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
**A Look At The
Air Force Inspector General's
Inspection System**

Inspection reports of the Air Force Inspector General provide valuable information, but the reports can be improved by developing more information on the underlying causes of problems disclosed during inspections and by reducing the number of non-mission-related findings.

The inspection system could be strengthened by reducing the high turnover of top-level inspection officials, replacing some military inspectors with civilians, and by giving the Inspector General more influence over the operations of command-level inspectors general.

Overinspection and duplication should be reduced.

This report was requested by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations.



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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-134192

The Honorable Jack Brooks
Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation
and National Security
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

HSE 01506

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of November 13, 1978, requested that we review inspector general operations in the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Logistics Agency. You also asked us to determine whether the new Department of Defense policy of releasing inspector general reports to us is a workable solution to the longstanding problem of obtaining inspection reports and records needed to perform our work.

We received excellent cooperation from Air Force officials and were provided copies of all reports and supporting documentation we requested. Accordingly, we were able to evaluate the effectiveness of the inspection system of the Air Force Inspector General. This report discusses the results of our review and contains several recommendations for strengthening the inspection system.

As you requested, we did not take the time to obtain written comments from the Air Force. However, we did discuss our findings with Air Force officials on an informal basis, and their comments are included in the report where appropriate.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report. At that time we will send copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

Sincerely yours,

John D. Heller

ACTING Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY, HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

A LOOK AT THE AIR FORCE
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S
INSPECTION SYSTEM

D I G E S T

Until November 1978, GAO was denied access to inspection reports and supporting documentation of the Air Force Inspector General's office. At that time, the Department of Defense adopted a new policy which permitted the release of such reports to GAO.

With this review, GAO undertook to determine whether or not this new policy would be a workable solution to the long-standing problem of access. Similar reviews are being made on Inspectors General of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Logistics Agency. (See app. I.)

ACCESS TO REPORTS NOT A
PROBLEM DURING REVIEW

The new Department of Defense policy, as implemented by the Air Force, seems to be a workable solution to GAO's previous problem of access. For the most part, GAO received excellent cooperation from Air Force officials and ultimately received copies of all reports requested during this review. (See p. 30.)

INSPECTION SYSTEM AND REPORTS
COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE

Headquarters and command-level inspectors general inspection reports provide valuable information on such topics as readiness, nuclear surety, functional problems, and, to some extent, management effectiveness within the Air Force. However, the management effectiveness inspection reports--the reports most frequently issued--can be improved by requiring inspectors to identify the underlying causes of problems disclosed during inspections, and by reducing the number of non-mission-related findings.

The system can be strengthened by reducing the high turnover of top-level inspection officials, by replacing some military inspectors with civilians, and by giving the Headquarters Inspector General more influence over command-level inspectors general. Some full-time inspectors could possibly be replaced by part-time personnel.

Finally, the overinspection and duplication that occur between inspector general and other inspections should be reduced.

HOW THE INSPECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS

The Air Force Inspector General is responsible for a variety of activities. GAO's review focused on the inspection function and did not include the safety, investigative, counterintelligence, or complaint functions of the Inspector General. During fiscal 1978, the inspection function cost about \$41 million and involved more than 1,500 persons. (See pp. 14 and 40.)

Headquarters and command-level inspectors general conduct different types of inspections, but their roles are similar in that they both serve as the "eyes and ears" of the people they work for.

Headquarters Inspector General personnel perform health service, functional, and systems acquisition management inspections for the Secretary of the Air Force and for the Air Force Chief of Staff. Command-level inspectors general perform management effectiveness, operational readiness, and nuclear surety inspections for the heads of their respective major commands or separate operating agencies. (See pp. 3-5)

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS CAN BE IMPROVED

Management effectiveness inspections have accounted for about 76 percent of the

command-level inspectors general efforts during fiscal 1974 through 1978, and improvements in them could have a significant impact on the inspector general system and the units inspected.

Air Force officials at command-level units told GAO that many management effectiveness inspection findings did not address some important areas, such as the mission of the unit, and that some Air Force personnel considered the findings to be insignificant and nitpicking. . GAO's review tended to support this. (See p. 8.)

Headquarters Inspector General staff recognized similar problems in a March 1979 background paper. That paper stated that inspectors tended to measure readily measurable administrative problems rather than more serious operational problems, and the cost of correcting the minor deficiencies that are identified may be too great in relation to ultimate savings and may divert unit attention from essential mission areas. (See p. 9.)

GAO's review of management effectiveness inspection reports also disclosed that the reports do not normally identify the underlying causes of problems. Thus, in attempting to correct the problems, unit officials waste resources treating symptoms rather than the cause. (See p. 10.)

LONGER INSPECTION TOURS FOR TOP
MANAGEMENT AND MORE CIVILIANS
COULD IMPROVE STABILITY

For the past 10 years, many top managers in the Air Force inspection system, including the Inspector General and his Deputy, have been reassigned before their tours expired. The same problem occurs at the command level. The normal tour for an inspector general and his top staff is 2 years. One command had 12 inspectors general in 15 years. (See p. 16.)

Two changes could alleviate this problem:

- Top personnel in the inspection system should serve their full tours of duty.
- More civilians should be placed in positions to back up top management personnel. Using more civilians would also provide continuity.

Civilians also could replace some military inspectors throughout the inspection system. Many nontraveling, administrative and support positions, as well as some traveling inspector positions, could be filled by civilians. This would bring the inspection function more in line with the DOD policy of filling each position with a civilian unless it can be proven that a military person is required. It could also result in cost savings because it generally costs less to fill positions with civilians than with military persons of comparable rank. (See pp. 18-20.)

USE OF MORE TEMPORARY INSPECTORS
MAY BE FEASIBLE

In lieu of full-time staff, the Navy and Marine Corps make extensive use of people who take part in an inspection and then return to their regular jobs. To a lesser extent, the Air Force uses temporary inspectors with special skills in such areas as legal, weather, engineering, personnel, and intelligence.

GAO is still assessing the effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps inspection systems and has noted that there are advantages and disadvantages associated with using temporary inspectors. The major advantage would be the reduction in budget and staffing levels. (See pp. 16-18.)

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL SHOULD
HAVE MORE INFLUENCE OVER
COMMAND-LEVEL INSPECTORS

Another way to strengthen the inspection system would be to have the Inspector

General exercise stronger control over needed improvements in command-level inspections. Under the present system, the Inspector General does not have direct control over the approximately 1,250 command-level inspector general personnel. Consequently, needed improvements cited by the Inspector General have not been corrected because major commanders or their inspectors general do not agree with them. (See p. 11.)

The Headquarters Inspector General could help insure that needed corrective actions are taken at command level if he would ask the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to issue directives, as necessary, to ensure that his recommendations for improvement are adopted. Another alternative would be to revise the organization of the inspection system so that the Inspector General would have direct control over all inspection resources. However, this alternative would conflict with the Air Force philosophy that the inspection function is an element of command, and the inspection resources the "eyes and ears" of commanders.

OVERINSPECTION AND DUPLICATION ARE PROBLEMS

Overinspection is a problem in the Air Force inspection system. (See pp. 23-24.) Duplication between Headquarters Inspector General inspections and Air Force Audit Agency reviews is being precluded through coordinating meetings. However, at the command level, GAO identified examples of duplication between reports issued by command inspectors general, other oversight review groups, and units' self-inspections made in preparation for an inspector general visit.

For example, at two of the three major commands, a self-inspection was conducted 2 to 3 months before the scheduled inspector general visit to ensure that prior inspection findings had been corrected and to keep the command from receiving an unsatisfactory rating. One unit used about 150 people, full-time for 2 weeks, and about 50 people, part-time for such a self-inspection--about three

times the number of personnel used by the command's inspector general in his subsequent inspection.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of the Air Force should:

- Issue directives to command-level inspectors general requiring that future management effectiveness inspection reports identify underlying causes of problems and that the reporting of minor deficiencies be reduced.
- Issue directives, as necessary, to command-level inspectors general requiring them to implement needed improvements suggested by the Headquarters Inspector General.
- Stabilize the top management of the system by requiring top military inspector general personnel to complete their tours of duty and by having civilians back up these personnel to promote continuity.
- Require that more civilians be used throughout the inspection system to the greatest extent possible.
- Expand the present staffing study on Air Force-wide inspection standards to include an analysis of the possibility of using more temporary inspectors and fewer full-time inspectors.
- Direct that the duplication occurring between inspector general reviews, self-inspections, and other inspections be reduced, possibly by increasing the number of "no-notice" inspector general inspections to limit the extensive pre-inspection that occurs in units about to be reviewed by inspector general personnel.

As instructed by the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Government Operations Committee, GAO did not obtain written comments from the Air Force. However, GAO considered the views of Air Force officials in preparing this report.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	automatic data processing
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, we could not evaluate the effectiveness of the Air Force Inspector General's inspection system because the Air Force had denied us access to inspection reports and supporting documentation. In November 1978 the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted a new policy for releasing inspector general reports to us. The Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations, subsequently asked us to determine whether or not this new policy would be a workable solution to this longstanding problem of access by reviewing the inspector general functions of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Defense Logistics Agency. Our first review, and the subject of this report, is the Air Force. (See app. I.)

