1	11	11
1976	9	9	1	1	1	1	11	11
1977	a/13	9	1	1	1	1	15	11
October 31, 1977	a/13	9	1	1	1	1	15	11
November 28, 1977	a/13	9	1	1	1	1	15	11

a/Additional spaces authorized, but never filled, pending conclusion of Panama Canal treaties.

## MILGP PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: determine requirements, select systems, monitor acquisitions and delivery, and maintain and service military hardware.

Transportation: move military hardware from point of origin to Panama, including requisitioning, crating and handling, and monitoring items at destination.

Fiscal management: determine cost, payment, methods, and interest and principal payment schedules for FMS agreements and monitor host country FMS fiscal responsibilities.

Contract administration: all FMS tasks, from initial request for price and availability data to letter of offer and acceptance, including monitoring sale for conformity on behalf of the United States and Panama.

Other: functions vary from staff member to staff member and include consulting on Departments of State and Defense matters with the President of Panama, chief of government, and general staff at the direction of the Ambassador; coordinating the development of Panama's military forces and treaty considerations with the military forces and the Departments of State and Defense; consulting with the chiefs of the military forces about FMS cases, IMET programs, joint exercises, and the like; coordinating civic action projects and public affairs programs between the United States and Panama; maintaining liaison with U.S. Forces in the Canal Zone that support the security assistance program; performing country team and internal MILGP administrative functions.

### Changes in functions and duties

Although the legislative history of Public Law 95-92 suggests that the Congress authorized MILGP as a special case rather than on the basis of a security assistance program, Panama was not exempted from the restrictions established by the law. Nevertheless, MILGP continues to perform the same functions as before Public Law 95-92, which, as defined by the MILGP, fall under the broad headings of (1) military advice and consultation to the Ambassador, (2) administration of the security assistance program, and (3) advisory assistance to the Panama national guard, pursuant to the mission agreement of 1942.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent Number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	2.60	28.9	0.50	50.0	0.40	40.0	3.50	31.8
Transportation	0.55	6.1	-	-	0.05	5.0	.60	5.5
Fiscal management	0.50	5.6	-	-	0.15	15.0	.65	5.9
Contract administration	0.40	4.4	-	-	0.15	15.0	.55	5.0
	4.05	45.0	0.50	50.0	0.75	75.0	5.30	48.2
Other	4.95	55.0	0.50	50.0	0.25	25.0	5.70	51.8
Total	9.00	100.0	1.00	100.0	1.00	100.0	11.00	100.0

ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED  
BY OTHER THAN MILGP PERSONNEL

The Special Forces Battalion in the Canal Zone provided a 2-man technical assistance team for 5 days in fiscal year 1977 to rehabilitate a language laboratory previously provided under MAP and to train Panamanian technicians to maintain it.

Two U.S. Air Force military training teams for the Panamanian air force are planned for fiscal year 1978--a 2-man team to teach supply procedures for 2 weeks and a 4-man team to teach basic instrument flight procedures for 6 weeks.

All these teams were or will be paid from IMET program funds.

## VIEWS OF MILGP OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Neither the personnel authorization nor the operation of MILGP was reduced or altered as a result of Public Law 95-92.

MILGP believes that the functions outlined in section 515(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act are not sufficiently broad to include the advisory functions performed by MILGP under the 1942 military mission agreement between the United States and Panama.

MILGP also stated that it performs additional functions not envisaged under section 515(b) of the act, because, in accordance with Panamanian preference, a Defense attache is not assigned to the U.S. mission in Panama.

MILGP believes it should be allowed to continue performing these attache-type functions and the advisory functions under the military mission agreement, until its role under the Canal treaties is established.

### Adequacy of staffing

MILGP officials believe the current staff is adequate and that it is necessary in order to continue the current security assistance program and country team functions and to provide advisory assistance to the Panama national guard. However, security assistance program management requirements suggest that current staffing is excessive. The program in Panama is small, and, according to MILGP personnel, most of the functions could be handled by one or two military personnel. Moreover, some of the tasks MILGP performs, such as handling billings, should probably be performed by host-country personnel.

MILGP emphasized the importance of its responsibilities to the Ambassador and its country team functions. Much of this activity results from the fact that it performs functions normally handled by a defense attache.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

MILGP is an integral part of the Ambassador's country team. As such, it is under the direct and unquestioning supervision of the Ambassador and he is kept informed daily of MILGP activities. MILGP serves as an instrument of the



Ambassador, and, as such, its every action reflects the direction and policy of the Chief of the mission.

### Interaction between MILGP and host country

MILGP interacts with Panamanian national guard officials in determining military needs and administering FMS cases.

### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Panamanian Armed Forces give MILGP an inventory of FMS and MAP equipment each year, and this inventory is compared with an inventory control list maintained by MILGP. The Chiefs of the MILGP Army, Navy, and Air Force sections have complete freedom of mobility in Panama and, in the course of normal activities, have occasion to see the locations and use of virtually all major items of equipment.

The Panamanian Armed Forces accept U.S. equipment with full knowledge of the restrictions on third-country transfers. Although nothing but integrity really prevents a third-party transfer, the United States retains considerable influence to insure that such transfers do not take place. Probably the greatest incentive to abide by restrictions against unauthorized transfers of arms is that it would greatly jeopardize further acquisitions. This would be catastrophic for Panama, since the majority of its equipment is of U.S. origin and cutting off spare-parts support would soon render all previously received equipment less effective.

### VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

#### Supervision and direction provided to MILGP

According to the Deputy Chief of mission, Public Law 95-92 did not change the Ambassador's direction and supervision of MILGP. MILGP personnel work under the authority of the Ambassador.

#### Effectiveness of MILGP operations

MILGP is a key element in U.S.-Panamanian relations because the Government of Panama is controlled by the military.

The Deputy Chief of mission characterized the present MILGP staffing level as "bare bones," and he believed that after the treaty was ratified, MILGP should be brought up to its authorized level. He sees MILGP as having an evolving mission, becoming increasingly important as ratification approaches. He believes its major task is to help prepare the Panamanians to undertake their own defense responsibilities under the treaties. No specific changes were suggested at this time, but the Deputy Chief of mission appeared to tacitly concur in the MILGP commander's concern that Panama should be treated as a unique organization under section 515(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

## PHILIPPINES COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable David D. Newsom

MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG)

JUSMAG CHIEF: Brig. Gen. James H. Mapp (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF JUSMAG: Manila, Philippines

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The United States has historical and military ties with the Philippines. Security assistance is viewed by the Philippines as evidence of continued U.S. interest in and commitment to the defense of that country, but it also insures that the Philippine Armed Forces have the capability to provide a safe environment for U.S. military bases there. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
1977	\$17.0	\$58.0	\$0.6
1978 (estimated)	18.1	50.0	0.7

### EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal year 1977 MAP funds were used to obtain helicopters, patrol craft, howitzers, ground mobility, and communications equipment as well as to pay for ship overhauls. Fiscal year 1978 MAP funds continue the 1977 line of effort.

Foreign Military Sales: In fiscal year 1977 the Philippine Armed Forces purchased ammunition, small arms, vehicles, and patrol craft equipment. Additionally, over \$15 million of spare and repair parts were purchased. Fiscal year 1978 FMS purchases are projected to be primarily small arms, ammunition, spare parts, and tactical aircraft.

International Military Education and Training: for fiscal year 1977, 103 Philippine military personnel attended 113 IMET courses. Fiscal year 1978 IMET is expected to be about the same in numbers of students and courses.

Also, IMET funds were used for three incountry mobile training teams, two in fiscal year 1977 and one in 1978. A fourth IMET-funded team is projected for fiscal year 1978.

### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown in the following table.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1975	50	49	9	9	6	6	65	64
1976	39	39	9	9	6	6	54	54
1977	a/39	38	9	9	6	6	54	53
October 31, 1977	a/34	36	9	9	6	6	49	51
December 31, 1977	34	33	9	9	6	6	49	48

a/In April 1977 authorized staffing was reduced to 35 military positions, so Public Law 95-92 resulted in a reduction of only 1 military position for fiscal year 1978.

A JUSMAG official stated that military personnel in excess of those authorized for fiscal year 1978 were transferred from security assistance, program-related functions by October 1, 1977. We reviewed the staffing as of November 29, 1977, and found that JUSMAG was in compliance with the fiscal year 1978 staffing ceiling.

### OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

There are no other incountry Department of Defense organizations performing security assistance functions. The last such organization, the U.S. Army Communications Command Field Office, consisting of five military and five civilians, was deactivated in April 1975.

