
BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

10,709

Critical Manpower Problems Restrict The Use Of National Guard And Reserve Forces

National Guard and Reserve units are assigned a critical role in current national defense strategy. GAO points out manpower weaknesses which are serious barriers to the planned use of these components.

These weaknesses include manpower shortages, unqualified people in jobs, high turnover rates, and varying degrees of full-time support. The weaknesses are noted in the components' internal evaluations and in Joint Chiefs of Staff-prescribed evaluations of the specific unit's ability to perform its mission if called upon to do so.

The report concludes that the problems must be resolved if the United States is to continue placing reliance on Guard and Reserve units.



FPCD-79-58
JULY 11, 1979



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20548

B-157371


To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report points out manpower weaknesses which are serious barriers to the planned use of the National Guard and Reserve Forces in the current national defense strategy. These weaknesses include manpower shortages, unqualified people in jobs, high turnover rates, and varying degrees of full-time support. The report concludes that the problems must be resolved if the United States is to continue placing reliance on Guard and Reserve units.

We obtained formal comments from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We also discussed the report with National Guard and Reserve components and considered their comments in the report.

Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-510).

We are also sending this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties.


Comptroller General
of the United States

D I G E S T

- ✓ U.S. Reserve forces have manpower problems that would seriously limit their ability to perform if needed quickly in wartime.

To readily understand what this means, a summary of recent changes in the way the services obtain men and women for military duty is necessary.

In 1973 the United States adopted the All-Volunteer Force concept to staff its military forces. ✓ Young men were no longer drafted to serve in the military services.

- ✓ One of the important changes implemented, along with the All-Volunteer Force, was the total force concept, which declared an integration of the roles of the active and Reserve components into one unified fighting force. ✓ With the total force concept came increased reliance on Reserve Forces. The Reserve Forces consist of the (1) Ready Reserve, which includes the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve; (2) Standby Reserve and (3) Retired Reserve. The Selected Reserve is the subject of this report.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AFFECTING
THE SELECTED RESERVES

A/C

✓ ~~In fact,~~ both combat and combat support and combat service support units in the Selected Reserve would be scheduled for deployment in the early phases of a major war in Europe. ✓ The question, "How manpower effective is the Selected Reserve?" has become increasingly important. The severity of the problems vary among the six Reserve components. The problems mostly affect the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, but the Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard are also affected.

Personnel quality

The Department of Defense (DOD) has never defined what makes a quality service member. However, it has generally used mental aptitude levels and education levels as indicators of quality. The mental aptitude levels and education levels have declined for all Reserve components under the All-Volunteer Force. (See pp. 15 and 17.)

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS SERIOUSLY AFFECT RESERVE READINESS

Although personnel shortages, unqualified people in units, and high loss rates indicate problems for the Reserve components, the critical question is, "Could the Reserve units perform their missions if called upon in wartime?" The Reserve components' assessments of their ability to perform indicate that they may have serious problems in this area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity Reports indicate that the most serious question of ability to perform is in the Army components. However, Air Force components, which are rated highest, have many units that are rated less than fully capable of performing their wartime missions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD has recognized that the Selected Reserve has serious manpower problems. It is planning and proposing actions for reducing the manpower shortages and improving effectiveness of the Reserve components. GAO believes it is too early to determine if DOD's initiatives will be successful.

If DOD is to continue placing reliance on the Reserve components, the problems outlined in this and previous GAO reports on the Reserves need to be resolved. ^{pic} The Secretary of Defense should assign specific responsibility for designing and implementing solutions to these problems and direct that the designated action office develop an

C o n t e n t s

	<u>Page</u>
DIGEST	1
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Reserve categories	1
Total force policy	3
Scope of review	5
2 HOW MANPOWER EFFECTIVE IS THE SELECTED RESERVE: AN OVERVIEW	/
Do the selected Reserve components have enough personnel to effectively perform?	/
Are personnel shortages greater than what the official records show?	10
Are selected Reserve personnel quali- fied to perform the duties assigned to them?	11
How much full-time support do Reserve units receive?	12
Who are the selected Reserve members?	13
What is the effect of personnel turn- over on Reserve components?	19
Can Reserve component units perform their wartime mission if called upon?	21
Does DOD view the All-Volunteer Force as being successful for the selected Reserve?	26
Conclusions	28
Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense	30
3 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD	31
Organization	31
Army National Guard strength levels and manpower shortages	32
Enlisted personnel shortages by se- lected career management fields	34
Unqualified people in Army Guard units	36
Personnel turnover	38
Personnel quality	38
Performance ability	40
Conclusions	46

		<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER		
8	AIR NATIONAL GUARD <i>AGC00526</i>	90
	Background	90
	Manpower shortages	90
	Qualifications	92
	Performance ability	94
	Conclusions	95
9	AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION	96
	OASD (MRA&L) comment 1	96
	OASD (MRA&L) comment 2	97
	OASD (MRA&L) comment 3	97
	OASD (MRA&L) comment 4	100
APPENDIX		
I	GAO letter report dated February 26, 1979, to the Secretary of Defense	101
II	Letter dated April 17, 1979, from the Deputy Associate Director for National Security, Office of Management and Budget	109
III	Letter dated April 23, 1979, from the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)	110

ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
OASD (MRA&L)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

About 800,000 men and women serve as part-time soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the Selected Reserve components of the Armed Forces. The purpose of the Reserve components is to provide trained individuals and units for service in any future emergency or at such other times as the national security requires.

The United States depends, more than ever before, on its Reserve Forces to provide a major part of our national defense. This report is a result of our review of the ability of the Reserve components to meet their commitment to provide qualified units and individuals in wartime.

RESERVE CATEGORIES

Reservists serve in the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. All members of the Reserves (Ready, Standby and Retired) may be ordered to active duty after a declaration of war or national emergency by the Congress for the duration and for 6 months thereafter. As many as 1 million members of the Ready Reserve may be ordered to active duty, after declaration of a national emergency by the President, for a maximum of 24 consecutive months of service. The Ready Reserve is made up of two subcategories: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The President has the authority to order to active duty, for a maximum of 90 days, up to 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve without the declaration of a national emergency.

The 800,000 members of the Selected Reserve generally serve in organized units and are paid for drilling on weekends (generally 1 weekend each month) and for attending a 2-week period of active duty each year. These Selected reservists will be the subject of this report. The rest of the Ready reservists are in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Generally, Individual Ready Reserve members are not assigned to units and are not paid. In a major war, the Individual Ready Reserve would be used as a source for personnel to fill out active and Reserve units and for replacements for combat losses. It is the subject of our ongoing review. Other studies underway deal with Guard and Reserve recruiting and training and the effectiveness of the Active Forces components. Other studies that have been completed include:

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Heavy reliance on Reserve components was first emphasized in the total force concept which initially surfaced with the start of the All-Volunteer Force. The Secretary of Defense, in his August 1970 memorandum to the services, said that economies in the defense budgets would require

"* * * increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve. Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserve will be prepared to be the initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."

This reliance on the Reserves was reinforced in August 1973 when the Secretary of Defense said:

"Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the active, Guard and Reserve Forces into a homogeneous whole."

The amount of reliance on Reserve Forces is listed by Selected Reserve mission in the following table.

Total Selected Reserve End Strengths

<u>FY</u>	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Naval Reserve</u>	<u>Marine Corps Reserve</u>	<u>Air National Guard</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	<u>Total</u>
----- (000 omitted) -----							
1970	409	261	128	49	90	50	987
1971	402	263	130	47	86	50	978
1972	388	235	124	41	89	48	925
1973	386	235	126	38	90	44	919
1974	403	235	115	32	94	46	925
1975	395	225	98	32	95	51	896
1976	362	195	97	29	91	48	822
1977	355	190	90	31	92	50	808
a/1978	348	189	84	32	91	52	796

a/As of June 30, 1978.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed background data relating to Reserve component roles in the total force policy under the All-Volunteer Force concept. We contrasted the services' wartime and peacetime strength requirements with their actual strength levels. We further analyzed the shortages by military career area. We obtained and analyzed information concerning the number of people qualified for their assigned jobs. We reviewed the reservists education level, mental aptitude, and age profiles. We obtained information on the number of females in the Reserve Forces. We also reviewed and analyzed reports assessing the ability of Reserve units to perform their wartime jobs.

We worked at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at the services' secretariat levels, the services' staff levels, and headquarters of the six Reserve components. We visited an Air Force Reserve and an Air National Guard operational readiness inspection, and Army National Guard and Army Reserve annual active-duty training. We also visited a Marine Corps Reserve mobilization operational readiness and deployment test and Marine Corps Reserve annual active-duty training.

We used questionnaire results obtained during our concurrent study of Selected Reserve training. As a part of that review, questionnaires were sent to 1,938 individual

CHAPTER 2

HOW MANPOWER EFFECTIVE IS THE SELECTED RESERVE: AN OVERVIEW

Since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, the United States has become more dependent on its Reserve Forces to provide a major part of our national defense. Both combat and support units in the Selected Reserve are scheduled for deployment in the early phases of a major war in Europe. However, the Reserve Forces have serious manpower problems that would severely limit their ability to perform if needed in wartime. For example, the Reserve Forces

- have severe manpower shortages,
- have many people who are not qualified for their job assignments,
- experience a large personnel turnover which hampers qualifications and unit training, and
- have large numbers of units which are rated either not ready or only marginally ready to perform their wartime jobs.


DO THE SELECTED RESERVE COMPONENTS HAVE ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM?

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense's (Reserve Affairs), testimony in March 1978, before the House Armed Services' Subcommittee on Military Personnel, acknowledged:

"One of the greatest challenges we face is the achievement and maintenance of authorized strength of sufficient quantity and quality. The steady and unacceptable decline in the paid drill strength of our Selected Reserve, especially the manpower intensive Army Guard and Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve is cause for concern."

This concern was echoed by various other Department of Defense (DOD) and military service representatives who testified before the Congress. For example, the Chief of Army Reserve told the House Appropriations Committee:

Overall, Selected Reserve components are short about 200,000 people. Most of the shortages are in the Army components, and, within the Army components, most of the shortages are in the lower enlisted grades in combat jobs. Actual shortages as of June 30, 1978, are illustrated in the following chart.



To illustrate the impact these shortages have on combat units, an Active Army brigade commander commented concerning the Army National Guard Mechanized Infantry Brigade that he evaluated and rated units as not ready to perform their missions.

"The overriding weakness in the Brigade is its personnel strength. The 69% assigned versus authorized strength is serious but only tells part of the story. Many subordinate companies, platoons, sections and squads, are at much lower levels of manning (frequently less than 50%). The solidarity of the chain of command reduces

Under Guard Bureau regulations, units must meet certain personnel and training readiness standards. Normally, these include maintaining a strength of at least 80 percent of authorized strength and maintaining an average attendance to drill of 85 percent of assigned strength and 90 percent attendance of assigned strength at annual training. Under certain conditions, such as initial organizations, reorganizations, or conversions, these percentages can drop as low as 50 percent. The Guard Bureau uses Inspector General reports, made about every 18 months, and annual training evaluations to assess units' compliance with these regulations.

In 1978 inspections were made at 2,496 of the more than 3,200 Army National Guard units. Of these, 1,847, or 74 percent, failed to meet one or more of the required standards, including 44 percent which failed to meet the required percentage of authorized strength.

ARE SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL QUALIFIED
TO PERFORM THE DUTIES ASSIGNED TO THEM?

To guarantee a highly effective Selected Reserve Force, it is necessary not only to attain the required strength levels but also to insure that reservists are properly trained and qualified for their assigned jobs. However, the Selected Reserve components have experienced significant difficulties in getting their personnel qualified. It is difficult to make comparisons among the components because of varied definitions of when a person is considered qualified.

The Army National Guard reports that about 76 percent of its enlisted personnel are fully qualified for their jobs. For the Army Reserve, about 73 percent of enlisted personnel are qualified.

The Air Force Reserve reports that 74 percent of airmen assigned have obtained the skill level needed for the jobs they hold. About 86 percent of the Air National Guardsmen are considered qualified for their assigned jobs.

According to Marine Corps records, 78 percent of its enlisted reservists are qualified for their jobs. In the Naval Reserve, 66 percent of the people assigned to mobilization positions are considered fully qualified for their assigned jobs.

Most of the commanders responding to our questionnaire stated that their units had a shortage of qualified individuals during calendar year 1977.

WHO ARE THE SELECTED RESERVE MEMBERS?

We could address a number of questions about the Selected Reserve, but those we will concentrate on here include:

- How many people served previously in the Active Forces?
- What is the age profile of Selected Reserve members?
- What is the education profile of Selected Reserve members?
- What is the mental aptitude level of Selected Reserve members?
- How many women are in the Selected Reserve?

How many people served previously in the Active Forces?

Selected Reserve components differ concerning the percent of people that they would prefer to have previously served in the Active Forces. Generally, the Army and Marine Corps desire more people who have never served before, whereas the Air Force and Navy would like to have people qualified by prior active duty.

The Army Reserve is falling considerably short of meeting its goal of having about 60 percent of enlisted accessions in the non-prior-service category. During fiscal year 1977, 23 percent of those entering the Army Reserve were non-prior-service.

In fiscal year 1977, 42 percent of the accessions to the Army National Guard had no prior military service. This was 8 percentage points short of the Army National Guard goal of 50 percent non-prior-service personnel accessions.

The Marine Corps Reserve would like to have 70 percent of its force with no prior military service; the actual percent at June 30, 1978, was 69 percent nonprior service.

The Naval and Air Force components, with more technical orientation, desire prior service participation and generally are achieving their desired mix of prior and non-prior-service personnel.

The Air Force and Naval components, with their technical orientation and need for prior service personnel, do not place much significance on the age of their personnel. The Marine Corps Reserve has been successful in keeping the age of its enlisted force down, while the Army Guard and Reserve have not been as successful. The Chief of the Army Reserve, in testimony before the Congress, said that, ideally, he would like to have Army Reserve soldiers about the same age as active-duty counterparts, but they average about 6 years older than those of the Active Army.

What is the education profile of Selected Reserve members?

Commanders responding to our questionnaire had divided opinions about whether the quality of enlisted personnel in their units was lower than the quality of enlisted personnel prior to the All-Volunteer Force. Most Army National Guard and Army Reserve commanders stated that the quality was lower, while Air National Guard Commanders generally said the quality was higher. Naval and Air Force Reserve commanders thought the quality was about the same as before. Marine Corps commanders were evenly divided between those thinking quality was higher, lower, or the same as before the All-Volunteer Force.

Of course, quality of personnel is a difficult thing to measure or define. Our recent report, "Needed: A More Complete Definition of a Quality First-Term Enlisted Person" (FPCD-79-34, Apr. 25, 1979), notes that DOD has never defined "quality." As that report points out, there are many factors that could be considered. Two measures DOD generally used to assess quality are the educational level and mental aptitude of new recruits. The portion of non-prior-service personnel who are not high school graduates has increased markedly since 1971, whereas the percent of non-prior-service personnel with college training has declined sharply. The percent of non-prior-service personnel who are high school graduates but have not gone to college has remained about the same.


