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STUDY BY THE STAFF OF THE U.S.

General Accounting Office

The Unit Status And Identity Report (UNITREP) System--What It Does And Does Not Measure

Information generated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system (and its predecessor, FORSTAT) provides a measurement of U.S. military readiness.

This study puts the current UNITREP system into perspective and is intended to help users of UNITREP information (particularly those outside the Defense organization) understand how the system works and how it fits into the Joint Chiefs of Staff's military capability reporting system.



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ABBREVIATIONS

CINC	Commander-in-Chief (of a unified or specified command)
C-rating	combat readiness rating
DOD	Department of Defense
ESOH	equipment and supplies on hand
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity Report
GAO	General Accounting Office
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MOS	military occupational specialty
NCA	National Command Authority
OPLAN	Operations plan
SITREP	Commander's Situation Report
UNITREP	Unit Status and Identity Report
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

PREFACE


Information generated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system (and its predecessor, FORSTAT) is used widely as a measurement of U.S. military readiness.

Readiness reporting systems are an important means of measuring the ability of U.S. forces. Because they reflect both positive and negative conditions, they should provide information to support budgetary and resource allocation decisions for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Congress. However, for years, DOD, the Congress, GAO, and others have been concerned over the inadequacies of readiness reporting systems in terms of their design, their accuracy in reporting military status/capability, and their use in determining appropriations levels.

One problem with readiness reporting has been the absence of a standard definition of readiness. For example, a 1980 House readiness panel report concluded that "readiness" was an imprecise term and that DOD did not have a definition of readiness applicable to broad congressional concerns. This conclusion was borne out by a March 1980 Air Force-sponsored study that cited 44 different readiness definitions and readiness-related terms used within DOD. This issue was at least partially addressed in mid-1982 when DOD approved a definition of "military capability" with readiness being one of four major components used to judge or evaluate DOD's ability to successfully undertake military actions.

This study analyzes the current UNITREP system and attempts to describe what the system does and does not do and how it fits into the overall military capability reporting system established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Reporting Structure. The data in this study should be useful to decision-makers who use UNITREP data in their deliberations. GAO staff members, too, should find it helpful, when they use UNITREP data in conjunction with their work on military assignments.

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Director

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

All U.S. military services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (including both Reserves and National Guard)--are required to report basic unit status and identity information through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system. Specific reporting instructions and guidance for the services are contained in JCS Pub 6.

UNITREP is one of 68 reporting systems constituting the JCS' Joint Reporting Structure which is designed to provide the National Command Authority (NCA) with information on logistics, communications, nuclear operations, and other functions during both peacetime and wartime conditions.

It maintains an inventory of military units, tracks their locations, and reports the activities they are involved in. Specific information elements include

- home and present locations;
- operational and administrative chains-of-command;
- current activity, such as deploying to station, training, etc.;
- level and type codes;
- parent organization;
- nuclear and conventional equipment;
- equipment crew status; and
- the status of JCS-controlled and transportable communication equipment.

UNITREP also reports on the readiness of combat, combat support, and service-selected combat service support units (both active and reserve).¹ These units report in terms of combat readiness ratings (C-ratings), which attempt to measure a unit's ability to perform wartime tasks by assessing the peacetime availability and status of resources possessed or controlled by the unit or its parent unit in four resource areas. These are

¹Includes both conventional and strategic units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

(1) equipment and supplies on hand, (2) equipment condition, (3) personnel, and (4) training. An overall C-rating is reported based on a composite of the individual unit's C-ratings in the four resource areas. There are five C-rating categories:

- C-1, Fully Combat Ready. A unit possesses its prescribed levels of wartime resources and is trained so that it is capable of performing the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, and tasked.
- C-2, Substantially Combat Ready. A unit has only minor deficiencies in its wartime level of resources or training.
- C-3, Marginally Combat Ready. A unit has major deficiencies in wartime resources or training which limit performance capability.
- C-4, Not Combat Ready. A unit has major deficiencies in wartime resources or training and thus cannot effectively perform its wartime mission.
- C-5, Service Programmed, Not Combat Ready. Due to service program(s), a unit does not possess the prescribed wartime resources or cannot perform the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked. (For example, ships in overhaul and units undergoing major equipment conversion/transition).

Generally, units report UNITREP data to a major command which in turn relays the data to the alternative national military command center for JCS. UNITREP data should be reported as changes occur and reach JCS within 24 hours of the change. Service headquarters may receive copies of UNITREP submissions directly from the major command. (See app. IV for more detail.)

HISTORY OF UNIT READINESS REPORTING

DOD's Directive S-5100.44, "Master Plan for the National Military Command System," dated June 9, 1964, directs that the current combat readiness status of U.S. Armed Forces be maintained to provide required information to NCA and JCS. In 1968, the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) system was established to provide this information.