## JUSMAG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

### Logistics management:

- Analyze Philippine perceived threats and requirements and requests for equipment.
- Report and program MAP, FMS, and excess defense articles.
- Monitor MAP and FMS requisition status.
- Identify solutions to Philippine Armed Forces maintenance problems and prepare for, monitor, and control technical assistance and mobile training teams brought in to correct these problems.
- Inspect end items.
- Coordinate and review the annual end-item inventory and report, which includes MAP, FMS, commercial, and third-country purchases.

Transportation: report MAP shipping data to the Philippine Armed Forces and arrange IMET students' transportation to the United States.

Fiscal management: manage MAP material and IMET funds, such as updating prices on equipment due or classroom and course costs.

Contract administration: obtain FMS pricing and availability data, get FMS letters of offer and acceptance signed and follow up on them, and forward FMS payments and check FMS billings.

Training management: determine requirements for and composition of mobile training and technical assistance teams, identify IMET course requirements, and maintain contacts with U.S. private company technical representatives.

Advisory assistance: according to JUSMAG officials, the only advising that JUSMAG personnel do is that which does not fit temporary team applications. The advisory assistance is given in response to questions and occasionally to dissuade Philippine Armed Forces personnel from acquiring sophisticated items in excess of their needs or unsupportable by their logistics system.

Planning: prepare reports for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, Military Security Assistance Projection, Congressional Presentation Document, and the Budget Year Plan.

Liaison: maintain protocol duties and attend meetings and security assistance-related briefings.

Administration: perform functions relating to internal operations and security assistance program-related clerical support (typing, filing, etc.).

Changes in functions and duties

Public Law 95-92 did not affect the functions performed by JUSMAG. Only one position was eliminated as a result of the law and the functions were assumed by other JUSMAG personnel.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>
Primary:		
Logistics management	15.68	32
Transportation	0.98	2
Fiscal management	1.47	3
Contract administration	<u>2.94</u>	<u>6</u>
	21.07	43
Other:		
Training management	1.96	4
Advisory/training assistance	0.98	2
Planning	3.43	7
Liaison	3.43	7
Administration	<u>18.13</u>	<u>37</u>
	<u>27.93</u>	<u>57</u>
Total	<u><u>49.00</u></u>	<u><u>100</u></u>

## Technical qualifications of personnel

Personnel appeared to be qualified for their positions. We interviewed three division chiefs, and all had attended security assistance courses prior to their current assignments. The Ground Forces division chief was a maintenance engineer; the Air Force division chief has had a prior tour in the Philippines and formerly was the Philippine Desk Officer at Air Staff; and the Navy division chief was experienced in maintenance and repair for the type of ships used by the Philippine navy.

## ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN JUSMAG PERSONNEL

During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, to date, mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, contract engineering technical services teams, and a management team provided the Philippine Armed Forces with technical assistance and training in the following areas.

- Armored personnel carrier maintenance
- Test and evaluation equipment deficiency corrections
- Quality control
- Calibration equipment requirements
- Operation of guns and associated fire control systems
- Shipyard management
- Fixed communications projects
- Equipment installation
- Inventory control system computerization
- Depot level supply and maintenance management
- Landing craft repair
- Radio and associated equipment replacement requirements

The composition, duration, and funding of these teams are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Teams Type	Number	Number of personnel			Duration				Funding			
			Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	FMS	MAP	IMET	Unknown
1977	MTT	2	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
1977	a/TAT	10	10	13	-	9	-	-	1	1	8	-	1
1977	CET	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
1977	Other	1	3	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
1977 total (note b) b/15			<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	-	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
1978	c/MTT	2	5	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
1978	d/TAT	6	2	23	-	6	-	-	-	2	4	-	-
1978 total d/ 8			<u>7</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>

a/A 5-year, MAP-funded TAT also performs engineering services and studies for an air defense communications system; most of the work is being done in Hawaii, but a team of one to four personnel visit the Philippine site about every 3 months for 1 to 4 weeks.

b/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

c/Includes one team programed for April 1978.

d/Seven MAP and one FMS-funded TAT are planned for fiscal year 1978; however, their composition and/or duration were not yet determined.

## VIEWS OF JUSMAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Only one position was deleted as a result of Public Law 95-92, and the functions were absorbed by other personnel in the section. According to JUSMAG officials, JUSMAG is generally as effective now as prior to Public Law 95-92.



## Adequacy of staffing

JUSMAG is being reorganized to increase operating efficiency and to absorb future personnel reductions without disrupting program management. Traditionally, MAAGs are organized by service division (Army, Navy, Air Force), but JUSMAG-Philippines is organizing along functional lines. Under the Chief, there will be a support, a management, and a logistics division.

The support division will provide internal JUSMAG support. Management will consist of plans, FMS, MAP, and IMET sections. Logistics will include supply, maintenance, and communications sections.

Additionally, there will be military service sections of one or two people each, to provide continued communication between JUSMAG and the Philippine military service. Officials acknowledge that the service sections are transitional and, in case of forced personnel reductions, will be the first positions deleted. With the reorganization, officials believe JUSMAG to be adequately staffed.

## Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Now, as well as prior to Public Law 95-92, the Ambassador has overall guidance and direction of JUSMAG operations. The Chief, JUSMAG, reports to the Ambassador, and JUSMAG operates as a subordinate organization within the U.S. mission. All matters of policy and substance are fully coordinated between JUSMAG and the Embassy. The Ambassador provides input for the JUSMAG Chief's performance ratings.

## Interaction between JUSMAG and host country

The Armed Forces of the Philippines are primarily responsible for all financial, logistics, and training management matters, including FMS. The Government of the Philippines does not maintain a FMS procurement office in the United States.

Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

JUSMAG has few personnel available to monitor the use and location of MAP and/or FMS items. The majority of the equipment is deployed in the Mindanao-Sulu area where, by direction of the U.S. Embassy, JUSMAG personnel are not allowed. JUSMAG must rely primarily on reports of the Philippine Armed Forces. One of these reports is the Annual Inventory and Utilization Report of equipment on hand as of September 30. In addition, inventory and utilization information is frequently required from the Philippine Armed Forces on specific items or categories of items as part of the justification for additional acquisitions. As frequently as possible, visits to monitor the use, maintenance, and location of MAP and FMS items are made to organizations in areas where JUSMAG personnel are not restricted from going.

Because of its size and travel restrictions, JUSMAG cannot "prevent" the unauthorized transfer of MAP and FMS items; however, the Philippine Armed Forces are continually made aware of the prohibitions on unauthorized transfers. JUSMAG is alert to and has detected no diversion of equipment from intended users. Philippine military officials have continually reassured JUSMAG that the prohibition on support to police-related activities is not being violated. Furthermore, diversion of items would weaken combat units, which is counter to the Philippine priority of strengthening the forces opposing the Muslim insurgency in the Mindanao-Sulu area.

VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

Supervision and direction  
provided to JUSMAG

The Ambassador viewed supervision and direction as insuring that JUSMAG operations support U.S. national policies, that its staff-power is the minimum required to carry out an effective program and that operations and attitudes promote satisfactory relations with the host country. Public Law 95-92 reaffirmed the Ambassador's authority and control, and the only change has been that JUSMAG message traffic is now sent through State Department rather than military channels.

## Effectiveness of JUSMAG operations

Since the Ambassador had been in the country only 2 months, he did not comment on JUSMAG effectiveness but did state that he was favorably impressed with the reorganizational efforts.

Continuance of U.S. base rights in the Philippines are being negotiated. The Ambassador stated that the government looks favorably on JUSMAG and that a large staff reduction or reduction in the JUSMAG Chief's rank could have an adverse effect on the negotiations.

In addition, both the Ambassador and the JUSMAG Chief stressed the virtual certainty that a MAP program in the Philippines would be a part of the agreement for continued base rights. The number of JUSMAG personnel required to manage the security assistance program could be directly affected by the results of the negotiations; therefore, assessments of personnel needs should be tempered by the uncertainty of the negotiation settlement.

PORTUGAL COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci

MAAG NAME: U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG)

USMAAG CHIEF: Col. William L. Wubbena (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF USMAAG: Lisbon, Portugal

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

The U.S. security assistance program is considered a positive force toward supporting and strengthening Portugal's contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thereby contributing to the defense of Western Europe. The program also enhances U.S. access to Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores.

Portugal's present goal is to modernize its Armed Forces into a professional, apolitical, NATO-oriented military establishment, dedicated to the support of new and still fragile democratic institutions. U.S. security assistance supports the equipping and training of an infantry brigade, related air logistical and tactical support, and modernization of the navy.

The continued presence of USMAAG is justified on the basis that it acts as a communications link with the Portuguese military on NATO matters and as a conduit to support Armed Forces modernization. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
1977	\$32.3	\$1.6	\$1.2
1978 (estimated)	25.0	2.0	3.3

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal year 1977 MAP funds were used for basic infantry equipment, such as recoilless rifles, vehicles, communications equipment, armored personnel carriers, payments on three C-130 aircraft, support for T-38 aircraft, and electronic spare parts for ships.