	<u>Non-high- school graduate</u>	<u>High school graduate</u>	<u>Some college</u>	<u>College graduate or higher</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army National Guard	81,936 26.5%	168,488 54.5%	43,015 13.9%	15,916 5.1%	309,355
Army Reserve	22,950 15.2%	75,831 50.4%	33,319 22.1%	18,497 12.3%	150,597
Naval Reserve	6,757 10.9%	37,335 60.0%	13,918 22.4%	4,194 6.7%	62,204
Marine Corps Reserve	8,156 29.0%	15,742 56.0%	3,412 12.1%	808 2.9%	28,118
Air National Guard	6,020 7.5%	57,013 71.5%	11,500 14.4%	5,252 6.6%	79,785
Air Force Reserve	3,208 8.2%	26,844 68.3%	6,517 16.6%	2,740 7.0%	39,309
Total	<u>129,027</u> 19.3%	<u>381,252</u> 57.0%	<u>111,681</u> 16.7%	<u>47,407</u> 7.1%	<u>669,368</u>

Note: Percentages may not add due to rounding. Unknowns are not included.

What is the mental aptitude level
of Selected Reserve members?

In addition to assessing the educational attainment, the military services have traditionally assessed the quality of individuals in the force by their mental aptitude. On the basis of scores on a standard test, service members are divided into five mental categories, I through V, in order of decreasing scores. Category III is considered average.

Distribution by mental category of non-prior-service males enlisted in the Reserve components during fiscal years 1971 to 1978 is shown below.



Although females make up about 7 percent of the current force, they accounted for about 17 and 16 percent of the non-prior-service personnel coming into the Selected Reserve Force in fiscal years 1977 and 1978.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF PERSONNEL TURNOVER ON RESERVE COMPONENTS?

The low job qualification rates, noted in an earlier section of this chapter, are caused, in part, by the turbulence resulting from a large amount of personnel turnover in the Reserve components. From June 1977 to June 1978:

--The Army National Guard gained 84,787 and lost 92,882.

--The Army Reserve gained 52,188 and lost 50,607.

--The Naval Reserve gained 19,861 and lost 27,691.

--The Marine Corps Reserve gained 10,997 and lost 8,614.

--The Air National Guard gained 14,815 and lost 14,910.

--The Air Force Reserve gained 11,799 and lost 8,854.

The percent of personnel lost for each component follows.

--21 came into the unit during the last year, and

--56 of the 76 on board are qualified for jobs assigned to them.

About 74 percent of the commanders responding to our questionnaire indicated that their units experienced a shortage of qualified individuals during the previous year. Of those experiencing a shortage, the majority (64 percent) said turnover of personnel was the underlying reason for the shortage.

What would influence reservists to stay in the military service?


Our questionnaire asked reservists, "If you had to make a decision today on reenlisting, how important would each of the following reasons be in your decision?" The factors considered most important are listed below.

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Percent of respondents rating this factor as important</u>
Opportunity to earn extra income	83
Providing for retirement income	81
Benefits	80
Developing my potential	73
Opportunity to serve my community	68
Desire to serve in the military service	63
Being a member of a team	63
Desire to learn a new skill	61
Opportunity to make friends	52
Gaining recognition and status	50
Chance to use my hobbies or interest	47
Desire to fill in spare time	27


As shown above, reservists rated financial factors important in any decision to reenlist, with the opportunity to earn extra income rated highest. Self-development, making new friends, and desire to serve in the military service did not rate as high as financial incentives and benefits.

CAN RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS PERFORM THEIR WARTIME MISSION IF CALLED UPON?


Although shortage of personnel, low qualification levels, lowered education levels, and high turnover could indicate




Army National Guard




Army Reserve




Marine Corps Reserve



Naval Reserve



Air National Guard



Air Force Reserve

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard use operational readiness inspections to test the validity of the Force Status Reports ratings. Inspections are made by the Active Air Force major command which would gain the individual unit in wartime. All Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units passed these inspections during the 18-month period ended June 30, 1978. However, a satisfactory rating does not mean the unit is fully ready and can accomplish its total force commitment. A satisfactory rating simply means that the Force Status Report rating has been found to be accurate. In addition, units rated not ready in the report do not receive operational readiness inspections.

The Marine Corps makes Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Tests. Reserve units must mobilize on short notice, deploy, and accomplish assigned missions. The tests have revealed administrative and logistics problems which could limit the units' ability to mobilize and deploy quickly. The Marine Corps is implementing a Combat Readiness Evaluation System. However, this system has not yet become fully operational. Once implemented, it will have the capacity to provide more useful evaluations of the units than the current Force Status Reports do because the new system will test the individual unit's ability to perform its mission.

Military service Inspectors General usually evaluate periodically both Active and Reserve units in their respective services. However, these inspections are typically of little use in evaluating the ability of the Reserve units to perform their mission. Instead, the inspections concentrate on proper completion of personnel records, proper filing of regulations, and other administrative-type details. Generally, inspections are made during the week when Reserve members are not present. Thus, the burden of the inspection falls on the full-time support personnel rather than reservists.

For example, at one Army National Guard unit we visited, 1 day of the 2-day weekend training was used to prepare for an Inspector General's visit. Instead of training, reservists were busy updating personnel records, filing regulations, and cleaning equipment. The inspection team arrived on Monday and only looked at the facilities, equipment, and records and talked to the civilian technician. It did not see the unit members working or training in their mission areas. Such inspections, although of value in assessing compliance with Army rules and regulations, do not give any basis for judging the unit's actual ability to perform its mission if needed in wartime.

Attempt to manage reserve losses

According to the DOD All-Volunteer Force study, Reserve components are not equipped to manage the turnover problem. DOD is now planning to establish a Reserve attrition data base and tracking system and to sponsor research to determine why people are leaving the Reserves. DOD says that, once the data base is established and the results of the research are known, DOD will increase its efforts to reduce turnover.

Variable initial training options

Recognizing that the 12 or more weeks of basic and initial skill training required of new recruits is often a problem which prevents people from joining the Reserves, DOD has proposed or is considering the following actions:

- Providing a split training option whereby an individual can take basic and initial skill training in two separate periods rather than all at once.
- Considering a program whereby people with certain skills could conduct and accomplish their initial skill training in the community.
- Conducting a test of a vocational technical training program in which the recruit receives initial skill training during his senior year of high school while he is attending drills.
- Considering expanding DOD's civilian acquired-skill program in which recruits receive constructive credit for civilian schooling or acquired skills.

Reserve Compensation System study

The Secretary of Defense established the Reserve Compensation System study group, which issued its final report to the Secretary on June 30, 1978. The study group concluded that the present Reserve Compensation System does not meet the needs of the Reserve under the All-Volunteer Force because it provides too little compensation to people in the lower grades with few years of service and provides excessive compensation for the higher ranking people with many years of service.

The group recommended changes in the Reserve pay system, the net effect of which would be to increase the compensation of junior reservists and to decrease it for senior personnel. The changes included providing training pay, retrainer pay,

Increasing full-time support

The services with the most manpower problems are also the services with the least amount of full-time support.

Increasing the full-time support to the Army Guard and Reserve would increase the manpower effectiveness of these components. However, the cost of such a program could be extremely high. The Army has recently requested a limited increase in the full-time support personnel for its Reserve component units. The estimated increased cost to bring the Army Guard and Reserve up to a level of full-time support comparable to that of the Air Force components exceeds \$1 billion annually.

In this review we did not determine the type of full time support personnel that should be used. However, our recent report concluded that certain technicians under the competitive civil service are not mobilization assets and would be unable to satisfy the military mission and requirements of the Reserve components. (See app. I.)

Increasing incentives

Reservists responding to our questionnaire rated the opportunity to earn extra income and benefits as the important factors influencing their decision to enlist in the National Guard or Reserve. They rated the opportunity to earn extra income, provide for a retirement income, and receive benefits as the most important factors that would influence their decisions to reenlist in the Reserves. Given the severe manpower shortage and the high turnover in the Reserve Forces today, it seems that increased benefits and higher pay may be the only method left within the All-Volunteer Force environment to achieve manpower goals for the Reserve Forces.

Making training more meaningful

Our proposed report, "Efficiency of Reserve Training Has Improved Since 1974, But More Can Be done," concluded that satisfaction in the Reserve Forces was directly related to meaningfulness of training and that the reservist who thought training was meaningful was more likely to reenlist. It pointed out a number of actions that Reserve components could take to improve reserve training.

CHAPTER 3

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Army National Guard is the largest component of the Reserve Forces; it is predominantly oriented toward combat units. In wartime, under DOD's total force policy, the Army National Guard is required to provide the Active Army with more than one-third of its combat strength requirements. However, shortages in personnel strength and shortages in skill-qualified personnel limit the Army Guard's ability to meet its total force commitments. We found that:

- The Army Guard has about 85 percent of the people it needs in peacetime and about 80 percent of the people it would need in wartime.
- The majority of the shortages are in combat-type jobs.
- About 76 percent of the enlisted people in the Guard are considered qualified for the jobs they are assigned.
- Only 31 percent of the Army Guard units have 80 percent or more of the people they would need in wartime already on board and qualified for their jobs.
- More than half of the Army Guard commanders responding to our questionnaire stated that the quality of enlisted personnel in their units now is lower than the quality of enlisted personnel prior to the All-Volunteer Force.
- Active Army evaluators rated 32 percent of Army Guard company-sized units as not ready to perform their missions and 37 percent as marginally ready.
- The average unit affiliated with the Active Army was rated somewhat better than the average rating of all Army Guard units.

ORGANIZATION

Constitutionally, the Army National Guard of each State is a state-administered military force with dual State and Federal missions. It is federally funded, subject to being called to active duty in wartime or national emergency and is required to maintain Department of the Army standards. In the event of mobilization, units of the Army Guard come directly under Active Army command. During peacetime State governors exercise command through State adjutants general.

	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Peacetime authorized</u>	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Percent of wartime needs</u>	<u>Percent of peace- time needs</u>
Personnel:					
Enlisted					
E-1 to					
E-4	256,874	232,367	162,416	63	70
E-5 to					
E-9	<u>138,942</u>	<u>139,175</u>	<u>152,311</u>	110	109
Total					
enlisted					
personnel	395,816	371,542	<u>a/314,727</u>	80	85
Officers	<u>38,255</u>	<u>39,120</u>	<u>33,707</u>	88	86
Total					
officers/ enlisted personnel	<u>434,071</u>	<u>410,662</u>	<u>348,434</u>	80	85

a/Figure includes 5,326 non-prior-service enlisted personnel awaiting initial active-duty training without pay.

While most of the Army Guard enlisted grades met or exceeded 85 percent of their required and authorized strength in terms of number of personnel, the most significant shortfall in personnel occurred in enlisted grades E-1 through E-4. The above table shows dramatic shortages of required strength in pay grades E-1 through E-4. The most significant shortage occurs in enlisted grade E-4, where there is only about 50 percent of the wartime requirement.

We believe personnel overages in higher enlisted grades indicate a dependence on older higher ranking personnel to satisfy shortages in lower ranks. In addition, grade stagnation and career progression problems may be indicated since the top five enlisted grades, with the exception of grade E-8, are over 100 percent of both wartime and peacetime strength.

As shown above, the Army Guard has not been able to meet its peacetime objective force size, let alone its wartime required personnel strength objective. Since the Federal mission of the Army Guard under the total force policy is to provide trained personnel to augment the Active Army in the event of mobilization or national emergency, further discussion on enlisted manpower in this chapter is presented relative to required wartime strength.

Effects of shortages on units

During training year 1977, 9 combat battalions out of a total of 437 had less than 50 percent of the people needed in wartime. ^{1/} Furthermore, about half of the total combat battalions had less than 80 percent of their required strength. At the company level, 111 combat companies had less than 50 percent of their wartime required strength. The following table shows the Army Guard combat unit and strength (fill level) as a percent of required strength.

<u>Percent of required strength</u>	<u>Number of battalions</u>	<u>Number of companies</u>
Less than 50	9	111
50 to 59	15	151
60 to 69	56	330
70 to 79	139	481
80 to 89	137	519
90 to 100	<u>81</u>	<u>662</u>
	<u>437</u>	<u>2,254</u>

The Chief, Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard, told us a unit's ability to perform its mission would most likely coincide with its strength. For example, a unit manned at 80 percent of its required strength generally will be capable of performing only 80 percent of its mission. Of course, many factors other than strength affect a unit's ability to perform its mission, such as (1) morale, (2) state of training, (3) equipment, and (4) urgency of the situation.

At the end of June 1978, the Army Guard had only 80 percent of its overall wartime strength requirement. In April 1978 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, warned of the potential consequence of the shortage. He told the Subcommittee that at current strength many Army Guard units will have to receive a substantial amount of fillers after mobilization to bring their strength up to the required level. He pointed out that it takes time to receive and integrate these fillers into the organization. Furthermore, the Army has a

^{1/}Training year coincides with the fiscal year. Shortages refer to the level the unit attained at the time it attended 2-week annual training during the training year.

	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Qualified</u>	<u>Qualified as percent of wartime requirement</u>	<u>Qualified as percent of actual</u>
Career management field:				
Total Army				
National Guard	<u>314,727</u>	<u>240,312</u>	61	76
Combat-type jobs:				
Infantry	50,677	39,888	51	79
Combat engineering	17,775	13,939	56	78
Field artillery	23,327	17,896	50	77
Air defense artillery	3,541	2,706	43	76
Armor	<u>15,134</u>	<u>11,655</u>	54	77
Total combat-type jobs	<u>110,454</u>	<u>86,084</u>	52	78
Other fields:				
Medical	13,098	9,206	51	70
Communications electronics operations	24,604	17,803	52	72
Mechanical maintenance	44,467	34,218	73	77
Law enforcement	11,367	8,501	56	75
General engineering	10,590	7,914	60	75
Communications electronics maintenance	2,389	1,537	47	64
Aviation maintenance	8,287	6,209	68	75

After applying DOD's 95 percent availability factor against the qualified enlisted force, the shortfall becomes more acute. [240,312 X .95 = 228,296 (number skill qualified X availability factor = available strength)] Thus, the number of enlisted personnel who are qualified for their assigned jobs and who would be available in wartime amounts to only 58 percent of the enlisted people the Army Guard needs.

Effects of job-qualified shortfalls on units

About 75 percent of the Army Guard commanders responding to our questionnaire said that their units experienced a shortage of qualified individuals. Our review showed that

Quality of personnel is difficult to define or measure; however, the services have traditionally evaluated force quality chiefly in terms of mental aptitude and educational attainment. Prior-service/non-prior-service mixture and age profiles also have been used to assess the quality of the force.