Over the years, GAO, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the services identified a number of deficiencies in the FORSTAT reporting system, such as (1) nonuniform interpretations of reporting criteria by the services, (2) inability of the system

to adequately reflect capability, and (3) inaccuracies in the system. In January 1979, JCS initiated changes to the FORSTAT system which resulted in the services adopting UNITREP in April 1980.

The basic modifications were:

- Changing the name of the system from FORSTAT to UNITREP since the system reports unit, not force, status.
- Requiring units to compute C-ratings for the four resource areas against wartime resource requirements as opposed to peacetime authorizations.
- Standardizing the quantitative criteria or percentages for determining the C-ratings in the four resource areas.
- Establishing a fifth C-rating category to reflect a not-combat-ready condition due to service-programmed action.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

We examined UNITREP to determine (1) what the system does and does not measure concerning readiness, (2) how UNITREP-generated data is used by JCS and services, and (3) the uniformity, timeliness, and control of data submitted to JCS from the services.

The purpose of this study is to help users of UNITREP information (particularly those outside the Defense organization) understand how the system works and how it fits into the JCS military capability reporting system. Also, it is intended to help the Congress, as well as GAO staffs, assess and evaluate UNITREP information provided by DOD and the services. It is not an evaluation with conclusions and recommendations.

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed the JCS UNITREP publications and applicable service regulations and interviewed responsible officials in JCS and the services' headquarters and field offices to determine the application of submitted data. In addition, we examined Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps UNITREP reports to determine the uniformity and accuracy of UNITREP data. At the Army, we used the results of a recent GAO report on the readiness of M-60 tank units (see footnote on p. 16) and recent Army Audit Agency evaluations of similar units.

We performed work at JCS and service headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at selected Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps commands, subordinate commands, and units.

CHAPTER 2

BASIC LIMITATIONS AND USES

OF UNITREP READINESS DATA

This chapter describes some of the inherent design limitations of the UNITREP system and how JCS and the services use UNITREP readiness information.

SYSTEM LIMITATIONS

Several important factors inherently reduce the scope and thus the comprehensiveness of the readiness status information generated through UNITREP. Users need to be aware of these limitations.

First, UNITREP reports only on "readiness," which is just one of the four key components, or "pillars," used by DOD to judge military capability, i.e., the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective. The system does not address combat sustainability, force modernization, or force structure.

Second, only combat, combat support, and service-selected combat service support units report readiness information under UNITREP. These units account for about 50 percent of the active force, while approximately 50 percent of the force is assigned to other unit types, such as units/organizations involved in training, supply, maintenance, and other support functions needed during mobilization and wartime.

Third, UNITREP reports only on certain selected resources controlled by or organic to the reporting unit. Important resources required to deploy a unit to a theater of operations and employ that unit in combat are not covered in C-ratings. For example, the availability of strategic transportation lift assets and consumables, such as fuel and ammunition needed to support operations, is not addressed.

Fourth, the UNITREP system generally does not attempt to rate units against the requirements of specific operational plans or within mission areas (the Navy is an exception here). These four factors are discussed in more detail below.

UNITREP reports on readiness-- not military capability

In the past, the term "readiness" and related terms have been used in varying contexts with differing interpretations or definitions. DOD took a major step in 1982 to reduce confusion in this area by adopting a standard definition of "military capability" built on the four key components of force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness. "Military


capability" is defined as the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective, like win a war or battle or destroy a target or targets. The specific definitions of its four supporting components, or "pillars," are:

- Force structure: numbers, size, and composition of the units that constitute Defense forces--divisions, ships, airwings.
- Modernization: technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments.
- Readiness: ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipments to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays).
- Sustainability: The 'staying power' of our forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment, often measured in numbers of days.

According to JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 172, reporting on the military capability of U.S. Armed Forces is accomplished through two reports--the Commander's Situation Report (SITREP) and the combat readiness status portion of UNITREP. MOP 172 further provides that military capability be reported on in terms of its subelements, or "pillars." While UNITREP addresses only the readiness subelement of military capability, the SITREPs address all four subelements and are submitted by the commanders of the unified and specified commands.¹ They provide evaluations of the significant factors that improve or degrade the capability of their commands to meet the requirements of plans approved by JCS. Additionally, commanders assess their forces' abilities to initiate and sustain operation plan execution. SITREPs are submitted annually and updated on a semiannual basis. The SITREPs, along with input from the services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Joint Deployment Agency, form the basis for the annual JCS Capability Report to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. general purpose forces.

The following is a schematic display of DOD's military capability definition (the marked area reflects information reported on by UNITREP C-ratings).

¹The major unified commands are the (1) U.S. European Command (EUCOM), (2) U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), (3) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), (4) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), (5) U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM), and (6) U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The specified commands are the (1) U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) and (2) U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC).



