

REPORT BY THE

# Comptroller General

OF THE UNITED STATES

## Transfer Of Army Pacific Support Functions Resulted In Unwarranted Personnel Costs

Budget adjustments resulting from transfer of support functions in the Pacific area have caused recurring increased personnel costs of at least \$25 million and possibly \$40 million in the Defense budget. GAO does not believe the increase is justified.

The Committees on Appropriations should ask the Secretary of Defense to show why future Defense budgets should not be reduced by at least \$25 million.

The Secretary should determine how the budget reduction should be shared within Defense and improve work force planning when workloads are transferred among the services.



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JANUARY 2, 1979





COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

b-183257

Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, and  
Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations

This report discusses Defense budget adjustments resulting from the transfer of military support functions in the Pacific area. We recommend that the Committees on Appropriations ask the Secretary of Defense to show why the fiscal year 1980 Defense budget should not be reduced by at least \$25 million. We also recommend that the Secretary take specific actions to improve Defense work force planning.

Officials in each service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were given an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the data presented, and discussed it with GAO. They did not dispute the data. Although they emphasized in discussion and in writing that we have been provided all available data on the manpower changes resulting from the Pacific realignment program, they maintain our analysis was based on incomplete data.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Chairmen, House Committees on Government Operations and International Relations; the Chairmen, Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

  
ACTING Comptroller General  
of the United States



D I G E S T

In response to Office of Management and Budget concern over excess military support personnel in the Pacific area, the Department of Defense ordered reductions and reported to Congress that overseas support realignments resulted in \$93 million in savings available for redistribution. As part of the reductions, the Army suggested transfer of its remaining support functions to other military services in the Pacific area. In December 1975, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed transfer of over 20 support functions. (See p. 1.)

GAO's analysis of these transfers shows unjustified recurring budget increases totaling at least \$25 million and possibly \$40 million in fiscal year 1978. The increases came from a series of Defense budget actions which funded personnel spaces for the gaining services without a corresponding reduction in Army spaces, as follows:

--\$10 million for new spaces in the December 1976 plan to implement the transfers and

--\$15 to \$30 million for additional new spaces in other decisions related to the transfers. (See pp. 4 and 5.)

WORK FORCE PLANNING DID NOT  
ASSURE PROPER RESOURCES  
FOR TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS

Neither the losing nor gaining services used applicable work force planning criteria--staffing guides or other work measurement methods--to determine manpower needed to do the work required for major functions transferred under the December 1975 decision. Each

gaining service, however, requested more personnel spaces and related resources than initially allocated by Defense.

The Air Force analyzed personnel requirements for functions it would receive. Its request exceeded its own requirements calculations and overstated family housing staffing by over 100 personnel positions. Moreover, Air Force officials gave family housing fewer positions than requested and received. (See pp. 8 and 9.)

The Navy took all personnel positions for transferred functions offered by the Army without determining need. The Navy then requested additional personnel positions for those not released by the Army. (See p. 10.)

Marine Corps personnel requirements were largely the result of supervisory judgments from workload observation, rather than application of formal staffing criteria. The supervisors' estimates were later increased with no reason given. (See p. 10.)

Officials in each service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were given an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the data presented, and discussed it with GAO. They did not dispute the data. Although they emphasized in discussion and in writing that GAO had been provided all available data on the manpower changes resulting from the Pacific realignment program, they maintain that GAO's analysis was based on incomplete data.

## CONCLUSIONS

GAO could not identify valid justification for personnel spaces used by the military services for the transferred functions. Also, evidence indicates additional spaces provided for selected functions were unnecessary. Therefore, GAO believes that recurring budget costs related to the transfers are not warranted unless the services provide justification. (See p. 11.)

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Since budget increases related to Program Budget Decision 253 are not, in GAO's opinion, justified, GAO recommends that

- the Committees on Appropriations ask the Secretary of Defense to show why future Defense budgets should not be reduced by at least \$25 million and
- the Secretary of Defense reanalyze transfers to determine how the budget reduction should be shared within DOD.