Mental aptitude is measured by written test scores received on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Tests. On the basis of these scores, enlistees are classified into five mental categories, with I being the highest. At June 30, 1978, about 60 percent of the enlisted personnel were in mental category III and below.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Category I (score over 92)	21,962	7
Category II (score 65 to 92)	96,561	31
Category III (score 31 to 64)	153,478	50
Category IV (score 30 or below)	30,028	10
Unknown	<u>7,372</u>	<u>2</u>
	<u>309,401</u>	<u>100</u>

At the end of June 1978, about 27 percent of the enlisted personnel in the Army Guard were non-high-school graduates. High school graduates constituted about 54 percent of the enlisted force, while enlisted personnel with some college and college graduates accounted for about 19 percent of the force. The bulk of the non-high-school graduates, about 77 percent of the total, are in the lower enlisted grades E-1 through E-4.

Concern over overgrading and aging in the Reserve components was expressed during hearings of the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, in 1979. One Subcommittee member said the Guard and Reserve appeared to be top heavy in terms of both rank and age. He observed that large numbers of personnel at the senior level are questionable mobilization assets. He pointed out the apparent stagnation in the middle grades due to lack of opportunities available in senior grades as resulting in severe manpower shortages in younger, more junior combat grades. He also noted that these younger, more junior grades form the backbone of our national defense in the All-Volunteer Force environment.

Aging in the Army Reserve components has also been expressed in DOD and Department of the Army reports as a deterrent in obtaining a quality enlisted force. One Army report states:


Although the Army classifies details of the Force Status Reports for Army Guard units, the reports show serious sustainability problems with a number of the Army Guard units. On April 20, 1978, more than one-third of the Army National Guard units were rated not ready to perform their wartime missions. The Army considers the remaining units ready, although only a small portion are considered fully capable of performing their wartime missions over a sustained period. Slightly over half of the units reporting met their peacetime authorized readiness level.

The results of the Reserve Evaluation System are not classified. Through this system, active-duty evaluators rate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units' readiness conditions during the units' annual 2-week active-duty training period. The purpose of the Reserve Evaluation System is to


- obtain an independent assessment of the training readiness status of Reserve component units,
- provide training assistance in conjunction with unit evaluation,
- determine the effectiveness of unit training programs,
- give commanders an indepth view of their units' strengths and weaknesses, and
- assist commanders in preparing subsequent training programs.

Army Guard and Reserve units during annual training are formally evaluated by an evaluator who has been specifically assigned to evaluator duty on the basis of grade, military occupational specialty, and experience. The evaluator observes and evaluates the unit over the 2-week period. The raters use the standard categories of fully ready to not ready as discussed in chapter 2. Also the evaluators must assess the total weeks required to be fully combat ready, which equates to a recommended effectiveness rating.

The chart below depicts the overall ability of the Army National Guard units to perform their wartime missions as shown in the Reserve Evaluation System report for training year 1977. The average guard company-sized unit is marginally ready.



437 combat battalions



2,254 combat companies

The average combat company and average combat battalion were rated slightly less ready than the average support company and support battalion.


Analysis of the Reserve Evaluation System report reveals that low personnel strength and lack of skill-qualified personnel significantly contributes to the high percentage of Guard units rated as "marginally ready" or "not ready" to perform in the event of war.

Early deployment

Units scheduled for deployment within 60 days of initiation of general mobilization are categorized as early deploying units and designated as D-D+60 units. Information obtained from the Reserve Evaluation System report disclosed the following ratings for these units.

3. Deployment capability improvement. Reserve units which require dedicated Active Army assistance to meet deployment schedules.

The Army National Guard has 77 battalions consisting of 391 company-sized units in the Army's affiliation program. Analyses of information obtained from the Reserve Evaluation System report disclosed the following training readiness condition of these affiliated units.



In comparison to the overall ratings for all 456 Army Guard battalions, a higher percentage of affiliated battalions were rated substantially ready and marginally ready and a lower percentage were rated not ready.

Similarly, in comparison to all 3,207 Army Guard units, a higher percentage of affiliated companies were given ratings of marginally ready or better; a lower percentage received ratings of not ready.

The overall training readiness condition ratings (units rated marginally ready or better) of affiliated battalions and companies are about 19 and 9 percentage points, respectively, higher than the total of all Army Guard battalions

CHAPTER 4

ARMY RESERVE

The Army Reserve is organized into predominately combat support and combat service support and training units. Under DOD's total force policy, the Army Reserve is required to provide trained and equipped units capable and ready for immediate use as augmentation to the Active Forces in the event of mobilization or national emergency. The Army Reserve's ability to perform its total force commitment is severely hampered by low personnel strength and lack of job qualified people. We found that:

- The Army Reserve has about 79 percent of the personnel needed to fulfill its peacetime requirement and about 76 percent of the people needed in wartime.
- Substantial shortages exist in essential combat-support-type jobs.
- About 73 percent of enlisted personnel currently assigned to Army Reserve units are considered qualified for their assigned jobs.
- Only 28 percent of Army Reserve units have 80 percent or more of the people needed during wartime already on board and job qualified.
- More than half of the Army Reserve commanders responding to our questionnaire stated the the quality of enlisted personnel currently in their units was lower than the quality of enlisted personnel prior to the All-Volunteer Force.
- Active Army evaluations rated 35 percent of the Army Reserve company-sized units as not ready to perform their mission and 27 percent marginally ready.
- The average unit affiliated with the Active Army was rated somewhat lower than the average rating of all Army Reserve units.

ORGANIZATION

The Army Reserve consists of about 3,000 company-sized units. Predominantly, the Army Reserve is organized into combat support and combat service support and training organizations. The Army Reserve includes 1,618 combat support, 1,018 training, and 321 combat companies. As of June 30,

units to the total force are presented in the remainder of this chapter.

ARMY RESERVE STRENGTH LEVELS
AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES

Overall, the Army Reserve is experiencing a manpower shortage of about 24 percent of its wartime requirement and 21 percent of its peacetime authorization. The Army Reserve's authorized peacetime strength is about 96 percent of its wartime requirement. The Army Reserve's aggregate strength levels and shortages and a composite of enlisted personnel grade structure requirements, authorizations, and shortages as of June 30, 1978, are shown below.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Peacetime authorized</u>	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Percent of wartime needs</u>	<u>Percent of peace- time needs</u>
Enlisted personnel:					
E-1 to E-4	115,698	107,292	68,040	59	63
E-5 to E-9	<u>93,875</u>	<u>91,610</u>	<u>84,356</u>	90	92
Total enlisted personnel	209,573	198,902	152,396	73	77
Officers	<u>40,050</u>	<u>41,175</u>	<u>36,203</u>	90	88
Total Army Reserve	<u>249,623</u>	<u>240,077</u>	<u>188,599</u>	76	79

The most crucial manpower shortage occurs in the enlisted force. Officer shortages are concentrated in a few areas such as the medical field which is only 56 percent manned. Further discussions on manpower effectiveness in this chapter will address the enlisted force. The most significant shortages occur in enlisted grades E-1 through E-4. Army personnel officials pointed out that this shortfall should be described as an inability to attract adequate numbers of new recruits in the skills required.

As shown, the Army Reserve has met neither its wartime required or peacetime objective force size. Since the Army Reserve, under the total force policy, is required to provide trained units capable and ready for immediate use as augmentation to the Active Force in the event of mobilization, further discussion in this chapter concerns the required enlisted personnel wartime strength.

Effect of shortages on units

The criticality of shortages in specific career management fields varies from unit to unit. For example, if a unit is required to have several communications electronic operators and has one operator assigned, this constitutes a critical shortage for this unit and adversely affects the performance of its mission.

During training year 1977, out of a total of 81 battalions, 15 had less than 50 percent of their wartime strength requirement. Another 50 battalions had from 50 to 79 percent of their wartime requirement. Thus, 65 battalions had less than 80 percent of their wartime requirement. From a total of 1,939 companies, excluding training companies, 249 had less than 50 percent of the personnel needed to perform their wartime mission. Furthermore, a total of 923 companies had less than 80 percent of the personnel needed to fulfill their wartime strength requirement. The following table shows Army Reserve units' assigned strength levels as a percent of wartime requirement.

<u>Percent of required strength</u>	<u>Number of battalions (note a)</u>	<u>Number of companies (note a)</u>
Less than 50	15	249
50 to 59	19	161
60 to 69	15	242
70 to 79	16	271
80 to 89	8	327
90 to 100	<u>8</u>	<u>689</u>
	<u>81</u>	<u>1,939</u>

a/Excludes training units.

Based on the rating system used for the Army's Force Status Reports as discussed on p. 40, over half of the battalions would be categorized as marginally ready or not ready to perform their wartime mission.

SHORTAGES IN SKILL-QUALIFIED RESERVISTS

According to Army Reserve records, about 73 percent of enlisted personnel assigned to units are qualified for their assigned jobs. As shown in the table below, however, the skill-qualified personnel currently assigned constitutes only 53 percent of the manpower required in the event of mobilization.

shortage of qualified individuals. Our review disclosed that during training year 1977 about 30 percent of Army Reserve company-sized units had less than half of the qualified individuals needed in wartime. Additionally, only about 28 percent of Army Reserve company-sized units had 80 percent or more of their wartime manpower requirement on board and qualified for their assigned jobs.

Percent of individuals needed in wartime who were in the unit and <u>job qualified</u>	Number of Army Reserve units (note a)	Percent of all units (note a)
Less than 50	581	30
50 to 59	247	13
60 to 69	288	15
70 to 79	277	14
80 to 89	256	13
90 to 100	<u>290</u>	<u>15</u>
	<u>1,939</u>	<u>100</u>

a/Does not include training units.

According to Army Reserve records at June 30, 1978, about 41,722 enlisted personnel were assigned to jobs they were not qualified to perform.

PERSONNEL TURNOVER

Contributing to the relatively large number of unqualified assigned individuals is the turbulence caused by the loss of job-qualified individuals who are later replaced by unqualified individuals. The Chief of the Army Reserve, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, for fiscal year 1979 acknowledged that one of the Army Reserve's principal problems was the retention of people.

From fiscal year 1973 to fiscal year 1977, the Army Reserve manpower strength declined by about 46,000 people. Between June 1977 and June 1978, the Army Reserve gained about 52,000 people and lost about 51,000. The losses during this period were about 27 percent of beginning strength. About 81 percent of the commanders responding to our questionnaire said their units experienced a shortage of qualified individuals during 1977, and about 86 percent of those who experienced this shortage cited turnover as the underlying reason.

"In combat units even a small age differential could be critical, while in many support units a differential of five or six years might be advantageous. On an across the board basis, an average differential of one year or slightly more would be satisfactory."

At June 30, 1978, the age distribution of the Army Reserve's enlisted force follows.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Under 25	39,981	26
25 to 34	75,587	50
35 to 44	25,134	16
45 to 54	8,803	6
55 and over	1,150	1
unknown	<u>1,741</u>	<u>1</u>
	<u>152,396</u>	<u>100</u>

Closely aligned with the Army Reserve's age objective are its years of service and non-prior-service/prior-service objectives. Army planners desire that 72 percent of Reserve enlisted personnel have under 6 years' service and that no enlisted personnel have over 32 years of service. This means the Army planners desire that only 28 percent of its Reserve enlisted force become career members. (The dividing line between career force and first term for the Army Reserve is the 6-year point.) According to DOD statistics, at June 30, 1978, only 43 percent of the enlisted personnel were in the under-6-years-of-service category.

Army planners desire also that 60 percent of the enlisted personnel entering the Reserve Force be non-prior-service individuals. This was emphasized by the Chief of the Army Reserve in his April 1978 testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense. He told the Subcommittee that the average enlisted soldier (reservist) would be slightly over a year older than his active-duty counterpart if the Army Reserve were able to get all the non-prior-service accessions it desires. Also, the non-prior-service objective is about 60 percent of total accessions.


He noted that the desired ratio of non-prior-service individuals will assist in keeping the force young and allow the Army Reserve to train people for the right jobs. Also, in contrast to prior-service individuals, non-prior-service people generally join the force for longer terms. Longer commitments help maintain strength levels and reduce

Although there are more units rated not ready than rated marginally ready, our analysis shows that, the average rating for Army Reserve units is marginally ready.

From our analysis of unit strengths and levels of skill-qualified personnel, significant deficiencies in these areas severely impair the Army Reserve's overall manpower preparedness.

Early deploying units

Readiness ratings for Army Reserve early deploying company-sized units as determined by evaluators are shown below.



1819 units

The chart above shows that, the majority, (about 53 percent) of early deploying units were rated either not ready or marginally ready. Comparison of the chart on early deploying with the chart on all units evaluated shows that on the average early deploying units were rated somewhat better than the typical Army Reserve unit.

Affiliated units

Overall ratings given affiliated companies by evaluators are shown in the chart below.

CHAPTER 5

NAVAL RESERVE

The Naval Reserve's total force commitment is to support the Active Navy during wartime with operational and support units and personnel. Our review indicates, however, that the Naval Reserve is hindered from meeting this commitment. Factors limiting the Naval Reserve's ability to perform its mission are personnel shortages, skill shortages, and unqualified personnel. We found that:

--Although the Naval Reserve had about 97 percent of the people it needs in peacetime, it has only 82 percent of the people it would need in wartime.

--Much of the shortage is in technically oriented jobs.

--Sixty-six percent of the people assigned to mobilization positions are fully qualified for the jobs assigned to them.

--Fifteen percent of the Naval Reserve units were rated not ready and 49 percent were rated marginally ready to perform their wartime missions.

NAVAL RESERVE MISSION

The primary mission of the Naval Reserve is to provide trained operational and support units and individuals available for active duty in wartime, national emergency, or when otherwise authorized to meet special situations.

NAVAL RESERVE ORGANIZATION

The two major types of units in the Naval Reserve are surface units and air units. The surface units can be further categorized as shore units and afloat units.

The shore units are organized under 16 Readiness commanders in Readiness Command regions around the country. Each Readiness commander is responsible for all mobilization readiness training, resource management functions, and surface reserve assets in his area.

The afloat units provide crews for the ships that make up the Naval Reserve Force. The Naval Reserve Force includes: 28 destroyers, 22 minesweepers, 4 fleet tugs, 2 (LPA) amphibious transports, and 1 (LKA) amphibious cargo ship. Ships within the Naval Reserve are under the operational control of

the level requested by the Navy for fiscal year 1979. When assessing wartime capabilities we used Navy reports showing a "mobilization allowance" which totaled 103,650. This level is used in the Force Status Reports to assess the Naval Reserve's ability to perform its mission.

As of June 30, 1978, the Naval Reserve was close to meeting the congressional level of 87,000. Actual strength was 84,443, or about 97 percent. However, the Navy has only 82 percent of the 103,650 people it would need in wartime.

Most of the personnel shortages are in the enlisted ranks as shown below.

	<u>Wartime requirement</u>	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Officer	20,954	17,883	3,071	85
Enlisted personnel	<u>82,696</u>	<u>66,560</u>	<u>16,136</u>	81
Total	<u>103,650</u>	<u>84,443</u>	<u>19,207</u>	82

SHORTAGES BY CAREER AREA

The following table shows some of the Naval Reserve enlisted career areas where shortages existed as of September 30, 1978.