HOW THE INSPECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS

The Air Force inspection system was established in 1947 under authority of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 8032 (b)(2), which does not mention an inspector general but provides that the air staff should investigate and report on the efficiency of the Air Force and its preparation for military operations. Air Force Regulation 123-1 broadened this responsibility by extending inspection activities into all areas of Air Force operations.

The Air Force Inspector General is responsible for a variety of activities. As agreed with representatives of the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, our review focused on the inspection function and did not include the safety, investigative, counterintelligence, or complaint functions of the Inspector General. 1/

During fiscal 1978, the inspection function cost about \$41 million and involved more than 1,500 persons. Approximately 250 members of the inspection staff were under the direction of Headquarters, which includes the Inspector General staff in Washington, D.C., and the deputy's staff at Norton Air Force Base in California. About 1,250 staff members

1/A brief overview of these functions is provided in app. V.

served in 12 Air Force major commands, 2 numbered Air Forces (the 9th and 12th), and the Air Force Academy and Air Force Reserve.

EVALUATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY OF INSPECTORS

The inspector general personnel are not independent in the sense that internal auditors are, primarily because they are not permanently assigned to the inspection function. They are selected for a 2- to 3-year tour of duty and then return to their functional areas. The temporary nature of this arrangement increases the possibility that inspectors could be influenced by former ties or anticipated relationships with commands. In addition, because of the way the system is designed, the command-level inspectors are not organizationally independent, as internal auditors are, because they must answer to the heads of major commands.

While this lack of independence could potentially reduce objectivity, we did not note any instances during our review when inspectors were not objective, including those instances where we accompanied inspectors on their reviews.

AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GENERAL SYSTEM DIFFERS FROM CIVIL AGENCY COUNTERPARTS

The Air Force inspector general system is basically different from its civil agency counterparts that were established on October 12, 1978, by Public Law 95-452. The civil agency inspectors general were created primarily to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. They are centralized, independent organizations with combined audit and investigative capabilities. The civil agency inspectors general are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for an unlimited term. They report to and are under the general supervision of the agency head. They also report results of their efforts periodically to the Congress. The civil agency inspectors general can be removed from office only by the President who must justify the action to the Congress.

The Air Force Inspector General inspection system is concerned primarily with improving morale, discipline, readiness, and efficiency of Air Force operations rather than detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. The Air Force Audit Agency carries out many of the functions performed by civilian inspectors general. The Air Force inspection system is not specifically designed to uncover fraud, although it has that capability. The Inspector General's Office of Special

Investigations has primary responsibility for fraud investigations within the Air Force.

Members of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations along with the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center and the Air Force Audit Agency form the Audit, Inspection, and Investigative Council--also known as the Fraud Council. Formed at the direction of the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Fraud Council is chartered to inhibit the potential for fraud by

- coordinating efforts to detect, review, and assess causes of fraud;
- ensuring that adequate controls exist to deter improper practices;
- improving procedures for early detection of problems; and
- ensuring information exchange.

The Council has developed a list of programs and functions within the Air Force which are susceptible to fraud. Periodically, this list is modified and disseminated to Air Force resource managers as part of a continuing effort to identify areas which require close surveillance.

TYPES OF INSPECTIONS PERFORMED

Headquarters and command-level inspectors general conduct different types of inspections, but they both serve as the "eyes and ears" of the people they work for. The Headquarters Inspector General personnel perform their inspections for the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff, while the command level inspectors general work for the heads of their respective major commands or separate operating agencies.

Inspections performed by Headquarters Inspector General personnel

Air Force Headquarters Inspector General personnel perform four types of inspections:

1. Health service management inspections of Air Force hospitals and dispensaries to determine whether Air Force regulations are being followed.

2. Functional management inspections of specific programs, functions, or activities on an Air-Force-wide or commandwide basis.
3. Over-the-shoulder inspections of the effectiveness of inspections performed by a major command or separate operating agency inspector general.
4. System acquisition management inspections of the developmental, technical, and financial progress of a system, such as a major weapons system.

Inspections performed by command-level
inspector general personnel

Based on the Air Force concept that inspection is an inherent responsibility of commanding, major commands and selected separate operating agencies and numbered air forces appoint inspectors general to carry out the functions of the inspection system. These inspectors general report to their respective commanders, and their inspection responsibilities are limited to subordinate units within their respective organizations.

At the major command level, inspector general personnel are primarily performing three types of reviews:

1. Management effectiveness inspections are primarily compliance oriented and use checklists to evaluate the management of an organization or activity.
2. Operational readiness inspections evaluate the operational capability of combat or combat-support units to accomplish their assigned wartime missions.
3. Nuclear surety inspections evaluate a unit's ability to perform its nuclear mission by assessing the units capability to receive, store, maintain, handle, load, transport, and ensure the security of nuclear weapons.

Except for nuclear surety inspections, which must be made every 18 months, inspections are not made at any set intervals. Shown below are the number of inspections made from 1974 through 1978.

Headquarters <u>inspections</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>Total</u>
Health service management	76	111	100	89	102	478
Functional management	33	27	36	57	30	183
Over-the-shoulder	44	48	17	10	5	124
System acquisition management	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
Total Headquarters	155	188	155	162	140	800
Major command <u>inspections</u>						
Management effectiveness	956	806	1,190	1,183	1,120	5,255
Operational readiness	247	183	184	208	183	1,005
Nuclear surety	<u>180</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>635</u>
Total major commands	<u>1,383</u>	<u>1,126</u>	<u>1,488</u>	<u>1,493</u>	<u>1,405</u>	<u>6,895</u>
TOTAL	<u>1,538</u>	<u>1,314</u>	<u>1,643</u>	<u>1,655</u>	<u>1,545</u>	<u>7,695</u>

Air Force officials said that although health services management inspections are performed more often than others, they require relatively few staff-days. The majority of headquarters inspection staff-days are devoted to functional and system acquisition management inspections. As indicated above, the number of over-the-shoulder inspections has decreased substantially from 1975 to 1978; Air Force officials stated that special studies performed by the Inspector General decreased the time available for those reviews.

At the command level, management effectiveness inspections consume the majority of inspection staff-days. The number of major command operational readiness and nuclear surety inspections has decreased somewhat since 1974.

We reviewed a number of reports from each of the types of inspections conducted by Headquarters and command-level inspectors general. The reports contained information that would be of value to Air Force officials concerned with readiness, nuclear surety, functional problems, and management

effectiveness. Based on our review of these reports and discussions with Headquarters personnel and individuals at the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Logistics Command, we developed conclusions and recommendations for

- improving management effectiveness inspections and reports;
- strengthening the inspection system; and
- reducing overinspection and duplication of inspection effort.

These matters are discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTIONS

AND REPORTS CAN BE IMPROVED

Inspectors are not required to prepare formal working papers to support their findings, so documented evidence of the quality of their work was scarce. Instead of working papers, inspectors rely on a validation process whereby officials are briefed and agreement reached on reported findings. We interviewed officials, followed up on selected inspection findings to determine if corrective actions had been taken, and observed inspections at three commands to determine the quality of their work.

The Air Force officials we interviewed generally believed the work of inspectors is of high quality. Our observations of inspections tended to support this opinion. We also noted that corrective action was taken on findings and that reports contained few repeat findings, which indicated that the findings or their symptoms were being addressed. However, we believe that management effectiveness inspections and reports can be improved.

Management effectiveness inspections have accounted for about 76 percent of the command-level inspectors general efforts during fiscal 1974 through 1978. Consequently, improvements in those inspections can have a significant impact on the entire Air Force inspector general system and the units inspected. Air Force officials we questioned at inspected command-level units said that many management effectiveness inspection findings did not address some important areas, such as the mission of the unit, and some Air Force personnel considered the findings to be insignificant and nitpicking. Our review of reports tended to support this.

Our review of management effectiveness inspection reports also disclosed that the underlying causes of problems are not normally identified. Thus, in attempting to correct the problems, unit officials may be wasting resources by treating the symptoms rather than the cause.

Headquarters Inspector General staff have recognized the same problems and have made recommendations for improvement in these areas. However, since the Inspector General's suggestions to command-level inspectors general do not have to be adopted if major commanders do not agree with them, these suggestions have gone unheeded.

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTION
REPORTS INCLUDE MINOR DEFICIENCIES

Although most unit personnel with whom we spoke rarely questioned the validity of inspector general findings in management effectiveness inspection reports, some did question their significance. Officials from units that were inspected and other command staff described the reported findings as follows:

- They do not touch on the effectiveness of operations.
- They are insignificant and nitpicking.
- About half the findings are significant; the other half deal with cleanliness and safety, which without repeated observation are of little benefit.
- The findings appear to be significant based on the way they are stated in the report but are not significant when all the facts are considered.
- The findings are subjective and judgmental in nature, but they are accepted because preparing a corrective action response is easier than detailing reasons for disagreement.

