


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*The Increasing Gap between
the Army's Capabilities and
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
DR. KENNETH J. COFFEY

THE inability of the U.S. Army to meet its manpower mobilization needs for the conventional defense of Central Europe has been a progressively worsening problem during the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) years.

In the draft era, there were large active forces and selected reserve units (reserve and national guard), large surpluses of trained, unassigned reservists, and a func-

tioning Selective Service system. By the end of 1979, however, strength reductions in both the active and reserve forces, massive declines in the strength levels of the individual reserve pools, and a conscription system in "deep standby" portended gravely on the ability of the army to meet the requirements of the "worst case" contingency.

A Warsaw Pact attack on NATO forces



in Central Europe would put a premium on the well-trained U.S. forces already in Europe and on those units in the U.S. that could be rapidly moved overseas. There could also be a requirement for later-deploying reinforcements and a sustained war capability, and it is in this area that the greatest uncertainties remain.

If the army is to have the resources to wage an extended NATO-Pact conventional conflict, the American people will have to strengthen their support, either by increased service in the armed forces or higher tax payments. Whether such actions are desirable or necessary is still open to question.

Thus this article analyzes the significance of the changes that have occurred during the AVF years, particularly regarding the ability of the army to provide massive reinforcements on a continuing basis in the event of a major land war in Europe.

manpower problems

The extent of the manpower-related problems that have developed in the AVF years can perhaps best be indicated by comparing the strengths and capabilities of the army at the end of fiscal year 1964 with those at the end of fiscal year 1979. As 1964 was the

last year of stable peacetime force levels prior to the buildup for Vietnam, its use as a benchmark for comparisons can be justified.

During these 15 years, whereas the strength of the active army, army national guard and army reserve was reduced by about 22 percent, while the primary pool of filler personnel and replacements, the individual ready reserve (IRR), was reduced by 58 percent. As Table I illustrates, the army total force of almost 2.3 million in 1964 had been reduced by almost 800,000 personnel by 1979.

At mobilization, not all members of the national guard, reserve, IRR, and standby reserve would be expected to report due to personal or family problems, employment in critical occupations, and, for the IRR and standby reserve members, determinations that their skills would not be of value in the mobilization effort. Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed "yield" rates for each category of manpower resource.¹ When these rates are applied, the manpower resources that would have been available on mobilization become clearer. As Table II shows, the army total force on mobilization would have been some 602,000 fewer in 1979 than in 1964.

Table I. Force level contrasts—FY 1964-FY 1978—Army total force

Component	End FY 1964 force level	End FY 1979 force level	Size of reduction	Percentage of reduction
active army	972,000	759,000	-213,000	22 percent
national guard	382,000	344,000	- 38,000	10 percent
reserve	269,000	188,000	- 81,000	30 percent
IRR	461,000	194,000	-267,000	58 percent
standby reserve	208,000	30,000	-178,000	86 percent
	<u>2,292,000</u>	<u>1,515,000</u>	<u>-777,000</u>	<u>34 percent</u>

Component	End FY 1964 mobilization force level	End FY 1979 mobilization force level	Size of reduction	Percentage of reduction
active army (100 percent)	972,000	759,000	-213,000	22 percent
national guard (95 percent)	363,000	327,000	- 36,000	10 percent
reserve (95 percent)	256,000	179,000	- 77,000	30 percent
IRR (70 percent)	323,000	136,000	-187,000	59 percent
standby reserve (50 percent)	104,000	15,000	- 89,000	90 percent
	<u>2,018,000</u>	<u>1,416,000</u>	<u>-602,000</u>	<u>30 percent</u>

Table II. Mobilization contrasts—FY 1964-FY 1978—Army total force

On mobilization, the army's need for pre-trained manpower would increase to 1.725 million, the number of personnel necessary to bring all units of the active army, national guard, and reserve to combat readiness and provide casualty replacements for the three to four months after mobilization before an increased flow of newly trained recruits could begin.² Yet, as Table III illustrates, the capability which the army possessed in 1964 to meet these requirements

has been seriously eroded.³ Had mobilization occurred in late 1979, many units would have had unfilled medical billets; there would have been grave shortages of combat engineers, among other skilled personnel; and most important, there would have been a significant shortage of personnel trained in the combat arms.