<u>Career management field</u>	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Shortage</u>	<u>Percent manned</u>
Seaman	5,562	3,033	2,529	55
Fireman	2,215	787	1,428	36
Equipment operator	3,603	2,377	1,226	66
Boatswain's mate	3,225	2,101	1,124	65
Builder	2,865	1,876	989	66
Hull maintenance technician	2,850	2,034	816	71
Construction mechanic	1,835	1,171	664	64
Aviation structural mechanic	2,428	1,775	653	73
Gunners mate (guns)	1,388	842	546	61
Fire control technician	1,256	736	520	59
Gunners mate technician	585	86	499	15

shortages of qualified people during the previous year. According to Naval Reserve records, about 66 percent of the people currently assigned to mobilization positions are fully qualified for the jobs assigned to them.

The Naval Reserve operates a national cross-assignment program whereby reservists attend training in units near where they live but are actually assigned to units elsewhere. This occurs because the unit where reservists live may either have no openings or no need for their skills. As of December 1978, of the approximately 66,500 enlisted people in the Naval Reserve, about 17,300 had not been cross-assigned to a mobilization position because the Reserve billet file was being updated.

The Naval Reserve estimated that, of the 17,300 people, from 10,000 to 12,000 would be placed in assignments and would either (1) fully qualified for their jobs or (2) trained or experienced in the general career area but would not meet exact job qualifications and would be about 75 percent mobilization ready. Therefore, from 5,000 to 7,000 people could be considered not qualified.

Of the remaining 49,200 enlisted people who already have mobilization assignments, the Naval Reserve considers about 32,700 (66 percent) fully qualified for their jobs. The remaining 16,500 (34 percent) who are considered not fully qualified are divided into two categories. About 14,400 (30 percent), although trained or experienced in the general career area, do not meet the exact qualifications and experience for the jobs they hold. The Naval Reserve considers this last group 75 percent mobilization ready. The remaining 2,100 people (4 percent) are in training for totally different jobs from the jobs they were previously qualified for or experienced in. The Naval Reserve considers this group 50 percent mobilization ready.

PERSONNEL QUALITY

Quality of personnel is difficult to define or measure. Traditionally, the military services have judged the quality of their personnel by mental aptitude and educational attainment. Additionally, such characteristics as age distribution and female participation have been considered.

Commanders responding to our questionnaire generally thought that the quality of the Naval enlisted force was about the same as that which existed before the All-Volunteer Force. Some commanders (18 percent) thought the quality was lower than before. According to DOD statistical reports,

About 19,900 (24 percent) of the people in the Naval Reserve at June 30, 1978, had entered during the previous 12 months. Additionally, about 27,700 (30 percent) of those in the Naval Reserve at June 30, 1977, had left by June 30, 1978.


This personnel turnover has affected the Navy's ability to maintain experienced and qualified units whose members have worked together as a team.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY


Less than 40 percent of Naval Reserve units report their ability to perform wartime missions through Force Status Reports. The remaining Naval Reserve units report through special systems that are used only by the Navy.

Force Status Reports

The Naval Reserve Force Status Reports use the four ratings (fully ready, substantially ready, marginally ready, and not ready) that are used by the other services. In addition to an overall rating, ratings are also given in personnel, equipment, and training. The chart below illustrates the overall combat readiness for the Naval Reserve units reporting as of June 30, 1978.



Overall ratings for the surface nonhardware units as reported to the readiness commands follow.




Surface Non-Hardware Units

About 65 percent of the nonhardware units of the Naval Reserve surface force are either marginally ready or not ready to perform their mission. The reports indicate that personnel and skill shortages are hampering the readiness capabilities of the Naval Reserve.

Naval Reserve Force status
for aviation non-flying units

The Naval Reserve Force Status System is a reporting system for all nonflying units in the Naval Air Reserve. This system rates (1) the capability of the units to perform each of its primary missions and (2) the overall mission readiness of the units.

Overall ratings for the Naval air nonflying units follow.



CONCLUSIONS

Assuming a valid need for a wartime strength level of about 100,000 people, many Naval Reserve units would have difficulty meeting their wartime commitments, due in part to personnel shortages and unqualified people.

In addition, only two-thirds of the people assigned to mobilization positions are considered fully qualified for the jobs assigned to them.

4th Marine Division structure

The 4th Marine Division (reinforced) is the principal ground combat element of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. By maintaining a division structure similar to that of the Active divisions, the 4th Division is designed to provide the necessary types of augmentation units, if required. That the division is "reinforced" denotes it has additional units within its organization that expand the combat capability and flexibility for division deployment.

The division includes three infantry regiments, a field artillery group, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery regiment, two tank battalions, and an assault amphibian battalion.

4th Marine Aircraft Wing structure

The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing contains attack, fighter, transport, helicopter and support aircraft. The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing is structured to provide a wing headquarters, an air control group, a light antiaircraft missile battalion, a forward area air defense battery, and four aircraft groups. Each aircraft group includes a headquarters and maintenance squadron and a marine air base squadron.

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Although the Selected Marine Corps Reserve at June 30, 1978, had 97 percent of the people it needs in peacetime, it had 84 percent of the people it would need in wartime. The actual strength at June 30, 1978, included 32,307 reservists and 4,025 active-duty personnel for a total of 36,332 people, while the peacetime objective was about 37,500 and the wartime requirement was about 43,200. The table below summarizes the wartime manpower shortages as of June 30, 1978:

	<u>Wartime requirements</u>	<u>Actual assigned</u>		<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
		<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Active</u>		
Officers	3,209	2,595	382	232	93
Enlisted personnel	<u>40,032</u>	<u>29,712</u>	<u>3,643</u>	<u>6,677</u>	83
Total	<u>43,241</u>	<u>32,307</u>	<u>4,025</u>	<u>6,909</u>	84

Note that some of the more severe shortages are in career areas very important to the Marine Corps combat mission, such as infantry staffed at 65 percent, field artillery at 53 percent, aircraft maintenance at 57 percent, and aviation ordnance at 33 percent. Shortages in the technical fields will be the most difficult to fill under a rapid buildup because of the relatively long training periods required in these fields.

Effect of shortages on units

Manpower shortages significantly affect the combat readiness of about one-third of the Marine Corps Reserve units and consequently impair their ability to meet their total force obligation.

The Marine Corps Force Status Reports compute manpower shortages and related combat ratings by comparing the number of personnel on board to the peacetime manpower requirements rather than wartime requirements. The wartime manpower requirements exceed the Selected Marine Corps Reserve's peacetime requirements by 5,754 personnel. In our opinion, using peacetime requirements significantly overstates the Marine Corps Reserve's combat readiness and its ability to meet its total force commitment in wartime. Marine Corps officials said that, beginning October 1, 1979, they will compute manpower shortages and related readiness ratings by using wartime requirements.

QUALIFICATIONS

According to Marine Corps records, about 5,850 marines, or about 22 percent of the enlisted personnel assigned to Marine Corps units, have not become fully qualified for the positions they hold. These Marines generally come into the Reserves qualified by active-duty service for jobs which are overstaffed in the Marine Corps Reserve. Thus, they must be retrained for the jobs they are assigned in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Unqualified personnel have a significant effect on the combat readiness of over half of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve units.

PERSONNEL QUALITY

Commanders responding to our questionnaire had mixed opinions about whether the quality of enlisted personnel in their units had declined under the All-Volunteer Force. About 36 percent said the quality was lower now, but 34 percent thought the quality was about the same as before, and about 30 percent thought the quality now was better.

Reserve personnel with over 6 years' service are considered career members. Just as the Marine Corps Reserve's mission requires a large number of younger personnel, it also requires a large number of noncareer personnel. Again, the Marine Corps has been successful in this area. About 76 percent of Marine Corps Reserve's personnel on board at June 30, 1978, had less than 6 years' service.

The number of females in the Marine Corps Reserve has increased from 88 (0.2 percent) in fiscal year 1972 to 878 (2.7 percent) in fiscal year 1978.

PERSONNEL TURNOVER

About one-third of the Marine Corps Reserve turns over each year. For example, as of June 30, 1978, 34 percent of the people in the Marine Corps Reserve had entered during the previous 12 months. Since a large number of trained people are leaving, new people replacing them must gain experience and often must be retrained. Thus, the Marine Corps Reserve at any particular time has a number (up to one-third of the force) of inexperienced and/or not fully trained people on duty.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY

Although manpower shortages and turnover result in units without a full complement of fully trained individuals, the critical question is, "Will the units be able to perform their mission if called upon in wartime?" The Marine Corps Reserve uses three primary indicators in assessing the ability of the units to perform: the Force Status Reports, the Mobilization Readiness and Deployment Tests, and the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System.

Force Status Reports

The Force Status Reports are designed to provide an assessment of the operational capability of units. Units are rated either fully ready, substantially ready, marginally ready, or not ready to perform their missions.

As noted previously, Marine Corps personnel ratings are based on actual strength and qualification levels compared to peacetime strength authorizations. If wartime strength requirements were used, as Army and Air Force components do, the ratings would be somewhat lower.

The Force Status Reports showed that as of July 2, 1978, about one-third of the Marine Corps Reserve units were rated

The aircraft wing tests do not provide detailed ratings in the administration and logistics areas like the 4th Marine Division tests do, but rather only satisfactory or unsatisfactory ratings. Test results did indicate administrative difficulties, such as incomplete personnel mobilization packages. Test results also disclosed that the majority of people being mobilized were not school trained for the jobs they had been assigned.

For one wing unit, we noted that in this case the official report did not list all the discrepancies that we had observed. For example, the aircraft scheduled to provide target area surveillance and spotting services was unable to get underway on one of the missions due to lack of fuel. Apparently advance notice had not been given to arrange with the host Navy fuel supply personnel to have the aircraft refueled. Another problem we noted, which was not mentioned in the report, was the lack of knowledge of standard operating procedures in loading and fuzing of ordnance by ordnance personnel. These discrepancies resulted in pilots being unable to deliver the bombs in the first mission.

However, since these discrepancies related to problems in carrying out the unit's mission, they were not required to be a part of the report on the test of the Wing unit. These types of discrepancies will be reported in the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System which is discussed below. We believe that until the new system is fully implemented, the Mobilization Operational Readiness and Deployment Tests should reflect all observed discrepancies.

Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System

The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System is designed to assess the ability of the Marine Corps air and ground combat, combat support and combat service support units to perform their mission. However, the system, at the time of our review, had not yet become fully operational. It is scheduled to provide

- performance standards based on assigned missions,
- a standardized reporting system, and
- feedback of units indicating strengths and weaknesses.

It is designed to permit both formal and informal evaluations. Formal evaluations are those directed by, and reported to, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Informal evaluations

CHAPTER 7

AIR FORCE RESERVE

Manpower-related problems affect some Air Force Reserve flying units' ability to meet their total force commitment.

For example:

--Manpower shortages significantly affect the combat ability of 25 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units and could also impair the combat ability of some Active Air Force units.

--Seventy-five percent of all Air Force Reserve airmen are considered qualified for their positions. Unqualified personnel affect the combat ability of approximately 37 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units.

--Overall, 15 percent of the Air Force Reserve units were rated not ready to perform their wartime mission. Additionally, 24 percent were rated marginally ready.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENTS--BACKGROUND

The Air Reserve components are made up of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The Air Reserve components' mission is to provide trained units and qualified personnel available for active duty in the Armed Forces in wartime or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires. In addition, the Air National Guard has responsibilities to the individual States.

Air Reserve components are primarily organized around 144 flying units or squadrons--53 in the Air Force Reserve and 91 in the Air National Guard. Also, Air Reserve Forces have 1,057 nonflying units providing either direct or indirect support (Air Force Reserve, 128; Air National Guard, 929) to the Air Force mission. The Air Force Reserve has a high concentration of units with a strategic and/or tactical airlift mission while the Air National Guard is predominately fighter aircraft oriented.

The total force policy places heavy reliance on the reserve forces as an integral part of the overall U.S. capability in time of war or in conflict. The Guard and Reserve Forces are to be used as the initial and primary augmentation for active-duty personnel. The reliance placed on the Air Reserve components is illustrated in the following graph:

The Air Force carries out the total force policy through a gaining command program which integrates the reserve forces into the total Air Force mission. "Gaining command" is defined as a major command of the Air Force to which units of the Air Reserve components are assigned for mobilization and augmentation purposes. Although a gaining command has no direct command authority over its reserve force units in peacetime, it closely monitors the reserves day-to-day activities.

Under the gaining command concept, the major command establishes the training standards, policy, and criteria to be followed by attached reserve force units for readiness purposes. In addition, the gaining command is responsible for inspections to ensure that reserve force units are, in fact, training under the established standards and are in a "ready" condition. Training and inspection are the most important aspects of the gaining command and reserve force relationships. Other areas of responsibility deal with safety, planning, and logistics.

Through inspections of all its units, both active and Reserve, the gaining command evaluates training effectiveness, unit readiness, and unit safety programs for compliance purposes. Two types of inspections, operational readiness inspections and management effectiveness inspections, are conducted by the gaining command. The inspection criteria used to rate reserve units are the same for the command's active units. For example, all KC-135 flying squadrons in the Air Force are inspected under identical standards.

Flying squadrons in the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard report unit readiness through the Force Status Reports. In these reports, percentage figures of the unit capability measurement system are converted into combat readiness ratings. The unit capability measurement system measures four areas--personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and training--with units reporting their standing in each of the four categories in percentage amounts. The measurement for each category is an evaluation of actual versus authorized and required strength. The passing percentage score differs for each category and reflects the minimum amount needed for a unit to be rated combat ready.

Also each unit's overall readiness is reported. The overall readiness percentage indicates the portion of the unit's total force mission it would be able to accomplish in time of war. For example, in the June 30, 1978, unit capability measurement system, a tactical fighter squadron

	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortage</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
Individual Mobilization augmentee:				
Officers	9,433	5,825	3,608	62
Airmen	<u>7,015</u>	<u>1,795</u>	<u>5,220</u>	26
Total	<u>16,448</u>	<u>a/7,620</u>	<u>8,828</u>	46
Reserve units:				
Officers	7,269	6,700	569	92
Airmen	<u>42,056</u>	<u>37,525</u>	<u>4,531</u>	89
Total	<u>49,325</u>	<u>44,225</u>	<u>5,100</u>	90
Total	<u>65,773</u>	<u>51,845</u>	<u>13,928</u>	79

a/This figure does not include 1,084 pay category "D" mobilization augmentees who are by law members of the Individual Ready Reserve and authorized 14 days training for pay annually.

The most serious shortages exist in the mobilization augmentee program. Only 46 percent of the mobilization augmentee manpower authorizations are filled. Augmentees fill a variety of Air Force career fields with the heaviest concentration in administrative jobs. Since the active units are dependent on these augmentees to handle the additional workload in time of war, the shortage of 8,828 personnel, or 54 percent of the total augmentees authorized, could definitely impair the active units' ability to carry out their wartime mission. Air Force Reserve officials said that the mobilization augmentee program has historically been manned according to the funding level authorized. This program exceeded its programmed manning for fiscal year 1978.

The Air Force Reserve unit manpower shortage of 5,100, or 10 percent of the total air reserve unit manpower authorizations, affects the combat ability of some Air Force Reserve units.