The management effectiveness inspection reports we reviewed included what appeared to be relatively minor non-mission-essential deficiencies, such as:

- Numerous vehicles which move slowly (25 miles per hour or less) did not have a "slow moving vehicle" emblem attached, as required.
- Tool boxes and tables throughout the shop were littered and dirty.
- Trash cans were overfilled.
- The base commander had not established procedures to provide sufficient space for an effective linen exchange program.
- The entrance did not have a vehicle access. Therefore, linen had to be transported to and from delivery trucks by rolling linen carts over sidewalks to the nearest parking lot, which exposed the linen to the elements.

--The commissary store manager had not followed established procedures to ensure correct pricing of grocery items.

--The shelf prices did not agree with the prices displayed on 9 of 100 merchandise items checked.

Although we found that the management effectiveness inspections were primarily compliance oriented, command officials stated that in a military organization, compliance with regulation and directives was necessary to ensure discipline, and measuring compliance constituted a form of management effectiveness analysis. Also, officials at one command stated that inspectors should inquire into all areas, not just mission-essential ones. They said that reports should include minor deficiencies as well as significant ones because other units receiving copies of the reports could benefit.

On the other hand, Headquarters Inspector General staff observations, as pointed out in a background paper prepared in March 1979, recognized problems similar to those we noted. Those observations included the following:

--Inspectors often tend to measure things that are readily measurable rather than those that may be essential to the mission of that unit. Significant high payoff deficiencies may go undetected.

--Overemphasis on inspecting administrative procedures tends to mask poor service and mission support in some areas.

--The fact that the cost of correcting minor deficiencies may be too great in relation to the ultimate payoff is often misunderstood.

In a recent over-the-shoulder inspection, Headquarters staff observed that command inspection teams spent a considerable amount of time inspecting compliance-type items which could have been eliminated by examining management indicators in the planning and preparation phase. As a solution, the staff recommended that sampling techniques be used. As a result, more time would be allowed to examine management issues above the compliance level, and the number of inspectors required could be reduced. We agree with this recommendation.

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTIONS
DO NOT FULLY DEVELOP FINDINGS

Inspection regulations require that inspectors identify causes to problems that are noted during inspections. However, our review of management effectiveness inspection reports disclosed that inspectors normally do not do this. Thus, in attempting to correct the problems, officials may be wasting resources by treating the symptoms rather than the cause.

For example, the following elements of a finding appeared in an inspection report we reviewed:

Condition	\$8,495 was allotted to refurbish a mobile calibration van although only \$7,000 was available
Criteria	Air Force and statutory directives
Effect	Violation of prescribed directives
Cause	Not identified
Recommendations	Management should emphasize (1) the problem area and (2) training buying personnel.

The report did not identify the cause of the overexpenditure of funds, although the recommendation indicated that training was the appropriate resolution. Also, nothing was provided to give management a perception of how many contracts were reviewed or how widespread the problem was.

We believe that findings are not always adequately developed because of the approach used to perform management effectiveness inspections. These inspections are based primarily on comprehensive checklists that are broad in scope and not directed toward mission-essential areas. Also, the inspections are usually conducted in a very short time (4 to 8 days, exclusive of preparing the report). Therefore, even though as many as 80 inspectors may conduct an inspection, they will probably not fully develop their findings and identify causes of problems.

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL CANNOT REQUIRE
COMMAND INSPECTORS GENERAL TO MAKE
NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS

Although the Inspector General is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force for the entire inspection system and for providing assistance in ensuring that resources are effectively and efficiently managed, he does not have direct authority over the command inspectors general. Consequently, over the years, the inspection policy and guidance has tended to be general and advisory in nature. Headquarters' primary vehicles for providing guidance to command inspectors general are Air Force Regulation 123-1 and recommendations resulting from over-the-shoulder inspections. Command inspectors general are not obligated to abide by Headquarters suggestions or recommendations.

Over the years, the Inspector General has commented on such things as the lack of realism in operational readiness inspections and the need for more mission-oriented findings in management effectiveness inspections. Several improvements have been made in the operational readiness inspections through adoption of the Inspector General's suggestions. For example, more joint operational readiness inspections utilizing resources from different commands are now conducted to present a more realistic wartime situation.

On the other hand, some Inspector General policies and recommendations which appear to have merit have been dropped, not implemented, or adopted slowly. For example, in a recent over-the-shoulder inspection, the Inspector General recommended fewer inspections at one command--based on the extent of efforts by other review groups; the commander replied by stating he would study the situation. The three commands we reviewed still are not complying fully with the Inspector General's regulations requiring command inspectors to identify underlying causes of weaknesses noted in their inspections.

The Headquarters Inspector General is attempting to strengthen and standardize the inspection system by replacing terms such as "should" and "desired" in inspection regulations with words such as "will" and "required." The Inspector General also plans to develop mission-oriented management effectiveness inspection guidelines which, if approved and properly implemented, would result in a more effective inspection system.

CONCLUSIONS

The management effectiveness inspections and reports, which comprise the majority of the Air Force inspection system's effort, provide major commanders with information on how well their subordinate units are complying with regulations and directives. However, we believe that the effectiveness of these inspections could be improved if the number of relatively minor deficiencies reported is reduced, and the underlying causes of problems identified are determined and reported.

The Headquarters Inspector General has also recognized that improvements are needed and is proposing action which, if implemented, would strengthen the inspection system. To ensure that the Air Force inspection system is strengthened, we believe strong control is needed. Several alternatives are available for accomplishing this. One alternative would be to completely centralize the system and place all inspectors general under Headquarters' direct control. However, this would require a basic change in the Air Force's inspection system philosophy since the Air Force believes that inspection is a function of command, and inspectors at the command level should be under the direction of major commanders.

Another alternative would be to ensure that Headquarters guidance is implemented by the major commands by direction of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force. Because the Inspector General reports directly to those two officials, we believe that he has an avenue to bring about needed changes and that he should not hesitate to use this avenue to strengthen the inspection system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the Air Force Inspector General inspection system, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force issue directives to command-level inspectors general requiring that future management effectiveness inspection reports identify underlying causes of problems. Those directives should also require that the reporting of minor deficiencies be reduced. We also recommend that the Secretary evaluate future improvements suggested by the Inspector General and issue directives to command-level inspectors general requiring them to adopt those with which the Secretary concurs.

CHAPTER 3

OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRENGTHENING

THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

During our review, we looked at staffing levels, qualifications, training, and length of assignment of inspectors. We also reviewed the use being made of additional staff to supplement the full-time inspection force and the extent to which civilian inspectors are used in the inspection system. We found that longer inspection tours for top inspection management personnel and the use of more civilians could provide more stability and possible cost savings. It may also be possible to reduce the number of full-time inspectors by using more part-time staff.

INSPECTION STAFFING LEVELS RELATIVELY CONSTANT

In fiscal 1978, the Inspector General had 3,352 persons assigned to him, including 1,503 for inspection and 1,849 for noninspection functions. Of the noninspection personnel, 39 were assigned to Headquarters, including the Inspector General and his staff; 287 were assigned to the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center; 1,473 were assigned to the Office of Special Investigations; and 50 were assigned to the Office of Security Police.

During fiscal 1974 through 1978, inspection staffing levels were relatively constant at about 1,500 persons. In fiscal 1978, 255 persons were assigned to Headquarters and 1,248 to the various command inspectors general. The chart on the following page shows the authorized inspection staff for fiscal 1978.

NO AIR-FORCE-WIDE STANDARDS EXIST FOR INSPECTION STAFFING LEVELS AT MAJOR COMMANDS

The number of inspectors assigned to the Air Force inspection system is determined primarily by the inspectors' respective commanders based on such factors as the number of units to be inspected, command population, and number of inspections. By comparing the number of inspectors to the total number of personnel in the major commands and separate operating agencies, we found that most commands maintained a ratio of one inspector to every 450 to 700 persons in the command. Several smaller organizations, such as the Air Force Academy and the Alaskan Air Command, had a ratio of about one

Authorized Inspection Staff for Fiscal 1978

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>		
Headquarters group:				
Office of the Inspector General	4	-	2	6
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center:				
Directorate of Inspection	141	17	23	181
Medical Inspection Division	38	12	4	54
Nuclear Surety Inspection	5	-	-	5
Office of Special Investigations (note a)	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>9</u>
Total Headquarters	196	30	29	255
Commands/separate operating agencies:				
Tactical Air Command (note b)	126	76	8	210
Military Airlift Command	81	51	8	140
Air Force Logistics Command	51	3	35	89
Aerospace Defense Command	51	60	7	118
Strategic Air Command	79	23	5	107
Air Force Communications Service	44	67	8	119
Air Force Systems Command	75	18	14	107
U.S. Air Force in Europe	50	39	5	94
Air Training Command	67	47	16	130
Pacific Air Forces	43	28	4	75
Air Force Reserve (note c)	6	8	2	16
U.S. Air Force Security Service	15	9	1	25
Alaskan Air Command	5	2	2	9
U.S. Air Force Academy (note c)	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>
Total commands	<u>695</u>	<u>436</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>1,248</u>
TOTAL	<u>891</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>1,503</u>

a/These inspectors report to the Director, Office of Special Investigations and perform inspections similar to the major commands/separate operating agencies.

b/Includes two numbered air forces (9th and 12th).

c/Separate operating agencies.

inspector to every 1,000 persons. This difference apparently exists because the Air Force has no servicewide staffing standards for the inspection function, so each major command and separate operating agency develops and maintains its own standards for inspection staffing.