In addition to the 1.725 million trained personnel needed shortly after mobilization, army war plans also identify a need for

Table III. Mobilization manpower requirements/resources—1964-1978 contrasts

Components	Requirements	Resources	Surplus/shortfall
		<i>End FY 1964</i>	
active army, mobilized national guard, reserve, IRR, and standby reserve	1,725,000	2,018,000*	293,000 surplus
		<i>End FY 1979</i>	
active army, mobilized national guard, reserve, IRR, and standby reserve	1,725,000	1,416,000*	309,000 shortfall

*assumes that the army at M-Day had stopped all losses of trained personnel

new recruits to enter training, commencing within 30 days of the mobilization decision.⁴ Because of training delays, these men and women would not be available for assignment to operating units for at least three to four months after their entry into active duty. Thereafter, however, they would be available for use as casualty replacements and formation of new units. In addition, if the manpower shortfalls in trained reservists are not eliminated, the newly trained conscripts or volunteers could be used to fill units of the existing force structure.

During the years of peace prior to the Vietnam War, the functioning Selective Service system provided a guarantee that such large numbers of new recruits could be provided. Since the AVF, however, the conscription agency has been allowed to stop all activities other than contingency planning, a move prompted in large measure by the judgment of Pentagon officials in 1975-76 that any possible conflict would more than likely be terminated before newly trained personnel could be utilized.⁵ Consequently, by the end of 1979, the capability of Selective Service for meeting sudden emergency demands for conscripts had fallen to a negligible level.

There also are a myriad of other issues and problems. Foremost among these is the uncertainty of the yield rates used by the army to predict mobilization gains. Whereas the loss of 5 percent from the selected reserve can be supported by both historical experience and various mobilization exercises in the late 1970s, the loss factors for the other manpower groups are less certain. In fact, the true availability of these mobilization resources cannot be determined. On the one hand, in total, there are enough pretrained personnel in the various personnel categories to meet the army's needs, if the resources of the Retired Reserve are included. On the other hand, if estimated losses from these sources on mobilization are understated, the army's problems would

be even greater than 1979 projections.

A variety of factors influences the validity of the army's "yield" rates. For example, the willingness of Americans to serve would vary considerably between a politically inspired mobilization in response to an insurgency in a Third World oil-producing country and a call-up in response to a major Warsaw Pact attack. In addition, there would certainly be a different response rate from personnel of different grades, skills, ages, and obligations for recall. Yet the army is expecting the same responses from nonobligated, non-combat arms field grade officers as from young, obligated combat arms enlistees.

Another major problem concerns matching of the army's specific needs with available mobilization personnel. The army estimates that some 70 percent of the IRR would report on mobilization, but little attention has been paid to whether these personnel could perform useful functions. For example, approximately 75 percent of the army's filler and replacement needs would be in combat arms or medical, combat engineer, and direct support fields; only about 25 percent of the IRR personnel possessed these skills in 1979. An overabundance of officers in the IRR compounds this problem.

A serious question also arises as to whether the manpower available on mobilization would be ready in time to play a useful role in the critical early weeks. The army has concentrated on developing new programs aimed at increasing the strength levels of the national guard, reserve, and the IRR, but it has generally ignored deployment-related problems. Yet the manpower requirements of the army at mobilization do not increase steadily; most of the personnel needed to boost the force to peak level are needed in the first few weeks. During this period, units of the active and reserve forces would be filled to their wartime quotas. Thereafter, replacements would be needed, but their numbers would be smaller than those needed in the initial weeks.