Proper Defense manpower resources require adequate work force planning. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense improve DOD work force planning by requiring

- application of work measurement methods to justify resource changes when workloads are transferred among DOD organizations,
- justification of all resources and close examination of any requested increases, and
- documentation of the disposition of resources affected by workload transfers. (See pp. 11 and 12.)





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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PBD	program budget decision

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In 1974 the Office of Management and Budget recommended a reduction in the number of Defense support personnel in the Pacific area. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) ordered realignments and reductions which, it reported to the Congress in 1976, resulted in \$93 million in savings available for redistribution.

During these Pacific reductions, the Army proposed to completely phase out of Okinawa by transferring its remaining support functions to other services. In a series of related program budget decisions (PBDs), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the transfer of the functions. Program Budget Decision 253, dated December 2, 1975, transferred over 20 support functions (see app. I) involving 2,370 positions from the Army to the other services. Revisions 253R and 253R2 modified the initial 253 decision slightly. Subsequently, PBD 255 dated December 4, 1976, provided additional positions requested by the gaining services.

PBDs are used to announce all budget decisions of the Secretary of Defense incident to the annual review of budgets submitted by DOD components. As such, PBDs are the decision record documents for the DOD budget.

On the basis of data available--data which DOD officials stated was complete--we believe the budget increases related to transfer of the functions in PBD 253 are not warranted. DOD officials provided us summaries of PBDs but refused to release PBDs to us because of a DOD policy prohibiting such release. This policy was described to us in a letter dated June 28, 1978, from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (See app. II.) The summaries were incomplete and inaccurate and did not support the associated additional personnel cost in DOD's budget.

### SCOPE OF REVIEW

We evaluated DOD's work force planning to determine if valid criteria and techniques were used to determine the number of personnel spaces needed for the functions transferred by PBD 253, and analyzed the effect these transfers had on personnel costs in the DOD budget. We met with agency officials and examined documents pertaining to resource changes resulting from the transfers. We worked from March

through November 1978 at the Office of Management and Budget, DOD, and service headquarters in Washington, D.C.; at Pacific commands in Hawaii and Japan; and at selected Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine field locations in Okinawa.

## CHAPTER 2

### PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO PACIFIC

#### SUPPORT REALINEMENTS HAVE UNNECESSARILY

#### INCREASED THE DEFENSE BUDGET

DOD added an unjustified, recurring cost of at least \$25 million and possibly as much as \$40 million to the DOD budget in fiscal year 1978. As discussed in the analysis of PBD actions below, the personnel spaces and related resources added either should already have been available for transfer from the Army or were in excess of those needed for the functions examined.

#### ADDITIONAL RESOURCES IDENTIFIED BY DOD'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ARE NOT SUPPORTED

PBD 253 identified 2,370 available personnel spaces for the transfer of functions to gaining services. The Air Force was responsible for preparing a coordinated DOD implementation plan for PBD 253 actions. This plan identified a gaining service requirement of 2,924 spaces, or 554 more than provided by the PBD. (See app. I for spaces for each function.) In anticipation of the implementation plan, a DOD decision (PBD 255) dated December 4, 1976, approved 588 additional positions for fiscal year 1977 (reduced to 530 positions for fiscal year 1978) to offset the difference in what the PBD provided and identified in the plan.

Chapter 3 shows the results of the transfer of three major functions we selected for review. For two of these, the services' personnel justifications indicated fewer spaces were needed than shown in the implementation plan.

In addition to not justifying the need for more personnel for the gaining services, DOD planners used an incorrect base for computing the increases. Even though the Army in Japan agreed that initial Army estimates of personnel spaces reflected in PBD 253 had been understated, the planners continued to use PBD 253 as the base from which to compute increases. As a result, the DOD implementation plan initially included unnecessary increases in personnel spaces.

As an example, the Air Force reported as of August 1976 that negotiations between the Army and Air Force resulted in the Army's agreement to provide 181 spaces in addition to the number provided by PBD 253. Air Force personnel, however,

did not consider these additional spaces as available resources when preparing the DOD implementation plan.

