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


UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION DIVISION

MARCH 18, 1981

B-202089



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The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
The Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Subject: Does the Army Decisionmaking Process Include Both Active and Reserve Components?  
(FPCD-81-37)

Total Force management involves decisionmaking that makes use of all available manpower components (Active Forces, Reserve, and National Guard) to fill manpower needs. The importance of Total Force decisionmaking becomes readily apparent in current All-Volunteer Force considerations because of the important contribution required of reserve component personnel.

In our January 24, 1979, report entitled "DOD Total Force Management--Fact or Rhetoric?" (FPCD-78-82), we concluded that the Department of Defense, and particularly the Army, was less than serious about Total Force because of the lack of emphasis and the failure of the components to participate in, or be considered in, management decisions. Although the Army has not fully solved the problems, it is making strides in improving its Total Force decisionmaking process.

Our current study shows that the Army has not only started consulting with all components affected by a particular decision, but does so early in the decisionmaking process. When coordination did not occur, the Army recognized this and corrected the coordination problem.

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OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

We made our study to determine if the Army's decisionmaking process considers the Total Force in a manner which recognizes the importance and the differences between the Active Forces, Reserve, and Guard. To do this, we evaluated the Army's decisionmaking process, dealing mainly with recruiting and retention. We traced many examples to see if Total Force policy is being carried out in actual practice. Three of the examples are presented as detailed case studies. (See p. 3.) Although we evaluated the Army's decisionmaking process, we did not evaluate the decisions themselves. We did not consider whether the ultimate decisions were right or wrong, only whether all components were consulted and their views considered in the process.]

We selected decisions for our examination on the basis of our professional judgment. Our selection criteria required decisions which affected more than one component; was relatively recent; and dealt with recruitment, retention, or both.

We interviewed knowledgeable military and civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard. We also examined relevant documents to validate their statements. All locations visited were in the Washington, D.C., area. Further scope information is contained in the case studies.

TOTAL FORCE--A REQUIREMENT

One former Secretary of Defense explained the Total Force concept during the 1971 congressional appropriations hearings by saying:

"In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World Security. These Free World military and related resources--which we call 'Total Force'--include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs."

Another former Secretary of Defense established the Total Force policy. In August 1973 he told the secretaries of the military departments and other selected military officials that:

"Total Force is no longer a 'concept.' It is now the Total Force policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces into a homogenous whole."

The Secretary also said that the Guard and Reserve Forces would be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active Forces.

#### ARMY TOTAL FORCE

Current Army thinking concerning Total Force policy is expressed in the statement of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on Armed Services, in late February 1980. He said, in part:

"As we enter the 80's our Nation relies on Reserve Forces for a substantial capability during the early phases of a national conflict. In the defense of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] our plans call upon the Reserves to contribute about one-half of the early deploying forces \* \* \* No longer are the Reserve Components 'RESERVE' in a literal sense but a part and parcel of the whole--THE TOTAL ARMY."

#### EXAMPLES OF TOTAL FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Some Army actions showing a commitment to Total Force participation follow:

FORECAST--The Army is developing an integrated family of automatic data processing systems, called FORECAST, to support Army strength projections and personnel management data forecasting requirements in peacetime and under mobilization conditions. Officers and enlisted personnel in all components are to be included.

Enlisted force management plan--The 1980 plan, which expresses the Army's long-range goals and objectives for personnel management was, for the first time, developed as a single (all components included) management document. (See enc. 1.)

Combined recruiting--Beginning May 1, 1979, Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve recruiting were combined under the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Based on the

National Guard's interpretation of the Constitution, recruiting responsibility for the Guard rests with the individual States. Therefore, the recruiting mission of the Guard has not been combined with the Active Army and Reserve.

Regulations--The Army Vice Chief of Staff has tasked the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel with developing a single set of enlistment regulations for the Active Army and Reserve. The Guard will retain its own regulations as long as the recruiting mission is separate from the other components.

Expanded basic training--All three components were actively involved in the decision to expand basic training by 1 week. (See enc. II.)