The Air Force is conducting a feasibility study to determine if Air-Force-wide staffing standards could be developed for the inspection function in lieu of the individual determinations that are currently being made.

ASSIGNMENT AS INSPECTORS

Selection of military personnel for inspection duty depends on the rank or grade and the Air Force specialty of the position being staffed. Generals are selected and assigned at the Air Force Headquarters level with concurrence of the Inspector General, or in the case of major commands, of the commander. All other inspector positions are filled by the personnel centers and approved by the appropriate headquarters or command inspector general with the vacancy.

Selections for inspection duty result either from recommendations of personnel serving as inspectors or from screening eligibility listings provided by the personnel centers.

QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING OF INSPECTORS

Air Force regulations state that inspectors should (1) be fully qualified and highly experienced in their functional areas and (2) complete the inspection school before performing duties as an inspector, but at most, no later than 90 days after assignment. Team chiefs are required to attend the school before assuming their duty.

The inspection school, a 1-week course given at the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, consists primarily of lectures, slide presentations, and work sessions. The major objective of the course is to get the new inspectors to think about their assignment responsibilities and writing. We found that about 83 percent of the new inspectors whose records we examined attended the inspection school within 90 days of assignment.

Personnel assigned to inspector duty are generally well educated. Of 213 officer records examined, 204 had bachelor degrees and 116 of these had masters degrees. Generally, the officers assigned to inspection duty have had many years of experience in the areas they inspect.

DUTY TOURS FOR INSPECTORS

Air Force regulations state that the normal inspection duty tour is 2 years, with provisions for a 1-year extension. The Air Force believes that a tour in the inspection function broadens an officer's knowledge in particular skills but believes that continued assignments are not productive; an infusion of new objectivity is required periodically for this function. Review of records at Headquarters and two commands indicated that about 90 percent of the personnel were assigned for 2- or 3-year tours, and about 10 percent were assigned for more than 3 years.

Short tour of top management personnel causes turmoil

Since 1968, new inspectors general and deputies for inspection have been appointed more frequently than at 2-year intervals. Concern over this was expressed in a January 1975 Inspector General memorandum to the Air Force Chief of Staff which stated in part that:

"You should recognize there has been considerable turmoil in the Air Force inspection side of the house over the past 18 months or so--there have been three chiefs, three TIGs [Inspectors General], three DIGs [Deputy Inspectors General for Inspection and Safety], and three Directors of Inspection--and each has, to some degree or another, tried to revamp the system."

The problem cited by the Inspector General extends to the command level. At one command reviewed, the inspector general position had been filled by 12 people in the last 15 years.

USE OF ADDITIONAL STAFF TO SUPPLEMENT FULL-TIME INSPECTION FORCE

Air Force regulations state that Headquarters staff offices, major commands, and separate operating agencies will make personnel with special skills available to assist in inspections. Headquarters and command inspectors general use additional personnel on temporary assignments to augment their permanent work force. However, none of the activities maintained costs for the augmented services.

During fiscal 1978, the Strategic Air Command used 49 temporary inspectors during 93 of its inspections. Their areas of expertise were related to legal, weather, administration, chaplain, veterinary, information services, and command control functions.

The Air Force Logistics Command used 38 temporary inspectors for 30 of 50 inspections conducted during the period October 1977 through January 1979. Their areas of expertise were mostly related to quality assurance, comptroller, engineering, logistics, staffing, and investigative functions.

During calendar 1978, the Tactical Air Command used a total of 53 temporary inspectors on 21 of its 59 inspections. Most of the augmented functions were related to operations and combat support. The 9th Air Force, which is a command within the Tactical Air Command, used 79 temporary inspectors on 21 of its 24 inspections in fiscal 1978.

At the headquarters level, additional inspectors are used primarily in the inspection areas of logistics, resource management, engineering services, human resources, and intelligence. Recent history shows that the extent they were used depended on the function inspected. For example, they were used for about 55 percent of the logistics inspections, 75 percent of the resource management inspections, 80 percent of the engineering services inspections, 70 percent of the human resource inspections, and 60 percent of the intelligence inspections.

Opinions on use of temporary staff
in lieu of full-time inspectors

Unlike the Air Force, which augments its staff of 1,500 inspectors, the Navy and the Marine Corps, because of budgetary and staffing limitations, make extensive use of temporary inspectors in lieu of maintaining a large, full-time staff. For example, the Navy, is able to maintain a full-time staff of only about 100 inspectors. We obtained views of Air Force officials on the advantages and disadvantages of using temporary staff for this purpose.

The Tactical Air Command inspector general stated that the inspection process would lose some effectiveness if more temporary and fewer full-time inspectors were used. He stated that obtaining temporary staff for the period necessary to plan and conduct the inspection was difficult.

The Strategic Air Command assistant inspector general did not favor extensive use of temporary inspectors because they are away from their permanently assigned duties for the period they serve as inspectors. He stated that it was costly to train temporary inspectors and more extensive use of them could result in ineffective inspections because of repeated and frequent turnover of personnel.

An Air Force Logistics Command inspector general official stated that the advantages of using temporary inspectors included (1) maintaining a minimum level of authorized staff because some inspector functions are not always needed and (2) being able to obtain the person with the most expertise in a specific area for a limited time. In addition, staff relationships with and confidence in the Inspector General might improve because the temporary inspector is provided the opportunity to make a field visit, see how the inspectors operate, and make input to an inspection.

He also listed possible disadvantages which included (1) possible increased staffing requirements for the activities furnishing the temporary inspector, (2) increased travel costs because the number of personnel conducting an inspection could increase, (3) not having a choice on the assigned temporary inspectors, and (4) reduced objectivity because, in some cases, when temporary inspectors return to their permanent assignment, they may have to respond to their own findings. However as noted in chapter 1, even the permanent inspectors may not be candid because of prior or anticipated relationships with the inspected activities.

USE OF MORE CIVILIAN INSPECTORS COULD RESULT IN SAVINGS

The Air Force inspection system is not employing civilians as extensively as it could. Currently, civilians constitute about 10 percent of the inspection staff, primarily in nontraveling, management and administrative functions rather than as inspectors. However, military personnel are also used in these positions, as we found at one command where 29 nontraveling, management and administrative positions were filled by military personnel. At one of the three commands we visited, civilians were not used as inspectors. The other two commands had a total of nine civilian inspectors; Headquarters had one civilian inspector.

DOD Directive 1100.4 states that the military services should employ civilians in positions which do not:

- Require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness.
- Require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved.
- Entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment.

DOD Directive 1100.9 states that management positions in professional support activities should be designated as military or civilian according to the following criteria:

- Military. When required by law, when the position requires skills and knowledge acquired primarily through military training and experience, and when experience in the position is essential to enable officer personnel to assume responsibilities necessary to maintain combat-related support and proper career development.
- Civilian. When the skills required are usually found in the civilian economy and continuity of management and experience is essential and can be better provided by civilians.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), in an article for the Defense Management Journal, October 1976, stated that:

"Defense Department policy is that each position be filled by a civilian unless it can be proven that a military person is required. As a result, the burden of proof is on the Services to show that each position programed as a military space can only be filled by a military person."

In our report to the Congress entitled "The Air Force Audit Agency Can Be Made More Effective" (FGMSD 78-4, Nov. 11, 1977), we recommended that civilians be appointed to most auditor positions filled by military personnel to bring the agency into compliance with DOD directives. By comparing civilian and military personnel costs, 1/ we showed a potential cost saving of \$2.14 million. The recommendation was adopted and the agency is making the conversion.

In our opinion, savings are also possible if civilians are appointed to fill some of the military personnel slots in the inspection system. The extent of the cost savings would be contingent upon whether there was an overall decrease in Air Force personnel, either by attrition or by a reduction in recruiting brought about by the replacement of some military inspectors with civilians.

1/To make the comparison, we used the Senate Committee on Appropriations' analysis of relative comparability of civilian and military compensation and benefits as of Oct. 1, 1975.

Officials at the three commands we visited said that certain traveling inspection functions, such as in supply, personnel, and logistics, and all nontraveling functions, could be performed by civilians. According to officials at one command, there is a shortage of military personnel in middle management positions with expertise in the logistics area. The use of civilians could (1) eliminate the need to recruit about 50 percent of their inspectors from other commands, (2) increase overall team expertise, and (3) significantly reduce the inspection learning and training period.

While acknowledging that civilians could be used, one commander said he preferred military inspectors because he had more control over them and inspection was a good training ground for officers. Another commander said it would not be practical to use civilians as traveling inspectors because (1) travel requirements would make it difficult to attract and retain qualified civilians and (2) many inspected functional areas required military personnel who are familiar with current operating policies and procedures.

When questioned on this subject, Headquarters Inspector General officials said that civilians are not used as traveling inspectors primarily because travel is required 50 percent of the time, and because civilians do not normally have the knowledge and experience required of the position.

