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ARE WE REALLY SERIOUS?:

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MANPOWER POLICIES IN THE ARMY RESERVE FORCES

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for presentation to:

International Studies Association
~~21st Annual Convention~~
Los Angeles, California
March 20, 1980

Addressee

and

West Point Senior Conference
on Defense Manpower Planning
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, New York
June 5-7, 1980

009571

March 1980

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(The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the General Accounting Office.)

The message from the Pentagon in 1980 concerning the health of the Army Reserve Forces is clear: thanks to innovative new policies and programs, the problems which have plagued these forces since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 are being resolved; further, that by 1985 the Reserves should be able to meet their mobilization and war-fighting commitments.

There is no disagreement between the Pentagon and "we" critics over the increased role of the Army Reserve Forces in national defense, or over the manpower, equipment and other factors of readiness which are critical to the accomplishment of their mission. Nor is there any major disagreement over the fact that improvements have been made during 1978 and 1979 and that further improvements will be made in 1980 and beyond. There remains, however, a reasonable difference of opinion concerning whether the new policies and programs will accomplish the Army's goal or, in contrast, whether they will provide only incremental "band-aid" fixes to much deeper problems.

It is the purpose of this paper, then, to critically analyze the current state of Reserve affairs in relation to the ongoing and planned improvements.

By assuming this devil's advocate role, it is contended that the extent of the problems can be more clearly defined, that the impact of the new policies and programs can be more accurately weighted, and that a clearer understanding of the remaining issues can be developed.

What Are Our Standards of Seriousness?

Since the advent of the AVF, the Army Reserve Forces have assumed a mobilization and war-fighting responsibility of far greater magnitude than in the draft years. Due to major reductions in the size of the Active Army, increasing commitments for deployment to Europe in support of NATO or to the Middle East, compression of the time thought allowable for delivering Reserve reinforcements, higher expected casualty rates, and a reduction in the expected warning time for any conflict, the Reserves have been given responsibilities that, while not equal to, are at least nearly as demanding as those of the Active Army.

I suggest, therefore, that reasonable standards of measurement concerning the seriousness of the commitment to providing such Reserve Forces capabilities would be those criteria normally used for the Active Army. Specifically, I submit that a mark of serious commitment would be planned or ongoing actions or programs to ensure (1) that the Reserves reach a manning level near to their wartime manpower requirements; (2) that the quality of Reserve Forces personnel be maintained at a level close to that of the Active Army; and (3) that the personnel recruited and retained be the right people in the right jobs who are well trained and ready to perform their mobilization roles. Against these measures, then, how are the Reserves

doing? How are they likely to be doing by the mid-1980's?

Will the Reserves Have Enough People?

The Army Reserve Forces consist of four major components: the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Army Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Army Standby Reserve, and the manning levels of all four components have fallen dramatically since the end of the draft. Due to a variety of reasons, their combined loss reached almost 800,000 from the manpower levels which had been maintained in the pre-Vietnam peacetime years. Whereas there were enough trained Reservists during those years to meet mobilization and war-fighting demands, the manpower resources of the Reserves in 1980 would be far from adequate.^{1/}

Nevertheless, the policy changes and new programs which were designed to improve the recruiting and retention of personnel in the key Reserve Forces components have prompted small incremental improvements.^{2/} For example, as noted in Table I, the Army National Guard was able to increase its strength from 341,000 in FY 1978 to 345,500 by the end of FY 1979.

TABLE I

ARMY RESERVE FORCES COMPONENTS: MANNING LEVEL CHANGES

<u>Component</u>	<u>End FY 1978 Strength</u>	<u>End FY 1979 Strength</u>	<u>Gain or Loss</u>
National Guard	341,000	345,500	+4,500
Reserve	185,800	190,000	+4,200
IRR	177,200	206,300	+29,100
Standby Reserve	48,000	16,000	-32,000

The gains registered by the Guard, Reserve and IRR were the first since the end of draft calls in 1972. Though the gains in the IRR were off-set by the losses in the Standby Reserve, the more readily-available status of IRR members indicates a net mobilization manpower gain.

