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The Army Can Improve Peacetime Use of Deployable Enlisted Personnel. FPCD-78-66; B-146890. See Labor 7, 1978. 17 pp. + appendix (17 pp.).

Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

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Although its combat mission has priority, the Army's peacetime role and demands on personnel are important. Army headquarters has not officially recognized its peacetime needs and incorporated them into its personnel management policies and instructions. A study was conducted to determine whether deployable Army enlisted military personnel were or could be used effectively and productively to accomplish work needed to maintain garrisons and, at the same time, enhance proficiency in their basic skills. Findings/Conclusions: Army headquarters does not provide adequately for using combat personnel for meeting peacetime needs. It staffs its deployable units and develops personnel management policies and instructions on the basis of combat requirements, and it gives no substantive recognition of the need to use deployable personnel for garrison work. Commanders' and individuals' perceptions of special duty in the garrison and how to use it effectively need to change. Most of those contacted had negative perceptions of special duty; these perceptions are demoralizing and not conducive to good performance. The Army would benefit from more constructive attitudes toward special duty. Special duty could be used as a reward for good performance and, by using high achievers in special duty, the required work could be accomplished with fewer people. Recommendations: The Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army, should develop: policy guidelines that recognize the extent of the Army's need to use deployable military personnel to maintain its combat capability and accomplish its garrison responsibilities; plans and issue guidelines that will assist commanders at all levels in assigning deployable personnel from their units to special duty in the garrison that will maintain or enhance individual skill proficiency and unit combat capability; and cost-effective means of recording reliable and realistic data on individuals' skill qualifications and on training and experience needed to maintain skill proficiency. An interim system should be developed and

tested for controlled management of garrisoned deployable personnel at installations. (RRS)

REPORT BY THE U.S.

General Accounting Office

The Army Can Improve Peacetime Use Of Deployable Enlisted Personnel

Although the Army's combat mission has priority, its peacetime role and demands on enlisted personnel are important.

The Army needs to develop plans and guidelines to make the most effective and productive use practicable of garrisoned deployable personnel.





UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-146890

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report summarizes our study of the Army's use of deployable enlisted personnel in peacetime. We have informally discussed our findings with Army officials at Fort Carson, Colorado.

The report contains recommendations to you. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report; a similar statement to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations should accompany the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of the Army. Copies are also being sent to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the House Committee on Government Operations.

We wish to acknowledge the courtesy and cooperation extended by your staff to our representatives during the review.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Krieger

H. L. Krieger
Director

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ARMY CAN IMPROVE
PEACETIME USE OF DEPLOYABLE
ENLISTED PERSONNEL

D I G E S T

The Army needs to maintain and increase the skill proficiency and combat capability of peacetime personnel, but more realistic standards and guidelines are needed.

Army headquarters has not fully recognized its peacetime needs and incorporated them into its personnel management policies and instructions.

Regulations allow temporary use of combat personnel for garrison work, but the Army does not acknowledge the extent of those needs nor provide for their sustained use. (See p. 3.)

Because of the mobility and deployability of military personnel, it is considered necessary to maintain, at the minimum, a core of key and well-trained civilians on Army posts to provide continuity to operations. Defense policy is to use civilians in as many support positions as practicable. Reductions in personnel ceilings have decreased the number of civilians that can be employed. (See p. 7.)

When there is more garrison work than can be accomplished by the authorized civilian manning levels, it often is done by military personnel "borrowed" from deployable units.

The 4th Infantry Division has been able to maintain a high level of reported combat readiness capability while providing some of the needed installation support. (See p. 9.)

FPCD-78-66

GAO studied 17 deployable individuals to find how they were used when not in training or doing skill-related work. No documentation was available, but they had time for other duties. (See p. 9.)

Only 2 of the 17 individuals felt their special duties enhanced their skills, but 13 suggested garrison positions they felt could benefit them.

Unit commanders and battalion officials generally felt that diversion of any persons from their combat positions has a negative effect on individual skill and unit proficiency. (See p. 11.)

Reports show how many persons with appropriate military occupational specialties are available to fill combat positions. They do not show whether persons assigned are acquiring the experience needed to maintain proficiency in their skills.

No one has clearly identified the required frequency of training for skill reinforcement, and there are no standards by which a unit commander can determine how often his men should repeat a task in order to maintain proficiency. Some persons assigned to special duty do not receive individual or unit training. (See p. 13.)

The Army does not have, but needs:

- Guidelines that will assist commanders in matching available skills in their deployable units with skills of positions needed in the garrison to achieve the most effective and productive use of the available personnel practicable.
- Authorization for the garrison positions needed. Typical requirements are for logistics school instructors, property shipment specialists, engineering equipment operators, physical activities specialists, mountain and survival skills instructors, supply specialists, and teen center operators.