CONCLUSIONS

Personnel assigned to inspection duty in the Air Force are generally well qualified and for the most part are receiving training in accordance with Air Force directives. However, we believe it would be highly advantageous to have more stability in the top management levels of the system. Constant turnover of top management personnel tends to weaken an organization. This problem could be alleviated in two ways: (1) have the top personnel in the inspection system serve their full tours of duty and (2) have more civilians, who would not be subject to the periodic rotation of military officers, back up the personnel in top management positions. The use of civilians would help stabilize the inspection system by providing continuity.

We believe that the Air Force inspection system should consist predominantly of military personnel. However, more civilians could be used for nontraveling support functions; for inspections of such nontechnical activities as bowling alleys, commissaries, exchanges, and recreation centers; and in some technical areas as well. Although travel does

create some personal hardship, it is not a job deterrent for everyone, and we believe civilians could be recruited for such activity.

We did not attempt to determine whether the criteria used by major commanders to establish inspection staff sizes is appropriate. The Air Force presently is conducting a study in this area. We believe that study should evaluate the feasibility of using more temporary inspectors and fewer full-time inspectors. We are looking into that issue but will be unable to reach a conclusion on it until our reviews of the military inspectors general in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Logistics Agency are completed later this year.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force:

- Stabilize the top management of the inspection system by requiring top military inspector general personnel to complete their tours of duty and by having civilians back up these personnel to promote continuity.
- Require that more civilians be used throughout the inspection system to the greatest extent possible.
- Expand the present staffing study on Air-Force-wide inspection staffing standards to include an analysis of the possibility of using more temporary inspectors and fewer full-time inspectors.

CHAPTER 4

OVERINSPECTION AND

DUPLICATION ARE PROBLEMS

We noted that overinspection and a significant amount of duplication exists involving management effectiveness inspections, unit self-inspections, and other evaluation and review groups' efforts. We believe substantial resources could be saved or redirected to more productive areas if overinspection and duplication of effort are reduced and eventually eliminated.

HEADQUARTERS INSPECTIONS AND INTERNAL AUDITING ARE BEING COORDINATED

The Air Force inspection system's and Air Force Audit Agency's missions and responsibilities permit them to inspect and audit virtually all functions, activities, and operations within the Air Force. The potential for duplication between the two activities exists and increased significantly when the Headquarters Inspector General began performing systems acquisition and functional management inspections which, in our opinion, are both essentially audits. The Audit Agency performs the same types of evaluations of similar systems and functional areas, including maintenance, procurement, supply, accounting, and finance. The primary difference between the two groups seems to be the approach. Audits usually go into more depth to comply with stringent professional standards such as those we prescribe. These standards require that auditors obtain evidence and document findings to support their work. Inspectors, on the other hand, do not follow auditing standards but are usually highly knowledgeable in the inspected area and rely on this knowledge as well as on discussions with top agency officials to support their work.

Without effective coordination between the Audit Agency and the Inspector General, duplication between these two organizations could easily occur in the systems acquisition and functional management areas. We noted during our review that an effective coordination system existed and the two organizations were preventing duplication. They conducted formal quarterly coordination meetings and frequently contacted each other informally to avoid duplication.

Although duplication was being precluded, we noted that when systems acquisition and functional management audits and inspections objectives were broad, some overlap between the two was unavoidable. Work may be done at the same locations, discussions may be held with the same people, and the same documents may be reviewed. To illustrate, a Headquarters Inspector General report on the functional management inspection of the Tactical Air Control System overlapped the Audit Agency review on logistics support of that same system. Field work by both agencies was generally concurrent, and the same Air Logistics Center and several bases were contacted by both agencies.

DUPLICATION OCCURS BETWEEN COMMAND-
LEVEL INSPECTIONS AND OTHER GROUPS'
EVALUATIONS

To a large extent, command-level inspections, staff assistance evaluations, and field unit's self-inspections are duplicative. During our review of the Navy's inspector general system, we have noted that guidelines followed by its inspectors general emphasize the need to reduce the number of repetitive inspections by requiring that results of special visits, technical reviews, special one-time inspections, training assist visits, etc., be used to waive portions of an activity's inspection. We believe that considerable staff resources utilized in conducting Air Force inspections, evaluations, and audits could be saved if coordination among the commands were better and if the command inspectors general were willing to adopt a policy similar to the Navy's. Presently, coordination efforts at the command level are limited to avoiding schedule conflicts and do not include coordination of functional area coverage.

Potential for duplication
recognized

Since 1968, we have reported to the Congress on several occasions that many groups are performing management reviews and evaluations within the various elements of the Department of Defense more or less independently of the efforts of other groups. We reported a growth in the number of such groups, in the striking similarity of authorized areas of interest, and in the seeming overlap of functions. In addition, we reported some confusion as to assigned responsibilities and an apparent need for some measure of overall coordination and guidance of the total review effort. There has been no apparent improvement because a DOD Joint Study Group on Audits, Inspection and Reviews noted in their draft report dated November 3, 1978, that over 350 such groups exist. The report

noted that the existence of so many groups significantly increased the likelihood that several groups carried out similar missions and responsibilities in almost every phase of DOD operations.

Command officials are aware of the overlap and duplication between the inspectors general and staff evaluation teams. The Inspector General has also recognized that a large amount of overlap and duplication of inspection and review activities is occurring within the Air Force. At the time of our review, his staff was conducting a special inspection of Air Force internal review activities. Although the review had not been completed, the staff noted overlap and duplication between command inspectors general and other command evaluation groups, and among the groups themselves. Other problems identified were (1) over-inspected base level units, (2) different inspection standards resulting in confusion and discontent in Air Force units, and (3) lack of problem-oriented inspections. The staff also observed that considerable time, resources, and costs are involved in the command visits. For example, at three commands included in the inspection, Air Force preliminary data showed that for fiscal 1978, 4,536 evaluation visits using 137,454 staff-days had been made at a cost of over \$3.5 million. This data did not include reviews performed by the Audit Agency.

The potential for duplication and overlap in staff review activities and inspector general inspections has also been recognized in a research study ^{1/} submitted to the air command and staff college. The study attributed the duplication of inspections to the number of activities that have inspection authority over units. That research study identified examples of duplication and overlap between inspection staff visits, maintenance staff visits, maintenance standardization and evaluation team visits, and other staff review groups.

Examples of duplicated effort
identified at one command

At one command, we identified examples of duplicated efforts by comparing information from the inspector general's management effectiveness inspection reports with information from reports by other oversight activities.

During September 18 through 25, 1978, the command inspector general conducted the inspection of a unit. The inspection covered the same functional areas examined by other

^{1/}"The Air Force Inspection System: Management Overkill?"
May 1975.

groups, and many of the findings were duplicated in the inspection report without indicating whether or not the problems were already being addressed as a result of prior reports. Although the staff visits occurred only 1 or 2 months before the inspection, the scope of the inspector general's work did not appear to be adjusted in any way.

The same command's inspector general conducted another management effectiveness inspection of a unit during February 5 through 12, 1979. We selected 25 reports written between November 1977 and December 1978 resulting from work performed during staff assistance visits, standardization and evaluation team visits, and audits by the Air Force Audit Agency to compare with this inspection. The inspection included the same functional areas covered by the other groups. Further, in numerous cases, the specific findings in the inspection report were virtually identical to prior reports.

SELF-INSPECTION ALSO DUPLICATES
INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEWS

The other two commands we reviewed had self-inspection programs which were almost identical to the inspector general inspections. One command required its activities to complete a self-inspection program semiannually while the other had no frequency requirement. The self-inspection program included a checklist, which was primarily the inspector general's management effectiveness inspection checklist supplemented by findings from other command bases. One of the commands activities termed its self-inspection a "Stay Fix" inspection, and conducted it before each inspector general management effectiveness inspection.

The stay fix inspection was very similar to the inspector general's inspection. The stay fix inspection, conducted approximately 90 days before the scheduled inspector general review, was designed to ensure that prior inspection findings had been corrected and that the activity did not receive an unsatisfactory rating. In the last stay fix inspection, about 150 activity personnel were involved full-time for 2 weeks. In addition, about 50 personnel were used part-time. This was more than three times the number of personnel the command's inspector general subsequently used in his inspection.

Using the inspection checklist, prior inspection findings, and related findings from the Audit Agency, GAO, and Defense Audit Service reports, the activity staff prepared the stay fix checklist. During the stay fix inspection, the staff identified 568 findings, including 33 findings that were repeated from the prior inspector general review. Each of

the repeat findings had previously been reported as corrected and closed. Due to the number of repeat findings discovered in the stay fix program, it seems that the real causes of the findings had only been temporarily fixed, or not fixed at all.

When the inspector general subsequently conducted his inspection, there were no repeat findings and the activity received a highly satisfactory rating.

In a background paper prepared in March 1979, the Headquarters Inspector General recognized the problem with the above situation. The paper noted that intense preparation for relatively minor inspection areas often diverts unit attention from essential mission areas.

