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

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
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Statement of

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Procurement, Logistics and Readiness Division

before the

House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittee on Investigations.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on Investigations to discuss our recent report on the Department of Defense's system of managing physical security at United States military bases. As you know, our report on this subject was issued March 6, 1981 and essentially points out that a management system needs to be established within Defense or among the services to bring about adequate security at reasonable cost. In response to our draft report, Defense initiated action on several specific problems, but did not agree with our proposals for strengthening overall management of the program. I hope that my testimony will underscore the need for additional actions. Following this brief

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statement, I will be glad to respond to any questions regarding our work on physical security.

What Is Physical Security?

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, physical security is:

> "That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft."

Physical security has three basic ingredients: threat, assets (objects to be safeguarded), and protective measures. Threats can range from perceived terrorist action to employee pilferage; assets can range from highly sophisticated weapons to shop tools; and protective measures can include any combination of equipment, such as fences, alarm systems, and lighting, and personnel which can be military, government civilians, or contractors.

Physical Security Management is a Major Challenge

Losses or sabotage of military assets are particularly sensitive because such incidents might cast doubt on the military's preparedness. Thus, the adequacy of physical security is a key ingredient in military readiness. However, it would be impossible, impractical, and extremely costly to design programs to deal with all perceived incident scenarios. The real challenge is for managers to judge the likelihoods of different threats versus the sensitivity of different assets and translate this into a system of protective measures which will provide adequate security at a reasonable cost.

It is next to impossible to pin-down exact costs of physical security. Considering the world-wide cost of security, law enforcement, and related functions, Defense probably spends over $2 billion a year--mostly in personnel costs.

Physical Security's Management Principles and Elements

In our view, certain key questions should be addressed in managing physical security:

--What is the threat that determines what needs protection?

--To what degree should the designated assets be protected? And,

--What is the best and most reasonable way to provide protection?

Besides these key questions, we believe a sound management system should include certain essential elements:

--guidance and criteria

--mechanisms to assure guidance and criteria are properly implemented, and

--monitoring/feedback mechanisms to bring about needed program direction and emphasis (as well as to assure proper implementation).

Department of Defense's Role in Managing Physical Security

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review is responsible for formulating uniform physical security policy. Within the Policy Review Organization is the Office of Security Plans and Programs. In addition, Defense has a Physical Security Review Board, comprised of Defense and service headquarters

members, to coordinate service-wide approaches to certain common problems. In addition to the Defense organizations, the services have their separate organizations involved in managing security.

Defense's current philosophy in managing physical security is to exert little control over the services or local commanders except for highly sensitive assets, such as nuclear and chemical weapons and materials, and arms, ammunition and explosives. We believe a more organized management approach is needed. Such an approach should concentrate on the essential management principles and elements mentioned earlier, and cover a wider range of assets.

In commenting on our draft report, Defense stated that its incremental approach of providing security guidance has resulted in meaningful security improvements.

In our view, the following conditions illustrate more is needed to bring about adequate security at reasonable cost.

Present Criteria and Guidance

Defense has taken a lead role in establishing minimum protection criteria for highly sensitive military assets. However, results of this approach are that (1) services issue different guidance to carry out Defense's criteria, (2) some services issue guidance on other assets, whereas others do not, and (3) in instances where two or more services issue guidance for an asset, the guidance may differ.

--For example, Defense requires constant surveillance or intrusion detection systems for very sensitive munitions. However, the Air Force requires two levels of intrusion

detection equipment, Army instructions parallel Defense instructions but recommend intrusion detection equipment without regard to the amount of surveillance, and Navy instructions state that intrusion detection systems may be used depending on the facility structure.

--One or more service may issue guidance for an asset whereas another service may not, as shown in the table:

Service Security Requirements for Selected Assets

Asset	Air Force	Army	Marine Corps	Navy
Aircraft	X	X		
Air traffic control facilities	X			
Data processing	X	X		
Funds	X		X	
Petroleum	X	X		
Vehicles		X		
Communications	X	X		X

How Physical Security Programs Are Implemented

With the exception of minimum guidance provided on a few items, DOD's expectations are that the local commander knows best what is needed to protect the installation. It is quite logical that one would find significant deviations from one installation to another. Those variances are largely due to the views, interests and perceptions that commanders have. Security protection measures are also influenced by available resources, such as numbers and types of people, and

security equipment, and local ingenuity on tradeoffs considered to provide the most cost-effective method. Given these conditions, there are many variances--as discussed below-- among the bases in protection measures in use, some tend to provide excessive protection, while others do not provide enough. Either extreme is undesirable, since over protection is unnecessarily costly, while underprotection risks loss of valuable assets and could degrade mission capability.

--Major inconsistencies occur in protecting assets such as airfields, aviation gas storage areas, motor pools, and funds being transported.