In spite of the fact that the Army had agreed to release additional resources in Japan, the Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force, in December 1976, reported to the Deputy Secretary of Defense that:

"The Army has no assets available over and above those transferred by the PBD to satisfy the stated additional requirements of the gaining Service. Likewise, the gaining Services do not have resources available to satisfy the shortfalls identified in the functions being transferred from the Army. Consequently (DOD) must provide the additional manpower and dollar resources by separate PBD to the Services-- as amendments to the October 1976 Service/Agency budget submission."

Accordingly, by means of PBD 255, DOD approved recurring increases costing \$10 million in fiscal year 1978.

OTHER DOD DECISIONS RELATED TO  
PACIFIC REALINEMENTS CAUSED FURTHER  
UNSUPPORTED BUDGET INCREASES

When discussing the increases resulting from the DOD implementation plan, DOD officials said the transfers could not be analyzed independently. They said prior phase-downs must also be considered. Our analysis of additional data showed that increases related to the Japan transfers were far greater than the \$10 million cited above, totaling at least \$25 million and possibly \$40 million in fiscal year 1978.

The following table reflects the fiscal year 1978 personnel impact of the Pacific support realignments according to DOD's analysis, which we have adjusted for an Army/Navy reallocation agreement. The table shows that DOD personnel positions increased by 2,561 under DOD decisions implementing the transfer of PBD 253 functions. DOD officials said other decisions, involving 3,763 positions, must also be considered in analyzing the transfers. We found, however, that 2,763 of the 3,763 positions under the other decisions did not involve the same positions, countries, or military bases. The remaining 1,000 positions involved the Army in Japan, but not necessarily the transferred functions. Even if all 1,000 were applied as an offset, 1,561 positions would still be increased under

Personnel Position Increases (Decreases) by DOD Components

<u>Program budget decision, series and date</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Logistics Agency</u>	<u>Total</u>
253, December 1975	-2,043	+2,849	+166	+1,003	+48	+2,023
255, December 1976		-7	+234	+309	+2	a/ +538
Army/Navy agreement dated Mar. 17, 1976	+1,868	-1,868	—	—	—	0
Total	<u>-175</u>	<u>+974</u>	<u>+400</u>	<u>+1,312</u>	<u>+50</u>	<u>+2,561</u>

a/Other PBD data indicated 588 positions for FY 1977 which were to be reduced to 530 positions for FY 1978.

these DOD budget decisions. The total increase may involve as many as 2,561 personnel positions. Based on cost data reported for PBDs 253 and 255, the resulting budget increase is at least \$25 million, and possibly \$40 million.

The above estimates do not include the effect of a November 1976 DOD decision which also impacts on PBD 253 transfers. In accordance with DOD policy, this document was not available for our analysis, but we were told the decision provided \$13.7 million in increases in family housing resources for the Air Force. Questionable budget increases could therefore be greater than those shown above.

AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS FAIL TO  
SUBSTANTIATE BUDGET INCREASES

In response to our request for PBDs, DOD officials provided PBD summaries and assured us that they included all the information used to develop the budget decisions as well as a complete audit trail relating to the manpower changes on the Pacific support realignment. (See app. II.) These summaries, no matter how carefully prepared, did not satisfactorily substantiate the resulting increased personnel costs in DOD's budget. For example:

- PBD 59, November 1976, involving Air Force family housing increases, was not included in the summaries provided.
- PBD 280 CR, January 1975, involving an increase of over 1,100 spaces, was not included until we specifically questioned its omission from the DOD analysis.
- The Army/Navy agreement of March 17, 1976, involving the reallocation of 1,868 spaces mentioned in the table on page 5, was not included in the DOD analysis.

Since the program budget decisions were withheld from our Office, we could not, with the exception of the DOD errors noted above, verify accuracy of DOD analyses.



### CHAPTER 3

#### WORK FORCE PLANNING DID NOT ASSURE

#### PROPER RESOURCES FOR FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED

#### IN DOD'S PACIFIC SUPPORT REALINEMENTS

Neither the losing nor gaining services used work measurement to determine the personnel needed for the functions transferred. In recent reports, 1/ we have indicated a need for OSD to take a more active leadership in directing the services to use work measurement for determining staffing requirements and in guiding them to adopt common methods.