Fiscal year 1978 MAP funding will be used for equipment for the infantry brigade associated with NATO, payments for the three C-130s, support and maintenance of the T-38s, maintenance and spare parts for naval vessels, and upgrading of communications equipment.

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS agreements were for munitions, airplane spare parts, and two C-130 aircraft. FMS transactions for fiscal year 1978 are expected to parallel those in fiscal year 1977, except for \$4.2 million for C-130 aircraft supply support packages.

International Military Education and Training: in fiscal year 1977, the students received advanced individual training in the United States in combat arms schools; instructor training; and pilot training, orientation, and maintenance. Another 187 students participated in observer training/orientation and information programs in Europe. The fiscal year 1978 proposed IMET program is similar to that of 1977; approximately 103 students are scheduled for individual training in the United States and 93 for observer/orientation training in Europe.

In addition, fiscal years 1977 and 1978 IMET funds have been used and programmed for mobile training teams to provide training assistance in aircraft maintenance, personnel administration, logistics management, tank and grenade launcher operations, English-language training, and aircraft transition.

#### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown below.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
1975	10	10	3	3	7	7	20	20
1976	10	9	3	3	7	7	20	19
1977	12	11	4	3	9	7	25	21
October 31, 1977	12	12	4	4	9	9	25	25
November 22, 1977	12	12	4	4	9	9	25	25

#### OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

No other organizations in Portugal perform security assistance program functions. However, two U.S. Air Force personnel are attached to USMAAG who perform postal services

for USMAAG as well as for the U.S. Embassy. An army person and a local national are also attached to USMAAG and are responsible for monitoring all Department of Defense surface cargo to Portugal. About 10 percent of their time is devoted to USMAAG military assistance program shipments and another 10 percent to shipment of USMAAG personnel household goods; the remainder is spent on monitoring shipments for other Defense personnel and organizations.

#### USMAAG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics and material management: program research and development; liaison with the Portuguese; obtain price and availability data; prepare requisitions of equipment and material; MAP end-use inspections; coordinate with training teams; and prepare planning and programming documents, such as the Military Security Assistance Projection and the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

Transportation: all MAP equipment and material movement and transfer to the Portuguese.

Fiscal management: monitor MAP funding levels authorized and available for expenditure.

Training management: develop training program requirements and monitor liaison with Portuguese officials on training programs, prepare travel orders for students, conduct English-language tests and briefings, conduct followup on students after training, and provide training input to the Military Security Assistance Projection and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

Political/military: country team meetings and discussions with Embassy officials, coordination with Defense Attache Office, and visits to Portuguese service headquarters.

Administration: general clerical and administrative duties in support of the security assistance program. Also includes driver duties performed by four local nationals.

#### Changes in functions and duties

According to MAAG officials, the functions performed and time devoted to security assistance did not change as a result of Public Law 95-92. The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	3.71	30.9	-	-	-	-	3.71	14.8
Transportation	0.17	1.4	-	-	1.20	13.3	1.37	5.5
Fiscal management	0.5	4.8	-	-	1.00	11.1	1.57	6.3
Contract Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	<u>4.45</u>	<u>37.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2.20</u>	<u>24.4</u>	<u>6.65</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Other:								
Training management	3.53	29.4	-	-	-	-	3.53	14.1
Political/military Administration	0.94	7.8	-	-	-	-	0.94	3.8
	<u>3.08</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>4.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6.80</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>13.88</u>	<u>55.5</u>
	<u>7.55</u>	<u>62.9</u>	<u>4.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6.80</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>18.35</u>	<u>73.4</u>
Total	<u>12.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>4.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>9.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>25.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>

### Technical qualifications of personnel

All USMAAG military personnel have either attended or are scheduled to attend security assistance training and material programers courses at their U.S. European Command. Furthermore, 10 of the 12 military personnel have attended the security assistance management course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 9 of the 12 are Portuguese-language qualified. In general, the personnel are qualified to perform the duties of their positions.

### ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN USMAAG PERSONNEL

During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, MAP and IMET-funded mobile training teams, a technical assistance team, and a quality assurance team have provided or will provide aircraft maintenance and instructor training, resources management, tank and grenade launcher operations, and English-language training.

The composition and duration of these teams are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration				
	Type	Num- ber	Mili- tary	Civil- ian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	
----- (number of teams) -----										
1977										
total	MTT	<u>7</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	
1978	MTT	10	66	-	-	6	4	-	-	
	TAT	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	
	QAT	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	
1978										
total		<u>12</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	

## VIEWS OF USMAAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Public Law 95-92 has had no impact on the effectiveness of USMAAG in carrying out security assistance program operations. Over the past year, USMAAG has assisted Portugal to restructure its military forces to assume a NATO role. This involves ordering equipment, scheduling individual training in the United States, and developing a logistical support system to support U.S.-provided equipment. USMAAG is also helping the Portuguese to improve personnel management capabilities through training courses and mobile training teams.

### Adequacy of staffing

The Chief, USMAAG, said that he is satisfied with present staffing levels and that any personnel reductions could adversely affect USMAAG's ability to perform security assistance functions essential to the modernization of the Portuguese military.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Public Law 95-92 reinforced the Ambassador's responsibilities and basic authority for directing and supervising USMAAG operations. The Ambassador actively directed and supervised USMAAG by providing policy guidance and objectives. He considers the Chief, USMAAG, to be a principal officer of the diplomatic staff and meets with him daily.

### Interaction between USMAAG and host country

Portugal does not maintain a procurement office in the United States to handle FMS matters. Most FMS letters of offer and acceptance and other procurement activities are channeled directly through its military service attache in Washington, D.C.



The military obtains equipment cost information, training, ammunition, and the C-130 aircraft through USMAAG.

Procedures for monitoring  
end use of MAP items and  
precluding unauthorized  
transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Portuguese submit annual reports to USMAAG on the quantity, condition, and location of MAP equipment, and USMAAG personnel observe MAP and FMS equipment during visits to host-country installations. To date, there has been no indication of unauthorized transfers of MAP or FMS equipment.

IEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

Supervision and direction provided to USMAAG

Public Law 95-92 did not change the Chief of Mission's role over USMAAG. The Chief, USMAAG, is considered part of the country team and meets daily with the Ambassador. The Ambassador provides policy guidance and direction to USMAAG on all security assistance matters.

Effectiveness of USMAAG operations

The Ambassador said that USMAAG is an essential part of the U.S. foreign policy in Portugal, and he does not anticipate any change in the USMAAG scope of operations, or staffing, in the near future. The Ambassador acknowledged that the previous Chief, USMAAG, wanted staff increases, but this was overruled because of insufficient justification.

## SAUDI ARABIA COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable John C. West

MAAG NAME: U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM)

USMTM CHIEF: Brig. Gen. Carl H. Cathey, Jr. (U.S. Air Force)

LOCATION OF USMTM: Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Security assistance to Saudi Arabia supports the U.S. foreign policy objectives of (1) insuring continued access to Saudi oil resources, (2) encouraging Saudi Arabia's constructive role in Middle East affairs, and (3) protecting U.S. access to Saudi Arabia's growing import market.

Saudi Arabia has 25 percent of the world's known oil resources and, according to the U.S. Ambassador, is the only country with the potential to meet the western world's minimum energy demands in the 1980s.

Politically, Saudi Arabia is anti-Communist and is using its vast energy and financial resources to influence world affairs, generally in parallel with U.S. efforts. Saudi Arabia's willingness to cooperate with the United States in Middle East peace efforts is largely derived from its confidence in continued U.S. support and cooperation to develop its society.

Saudi Arabia has a small manpower base and limited infrastructure, and the thrust of the security assistance program is to help the Saudi military develop the capability to defend the country against the perceived external threat and to develop its infrastructure. An important fact is that about 80 percent of the total program is for construction, education, and medical care--not military hardware.

The fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance program are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>FMS</u>
	(millions)
1977	\$1,804.7
1978	5,100.0
(estimated)	

## EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER FMS

In 1974 the Department of Defense surveyed Saudi Arabia's defense needs, and recommended a 5-year program to upgrade personnel skills and modernize equipment. Our October 1977 report, "Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia," (ID-77-19) described the type of equipment and services sold and expected to be sold to Saudi Arabia.

According to the Congressional Presentation Document, FMS to Saudi Arabia in fiscal year 1978 will likely include trucks and trailers, assorted ammunition, communications improvements, advanced fighter aircraft, technical services, and training in the United States for about 1,400 military personnel. The majority of the training will be pilot training and professional technical training in other areas.