- Realistic standards on how much training, testing, inspection, and duty its personnel should have in order to maintain capability in a skill or assigned combat position, and records to compare with standards.
- Objective means of identifying effects of special duty on individual skill proficiency and units' combat proficiency.
- A plan that identifies types of garrison positions that may complement or supplement individuals' skills or assigned combat positions.
- Realistic data on how many persons, with what skills, can be diverted from units, for how long, without significantly decreasing the unit's combat capability.
- A program encouraging special duty in the garrison as an opportunity for individual improvement rather than as a penalty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army, should develop:

- Policy guidelines that officially recognize the extent of the Army's need to use its deployable military personnel to maintain its combat capability and accomplish its garrison responsibilities as effectively and productively as practicable.
- Plans and issue guidelines that will assist commanders at all levels in assigning deployable personnel from their units to special duty in the garrison that will, to the extent practicable, maintain or enhance individual skill proficiency and unit combat capability.

- Cost-effective means of recording reliable and realistic data on individuals' skill qualifications and on training and experience needed to maintain skill proficiency.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have undertaken studies and new initiatives which offer the potential for meaningful improvements in the methods used to determine manpower requirements. To supplement these initiatives, an interim system should be developed and tested for controlled management of garrisoned deployable personnel at an installation such as Fort Carson. Such a system might include:

- Developing and maintaining an inventory by military occupational specialties of personnel available.
- Establishing and implementing a program for rotating individuals in and out of garrison duty for specified periods of time which would enable them to acquire training and supplementary special duty experience to enhance their skill proficiency. At the same time, work needed to maintain the garrison effectively and economically could be accomplished.

At the end of a specified test period an evaluation should be made using criteria for effectiveness to overcome the present problems discussed in this report.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Army regulation
GAO	General Accounting Office
MOS	military occupational specialty
SQT	skill qualification test
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Army's primary mission is to maintain the combat capability necessary for the national defense. Military personnel must be garrisoned and trained, maintain proficiency in designated skills, and be available for deployment when needed.

Although its combat mission has priority, its peacetime role and demands on personnel are important. Army headquarters has not officially recognized its peacetime needs and incorporated them into its personnel management policies and instructions.

In February 1978 we reported on "Management and Use of Army Enlisted Personnel--What Needs to be Done" (FPCD-78-6). This report on a study made at Army headquarters and Fort Carson, Colorado, said

"Problems arise when combat units perform peacetime functions. The Army's personnel utilization policy and Fort Carson's utilization reporting system are designed for combat. Division units are authorized positions and personnel on the basis of combat requirements. In peacetime, however, unit commanders must use personnel with combat skills to accomplish peacetime or garrison missions which require different skills. At the same time, commanders are expected to maintain a high level of personnel and unit combat readiness.

* * * * *

"We are planning a separate study to determine the feasibility of using garrisoned personnel in non-combat activities which may improve their effectiveness and productivity and reduce operating costs. The primary concern is that combat personnel receive training and experience needed to maintain proficiency in their basic skills. Consequently, non-combat activities should complement or supplement combat duties to the extent practicable."

SCOPE OF STUDY

We made a study of selected deployable enlisted military personnel of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized),

Fort Carson, Colorado, to find how they were used in duties or activities when not engaged in training or skill-related activities. In related studies at other locations we are reviewing the authorization criteria for personnel needed in service and support activities for Army combat units and the validity of the Army's garrison staffing guide.

Circumstances, practices, and policies at one Army installation may not be representative of all installations, but there should be some commonality of personnel management practices among installations. Conditions similar to those at Fort Carson could exist at other Army installations.

CHAPTER 2

ARMY PERSONNEL POLICIES DO NOT

ADEQUATELY MEET PEACETIME NEEDS

In this study we wanted to find whether deployable Army enlisted military personnel were, or could be, used effectively and productively to accomplish work needed to maintain garrisons and, at the same time, enhance proficiency in their basic skills. The information we obtained indicated that the Army can improve the management and use of its deployable enlisted personnel.

Army headquarters does not provide adequately for using its combat personnel for meeting peacetime needs. It staffs its deployable units and develops its personnel management policies and instructions on the basis of combat requirements. It gives no substantive recognition to the need to use deployable, or Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), personnel for garrison work.

Army regulation (AR) 570-4, "Manpower Management," sets forth the objectives, principles, and policies of manpower management with the objective of maintaining combat effectiveness with minimum manpower. It says personnel management policy is based on the principle that the Army must insure that manpower resources are properly trained, distributed, and utilized and at the same time insure an adequate use of trained manpower to meet military contingencies. It provides that the commander may use Strategic Army Force personnel on a temporary basis to fill positions in installation support units when the best utilization of available personnel dictates.

AR 600-200, chapter 3, "Personnel Utilization," authorizes use of a person outside his military occupational specialty (MOS) for not more than 90 days when in actual combat conditions or to meet an urgent military requirement or an exceptional need for a temporary duty position. Use of a soldier for special duty may be extended up to 12 months when it has been determined that his special training or skills are required for total mission accomplishment.