Air Force Reserve career areas where significant manpower shortages existed as of June 30, 1978, are listed below. All of the career areas listed have less than 90 percent of the manpower required to meet the Air Force Reserve's total force commitment.

QUALIFICATIONS

As of July 26, 1978, 9,458 airmen, or about 26 percent of all Air Force Reserve airmen assigned to units, had not yet obtained the specialty skill levels authorized for the positions they held.

The June 30, 1978, Force Status Reports indicated that unqualified personnel were a problem that affected the combat readiness of 15 units or about 37 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units. Of these 15 units, 9 were rated substantially ready, and 6 were rated marginally ready. The primary training shortfall was in the area of combat crews.

Unqualified personnel also have a noticeable impact on the 15 flying units' ability to meet their total force commitment, which is illustrated below.

Percent of total force
mission unit is
able to fulfill

0 to 49 | 0

50 to 59

60 to 69

70 to 79

80 to 89


90 to 100 | 0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

----- Number of units -----

Air reserve technicians

Without the full-time support, the problem of manpower qualifications could be intensified. According to DOD, the primary role of the Air Reserve technician is to train reservists. Technicians plan and conduct training of reservists during the normal workday, training assemblies and when reservists are on active-duty training.



The chart shows that 39 percent of the Air Force Reserve flying units were marginally ready or not ready. This is important, considering the great reliance that is being placed on the combat readiness of the Air Force Reserve units in the total force concept. Two of the five units not combat ready were in conversion to new aircraft. Additionally, two factors contributing to the Air Force Reserve readiness position were manpower shortages and unqualified personnel.

Operational readiness inspection


Air Force Reserve flying units' ability to perform is also measured by operational readiness inspections. The purpose of an operational readiness inspection is to assess a unit's weapon system, equipment, and its personnel's ability to perform the wartime mission or functions for which the unit was organized or designed. Ideally, the inspection should evaluate every aspect of the unit's capability to meet its wartime tasking, including the effectiveness of all direct mission support areas.

Major commands are responsible for developing a scoring system and criteria for rating Reserve units' capability

The large percent of Air Force Reserve flying units that are marginally ready or not ready need attention especially when considered in the light of the great reliance placed on the Air Force Reserve under the total force concept.

Air National Guard career areas having significant manpower shortages as of June 30, 1978, are listed below. All career areas listed have less than 90 percent of the manpower required to meet the Air National Guard's total force commitment.

<u>Career area</u>	<u>Required</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortage</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
Officers:				
Pilots	4,070	3,698	372	90
Navigator	1,227	893	334	73
Physician	402	256	146	64
Personnel	588	452	136	77
Communications				
electronics	850	733	117	86
Aircraft				
maintenance	632	535	97	85
Civil engineering	417	365	52	88
Air weapons				
director	442	395	47	89
Dental	183	145	38	79
Health service				
management	162	130	32	80
Transportation	193	161	32	83
Computer systems	100	83	17	83
Airmen:				
Communications				
electronics	6,440	5,493	947	85
Munitions weapons				
maintenance	3,561	2,638	923	74
Communications				
operators	3,966	3,070	896	77
Transportation	3,124	2,252	872	72
Administration	5,860	5,010	850	86
Food services	2,588	1,797	791	69
Security police	4,454	3,671	783	82
Fuels	2,126	1,399	727	66
Wire communication				
systems maintenance	2,780	2,396	384	86
Command control				
systems	2,860	2,536	324	89
Maintenance management systems	644	567	77	88
Logistic plan	220	149	71	68
Missile electronic maintenance	153	130	23	85
Intricate equipment maintenance	168	145	23	86



Of the four units in the 0- to 49-percent category, three units cannot accomplish any of their total force commitment (0 percent), while the remaining unit can accomplish 14 percent of its total force commitment. All four units have insufficient combat aircrews ready because they are undergoing aircraft conversion, and the aircrews are in the process of training for new aircraft.

Air National Guard technicians

The Air National Guard also has full-time technicians similar to those discussed in chapter 7. These technicians provide unit support in command, maintenance, administration and military personnel, operations, flying training, medical, supply, communications, safety, intelligence, photography, base engineering, and security.

Air National Guard technicians are employed at 156 locations throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. The concentration of technicians ranges from 10 in ground units, such as communications units, to 150 to 200 in flying units.

Guard flying units under the total force concept. As noted earlier, two factors contributing to the readiness rating of the Air National Guard flying units rated marginally ready or not ready are manpower shortages and unqualified personnel.

Operational readiness inspections

The Air National Guard flying units' readiness is also confirmed by operational readiness inspections.

During the 18-month period ended June 30, 1978, there were 82 operational readiness inspections. All units were rated satisfactory. A satisfactory rating does not mean the unit is fully ready and can accomplish all of its total force commitment. A marginally ready unit with a satisfactory operational readiness inspection rating would mean that this unit's rating in its Force Status Report is accurate.

CONCLUSIONS

When comparing the combat ability of the Reserve Forces in total, the selected air reserve forces (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) are the most combat capable. However, the Air National Guard does have manpower problems that affect some flying units' ability to meet their total force commitment.

The Air National Guard has about 90 percent of the manpower required to meet its total force commitment. Overall, the Air National Guard is short 10,123 people. This manpower shortage has adversely affected 15 units, or 17 percent of all Air National Guard flying units. Some of the key career areas where significant manpower shortages exist are pilots, navigators, physicians, aircraft maintenance, communications, munitions, weapons maintenance, and fuels.

As of April 30, 1978, about 69,000 or 86.5 percent of all Air National Guard airmen were considered qualified for their current positions. Unqualified personnel have affected the ratings of about 20 percent of the flying units. As a result, these units' ability to meet their total force commitment has been impaired.

Even though the overall readiness ratings are good, compared to other services, 20 percent of the Air National Guard flying units are marginally ready or not ready. This is a serious matter when considered in the light of the great reliance placed on the Air National Guard flying units under the total force concept.

OASD (MRA&L) COMMENT 2

DOD encourages us to note the imperfect character of the Readiness Reporting System.

Our position

We agree that the Readiness Reporting System is of an imperfect character because of (1) the lack of precise measurable objectives which correlate with wartime objectives and (2) the subjective measurement techniques. However, this is the only formal systematic reporting system available and prescribed for all services by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because we had no other criteria, we used that prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OASD (MRA&L) COMMENT 3

Statements throughout the report give the implication that personnel strength is the reason units were rated either marginally ready or not ready when, in fact, equipment shortages or other factors may be the detractor from a higher rating.

Our position

We agree that there could be other than people problems which impact on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve. However, we do not agree that the existence of the other problems lessens the criticality of the adverse impact of the manpower/personnel problems on readiness.

Moreover, as stated previously in this report, manpower shortages and unqualified personnel affected the readiness ratings and also the combat ability of the Reserve components.

Air Force Reserve

As noted in this report (see pp. 79 and 84), manpower shortages significantly impact on 25 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units (i.e., manpower shortages were the chief reason causing these units to be less than fully ready).

The report notes (see pp. 79 and 85) that the problem of unqualified personnel affects the combat readiness of 37 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units (i.e., unqualified personnel was the chief reason causing these units to be less than fully ready).

Army Reserve

In the report (see p. 51) we display the number of units at various levels of operating strength. Analysis of the Reserve Evaluation System data reveals the following.

	<u>Strength readiness rating</u>	<u>Overall readiness rating (as shown in our report)</u>
Fully ready	28%	14%
Substantially ready	16	24
Marginally ready	16	27
Not ready	40	35

On page 40 of the report we display a breakout showing the percent of individuals needed in wartime who are in the unit and job qualified. Further analysis of the data follows.

	<u>Qualifications readiness rating</u>	<u>Overall readiness rating (as shown in our report)</u>
Fully ready	21%	14%
Substantially ready	14	24
Marginally ready	15	27
Not ready	50	35

Naval Reserve

Personnel strengths and unqualified personnel were also major factors for the Naval Reserve's having 64 percent of its units reported as either marginally ready or not ready. For Naval air units, 73 percent of those rated not ready and 28 percent of those rated marginally ready were because of personnel strengths. An additional 9 percent of those rated not ready and 28 percent of those rated marginally ready were caused by unqualified personnel. For Naval surface units reporting under the Force Status system, 46 percent of those rated not ready and 72 percent of those rated marginally ready were because of personnel strengths. An additional 15 percent of those rated not ready and 24 percent of those rated marginally ready were caused by unqualified personnel.



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-152420

FEBRUARY 26, 1979

The Honorable Harold Brown
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are currently reviewing the Reserve technician program and have identified an aspect which we believe warrants your immediate attention. The Army's technician program is not fully achieving its objectives because about 46 percent of the Army Reserve dual-status technicians (military reservists who are also civilian employees of the Reserves) cannot be mobilized with their Reserve units.

The objectives of the technician program are to provide a nucleus of trained personnel to provide continuity in the management and administration of the Army and Air Force Selected Reserve units and to increase the mobilization readiness of those Reserve components. Currently, the mobilization objective cannot be fully achieved because, in the Army Reserve, 26 percent of the dual-status technicians are assigned to military positions in units other than the one in which they are employed and an additional 20 percent of technicians are not qualified to hold military positions. Clearly, these situations impair the Army Reserve's mobility readiness. Legislation is needed to achieve program objectives by preventing a person from holding a job as a technician when he or she is not a member of the Reserve unit in which the position is authorized.

BACKGROUND OF THE TECHNICIAN PROGRAM

The National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 sets forth the conditions for dual-status employment in the National Guard. The statute specifically mandated that military membership was a condition of technician employment and

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"Status quo" technicians

Dual-status Reserve technicians who lose their Reserve membership for reasons beyond their control (e.g., physical reasons, mandatory removal due to age, or failure to be promoted) are classified as "status quo" in that they are no longer members of their Reserve units but still perform as civilians the necessary work to maintain the readiness of the unit. In time of activation, the status quo technicians would not mobilize.

Currently, there are 1,740 status quo technicians in the Army Reserve, about 20 percent of the total 8,550 technician strength. In comparison, the Air Force Reserve does not have a problem to the same extent as the Army Reserve. The 83 status quo technicians in the Air Force Reserve represent less than 2 percent of the total 6,501 technician strength. This is due, in part, to the more effective management of the Air Force Reserve technician program, including a priority placement program for technicians who are no longer Reserve members.

The following table shows that the number of Army and Air Force Reserve status quo technicians has increased slightly over the past 5 years.

<u>As of</u>	<u>Number of status quo technicians</u>	
	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>
September 30, 1978	1,740	83
September 30, 1977	1,793	70
June 30, 1976	1,749	(not available)
June 30, 1975	1,652	70
June 30, 1974	1,667	58

Misassigned technicians

The memoranda also provide that, to the maximum practicable extent, technicians will be participating Reserve members assigned to the units with which they are employed.

Army Reserve dual-status technicians are permitted to be members of Reserve units other than the units in which they are employed. This condition seriously degrades the

B-152420

These studies generally concluded that the status quo technician problem is of major concern and agree that status quo technicians are not mobilization assets. For example, the FTTA study concluded that:

"The excepted civil service status of the National Guard technician provides significant advantages over the competitive civil service status of an employee of the U.S. Army Reserve or the U.S. Air Force Reserve in the operation and management of a full-time support force.

"The U.S. Army Reserve has the least effective full-time support (technician) force of the seven Selected Reserve Components, primarily because of the fragmentation of its management program and its severe status quo problem."

The FTTA study recommended that all technicians be converted to excepted service dual-status comparable to the National Guard technician programs as authorized by section 709, title 32, United States Code.

The ORI study reported that there were mobilization capability problems inherent in having 26 percent of the Army Reserve technician force assigned to units other than those in which they were employed.

EFFORTS TO CORRECT PROBLEMS

The House Appropriations Committee recognized the status quo problem in each of its last two reports on the DOD appropriations bill.

In its report of July 27, 1978 (95-1398), the Committee attempted to deal with the problem by recommending a test program within each of the four Reserve components having civilian technicians, to determine if the reserves have the ability to attract and hire personnel in an active duty status by:

"(1) Converting the full-time training site support to military personnel in lieu of using commercial contract as proposed in the budget.

"(2) Filling all vacancies which occur in positions currently held by status quo technicians with full-time reservists on active duty.

B-152420

The latest proposal is being held in abeyance because DOD is implementing the test program suggested by the House Appropriations Committee. DOD plans to convert 436 Army and 68 Air Force Reserve technician vacancies to full-time military positions in fiscal year 1979. The conversion does not affect the 1,823 Army and Air Force status quo technicians unless some of the positions currently held by these technicians become vacant. They could then be converted to full-time military positions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In our opinion, status quo and misassigned technicians under the competitive civil service are not mobilization assets and would be unable to satisfy the military mission and requirements of the activated Reserve components. The dual-status technician force was established to satisfy a military need much the same as the active military force. Therefore, the military requirement should be the primary consideration. This requirement is clearly recognized for the National Guard technician force in the law governing its technician program. Legislative action is needed to obtain the same degree of military consideration and mobilization readiness for the Army and Air Force Reserve technician programs. The legislation should provide for converting reserve technician positions from the competitive to the excepted service.

Previous DOD legislative proposals concerning this subject have met strong CSC opposition because DOD failed to address CSC concerns outlined above. These concerns should be addressed in future proposed legislation. We view the change to excepted service as a reduction in force. For individuals who do not retire under discontinued service provisions, the legislation should be designed to allow members directly affected to find other employment. We suggest that DOD provide placement assistance for status quo technicians, and with this assistance, a 2-year period should be enough time to reassign and relocate the individuals concerned.

DOD is currently conducting a test program proposed by the House Appropriations Committee to determine the effectiveness of filling these positions with full-time military personnel. It has decided not to propose legislation to correct the status quo and misassigned technician problems until it has had an opportunity to review the results of the test.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 17 1979

Mr. H. L. Krieger
Director, Federal Personnel
and Compensation Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Krieger:

This is in reply to your letter to the Deputy Director, OMB of March 21, 1979 requesting comments on a GAO draft entitled, "How Manpower Effective is the Selected Reserve". (Code 965014).

While Reserve strength shortages are widely recognized and much effort is being put forth to resolve the problem, your draft highlights two additional and related areas that we believe are of critical importance -- unqualified personnel in units and high turnover. It is important that continued emphasis be placed on these two vital areas as manning levels are improved.

We feel a balanced program of cost and no cost initiatives to meet the most critical Reserve shortfalls is most important. The unique differences among Reserve Components must be recognized in the application of funding to areas such as full-time support and added incentives recommended in your draft. As pointed out, to bring Army full-time support to Air Force levels would cost over \$1 billion annually. As with any new initiatives, a comprehensive plan including total long range cost implications and an assessment of likely effectiveness is much preferable to a "piecemeal" approach.

We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report on the important subject of Reserve manpower effectiveness.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "David Sitrin".