¹The command, control, and communications required to form a cohesive, effective force from available units.

As it has been defined, then, readiness is an indicator of precombat status which affects the ability of a force to achieve a wartime objective. Further, unit readiness is a subset of force readiness that involves unit integration and coordination through command, control, and communication to form a cohesive, effective force. Unit readiness is further broken down into two major categories--personnel and materiel readiness. Personnel readiness consists of the personnel available and their training. Materiel readiness consists of equipment and supplies on hand and equipment condition.

Only combat-oriented units
report readiness information

UNITREP is not designed to address the readiness of many types of military units necessary during mobilization or wartime. Only combat, combat support, and service-selected combat service support units report readiness information under UNITREP. Generally, nondeploying units, such as the training bases, logistical installations, and air bases, do not C-rate in UNITREP.² These organizations, however, have assigned mobilization missions and would be important to the successful accomplishment of U.S. military operations. The following table shows the number of personnel assigned to C-rating units as compared to the total active personnel on board in each service:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel assigned to C-rating units	451,905	284,723	169,882	109,015	1,015,525
Total active personnel	776,521	546,365	568,650	190,194	2,081,730
Percentage of active personnel assigned to C- rating units	58	52	30	57	49

As shown above, about 50 percent of the total number of active duty U.S. military personnel are assigned to C-rating units, while about 50 percent are assigned to logistic support and administrative duties and headquarters functions, which are not rated.

²The Navy, however, is developing a reporting system to measure base readiness using C-ratings similar to UNITREP. It is called the Shore Base Readiness Assessment.

UNITREP reports only on
certain resources

As designed, UNITREP C-ratings are based on those resources under the operational control of the reporting or parent unit. Thus, the true ability of units could be overstated because not all resources needed to accomplish a unit's mission are controlled by the combat-type units which report under UNITREP. Often, resources such as fuel and munitions are pooled and are under the control of separate support units so that a unit for which munitions or petroleum are essential materials may report itself as C-1, or fully combat ready, although in many instances it does not routinely have information as to whether these resources would be available following mobilization.

Further, the system does not normally address the ability or inability of a higher command, service, or DOD to augment a unit's resources (equipment, spare parts, personnel) from sources external to the unit.

UNITREP is not designed to
rate against specific plans

The C-ratings are based, for the most part, on the assumption that an available percentage of certain selected resources equates to a certain level of capability or readiness.

The system is not designed (1) to rate units against the unique requirements of specific operations plans or (2) to rate the ability of units to perform (with the exception of the Navy) specific mission functions. For example, the C-ratings do not address factors which would affect the unit's combat effectiveness, such as the geographic location of the combat zone (desert, jungle, mountains) and the level of threat/sophistication of the enemy. In other words, a C-1, or fully combat ready rating, presumes that the reporting unit is capable of performing effectively wherever it may be employed. Presently, only Navy units, to a limited degree, report readiness in the context of multiple mission functions, such as antisubmarine warfare, mobility, and others. Mission ratings are reported in addition to the C-ratings reported through UNITREP.

Mission ratings (M-1 through M-4--fully mission ready to not mission ready) are developed by assigning a C-rating for each resource area (personnel, training, equipment on hand, and equipment condition) under each mission area. In a mission area, if two low or "bad" C-ratings are computed, such as two C-4's, the rating for that mission would be M-4. If, however, only one "bad" C-rating is computed, such as one C-4, then the mission rating would be one less, or an M-3.

JCS USE OF UNITREP INFORMATION

A UNITREP data base is maintained by JCS from which over 50 reports are periodically generated and used by various elements of DOD. The data base is used for general unit status monitoring and management purposes, such as highlighting resource shortages which impact unit readiness. In addition, JCS maintains a UNITREP "priority file" which can be accessed quickly to answer the most frequently asked readiness questions, such as "How many Air Force units in Europe are reporting C-3/C-4?" or "What Army divisions in the United States are experiencing personnel problems?" This file is limited to about 15,000 unit designation codes. Currently, a total of 24 automated report formats are available to JCS for displaying data from this "priority file." Additionally, UNITREP data is used by JCS to:

- Prepare periodic reports. UNITREP data is one of the input resources for the JCS Capability Report (formerly known as the JCS Readiness Report) and the annual Chairman's (JCS) Posture Statement.
- Prepare readiness briefings. For example, the Chairman of JCS is briefed weekly on the status of a specific major command (commands are rotated through this cycle).
- Respond to routine inquiries. Routine questions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, NCA, and the Congress about the readiness status and activities of a specific unit or units are answered from the UNITREP data base.
- Monitor the status of vital equipment. The status of certain nuclear-related equipment, reconnaissance aircraft, and JCS-controlled communication equipment is reported through UNITREP.