Even though regulations allow temporary use of TOE personnel for garrison work, the Army does not recognize the extent of garrison needs for and use of TOE personnel, and makes no provision in its instructions for sustained

use of TOI personnel for garrison work. In fact, headquarters ignores this need in its personnel reporting system, combat readiness computation, and, to a large extent, in its personnel training.

Our report on the management and use of Army enlisted personnel (see p. 1) said that utilization and reporting practices result in showing personnel performing in their assigned positions without regard to whether they are actually working in those jobs. Although reports show how many persons with appropriate MOSSs are available to fill combat positions, the reports do not show whether persons assigned are acquiring the experience needed to maintain proficiency in their skills. Our report also said that

"* * * except for some special duty rosters, we found no reports identifying persons working outside their assigned jobs, no record of how long it had been since they worked in their jobs, or any indication of how much or what kind of actual experience they had received. A Fort Carson official said that the Army had discontinued maintaining detailed training records."

THE 4th INFANTRY DIVISION'S PEACETIME MISSION

In peacetime the Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, is responsible for maintaining (1) the combat capability of his military personnel and (2) the garrison. Lacking official Army recognition of his total peacetime personnel needs and definitive guidelines for meeting them, the Commander must use his own judgment as to how he can best satisfy the competing demands for his limited resources of military personnel, civilian employees, and contract services.

We have not questioned, in this study, the number of military personnel garrisoned and available for deployment. Nor have we questioned the need for training, testing, and activities associated with their skills to maintain proficiency. However, it is questionable whether the Army knows that its personnel receive enough training, but not more than needed, or that they are used as effectively as practicable when they are available for other peacetime duties.

Peacetime military responsibilities

The Division's peacetime mission, briefly, is to:

- Train division personnel to execute missions that are either specified or implied by higher headquarters.
- Maintain equipment in a state of readiness that will allow the division to execute any assigned mission.
- Assist reserve components in their training and readiness program.
- Prepare to accept reserve components after deployment of the division and their mobilization.
- Prepare to assist the civilian community with disaster relief or civil disturbance actions.

Training activities

The training portion of its mission, pertaining directly to deployable personnel, is to:

- Attain and maintain the state of operational readiness required for efficient execution of combat operations (combat capability), civil disturbance operations, and natural disaster relief missions.
- Attain and maintain a state of deployment readiness which will permit rapid deployment by land, air, and/or sea in accordance with current operating plans.
- Provide for the professional development of assigned officers and enlisted men.

The Army has developed MOS criteria and standards which each individual must meet to be considered qualified in his skill. Skill Qualification Tests (SQT), which each individual must take every 2 years, have been developed based on these criteria and standards. Those who do not make a passing grade must take the test again in a year. The individual's test results determine, in part, his eligibility for promotion and reenlistment.

Unit readiness is an appraisal of a unit's capability of accomplishing its assigned mission. This capability is determined on the basis of the Army training and evaluation

program which establishes unit training missions with specified tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for combat critical missions. It provides for training and evaluation of the ability of units and individuals to accomplish specified training objectives and tasks under simulated combat conditions, and is described as:

"* * * a program that enables the commander to evaluate his unit, develop his training program, train to overcome the weakness discovered in the evaluation, then conduct a reevaluation."

Individuals' skills must be reinforced from time to time to maintain an adequate individual combat capability. Individuals must operate together as teams in units periodically during a garrison situation to maintain unit combat capability. Their combat capability is tested periodically, but as noted in our February 1978 report (see p. 1),

"We found no standards or guidelines to gauge the minimum experience or training a person should have or the frequency of experience necessary to maintain proficiency in his authorized MOS. Nor did we find provisions for reports or other means of assessing individuals' experience in their skills and jobs or systematic procedures for rotating personnel among related jobs. Although it seems to be a fairly common practice to rotate people in jobs such as tank crew positions, we found no evidence of systematic procedures for, or records of, the rotation, experience, or crosstraining of individuals."

The Army is aware of this lack of standards and procedures on required amounts and frequency of training. We discussed this matter with officials of the Army Training Command's Army Training Board and Training Development Institute and of the Army Research Institute. Officials said that unit commanders know from the "Soldiers Manual" which tasks their personnel must know. However, no one has clearly identified the required skill reinforcement frequency, and there are no standards to tell a unit commander how often his men should repeat a task in order to maintain proficiency.

Army Research Institute officials said a current research project on the pace at which skills decay should help determine the required frequency of skill reinforcement but that the amount of reinforcement needed varies

with each individual. They said the frequency and extent of reinforcement training needed to bring skills up to standards is an extremely difficult, complex, and costly matter to resolve.