--Attachment A illustrates differences in protection programs at ordnance storage areas--one subject on which Defense has issued guidance.

--Attachments B, C, and D show some obvious contrasts between an Army ordnance storage area and an Air Force ordnance storage area.

Oversight/Monitoring of Base Programs

In our view, one essential management element in any program is oversight or monitoring of operations. Representatives of Defense's Office of Security Plans and Programs make selected site visits to examine security of the assets it has issued guidelines on. Oversight and monitoring of other operations are usually left to each service or command.

Another aspect which hampers monitoring and oversight is the lack of visibility of physical security costs in budgets. Such costs are included in military personnel, operation and maintenance, and military construction appropriations. Our review disclosed many situations of protective measures which appeared unnecessarily costly. Some examples follow.

--The Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, currently has 29 Marine guards. The only sensitive areas are a vault in one building and classified classrooms. These areas according to Navy criteria and a Naval personnel review would require only 10 Marines.

--Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, has 38 military police mostly responsible for guarding 45 aircraft. At Simmons Army Airfield, Fort Bragg, protection for several hundred aircraft is provided by a gate guard and a one-person patrol during each shift.

--170 military police are used at Fort Myer, a 240-acre base. Some of their assigned duties were not required by Army regulations.

--46 military police and 9 contract guards provide protection at Fort McNair. Sixteen of the military police were performing a function which at the time of our review was not authorized by the Department of the Army.

--Fort Bragg, with a military population of 40,000, has a $237,000 contract for 26 civilian guards to protect its ammunition storage area.

--Although the Air Force uses two levels of intrusion detection equipment in munitions bunkers we believe that only in extreme cases a backup device is needed. The cost of the equipment is unknown. And, the Air Force is the only service to adopt this practice.

--Only the Army requires all its helicopters to be equipped with door and ignition locks. Pilots and officials told us the locks would do little to prevent theft, and do nothing to prevent malicious destruction.

--Fort Bragg, during our field work, had planned to spend $132,000 for intrusion detection equipment on munitions bunkers which were under constant surveillance. After our inquiries, the plans were reduced to $16,000 for only four bunkers. Since the four bunkers will continue to be under constant surveillance, no intrustion detection equipment is required in accordance with Defense instructions.

--Additional examples of lax security and specific incidents are discussed in more detail in attachment E.

The essential issue in the above examples is that DOD management did not know of the situation. Furthermore, the following questions had not been adequately addressed.

--What is the threat?

--What needs protection?

--Is the cost of the protective measures reasonable?

--Have the tradeoffs between people and investment in security equipment been adequately studied?

--If the duties must be done by people, was the best alternative among military, civilians or contract guards adequately considered?

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In closing, our overall view is that because of the importance and the enormous cost involved in providing proper security, more management guidance and attention, including periodic feedback, is needed. While some DOD guidance has been provided for the highly sensitive assets, this does not now exist for the remaining assets. We believe such guidance is needed as well as information on state of the art security sensing equipment. This type of information should be provided to the installations. Additionally, DOD needs to implement a feedback mechanism to monitor adequate implementation.

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

VARIANCES IN 10 ORDNANCE STORAGE AREAS

Activity	Sensitivity of item (note a)	Guard type	No. of guards	Physical security measures: Detection equipment	Con-trolled area	Entry pro-cedure	Peri-meter fence	Area light-ing	Vault door locks/hasps	Watch-tower	Sentry dog	Auxil-iary power
Camp Pendleton	I-IV	Military	58	-	-	X	X	X	X	X	-	-
Fort Bragg	I-IV	Contract	26	b/X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X
Cherry Point	I-IV	Military	12	-	X	-	X	-	X	-	-	-
McClellan	I-IV	c/Civ./mil.	0	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-
Oceana	II-IV	Civ./mil.	3	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-
Fort Belvoir (north)	II	Civilian	3	-	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-
Cape Canaveral	II-III	Contract	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-
Fort Belvoir (south)	III	Military	1	-	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
Patrick	III-IV	c/Military	0	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-
Pope	III-IV	c/Military	0	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X

a/Defense categories for arms, ammunition, and explosives. (Category I is most sensitive, while category IV is least sensitive.)

b/Inoperable intrusion detection equipment.

c/No interior guard force; only base police patrols.

ATTACHMENT A

ATTACHMENT B

ORDNANCE STORAGE BUILDING AT FORT BELVOIR'S SOUTH AREA

(COURTESY OF THE U.S. ARMY)

ATTACHMENT C

A MAGAZINE AT FORT BELVOIR'S NORTH ORDNANCE AREA



(COURTESY OF THE U.S. ARMY)

ATTACHMENT D

ORDNANCE STORAGE FACILITIES AT CAPE CANAVERAL



CAPE CANAVERAL'S ORDNANCE STORAGE FACILITIES ARE MODERN STRUCTURES AND EQUIPPED WITH 1) TWO HIGH SECURITY PADLOCKS, 2) PHONES TO COMMUNICATE WITH SECURITY POLICE, 3) MAGNETIC INTRUSION DETECTION SWITCHES, 4) INFRARED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (SEE ARROW), AND 5) INTERIOR DURESS SWITCHES

(COURTESY OF TECHNICOLOR, INC.)