SERVICES' USE OF UNITREP INFORMATION

UNITREP is used by the various service organization levels, headquarters, and field commands to routinely monitor unit status. In summary, the system is used chiefly as

- a medium for uniform readiness briefings and communication,
- a source of information on unit resource status before peacetime deployment, and
- an indicator of the potential need to reallocate resources.

At each command level we visited, however, officials stressed that UNITREP alone should not be used to make decisions about indicated problems because UNITREP reports represent a "snapshot" in time of a dynamic entity. For this reason, the detailed information contained in other reports is needed to verify whether the problem is current and to determine the scope and extent of the problem.

At the headquarters level, the head of each service receives detailed UNITREP briefings at least on a quarterly basis. Within each headquarters, components exist to monitor UNITREP reports daily.

Briefings

Briefings based on the UNITREP data are given regularly at the command levels we visited. The purposes of these briefings include giving commanders the information their superiors are receiving about the unit and identifying problem areas to examine in greater detail. Generally, these briefings focus on (1) the problems of degraded units that are reporting C-3 and C-4 ratings, (2) any ongoing or planned actions to correct the problems, and (3) historical trends or cycles.

At each command level, officials considered it essential to know what UNITREP showed for the unit or units for which that particular command was responsible. Through awareness of the reported data, the command knew what general problems were being reported and was better prepared to answer questions about those problems from higher authorities. Examples of UNITREP use at field organizations we visited follow.

- At Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, the wing commander was briefed daily on that day's UNITREP. Present at the briefing were representatives of each activity within the wing. During the briefing, the wing commander asked his staff for additional details on problem areas.
- The Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, was also briefed daily on the UNITREP data for his units. The main purpose of the briefings was to inform him of what was being reported to JCS and to better enable that command to provide additional information if requested by the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
- At the Second Marine Division and Second Force Service Support Group, the Commanding Generals and their staff were briefed monthly on the UNITREP C-rating changes and trends being reported to higher commands and the problems being reported in various resource areas.

Peacetime deployment

We found that UNITREP is also used to provide information on unit resource status prior to the peacetime deployment of military units. For example, within the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, units with C-3 or C-4 ratings were closely monitored particularly as they neared a scheduled deployment date. In fact, general policy in the Atlantic Fleet was that if a unit had a C-4 rating in personnel, the unit commander was required to assess the situation before deployment. Based on the assessment, the Atlantic Fleet could put restrictions on the unit's operations or not let it deploy. UNITREP data is also one of several factors that the Commander, Naval Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic, considers when determining which available submarine might be sent on an unscheduled mission.

Resource allocation

In addition to its other uses, UNITREP serves as a general indicator of resource allocation needs within the unit or appropriate command. Although service officials said that UNITREP does not give commanders the detailed information needed to make resource allocation decisions, it does serve as a broad indicator of resource needs and potential problems. Other more detailed reports are used to determine whether a problem reported under UNITREP is still a current one and how extensive it might be. Program or functional managers receive these reports which provide current information, such as (1) what equipment is deadlined and for what reason, (2) the status of supply and maintenance efforts, and (3) current and projected personnel status and changes.

UNITREP USEFULNESS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

While JCS Pub 6 states that UNITREP would be a primary source to determine unit availability during a crisis, its overall usefulness in such situations appears limited. This is because of limitations in the computer/communications network supporting it; i.e., the system does not function on a real-time basis and is not very survivable. Furthermore, the accuracy, validity, and timeliness of the data provided by reporting units is suspect, as discussed in chapter 3 of this study. Recognizing the system's unresponsiveness, JCS, at the time of our study, had nearly completed an improvement effort to reduce the amount of data provided under UNITREP. However, this effort was subsequently terminated. (See p. 12.)

Communications System Supporting UNITREP

One of the functions of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) is to support the UNITREP system. We have concluded on several occasions that WWMCCS is not a

responsive or survivable system and thus not likely to provide UNITREP users with timely, reliable information during a crisis situation.³ Specifically, we found that:

- The WWMCCS computer system basically was not designed to function in the real-time mode required to make the system responsive.
- Generally, the WWMCCS equipment is installed in nonsurvivable facilities. Only 1 of the 26 WWMCCS sites visited had adequate provisions for backup computer systems should their data processing capabilities cease indefinitely.

In a subsequent report⁴ we reached the same conclusions about the systems's limitations in providing data during a crisis and its survivability.