Each commander is responsible for his unit's performance and, based on his perceptions and management style, must decide the amount and frequency of training his personnel receive. This varies among units. Some unit and battalion commanders feel that their personnel should be in training 100 percent of the time. Although some officials perceive full time for training as desirable, that does not occur and is not a realistic goal because of limitations on maneuver space and funds for supplies, fuel, ammunition, and equipment. Our study of selected individuals showed that training activities for individual skills and unit or team operations constituted less than a normal full-time workload and that a substantial portion of their time was used for nontraining activities.

If the Army had standards for the required frequency of training and records of the actual frequency with which it is received by individuals, the extent of individuals' availability for other duties could be more clearly and objectively determined.

Peacetime garrison responsibilities

The Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, is responsible for accomplishing all functions and activities associated with maintaining the garrison. These include administering, operating, and maintaining all installation facilities and providing administrative and logistical support to the division and tenant activities, and providing services for active duty and retired military personnel and their dependents.

In March 1978, Headquarters, Forces Command, issued an authorization document for the garrison at Fort Carson. On the basis of an August 1977 manpower survey, the Command summarized staffing effective September 30, 1978, as follows.

	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Difference</u>
	<u>Required</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	
Military	780	490	290
Civilian	<u>1,906</u>	<u>1,279</u>	<u>627</u>
Total	<u>2,686</u>	<u>1,769</u>	<u>917</u>

Fort Carson officials identified local requirements not included by Forces Command and estimated that a staff of 2,980 persons would be needed, 1,211 more than authorized. Forces Command authorized some of the unmet requirements to be filled by TOE personnel.

On December 31, 1977, 1,359 civilians and 523 TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances) military personnel were assigned to the garrison. Additional TOE deployable military personnel were assigned special duty in garrison functions but not enough to meet all recognized requirements.

Because of the mobility and deployability of military personnel, it is considered necessary to maintain, at the minimum, a core of key and well-trained civilians in garrison positions to provide continuity to garrison operations. Department of Defense policy is to use civilians in as many support positions as practicable and to designate whether positions are to be filled by civilians or military personnel.

Civilians do a wide range of work which includes the type of activities required for community and military support not usually found in civilian communities. Reductions in personnel ceilings have decreased the number of civilians that can be employed. Currently Fort Carson is undergoing a reduction in force of about 160 civilians. Positions selected to be abolished include those of clerks, warehouse forklift operators, motor vehicle operators, laundry workers, automotive mechanics, heavy mobile equipment repairmen, and plumbers.

Fort Carson contracts for some types of services. Garrison work performed by contract personnel during fiscal year 1978 included refuse collection and food services at a cost of about \$260,000 and \$3,200,000, respectively. Other contract work included custodial services, repairing and resurfacing roads, and maintaining communication equipment.

Since garrisoned deployable military personnel are not engaged full time in activities needed to maintain proficiency in their skills, they have time for other duties. There are no specific limits or restrictions on what garrison work can be performed by military personnel. When there is more garrison work than can be accomplished by the authorized civilian manning levels, it often is done by military personnel "borrowed" from deployable units.

Fort Carson has a program for the identification of needs for and allocation, administration, and control of borrowed manpower, generally special duty in support of installation-essential support missions. Under the program, requests for manpower must be reviewed before approval.

Manpower levies to fill the approved requests are allocated among providing units. Unit commanders select individuals to fill the levies. The need for each position must be reviewed for verification at least semiannually.

The 4th Infantry Division has been able to maintain a high level of reported combat readiness capability while providing some of the needed installation support. During our review Fort Carson officials estimated that 350 positions were being filled by diverting personnel from TOE positions to special duty. In addition, it diverted some personnel to meet command requirements not authorized in combat-oriented TOE activities which can be accomplished by TOE units.

Case studies

As previously stated, we wanted to find whether Army enlisted military personnel were, or could be, used effectively and productively to accomplish work needed to maintain garrisons and, at the same time, enhance proficiency in their basic skills. One objective was to identify the amount of time during the past year selected persons spent on activities required to maintain their individual and unit capability.

Historical data on how enlisted personnel at Fort Carson were used had not been accumulated. The only information we could obtain was the recollections of individuals and their commanders. On that basis, we estimated how individuals' time was used.

Since historical data was not available, selection of a statistical or random sample of persons to be studied would not have provided a sound basis for projecting the findings to the entire personnel population at Fort Carson. Instead, we studied the activities of 17 deployable enlisted persons.

We selected persons with 14 of the most prevalent skills from different units, including some who had been diverted from their assigned TOE positions, who were available to be

interviewed. These cases are not intended to be representative of all or any particular segment of deployable personnel and cannot be validly used for projections.

Summaries of the cases studied are attached to this report. (See app. I.) We recognize that the 17 cases studied represent only the perceptions of the enlisted personnel selected about how they served the Army in their garrison situation. Yet, these perceptions are interesting.