NO-NOTICE INSPECTIONS MIGHT REDUCE
SELF-INSPECTIONS AND ASSURE FASTER
RESPONSE TO INSPECTOR GENERAL FINDINGS

Each command inspector general that we reviewed had established formal procedures for units to follow in responding to findings in inspection reports. These procedures generally require the inspected unit to address in writing the corrective actions taken or planned to remedy the deficiencies and to send that response through the chain of command, to the Inspector General. In addition, the inspector general's offices administratively followed up on the findings to determine their status. Inspection reports we reviewed contained up to 400 findings, and the amount of administrative effort required to follow up on one report can be enormous. Officials at one command stated that 6 months was not an unusual amount of time to close all inspection report findings.

However, no matter what amount of written effort is expended on reporting the status of corrective actions, the ultimate proof of corrective action does not occur until the next inspection when the findings from the previous inspection report are checked. Thus, the inspection activity may report a problem as being corrected when in fact they have not corrected it, or they may correct it and because of personnel changes, the problem could recur. At one command we visited, this situation was confirmed when we reviewed reports resulting from two surprise reinspections that were conducted to follow up on management effectiveness inspections of units made several months before. Both reinspections identified that more than 25 percent of the original findings followed up on that had been reported to the Inspector General as closed were not corrected. A similar situation was noted at another command.

Since we found that few repeat findings are identified during a regular, announced reinspection, we believe that what is probably occurring is that just before the next inspector general review, a unit will perform some form of self-inspection to make sure that findings in the inspector general's previous report are corrected. It seems likely that corrective action would be taken sooner if the inspectors general conducted their inspections on a no-notice basis. Units would then be unable to postpone taking action and risk having a repeat finding because they would not know exactly when the next inspector general review would occur. No-notice inspector general reviews could similarly reduce the extensive pre-inspection that occurs in units about to be reviewed.

CONCLUSION

Overinspection continues to be a problem within the Air Force due to the large number of inspector general reviews, staff assistance visits, and self-inspections being performed.

Duplication of inspection effort is not a problem at the Headquarters Inspector General level because of the coordination of inspection with the audits of the Air Force Audit Agency. However, duplication does occur between command-level inspector general reviews and other groups' evaluations, and to an even greater extent with units' self-inspections made just before announced inspector general reviews. While self-inspection is a good concept, its overuse can waste resources and divert attention from essential mission areas.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct that duplication be reduced between inspector general reviews, self-inspections, and other inspections. This can possibly be accomplished by increasing the number of no-notice inspector general inspections to limit the extensive pre-inspection that occurs in units about to be reviewed by inspector general personnel.

CHAPTER 5

GAINING ACCESS TO COPIES OF INSPECTION

REPORTS NOT A PROBLEM DURING THIS REVIEW

As a result of revised Air Force policy, we have been granted access to Inspector General reports and related records.

WE ARE AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO ALL RECORDS

The Air Force is subject to the provisions of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which states our authority to gain access to records as follows:

"All departments and establishments shall furnish to the Comptroller General such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective offices as he may from time to time require of them: and the Comptroller General, or any of his assistants or employees, when duly authorized by him, shall for the purpose of securing such information, have access to and the right to examine any books, documents, paper or records of any such department or establishment."

These provisions do not contain any relevant limitations on the Comptroller General's access to records authority. Such limitation would be contrary to the concept of an independent Comptroller General able to undertake unrestricted analyses of Government programs and activities.

PRIOR DOD POLICY RESTRICTED OUR ACCESS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS

Historically, DOD has held that Inspector General reports shall not be furnished to us except upon approval of the secretary of the military department concerned. This policy was stated to us in 1958 and 1967, and was reiterated by the acting Under Secretary of the Air Force on June 29, 1977. On that occasion, the acting Under Secretary wrote us that our request for access to inspector general reports and files was denied because the reports contained conclusions and recommendations that were derived from Inspector General inquiries conducted under the concept of confidentiality.

On June 29, 1978, we reported to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives 1/ that we were unable to complete our evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the Air Force Inspector General's operations because the Department of the Air Force denied us access to all reports and supporting documents essential to our efforts.

We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to amend Air Force regulations to allow us complete and unlimited access to all reports, files, and documents related to efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of Air Force operations. Such access would enable us to exercise our responsibility to review and evaluate the results of Government programs and activities. Also, we recommended that these same inspection reports be made available to appropriate evaluation groups in DOD and the Congress to enable them to utilize the data in planning and carrying out their activities.

DOD'S REVISED POLICY ALLOWS US
ACCESS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS

On November 6, 1978, DOD adopted a new policy for releasing inspector general reports to us which provides that:

"Every effort should be made to accommodate the specific needs of GAO on a case-by-case basis-- including, as appropriate, release of reports and records, or access without releasing physical custody of the files or reports.

"Each DOD component is authorized to delegate the authority for access to and release of Inspector General reports.

"In those instances where mutual accommodation cannot be worked out, the issue should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Military Department or head of the Defense agency for decision. The Comptroller General has indicated that he will be personally available for discussions to determine whether the needed information can be supplied in some other manner."

1/"Is the Air Force Inspection System Effective? GAO Was Denied Access to Pertinent Records," FGMSD-78-42, June 29, 1978.

In a memorandum implementing the new DOD policy, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that:

"Visual access [as described above] will be the primary method of releasing information contained in Inspector General reports to the General Accounting Office. The Inspector General may delegate authority for granting visual access to the Deputy Inspector General for Inspection and Safety and the major command Inspectors General. If the General Accounting Office requests physical release of a complete report the request must be directed to the Inspector General.

"In those cases where visual access or full release of Inspector General reports is considered seriously harmful to the continued performance of the Inspector General's mission, a full and complete Statement of Fact may be provided, with an explanation of the reason for selecting this course of action."

The Inspector General delegated to his deputy and the major command inspectors general his authority to provide us visual access to their reports and files. However, he did not delegate to them his authority to provide us with copies of reports or documents for our files. He advised us that upon receiving a request for copies of reports, he obtains written comments from the applicable Air Force headquarters staff offices about releasing the reports. If the staff offices object to releasing copies of the reports, and the Inspector General agrees, the request is forwarded to the Secretary of the Air Force for a final decision.

WE GENERALLY RECEIVED COMPLETE ACCESS
TO REPORTS DURING THIS REVIEW

Air Force Regulation 11-8, "Air Force Relations with GAO," requires that requests for physical release of inspection reports be signed by a GAO official at the associate director level or higher. However, on this assignment, arrangements were made with the Inspector General allowing the GAO team leader to request copies of the reports.

After being granted visual access to reports and records we requested 62 copies of reports published during the period October 1977 to December 1978. All copies of reports, except those dealing with Strategic Air Command operational readiness inspections, were provided to us within our requested

time frames and without deletions. The Strategic Air Command's operational readiness reports were not provided until we had completed our field work; the delay, however, did not hamper our work.

Initially, the Strategic Air Command Inspector General granted us full visual access to inspection reports. Subsequently, he told us that per instructions from Air Force headquarters, we could not have access to any Strategic Air Command inspection reports until his personnel had screened the reports and deleted any reference to operational planning, war plans, and force deployments. The Air Force considered this to be sensitive information not releasable to us. If any data were deleted, we would be told why in writing, per Air Force regulation 11-8.

After the reports were screened, we were allowed full visual access to and ultimately received copies of the entire reports without deletions. The screening of the reports for this data seemed unnecessary since none of the reports were security classified. Also, the reports were widely distributed throughout the Air Force. For example, 145 copies of one of the reports were distributed on a controlled basis to 33 different Air Force organizations, including the Air Force Audit Agency.

ACCESS PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED
IN A SEPARATE REVIEW

On another GAO review that took place concurrent with our review, we requested copies of six Tactical Air Command operational readiness inspection reports. Although full visual access was granted, we were denied copies of the reports. According to an Inspector General official, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans, and Readiness recommended that copies not be provided since (1) we had visual access, (2) the reports contained data concerning operational status which the Air Force did not, for national security reasons, want leaked to unauthorized personnel, and (3) we had not shown a compelling need for the reports.

Although supporting the position that we should not be given copies of the reports, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management directed that copies be kept in the Washington, D.C., area until issuance of the report, and that we be allowed to look at the reports at any time.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION IN
CERTAIN INSPECTION REPORTS
WOULD FACILITATE DOD AND
CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING

Based upon our review of various inspection reports we could not discern why the reports were considered to be of a privileged nature. We believe several types of inspection reports such as functional management, systems acquisition management, operational readiness, and nuclear surety inspections contain valuable information that would benefit DOD and congressional decisionmakers.

For example, on one system acquisition management inspection of a multimillion-dollar program to procure electronic warfare equipment, the inspectors concluded that the program should not be committed to full production until the following adverse conditions were rectified:

- Total program investment cost identified.
- Production baseline determined and documented.
- Production readiness actions completed.
- Adequate supportability plans developed.

Also, as a result of a functional management inspection of the management procedures for automatic data processing (ADP) systems, headquarters found that:

- A standard cost accounting system to capture ADP system development, modification, and maintenance costs would improve controls over ADP projects and build a data base for better estimating budgets.
- There was insufficient data on the anticipated benefits of ADP modification projects reviewed to ascertain their cost effectiveness.