Will the gains that should accrue from the new policies and programs be enough to meet the Army's 1985 requirements? The Pentagon believes so, but the magnitude of the tasks remaining casts a large shadow of doubt on this position.

The basis for this doubt is multifold, and concerns not only the large number of additional personnel that must be recruited and retained, but also a variety of yet-discussed weaknesses in the current posture and in several of the ongoing corrective programs.

Concerning the attainment of manning level objectives, it should be noted that the stated peacetime objectives are far above the current levels for all components except the Standby Reserve, which will cease to contain any significant numbers of useable manpower assets. As Table II illustrates, the challenges of increasing the size of the three major components will be formidable.

TABLE II

CONTRASTS BETWEEN FY 1979 AND PEACETIME MANNING LEVEL OBJECTIVES

<u>Component</u>	<u>End FY 1979 Manning Level</u>	<u>Peacetime Objective</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
National Guard	345,500	418,000	72,500
Reserve	190,000	252,400	62,400
IRR	206,300	400,000	197,700

Even if these peacetime objectives are attained, both the National Guard and the Reserve still would be some 50,000 personnel below their wartime manning needs. There would be enough trained personnel in the IRR, however, not only to fill out the National Guard and Reserve units, but also to fill out certain Active Army units and provide casualty replacements during the early months of a conflict.

Compounding the problem, however, is the recent decision of the Army to expand their mobilization manpower requirements by 60,000 over the next ^{3/} six years. Whereas some of this increase will be met by planned increases in the Active Army, the bulk of the added manpower (40,000 or so) will have to come from the Reserves. Thus, it is likely that the current FY 1985 manning level objectives will have to be raised even further.

There also are various weaknesses which merit discussion in the current posture of the Reserves and in several of their new programs.

First, the official reporting system of the National Guard and Reserve appears to be over-stating strength by including men and women in their units who have been enlisted but have not as yet completed basic military training. Such personnel - who numbered 25,253 in the Guard and 10,017 ^{4/} in the Reserve at the end of FY 1979 - will at some point be usable assets. Until they complete their training, however, it is misleading to include them in strength figures. Perhaps the Reserves should categorize such personnel as they do in the Active Army, as members of a Training Pipeline or Delayed Entry pool.

Second, as a result of a detailed audit by the General Accounting Office of the Army's system of keeping track of unit strength totals in the Guard and

Reserve, several reporting and administrative errors have come to light. The net result, according to GAO, is that the Army Guard and Reserve are over-reporting their on-board strength by almost four percent, a disparity of some 20,000 personnel, the equivalent of about four Army brigades.^{5/}

Third, an Army Audit Agency report issued in late 1979 identified more than 34,000 Guardsmen and 15,800 Reservists who had missed half or more of their drills during the first half of FY 1979, a level of training far below the standards of acceptability set by the Department of the Army. These unsatisfactory performers amounted to about 10% of the Guard and 8.5% of the Reserve strength totals.^{6/}

The last area concerns the programs to screen men being released from active duty or duty with the National Guard or Reserve and transferring them to the IRR. Those being transferred include many who have been released from active duty for reasons of bad attitude and other undesirable traits, and I have serious reservations concerning the usefulness of these personnel in a mobilization effort. I also doubt the usefulness of those people being transferred to the IRR from Guard and Reserve units because they are not fulfilling their obligations to attend drills and summer camps. Many of these men have not been seen by their unit commanders for many months and efforts to find them have been in vain. In such cases, in my view, it would be folly to say that we could find them quickly in the event of a military emergency. In terms of assessing the overall impact of the new policies and programs, then, the transfer of such questionable assets to the IRR may be adding an unrealistic dimension to the commitment of the Army to reach their peacetime manning level objectives by FY 1985.

What About the Quality of Guard and Reserve Recruits?

Quality performance is difficult to assess and even more difficult to predict. Impacting upon it are a myraid of individual traits -- honesty, integrity, skill, loyalty, commitment and motivation. It also is a product of situational variables -- the work environment, unit esprit, training and leadership. Consequently, it is next to impossible for the armed forces or any other large employer to effectively select the right people for all of their positions. At best, efforts are made to select those with the highest potential. At worst, because of the time and cost factors associated with even a basic selection program, choices are made on the basis of impressions, work history and other subjective judgments.