- Eleven estimated they used from 64 to 93 percent of their time in training, testing, or duties associated with their MOS or assigned TOE position. One said he used no time for this purpose.
- Most said they worked in other duties. Nine had been diverted to work outside their TOE positions. A tactical wire operations specialist estimated that he was used 38 percent of the time as a gymnasium activities supervisor. A field artillery crewman estimated he was used 50 percent of the time as an instructor in mountain rescue. A medical specialist estimated that he was used 59 percent of the time as a skill development trainer, driver, and assistant Sergeant Major. Two said they had not worked in other duties.
- Only two, both medical specialists, felt their other duty experience obtained while working outside their TOE position contributed to enhancement of their MOS or assigned TOE capabilities. Their battalion and unit commanders were the only commanders who perceived positive effects.
- The combat capabilities of 12 persons had not been determined. They had not taken an MOS test or the SQT, or had not received SQT results.
- Six had received enlistment bonuses. The field artillery crewman noted above estimated he was used 50 percent of the time as an instructor in mountain rescue. He was returned to his assigned TOE position when personnel officials realized he was a bonus recipient. Another field artillery crewman was used within his unit as the unit armorer for about 8 percent of the time. The other four were not used outside their assigned TOE positions.
- Thirteen suggested garrison positions they felt could enhance their MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities.

Unit commanders and battalion officials expressed mixed opinions about the effects of special duty, but generally they felt that diversion of any personnel from TOE positions had a negative effect on individual skill proficiency and unit proficiency. For instance, one official explained that a howitzer crew is composed of seven people and that when one or two are taken away the crew is incomplete. The incomplete crew may be able to operate satisfactorily for a short time but not for an extended period such as might occur during warfare. Also, a crew reduction would cause an unsatisfactory safety condition.

Most commanders said that because of various complexities they do not recall their special duty personnel for unit or individual training, and that time away from their skills and units decreases individual skill proficiency and value to the unit. On the other hand, some said they select their better people for special duty because they can fit right in with the units' needs and retain their skills with little reorientation. Also, they suggested that treatment of special duty as a reward would improve morale and require fewer people.

Deterrents to using deployable personnel for garrison work

We considered possible deterrents to using deployable personnel for garrison work.

Legal restrictions

Legal officials at Fort Carson were unaware of any statutory restrictions on using deployable personnel outside their TOE positions and/or MOS to accomplish garrison work.

Union agreements and pressure

The Army is required by contract to advise the local union of use of military personnel when it could result in a reduction in force or demotion of a civilian employee. In addition, the Army may not permanently fill with military personnel a civilian position vacated by a reduction-in-force. Fort Carson officials said that, other than these requirements, unions have no part in decisions on how military personnel are used.

It is conceivable that the unions might strongly object if the Army should plan a widespread replacement of civilians with military personnel.

Political pressure

We found no evidence of any political pressure on use of military personnel. It is conceivable that some political pressure might be applied if it seemed civilian positions were being jeopardized.

Army policies and reporting requirements

The Army staffs its deployable units for combat and combat support capability. Its managers are evaluated on how well they maintain combat readiness as demonstrated by field exercises.

Army traditions and attitudes

Army commanders traditionally exercise close control over personnel assigned to them. Diversion of their personnel is considered an infringement on their command prerogatives. This attitude was reflected in the case studies. Officers expressed various opinions that

- they need all their personnel full time to maintain combat readiness,
- only "duds" should be assigned to special duty,
- only "sharp" persons should be assigned to special duty, and
- each unit is assigned so many extraneous tasks they cannot spare any of their personnel.

Mission requirements

Combat readiness and capability of deployable units is the Army's primary consideration. Officers said that to be combat effective individuals should periodically train together as units. Regulations provide that personnel on special duty return to their units for needed training. However, some commanders said their personnel assigned to special duty do not return to their units for training. Also, they said individuals working outside their positions often do not receive individual training in their skills, and this reduces skill proficiency.

Unrestricted use of personnel outside their TOE positions could severely degrade combat capability. Some commanders

estimated they could lose a certain percent of their personnel and still maintain capability, but loss of too many would critically lower their units' capability.

Personnel skills inadequacies

Some persons require longer and more intensive training than others to attain and maintain proficiency in their military skills. Also the technical nature of some skills requires that those skills be reinforced on a more frequent basis than others. Indiscriminate use of TOE personnel for garrison work could have an adverse impact on skill proficiency.

Some of those barriers seem significant. However, we believe they would not be too difficult for the Army to overcome were it convinced of the need for and the benefits to be gained from more extensive and structured use of deployable personnel for garrison work.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The Army does officially recognize the garrison mission through manpower surveys and authorization documents setting limits on civilian and military staffing. Although it acknowledges that deployable TOE personnel are used to supplement authorized staffing, it makes no allowance for that use in its personnel utilization and reporting system.

Army headquarters takes no action to authorize use of TOE personnel for garrison requirements. Forces Command recognizes many of the unauthorized garrison requirements in its manpower surveys and approves use of TOE personnel to fill some of those needs. Fort Carson has developed a program for using borrowed personnel for installation-essential support missions and has been able to maintain the Division's reported combat capability while providing some of the needed manpower not included by TDA authorizations.