We examined in detail three transferred functions in order to assess the procedures of each gaining military service on Okinawa. The Army transferred a hospital to the Navy, family housing management to the Air Force, and base operating support (Camp Kuwae) to the Marine Corps. In each case the gaining service requested more resources than initially allocated by DOD. As discussed in chapter 2, DOD approved the increased resources for these and other transferred functions.

#### VALIDATION OF ARMY RESOURCES PRECLUDED BY AN ARMY MORATORIUM ON MANPOWER SURVEYS IN JAPAN

Almost all transfers in Okinawa were from the Army to one of the other military services. The Army used estimates of its authorized personnel spaces as the basis for resources to be released for each function, but agreed to changes during negotiations with other military services. The Department of the Army, in March 1975, approved a request by its command in Japan to suspend audits of manpower requirements on Okinawa. As a result, there were no tests of the reasonableness of authorized staffing levels for at least 2 years before the transfers.

The spaces for the three functions we examined are summarized below. The three functions selected for detailed

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1/"Improvements Needed in Defense's Efforts To Use Work Measurement" (LCD-76-401), Aug. 31, 1976, and "Development and Use of Military Services' Staffing Standards: More Direction, Emphasis, and Consistency Needed" (FPCD-77-72), Oct. 18, 1977.

examination included over 50 percent of the 2,370 personnel positions allocated to the PBD 253 workload. The transfer of functions was primarily on Okinawa, Japan, and became effective during 1977.

<u>Function</u>	<u>Initially provided by PBD 253</u>	<u>Released by Army in Japan (fiscal year 1977)</u>	<u>Gaining service requirement</u>
Hospital (note a)	b/ 892	891	919
Family housing	321	377	504
Base operating support for Camp Kuwae	<u>97</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>149</u>
Total	<u>1,310</u>	<u>1,385</u>	<u>1,572</u>

a/Includes 128 spaces for a medical laboratory on mainland Japan.

b/In fiscal year 1978 and later years, this allocation dropped by 32 spaces.

Although 1,385 spaces were released from the Army Command in Japan, we were unable to determine how many, if any, were released Army-wide.

AIR FORCE JUSTIFICATIONS DO  
NOT SUPPORT RESOURCES  
REQUESTED AND RECEIVED

Family housing is the largest of 14 functions scheduled for transfer to the Air Force and accounted for 504 of 1,312 personnel required for the Air Force in DOD's implementation plan. From February through March 1976, a Pacific Air Force study analyzed family housing and other functions to determine resources needed to do the work. Air Force officials said their resource requirements were based on the work of the study team.

We examined the study and found that its recommendations exceeded its own requirements calculations by over 100 personnel positions. The excess may even be greater because, as Air Force manpower officials agreed, Air Force housing personnel standards were not appropriate for such a large organization.

Air Force records were not adequate to identify whether personnel authorizations for family housing were

actually used for that purpose. Three separate Air Force reports, including data prepared in response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request, showed fewer personnel authorized or assigned than the number of personnel reported as required. For instance, the data prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee showed a total of 380 Okinawa family housing personnel positions in the 1978 budget. The 380 positions do not even cover the 504 additional positions the Air Force requested and received, much less the positions the Air Force already had for its workload prior to the transfer.

In a prior report, <sup>1/</sup> we recommended consolidation of all onbase military family housing and household furniture management on Okinawa. This consolidation was completed in February 1977 under the Air Force. Followup work indicates that 85 personnel spaces costing about \$1.4 million annually were saved by the consolidation. In that instance, Air Force civil engineers' data showed that their housing personnel increase was more than offset by Army and Navy decreases, for a net saving of 85 personnel.

Another indication that Air Force family housing requirements were overstated is seen in a February 1977 Air Force memorandum which stated that 18 family housing positions were an overallocation to be withdrawn from Okinawa and turned in to Air Force headquarters. Although the positions were later withdrawn from Okinawa, DOD analyses did not show that the positions were withdrawn from the Air Force.