Nor would personnel from supplementary pools be immediately available for deployment. Initial ordering, administrative processing, and prereporting leave would take time. Many personnel would require refresher training before they were able to resume old specialties. And those assigned to new specialties would require even longer periods of training. Thus, although supplementary sources of manpower might eliminate peak manpower shortfalls, they would probably not satisfy needs immediately after mobilization, when trained personnel would be needed to fill deploying units.

Finally, even if the army manages to resolve its projected shortfall problems, the deployed forces would be far less combat ready than the forces of the pre-Vietnam years. This conclusion is based on the fact that active army personnel are readier than those of the selected reserve and that men and women in both these groups are readier than members of the individual reserve pools or retirees or veterans. Although the army possibly could field a mobilized force as large as that of 1964, it would not have as many trained active and selected reserve personnel.

army reinforcement plans

The military strategic goals of the United States for a conventional conflict in Central Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have not changed since the advent of the AVF. By maintaining a strong on-site force and a rapid, though limited, immediate reinforcement capability and in concert with the forces of European NATO members, the U.S. hopes to deter aggressive action. Failing this, the readily available active force units, together with the available forces of other NATO members, would be expected to contain any Pact advances within West German territory long enough to equalize the balance of forces through reinforcement and to prevent the conflict

from escalating into a tactical or general nuclear exchange.

In a military emergency, American forces would be rapidly augmented by dual-based units that serve in both Europe and the United States, and by other units that have stockpiles of equipment and supplies in West Germany. In 1979 such stockpiles were sufficient for an augmented force of about 2.3 divisions, the personnel of which would be airlifted to Europe in case of potential or actual conflict. These initial reinforcements would be supplemented by other airlifted or sealifted divisions and support troops, including active army units (augmented by reserve fillers), and army national guard and army reserve combat and support units. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted in 1975 that some 12 or 13 divisions would be deployed, but indications since then, such as the planned conversion of the Second Infantry Division to a NATO-oriented mechanized infantry division, are that even more divisions would be committed to the conflict.⁶

Because the deployment schedule would allow little time to send crucial reinforcements, most of the early transported units would be from the active army, with national guard and army reserve forces serving as a first echelon of reinforcements and as replacements for active army units involved in initial combat. No doubt, however, most of the army national guard units, as well as the vast majority of combat support units in the army reserve, would be deployed to Europe for an extended conflict. Under current planning decisions, the first reserve units to deploy would be those maneuver battalions needed to round out active army divisions. Such units would depart within thirty days of the mobilization decision. At the same time certain support elements needed to augment supply and maintenance functions in Europe also would be deployed. Shortly thereafter, additional reserve combat units and support elements

would embark. Finally, the eight national guard divisions would be committed. In total, planners expect that the full deployment of designated active army, army national guard, and army reserve units could be completed in somewhat more than a hundred days, though the Pentagon has established a deployment goal for all of the forces of ninety days or less.⁷

strategic mobility limitations

The availability of trained reinforcements in the United States is but one of several conditions which must be met before U.S. forces can meet their strategic commitments in the defense of Central Europe. Another key factor is the availability of adequate air and sealift resources. If we cannot get the troops to Europe quickly, their availability will add little to NATO defensive efforts.

In 1979 the U.S. military air fleet was the world's best.⁸ Although government policies had supported its development since the early 1960s, U.S. strategic air transport still has its shortcomings. The 304 aircraft in the U.S. military fleet plus the resources of Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) constitute an imposing resource. But at any given moment many aircraft may be grounded for maintenance and service, and the combined capacity of all available aircraft would be sufficient to transport only a small portion of the massive reinforcements needed for a conventional conflict in Europe. For example, estimates are that it would take about ten days to transport the first reinforcing division, if most of the unit's heavy equipment were already stockpiled in West Germany.⁹ Transporting the 2.3 division equivalents that have stockpiled equipment waiting for them would therefore take three to four weeks.