Audits are designed to provide the same type of information and are releasable to the Congress and DOD. However, under the coordination policy between the Inspector General and the Air Force Audit Agency, audits generally will not be made in areas where inspections were recently completed or started whenever the audit group believes that the area is being effectively covered by the inspection function. When this occurred in the past, the benefits of audits in these areas may have been denied to the Congress and DOD because significant problems surfaced by inspections may not

have been reported outside the Air Force due to the privileged nature of inspection reports.

The Inspector General advised us that the new DOD policy on releasing inspector general reports would apply to congressional oversight committees.

CONCLUSIONS

DOD's new policy for releasing inspector general reports and records to us is a workable solution to the longstanding problem of our access to inspection reports. By providing us with visual and physical access on a case-by-case basis, DOD recognized our authority to examine documents that were derived from Inspector General inquiries reportedly made confidentially.

Several types of inspection reports, such as those involving the acquisition of weapons systems, contain valuable information which would benefit DOD and congressional decisionmakers and should be made available to them.

CHAPTER 6

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This review was conducted at Inspector General Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center and the Air Force Audit Agency, Norton Air Force Base, California; the Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; and selected activities within the commands. Headquarters and command inspection personnel assigned to the activities reviewed represent 39 percent of the Air Force inspection force.

As agreed with representatives of the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations, we concentrated on the inspection function and did not evaluate the functions of the Offices of Special Investigations or Security Police, or the nuclear surety and safety policy areas that are also assigned to the Air Force Inspector General.

Within the Tactical Air Command, we visited Shaw Air Force Base and Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina, and Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. We also interviewed officials of a Virginia Air National Guard unit and the Virginia U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer whose contracting and procurement functions are inspected by the Tactical Air Command inspector general.

We visited the Air Force Logistics Command Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, Newark Air Force Station, Ohio; Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; 3096 Aviation Depot Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

Within the Strategic Air Command we visited the 381st Strategic Missile Wing, and 384th Air Refueling Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; the 351st Strategic Missile Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri; and the 92d Bombardment Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington.

At each command reviewed, we observed part of an inspection to determine the approach and general manner in which inspections were conducted.

We reviewed in detail 62 reports and related correspondence and laws, regulations, and directives pertaining to the inspection system. We reviewed functional and systems acquisition management inspections and over-the-shoulder inspections performed by the Headquarters Inspector General. We also reviewed management effectiveness, operational readiness, disaster preparedness, and functional management inspections performed by the command inspectors general. We did not review any health services inspections.

We interviewed headquarters and command inspectors general, base commanders, and other command personnel and Audit Agency officials. We also interviewed appropriate Air Force management personnel to ascertain whether report recommendations were being complied with or referred to higher levels. In addition, we interviewed members of two DOD task force groups whose evaluations were concerned with the DOD inspection systems. One task force group was initiated by DOD while the other was required by the Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law 95-452, of October 12, 1978.

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225-5147

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
 LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
 OF THE
 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-373
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

November 13, 1978

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the U.S.
 General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear General:

As you know, through the efforts of Assistant Secretary Fred P. Wacker the Department of Defense adopted on November 6, 1978 a new policy for releasing Inspector General reports to GAO. While I remain concerned over past refusals of the Department of Defense to provide GAO necessary information, I am hopeful that this will mean GAO will have access to all the information it needs to be able to effectively carry out its work.


I believe it is in order, therefore, for GAO to immediately determine whether or not this new policy will in fact prove to be a workable solution to this long-standing problem. This can be best accomplished by a GAO review of the Inspector General functions of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and of the Defense Logistics Agency. Such a review will be timely in light of the study mandated in the Inspector General legislation and will assist the Subcommittee in its ongoing review of DoD internal management control activities. Such a study should encompass an evaluation of the organization, role, staffing, independence, quality of work and effectiveness of these agencies.

Because of the importance of this review, it will be necessary to have it completed as expeditiously as possible. I would expect to receive a final report on the Department of the Air Force Inspector General not later than May 31, 1979, final reports on the Navy and Marine Corps Inspectors General not later than July 31, 1979, and final reports on the Army and Defense Logistics Agency Inspectors General not later than September 30, 1979. While these are tight deadlines, they can be met if sufficient resources are devoted to this project. And, as usual, I request that GAO not provide draft reports to the affected agencies for official comment, which should also enable you to meet these deadlines.

I would appreciate it if the GAO staff members who will be assigned to this review would meet as soon as possible with members of my staff to discuss in detail the questions the Subcommittee desires to have dealt with by the review.

With best wishes I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jack Brooks", written in a cursive style.

JACK BROOKS
Chairman

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 225-5147

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
 LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
 OF THE
 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-373
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 28, 1979

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the U. S.
 General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, N. W.
 Washington, D. C. 20548


Dear General:

Last November I asked GAO to conduct comprehensive reviews of the Inspector General functions of the Departments of Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Defense Logistics Agency. Since it is important to have the results of these reviews prior to the completion of the Department of Defense's own Task Force review of the operations of its audit, inspection and investigative components, I asked for early completion dates with the latest report being submitted to the Subcommittee no later than September 30, 1979.

It is now my understanding that GAO, after beginning work on these reviews, feels that more time than originally planned will be needed because of the sizes and differing organizational structures of these offices. This being the case, I am agreeable to allowing some additional time but must continue to stress the importance of the reviews being timely. It is, therefore, my hope that the Air Force report will be available no later than August 31, 1979, the Army report no later than October 31, 1979, and the Navy and Marine Corps and Defense Logistics Agency reports no later than December 31, 1979.


I appreciate the amount of resources and talent you are devoting to these important projects.

Sincerely,



JACK BROOKS
 Chairman

AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS



AIR FORCE INSPECTION COSTS FOR FISCAL 1978

	<u>Military personnel cost</u>	<u>Civilian personnel cost</u>	<u>Other (note a)</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters groups:				
Office of Inspector General	\$ 173,853	\$ 143,673	\$ 27,971	\$ 345,497
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center:				
Directorate of Inspection (note b)	5,171,907	409,101	1,298,998	6,880,006
Medical Inspection Directorate	1,345,753	-	242,962	1,588,715
Air Force Office of Special Investigations	<u>242,318</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>72,717</u>	<u>315,035</u>
Total Headquarters	6,933,831	552,774	1,642,648	9,129,253
Commands/separate operating agencies:				
Tactical Air Command (note c)	4,441,814	106,808	764,581	5,313,203
Military Airlift Command	3,171,571	112,818	456,963	3,741,352
Air Force Logistics Command	1,834,933	1,315,460	241,473	3,391,866
Aerospace Defense Command	2,563,102	169,974	371,998	3,105,074
Strategic Air Command	2,723,023	82,273	294,889	3,100,185
Air Force Communications Service	1,988,619	103,914	602,346	2,694,879
Air Force Systems Command	1,918,567	351,432	383,087	2,653,086
U.S. Air Force in Europe	1,890,630	57,227	250,202	2,198,059
Air Training Command	2,015,678	241,953	138,607	2,396,238
Pacific Air Forces	1,358,448	54,934	316,956	1,730,338
Air Force Reserve (note d)	330,623	21,132	54,732	406,487
U.S. Air Force Security Service	133,538	41,000	145,781	320,319
Alaskan Air Command	151,697	26,787	32,482	210,966
U.S. Air Force Academy (note d)	132,367	35,143	2,661	170,171
Total commands	<u>24,654,610</u>	<u>2,720,855</u>	<u>4,056,758</u>	<u>31,432,223</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$31,588,441</u>	<u>\$3,273,629</u>	<u>\$5,699,406</u>	<u>\$ 40,561,476</u>

a/Includes costs for communications, supplies, equipment, and the largest component-- transportation, which accounted for about \$5.3 million of this amount.

b/Includes costs for nuclear surety inspections.

c/Includes costs for Tactical Air Command's two numbered air forces.

d/Separate operating agencies.

FUNCTIONS UNDER THE CONTROL
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION, SAFETY,
INVESTIGATIVE, AND SECURITY POLICE SYSTEMS

The Inspector General, located at the Pentagon, is a lieutenant general appointed by the Chief of Staff. He reports to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force on the strengths and weaknesses of all Air Force activities and makes recommendations for correcting problems. More specifically, he is responsible for the optimum effectiveness of Air Force inspection safety, investigative, counterintelligence, and complaint programs, and assists in ensuring that Air Force resources are effectively and efficiently managed to sustain the Air Force peacetime and fighting capability.

Three distinct organizations are under the direct control of the Inspector General: the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, the Office of Special Investigations, and the Chief of Security Police. The Inspector General maintains a staff of about 45 people at the Pentagon. With the exception of the Office of Special Investigations, his other operating offices or agencies are located outside the Washington, D.C., area.