David Sitrin
Deputy Associate Director
for National Security

of numerous reasons why a unit could be rated "not ready" or "marginally ready." Statements throughout the report are made to the effect "XX percent of the total units were rated either marginally ready or not ready." The implication is that all of these units are rated so on the basis of their personnel strength. In fact, equipment shortages, or other factors may be the detractor from a higher rating. The conclusions would have been valid only if they had been based upon the number of units with marginally ready or not ready ratings as a result of manpower shortages.

Certain displays indicate that for some components the readiness condition of units is classified, while for others it is not. Because of this, and assuming that there is no way to make the readiness comparisons using unclassified data for all components, we would recommend deletion of those sections which contain classified and unclassified data mixes.

Sincerely,



Richard Danzig
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)

(965014)

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23 APR 1979

Mr. H. L. Krieger
Director, Federal Personnel and
Compensation Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Krieger:

This is in reply to your letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding your draft report dated March 15, 1979, entitled "How Manpower Effective is the Selected Reserve," OSD Case Number 5117, (Code 965014).

We have reviewed the draft report and will provide detailed comments (most of which are intended to correct inaccuracies) directly to the GAO points of contact. This letter will be confined to comments of a general nature.

We realize that this report is directed at the Selected Reserve, and that other reports will address other portions of the Total Force. We think it would be wise, however, to make a special effort to guard against the risk that this fragmentation may mislead readers. For example, although the Selected Reserve does have manpower shortages it is not the only source for meeting wartime manpower requirements. Other sources of pretrained manpower (the Individual Ready Reserve, the Retired Reserve and members of the active forces who would be available for reassignment from peacetime occupational specialties to fill a wartime requirement) may greatly mitigate the effects of Selected Reserve shortfalls. For this reason, a valid assessment of manpower effectiveness should consider the requirements versus available manpower of the "Total Force."

In addition, we would encourage you to note the imperfect character of the Readiness Reporting System on which your report relies. The categories of reporting range from "not ready" to "fully ready." A number of statistical displays and resultant conclusions are based upon these readiness ratings. The report does not address the reasons for units being "not ready" or "marginally ready." Assigned strength is only one

B-152420

Implementation of this program will not solve the status quo and misassigned technicians problem because DOD must wait until these technicians retire or voluntarily leave before converting the positions to full-time military positions. Recent studies have concluded that this problem is of major concern and we believe that there is a need to take prompt action to improve the mobilization readiness of the reserve forces.

We recommend that DOD promptly submit to the Congress legislation placing Army and Air Force Reserve dual-status technicians under the excepted service, giving careful consideration to the concerns expressed by CSC.

- - - -

As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the Chairmen, House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force.

Sincerely yours,



H. L. Krieger
Director

B-152420

"(3) Filling all positions not manned at the end of fiscal year 1978 and all new positions added to the structure in fiscal year 1979 with full-time active duty military support. Although dual-status technician vacancies can continue to be filled by dual-status technicians, the Committee believes that the Chiefs of the Reserve forces should also attempt to fill some of these vacancies with full-time military support."

DOD has, since the early 1970s, submitted several legislative proposals to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to change Army and Air Force Reserve technicians from the competitive to the excepted service. No action has been taken on any of these proposals because of reservations about making the Reserve technicians identical to the National Guard and taking some rights away from competitive service technicians.

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) opposed the proposals because of unresolved questions concerning

- the status of civilian technicians presently on the rolls (i.e., whether they remain in the competitive service or at some point become excepted) and
- what happens to status quo technicians already on the rolls who either never had or who lose the required membership in the military Reserve unit through no fault of their own?

The CSC position emphasized that these are presently civilian, competitive service jobs, and the Government has made a commitment to the incumbents which should not be abridged.

In fiscal year 1978, DOD again forwarded a legislative proposal to OMB. The proposal recommended that Army and Air Force Reserve technicians be changed from the competitive service to the excepted service and required that a person losing his or her active reserve status for any reason be automatically terminated from the technician job. OMB coordinated the proposal with CSC. CSC had reservations about the proposal because it was similar to past proposals that CSC had opposed. Consequently, CSC never formally responded to the proposal. DOD and CSC have not resolved their differences because DOD does not agree with CSC's position that current incumbents not be affected by any changes.

B-152420

mobilization capability of the supported unit. Upon mobilization, these technicians should be assisting in the preparation of their units for the transition to active duty. However, at this crucial time, these technicians may have already been mobilized with their Reserve units and would not be available to the units in which they are employed. About 26 percent of the Army Reserve technicians are currently assigned to Reserve units other than the units in which they are employed as technicians. Again, the Air Force does not have a similar problem, due in part to a more effective management of the Air Force Reserve technician program including the requirement for a closer relationship between technician and military positions.

We recognize that the problem of status quo and misassigned technicians in the Army Reserve is due in part to the number of small, specialized units that are widely dispersed and often located in small population centers. By contrast, the Air Force Reserve units are more centrally located in areas in which there are larger Federal work force populations. However, the Army and Air National Guard have similar disparities in the location of their units and the excepted technician program, by law, does not permit status quo or misassigned technicians.

STUDIES ADDRESSING RESERVE
TECHNICIAN PROBLEMS

The problem of status quo technicians has been addressed by four major studies during the past 2 years. Three of these studies were made within the Department of Defense (DOD) and are entitled:

- "Report on Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve (FTTA)," June 1978.
- "Study on the Full-Time Personnel Requirements of the Reserve Components (Stroud Study)," December 1977.
- "Reserve Compensation System Study (RCSS)," June 1978.

The fourth study was made by Operations Research Institute, Inc. (ORI), Silver Spring, Maryland, under contract with Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, and is entitled "The Army Reserve Technician Study," June 1978. This study also addressed the issue of misassigned dual-status technicians.

B-152420

retention. Thus, Guard technicians are considered to be unlike other Federal civil service employees because technicians are required to be a military selected reservist first and a Federal employee second.

National Guard technicians are expressly authorized under the provisions of title 32 of the United States Code. As a condition of continued employment as a civil servant, they must be members of the military units for which their technician positions are authorized. These are "excepted service" appointments.

Full-time support for the Army and Air Force Reserves is largely provided by dual-status technicians. Unlike the National Guard technician program, there is no express statutory authority for the civilian technician programs of the Reserves. Thus, they come under the general civil service laws in title 5, United States Code, and are "competitive service" appointments.

The Navy and Marine Corps Reserves rely primarily on active duty military personnel for full-time support.

ARMY AND AIR FORCE RESERVE TECHNICIAN PROGRAMS

The Army and Air Force Reserve technician programs operate under "memoranda of understanding" between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the U.S. Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management). These memoranda specify the conditions of employment for Reserve technicians and recognize the requirement for dual-status of technicians for the purpose of providing enhanced mobilization readiness.

The memoranda provide that dual-status technicians who later lose their active Reserve status for reasons outside their control will not be involuntarily reassigned or removed. Voluntary release or loss of Reserve membership because of unsatisfactory military performance or conduct by a technician who has attained dual-status will be a basis for removal from his or her position. Provisions are made for assisting technicians who lose their dual-status for reasons beyond their control in finding other employment.

Marine Corps Reserve

As noted in the report (see p. 73), manpower shortages impact on the combat readiness of about one-third of the Marine Corps Reserve units (i.e., manpower shortages were the chief reason causing these units to be less than fully ready).

The report also points out that (see p. 73) unqualified personnel have a significant impact on the combat readiness of over half of the Marine Corps Reserve units.

OASD (MRA&L) COMMENT 4

Since certain displays indicated that for some components the readiness condition of units is classified while for others it is not, the Office of the Secretary of Defense recommends that we delete those sections containing classified and unclassified data mixes.

Our position

DOD took the position that, since some of the readiness condition data was classified and some was unclassified, we should delete the unclassified data. We disagree. In our opinion, the Congress and the public are entitled to as complete a picture as possible, and deleting this data would be contrary to this principle. However, classification of data by one service when similar data is unclassified by another service raises questions about the possibility of overclassification or inaccurate classification. These issues with respect to DOD were addressed in our recent report to the Congress, "Improved Executive Branch Oversight Needed For the Government's National Security Information Classification Program" (LCD-78-125, Mar. 9, 1979).

Air National Guard

As noted in this report (see pp shortages impair the readiness rating all Air National Guard flying units ages were the chief reason causing them to be less than fully ready).

The report also notes that (see p. 34) insufficiently trained personnel is a problem that affects all Air National Guard flying units.

Army National Guard

In this report (see p. 35) we detail the number of units at various levels of the Reserve Evaluation System data that 72 percent of the Army National Guard units in the strength are less than fully ready in the strength are as follows.

	Strength readiness rating	(%)
Fully ready	28%	
Substantially ready	21	
Marginally ready	21	
Not ready	30	

On page 37 of the report we show the percentage of people needed in wartime who are not qualified for their jobs. Reserve Evaluation System data shows that Army National Guard units were rated less than fully ready (or training).

	Qualification readiness rating
Fully ready	22%
Substantially ready	19
Marginally ready	27
Not ready	37

CHAPTER 9

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Official comments were received from the Acting Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) (OASD (MRA&L)) and the Deputy Associate Director for National Security, Office of Management and Budget. (See apps. II and III.) The Office of Management and Budget pointed out in its comments that, while Reserve strength shortages are widely recognized and much effort is being put forth to resolve the problem, the report highlights two additional and related areas that it believes are of critical importance--unqualified personnel in units and high turnover in personnel.

OASD (MRA&L) had, basically, four comments which follow.

OASD (MRA&L) COMMENT 1

Although the Selected Reserve does have manpower shortages, it is not the only source for meeting wartime manpower requirements, and the assessment of manpower effectiveness should consider the requirements versus available manpower of the total force.

Our position

We agree that the problems should be addressed in a total force concept. We agree also that the Selected Reserve has manpower shortages and that it is not the only source for meeting wartime manpower requirements. However, contrary to the inference contained in the OASD (MRA&L) comments, significant shortages of pretrained manpower exist in the Individual Reserves (see our report FPCD-79-3), particularly in the Army. That report also states that civilianization of some positions could reduce requirements in the Active Force but that neither data nor analysis is available to support a precise number. The Office of the Secretary of Defense estimate cited in that report was 10,000 positions a year, which is hardly significant. Moreover, a companion analysis which we are doing on the manpower effectiveness of the active-duty force indicates the active-duty force too, is short of wartime requirements. Therefore, we do not agree that other sources of manpower would greatly mitigate the effects of Selected Reserve "shortfalls."

DOD believes that these full-time forces constitute the single most dominant factor influencing unit combat readiness. These technicians contribute to the training of the part-time reservists.


Without the full-time support, the problem of manpower qualifications could be much worse.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY

Force Status Reports

As discussed earlier, the Force Status Reports are the primary documents used by the Air National Guard to report the combat readiness of flying units.

The combat readiness of the Air National Guard flying units, as detailed in the June 30, 1978, Force Status Reports, follows.



Twenty percent of the flying units are marginally ready or not ready. The 6 percent of flying units rated not ready were all undergoing conversion to new weapon systems. Even though this is better than the Air Force Reserve flying units' overall combat readiness ratings, it is still serious considering the great reliance placed on the Air National

The June 30, 1978, Force Status Reports indicate that manpower shortages impact on 15 units, or about 17 percent of all Air National Guard flying units. Of the 15 units affected by manpower shortages, 12 were rated substantially ready and 3 were rated marginally ready.

These manpower shortages affect the 15 units' ability to meet their total force commitment. For example, manpower shortages have limited 13 units to meeting 80 to 90 percent of their total force commitment. The remaining two units have been more limited by manpower shortages in that they can accomplish 73 and 74 percent of their total force commitment, respectively.

Manpower shortages have not affected Air National Guard flying units as much as they have those in the Air Force Reserve.

QUALIFICATIONS

As of April 30, 1978, about 69,000 airmen, or about 86.5 percent of all Air National Guard airmen, were considered qualified for their current positions. The unqualified airmen may be qualified in a lower skill level or in a different position; however, they are not qualified for their current positions. These airmen may be recent recruits and still in training or they may be experienced airmen who have changed job positions and are in the process of learning their new duties and responsibilities.

The June 30, 1978, Force Status Reports indicate that unqualified personnel is a problem that affects readiness ratings of 18 units, or about 20 percent of all Air National Guard flying units. Of these 18 units, 8 are rated substantially ready, 6 are rated marginally ready, and 4 are rated not ready. As with the Air Force Reserve, the primary deficiency is in aircrews. Of the 18 units, 14 have insufficient combat crews ready. Six of the units were undergoing conversions to new aircraft and, additionally, 3 were manned, but crews could not become fully qualified because of a systemwide C-130 aircraft problem.

Unqualified personnel have an impact on the 18 units' ability to meet their total force commitment. This is illustrated by the following chart.

CHAPTER 8

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We found that the Air National Guard has manpower problems that could limit the ability of some flying units to meet their total force commitment. For example:

- The Air National Guard has about 90 percent of the people it would need in wartime. Manpower shortages significantly affect the combat ability of 17 percent of all Air National Guard flying units.
- About 87 percent of all Air National Guard airmen are considered qualified for their current positions. Unqualified personnel affect the combat ability of about 20 percent of all flying units. Most of those affected were undergoing conversion to new aircraft or were prevented from becoming qualified because of aircraft groundings.
- Overall, 6 percent of the Air National Guard flying units were rated not ready to perform their wartime jobs. Additionally, 14 percent were rated marginally ready. All of the units rated not ready were undergoing conversions to new aircraft.

BACKGROUND

The organizational structure of the Air National Guard is designed to comply with the dual Federal-State role prescribed by law. During peacetime, Air National Guard units are under State control with no direct chain of command to the Department of the Air Force. During mobilization, Air National Guard units come under Federal control and are absorbed by individual gaining commands as discussed in chapter 7.

MANPOWER SHORTAGES

The Air National Guard has about 90 percent of the personnel required to meet its total force commitment. The following table summarizes its shortages as of June 30, 1978.

	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
Officers	12,723	11,113	1,610	87
Airmen	<u>88,307</u>	<u>79,794</u>	<u>8,513</u>	90
Total	<u>101,030</u>	<u>90,907</u>	<u>10,123</u>	90

to perform their probable wartime missions. The major command determines which areas are critical for particular units and missions.

During the 18-month period ended June 30, 1978, there were 23 operational readiness inspections conducted. Twenty-two of the units inspected received satisfactory ratings and one received an unsatisfactory rating.

Air Force officials said an operational readiness inspection tests the validity of the Force Status Reports combat readiness ratings and unit capability measurement study percentages. A satisfactory rating indicates the unit's rating in the Force Status Report and unit's capability measurement system are accurate. For example, given a unit that is rated marginally ready with a unit capability percentage of 65 percent, a satisfactory operational readiness inspection rating means that this unit is, in fact, marginally ready. A satisfactory rating does not mean the unit is fully ready and can accomplish all its total force commitment. A higher or lower operational readiness inspection rating indicates the Force Status Report and unit capability measurement system ratings need to be adjusted accordingly. It is also important to note that only units rated at least marginally ready are given operational readiness inspections.

The results of the operational readiness inspections for the last 18 months confirm that the Force Status Reports and the unit capability measurement system are reasonably accurate.