In a July 19, 1978, memorandum, Pacific Air Force officials disagreed with our observations that family housing requirements were overstated by more than 100 personnel positions. Neither the memorandum nor subsequently provided Air Force data substantiated the positions. In another memorandum, dated August 14, 1978, Pacific Air Force officials acknowledged duplications in their initial justification but maintained that there was no overallocation. The officials identified functions they said might not have been included in available justifications, and described various adjustments which may have been made. They did not, however, provide any additional supporting documents to validate the family housing personnel positions. Air Force officials gave family housing fewer positions than requested and received under

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<sup>1/</sup>"Millions Could Be Saved Annually and Productivity Increased if Military Support Functions in the Pacific Were Consolidated" (LCD-75-217), Aug. 26, 1975.

PBD 253. In view of the ambiguous personnel requirements procedures used and the lack of support for the positions, we question the need for the additional Air Force resources.

NAVY REQUIREMENTS WERE BASED ON ARMY  
RESOURCES AVAILABLE PLUS ADDITIVES

The hospital function gained by the Navy included four separate components--the hospital, a preventive medicine unit, a dental clinic, and a medical laboratory. The medical laboratory is on mainland Japan; the rest are on Okinawa.

The Navy did not apply staffing standards in determining its requirement of 919 personnel for these functions. Instead, Navy officials assumed that the spaces used by the Army were justified, and they accepted all personnel authorizations released. In addition, the Navy identified 27 more spaces not released by the Army and added those spaces to the Navy requirement.

Of the 919 spaces requested by the Navy, we were able to substantiate that 913 were allocated to Navy medical activities in Japan.

MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS  
WERE BASED ON SUPERVISORY  
ESTIMATES PLUS ADDITIVES

Base operating support for Camp Kuwae (the area surrounding the Navy hospital) was originally scheduled for transfer to the Air Force. OSD decided, however, that Marine Corps support would be more appropriate.

Marine Corps supervisors observed the workload at Camp Kuwae and estimated that 124 personnel were required to do the work. Formal staffing standards were not used in preparing these estimates. During negotiations on Okinawa, the Marine Corps added 25 spaces to their supervisors' estimate, for a total requirement of 149. We did not find any basis for the 25 additional spaces. The Air Force, which was originally scheduled to take over this workload, indicated a need for 139 personnel.

We traced personnel authorizations and were able to determine that all but eight Marine Corps positions were allocated to Okinawa. The eight military spaces may never have been received by Marine Corps headquarters in Washington, D.C. A Marine official told us that disposition of the eight spaces was not known, but that, if received, they may have been used to help meet an across-the-board manpower reduction.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS

Work force planning for DOD's Pacific support realignments under PBD 253 was inadequate. Of the four services involved, only the Air Force applied work measurement methods to transferred functions, but the resulting data did not justify the resources requested. Although the Marine Corps examined the functions to be transferred, justifications were based on local supervisors' estimates and accounted for only part of the Marine Corps request. The Navy simply accepted Army resources and then identified additional needs. The Army, which gave up most of the functions, had not studied manpower requirements for at least 2 years before the transfers.

Most of the overstatement, however, resulted not from military service requests for increases, but from simply not reducing Army resources for workload lost. The total increase, which we estimate to be between \$25 and \$40 million, results from a combination of unnecessary spaces provided to gaining services without comparable reduction of Army spaces.

The budget decision summaries and other information provided by DOD did not support the increased personnel requirements.

Officials in each service and OSD were given an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the data presented, and discussed it with us. They did not dispute the data. Although they emphasized in discussion and in writing that we had been provided all available data on the manpower changes resulting from the Pacific realignment program, they maintain our analysis was based on incomplete data.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Since budget increases related to PRD 253 are not, in our opinion, justified, we recommend that

- the Committees on Appropriations ask the Secretary of Defense to show why future DOD budgets should not be reduced by at least \$25 million and
- the Secretary of Defense reanalyze transfers to determine how the budget reduction should be shared within DOD.