The two attributes principally used by the armed forces to describe and measure the quality of their new recruits are level of education and mental aptitude. Possession of a high school diploma has proven to be a sound indicator of capacity to adjust to the discipline of a military environment, while the scores attained by potential recruits on the three hour Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) have proven to be good indicators of potential success in training. More sophisticated methods of measuring quality exist; yet, their implementation would appear to be remote due to very high costs. As a result, it is likely that both the Active Army and the Reserve Forces will continue to use the two traditional methods of measuring quality.

In the case of high school diploma graduates, then, how did the recruits for the National Guard and Reserve in FY 1979 compare with those for the Active Army?

The answer to this question cannot be accurately determined until all the young men recruited by the Guard and Reserve while they were still in high school finish their high school programs or drop out. Nevertheless, by giving "credit" to the Guard and Reserve for such students, a reasonable comparison can be made, though weighted slightly in favor of the Reserves.

The proportions of male high school diploma graduates among the new recruits in FY 1979 differed markedly among the three components. As Table III highlights, the Guard achieved a high school diploma rate somewhat above the rate for the Active Army (which was the lowest of the four Active Services), while the Reserve rate was substantially lower:^{7/}

TABLE III

PROPORTION OF HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES IN FY 1979 MALE RECRUIT GROUPS

<u>Component</u>	<u>Proportion of Diploma Grads</u>	<u>Proportion of Non-Diploma Grads</u>
Active Army	59%	41%
National Guard	65%	35%
Reserve	30%	70%

By including the statistics for women high school diploma graduates, the proportions of such quality recruits improve slightly for all components, due to the universally high qualifications of their women recruits. The relative positions of the three components, however, do not change.

The same disparities between the Reserve and the Active Army/National Guard appear when statistics for Mental Categories are examined. As Table IV shows, the proportion of Mental Category IV personnel in the Reserve (those least desired) was about double the proportion in the Active Army and the

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National Guard.

TABLE IV

PROPORTION OF MENTAL CATEGORIES IN MALE RECRUIT GROUPS, FY 1979

<u>Component</u>	<u>I & II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Active Army		89%	11%
National Guard	20%	69%	11%
Reserve	12%	68%	20%

The bleak status of quality recruiting in the Reserve is clouded further by the probability that the mental test system being utilized by the Active and Reserve Forces has been inflating Mental Category rankings by a significant amount. Such inflation has been suspected by many analysts for some time, but it was not confirmed by the Department of Defense until early 1980. At that time, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics Robert B. Pirie told Members that "statistical sampling suggests that a sizeable fraction (less than one half but probably more than one quarter) of FY 1978 male recruits labeled as Mental Category III should have been labeled as Mental Category IV."^{9/} (FY 1979 data are now being analyzed.)

If Pirie's conclusion is extended to the FY 1979 group (and every indication supports this), then the inabilities of the Reserve to recruit quality personnel during FY 1979 was even greater than indicated. At worst, if 50% of those labeled as Mental Group III were actually Mental Group IV's or lower, then somewhat more than one-half of men recruited by the Army Reserve were in Mental Group IV and V, or the lower 30% of the standard population. In addition, in all probability, most of the men identified as Mental Group IV's were in reality Mental Group V's (the lowest 10%) who are excluded

by statute from service. Thus, if correct test scoring procedures had been in effect during FY 1979, the Army Reserve would have been precluded from enlisting some 20% of their accessions (the Active Army and the Army National Guard would have been precluded from enlisting some 10%). Such actions, of course, would have impacted heavily on the overall recruiting programs and on unit manning levels and it is likely that instead of registering small manning level gains, major force level reductions would have occurred.

Compounding this problem is a recognized level of recruiting malpractice, actions which also inflate the quality measures of new recruits. During FY1979, the Active Army conducted an extensive investigation of test compromise and other forms of irregularities within the Active Army and Army Reserve recruiting programs. Their efforts concluded that some two-to-three percent of those enlisting had participated in some malpractice, including many who had received improper coaching or other help on the ASVAB test.