If the Pentagon has its way, improvements will be made in the strategic airlift over the next decade to double the capacity of the 1979 fleet. This program would in-

clude modification of C-5s, lengthening the fuselage of C-141s, buying new midair refueling tankers (DC-10s), and modifying civilian airliners better to handle military cargo. In total, the program would cost about \$4 billion. For this reason, and because of congressional opposition to providing funds to the civilian airlines, the full amount of funds requested for the program has not been appropriated. Consequently, unless there is a major change in attitude in the Congress, a vastly increased strategic airlift capacity cannot be expected.

If the total force elements designated for transport to Europe are to be delivered there on schedule, then, a major share of the burden will have to be assumed by sealift resources. Yet the capability of the U.S. sealift also is seriously deficient. For example, the Military Sealift Command in 1978 maintained only 27 dry cargo ships and 30 tankers, a fleet capable of moving not much more than one division.¹⁰ Another 145 inactive "mothballed" dry cargo ships are controlled by the Maritime Administration; of these, eight are in the so-called ready reserve fleet and could be made available in five to ten days. It would take many weeks, however, to activate the remaining 137 ships. To a large extent, then, the U.S. would have to rely on 291 flag dry cargo ships or on the cargo ships of the European allies.¹¹ Although almost two hundred NATO ships have been identified for use in a NATO reinforcing effort, these ships and the U.S. flag dry cargo ships would be poorly suited for military use or not readily available.

The success of limited U.S. transport resources also would depend on preserving reception facilities in Europe. Many of these facilities are quite close to the East German border and militarily vulnerable. Indeed, if Pact forces should manage to penetrate West German territory to any significant degree (and certainly if they should reach the Rhine in two to seven days, as some ob-

servers predict), airfields in West Germany that receive and unload the large American jet transports would be in enemy hands or under hostile fire.¹² The seaports where ships unload U.S. reinforcements and supplies (such as those in Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as the main port, Bremerhaven, in north Germany) also would be vulnerable, as would the 250-mile line of communication between the ports and Seventh Army units in southern Germany, although the line of communication to the U.S. brigade in northern Germany would be more secure.

*equipment stockpiles
and war reserve limitations*

The size and comprehensiveness of equipment stockpiles and war reserves in Europe also would impact on U.S. capabilities. If well-trained units of the total force can be transported to Europe but cannot be fully equipped on arrival or sustained with ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies, their availability on the battlefield would add little to the NATO defense.

The usefulness of early reinforcements in Germany following mobilization would depend on the status of the pre-positioned equipment stockpiles. (The army's phrase for this equipment is POMCUS, an acronym for "pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets.")¹³ As noted earlier, some 2½ divisional sets of equipment are maintained.

In the army's view, the limitations inherent in a reinforcement plan that requires the quick movement of men and materiel to Europe are such that European stockpiles should be enlarged, and in a major departure from previous policy, the Pentagon decided in 1977 to support a short-term goal of stockpiling three additional divisional sets of equipment by FY 1983.

The short-term goal was endorsed by the NATO ministers at their spring 1978 meeting. If all goes according to plan, the first

additional set will be largely in place by the end of FY 1980.

Such improvements in equipping airlifted U.S. reinforcements with POMCUS would be of little value, however, unless war reserve stocks also were improved. These stocks are combat-essential items stockpiled for use as replacements for losses.¹⁴

In the mid-1970s the United States, alone among NATO allies, doubled its requirements.¹⁵ This decision was based primarily on the very early but heavy losses of ammunition and other materiel in the 1973 Middle East war as well as on the increasing weight of opinion that a war in Europe would be fought largely with the materiel on hand.