CONCLUSION

When comparing the readiness ratings of the Reserve forces in total, the selected air reserve components (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves) have the most units rated fully ready or substantially ready. However, the Air Force Reserve does have manpower problems that affect some flying units' ability to meet their total force commitment.

Manpower shortages directly affect the combat ability of 25 percent of the flying units and could also impair the ability of the active units that rely on mobilization augmentees in time of war or national emergency. Significant shortages exist in such career areas as physician, aircraft mechanic, and munitions and weapons maintenance.

In addition, unqualified personnel affect the combat ability of 37 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units and have impaired these units' abilities to meet their total force commitment.

DOD has determined that the complex modern Air Force Reserve mission requires a full-time air reserve technician work force of about 7,000 to insure stable, continuous administration of the part-time Reserve. This represents about 18 percent of the Reserve positions in units in which technicians are employed. The air reserve technician at the Reserve Numbered Air Force and unit level provides full-time management continuity of the part-time Reserve. Technicians are providing support to Reserve units at 38 different locations. The number authorized in a Reserve unit ranges from 2 to 495, depending on the unit's mission, equipment, and the work required to meet its training and administrative needs.

About 73 percent of the technicians are assigned to the aircraft maintenance function, with the remainder assigned primarily in the operations and personnel areas.

As a condition of employment, a technician must also be a reservist and be trained with the unit in which he is employed. Air Reserve technicians are full-time career civil service employees. They receive the pay of their civilian job and, in addition, receive military pay for all training drills performed in military status. Since technicians work at their skills on a full-time basis, they are available to train part-time reservists.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY

Force Status Reports

As mentioned earlier, the Force Status Reports are the primary documents used by the Air Force Reserve to report the combat readiness of its flying units. The chart below illustrates the combat readiness at June 30, 1978, according to the Force Status Reports ratings, for all Air Force Reserve flying units. 1/

1/As of April 16, 1979, the Air Force Reserve had improved from the data shown above: not ready, 2 percent; marginally ready, 15 percent; substantially ready, 44 percent; and fully ready, 39 percent.

<u>Career area</u>	<u>Required</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Shortage</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
Officers:				
Navigator	<u>a/1,047</u>	857	190	82
Physician	248	157	91	63
Transportation	282	249	33	88
Airmen:				
Aircraft main- tenance	6,169	4,832	1,337	78
Transportation	7,278	6,081	1,197	84
Aircraft systems maintenance	5,752	4,837	915	84
Structural/ pavement	1,535	1,287	248	84
Fire protection	989	793	196	80
Munitions and weapon maintenance	819	625	194	76
Food service	667	517	150	78
Sanitation	254	173	81	68
Fuels	287	223	64	78
Maintenance management system	241	203	38	84
Logistic plans	78	64	14	82

a/Air Force Reserve officials in May 1979 said that due to changes in requirements, they now have more navigators than needed.

The June 30, 1978, Force Status Reports indicated that manpower shortages did impact on the combat readiness of 10 Air Force Reserve flying units and would impair their ability to meet their total force commitment in wartime. This accounts for about 25 percent of all Air Force Reserve flying units.

Of the 10 units affected by manpower shortages, 4 were rated substantially ready, 2 units were rated marginally ready, and 4 were rated not ready.

These manpower shortages also affect the 10 units' ability to meet their total force commitment. For example, manpower shortages have limited six of these units' combat ability to such an extent that they can accomplish only 70 to 79 percent of their total force commitment. The remaining four units have also been limited in that manpower shortages restrict them to accomplishing no more than 80 to 89 percent of their total force commitment.

was given an overall rating of 57 percent. This means this squadron could accomplish about 57 percent of it's total force mission.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss manpower problems affecting the combat ability of the Air Force Reserve. Chapter 8 will discuss the effect manpower problems have on the Air National Guard combat ability.


AIR FORCE RESERVE MANPOWER SHORTAGES

Members of the Air Force Reserve are organized as units and as mobilization augmentees. Mobilization augmentees are Reserve members assigned to an Active Air Force unit to facilitate the additional workload during the period immediately following a declaration of war or national emergency or to respond to any situation that the national security requires. Unlike the Reserve units, mobilization augmentees are under the active unit's command organization in both peacetime and wartime.

Air Force Reserve officials said they did not use a peacetime manning objective but that they operated only with a wartime objective in mind. Therefore, references in this chapter and in chapter 8 to required strength relate to the personnel who would be required in wartime. The Air Force is restricted to a 90-percent funded level of its wartime requirement.

Overall, the Air Force Reserve has about 79 percent of the manpower required to meet its total force commitment. Shortages exist both in the Reserve units and in mobilization augmentee manpower. These shortages, as of June 30, 1978, are summarized below.

Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force
Reserve as Part of the Total Air Force Capability



do not require a report to Marine Corps Headquarters; they may be conducted during normal training evaluations at any unit level and time.

Since the system was officially implemented on July 1, 1978, the 4th Marine Division has made no formal evaluation, but it has made four informal evaluations. All four units passed.

The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, at the time of our review, had not implemented the system due to a shortage of qualified evaluators, all of whom must be school trained. Additionally, not all of the performance standards had been completed.

CONCLUSIONS

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve's ability to augment and reinforce the active-duty Marine Corps is limited by a lack of full wartime personnel strength and by unqualified people in some units.

According to the Force Status Reports, about one-third of Marine Corps Reserve units were rated either marginally ready or not ready. Apparently more units would fall into these categories if the assessments were made against wartime manpower strengths rather than peacetime strengths.

The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System, when fully implemented, seemingly has the capacity to provide more useful evaluations of the units than the Force Status Reports because it will test an individual unit's ability to perform its mission.

marginally ready or not ready. As discussed previously, two factors significantly contributing to the Marine Corps Reserve units rated marginally ready or not ready are manpower shortages and unqualified personnel.

Mobilization Operational
Readiness and Deployment Tests

The 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Air Wing are required to conduct Mobilization Operational Readiness and Deployment Tests of their subordinate units. These tests are designed to exercise and evaluate Selected Marine Corps Reserve units in the mobilization and deployment process. The tests concentrate on the performance of actions essential to the mobilization process and evaluate administrative readiness for mobilization, logistical and readiness for mobilization, emergency recall procedures, and embarkation readiness.

The tests are not designed to measure the units' ability to carry out their combat missions but, rather, to judge their ability to mobilize and deploy as units.

During fiscal year 1978 the Marine Corps Reserve conducted 18 tests, 10 in the 4th Marine Division and 8 in the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.

The 10 tests in the 4th Division involved 58 units. These 58 units were rated as follows in the administration and logistics areas.

	<u>Number of units</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Administration area:		
Fully ready	20	34
Substantially ready	27	47
Marginally ready	8	14
Not ready	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>58</u>	<u>100</u>
Logistics area:		
Fully ready	11	19
Substantially ready	36	62
Marginally ready	9	16
Not ready	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	<u>58</u>	<u>100</u>

The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reported that all 39 units participating in the eight tests were rated satisfactory.

The quality of personnel making up the force is difficult to define or measure. Traditionally, DOD has estimated the quality of the force by such items as mental aptitude and educational attainment of the force. In addition, other items, such as age profile and career status of the enlisted force, have been analyzed. While these measures may indicate problem areas in the force, the critical question is, "Can the Reserve units perform their wartime mission if called upon?" This question will be addressed in a later section of this chapter.

The following table summarizes the Selected Marine Corps Reserve's enlisted personnel mental category classification as of June 30, 1978.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Category I	701	2.3
Category II	5,423	18.3
Category III	11,096	37.3
Category IV and V	1,295	4.4
Unknown	<u>11,197</u>	<u>37.7</u>
Total	<u>29,712</u>	<u>100.0</u>

According to DOD statistics at the end of June 1978, about 28 percent of the enlisted personnel in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve were non-high-school graduates. High school graduates made up about 53 percent of the enlisted force, while enlisted personnel with some college and college graduates accounted for about 14 percent of the force.

Combat missions dictate that the Selected Marine Corps Reserve contain a relatively young and presumably vigorous force. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve generally has been successful in acquiring such a force.

As of June 30, 1978, only about 7 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve's enlisted personnel were 35-years old or older. The following table shows the Selected Marine Corps Reserves' enlisted personnel age distribution.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Under 25	22,105	74
26 to 34	5,491	19
35 to 44	1,521	5
45 to 54	435	1
55 and over	<u>160</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>29,712</u>	<u>100</u>

Marine Corps Reserve career field areas having significant shortages are listed below. All of the career areas except one have less than 80 percent of the people needed to meet the Marine Corps Reserve total force commitment in wartime.

<u>Career area</u>	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Actual assigned (note a)</u>		<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Percent assigned</u>
		<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Active</u>		
Officers:					
Logistics	106	8	34	64	40
Air control/air support/antiair warfare	195	110	9	76	61
Motor transportation	119	69	6	44	63
Enlisted personnel:					
Infantry	9,508	6,140	128	3,240	66
Operational communications	4,010	2,823	76	1,111	72
Supply administration	2,495	1,549	301	645	74
Field artillery	1,751	926	22	803	54
Avionics	1,149	419	430	300	74
Engineer, construc- tion equipment, and shore party	2,894	2,191	92	611	79
Telecommunications maintenance	847	306	88	453	47
Food service	853	355	16	482	43
Utilities	759	316	31	412	46
Tank and amphibian	965	559	13	393	59
Aviation ordnance	487	162	121	204	58
Ammunition and explosive ordnance disposal	400	82	3	315	21
Air control/air support/antiair warfare	493	192	24	277	44
Electronics maintenance	331	103	87	141	57
Logistics	397	184	25	188	53
Transportation	290	82	3	205	29
Intelligence	150	0	28	122	19
Aviation operations	367	239	69	59	84

a/As of September 1978.

CHAPTER 6

SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve under the total force policy must be capable of providing combat units on short notice to augment and to reinforce the Active Marine Force.

We found the Selected Marine Corps Reserve's ability to fulfill its obligation under the total force policy was somewhat limited.


- Although the Selected Marine Corps Reserve has about 97 percent of the people it needs in peacetime, it has about 84 percent of those who would be required in wartime.
- About 22 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve enlisted people are not fully qualified for the jobs assigned to them.
- About 34 percent of the people in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve at June 30, 1978, had entered during the previous 12 months.
- About one-third of the Marine Corps Reserve units were rated either marginally ready or not ready to perform their assigned missions.

MISSION OF THE SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve's mission is to provide trained units and qualified individual Marines for active duty in wartime or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve is composed essentially of the 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Together, these organizations comprise the 4th Division/Wing team. They are equipped to conduct combat operations on land, at sea in amphibious assault operations, and in the air. For example, a considerable portion of the total Marine Corps inventory is in the Reserve Force structure. About 33 percent of the heavy artillery, 40 percent of the tanks, 50 percent of the light-attack aircraft and 33 percent of the anti-aircraft missile resources are assigned to the Selected Reserve units.




As shown, 57 percent of the nonflying units of the Naval Air Reserve are rated either marginally ready or not ready to perform their assigned missions.

Telecommunications unit reports

The Naval Reserve reporting system for surface telecommunications units shows that 87 percent of the units are rated either marginally or not ready to perform their assigned missions as shown below.

As shown above, 64 percent of the Naval units reporting are rated either marginally ready or not ready to perform their wartime missions. The Naval air units had a higher percent of units rated not ready than did the Naval surface units, as shown below.



Personnel shortages, skill shortages, supply and equipment shortages, and transitioning of squadrons from older to newer models of aircraft were listed as reasons causing the Naval air units to be rated either marginally ready or not ready. Similar reasons were listed for the surface units reporting.

Navy required reports

Surface Reserve Readiness Reports

The Surface Reserve Readiness Report is a Naval system for determining and reporting surface unit readiness for non-hardware units that do not report under the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. The format for this system is in accord with the Navy Force Status Reports format. Overall evaluations of both personnel and training are computed for each unit, the lower of which constitutes the unit's overall readiness evaluation.

about 32,600 enlisted Naval reservists' mental category identification was not known. Of the 33,958 that were known, about 10 percent were in mental category I (the highest category), 42 percent in category II, 39 percent in category III, and 9 percent in mental categories IV and V.

About 60 percent (37,335) of the Naval Reserve enlisted personnel are high school graduates. Individuals having some college education number 13,918, or 22.4 percent of the enlisted force, and those who hold college degrees or have had some graduate studies number 4,194, or 6.7 percent. About 6,757 personnel, or 10.9 percent, are non-high-school graduates.

The median age for the enlisted Selected Naval Reserve as of June 30, 1978, was 30 years. There are about 18,860 enlisted personnel, or 28 percent, who are over 35 years of age and about 7 percent who are over 50 years of age. The age distribution of the Selected Naval Reserve follows.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
25 and under	41	0.2	19,124	28.7
26 to 35	8,688	48.6	25,808	38.7
36 to 50	8,641	48.3	14,344	21.5
51 to 60	446	2.5	4,516	6.8
Unknown	67	.4	2,768	4.2
Total	<u>17,883</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>66,560</u>	<u>100.0</u>

From fiscal years 1972 to 1978 (third quarter), the number of females in the Naval Reserve has increased from 1,405 personnel, or 1.1 percent, to 3,682, or 4.4 percent.

As of June 30, 1978, the female enlisted force numbered 3,290, or 5 percent of the total enlisted strength of 66,560 and the officer ranks numbered 392 females, representing 2.2 percent of the total officer strength of 17,883.

PERSONNEL TURNOVER

A Naval Reserve official testifying before the 1979 House Appropriations Committee stated:

"The downward trend in authorized and funded strength for the Naval Reserve during recent years and the related organizational and structural changes have created a level of turbulence which has impacted adversely upon recruiting and retention efforts in the Naval Reserve."

The personnel shortages are not evenly distributed throughout the Naval Reserve. For example, the following chart shows the total wartime requirements and actual strength for various types of Naval Reserve units.

<u>Type of unit</u>	<u>Wartime requirement</u>	<u>Actual strength (note a)</u>	<u>Percent manned</u>
Nonhardware units which will augment or reinforce units	58,021	50,828	88
Hardware units which will augment or reinforce other units (note b)	1,734	1,442	83
Hardware and other units which will remain units upon mobilization:			
Mine forces	1,100	770	70
Mobile logistics support forces	172	110	64
Surface combatant forces	3,279	2,293	70
Air forces	9,859	8,143	83
Cargo handling forces	768	650	85
Construction forces	13,000	10,287	79
Amphibious forces	662	361	55
Marine Corps support	4,603	2,803	61
Special warfare forces	2,103	1,738	83
Military sealift program	1,157	872	75
Navy control of shipping program	1,768	1,241	70
Supply systems program	737	607	82
Personnel systems program	780	620	79

a/As of September 1978.

b/Hardware units are those with their own equipment, such as Naval Reserve Force's ships or aircrafts.

QUALIFICATIONS

Most (77 percent) of the Naval Reserve unit commanders responding to our questionnaire said their units experienced

the Active Navy Pacific and Atlantic Fleet commanders. The manning level composition for an active ship assigned to the Naval Reserve is 65 percent active personnel and 35 percent Reserve personnel.