### STAFFING LEVELS

The personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned	Author-ized	Assigned
1975	140	134	2	2	9	4	151	140
1976	131	143	2	2	18	10	151	155
1977	167	147	2	1	15	15	a/184	163
October 31, 1977	80	67	2	2	10	10	92	79
December 31, 1977	80	69	2	2	10	10	92	81

a/Does not include 60 positions authorized for support functions or 6 military positions funded by the U.S. Government.

As a result of Public Law 95-92, USMTM was reorganized to comply with authorized staffpower ceilings; however, the total number authorized remained unchanged. A total of 250 positions are authorized, 6 funded by the U.S. Government and 244 funded under an FMS case. Of the 250 authorized positions, 92 are now classified as USMTM positions, 98 as USMTM technical assistance field team (TAFT) positions, and 60 as USMTM TAFT-support positions. By so classifying the positions, the TAFT and TAFT-support positions are not subject to the staffpower ceiling. Authorized and assigned staffing levels for these positions, as of October 31, 1977, are as follows.

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Local nationals</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Author- ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author- ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author- ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Author- ized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
USMTM-TAFT	88	78	4	0	6	5	98	83
USMTM-TAFT Support	56	51	0	0	4	4	60	55

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

Other incountry Department of Defense elements support the security assistance program, as discussed below.

Detachment 22 includes the U.S. Air Force contract administrator and program manager of the Peace Hawk V Program, which involves operation and support of F-5 aircraft, support equipment, facilities, and training provided by contractors to the Royal Saudi Air Force. Detachment 22 personnel perform no advising or training, but rather monitor that which the contractor is providing. The Saudi Government, under an FMS case, pays all Detachment 22 personnel costs.

For the Saudi national guard modernization program; a project manager's office monitors and administers the work of contractors involved in the program, but provides no advisory or training assistance. All program costs are paid by the Saudi Government under an FMS case.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Middle East Division is the construction agent for the Middle East and North Africa. As such, it is responsible for supervising and coordinating several ongoing construction programs for Saudi Government officials. The Corps is also assisting the Saudi army ordnance corps in managing its logistics system. It performs a contract administration role and does not provide advisory or training assistance. The Government of Saudi Arabia pays costs associated with the Corps of Engineers under an FMS case.

The following table shows the other Department of Defense personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Third-country nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Detachment 22:								
1975	20	19	19	15	0	0	39	34
1976	35	29	34	27	0	0	69	56
1977	39	38	34	33	0	0	73	71
October 31, 1977	39	39	34	32	0	0	73	71
December 31, 1977	39	39	34	32	0	0	73	71
Saudi national guard modernization program:								
1975	23	22	25	21	7	7	55	50
1976	23	23	32	28	9	9	64	60
October 31, 1977	27	27	36	35	12	11	75	73
December 31, 1977	27	26	36	35	12	12	75	73
Corps of Engineers:								
1976 (note a)	45	40	236	260	18	20	299	320
December 31, 1977 (note b)	46	75	866	706	42	42	954	873

a/Saudi Arabia District as of June 30, 1976.  
b/Middle East Division.

## USMTM FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

**Logistics management:** analyze, evaluate, and suggest recommendations for requests for material, equipment, and letters of offer and acceptance. Coordinate changes to the letters of offer and acceptance resulting from availability, comparability, delivery schedules, prices, and scope of work.

**Transportation:** monitor shipping status of FMS equipment and material and arrange for quality assurance teams at delivery point and for the Saudis to move equipment and material to final destination.

**Fiscal management:** plan, program, budget, and monitor USMTM operating funds, including assistance-in-kind funds.

**Contract administration:** assist the government in contract negotiations and monitor contract performance.

Training management: assist the government to develop and implement training programs; administer English-language tests and issue travel orders for military students attending training programs out of the country; brief and debrief the students and follow up on placement of students who complete the out-of-country training; and monitor the performance of mobile training teams, technical assistance field teams, and other training teams.

Liaison and coordination. answer questions on equipment, material, and training requirements. Attend social functions and other activities that further relations with the Saudis.

Command and control: provide overall supervision of security assistance program.

Administration: provide administrative support for security assistance program.

Travel: Because of the decentralized nature of the security assistance program in Saudi Arabia, considerable time is spent in traveling to the various sites. For the most part, travel time was included in the duties to which the travel was related; in certain instances it was not possible to relate the travel to a specific function or duty.

Advising and training: advise on construction management, training needs, operating schedules, personnel plans, etc.

### Changes in functions and duties

According to USMTM officials, the type and scope of management functions performed before and after Public Law 95-92 have not changed. The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Third-country nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	3.75	4.69	-	-	-	-	3.75	4.08
Transportation	2.00	2.50	-	-	0.85	8.5	2.85	3.10
Fiscal management	5.91	7.39	-	-	0.60	6.0	6.51	7.08
Contract administration	1.95	2.44	-	-	1.60	16.0	3.55	3.86
	13.61	17.02	-	-	3.05	30.5	16.66	18.12
Other:								
Training management	5.72	7.15	-	-	-	-	5.72	6.22
Liaison and coordination	10.00	12.50	0.2	10.	2.40	24.0	12.60	13.70
Command and control	4.01	5.01	-	-	-	-	4.01	4.36
Administration	36.55	45.68	1.8	90.	4.43	44.3	42.78	46.50
Travel	9.51	11.89	-	-	.12	1.2	9.63	10.47
Advising and training	0.60	0.75	-	-	-	-	0.60	0.65
	66.39	82.98	2.0	100.	6.95	69.5	75.34	81.90
Total	<u>80.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>100.</u>	<u>10.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>92.00</u>	<u>100.02</u>

### Technical qualifications of personnel

Most USMTM military personnel are assigned to positions requiring their primary or secondary job code classifications. Before USMTM accepts individuals to fill vacant positions, it reviews their skill qualifications and may decline to accept them if their qualifications do not meet position requirements. From our limited review of the qualifications of assigned personnel, they appear to be qualified for their positions.

### ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN USMTM PERSONNEL

Saudi Arabia purchases mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, technical assistance field teams, and survey teams under FMS cases. The services purchased during fiscal years 1977 and 1978 include instruction and/or technical assistance in

- policy and procedures standardization,
- armor, artillery, and missile operations,
- parachute rigging,

- aircraft safety and pilot training,
- munitions policies and practices,
- supply receipt and storage,
- printing plant layout,
- base security, and
- vehicle and missile maintenance.

The following table shows the composition and duration of these teams.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years
						(number of teams)			
1977	MTT	4	29	-	-	3	1	-	-
1977	TAT	5	11	4	-	4	1	-	-
1977	Survey	1	6	-	-	1	-	-	-
1977	TAFT	4	13	4	-	1	-	2	1
1977 total (note a)		<u>14</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
1978	MTT	b/7	44	-	-	6	1	-	-
1978	TAFT	c/5	116	5	-	-	-	5	-
1978 total		<u>12</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/Includes one team with a letter of offer and acceptance in process.

c/Includes USMTM-TAFT; formerly USMTM authorized positions with 78 military and 5 civilian personnel. This TAFT is renewable annually by the Saudi Arabian Government.



## VIEWS OF USMTM OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Public Law 95-92 had no impact on the effectiveness of USMTM operations. Since enactment of the law, USMTM has further refined its operating and support costs and those of the USMTM-TAFT to insure that all costs are funded by the Government of Saudi Arabia. It has realigned its organization by assigning all personnel who perform advisory and training functions to the USMTM-TAFT.

### Adequacy of staffing

Public Law 95-92 had no real effect on the USMTM staff level. What has transpired is a realignment, based on guidance from the Defense Security Assistance Agency, which now categorizes USMTM personnel as other USMTM staff, USMTM-TAFT, or USMTM support TAFT.

The need for and the staffing level of the USMTM-TAFT and TAFT support will be reviewed annually in conjunction with the Saudi ministry of defense. When their functions and duties are no longer needed, the staffing level will be adjusted accordingly. However, it is expected that the number of TAFT personnel, including the USMTM-TAFT, required to complete approved modernization programs may increase. Conversely, as these programs are completed the number of TAFT personnel will be reduced.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

The Chief, USMTM, accepts overall guidance and direction from the Ambassador and insures that the Ambassador's guidance is followed by the TAFTS and other incountry organizations performing security assistance functions. This method of operation existed before enactment of Public Law 95-92.

An attempt was made to centralize control of the other incountry organizations which perform security assistance functions--Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabian National Guard, and Detachment 22--under the Chief, USMTM, but this move was opposed by the Government of Saudi Arabia and was abandoned.