Ammunition supplies are among the critical shortfall items, and this problem is compounded by a shortage of ammunition storage areas, port facilities with ammunition handling capabilities, and U.S. production limits. The army's ammunition stock objective for Europe is 1.3 million tons, but this goal will not be reached until the early 1980s. During 1978 some 210,000 tons were added to European stocks, bringing the total to about 700,000 tons or slightly more than half the desired level.¹⁶ If hostilities were to occur before completion of the war reserve stockpiling program, about one-fourth of the surface cargo heading for Europe would need to be ammunition. Despite these and other problems, however, there were more U.S. war reserve stocks in Europe in 1978 than at any other time in history.¹⁷

European NATO members also have made some increases in their reserves, and their efforts during 1980 and later years will be directed toward bringing their depleted stocks up to programmed levels. Indeed, much of the additional monies pledged for NATO improvements in 1977-78 will be used for this purpose. Despite these gains, however, the capabilities of the European NATO members will remain well below

the capabilities of the U.S. forces; this fact was attested to by a special subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, which concluded in early 1979 that the European nations would begin to run out of equipment and ammunition in a matter of days rather than weeks or months.¹⁸ If this assessment is correct, the building of larger U.S. war reserve stocks becomes an even more critical issue, for the U.S. would most likely provide support to its NATO allies in the event their reserves become exhausted in a protracted conflict.

the army's long-war strategy

The army has not publicly stated its planning goals, but indications—such as stockpiling targets for equipment and ammunition—are that army plans are based on preparedness to fight for ninety days or more.¹⁹ Obviously, such planning goals contain a hedge against uncertainty as well as a warning to the Soviets that the U.S. is serious about defending Central Europe for an extended period. This assumption, which is key to U.S. strategy for the defense of Central Europe, has been maintained regardless of the fact that the European NATO forces


Although the U.S. military air transport fleet was the world's finest in the '70s, it does have shortcomings. Despite its size—more than 300 planes plus those of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet—it would take three to four weeks to transport the 2.3 divisions for which equipment is stockpiled in Europe. For the '80s, increasing fleet capacity includes modification of the C-141 StarLifter (below), "stretching" its fuselage by 23½ feet, and making maximum use of the C-5's cavernous hold to accommodate the string of Army vehicles (facing page) and more.



appear to be oriented toward a much shorter war. While exact figures are classified, various observers have estimated that the European NATO members are not planning for a conventional ground war of much more than thirty days.²⁰ The commitments of these nations for greater defense expenditures in 1979 and beyond are very likely to result in an extension of the thirty-day planning goal, but it is doubtful that the European NATO members will match the U.S. commitment.

The European NATO forces would not completely withdraw from combat when

their equipment and manpower resources were depleted; nevertheless, despite the provision of equipment and ammunition from U.S. sources, their full involvement in an extended NATO defensive effort would by necessity be limited. It therefore seems likely that a conventional conflict extending much beyond the supply limits of the European NATO members would become a struggle primarily between U.S. and Warsaw Pact forces. In this case, disparity between the NATO and Pact forces would be so great that the conventional phase of the conflict would probably not last very long, a



view supported by many observers who believe—regardless of the capabilities of the two forces—that the conflict would be settled either by negotiation within thirty days or escalate into a nuclear exchange.²¹

Among all the estimates, official and unofficial, of the probable length of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict in Central Europe, only the United States appears to believe in the possibility of a longer war—and makes it the basis for strategic planning. In fact, the weight of evidence supports the likelihood of a shorter war. Thus, there appears to be a reasonable basis for questioning the validity of the army's long-war strategy and asking whether the national security would be better served by the abandonment of the current strategy in favor of a short-war concept.

The potential benefits to be gained from adopting a short-war strategy would be great. For in terms of strategic capabilities, a formal short-war strategy would make available added resources to develop and equip a more effective short-war force. Furthermore, it would avoid the societal disruptions and additional costs that might be caused by the need to forge a national consensus on restoring the army's strategic capabilities to their former levels. Nevertheless, there can be no certainty that a conventional conflict in Central Europe would end in a few weeks, for, as Neville Brown has pointed out, military planning is not a mechanical science that lends itself to exact quantification.²² Thus, if the U.S. were to endorse a short-war strategy, it might also run the risk of increasing the probability of aggression, though the U.S. nuclear inventory would continue to make such aggression a very remote possibility.