Naval Reserve air squadrons are organized under six Reserve air wings--two carrier air wings, two patrol wings, one tactical support wing, and one helicopter wing. These wings are separate and distinct from Active Naval wings with similar missions. In wartime or under mobilization conditions, Naval Reserve aviation squadrons and wings would be assigned to the operational control of appropriate Active Naval Fleet commanders.

Naval Reserve aircraft are directly assigned to the Reserve squadrons and are under the operational control of the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, in peacetime. Among the types of aircraft used by the Naval Air Reserve are the F-4 Phantom, the A-7 Corsair, E-2B Hawkeyes, and the P-3 Orion antisubmarine warfare aircraft.

The Naval Air Reserve Force and its support units are located at 19 flying sites and 9 nonflying sites around the country. The Naval Reserve operates six Naval air stations and two Naval air facilities.


NAVAL RESERVE STRENGTH ISSUE

The question, "How big should the Naval Reserve be?" has been hotly debated in recent years. The Navy says the Naval Reserve needs about 103,000 people. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved a force level of 52,000 in fiscal years 1977 and 1978 for the budget submissions. The fiscal year 1979 budget submission was reduced even further to a level of 51,400. But the Congress funded the Naval Reserve to provide for force levels of 96,500 in fiscal year 1977 and 87,000 in both fiscal years 1978 and 1979.

The DOD-proposed reduction for these years would have included the transfer of about 35,600 people to a Reserve status where they no longer take part in weekend drills.

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN THE NAVAL RESERVE

At June 30, 1978, the actual strength of the Naval Reserve was 84,443. If this is compared to DOD's proposed strength level of 51,400, the Navy would have about 33,000 people more than it needs. However, in our analysis we used the congressional level of 87,000. The Congress has funded for this level for the last 2 years, and this was



The chart above shows that about 88 percent of affiliated units are either marginally ready or not ready. Of particular concern is the fact that half of the affiliated units were rated as not ready to perform their wartime mission.

In summary, the average D-D+60 unit was rated higher and the average affiliated unit was rated lower than the typical Army Reserve unit.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army Reserve's capability to perform its mission as part of the total force Army is severely impaired by low unit strengths and shortages of job-qualified people.


turbulence. Contrary to the 60-percent non-prior-service objective the Army Reserve desires, only about 24 percent of the individuals entering the Army Reserve during fiscal year 1978 (as of June 30) were in the non-prior-service category.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY

Inadequate personnel strength, lack of skill-qualified individuals, and deficiencies in the quality of the force reflect on the Army Reserve's ability to perform its mission.

The Army classifies details of the Force Status Reports for Army Reserve units. Generally, these reports show that more than half of the Army Reserve units reporting into the system are not ready to perform their wartime missions. Slightly over half of the Army Reserve units reporting met their authorized readiness level.

The chart below shows the overall ability of Army Reserve units to perform their wartime missions as assessed by active-duty evaluators during training year 1977 using the Reserve Evaluation System.



1939 units
(excludes training units)

PERSONNEL QUALITY

In comparing the quality 1/ of enlisted personnel currently assigned in Army Reserve units to the quality of those assigned before the All-Volunteer Force, over half of the unit commanders responding to our questionnaire said the overall quality of the current force was lower. Moreover, about 16 percent of these commanders said the quality of the current enlisted force was much lower. Although the quality of personnel is difficult to define or measure, it generally has been evaluated chiefly in terms of mental aptitude and educational attainment, with some attention to non-prior-service and prior-service mix, age, and years of service.

At June 30, 1978, about 53 percent of the Army Reserve's enlisted force were in mental category III and below.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Category I (score over 92)	15,288	10
Category II (score 65 to 92)	53,692	35
Category III (score 31 to 64)	66,411	44
Category IV and V (score under 31)	14,223	9
Unknown	<u>2,782</u>	<u>2</u>
	<u>152,396</u>	<u>100</u>

At the end of June 1978, about 15 percent of the Army Reserve's enlisted personnel were non-high-school graduates. High school graduates accounted for about 50 percent of the enlisted force; personnel who attended college but did not graduate comprised 22 percent of the force; 12 percent of the force had obtained at least one college degree. The educational attainment of the remainder of the force was unknown.

Overall, the average age of the Army Reserve enlisted force is 29.8 years. In his previously cited testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, the Chief of the Army Reserve said, ideally, he would like to see reservists about the same age as their active-duty counterparts. He said the average age of the Army Reserve enlisted force is about 6 years older than the Active Army. The Chief of the Army Reserve stated that realistically the Army Reserve depends on prior-service people for the bulk of its accessions. As a result, the enlisted force will be 3 or 4 years older than the desired age. He said that:

1/As stated, quality is as used by the Department of Defense.

<u>Career management field</u>	<u>Actual strength (note a)</u>	<u>Qualified</u>	<u>Qualified as percent of wartime requirement</u>	<u>Qualified as percent of actual strength</u>
Total Army Reserve	152,396	110,674	53	73
Infantry	14,393	10,829	63	75
Combat engineering	5,048	3,832	43	76
Field artillery	2,940	2,130	35	72
Air defense artillery	123	101	34	82
Armor	1,046	759	58	73
Medical	15,444	11,095	47	72
Communications electronic operations	6,956	4,545	39	65
Mechanical maintenance	14,133	10,433	53	74
Law enforcement	5,749	4,442	54	77
General engineering	8,249	5,710	40	69
Communications electronic maintenance	1,320	827	43	63
Aviation maintenance	1,982	1,402	60	71
Supply and services	17,765	13,113	54	74
Transportation	9,883	7,147	51	72
Electronic warfare cryptologic operations	560	349	32	70

a/At June 30, 1978.

Relative to wartime manpower requirements, the number of skill-qualified personnel assigned in the selected career management fields ranges from 32 percent to 63 percent of the requirements. If we apply DOD's 95 percent availability factor, out of the 110,674 personnel assigned to units and qualified to perform their jobs, 105,140 would be available upon mobilization. This equates to 50 percent of the Army Reserve's wartime manpower need.

Effect of job-qualified shortages on units

About 81 percent of the Army Reserve commanders responding to our questionnaire said their units experienced a

ENLISTED PERSONNEL SHORTAGES BY SELECTED
CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELDS

Overall, the Army Reserve has a shortage of 57,177 of the enlisted personnel required in the event of mobilization; moreover, 83 percent of this total shortfall occurs in the lower grades. Career management fields that account for about 76 percent of the shortage in required strength are shown below.

<u>Career management field</u>	<u>Wartime required</u>	<u>Actual strength</u>	<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Shortages as a percent of required strength</u>
Total Army Reserve (Selected career management fields)	209,573	152,396	57,177	27
Infantry	17,309	14,393	2,916	17
Combat engineering	8,886	5,048	3,838	43
Field artillery	6,057	2,940	3,117	52
Air defense artillery	299	123	176	59
Armor	1,307	1,046	261	20
Medical	23,800	15,444	8,356	35
Communications electronic operations	11,648	6,956	4,692	40
Mechanical maintenance	19,810	14,133	5,677	29
Law enforcement	8,248	5,749	2,499	30
Aviation maintenance	2,337	1,982	355	15
Supply services	24,301	17,765	6,536	27
Transportation	14,027	9,883	4,144	30
Electronic warfare cryptologic operations	1,233	560	673	55

Numerically, the greatest shortage exists in the medical career field where a shortage of 8,356 personnel represents 35 percent of the total personnel required. Since the Army Reserve predominantly consists of combat support and combat service support and training organizations, substantial shortages in support-type career management fields adversely affect manpower preparedness of Army Reserve units.

1978, 188,599 Selected reservists were assigned to staff the Army Reserve's approximately 3,000 company-sized units.

Army Reserve activities and training throughout the United States are under the direction of the Forces Command except for individual and school training for individual reservists, which is supervised by the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

ARMY RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE

The Army Reserve's mission is to provide (1) units in accordance with Department of the Army mobilization plans in strength, state of training, and equipment sufficient to be deployed or to support mobilization requirements with a minimum of postmobilization training time and (2) trained individual reinforcements (officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel) as required by current mobilization programs for the purpose of replacing unit losses and filling active and Reserve component units.

Under Department of Defense total force policy, the Army Reserve is responsible for providing trained and equipped units capable and ready for immediate use as augmentation to the Active Forces for selective expansion and for limited or general war.

Under current mobilization plans, more Army Reserve units will be deployed during the first few weeks of mobilization than at any time in our history.

Shortages in personnel strength have significantly hampered the Army Reserve's capacity to accomplish its mission. In a statement before the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, during fiscal year 1979, the Chief, Army Reserve, acknowledged that manpower continued to be the Army Reserve's most critical problem. He informed the Subcommittee that:

"Since the end of the draft in 1972 the strength of the Army Reserve has declined to an alarmingly low level. This strength shortfall is the primary contributor to reduced force readiness. * * * Without adequate manning it is impossible for a unit to obtain the desired level of training and readiness."


Personnel shortages, lack of skill-qualified personnel, and the effect of these shortages and other personnel-related deficiencies on the Army Reserve's ability to provide trained

and companies. Our analysis on affiliated units during annual training indicates that high percentages of personnel shortages and low percentages of skill-qualified personnel significantly hamper some affiliated units' ability to perform their mission.


CONCLUSIONS

The Army National Guard has only a limited capability to perform its mission as a part of the total Army. The Guard does not have enough people, and of those they do have, a considerable portion are not qualified for the jobs assigned to them.

OVERALL TRAINING RATE
D-D+60 UNITS



185 D to D+60 battalions



Fully Ready


2,240 D to D+60 companies

The majority of these early deploying units were rated marginally ready and not ready. The average early deploying company was rated about the same as the typical National Guard company. The early deploying battalions, on the average, were rated slightly higher than the typical Guard battalion.

Affiliated units

The Army employs an affiliation program to enhance the readiness of National Guard units required to support mobilization contingencies through peacetime association with Active Army units. Active Army units assist and supervise the equipping and training of these affiliated Reserve units. National Guard units are affiliated with Active Army units in three categories.

1. Roundout. Reserve units assigned to an understructured Active Army division to raise it to the desired configuration.
2. Augmentation. Reserve units added to Active Army brigades or divisions, which have a standard battalion mix, to increase the combat power of the Active Army sponsor.



While 69 percent of the total Army Guard company-sized units were rated either marginally ready or not ready, 80 percent of the combat companies and 88 percent of the combat battalions were rated either marginally ready or not ready as shown below.

"The possible adverse impact of an aged force on unit readiness and the Army mobilization necessitate consideration of age as one of the evaluation criteria."

DOD statistics at June 30, 1978, show that 22 percent of the Army National Guard's enlisted members are 35 years old or older. The following table shows the Army Guard's current enlisted age distribution.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Under 25	111,130	35.9
25 to 34	129,001	41.7
35 to 44	48,020	15.5
45 to 54	18,084	5.8
55 and over	2,982	1.0
Unknown	184	.1
	<u>309,401</u>	<u>100.0</u>

In correlation with the age and grade objectives are the years of service and career/non-career-force objectives. The Army Guard desires that 74 percent of the enlisted force have under 6 years' service and that no enlisted personnel have over 32 years of service. Actually, instead of the desired 74 percent with under 6 years' service, at June 30, 1978, only 46 percent of the guardsmen were in this category. Army planners desire a high percentage of non-career personnel to provide the youthfulness and vigor needed in combat.

The percent of women in the Guard has increased from 0.1 percent in fiscal year 1973 to 3.5 percent at June 30, 1978. The Army Guard's Chief of Mobilization and Readiness Division said the growth in the number of females assigned to Army Guard units did not pose readiness problems. He also said females are not assigned to combat units.

PERFORMANCE ABILITY

Personnel strength, skill qualification, and overall quality of the Army Guard's enlisted force affects its ability to perform.

The Army uses the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Force Status and Identity Reports and the Army's Reserve Evaluation System to measure Reserve units' ability to perform their missions. Both systems indicate serious shortcomings in the ability of a number of units to perform and to sustain their performance, if they were called upon in wartime.

the intensity of the shortage of qualified people varied from unit to unit. For example, during training year 1977 about 15 percent of the Army Guard units did not have even half of the qualified individuals they would need in wartime, and about 31 percent of the Army Guard units had 80 percent or more of the people they would need in wartime already on board and qualified for their assigned jobs.

<u>Percent of those needed in war- time who are currently in the unit and qualified for their jobs</u>	<u>Number of National Guard units</u>	<u>Percent of all units</u>
Less than 50	490	15.3
50 to 59	448	14.0
60 to 69	598	18.6
70 to 79	686	21.4
80 to 89	527	16.4
90 to 100	<u>458</u>	<u>14.3</u>
	<u>3,207</u>	<u>100.0</u>

PERSONNEL TURNOVER

One significant factor which contributes to the low qualification level of the Army National Guard is personnel turnover. Qualified, experienced personnel are lost and, in turn, are replaced by personnel who may be new to the military or new to the job they are doing in the military.

Since the beginning of fiscal year 1973, the Army Guard has lost from 70,000 to 135,000 people each year and gained from 68,000 to 108,000 people each year. The overall strength level dropped about 40,000 between July 1, 1972, and June 30, 1978. Between June 1977 and June 1978, the Army Guard gained about 85,000 people and lost about 93,000. The losses were about 26 percent of beginning strength. These losses have ranged from 20 to 30 percent during the fiscal year 1973 through 1978 period.

As noted above, 75 percent of the Army Guard commanders responding to our questionnaire said their units experienced a shortage of qualified individuals. Of those experiencing a shortage, about 90 percent said personnel turnover was the underlying reason for this shortage.

PERSONNEL QUALITY

More than half of the Army Guard commanders responding to our questionnaire stated that the quality of enlisted personnel in their units was lower than the quality of enlisted personnel before the All-Volunteer Force.

significant shortage of Individual Ready reservists who would be used as fillers. Therefore, it would be difficult to even obtain sufficient fillers for all units. As a result, some units would have to either wait for fillers or deploy at strengths well below those authorized for wartime. He acknowledged that this condition reduces unit readiness.

Concern over personnel shortages was further expressed by the director, National Guard Bureau, in his statement before the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations. He stated that, in their Federal role, Guard units are scheduled for early deployment in most cases and represent a large part of the total Army's overall combat strength. He noted that Army Guard combat units have rapid mobilization missions and represent more than one-third of the Army's combat strength requirements. He further stated:

"The division and separate brigade-size units of the Guard as well as those which round out the active Army divisions provide a large portion of the forces necessary to provide the minimum flexibility consistent with the Army's mission. Maximum effectiveness requires full personnel complement as well as the equipment. This means full crews for our tanks, howitzers, and other arms and equipment. Our current personnel assets do not provide this essential state of affairs."

UNQUALIFIED PEOPLE IN ARMY GUARD UNITS

Compounding the problem of personnel shortages in the Army Guard is the relatively high percent of assigned personnel who are not qualified for their jobs. According to Army National Guard records, about 76 percent of the Guard's enlisted personnel are qualified for their assigned jobs.