Do the Reserves Have the Right People in the Right Jobs, and Are They Trained and Ready to Go?

Beyond the questions of whether the Reserve Forces can reach their desired levels of manning or whether their quality can equal that of the Active Army is - perhaps - a more critical question of whether they are recruiting and retaining the right personnel.

In order to provide the Reserves with the right mix of younger, more energetic and junior personnel in the lower ranks and older, more experienced veterans in the NCO positions, the Reserves have determined that they need a yearly input mix of about 60% non-prior service (NPS) personnel and 40%

veterans. This determination, however, is not based on an extensive force structure analysis. Nevertheless, the 60-40 split was about the level maintained during the draft years.

Since the end of the draft, neither the National Guard nor the Reserve has been able to attain the desired level of NPS accessions. As a consequence, their recruitment of more than enough veterans has had a negative impact on their effectiveness, as well as on the strength level of the IRR.

If the Guard and Reserve were to attain their desired strength levels and also attain their desired levels of NPS accessions, then the Guard each year would need to recruit some 60,000 such men and the Reserve would need to recruit some 52,000. Clearly, the achievement of this goal has been beyond the current capabilities of either component, though the Guard has done far better than the Reserve.

Nonetheless, the Guard's input of male NPS recruits in FY 1979 of some 42,000 would have to be increased by 18,000, while the Reserve's input of 22,000 would have to be more than doubled. While each of the components in recent years has made incremental improvements in their recruitment of NPS personnel, it is doubtful that the combined impact of their new policies and programs will allow them to reach the desired levels. As a consequence, even if the Guard and Reserve are able to reach their desired manning levels, the composition of their forces still will be less than desirable.

An examination of the distribution of personnel within the enlisted grades of the Guard and Reserve illustrates this problem. Within the Guard, at the end of FY 1979, there were some 160,000 E-1 to E-4 personnel, or some 62% of their wartime manning requirements. At the same time, the 150,000 E-5 to

E-9 personnel were already some 11,000 more than needed for the wartime structure. Within the Reserve, the 71,000 E-1 to E-4 personnel would have filled only 61% of their wartime requirements, while their more than 81,000 E-5 to E-9 personnel represented 86% of their needs.

Beyond the problems concerning shortages of junior personnel are many other manpower problems, including disproportionate shortages of personnel in the combat career fields (infantry, combat engineering, field artillery, air defense artillery and armor). Whereas the Guard overall is short some 20% of the personnel needed for their wartime manning, the shortages in the five combat skill areas are almost double, with the highest shortages in the infantry and air defense artillery. In sum, as the General Accounting Office recently concluded, the five combat-type career management fields numerically represent about 70% of the total enlisted shortages. ^{10/}

Within the Reserve, similar shortages exist, though since the Reserve consists predominantly of combat support and combat service support units, the shortage skills are somewhat different from those of the Guard. In the Reserve, the major shortage skill areas are combat engineers, with only 63% of their wartime strength, field artillery with only 48%, and medical personnel with only 65%.

The shortage problems within the critical skill groups in the Guard and Reserve are heightened by a relatively high percent of assigned personnel who are not qualified for their jobs. As the GAO also has noted, within the five critical combat skill areas in the Guard, only some 78% of the personnel on-hand are qualified to serve in their positions. In total, then, the Guard has only slightly more than one-half of the qualified

personnel it needs in its combat jobs. Within the Reserve, the combination of manning level shortfalls and unqualified personnel results in an even grimmer situation. For the three skill areas of combat engineers, field artillery and medical, the numbers of trained personnel in FY 1979 represented only 43%, 35% and 47% respectively of their wartime manning requirements.^{11/}

These shortage problems would be compounded upon mobilization, for not all members of the various Reserve Forces components would be expected to report for active service. The reasons for this would be many: health, personal business or family problems; having failed to inform the Army of address changes; employment in critical occupations; and, for the IRR and Standby Reserve, determinations that the skills of the individual Reservists would not be needed in the mobilization effort. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense has developed "yield" rates for each category of manpower resource.^{12/}

Whereas the expected loss upon mobilization of 5% from the Guard and Reserve units can be supported by both historical experience and various mobilization exercises of the late 1970's, the loss factors for the IRR and Standby Reserve are less certain. On the one hand, in total, there are enough pretrained personnel in the various categories to meet the Army's needs, if the resources of the Retired Reserve are included. On the other hand, if the estimated losses from these sources are understated, the Army's problems would be even greater.