Despite such assurances, the relationship between force structures and capabilities and the deterrence of aggression is highly uncertain. Military and civilian leaders repeatedly assess this relationship, but, as Morton H. Halperin has noted, NATO does

not know exactly what the Soviet evaluation of forces on the central front is or how it would be affected by possible changes in war-sustaining capabilities.²³ Thus the impact on the deterrent value of the armed forces of adopting a short-war strategy cannot be predicted with any certainty.

the total force concept

During the Vietnam War years, just before the adoption of the total force policy, army reserve forces were treated as a second-rate military resource while the active forces received most of the attention and funding. In addition, since the President was unwilling to call major units to active service, the role of the guard and reserve was ill-defined. Their effectiveness was marginal to poor because most of their modern equipment had been sent to Vietnam and their units were staffed with many young men who had enlisted in order to avoid the draft and Vietnam combat assignments.

Since the adoption of the total force policy, however, noticeable improvements have been made in national guard and army reserve units. The policy has reinstated a clear sense of mission among reservists; equipment inventories are being replenished and modernized; training is being intensified; and the draft-motivated enlistees of the Vietnam era are being replaced by volunteers. Nonetheless, as the adoption of the total force policy shifted a major portion of the army's war-fighting responsibilities to the reserves, the problems that emerged during the AVF years have compounded what was an initial weakening of the army's combat capabilities. This questionable ability to sustain extended combat operations in Europe has many implications.

First, the on-site units of the Seventh Army, and other units of the active army that could be quickly flown to Europe, together with the forces of the European NATO allies, may not be strong enough to

deter aggression by Soviet and other Pact forces or to avoid military defeat in the critical early weeks of the war.

Second, a conventional conflict would be much more likely to escalate into a nuclear exchange or be ended through negotiation.

Third, if negotiations were to occur between NATO and Pact leaders, before the outbreak of hostilities, during the initial stages of the conflict, or later, the absence of a strong U.S. war-sustaining capability would greatly reduce NATO's bargaining power.

These conclusions are based, of course, on the assumptions that it would not be in NATO's interest to initiate tactical or general nuclear war or to end a conflict through negotiation and that it would be in the interest of the Pact to pursue an extended conflict with NATO forces. If NATO leaders are willing to use nuclear weapons, particularly tactical attacks on troops, staging areas, and supply depots, the availability of an extended war capability becomes somewhat of a moot point. Indeed, if the Pact perceives that NATO would rely on nuclear weapons, its forces would be unlikely to initiate any attack, save one for limited objectives which could be achieved quickly before the exhaustion of on-site NATO forces or a decision by NATO to use nuclear weapons.

IN ALL likelihood, if a conflict occurred in Europe between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, reinforcing units from the United States would be required. While one cannot guarantee this situation, the ability of the army to provide reinforcements would provide a major bargaining asset in negotiations during times of crisis, an added deterrent to those forces already in Europe, and an actual military capability in times of armed aggression. Yet, as noted earlier, the capability of the army to meet its reinforcing commitments has diminished during the 1970s. The argu-

ments for corrective action, therefore, are strong.

Nonetheless, before a less-than-popular action is taken, several decisions which impact on the seriousness of the manpower-related problems deserve critical scrutiny. One such decision that merits examination and validation concerns the judgment of wartime requirements.

Determinations of wartime needs are far from objective decisions: rather, they are subjective judgments which reflect a myriad of assumptions and value judgments. In addition, the requirements have frequently been changed, reflecting the judgment of military planners at that time and the then-current assessments of a multitude of related factors. Though a mobilization shortfall in training individuals and new recruits would have occurred at the end of FY 1979, future adjustments in the requirements will either reduce the shortfalls or make them worse.