## Interaction between USMTM and host country

The 1974 Department of Defense Survey of Saudi defense needs recommended that Saudi Arabia establish an FMS procurement office in the United States. After some initial activity, the project became dormant. Recently, the Saudi ministry of defense reinitiated efforts to establish such a procurement office, but plans and procedures have not been finalized. At the present time, all Saudi FMS requests are processed through the Embassy/USMTM.

## Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Saudi Government has received no MAP equipment since before 1966, and virtually all existing equipment is unserviceable or has been disposed of. USMTM is not aware of any unauthorized transfers. Although the use of FMS equipment by Saudi Arabia is limited to self-defense purposes and U.S.-Saudi agreements prohibit transfers without U.S. approval, there are no statutory provisions for monitoring end use of FMS items.

## VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

### Supervision and direction provided to USMTM

According to the Ambassador, Public Law 95-92 has not affected his control over the security assistance program or USMTM. He has periodic meetings with the U.S. military groups performing security assistance functions and is in daily contact with these groups when problems arise. The Ambassador said that the U.S. military groups manage their organizations on a day-to-day basis but that he provides them with guidance and direction on all policy matters concerning relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. He said also that the Departments of State and Defense have a joint responsibility for insuring the success of the security assistance program and have placed increased emphasis on the program, particularly on the analysis and justification required for arms requests.

### Effectiveness of USMTM operations

The Ambassador said that Public Law 95-92 has resulted only in a paper realignment of staffing. He praised USMTM performance and said that he could not think of anything specific that would make it more effective.

SPAIN COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Wells Stabler

MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Group and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMG/MAAG)

JUSMG/MAAG CHIEF: Maj. Gen. Slade Nash (U.S. Air Force)

LOCATION OF JUSMG/MAAG: Madrid, Spain

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Spain's importance to the United States and NATO is its strategic location, access to and use of air and naval facilities by U.S. Forces, and potential contributions to the NATO military resources.

U.S. security assistance is designed to modernize Spain's Armed Forces and to allow them to make an important contribution to the defense of the West. Specific levels of security assistance are spelled out in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the United States and Spain in 1976. Under the Treaty, the United States, over a 5-year period (1977 through 1981), will provide \$600 million in FMS financing, \$75 million in MAP, and \$10 million in IMET.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
1977	\$15	\$ 95	\$2
1978 (estimated)	15	200	?

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military assistance: the \$15 million in fiscal year 1977 was used to procure UH-1H helicopters, radio sets, air defense missiles, boats, ship spare parts, ammunition, rockets, and automotive supplies and equipment. Fiscal year 1978 funding is for planned procurement of UH-1H helicopters, radios, 155mm howitzers, ship spare parts, and air defense missiles.

Foreign military sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS agreements consisted primarily of the I-Hawk system, CH47 helicopters, supply support items, Harrier aircraft, F-4C aircraft, electronic warfare equipment, and cooperative logistical support for aircraft. 1978 FMS is expected to include TOW missiles and launchers, howitzer equipment, mechanized infantry equipment, helicopters, air defense missiles, electronic counter-measure equipment, and cooperative logistical support.

International military education and training: most of the \$2 million allocated for fiscal year 1977 was used to train about 190 military students in courses ranging from command and general staff and NIKE unit training to unit officer and technical training in ordnance, armor, infantry, English language, sonar, radar, and pilot training.

The structure of the 1978 program is similar to that for 1977. An estimated 308 students are programmed for training, including 10 students for observer training in Europe.

IMET funds also are programmed each year for mobile training teams, training aids and devices, and publications.

#### STAFFING LEVELS

The Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Joint U.S. Military Group are combined under one commander in Spain. The military staff ceiling prescribed in Public Law 95-92 has been applied to both organizations and, accordingly, both are represented in the data below. JUSMG is responsible for administering the treaty and U.S. Forces stationed in Spain and does not perform security assistance program functions. As of October 1, 1977, there were nine military persons, four civilians, and nine local nationals assigned to JUSMG, compared with authorized strengths of eight, three, and seven, respectively.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
1975	38	40	15	15	19	18	72	73
1976	25	36	8	10	19	19	52	65
1977	30	32	8	8	19	19	57	59
October 31, 1977	27	30	7	8	14	16	48	56
December 15, 1977	27	27	7	8	14	18	48	53

As shown in the table, the current military staff level coincides with the level authorized for fiscal year 1978. However, as of October 1, 1977, the effective date of Public Law 95-92, JUSMG/MAAG had three military personnel in excess of the authorized level. Departments of State and Defense instructions required that military personnel in excess of the authorized level be transferred to nonsecurity assistance program positions, effective October 1, and, according to JUSMG/MAAG officials, the three military personnel were not involved in the program after October 1, 1977.

The instructions also required civilian personnel in excess of the authorized level to be reassigned out of the country by September 30, 1978. As of December 15, 1977, there was one U.S. civilian and four local nationals in excess of the authorized level. One local national was to retire January 31, 1978; the other three and the U.S. civilian employee were to be officially notified of their release as of January 3, 1978.

OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

Territorial Command Net is a project to improve command and control of the Spanish army and navy. The staff consists of logisticians, engineers, and quality assurance personnel who provide guidance and technical assistance and supervise and monitor training provided by contractors. The salaries of the military personnel are funded by the Department of Army and are not reimbursed under FMS. The following chart shows the number of personnel assigned to Territorial Command Net from 1975 to October 31, 1977.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Local nationals</u>	<u>Total</u>
1975	13	7	-	20
1976	13	9	-	22
1977	15	11	1	27
October 31, 1977	10	10	1	21

Combat Grande is a project to modernize Spain's aircraft control and warning system. Personnel monitor and provide support to the project, which is being funded under MAP, FMS, and the host country.

Combat Grande Personnel--1975 to October 31, 1977

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Local nationals</u>	<u>Total</u>
1975	9	4	-	13
1976	10	4	-	14
1977	10	4	-	14
October 31, 1977	11	5	1	17

The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Liaison Office provides support to the Spanish navy shipbuilding program and represents the U.S. Navy in the administration of FMS shipbuilding contracts. Specific tasks and functions include providing guidance and assistance on problem areas and monitoring and reporting on program progress. All personnel costs are reimbursed by the Government of Spain.

U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Liaison Office Personnel--  
1975 to October 1977

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Local nationals</u>	<u>Total</u>
1975	3	6	3	12
1976	4	6	3	13
1977	3	7	3	13
October 31, 1977	3	8	3	14

JUSMG/MAAG PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: develop, submit, and modify the MAP program and receive MAP materiel, coordinate with Spanish service counterparts and training teams, prepare the MAP materiel portion of planning and programming documents; and check end use of MAP materiel.

Transportation: monitor, coordinate, and provide status reports of equipment and materiel movements as required or requested.

Fiscal management: monitor actual funds expended as compared to authorized funds available.

Contract administration: administer all non-FMS contracts.

IMET training management: conduct English-language tests, prepare student travel orders, brief students, and monitor their progress while in training. Prepare IMET section of planning and programming documents and coordinate the efforts of mobile training teams.

FMS management and liaison: review and assist, program, and process FMS requests; maintain liaison with the Spanish and with U.S. counterparts in Washington, D.C.; coordinate with training teams funded under FMS cases; check and use FMS equipment; and prepare planning and programming documents, such as the Military Security Assistance Projection and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

Political/military: further and maintain good relations with Spain and keep abreast of the current Spanish military situation, interact with Embassy personnel, visit Spanish service headquarters, and coordinate with the Defense Attache.

Advising: provide requested advice on logistics matters. No training is provided by JUSMG/MAAG personnel.

Administration: provide administrative support to the security assistance program in relation to official visitors, annual and sick leave matters, and personnel reassignment.

#### Changes in functions and duties

According to officials, the only change as a result of Public Law 95-92 has been in the JUSMG/MAAG relationship with commercial contractors. Prior to enactment of the law, JUSMG/MAAG personnel would make appointments for commercial contractors with the appropriate Spanish military officials. This service is no longer provided. Also, requests for pricing and availability data and letters of offer and acceptance now are forwarded through the Embassy rather than through Department of Defense channels.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	2.56	12.51	-	-	-	-	2.56	8.32
Transportation	0.22	1.08	-	-	-	-	0.22	0.71
Fiscal management	0.39	1.91	-	-	-	-	0.39	1.27
Contract administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	<u>3.17</u>	<u>15.50</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3.17</u>	<u>10.30</u>
Other:								
IMET training management	3.00	14.66	-	-	-	-	3.00	9.75
FMS management and liaison	5.40	26.39	-	-	-	-	5.40	17.5
Political/military Advising	1.86	9.09	-	-	-	-	1.86	6.05
Administration	0.05	0.24	-	-	-	-	0.05	0.16
	<u>6.98</u>	<u>34.12</u>	<u>3.58</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6.73</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>17.29</u>	<u>56.19</u>
	<u>17.29</u>	<u>84.50</u>	<u>3.58</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6.73</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>27.60</u>	<u>89.70</u>
Total (note a)	<u>20.46</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>3.58</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>6.73</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>30.77</u>	<u>100.00</u>

a/Does not include 6.54 military persons, 3.42 U.S. civilians, and 7.27 local nationals performing nonsecurity assistance program functions relating to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

### Technical qualifications of personnel

We reviewed the qualifications and prior experience of the military personnel assigned to MAAG, and they appear to be qualified for their positions. For example, in the Army section, all the officers performing security assistance functions have completed Command and General Staff College. All the officers are Spanish-language qualified, and all but one have attended security assistance courses.

### ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN JUSMG/MAAG PERSONNEL

Mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, and a contract field service team have provided technical assistance and training on aircraft, missiles, computers, air defense and surveillance systems, radio maintenance, antijamming operations, weapons control, and parachute rigging.



The composition, duration, and funding for these teams for fiscal year 1977 and projected for 1978 are shown in the following table.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration				Funding			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	Unknown	FMS	IMET	MAR
(number of teams)---													
1977	MTT	7	14	4	-	5	1	-	1	-	2	5	-
	CFS	1	-	-	(b)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	TAT	2	2	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	c/1	-	-
	Total												
	(note a)	10	16	5	(b)	6	2	-	1	1	c/3	5	-
1978	total												
	MTT	2	9	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

b/Number of contractor personnel assigned to the CFS team was not available.

c/One TAT was provided free to correct problems with equipment overhauled under an FMS case.

## IEWS OF JUSMG/MAAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

Because Public Law 95-92 has only been in effect since October 1977, JUSMG/MAAG officials said that it is difficult to determine the changes in program management effectiveness; only one FMS request for significant combat equipment has been approved since enactment of the law. Officials said they anticipate no difficulties in complying with the law if the United States does not lose sight of the special defense relationship and treaty requirements that exist with the Government of Spain.

### Adequacy of staffing

The Chief, JUSMG/MAAG, said that the current staff is adequate to accomplish security assistance program objectives. According to JUSMG/MAAG officials, any reduction in the current staff would require a corresponding increase in the Embassy staff.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Security assistance procedures and programs have always been under the complete control of the Ambassador. As a result of Public Law 95-92, with the State Department's recognition of Spain's unique status and with guidance provided by the Ambassador, each security assistance case is judged on its own merits, taking into consideration whether (1) the case falls under the Treaty, (2) the requesting agency can be assumed to speak for the Government of Spain, and (3) all appropriate Embassy sections have been consulted on how to handle the case.

### Interaction between JUSMG/MAAG and host country

Spain does not maintain an FMS procurement office in the United States. It channels requests through the JUSMG/MAAG or its service attaches in Washington, D.C. There is no set procedure, but the Spanish prefer to deal with JUSMG/MAAG because of past experience and common identity. Because only one FMS case has been approved since enactment of Public Law 95-92, no pattern has yet emerged on the procedures the Government of Spain will choose to follow.

### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

The Government of Spain submits annual reports on the status of MAP equipment, and during periodic visits to Spanish units, JUSMG/MAAG personnel observe and report on MAP equipment.

JUSMG/MAAG officials said that it is not possible to prevent the unauthorized transfer of MAP and FMS equipment to third parties. However, in carrying out normal security assistance responsibilities, JUSMG/MAAG officials are alert to circumstances that would indicate such activity.

### VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

#### Supervision and direction provided to JUSMG/MAAG

Public Law 95-92 did not affect the supervision and direction provided by the Ambassador to JUSMG/MAAG. The Chief, JUSMG/MAAG, is a member of the country team and, as such, participates in the meetings with the Ambassador.

Policy questions and problem areas are addressed in the daily country team meetings. The Political/Military Officer serves as JUSMG/MAAG's point of contact with the Embassy and is responsible for reviewing and approving all JUSMG/MAAG submissions.

#### Effectiveness of JUSMG/MAAG operations

According to the Ambassador, the security assistance program is incorporated in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which represents the keystone to U.S.-Spanish relations. Spain has demonstrated its trust and confidence in JUSMG/MAAG through its willingness and insistence on handling security assistance issues through JUSMG/MAAG.

The Ambassador said that JUSMG/MAAG is doing a good job and that he is satisfied with its performance and working relationship with the Government of Spain. The Ambassador previously supported JUSMG/MAAG staff reductions but now considers the staff adequate to manage the security assistance program, which is expected to increase as a result of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

## THAILAND COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Charles S. Whitehouse

MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand  
(JUSMAG)

JUSMAG CHIEF: Col. Aaron E. Walker (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF JUSMAG: Bangkok, Thailand

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Thailand is faced with new, potentially hostile Communist-controlled neighbors on its northern and eastern borders and with a Communist-controlled insurgency with external support. It is in line with U.S. objectives and interests to (1) encourage Thailand to acquire weapons to meet the immediate insurgency threat and modernize its conventional defensive units and (2) help Thailand remain free of a dominating influence by a power unfriendly to the United States. Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>IMET</u>
	—————(millions)—————		
1977	\$16.0	\$103.8	\$1.2
1978 (estimated)	8.0	40.0	1.0

### EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Military Assistance Program: fiscal years 1977 and 1978 funds were and are being used to procure spare parts; ammunition; communications equipment; howitzers, machineguns, rifles, and mortars; tractors, trailers, and trucks; jet engine overhauls; and technical assistance.

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS purchases included aircraft; missiles; armored personnel carriers; grenade launchers; ammunition and fuses; radios; trucks; ordnance, engine ring, signal, ship, vehicle, and aircraft spare parts; engine overhauls; and technical publications. Anticipated fiscal year 1978 purchases include aircraft, radar, helicopters, howitzers, rifles, pistols, mortars, trucks, and spare parts.

International Military Education and Training: during fiscal year 1977, 169 Thais received training in the United States; 154 are expected during fiscal year 1978. Courses provided, by priority, are resource management, career and influence, and skills to support MAP-provided equipment. IMET funds have also been used to obtain training aids and incountry training through a mobile training team.

### STAFFING LEVELS

The following table shows personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
1975 (note a)	650	775	21	20	75	75	746	870
1976 (note a):								
As of July 1, 1975	268	280	20	20	69	69	357	369
As of March 1, 1976	97	182	30	30	68	68	195	280
1977	117	122	14	13	47	47	178	182
October 31, 1977	40	77	7	8	15	35	62	120
December 2, 1977	40	72	7	8	15	34	62	114

a/From July 1965 through July 1, 1976, the U.S. Military Assistance Command (USMACTHAI), which was responsible for command of U.S. military elements, and JUSMAG, which was responsible for administering the security assistance program, were combined under one commander, so there was no distinction made in staffing authorizations. The March 1, 1976, staffing authorization shows the staffing authorization for JUSMAG after USMACTHAI command functions were eliminated in consonance with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Thailand.

As of December 2, 1977, JUSMAG had 32 military persons, 1 U.S. civilian, and 19 local national employees in excess of its authorized staffing. All but 4 military personnel had received reassignment orders and were to be transferred by January 31, 1978, as required by Departments of State and Defense instructions. Reassignment orders had also been requested for the other 4 military personnel. The civilian is scheduled to leave Thailand in April 1978, and excess local national employees are scheduled for release during the year.

We were told that all excess military personnel were assigned to nonsecurity assistance program functions, effective October 1, 1977. Since there were no other large U.S. military organizations to which personnel could be assigned while awaiting reassignment orders, JUSMAG and the U.S. Embassy decided to assign the excess military personnel to nonsecurity assistance program-related tasks within JUSMAG. They wanted them in positions which would be as meaningful as possible, such as inventorying JUSMAG equipment and supplies. These were jobs that needed to be performed but carried a low priority. Although these excess personnel were removed from direct program functions and directed to refrain from contacting Thai personnel, they were allowed to respond if a Thai official specifically requested to speak to them on a program-related matter.

#### OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

JUSMAG is the only Department of Defense organization in Thailand performing security assistance program functions and duties.

#### JUSMAG personnel functions and duties

Logistics management: maintain liaison, review Thai requisitions, monitor undelivered MAP and FMS equipment, determine MAP requirements and develop MAP program, review FMS letters of offer and acceptance, evaluate Thai Armed Force structure sufficiency and assure that systems requested are fully supportable, provide advice and assistance on Thai logistics and maintenance systems problems, check MAP end-item use, and handle legal matters arising from MAP property disposal and administration of the sale of brass cartridges from MAP-provided ammunition.

Transportation: handle MAP cargo receipt, shipment, and transfer; receive supplies; perform U.S. customs inspection functions; and operate JUSMAG aircraft.