JCS study to improve
UNITREP's responsiveness

JCS recognized these limitations in the UNITREP reporting system and initiated a program to address them. Known as the "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Improvement Program," JCS reviewed the UNITREP system and 14 other JCS reporting systems in JRS to (1) improve the responsiveness of the systems during wartime and (2) streamline peacetime reporting requirements. Data for this study was gathered at JCS and throughout the various services. According to JCS, this program, with regard to UNITREP, was intended to identify the minimum essential data elements that need to be reported and which critical units should be required to report in peacetime, crisis, wartime, and the postattack period. Thus, the amount of data that each unit would be required to report, as well as the number of units that must report, would be reduced. However, the results of this effort were subsequently judged to be unsatisfactory and the effort was terminated.

³The World Wide Military Command and Control System--Major Changes Needed in Its Automated Data Processing Management and Direction (LCD-80-22, Dec. 14, 1979, supplemented by LCD-80-22-A, issued June 30, 1980).

⁴The World Wide Military Command and Control Information System--Problems in Information Resource Management (MASAD-82-2, Oct. 19, 1981).

SUMMARY

UNITREP is basically a management information system used by JCS and the services to monitor the status of U.S. military units; however, it must be used in conjunction with the Commanders' SITREPs and other inputs to assess U.S. military capability. Because all services are required to report under the system, UNITREP is probably the most authoritative source available for obtaining unit status information and its readiness data can be and is used routinely to track trends and certain deficiencies in the equipment, personnel, and training areas. Nevertheless, at most command levels, it does not provide the level of detail or amount of information required on which to base specific corrective actions. The system basically serves to flag potential problems that may require additional follow-up by logistics or functional managers. Its usefulness or applicability during time-constrained situations--such as a crisis or mobilization--may be limited because the communications system that supports it is both unresponsive and vulnerable.

CHAPTER 3

EXTENSIVE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED IN UNITREP REPORTING

This chapter discusses the UNITREP resource area reporting criteria contained in JCS Pub 6 and the service differences in reporting C-ratings through the system.

RESOURCE AREA REPORTING CRITERIA AND SERVICE DIFFERENCES

JCS Pub 6 provides overall guidance to the services for reporting unit readiness status under UNITREP. In some instances, it provides specific directions, such as standard quantitative criteria to be used by all services when computing C-ratings and when C-rating changes are to be reported. However, in other areas, the criteria are general and allow for subjective judgment in application. For example, the services are permitted to

- choose the criteria against which they compute training and personnel C-ratings;
- select, in most instances, the unit-controlled resources to be measured when computing C-ratings;
- use different concepts for determining equipment condition; and
- subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit's reported overall C-rating.

The specific criteria used to report to UNITREP are summarized below by resource area followed by how the services differ in application.

Reporting personnel status

According to JCS Pub 6, the UNITREP system compares the unit's currently available personnel against the unit's wartime, or structured, strength authorization using the three following criteria. All services are required to report under criteria "a" and "b"; reporting under criterion "c" is optional.

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Resource area combat rating</u>				
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>C-5</u>
a. Total available strength divided by structured strength.	>90% =	>80% =	>70% =	<70%	(a)
b. Service-selected critical MOS (note b) qualification of available strength divided by structured strength of critical MOS.	>85% =	>75% =	>65% =	<65%	(a)
c. (Optional by service.) Grade fill of service-selected critical E-5's and above available divided by structured strength or critical E-5's and above.	>85% =	>75% =	>65% =	<65%	(a)

^aService programmed not combat ready. > means greater than or equal to. < means less than. =

^bMOS--military occupational specialty. This is a generic term used in Pub 6 to describe job types.

The unit's personnel C-rating is the lowest C-rating assigned against any of the criteria used. For example, if a unit's personnel C-rating is computed to be C-2 under criterion "a," C-3 under criterion "b," and C-4 under criterion "c," the unit's reported personnel rating would be C-4.

Service implementation

The Army, Marine Corps, and Navy base their personnel readiness computations on established wartime requirements as required by JCS guidance; however, the Air Force uses peacetime authorizations in some instances because all wartime requirements for personnel have yet to be established.

The manner in which most services apply the second criterion on critical MOS makes most or all MOS "critical" and so provides limited insight beyond information reported under method "a." Basically, the authorized MOS are matched against the MOS available (with some substitution) to establish a fill rate, or percentage, for this criterion. In other words, "critical" type MOS or skills are not designated and reported separately.

Only the Army and Navy are using the optional method, which measures the availability of their senior personnel. Because the Air Force and Marine Corps do not use this measure, their units' C-ratings do not reflect problems in this area. For example, some Marine Corps units we visited were reporting high personnel and training readiness ratings even when the availability of experienced senior enlisted personnel was only 44 to 65 percent of the total authorized. If these units had used the optional method, which considers the availability of senior enlisted personnel, their ratings would have been significantly lower.