In evaluating the seriousness of the problem, one should remember that the requirements are determined on a "worst case" basis and that the chances of such occurring are considerably less than 100 percent. Such a scenario, of course, could occur, and for this reason the "worst case" planning process is a valid tool. Conversely, however, such emphasis on the most remote possibility creates an exaggerated sense of the magnitude of the problems. It is not the purpose of this article to question the use of the "worst case" planning process. Suffice to say that most or all of the mobilization manpower shortfalls and other problems would be eliminated if the United States adopted a "more likely" scenario as the basis for determining needs.

Another uncertain requirement concerns the need of the army completely to fill all its units prior to the availability of newly trained volunteers or conscripts. Particularly in light of the limitations noted earlier in strategic mobility, equipment, and sup-

ply resources, the army should be made to justify its stated manpower-fill requirements. For if the army can trade off some or all its requirements for filler personnel and casualty replacements, many of the army's mobilization problems could be resolved by restoring the emergency induction capability of Selective Service.

It is doubtful, however, that a revalidation of the army's force structure and manpower-fill requirements would completely eliminate mobilization problems. Accordingly, the nation may be left with several less-than-satisfactory choices.

For example, it could be agreed that we will accept the shortages. If the need for reinforcements does not materialize or if it occurs early enough before the outbreak of hostilities, the effect of the reserve force shortfalls would be minimal. Also, if there is little or no warning of the outbreak of war, the reserves would have little impact on the critical first weeks of fighting in Europe. Thereafter, however, if combat continued, a serious shortfall would jeopardize the army's capabilities for sustained conventional combat and lower the nuclear threshold accordingly, but U.S. strategic nuclear forces would not be affected.

It also could be agreed that a war in Europe would develop only after a period of warning longer than that now anticipated by Pentagon planners. If this decision were made and proved to be valid, it would allow a longer period for reserve retraining, the reconstruction of Selective Service induction machinery, and the training of greater numbers of new conscripts and volunteers.

Finally, and most sensibly, the nation could agree that U.S. strategic policy for the

defense of Western Europe must be reconciled with the changed capabilities of the AVF. For within the context of a continuing commitment to a long war-sustaining capability, it is an unfortunate paradox that the AVF has fostered both the total force policy and the progressively worsening ability of the army to meet the obligations of that policy.

Perhaps, then, the total force policy and the commitment to maintain a long war-sustaining capability are an anachronism of a past era when a large mass army was the order of the day. In any event, in an era of volunteerism, the willingness of the American people to support the armed forces and participate therein should determine the level of strategic commitments.

At least for the foreseeable future, therefore, the nation's commitments should be reduced in order to reflect the level of capabilities possible under the AVF system and steady-state funding levels. In particular, the commitment to maintain a long war-sustaining capability should be replaced by a more realistic short-war policy, allowing the concentration of available resources in on-site combat power and readily available, fully manned, trained, and equipped reinforcements.

Such compromising actions should not be taken lightly. Certain risks would accrue. Yet in an era when there are inadequate personnel and funding resources to support both a short-war and a long-war capability, the continuation of such commitments will only perpetuate the inability of the army to perform either mission fully—a condition that could contribute to a breakdown in détente or a change in the world order.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Planners in the Pentagon have estimated reporting percentages from the various categories. These were based on evaluations of the mobilizations of 1940, 1950, 1961, and 1968, with allowances for

better management and control. Despite the fact that standby and retired reserves have never been activated and that the U.S. has not fully mobilized since 1940, the Pentagon estimates that 95 percent of the selected reserve unit members, 70 percent of the IRR, and 50

percent of the standby reserve would respond to a mobilization call. Both the percentages for the selected reserve and IRR are higher than historical precedents. See Secretary of Defense, *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, unclassified portions of Secret document (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 11.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *A Report to Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976), p. IX-5.

3. Although the requirements for the mobilized force structure have not changed significantly since 1964, increases have been made in the estimated combat replacement needs primarily because of the high casualty rates of the 1973 Middle East war. Consequently, if a mobilization had occurred in 1964, the manpower surpluses would have been even greater than indicated.