Army headquarters action is needed to officially recognize the need for and facilitate the use of deployable military personnel in functions and duties needed to maintain the garrison in peacetime. Headquarters should also develop plans and guidelines for implementing such utilization and for identifying garrison positions that may complement or supplement combat skills. This could improve the

- effective and productive use of garrisoned deployable personnel,
- operation of the garrison,
- morale of the commanders and individuals, and
- cost-benefit ratio of its manpower resources.

Commanders' and individuals' perceptions of special duty in the garrison and how to use it most effectively to their benefit need to change. Most of those contacted had negative perceptions of special duty. Individuals regarded it as undesirable. Commanders, in essence, felt their personnel assigned to special duty were lost to the units, and were inclined to select low performers and misfits.

These perceptions are demoralizing and not conducive to good performance. The Army would benefit from more constructive attitudes toward special duty. As some officials noted, special duty could be used as a reward for good performance. It could be viewed as

- a release from repetitive training exercises and menial unit tasks,

- work which might enhance leadership capabilities and supplement combat skills, and

- a means to develop marketable skills in some cases.

By using high achievers in special duty the required work could be accomplished with fewer people.

The Army does not have, but needs:

- Guidelines that will assist commanders in matching available skills in their deployable units with skills of positions needed in the garrison to achieve the most effective and productive use of the available personnel practicable.

- Authorization for the garrison positions needed. Typical requirements are for logistics school instructors, property shipment specialists, engineering equipment operators, physical activities specialists, mountain and survival skills instructors, supply specialists, and teen center operators.

- Realistic standards on how much training, testing, inspection, and duty its personnel should have in order to maintain capability in an MOS or assigned TOE position, and records to compare with standards.

- Objective means of identifying effects of special duty on individual skill proficiency and units' combat proficiency.

- A plan that identifies types of garrison positions that may complement or supplement individuals' MOSS or assigned TOE positions.

- Realistic data on how many persons, with what skills, can be diverted from units, for how long, without significantly decreasing the unit's combat capability.

- A program encouraging special duty in the garrison as an opportunity for individual improvement rather than as a penalty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army, develop:

- Policy guidelines that officially recognize the extent of the Army's need to use its deployable military personnel to maintain its combat capability and accomplish its garrison responsibilities as effectively and productively as practicable.
- Plans and issue guidelines that will assist commanders at all levels in assigning deployable personnel from their units to special duty in the garrison that will, to the extent practicable, maintain or enhance individual skill proficiency and unit combat capability.
- Cost-effective means of recording reliable and realistic data on individuals' skill qualifications and on training and experience needed to maintain skill proficiency.

We have noted that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have undertaken studies and new initiatives which offer the potential for meaningful improvements in the methods used to determine manpower requirements. Long-term programs include the Army's restructuring of manpower authorization criteria for combat service and service support personnel and the Navy's program for developing staffing standards for shore based support.

To supplement these initiatives, we recommend that an interim system be developed and tested for controlled management of garrisoned deployable personnel at an installation such as Fort Carson. Such a system might include:

- Developing and maintaining an inventory by MOSs of the personnel available.
- Establishing and implementing a program for rotating individuals in and out of garrison duty for specified periods of time which would enable them to acquire training and supplementary special duty experience to enhance their skill proficiency. At the same time,

work needed to maintain the garrison effectively and economically could be accomplished.

At the end of a specified test period an evaluation should be made using criteria for effectiveness to overcome the present problems discussed in this report.

CASE STUDIESCase Study No. 1

MOS: 11B10 Infantryman

Assigned TOE position: Personnel Carrier Driver

Enlisted bonus recipient: Yes

Years in Army: 3 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training

5%

Downrange unit training & testing

25

Inspections

4

Physical training

14

48%

MOS-related duties:

Vehicle maintenance

28

Other duties:

Post guard

2

Leave

5

Not accounted for

17

Total

100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None identified

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:

Unit police, work in gymnasium, vehicle maintenance logistics, honor guard

MOS test results: November 1975--average

Skill qualification test results: Not verified

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion

Company Commander: If individual receives training, combat capability would be sufficient

Battalion official: If individual can maintain basic skills, then combat capability will not be degraded

Case Study No. 2

MOS: 11C10 Indirect Fire Infantryman

Assigned TOE position: Mortar Gunner

Enlisted bonus recipient: Yes

Years in Army: 2 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	5%	
Downrange unit training & testing	25	
Inspections	4	
Physical training	<u>14</u>	48%
MOS-related duties:		
Vehicle maintenance		28
Other duties:		
Post guard		2
Leave		5
Not accounted for		<u>17</u>
	Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None identified

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Unit police, work in gymnasium, vehicle maintenance logistics, honor guard

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Not verified (below 60)

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion

Company Commander: If individual receives training, combat capability would be sufficient

Battalion official: If individual can maintain basic skills then combat capability will not be degraded

Note: Individuals in case studies 1 and 2 were in the same battalion, but different units. They provided information in a joint interview and told us they each spent approximately the same amount of time on the various activities.