ATTACHMENT E

ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF LAX SECURITY AND SPECIFIC INCIDENTS

OCEANA/NORFOLK NAVAL AIR STATIONS

At the time of GAO's visit on April 23, 1981, there were three incidents of aircraft vandalism reported by the newspapers. These were:

--March 26, 1980, at Oceana Naval Air Station, 10 Navy jets were vandalized.

--July 11, 1980, at Norfolk Naval Air Station, 7 Navy helicopters were vandalized.

--September 15, 1980, at Norfolk Naval Air Station, 3 Navy helicopters were vandalized.

A review of the investigative reports conducted by the Naval Investigative Service for the three incidents indicated above showed evidence of "inside" criminal activity, apparently due to discontent or attempts to discredit individuals.

Oceana NAS

The security office at Oceana consists of 75 military and 11 civilians who provide security for everything on base with the exception of the flight line. The security of naval aircraft on the east coast comes under the Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic in Norfolk. The security officer at Oceana has 6 years of experience as a security officer but has no formal background and very little training in security procedures

The security officer stated that most of the security people's time at Oceana is spent coordinating traffic flow during peak driving hours, and preventing and investigating thefts of personal valuables in personnel living quarters. Security people at Oceana had no idea of the exact number of aircraft incidents on base, but sometimes get involved when the Base Commander decides to "close" the base and search cars for missing aircraft items.

Security provided on the flight lines consisted of daily vigilance on the part of those who work on the flight line during the day, and a system of guard posts at night manned by ground support personnel using a "guard duty" rotating basis. These guards are neither armed nor specifically trained in security techniques. At one checkpoint (guard house) used to clear vehicles before allowing access to the flight lines, we were told that the "sentry" often times was someone currently under disciplinary action.

Norfolk NAS

On April 24, 1981, we visited the Norfolk NAS--site of two incidents discussed above. The location where the incidents occurred is located within the central part of the base, bound on one side by the James River.

At this base as well as Oceana, security procedures had changed little if any since the reported incidents.

FORT BELVOIR

We made a follow-up visit to Fort Belvoir on April 20, 1981, to determine what steps had been taken by Army officials to correct the findings we pointed out at the time of our review.

Little change could be noted. At the south ammunition storage area, intrusion detection devices were in the process of being installed and at the north storage area, an attempt had been made to clear some brush from the top of one of the bunkers.

At this installation there are two main areas where ammunition and explosives are stored. One area, known as the south ammo storage point (SASP), is used to store ammunition in hollow clay brick buildings that a security inspector said "did not meet the structural standards of AR190-11, ***lighting was inadequate," and "the facility was not protected by an alarm system." He also noted the absence of a "clear and maintained zone around the perimeter fence." Since the time of the inspection visit in 1979 and our review in 1980, and a subsequent visit in 1981 the situation remains essentially the same.

The second area for storage of explosives and ammunition is the north ammo storage point (NASP) located in a community section of Springfield, Virginia. At this facility there is stored what a security inspector at the time of his visit called "the most highly pilferable items within the military." He went on to say

ATTACHMENT E

"the facility is located in an extremely isolated area and is highly vulnerable during non-duty hours to terrorist attack." Also, he noted the storage area did not have (nor does it now have) an alarm system, a perimeter fence, clear zones maintained around the igloo storage areas, or high security hasps on entrance doors as required by AR190-11.

The location of the NASP is in close proximity to a civilian community, and with limited intrusion detection or protection, provides ample opportunity to allow easy access by local children who (we were told by security officials) managed to get through the fence and ride trail bikes or otherwise play in the area.

The absence of security detection/intrusion equipment was mirrored by an absence of security guards at the NASP. Although Fort Belvoir has a battalion of trained security police and one group of DOD civilian police to provide security for the post (excluding Davison Airfield), one of the most sensitive areas is virtually unprotected.

A review of the military police duties at Fort Belvior indicated that security personnel were not being solely used for protection or prevention of crime, but that in numerous instances police were easing traffic flow to weddings, parties, and ceremonial functions, or otherwise providing services of convenience or show.

Providing inadequate security for the more sensitive assets appeared to result from a general lack of coordinating security requirements among the Fort Belvoir commands and prioritizing base assets that require security measures. Also, better follow-up on security discrepancies is required.

THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

The Military District of Washington (MDW) provides security for Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.; Fort Myer in Arlington, Virginia; and Davison Airfield at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

On our follow-up visit almost a year after our review, no action has been taken on our recommendations because, as one Army official told us, "nobody at the DA level told us we had to do anything."

We recommended reductions of security personnel at all locations in MDW, which paralleled the Department of the Army's intention to reduce the MDW security force to 19 and then contract-out the remaining functions. Army officials told us that a meeting was held on March 4, 1981, between the Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Personnel for the Army and the Commanding General of MDW. An agreement was reached not to make a large-scale reduction, but for MDW to make an effort to reduce some positions whereever possible.

In an FY 82-85 DA Amended Program Decision Memorandum, combat support and service support personnel strengths were to be cut. The military police's share of that cut was set at 1,256. To avoid reductions in mobilization capabilities and to ensure adequate law enforcement support at large installations, reductions were

levied against installations with low troop densities and without mobilization missions. Under that plan MDW would lose 88 spaces in FY 81 plus another 170 by the end of FY 85. At the end of FY 85 the 561st MP Company would have 19 military police remaining.

The 561st Military Police Company located at Fort Myer is authorized a Provost Marshall and 249 positions to provide security at Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir (38 positions), Fort McNair (46 positions), with the remainder assigned to Fort Myer. In a 24 hour, period security functions are as follows.

--Providing security at Fort Myer are four military police platoons in addition to a support unit, a dog handling section, and a police investigation unit. Duties for platoon members range from two motorized area patrols and two motorized fund escort patrols, to one walking patrol and 24 hour guard coverage for two entrances to the post.

--Providing security at Fort McNair, a small post by most standards (89 acres and less than one mile long with a combined military and civilian population of 1,800 people) are a Provost Marshall and an attending operation unit, 2 area motorized patrols, 1 walking patrol, and 2 gates with one guarded 24 hours per day and the other guarded during daylight hours only.

--Providing security at Davison Army Airfield are a Provost Marshall and one platoon of police to provide three patrols for the flight line area, 24 hour

guard coveragae at one of two gates (the other has daytime guard), 2 canine patrols, three motor patrols, a desk sergeant for each shift, and three relief positions.

Questions of need can be raised on several of the above areas.

--Need for two police assigned for each gate on an open post.

--Need for two police assigned for each motorized patrol.

--Need for fund escorts (if deemed essential, should such service be provided on a reimbursable basis).

--Need at Davison Airfield where all aircraft are locked and parked in hangars, to have 38 security people assigned. (Maybe alarms on the doors of the two hangars with a roving patrol or backup team to respond in the event of an emergency could satisfy this need.)

Also, as of the date of our follow-up visit, 16 positions for the Armed Forces Police Detachments (AFPD) that were disallowed by the DA on February 1980 were still in existence. The cost to MDW for that service is approximately $400,000 annually.

MDW Army officials repeatedly emphasized the need for providing security at all three posts since VIPs and high-level Army staff either live on or use the facilities. However, our follow-up visit to Fort Story, Virginia, where high level officials visit frequently, found that this installation deemphasized security for visitors.

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The need for military presence at guard posts deemed very desirable by some commanders serves to point out the general lack of criteria for establishing guard posts, patrol zones, the number of people assigned to a patrol, etc. In fact, it appears commanders are on their own when it comes to making trade-off decisions, and there is little accountability built in after those decisions are made.

NAVY ANTI-COMPROMISE/EMERGENCY DESTRUCT PROGRAM

Recent events as well as past incidents would suggest that a need for a device to prevent the recovery of national security information under emergency or no-notice conditions is needed.

The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the takeover of our Embassy in Iran, the seizure of the Pueblo, and even the possibility of sensitive documents falling into the hands of those with interests other than our own through an accident such as the crash of an airplane, strongly suggest that a need exists for a device that can deny access to top secret documents during crises. This particular R&D program (ACED) was designed to produce a device for such a purpose and has been in existence since the time of the Pueblo crisis. But as of this date a reliable and safe device has not been developed.

Some prototypes developed to date experienced the following problems.

--Explosive type devices tend to destroy not only the material, but also the surrounding area.

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--Chemical type devices tend to be too unstable and some foreign countries will not permit entry, an example is the sodium nitrate prototype.

One Navy official told us, "The ACED program is one the Navy doesn't want." In 1978 the Navy proposed terminating program funding because, as a letter from the Navy Director of Land Warfare stated, "During the past 10 years no device has been put into advance development" and "the Navy was remiss, due to lack of a designated sponsor, in taking timely action to assume its assigned responsibilities."

Several things need to be done, for example, the Navy needs to identify the extent of its top secret document holdings as well as those of the other services, and facilities have to be designated to accommodate such a device. Meanwhile, funding continues to run at $1 million annually.