Air Force Inspection and Safety Center
commander performs inspection, safety, and
complaint functions for the inspector general

The Inspector General has delegated to the Deputy Inspector General for Inspection and Safety the authority for carrying out the inspection, safety, and complaint functions. He is responsible to the Inspector General for planning, directing, and monitoring these activities. The Deputy, a major general, is also the Commander of the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center located at Norton Air Force Base, California. He exercises staff surveillance over and establishes standards, policies, and procedures relating to Air Force inspection and safety activities. Through the Inspector General, he keeps the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff informed on factors affecting the readiness and effectiveness of the Air Force. The following directorates at the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center carry out the Deputy Inspector General's responsibilities.

The Directorate of Inspection is responsible for determining the status of operational readiness within commands, effectiveness and efficiency of management systems, defining problems impeding the effective accomplishment of the Air Force mission, providing factual information on which to base corrective actions, and operating the inspection school for all newly assigned inspection personnel. The director is a brigadier general.

The Directorate of Medical Inspection is responsible for all medical inspection matters, including evaluation of organizations and activities, facilities and equipment, aeromedical evaluation systems, personnel management policies and programs, readiness of programs and organizations, compliance with civilian medical standards and laws and with Air Force regulations and directives. The director is a brigadier general.

The Directorate of Nuclear Safety, located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, establishes nuclear safety policies and evaluates major command nuclear capability inspection efforts. The director acts as the Air Force headquarters focal point for liaison with the Defense Nuclear Agency and other Government agencies involved in nuclear surety. The director is a colonel.

The Directorate of Aerospace Safety provides staff supervision of accident prevention programs in the areas of flight, ground, weapons, life science, and system safety engineering. The director is a brigadier general.

The Directorate of Programs provides staff supervision of the Air Force inspection system, provides travel management support for field efforts, and performs budget, staffing, personnel, data automation, and administrative management functions for the Inspection and Safety Center. The director is a colonel.

Members from the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations form the Audit, Inspection, and Investigative Council also known as the Fraud Council. (See ch. 1.)

Office of Special Investigations
performs investigative and
counterintelligence functions

The Office of Special Investigations provides the Inspector General with staff support in the development of overall policies for special investigation matters and assists him in formulating and executing plans, policies, and procedures for

counterintelligence and investigative programs. The Office of Special Investigations is decentralized into worldwide offices and suboffices. The director is a colonel. Unlike the major command and separate operating agency inspection groups, the district offices and suboffices are under the control of the Director of the Office of Special Investigations rather than the commanders of major commands.

Chief of Security Police also assigned
to the Inspector General

The Office of Security Police is also assigned to the Inspector General. The Chief is a brigadier general and is located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. He is responsible for planning, directing, and supervising policies and procedures for all Security Police activities, including

- base defense,
- Security Police personnel and equipment programs,
- security of all physical and aerospace resources,
- the Wartime Information Security Program,
- maintainance of law and order,
- prisoner retraining and correction programs,
- vehicle traffic management, and
- the military working dog program.

GAO'S OBSERVATION OF COMMAND INSPECTIONS

As mentioned in appendix III, we observed portions of three inspections at the commands we visited. We were not able to observe the entire inspections because of the large number of inspectors involved and the simultaneous coverage of multiple areas. The following descriptions of the inspectors' planning and execution we observed, however, demonstrates that the quality of inspections was generally good.

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

We accompanied a Tactical Air Command inspection team and observed a management effectiveness inspection of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. We were informed that the inspection and its resulting report were representative of the command's inspection activity.

The inspectors operated independently, but adhered generally to a schedule. The entire team met each evening to present findings and discuss items of mutual interest. Additionally, photographers provided by the base were available to photograph selected items for showing at the critique.

The inspection lasted 8 days with the last 3 days dedicated to preparing the report for publication and presenting the formal critique to assembled unit personnel. After the team returned to Tactical Air Command headquarters, the commander was briefed on the inspection results.

The inspection team consisted of 78 persons. Inspectors were designated to inspect specific functional areas. Workpapers in the traditional auditing sense were nonexistent. Inspectors were not required to generate documentation in support of findings, and according to individual preference, they made notes or recorded inspection steps and findings on notepaper and/or on an inspection checklist. We were advised that documentation in support of findings was unnecessary because findings were validated with the responsible individuals and supervisors. Agreement between the inspector, the responsible unit personnel, and the inspector general division chief was reached before a noted deficiency became a finding for the final report.

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

We observed a Strategic Air Command inspector general inspection at Fairchild Air Force Base, Spokane, Washington,

from February 24 through March 3, 1979. We observed the activities of 15 of the 51 inspectors who conducted various portions of management effectiveness, operational readiness, nuclear surety, and disaster preparedness inspections. These inspections covered four tactical exercises and 11 organizations.

Inspectors employed a guide or checklist and/or consulted other information sources, such as prior inspector general reports, to familiarize themselves with the particular functional areas they inspected. The inspectors examined elements they considered critical to a unit's rating of satisfactory performance. The inspections appeared to be thorough. Also, most of the 17 officials interviewed commented that the inspections were thorough and that inspectors appeared to be knowledgeable in the areas they inspected.

We noted the thoroughness of the inspection during an observation of a nuclear surety and disaster preparedness inspection performed at one of the units. The inspector evaluated the unit's ability to effectively (1) respond promptly to a mock terrorist threat and to a disaster preparedness exercise and (2) dispatch accurate and complete information and instructions to its subordinates in managing and controlling these situations.

The above scenario established that several terrorists had penetrated a nuclear munitions storage facility and caused an explosion and fire in the compound. Munitions control was tasked with instructing its subordinates to secure the area, evacuate personnel, evaluate and neutralize the terrorist threat, and notify the fire department on the location of the fire and types of munitions stored at the facility. The inspector monitored the exercise and noted that personnel had dispatched erroneous information to the fire department regarding the types of stored weapons.

Following the exercise, the inspector advised the unit commander that personnel did not verify the types of munitions stored in the facility which came under attack before information about the incident was dispatched to the fire department. The inspector requested inputs from the supervisory personnel regarding the exercise and obtained the concurrence of supervisors on the problems. In our opinion, he provided a plausible recommendation that

--unit personnel verify all munitions stored before dispatching information on contents and

--only one person at a time be designated to dispatch and control the information that is sent.

We also observed that the inspectors coordinated their inspection activities by discussing areas which were potentially deficient. This was accomplished both formally and informally. Formal discussions took place during the initial inspector general team meeting at Fairchild Air Force Base. Team meetings were conducted to promote an exchange of information and to keep the team director and the team chiefs appropriately informed of problem areas. Several inspectors completed a discrepancy form to alert other inspectors to discrepancies which may have been prevalent in their particular functional areas of inspection responsibility. After the initial team meeting, there were several instances where inspectors discussed discrepancies that each had found.

While we could not determine the extent of supervision, we noted a few instances where team chiefs conferred with an inspector to obtain clarification concerning the draft report. Twice we observed that a team chief directed an inspector to obtain additional information to clarify a point.

AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

During March 5 through 9, 1979, we observed a management effectiveness inspection of the Maintenance Contract Administration Branch, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, one of three activities included in the inspection. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the management effectiveness of the branch in accomplishing its mission, which is to administer contracts with three contractors.

Unlike most management effectiveness inspections, this inspection was limited in scope because the inspected activity has a narrow mission. The inspection team consisted of only five officials--a team chief and four members. The team chief was a lieutenant colonel, and the team members were two majors, a captain, and a civilian.

The team chief was responsible for planning the inspection but delegated that task to a team member. Using a basic preparation schedule as a guide, the team member established contact with appropriate officials, made a title search of inspector general and external audit agency reports, solicited inputs from the headquarters staff, arranged travel, and prepared an inspection plan.

The inspection plan was a modified version of the checklist which the inspector general, with input from headquarters staff, annually updates and provides to the activity for a self-inspection guide. In preparing for the inspection, the inspection team reviewed applicable directives and regulations, one prior inspection report, and four external audit agency reports.

During the inspection, team members reviewed contracts and delivery orders to determine if the activities involved in the contract administration complied with applicable policies, procedures, and regulations.

Regarding complete inspection coverage, the team chief said there was no way to assure that all problems at an activity have been identified. He said inspectors always leave an inspection wondering what has been missed. Compared to an audit, the inspection was much briefer and did not allow for indepth review. The team chief thought that more inspection time would allow the inspection team to do a more thorough job.

The primary means for controlling the inspection were sessions held at the end of each day where each team member discussed activities and potential problems. The team discussed these problems and the team leader decided what, if any, followup action to take. At each session, the team leader prepared a log of discussions. At the conclusion of the inspection, the workpapers consisted of a log of the daily sessions and drafts of proposed findings.

Potential findings developed during the inspection were primarily compliance oriented except for staff action findings which required the headquarters staff to act. We also observed that findings were not always developed. The team leader said it was rare to have a finding in which the cause and effect are defined and fully supported.

Classification of findings were subjective and dependent upon the inspectors' judgment regarding significance, degree, and severity of the noncompliance. For example, a problem that occurred once may have been a compliance finding if the inspection team determined it was not severe or significant. If a problem was not significant but occurred many times, it may have been classified as a management finding because it signified that management attention was lacking or the non-compliance was a conscious effort to circumvent directives. Also, if the finding involved a substantial sum of money, the inspection team classified it as a management finding.

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