Fiscal management: handle personnel pay and the JUSMAG budget and provide life-cycle costing on planned FMS procurements.

Training management: select U.S.-based training courses and arrange for student travel to the United States, determine requirements and make arrangements for mobile training teams and technical assistance teams, and supervise and monitor these teams.

Administration: maintain message traffic and mailroom services, nonsecurity assistance program legal services, and administrative support (i.e., typing and clerical work) within the JUSMAG operating divisions.

Technical assistance: provide direct technical advice at a Thai maintenance activity.

Changes in functions and duties

The JUSMAG military personnel reduction caused by Public Law 95-92 has resulted in fewer liaison contacts with lower level Thai military officials. However, the purpose and scope of these contacts, which is to provide assistance and guidance in FMS procedures, IMET planning and programing, and logistics systems management, have not changed. In addition, JUSMAG's capability to monitor MAP's equipment condition and use and to assess the reliability of Thai-furnished status information has been reduced.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and the percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties. A detailed breakdown by military, civilian, and local nationals was not available.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Equivalent number</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>
Primary:		
Logistics management	14.14	23
Transportation	9.30	15
Fiscal management	9.30	15
Contract administration	-	-
	<u>32.74</u>	<u>53</u>
Other:		
Training management	7.44	12
Administration	20.82	34
Technical assistance	<u>1.00</u>	<u>2</u>
	29.26	48
Total	<u>a/62.00</u>	<u>b/100</u>

a/Does not include the 32 military persons, 1 civilian, and 19 local nationals in excess of the authorized staffing level.

b/Does not add due to rounding.

## Technical qualifications of personnel

We examined the qualifications and prior experience of the six military personnel (officers) most recently assigned to JUSMAG. All of them were fully qualified for their positions; five were working in their primary job classifications and one in his secondary job classification. In addition, four of them had logistics experience. We found that these officers' backgrounds were primarily in support rather than military tactical or operational activities.

## ADVISORY AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN JUSMAG PERSONNEL

Thailand has made extensive use of MAP-funded technical assistance teams (TATs) and IMET-funded mobile training teams (MTTs). The following list shows the assistance provided or to be provided by these teams during fiscal years 1977 and 1978.

### Technical assistance:

- Establish an operational vehicle-rebuilding plant and precision-measuring electronics laboratory.
- Radar and air force depot-level maintenance.
- Logistics system reconciliation.
- Ammunition renovation.
- Install a language laboratory and train technicians.

### Training assistance:

- Teach Royal Thai marine instructors to maintain and/or repair radiators, landing-craft turrets, vehicle fuel and electrical systems, and engineering and radio equipment and to apply new undercoating procedures for extending jeep life.
- F5E aircraft pilots.



The following table shows composition, duration, and funding for these teams.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration				Funding
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years	Unknown
(number of teams)										
1977 total (note a)	TAT	20	18	21	4	20	-	-	-	-
1978	MTT	8	9	1	-	7	-	-	-	1
	TAT	3	-	4	-	3	-	-	-	-
1978 total		11	9	5	-	10	-	-	-	1

a/Includes teams carried over from fiscal year 1976 and teams initiated during 1977; 1978 includes only teams initiated in fiscal year 1978.

## VIEWS OF JUSMAG OFFICIALS

### Effectiveness of operations

The reduction in personnel has limited the number of liaison contacts with military officials, which in turn has reduced JUSMAG's ability to identify and correct errors early in the FMS process. This impact cuts across the board in FMS procedures, IMET planning and programing, and the management of Thai logistical systems. JUSMAG's effectiveness in helping the Thais manage FMS resources to get the most value from funds expended, particularly for operations and maintenance, is proportionately reduced.

### Adequacy of staffing

JUSMAG officials would like to maintain the current staffing level for several years and then gradually phase down. They stated that the current personnel level is needed to assure an efficient transition from MAP to FMS.

They said that JUSMAG could probably be phased down to three to six military personnel by the end of fiscal year 1979 if the Thais (1) were presented now with a planned JUSMAG phaseout and (2) initiated action to establish a

procurement office in the United States with secure communications links to Thailand and with freight forwarding points on the U.S. east and west coasts. Officials stated that the Thais could probably handle the FMS paperwork and planning for major end-item procurements without JUSMAG assistance. However, the Thais' inexperience in planning for overhaul and replacement parts would reduce their effectiveness in planning operations and maintenance, an area that represents about one-third of the FMS purchases. Therefore, JUSMAG officials would prefer that JUSMAG not be phased down to the three to six military personnel until the end of fiscal year 1980 so as to give the Thais more time to strengthen their program-planning techniques.

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, officials also agreed that, if the Thais take the actions specified above, they could probably assume total responsibility for their FMS program. However, they stated that the phasedown should be geared to residual MAP deliveries, which will probably be completed by the end of fiscal year 1980.

#### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

The Chief of the diplomatic mission exercises overall guidance and direction of JUSMAG operations. All policy and substantive matters are fully coordinated with the American Embassy and, in many cases, jointly developed. Public Law 95-92 has not changed this relationship.

#### Interaction between JUSMAG and host country

Thailand does not maintain a procurement office in the United States, and JUSMAG has tried to discourage the Thais from going directly to their defense attache in Washington, D.C., on FMS procurements because it takes much longer than using the JUSMAG channel. All FMS letters of offer and acceptance are handled through JUSMAG.

#### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

JUSMAG personnel enjoy essentially unlimited access to Royal Thai Armed Forces' installations and activities. Periodic "spot-checking" of equipment against the annual MAP inventory is provided by the Thais. Large items of equipment are easily and fully accounted for, smaller items are spot-checked to a limited degree.

No instances of unauthorized equipment transfers have been identified, but, except for large equipment items that are easily identified, there is no foolproof method for insuring that equipment is not transferred.

If unauthorized transfers were detected or suspected, JUSMAG would report them immediately to the Chief of mission.

#### VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

##### Supervision and direction provided to JUSMAG

Public Law 95-92 made no change in the Chief of the mission's direction and supervision of JUSMAG. All large FMS deals are handled through Department of State channels, and the Embassy makes all policy decisions on specific arms requests.

The Embassy's political section is JUSMAG's point of contact, and they are in daily contact. The JUSMAG Chief is a member of the Ambassador's country team which meets twice a week.

##### Effectiveness of JUSMAG operations

According to an Embassy official, the JUSMAG staff reduction did not reduce the effectiveness of the operation because advisory and training functions were also curtailed. He said that JUSMAG is probably still overstaffed but that the Embassy would like to see how it operates under the military ceiling of 40 before deciding about further reductions. An Embassy official agreed that JUSMAG could probably be reduced to six military personnel provided the Thais are notified of the phasedown now so as to allow them time to budget for and take the steps necessary to assume effective management of their FMS program.

## TURKEY COUNTRY PROFILE

AMBASSADOR: The Honorable Richard Spiers

MAAG NAME: Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey  
(JUSMMAT)

JUSMMAT CHIEF: Maj. Gen. Willard Latham (U.S. Army)

LOCATION OF JUSMMAT: Ankara, Turkey

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION

Turkey is strategically located at the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact nations and controls the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It also serves as a buffer between the Warsaw Pact nations and the Middle East. The United States supports a stable and pro-western Turkey capable of sustaining an active political and military NATO role. It is also important to U.S. interests to insure Turkey's relatively neutral posture in the Arab-Israeli dispute, have continued access to Turkish air space and sea ports, and have use of military facilities on Turkish soil.

The U.S. security assistance program has been described as the keystone of U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations. This relationship was seriously disrupted by the 1975 U.S. embargo on military aid and sales to Turkey arising out of Turkey's use of U.S.-originated equipment in its 1974 intervention in Cyprus. This embargo has also had a negative effect on Turkey's military posture. U.S. Embassy and JUSMMAT officials believe that restoration of close security ties rests with full resumption of U.S. military assistance and sales.

Fiscal years 1977 and 1978 security assistance programs are compared below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>FMS</u>
	(millions)
1977	\$125
1978 (estimated)	175

In fiscal year 1976, Turkey changed from MAP to FMS, after the U.S. embargo on FMS was suspended.

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED  
UNDER EACH PROGRAM

Foreign Military Sales: fiscal year 1977 FMS included F-4 aircraft and spare parts, F-100F replacement aircraft, AIM missiles, TOW missiles and launchers, electronic warfare equipment, munitions, communications equipment, and a mobile training team. FMS was also used to provide training in the United States to 64 military personnel at postgraduate schools and other advanced technical courses. Fiscal year 1978 FMS purchases of TOW missiles and launchers, fighter and patrol aircraft, electronic warfare equipment and artillery support components are anticipated. Turkey is also expected to use FMS for mobile training teams and for flight instruction and aircraft maintenance training in the United States for about 48 military personnel.