Reporting training status

According to JCS Pub 6, the calculation of the C-rating in the training resource area compares the present level of training to the standards for a fully trained unit as established by each service, using one of the following methods:

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Resource area combat rating</u>				
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>C-5</u>
a. Weeks of training required	<2 =	>2<4 =	>4<6 =	>6	(a)
b. Or percent of combat ready aircrews	>85% =	>70% =	>55% =	<55%	(a)
c. Or percent of unit training completed	>85% =	>70% =	>55% =	<55%	(a)

^aService programmed not combat ready.
 < means less than or equal to.
 =
 > means more than or equal to.
 =

Service implementation

Army unit C-ratings for training are computed using the first criterion--the number of weeks required to become fully combat capable as required in the unit's Table of Organization and Equipment. For the most part, this rating is based on the unit commander's subjective evaluation. A recent GAO study¹ reported that Army units did not consider factors affecting training status, such as the results of unit training evaluations and the availability of training facilities, instructors,

¹Personnel and Training Problems Continue To Plague Readiness of M-60 Fleet--Intensive Management Required (PLRD-82-7, May 7, 1982).

and funds. In some instances, the results of training evaluations contradicted the training ratings being reported through UNITREP; i.e., C-ratings appeared to be inflated. Other studies by GAO and the Army as well have reported overstatements of training readiness caused by the inability to adequately account for personnel problems occurring, such as turbulence, shortages in grade, and detachments of personnel to other than their primary duties.

Navy air squadrons use the second criterion, "percent of combat ready aircrews," for computing training status. However, the Navy squadrons we visited calculated their training combat ratings based on the percentage of required training that had been completed by assigned pilots but excluded the status of other crew members, for example the weapons officer, needed to fly other than single pilot aircraft.

In the Marine Corps, nonflying units are rated on the criterion of "weeks of training required." Flying squadrons are rated on the percent of combat ready aircrews. Basic comments in this report about the Army also apply to the Marine Corps ground and flying units--the training rating is based on the subjective evaluation of the unit commander, and not all factors affecting training status were considered. We found that in 10 of 23 Marine units reporting high training ratings, only 44 to 65 percent of the authorized senior enlisted staff--those personnel largely responsible for training--were available.

Air Force training C-ratings are based on the combat ready aircrews and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) crews criteria. The training level of other personnel is reflected only by the "critical skills" personnel criterion.

Reporting equipment and supplies on hand status

For the equipment and supplies on hand (ESOH) resource area, JCS Pub 6 requires the UNITREP system to compare the amount of possessed combat-essential equipment (e.g., aircraft, missile launchers, tanks), end items (e.g., trucks, jeeps), support equipment (e.g., repair stands), and organic supplies (e.g., spare parts) with the amount required for the unit's wartime mission. This measurement does not evaluate the condition of the equipment. According to Pub 6, ESOH C-ratings should reflect the status of resources existing as of the time of the report, but the rating can be projected up to 72 hours unless the units mission/alert response time² is shorter. Any allowed response time, expressed in hours, should be identified in the report. The criteria are as follows:

²Response time--the time a unit has to get ready or prepare to perform its mission.

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Resource area combat rating</u>				
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>C-5</u>
a. Total service-selected combat essential equipment possessed divided by prescribed wartime requirement (note b). Aircraft percentages are in parentheses.	>90% = (>90%) =	>80% = (>80%) =	>65% = (>60%) =	<65% (<60%)	(a) (a)
b. Total service-selected end items, support equipment, and supplies possessed divided by prescribed wartime requirements.	>90% =	>80%	>65%	<65%	

^aService programed not combat ready. > means greater than or equal to. < means less than. =

^bCertain major items of equipment with unique capabilities, notably Air Force mobile/transportable communications electronic equipment and navigation aids, are not expressed in percentage measurements. The services will be developing supplemental instructions to measure the combat readiness of these items.

A unit may have several types of combat-essential equipment, end items, support equipment, or supplies for which on-hand percentages are separately computed. The lower C-rating assigned for the categories above determines the unit's ESOH C-rating.

Service implementation

The Army is unique among the services in its use of the "pacing item" concept to report on equipment on hand as well as equipment readiness. "Pacing items," as designated in AR220-1, are those necessary to a unit's performance of its basic mission, for example, tanks in an armor unit and aircraft in aviation units. These major equipment items/systems are evaluated separately from other reportable equipment. The reporting unit's overall C-rating in the ESOH area cannot exceed the C-rating computed for the unit's "pacing item(s)." The Army reports only on equipment under this criterion; the availability of repair parts and other supplies is not addressed. Army regulations do not permit use of a mission/alert response time to project this or any other rating criterion.

In the Navy, air squadrons count only aircraft when computing C-ratings for the equipment and supplies on hand. Supplies and support equipment are not considered in the squadrons' ratings, but are reported on by the aircraft carrier in its report. While Navy C-ratings are not normally projected, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet's Naval Surface Force regulations require its units to include supplies on order as well as those on hand in computing this rating, which essentially makes it a projected rating.