A variety of factors would influence the validity of the "yield" rates. For example, the willingness of Americans to serve would vary considerably between a politically inspired mobilization in response to an insurgency in

a Third World oil-producing country and a call-up in response to a major Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe. In addition, there would certainly be a different response rate from personnel of different grades, skills, ages, and obligations for recall. Yet, the Army is expecting the same response rate from non-obligated, non-combat arms field grade officers as from young, obligated, combat arms enlistees.

Another problem concerns the matching of the Army's specific manning needs with available personnel. The Army estimates that some 70% of the IRR would report on mobilization, but little attention is being paid to whether all of these personnel could perform useful functions. For example, approximately 75% of the Army's filler and replacement needs would be in combat arms, medical, combat engineering and other direct support fields. Yet, only about 25% of the IRR personnel possessed these skills in FY 1979, and few steps have been taken to plan and develop the retraining programs which would be essential to the effective utilization of the IRR resources. An overabundance of officers in the IRR compounds this problem.

A serious question also arises as to whether the manpower available upon mobilization would be ready in time to play a useful role ^{IN} the critical early weeks. The Army has concentrated on developing new programs and policies aimed at increasing the strength levels of the Guard and Reserve as well as the IRR, but it has generally ignored time-related problems. In fact, however, most of the personnel needed to boost the wartime force to its peak level would be needed in the first few weeks, and it would be unlikely that the reporting and deployment schedules called for in current plans could be met, particularly by those in the IRR and the Standby Reserve. In such

cases, initial ordering, administrative processing and pre-reporting leave would take time. Many personnel would require refresher training before they could be assigned to operating units; those assigned to new specialties would require even longer periods of training. Though such personnel might eventually fill units to their wartime levels, enough of them would be delayed in reporting to their units to cause major manning problems.

How Really Serious Are We About the Army Reserve Forces?

As our examination of the measurement criteria illustrated, the Army Reserve Forces, the Reserve in particular, have not been nearly as successful as the Active Army in meeting manning level, manpower quality and personnel effectiveness goals. But is this the result of deliberate or unconscious inattention, or is it the result of different and apparently unsurmountable recruiting, training and retention problems unique to the Reserve Forces?

Whereas some positive changes have taken place, the weight of evidence supports the conclusion that the leadership elements within the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have not as yet fully matched their repeated statements of concern over the problems in the Reserve Forces with appropriate action, management attention and resources.

Decisions reflected in the budgetary process provide a clear indication of this. For example, in his official guidance to the Services issued during 1979 for the preparation of the FY 1981 budget, the Secretary of Defense made a sharp distinction between his concern for the Active Forces and his concern for the Reserves. While spelling out in great detail desired manning levels, numbers of high school diploma graduates and women, attrition rates, and

other goals for the Active Forces, his directions for funding the Reserves were limited to broad statements such as "peacetime manning should be increased where it is lower than authorized, and particular emphasis should be placed on the early deploying units." And in terms of the high school diploma graduate marketplace, he created what could be considered as a second class citizenship for the Reserves by directing them to minimize competition with the Active Forces among high school seniors by concentrating on labor force participants, post-secondary students, and individuals with low propensity to enlist in the Active Forces.^{13/} In other words, as many Active Army recruiters have said to Guard and Reserve recruiters: "Stay away from the prime recruiting market!"

There are those within the Pentagon that say that the lack of definite goals for the Reserves in the Budget Guidance was not due to lack of concern, but rather to an acceptance of the fact that the Reserves, particularly the Army Reserve Forces, could not control and manage their recruiting and retention programs to the level of sophistication attained by the Active Forces and necessary for the establishment of more definitive goals. Nevertheless, the Guidance did allow each Service to set its own goals for its Reserves. Consequently, in their subsequent budget process, the Army not only established end strength goals far below peacetime manning objectives, it also set quality standards lower than those set for its active personnel. Further, the Army did not request the Reserve pay changes, increased bonus funds, improved training facilities and programs, increased recruiting forces and other resources that would have provided the means for the Army Reserve Forces to make a serious and substantial movement toward greater parity with the Active Army.