Case Study No. 3

MOS: 11E10 Armor Crewman
Assigned TOE position: Tank Gunner
Enlisted bonus recipient: No
Years in Army: 3 years
Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	8%	
Downrange unit training & testing	42	
Inspections		
Physical training	<u>5</u>	55%
MOS-related duties:		
Vehicle maintenance		11
Other duties:		
Tool room supplier	16	
Post guard duty	<u>3</u>	19
Leave		11
Not accounted for		<u>4</u>
	Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: No effect

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Tool room supplier, instructor,
maintenance of tools or equipment

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Results not yet received

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No effect

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: If non-MOS-related, significantly negative; if MOS-related, no effect

Case Study No. 4

MOS:	12B10	Combat Engineer		
Assigned TOE position:	Assistant Squad Leader			
Enlisted bonus recipient:	No			
Years in Army:	Information not available			
Use of time during the last year (estimated):				
Training, testing, and inspection:				
Individual skills & mandatory training			30%	
Downrange unit training & testing			25	
Inspections				
Physical training		<u>8</u>		63%
MOS-related duties:				
Vehicle maintenance				15
Other duties:				
Post guard duty		6		
Community service		2		
Augmentation of reserve forces		<u>6</u>		14
Leave				8
Not accounted for				<u>0</u>
			Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicated

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
NCO instructor

MOS test results: Results not available

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 5

MOS: 13P10 Field Artillery Crewman

Assigned TOE position: Cannon Gunner

Enlisted bonus recipient: Yes

Years in Army: 3 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 6%

Downrange unit training & testing 5

Inspections 4

Physical training 4 19%

MOS-related duties:

Other duties:

Instructor in mountain rescue 50

Vehicle maintenance 15 65

Leave

11

Not accounted for

5

Total

100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS
or assigned TOE position capabilities: None

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
None identified

MOS test results: Above average

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and
unit proficiency:

Individual: Significantly negative

Company Commander: Same

Battalion official: Same

Case Study No. 6

MOS:	13B10, Field Artillery Crewman		
Assigned TOE position:	Motor Carriage Driver		
Enlisted bonus recipient:	Yes		
Years in Army:	2 years		
Use of time during the last year (estimated):			
Training, testing, and inspection:			
Individual skills & mandatory training		22%	
Downrange unit training & testing		25	
Inspections		13	
Physical training		<u>7</u>	67%
MOS-related duties:			
Vehicle maintenance			7
Other duties:			
Post guard		6	
Unit armor		<u>8</u>	14
Leave			9
Not accounted for			<u>3</u>
		Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicated

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Instructor

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No effect

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 7

MOS: 63C10 Track Vehicle Mechanic

Assigned TOE position: Track Vehicle Mechanic

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 8 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training	0%	
Downrange unit training & testing	0	
Inspections		
Physical training	<u>0</u>	0%
MOS-related duties:		<u>0</u>

Other duties:

Greenskeeper	76	
Hospital stay	4	
Monday musters	<u>4</u>	84

Leave

9

Not accounted for

7Total 100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities: Mechanic of some sort

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: Since he has no proficiency in skill, no effect

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 8

MOS: 16P10 Chaparral Crewman

Assigned TOE position: Ammunition Handler

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 2 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 25%

Downrange unit training & testing 12

Inspections

Physical training 9 46%

MOS-related duties:

Vehicle Maintenance 36

Other duties:

Post guard and detail 6

Leave 10

Not accounted for 2Total 100%Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS
or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicatedGarrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Instructor

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Verified

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and
unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion expressed

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 9

MOS: 36K20 Tactical Wire Operations Specialist
 Assigned TOE position: Tactical Wire Operations Specialist
 Enlisted bonus recipient: No
 Years in Army: 2 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	1%	
Downrange unit training & testing	2	
Inspections		
Physical training	6	9%
MOS-related duties:		
Vehicle maintenance		33
Other duties:		
Physical activities supervisor	3%	
Post guard	6	
Other	1	45
Leave		13
Not accounted for		0
	Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicated

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
 Communications work

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No effect since required to return for mandatory training

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 10

MOS: 95B10 Military Policeman

Assigned TOE position: Military Policeman

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 2 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 13%

Downrange unit training & testing 12

Inspections

Physical training 6 31%

MOS-related duties:

"White hat" duties (Military Police) 17

Other duties:

Farmhand--Turkey Creek Ranch 44

Leave

Not accounted for 62Total 100%Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS
or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicatedGarrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
"White hat" (policeman) type duties

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Has not received results

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and
unit proficiency:

Individual: Negative

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: More adverse on unit than
individual

Case Study No. 11

MOS: 91B10 Medical Specialist

Assigned TOE position: Vehicle Driver

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 2 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 4%

Downrange unit training & testing 15

Inspections

Physical training 4 23%

MOS-related duties:

Other duties:

Battalion Commander's driver 10

Assistant to Bn Sgt Major 20

Skill Development Center 29 59

Leave 12

Not accounted for 6

Total 100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: Positive due to learning experience especially

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities: In Skill Development Center, work in the base hospital and clinic, Alcohol and Drug Treatment Center, Inspector General team member

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency: Positive effect on individual capabilities.
No effect on unit proficiency

Individual: No effect since able to participate in down-range training and maintain MOS skills.

Company Commander: Positive since almost always MOS-related

Battalion official: Same as company commander except expressed concern of losing combat skills and ability to survive

Case Study No. 12

MOS: 91B10 Medical Specialist

Assigned TOE position: Litter Bearer

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 3 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 11%

Downrange unit training & testing 27

Inspections 10

Physical training 7 55%

MOS-related duties:

Maintenance 22

Other duties:

Formations and lunch 12

Leave 4

Not accounted for 7Total 100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS
or assigned TOE position capabilities: Positive if
exercising MOS

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Work in hospital

MOS test results: Verified (60 or better)

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and
unit proficiency:

Individual: Positive since exercising MOS

Company Commander: None indicated

Battalion official: Positive since almost always
MOS-related except concern
of losing basic combat skills
and ability to survive.

Case Study No. 13

MOS: 76Y10 Unit/Organization Supplyman

Assigned TOE position: Supply Clerk

Enlisted bonus recipient: No

Years in Army: 3 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 1%

Downrange unit training & testing

Inspections

Physical training 1 2%

MOS-related duties:

Work in MOS

Special duty--reconciliation ammunition clerk 32

Other duties:

Police call

Personal activities 1 4

3

Leave

Not accounted for 12

0Total 100%

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicated

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities: None indicated

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test results not received

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No effect

Company Commander: No effect if MOS-related

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 14

MOS: 76D10 Materiel Supplyman
Assigned TOE position: Materiel Supplyman Specialist
Enlisted bonus recipient: No
Years in Army: 3 years
Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	10%	
Downrange unit training & testing	16	
Inspections		
Physical training	4	30%
MOS-related duties:		
Warehouse work	16	
Air load commitment	8	
Company armor	3	
CBR duties	7	34
Other duties:		
Vehicle maintenance	15	
Post guard duties	4	
Clerk, Commander's driver	7	26
Leave		8
Not accounted for		2
		<u>2</u>
		<u>100%</u>
	Total	

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None indicated

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities: Inspector/instructor

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Tested March 1978, no results to date

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: Supplement MOS, and a positive effect on unit capability since able to participate in training (downrange)

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 15

MOS: 13B10 Field Artillery Crewman
Assigned TOE position: Cannoneer in a howitzer section
Enlisted bonus recipient: Yes
Years in Army: 1 year
Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	43%	
Downrange unit training & testing	17	
Inspections	10	
Physical training	<u>6</u>	76%
MOS-related duties:		
Vehicle maintenance		17
Other duties:		0
Leave		6
Not accounted for		<u>1</u>
	Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities: None identified

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion officials: Negative

Case Study No. 16

MOS: 13E10 Cannon Fire Direction Specialist

Assigned TOE position: FADAC Operator

Enlisted bonus recipient: Yes

Years in Army: 3 years

Use of time during the last year (estimated):

Training, testing, and inspection:

Individual skills & mandatory training 22%

Downrange unit training & testing 32

Inspections

Physical training 10 64%

MOS-related duties:

Vehicle maintenance 22

Other duties:

Post guard duty 6

Leave 6

Not accounted for 2

Total 100%Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS
or assigned TOE position capabilities: NoneGarrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
None identified

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and
unit proficiency:

Individual: No opinion

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative

Case Study No. 17

MOS: 64C10 Motor Transport Operator		
Assigned TOE position: Truck Driver		
Enlisted bonus recipient: No		
Years in Army: Information not available		
Use of time during the last year (estimated):		
Training, testing, and inspection:		
Individual skills & mandatory training	15%	
Downrange unit training & testing	25	
Inspections		
Physical training	<u>4</u>	44%
MOS-related duties:		
Vehicle maintenance		44
Other duties:		0
Leave		12
Not accounted for		<u>0</u>
	Total	<u>100%</u>

Contribution of other duty experience to enhancement of MOS or assigned TOE position capabilities: None

Garrison positions that could enhance these capabilities:
Driving and maintaining trucks and other vehicles

MOS test results: Test not taken

Skill qualification test results: Test not taken

Perceptions of effects of other duties on individual and unit proficiency:

Individual: None indicated

Company Commander: Negative

Battalion official: Negative