Air Force units use combat-essential equipment, i.e., aircraft, as the primary basis for deriving C-ratings for equipment and supplies on hand. Other end items, support equipment, and supplies are also considered, but the specific items included vary by major command/mission. The Air Force projects ratings based on unit response time.

The Marine Corps requires its units to report on selected items published periodically in Marine Corps Order 3000. The order breaks reportable equipment into two lists--one for combat essential equipment, which is primarily aircraft and certain ground unit major items, such as tanks and howitzers, and one for other end items. Mount-out stocks, which consist of spares and equipment needed to sustain initial combat, are not included. However, the Corps considers the items listed to be sufficiently representative of equipment functional areas so that reporting on them will provide the necessary data to indicate the equipment readiness of its operating forces.

Marine aviation units report only on combat essential equipment--aircraft--while other units,³ without combat-essential-designated equipment, report only on other end items.

Reporting equipment readiness status

The C-rating criteria for this resource area (contained in JCS Pub 6) compares combat-essential equipment and major end items possessed by the reporting unit that are combat ready against the unit's wartime requirement. Here again, units may adjust the C-rating for either mission response time or a 72-hour period, whichever is shorter. The criteria are as follows:

³These are units that do not have aircraft or one of the following essential systems: self-propelled gun (M107), self-propelled howitzer (M109A1), towed howitzer (M101A1 and M114A2), self-propelled howitzer (M10A1/A2), landing vehicle, or tanks.

Criteria	Resource area combat rating				
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>C-5</u>
a. Total service-selected combat-essential equipment possessed and combat ready divided by prescribed war time requirement (note b). Aircraft percentages are in parentheses.	>90% = (>75%) =	>70% = (>60%) =	>60% = (>50%) =	<60% (<50%)	(a) (a)
b. Major service-selected end items of equipment possessed and combat ready divided by prescribed wartime requirement.	>90% =	>70% =	>60% =	<60%	(a)

aService programed not combat ready. > means greater than or equal to. < means less than. =

bCertain major items of equipment with unique capabilities, notably Air Force and mobile/transportable communications electronic equipment and navigation aids, do not lend themselves to a percentage measurement. Supplemental instructions to measure the combat readiness of these items are to be developed.

The unit equipment readiness C-rating is equivalent to the lower of the two ratings derived from the above criteria.

Service implementation

Equipment readiness C-ratings in the Army are based on full mission capable rates averaged over a 30 day period to reflect the amount of time that the equipment was considered to be available to perform its mission. The other services do not use this method but generally report on an "as is" basis as of a specific date. The "pacing item" concept, as discussed in the equipment on hand criterion, is also applied to the equipment readiness ratings. For aviation units, only full mission capable aircraft are considered when computing equipment readiness ratings.

For Navy air squadrons, only aircraft are used to compute equipment readiness C-ratings; other end items, while essential to the effective performance of the squadron, are not considered but are reported by the aircraft carrier as is done for ESOH ratings. For surface units, commanders may use some discretion as to what specific equipment items will be included in the C-rating computation. Mission response times are not used by the Navy in contrast to the Air Force and Marine Corps.

Equipment readiness ratings in the Air Force are based on aircraft for flying units and missiles for ICBM units. Other end items are not considered. Mission response times, based on operation plan requirements not to exceed 72 hours, are used in this computation.

The Marine Corps reports equipment readiness on equipment listed in Marine Corps Order 3000. Previous comments in this study regarding combat-essential and other equipment under the equipment on hand rating apply to the equipment readiness rating as well.

Reporting overall C-ratings

The overall C-rating is a composite of the unit's measured resource areas and is intended to indicate the extent to which a unit can perform its wartime mission. Normally, the overall rating should be equal to the lowest rating computed for the resource areas--equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, personnel, and training. However, JCS guidance permits a unit's overall rating to be raised or lowered based on the commander's judgment and evaluation of his unit's status. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps allow commanders to use this prerogative, but the Navy does not. While adjustments to the overall rating are permitted, the computed ratings for the measured resource areas cannot be changed or modified.

Since few definitive criteria are provided to commanders for exercising this authority, a good amount of subjectivity is reflected in the information provided to JCS. Although commanders above subordinate reporting units are not supposed to change the overall rating reported through them, we found instances where this had occurred. For example, one senior commander raised several units' overall ratings which the unit commander had downgraded because of shortages of senior enlisted personnel. Officials said this was done because (1) the unit commanders were inexperienced and (2) other commanders experiencing similar personnel shortages had not downgraded their overall ratings.

SUBMITTING AND UPDATING UNITREP REPORTS

JCS requires that any change to a unit's combat ratings be reported within 24 hours, but some information received by JCS can be as much as 45 days old.