Within the Reserve Forces programs, however, it is clear that the Guard has been given somewhat greater priority, due in all likelihood to its higher proportion of early deploying forces and to the Guard's traditional political independence and influence.

In defense of the Army's failure to fully support its Reserve Forces, it should be pointed out that Congress in recent years has not been favorably inclined to major and revolutionary changes in Reserve pay and other policies, though they recently initiated and funded a needed enlistment/reenlistment bonus program. They have not, however, seriously considered the major departures from current policy (such as un-linking Active and Reserve pay and making major increases in Reserve incentives) which would be necessary to fully resolve the manpower problems. In any case, it is clear that the Army's position on setting less-than-optimum goals for the Reserves has been influenced by what they believed they could get (rather than by what they needed) in order to make significant and continuing improvements.

Why has the Army been less than fully serious about its Reserve Forces? Several reasons can be cited.

First, the Army has been preoccupied since the end of draft calls with the problems of manning the all-volunteer Active Army. With continuing difficulties in finding and keeping enough quality personnel, particularly for the combat arms, Active Army managers have been hard-pressed to retain even a slowly shrinking force. Consequently, in an era of limited resources and management skills, priority has been given to countering the problems of the Active Army.

Second, there is a large body of opinion within the Army and elsewhere which is increasingly questioning the necessity for a large Reserve Force in a

period of history which they believe will be characterized by short, violent confrontations, with premiums on ready forces and mobility. Whereas certain of the Guard and Reserve units earmarked for early deployment could play a role in such short-war scenarios, the bulk of the Reserve Forces would not be ready for deployment until weeks or even months after the outbreak of a crisis and they would have little impact on the eventual outcome. As a result, these critics argue, there is little justification for expending resources or management expertise for forces of such marginal value.

Third, there is the realistic view of many in the Army establishment and elsewhere that the role of the Reserves is being severely limited by equipment, supply, War Reserves, and strategic mobility weaknesses.^{14/}

A variety of statistics and testimony could be presented on our current inabilities to deliver and support massive reinforcements in the event of a crisis in Europe or in the Middle East. Whereas there is a lack of agreement on our exact capabilities, there is no disagreement over the fact that the United States could not deploy the bulk of its stateside Active Army units, much less many of the Reserves, in a time frame which was close to that called for in contingency plans.^{15/} Accordingly, it can be argued that until we begin to have the capability to equip, transport and support massive reinforcements, the commitment of added resources to the Reserves would only sidetrack monies and management attention that could be better utilized in areas of more critical importance.

What Choices are Open to Us?

I suggest that only three alternative courses of action are open to Pentagon decision-makers in the early 1980's: (1) maintaining the current degree of commitment and resources; (2) becoming fully committed to bringing the Reserve Forces up to the hoped-for levels of strength and effectiveness; or (3) redirecting Reserve Forces assets and management attention to the critical early deploying units, with the remaining units being assigned to cadre status.

The continuation of the status quo policies and programs for the Guard and Reserve no doubt would result in a steady slow improvement over the next few years. Such incremental gains, however, could not be expected to bring the two components up to the desired levels of readiness and manning. In fact, many of the gains could be offset by major recruiting difficulties, prompted by the shrinking pool of eligible enlistment candidates.^{16/}

While some gains would be realized in the IRR from the various programs already initiated or being planned, this manpower resource still would be inadequate to meet wartime requirements, if not in terms of gross numbers then at least in terms of skilled and ready personnel.