STAFFING LEVELS

The following table shows the personnel authorized and assigned to the security assistance program.

Fiscal year	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
1975	122	105	24	20	57	58	203	183
1976	113	105	22	21	58	56	193	182
1977	85	88	17	16	58	53	160	157
October 31, 1977	64	72	16	16	40	53	120	141
January 31, 1978	64	64	16	16	40	43	120	123

As of January 31, 1978, 10 military persons, 3 civilians, and 1 local national were included in JUSMMAT. These individuals perform nonsecurity assistance functions relating to the Chief, JUSMMAT's, additional duties as the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, Contact Officer; U.S. Defense Representative; and U.S. Country Representative for Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction. The staffing ceiling imposed as a result of Public Law 95-92 has been applied to these positions, so they are included in the above table.

Departments of State and Defense instructions required that military personnel in excess of authorized levels at October 1, 1977, be transferred to nonsecurity assistance functions and reassigned out of the country by January 31, 1978. According to JUSMMAT officials, seven of the eight

excess military personnel were transferred; for personal reasons, the other individual was unable to depart Turkey until January 30, 1978, and in the interim he was used for other MAP activities. As shown above, the number of military personnel assigned as of January 31, 1978, coincides with the fiscal year 1978 authorized level. The three excess local nationals had received termination notices effective February 21, 1978.

#### OTHER OVERSEAS PERSONNEL PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

No organizations in Turkey other than JUSMMAT perform security assistance program functions.

#### JUSMMAT PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

Logistics management: procure, maintain, and transport materiel and personnel; finalize the JUSMMAT budget program; inspect MAP end-item use; make liaison visits related to MAP-provided materiel and training; process disposal actions for MAP equipment; prepare FMS case justifications for equipment, training, or services requested by the Turkish Armed Forces; process requests for price and availability data, letters of offer and acceptance, and follow-on support and training.

Transportation: monitor delivery dates and status of MAP and FMS materiel and services and coordinate delivery of materiel by the Defense Transportation Service between the Turkish Armed Forces and U.S. agencies.

Fiscal management: monitor JUSMMAT operating funds; assist the Government of Turkey in establishing MAP requirements, and monitor MAP and FMS programs to insure that funding levels are not exceeded.

Contract administration: monitor JUSMMAT's C-12 aircraft maintenance contract.

Advising and training: assist Turkish Armed Forces to attain self-sufficiency in planning, processing, and managing FMS cases and provide training or assistance to overcome a particular problem.

Planning: hold joint planning discussions with Turkish Armed Forces to develop Joint Strategic Operation Plans, Military Security Assistance Projections, and program-year requirements.

Administration: supervise and administer the security assistance program.

Changes in functions and duties

Public Law 95-92 has had little impact on JUSMMAT's functions and duties. However, enactment of the law and the President's arms transfer policy guidelines did result in minor procedural changes. For example, JUSMMAT no longer makes appointments for contractors with Turkish military officials or recommendations to these officials on the need for specific types of equipment. Also, requests for offer and acceptance are now processed through the Embassy rather than through military channels.

The following table shows the equivalent personnel and percent of time devoted to security assistance program functions and duties.

Function	Military		Civilian		Local nationals		Total	
	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time	Equivalent number	Percent of time
Primary:								
Logistics management	16.12	29.8	-	-	2.15	5.5	18.27	17.2
Transportation	0.54	1.0	-	-	0.03	0.1	0.57	0.5
Fiscal management	1.62	3.0	-	-	1.65	4.2	3.27	3.1
Contract administration	0.30	0.6	-	-	-	-	0.30	0.3
	<u>18.58</u>	<u>34.4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3.83</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>22.41</u>	<u>21.1</u>
Other:								
Advising and training	0.82	1.5	-	-	0.02	0.1	0.84	0.8
Planning	12.91	23.9	-	-	-	-	12.91	12.2
Administration	21.69	40.2	13.0	100.0	35.15	90.1	69.84	65.9
	<u>35.42</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>35.17</u>	<u>90.2</u>	<u>83.59</u>	<u>78.9</u>
Total	<u>a/54.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>a/13.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>a/39.00</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>a/106.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>

a/Does not include 10 military persons, 3 U.S. civilians, nor 1 local national who perform nonsecurity assistance program functions as described earlier.

## Technical qualifications of personnel

The majority of the military personnel are assigned to positions requiring their primary or secondary job specialty codes and have attended security assistance management school. Thus, they appear qualified for their positions.

### ALTERNATIVE AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN JUSMMAT PERSONNEL

During fiscal year 1977, only one mobile training team provided training on the maintenance of the M107 gun under an FMS contract. For fiscal year 1978 only one FMS-funded MTT is scheduled to assist the Turkish army establish a maintenance training school. The composition and duration of these teams are shown below.

Fiscal year	Teams		Number of personnel			Duration			
	Type	Number	Military	Civilian	Contract	Under 6 months	6 to 12 months	1 to 2 years	Over 2 years
1977	MTT	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-
1978	MTT	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-

(number of teams)

## VIEWS OF JUSMMAT OFFICIALS

### Effective Operations

Officials said that it is difficult to assess JUSMMAT's effectiveness in carrying out security assistance because the embargo which has been in effect since February 1975 suspended all security assistance to Turkey. However, in fiscal year 1976, the suspension as related to FMS was lifted, and this necessitated a rapid transition for Turkey from dependency on MAP to FMS. JUSMMAT officials believe that, for the most part, they have been effective in assisting the Turkish Forces to make the transition from MAP to FMS.

On the other hand, in several instances the United States did not respond or made late responses to Turkish requests for information, which raised the possibility of requisitions being canceled or pricing estimates expiring. In this regard, JUSMMAT has not been effective.



### Adequacy of staffing

The JUSMMAT staff was reduced 25 percent as a result of Public Law 95-92, but JUSMMAT believes the staff is sufficient for the current security assistance program. However, if the Defense Cooperation Agreement is approved by the Congress, JUSMMAT may need to be augmented with a temporary staff having the know-how and experience to handle the proposed \$1 billion, 4-year military assistance package which is a part of the agreement.

### Supervision and direction provided by Chief, U.S. diplomatic mission

Public Law 95-92 did not change the Ambassador's control over JUSMMAT operations because there has always been a close working relationship between the Embassy and JUSMMAT.

### Interaction between JUSMMAT and host country

Turkey does not maintain an FMS procurement office in the United States, but Turkish military attaches in Washington, D.C., handle some commercial purchase requests. The Turkish navy and air force have a representative at U.S. logistic centers to manage the procurement and requisition for active FMS cases. Although there is no direct interaction between JUSMMAT and these officials, in the interest of promoting Turkish self-sufficiency, JUSMMAT continues to urge the Turkish Armed Forces to establish an FMS procurement office in the United States. A plan to accomplish this was being developed when the embargo was imposed in 1975.

### Procedures for monitoring end use of MAP items and precluding unauthorized transfers of MAP and FMS items

When the United States imposed the embargo on arms transfers to Turkey, the Turkish Government reacted by suspending end-item use reports and visits by U.S. officials to Turkish units. However, they have allowed some orientation visits, which permit limited JUSMMAT observation of MAP-provided equipment. JUSMMAT is negotiating with the Turkish general staff for a return to normal relations in this area. However, as a result of recent Turkish command and staff changes, a new Turkish negotiating team was appointed, and it is reluctant to accept certain points previously agreed upon. JUSMMAT officials said that, even with end-use reports and visits,

it would not be possible to prevent or detect unauthorized transfers.

## VIEWS OF EMBASSY OFFICIALS

### Supervision and direction provided to JUSMMAT

The Ambassador meets periodically with the Chief, JUSMMAT, and has daily contact with JUSMMAT operations through the Embassy's Office of Mutual Security Assistance, which acts as liaison between all U.S. military operations and the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The Ambassador stated that he has a great deal of experience with the U.S. military and the security assistance program. He also has been actively involved in the preparation of the security assistance Congressional Presentation Document and the Presidential Determinations which are required for Turkish FMS credit cases.

### Effectiveness of JUSMMAT operations

According to the Ambassador, Turkish military officials are sensitive to the possibility of scandals so they prefer to deal directly with the U.S. Government rather than with commercial firms. Also, they appreciate the managerial benefits derived from having the U.S. Government act as the intermediary for the quality control, delivery, and logistical support of U.S.-originated equipment and services. The Ambassador expressed satisfaction with JUSMMAT's operations and level of staffing; but, because certain security assistance programs remain suspended due to the embargo, it is difficult to make a judgment on JUSMMAT's overall effectiveness.

(46356)