Cross training--Two-hundred Guard captains will be sent to Europe for extended active duty with the Army.

Total Force data--Important management data is now being presented in a Total Force format. For example:

--Total Army enlisted strengths: Wartime requirements and peacetime objectives.

--Total Army statistics (strength, accessions, and losses) for fiscal year 1980.

--Total Army recruiting resources over time.

In-Service Recruiter Program--In-service Reserve and Guard recruiters are counseling Active Army soldiers about Reserve and Guard service opportunities. About 2 months before soldiers are scheduled to complete their active duty tours, the in-service recruiters interview them and outline the various Reserve and Guard options available to them upon discharge. This counseling approach is new and differs from the simple briefings which, in the past, were presented to separating soldiers the last day of their tour. (See enc. II.)

Simultaneous Membership Program--This program offers prospective enlistees an opportunity to be in the Guard while pursuing a Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) commission. The ROTC scholarship program allows graduates to satisfy service obligations in either the Guard or the Reserve. In addition, Guard and Reserve officers, as well as Active Army officers, will be instructors at ROTC centers.

CAPSTONE--This new program, along with the Army's Affiliation Program, is designed to improve the operational readiness of Guard and Reserve units that will be required to support a mobilization. CAPSTONE enhances the Affiliation Program, however, by aligning a wartime logistical structure with the peacetime associations established under the Affiliation Program.

CONCLUSIONS

Since our January 1979 report on the status of Total Force, the Army decisionmaking process now includes all components. The Army has recognized the critical importance of, and the interdependence of, each component and has taken actions which should foster the Total Force policy. All component staff are consulting each other and considering each other's views more and more in the Army decisionmaking process, and, even though they do not always agree with the resulting decisions, they are aware that their views have been considered.

Support by the Congress and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Army recruiting, retention, affiliation, training, and management efforts has greatly contributed to the Army's progress.

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We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested persons.

Sincerely yours,

  
Clifford I. Gould  
Director

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EXAMPLE: THE ENLISTED FORCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

The Army's Enlisted Force Management Plan, 1980 edition, a Total Force document which recognizes all components, was developed by representatives from each of the components working together. The plan expresses the Army's long-range goals and objectives for personnel management. The 1980 edition is the first time the Army has incorporated all components into one management plan.

The following analysis of the plan's development is based on our discussions with officials in the Army's Military Personnel Management Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Reserve's Personnel Division, and the Guard's Enlisted and Special Activities Branch in its Personnel Division. We also examined relevant documents. Although we evaluated the coordination that contributed to the plan's development, we did not evaluate the plan's effectiveness.

ALL ARMY COMPONENTS WORKING TOGETHER  
DEVELOPED THE 1980 MANAGEMENT PLAN

Although the Army has prepared individual component plans in the past, the products, according to Army staff, were rarely very meaningful or useful. For example, the 1978 plan included only the Active Force. The last Reserve plan was developed in 1976 by Active Army staff, who had little insight into the workings of the Reserve, and, as a result, it was never implemented.

When the Enlisted Division in the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) was tasked in October 1979 with updating the 1978 management plan, it recognized the need for considering the Total Force and for developing a useful management tool. One means of doing both was to involve the Reserve and the Guard; so in January 1980, DCSPER requested that one Reserve officer and one Guard officer be assigned to its Enlisted Division to facilitate the plan's development. The temporary assignment of these officers to the staff proved to be extremely valuable, since they became the focal points for almost daily contacts between the Enlisted Division, the Reserve, and the Guard.

Developing the plan required the participation of all components. Because of the change in approach to the plan, the action officer in charge held briefings on the concept from February through April 1980 for all the Army directorates, including the Reserve and the Guard, to enlist the support of

the entire Army. The last of these briefings was presented to the Army's Vice Chief of Staff on April 11, 1980. In the meantime, the Enlisted Division staff was developing the first draft of the plan which was sent to all Army staff offices, including the Reserve, the Guard, and major commands, for comment and review in April 1980. After considering the comments and concerns, the Enlisted Division then revised the plan and sent the final draft for comment on July 8, 1980. The plan was approved by the Secretary of the Army in November 1980.