The second alternative would be the most expensive and difficult to achieve. Failing a return to Selective Service or the adoption of a special IRR draft - highly unlikely events - major changes would have to be made in the attractions of Reserve Forces service. Pay would have to be un-linked from Active Army pay rates and substantial increases would be necessary. A myraid of new enlistment and reenlistment bonuses also would be required, as well as major increases in the recruiting forces and their supporting personnel and facilities. In addition, there would have to be improvements

in Reserve training programs so that more of those inticed to Reserve Forces service would remain. And in this regard, more and better equipment, training facilities and funds, and greater Active Army affiliations and supervision would be needed. The price tag for such a commitment cannot be determined without detailed additional research though it probably would require several billions of dollars. Yet, as the draft for the Active Forces was ended on the basis of the work of the Gates Commission in 1969-1970 and the subsequent commitment of added funds, there can be no doubt that a similar effort and commitment in 1980 and 1981 could achieve the same result for the Reserves. In short, as Martin Anderson urged in a recent op-ed piece in the Washington Post: "We should announce that from now on the Reserves are serious business, not a paid routine gambol."^{17/}

Some may argue that the stronger position of the Carter Administration on national security matters which has resulted from the Iran and Afghanistan crises will be the first serious step on the path toward building such fully ready Reserves. Unfortunately, however, a close examination of the President's pending FY 1981 budget fails to support this view. While the budget has been presented as a "real" increase in defense spending, it also is based on assumptions about inflation that are not likely to turn out to be true. One only has to remember that President Carter also made a "real" increase proposal in 1979 and that this projected gain turned into a loss because of the unexpectedly high inflation.

Neither does the FY 1981 Budget, as proposed, add much to the sorely underfunded Reserves or to manpower programs overall.^{18/} Indeed, even if inflation allows "real" increases to take place, the gains will be in weapons systems development and procurement, which are admittedly needy areas

but not exclusively so.

Perhaps, then, the most realistic course of action would be to accept the fact that the problems of the Reserves will not be fully corrected in the near future and that whatever assets are available should be concentrated in the units designated for early deployment.

To a great extent, such concentration already is taking place. Such units are receiving more management attention than their later deploying counterparts. Fulltime manning is at higher levels. Enlistment and reenlistment incentives are targeted at personnel in these units, and the units are receiving priority for new equipment and better training. At the same time, however, many resources and attention still are being directed elsewhere.

The adoption of a cadre manning policy would free many of these resources for use with the early deploying units. Under such a cadre concept, the later deploying Guard and Reserve units would maintain their officer and senior NCO positions, but they would be relieved of responsibility for recruiting and training the bulk of their younger, more junior personnel.

The absence of such junior personnel would deter traditional training and require massive fills of new people upon mobilization. At the same time, however, it would not be necessary to strip the few remaining junior personnel from these units upon mobilization for use as fillers, a policy which though not popular has nevertheless been endorsed by the leadership in the Pentagon.^{19/} Instead, the early deploying units could be manned at higher levels while the later deploying units in cadre status could amend their training programs to foster the skills necessary for forming units and leading personnel fresh from the training base.

Whether the status quo is maintained or a cadre policy is adopted, it is

clear that upon mobilization the available combat arms and other shortage skill personnel in the IRR would have to be assigned to early deploying units and that the later deploying units would have to be filled with re-trained individual Reservists or newly trained conscripts, personnel who would not be ready for assignment until several months after mobilization. Thus, whether or not such units are allowed to continue their recruitment and retention of junior personnel, they would not be ready for deployment at an early date. Due to limitations on strategic mobility, War Reserves, and our capacity to continuously supply an overseas force, however, such longer-than-expected delays in achieving readiness for deployment would not be a critical factor.

In a recent article in Army magazine, Thomas D. Slear, a West Pointer and a former Army officer, reported that the Reserve infantry company which he observed was authorized 155 personnel, that 55 people were on the rolls, but that only 25, almost all officers and senior NCO's, had shown up for weekend training. Of the remaining 30 or so personnel, 11 had not been seen for upwards of five months while the others, almost all E-1's to E-3's in their initial terms of service, had called in with such excuses as marital problems, bad colds and car troubles. On the positive side of ledger, however, Slear noted that "the unit's enthusiasm, competence and esprit in their field training bespoke the existence of a strong cadre of leadership that a mobilizing Army would welcome." ^{20/} Such are the strengths and weaknesses of many Reserve units today. And whether formalized or not, it is clear that units such as that visited by Slear already have evolved to a cadre status.