Proper DOD manpower resources require adequate work force planning. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense improve DOD work force planning by requiring

- application of work measurement methods to justify resource changes when workloads are transferred among DOD organizations,
- justification of all resources and close examination of any requested increases, and
- documentation of the disposition of resources affected by workload transfers.

FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED UNDER PROGRAM BUDGET DECISION 253,DATED DECEMBER 2, 1975, AS REVISED

Function (note a)	Spaces provided by PBD 253	Gaining service requirement	Increase (decrease)
Hospital (note b)	892	919	27
Family housing	321	504	183
Base support, Camp Butler	258	311	53
Commissaries	188	206	18
Telephone exchange, Zukeran	129	143	14
Tri-service laundry	105	87	(18)
Wholesale subsistence (note c)	103	164	61
Base support, Camp Kuwae	97	149	52
Base support to Navy, Kadena	90	90	0
Wholesale subsistence (mainland Japan)	73	94	21
Telephone exchange, Makiminato	40	42	2
Fire department, Zukeran	24	26	2
Taiwan subpost (Republic of China)	14	18	4
Miscellaneous base support	12	41	29
Civilian personnel servicing	3	45	42
Kanagawa milk plant (mainland Japan) (note c)	0	56	56
Miscellaneous functions involving less than 10 personnel each (Okinawa and mainland Japan)	<u>21</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>8</u>
	<u>2,370</u>	<u>2,924</u>	<u>554</u>

a/Okinawa, Japan, unless otherwise indicated.

b/Includes 128 spaces for a medical laboratory on mainland Japan.

c/Transfer incomplete at time of our review.



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUN 28 1978

Mr. Uldis Adamsons  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
International Division  
Far East Branch  
Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana'ole Federal Building  
300 Ala Moana Boulevard  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96850

Dear Mr. Adamsons:

This is in response to your request of May 31, 1978 for access to several program budget decision (PBD) documents. It is the policy of the Department that summaries of program budget decisions may be made available once the President's budget has been submitted to the Congress. Program budget decision documents are internal documents containing alternatives from which the Secretary of Defense and the President make decisions. It has been our long-standing policy, reiterated as recently as April 29, 1977 in the attached letter from Secretary Brown to Senator McClellan that such documents are prohibited from being released.

In regard to your specific task concerning PBD 253, copies of all of the worksheets and other backup material used to develop the PBD, as well as a complete audit trail of the manpower changes which occurred over time as a result of our Pacific support realignment program have been provided to Mr. Kincaid of your Washington staff, by my staff. This along with other related documents provided by other Office of the Secretary of Defense components and the Military Departments should provide for a very complete understanding of the Pacific support realignment program.

A copy of this response is being provided to the Army and Air Force so that they may respond accordingly.

Sincerely,

*John R. Quetsch*  
John R. Quetsch  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Comptroller)

Enclosure



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

APR 29 1977

Honorable John L. McClellan  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I share your concern regarding unauthorized disclosure of internal working documents and assure you I intend to continue the long-standing policy which prohibits the release of such documents, particularly those which present alternatives to the Secretary of Defense for decision.

The departure from this policy, to which you refer, was not intended to provide preferential treatment to a particular Congressional Committee. On March 7, Chairman Stratton asked for all documents relating to the decision to close the University of the Health Sciences. Included in material given to Chairman Stratton, and subsequently to Mr. Lieberman of your Committee staff, were copies of three Program Budget Decisions. They were included because it had been clear for some time that the University issue was a matter of special interest to the Congress and there were positive indications that the PBDs had already been made available without authorization to some Subcommittee Members.

You may be assured I will make every effort to enforce directives governing the unauthorized disclosure of internal documents, and that there be no instance where a particular Congressional Committee is treated in a selective or preferential manner. Finally, a review of OSD correspondence indicates that no PBDs, PDMs, or POMs have been officially transmitted to any unauthorized individual or Congressional Committee over the past four years.

May I assure you of my continuing concern in such matters, and my appreciation for your interest and continued support.

Sincerely,

*Harold Brown*



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