Implementation of the approved plan will be carried out primarily through the Army's manpower programs and will require continual coordination between the Army's Enlisted Division, the Manpower Directorate, and the budget staff. The group responsible for developing the plan, DCSPER's Enlisted Division, has assumed the oversight role for insuring that the plan is implemented for all components.

Although the development of such a Total Force plan by representatives from each of the Army components is significant in itself, the plan's development prompted other actions which are Total Force oriented as well. These include the development of the 1981 total Army enlisted accession objectives and a total Army officer management plan.

EXAMPLE: EXPANSION OF BASIC TRAINING

All components were actively involved in the recent decision to expand basic training from 7 to 8 weeks. Although the expanded program has been implemented at least initially only for the Active Force, the Reserve and the Guard played an important role in the decisionmaking process.

The following analysis of that decisionmaking process is based on our discussions with officials in the Army's Training Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the Reserve's Operations and Training Division; and the Guard's Enlisted and Special Activities Branch in the Personnel Division. We also examined relevant documents. Although we evaluated the coordination that contributed to this decision, we did not evaluate the decision to expand basic training.

ALL ARMY COMPONENTS PARTICIPATED IN THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

The Army recently expanded its basic training program to 8 weeks for its enlisted active duty personnel. Although the Reserve and Guard will not implement the expanded program until October 1981, they actively participated in the decisionmaking process. In October 1978 a detailed analysis of the basic training program was begun. This analysis led to the firm conclusion that additional basic training is needed in several areas. To accommodate these needs, a new program of instruction was developed which would extend basic training by 1 week. The proposed curriculum was coordinated with the Reserve and the Guard, and by April 1980 all components had agreed on the program of instruction and to implement the expanded program in October 1981.

PROGRAM CHANGED BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

Recognizing the need for the expanded basic training program, the Army Chief of Staff suggested that it be implemented in January 1981 instead of October 1981 as originally planned. Once again, all the components were consulted.

The Reserve and the Guard responded that, for several reasons, including funding, they could not expand basic training to 8 weeks in January 1981. Full expansion would increase pay and allowances by about \$5 million, which would require congressionally approved reprogramming.



In response to the Reserve's and Guard's needs, compromises and tradeoffs were made. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command which conducts the training agreed to retain enough 7-week basic training units to accommodate the Reserve and Guard recruits. The result was that basic training was expanded to 8 weeks at only two bases--Forts Knox and Leonard Wood. Reserve and Guard recruits previously scheduled for basic training at these bases are being redirected to other locations. The expanded program will be extended to all training bases and be fully implemented for all components in October 1981 as originally planned.

EXAMPLE: THE IN-SERVICE RECRUITER PROGRAM

The Army's In-Service Recruiter Program is another way the Army's decisionmaking process involves its Total Force, not just its Active component. The program requires close coordination among all the components in order to motivate personnel scheduled to separate from the Active Force to remain a member of Total Force and enlist in the Reserve or the Guard when their tour in the Active Army has ended. Although coordination problems do appear, the Army is reacting to remedy them.

The following analysis of one coordination problem is based on our discussions with officials in the Army's Military Personnel Management Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Inspector General's Office, the Reserve's Personnel Division, and the Guard's Recruiting and Retention Support Center in the Personnel Division. We also examined relevant documents. Although we evaluated the coordination that contributed to several program changes, we did not evaluate the specific changes.

THE ARMY REACTS TO PROGRAM  
COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Although coordination problems can occur, recent Army actions in one case indicates its willingness to require coordination and provide the necessary Total Force perspective. On August 28, 1980, an In-Service Recruiter Program work group met to discuss ways to increase prior service enlistments in the Reserve. Although the group was concerned with the Reserve and the Guard, it did not participate in the session. Consequently, the decisionmaking process at that time might have reflected a more traditional Army thinking process rather than its current Total Force emphasis. However, when the Army later realized that Reserve and Guard representatives were not invited, a second meeting was convened. At that meeting on November 5, 1980, members of all components examined the status of the program and, agreeing on the results of the August meeting, defined the future direction of the program.