Of the three alternative courses of action, there is no doubt that national defense would be best served by a more serious commitment on the part of

the Army and the Department of Defense to the resolution of the many Army Reserve Forces manpower problems. Failing this, however, the Army must make the best use of the available resources and the formalization of a cadre policy for the majority of the Army Guard and Reserve would be a positive step in this direction.

NOTES

1. Estimates of the extent of the shortfall vary. One of the more optimistic (270,000) was made by a top Pentagon official in early 1980. See Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics Robert B. Pirie, Hearings Before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 19 February 1980, p. 28.
2. For a summary of the new policies and programs, see Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Status of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR): Strength and Initiatives, Fiscal Years 1978-1979," 30 January 1980; and "Selected Reserve Manpower Strength Assessment and Recruiting Results for Fiscal Year 1979," 31 December 1979.
3. Pirie, op. cit., p. 28.
4. See Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), "Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics," 30 September 1979 for a display of all Army Reserve Forces strength and quality data used herein.
5. General Accounting Office, General Accounting Office Report to the Secretary of the Army, Army Guard and Reserve Pay and Personnel Systems are Unreliable and Susceptible to Waste and Abuse, 28 January 1980, p. 28.
6. Ibid., pp. 24, 31.
7. Despite the fact that the Guard was able to recruit more than twice the proportion of high school diploma grads than the Reserve, both components were able to attract about equal proportions of Black and White quality recruits. For example, within the Guard, 61.5% of the White recruits were high school diploma grads compared with 64% of the Black recruits. In the Reserve, 30% of both the White and Black recruits were high school diploma grads.
8. Unlike the nearly equal proportions of Blacks and Whites with high school diplomas, there were far greater proportion of Blacks in Mental Category IV than Whites. For example, in the Guard, 19.2% of Black male enlistees in FY 1979 were ranked as Category IV's, while only 8.2% of the Whites were so-classified. In the Reserve, 31% of the Blacks were ranked in Category IV, compared with 13.6% of the Whites.
9. Pirie, op. cit., p. 11.
10. General Accounting Office, Comptroller General's Report to the Congress, Critical Manpower Problems Restrict the Use of National Guard and Reserve Forces, 11 July 1979, pp. 34, 50.

11. Ibid., pp. 36-37, 51-52.
12. The Secretary of Defense has provided the following "yields" for use in mobilization planning: Selected Reserve (Guard and Reserve units), 95%; IRR, 70%; Standby Reserve, 50%. See Consolidated Guidance, 7 March 1978, p. 0-8 (unclassified).
13. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Consolidated Guidance, 12 April 1979, p. N-8 (unclassified).
14. Concerning these limitations, the Secretary of Defense had this to say to Congress in early 1980: "We have economized (some would say skimmed) on the nuts and bolts needed to sustain a non-nuclear conflict in a particular theater for more than a relatively short time." See Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs, 29 January 1980, p. 99.
15. The Army's plans for deployment of reinforcements from the United States for a major conflict in Europe include most of the Guard and Reserve units, as well as the Active Army divisions not currently assigned overseas. And in order to meet the Army's deployment schedule, the movement of all of these units would have to be completed in ninety days or less. See Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March-April 1977, p. 2436.
16. By 1986, the number of 18 year old males will be only 1,839,000, a reduction of 324,000 from the 1979 level. There also will be corresponding reductions in the number of male high school diploma graduates and increased competition for such youth from educational institutions and civilian employers.
17. Martin Anderson, "Build the Reserves, Not Lists," Washington Post, 3 February 1980, p. C-1.
18. A recent Department of Defense study documented that the "real" expenditures for the Guard and Reserve (all four Services) actually decreased by about 10% from FY 1978 to FY 1980. See Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), ROGAR: Review of the Guard and Reserve, 26 December 1979.
19. As a top Pentagon official told Congress in early 1980: "We would borrow people in shortage skills from late deploying units, accepting the fact that the units that are reduced may not be able to deploy when scheduled." See Pirie, op. cit., p. 35.
20. Thomas D. Slear, "The Men of Company A," Army magazine, January 1980, pp. 40-41.