4. Statement of Dr. John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), *Hearings before the Task Force on National Security*, House Budget Committee, 13 July 1977, Tab R-5, "Standby Draft."

5. Statement of William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), *Hearings on the Selective Service System*, House Committee on Armed Services, 27-29 January, 2-3 February 1976.

6. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1976* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), Part I, p. 105.

7. *Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March-April 1977, p. 2436.

8. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the airlift capacity is largely provided by 70 C-5 and 234 C-141 jet transports of the Military Airlift Command, and 227 commercial jet airliners which could be made available in an emergency through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). See Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 10929*, 2 February 1978, p. 179.

9. Estimate made by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, as quoted in "U.S. Ground Forces: Inappropriate Objectives, Unacceptable Costs," *Defense Monitor*, November 1978, p. 5. A more detailed analysis of the U.S. airlift capability was provided by the U.S. Army to the Library of Congress and is cited in *United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress*, p. 30. The army estimate stated that the planned move of the 82d Airborne Division to the Middle East in 1973 would have required one week if alert times had permitted prior preparation, longer if not. This move would have involved a somewhat smaller than normal U.S. division (about eleven thousand men), a basic load of ammunition and five days' supply of rations and fuel. The one-week time estimate for moving the first reinforcing division to Europe is repeated by authors of other works. See, for example, Leon Sloss, *NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities*, Washington Papers of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), p. 40.

10. Statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, op. cit., p. 179. In 1970 the number of dry cargo ships totaled more than 190, or some seven times the 1978 totals. See John M. Collins, *Imbalance of Power* (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 207.

11. Sealifted reinforcements could begin to arrive in Europe about three weeks after mobilization. With certain improvements in the contingency planning and preparation phase, however, the Pentagon believes that up to four divisions could be sealifted to Europe within thirty days. See Department of Defense, *Navy Accelerated Sealift Study: Project Sea Express*, 25 July 1974, p. 43.

12. The main airfield reception area for C-5 transports in West Germany has been Frankfurt's Rhein-Main airport, which is only 178 miles from the East German border.

13. The POMCUS equipment and supplies are located at eight sites, all east of the Rhine River and reasonably close to major airfields (and to the border with East Germany). Equipment is maintained in controlled humidity warehouses, covered storage, and some open storage facilities.

14. Pre-positioned war reserve stocks are a separate category of equipment from POMCUS, though many of the same items are contained in each. POMCUS equips dual-based units; war reserve stocks replace items such as ammunition and tanks that are likely to be expended once a conflict begins.

15. Richard Burt reported in 1978 that the United States' Five-Year Defense Plan calls for the provision of war reserve stocks for a ninety-day conflict. See "U.S. Analysis Doubts There Can Be Victor in Major Atomic War," *New York Times*, 6 January 1978, pp. A-1, A-4.

16. Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Huskie NATO Heads '79 Defense Priorities," *Army*, March 1978, p. 16.

17. Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility and Logistics Issues* (Washington: U.S. Congress, 1978), p. 4.

18. *NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness, Report of the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness*, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979); p. 2.

18. A concern about the need for an even longer "sustaining" capability was expressed by a leading Defense Department official in 1976. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) spoke at length about the army's manpower shortfall problems in Europe for the first seven months following a mobilization. See statement of William K. Brehm before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 6 February 1976.


20. A special congressional subcommittee determined in 1979 that the European NATO countries lack the capability to fight for thirty days and that plans do not provide for achieving such a capability until 1983. See *Report of the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness*, p. 2. Also see Sloss, *NATO Reform*, p. 34.

21. See, for example, Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin, *The Security of Western Europe* (London: Charles Knight, 1972), pp. 63-64; and Edward L. King, *The Death of an Army: A Pre-Mortem* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), pp. 140-43.

22. Neville Brown, *Strategic Mobility* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 199.

23. Morton H. Halperin, *National Security Policy-Making* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 162.

R the contributors




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
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