We found numerous situations of delayed UNITREP reporting. For example, the readiness of a Navy aircraft carrier was significantly impaired by a major accident, yet no UNITREP reflecting this readiness degradation was submitted until 3 days after the event. Moreover, some units routinely delay reporting changes in readiness status; for instance, one Atlantic Fleet unit we visited did not normally report any combat rating changes which occurred between monthly UNITREP reports. The

Atlantic Fleet Marine Corps units we visited reported readiness on a monthly basis. Some of these units reported their readiness as of the 22nd of the month so that if it reached JCS on the 5th of the next month, the information could be as much as 2 weeks old. This delay occurs because higher commands review UNITREP reports before they are transmitted to JCS.

Marine Corps units we visited did not make interim combat rating changes during the month. Thus, a change occurring after the 22nd of one month and not reported until the next monthly report could be 45 days old before JCS receives it. Similar situations occur regularly within the Army, whose monthly reports are at least 9 days old when JCS receives them. In contrast, the Tactical Air Command requires its units to report on a daily basis.

SUMMARY

In a broad sense, the UNITREP system satisfies a basic purpose for which it was established--it provides a single mechanism for each service to report unit identity, status, and readiness information to NCA.

However, it is important for users to recognize that JCS guidance to the services (and their implementation thereof) allows considerable discretion and subjectivity in the application of its criteria and the computation of the C-ratings. As a result, UNITREP C-ratings are computed, submitted, and updated differently making it difficult to compare like units or to gain an overall perspective of unit status by rolling up or combining ratings.

UNITREP INFORMATION REPORTED IN ADDITION TO C-RATINGS

In addition to C-ratings, UNITREP contains other information related to the identity and resources of U.S. military units. This information is discussed below.

BASIC IDENTITY DATA ELEMENTS

This data is used to register units into the UNITREP system and to provide information on the identity of military units. It is filed by the service which registers a unit into the UNITREP data base. It is reported only when a unit is registered and thereafter when data changes occur.

This element of UNITREP contains such information as the unit identity, type, descriptor (active, reserve, or planned) and level codes, the major command the unit is assigned to, and the unit's name.

GENERAL STATUS DATA

General Status Data provides JCS and other users with information regarding the unit's chain-of-command, location, and activities and is filed by all active service registered units as it changes. Specifically, this data identifies the unit's home and present locations, the organizations exercising operational and administrative control over the unit, the unit's parent unit, and the unit's current activity.

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFER STATUS DATA

Transfer Status Data pertains to unit command changes which occur whenever a unit transfers from one command to another. It identifies the "gaining" and "losing" commands, commands interested in gaining the unit, transfer dates, and the unit's new location. Transfer data is filed by major commands 15 days prior to the effective transfer date.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

Personnel Strength Data yields information on the personnel status of military units. It is reported monthly by all units outside the 50 states and by all combat and combat support units in the 50 states. It shows, by type of personnel (enlisted, warrant officers, and civilians), the number of personnel authorized, assigned, possessed, and deployable, as well as their geographical location. The numbers of personnel that are casualties or prisoners of war may also be reported when directed by JCS, a commander-in-chief (CINC), or the parent service.

EQUIPMENT AND CREW STATUS DATA

This data pertains to the status of major equipment possessed by military units and the status of equipment crews. The

data is filed as it changes by the reporting units. Equipment and Crew Status Data identifies major equipment pieces and shows the amounts of equipment authorized, allocated, and possessed. It also categorizes equipment as dual (nuclear and conventional capable), nuclear, conventional, and other and shows by category the amount of equipment operationally ready. This data also shows the number of equipment crews authorized, allocated, and formed and the amounts of mission capable crews in dual, nuclear, conventional, and other categories.

OPERATIONAL PLAN (OPLAN) STATUS DATA

OPLAN Status Data identifies such information data as a unit's OPLAN number, the OPLAN's force requirement, a unit's directed deployability posture, and the unit's deployability reaction time. OPLAN Status Data is reported by all units and organizations alerted for or committed to OPLANs. This data is filed by air defense units and other organizations only when they are instructed to do so by JCS.

NON-NUCLEAR OPLAN STATUS DATA

This data provides information on the status of major equipment committed to OPLANs. Specifically, it identifies the type and numbers of equipment required to be committed to an OPLAN, the number of equipment pieces actually committed, equipment location, and equipment reaction time. Non-Nuclear OPLAN Status Data is filed by organizations alerted for or committed to conventional air defense plans or orders.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES DATA

Nuclear Capabilities Data is filed by organizations possessing nuclear or dual capable major equipment, as well as by all organizations possessing major equipment capable of providing aerial reconnaissance or refueling support for nuclear operations. This data includes such information as the equipment's location, weapon type, status, and reason degraded.

TRANSPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS DATA

These data elements provide JCS and other decisionmakers with information on the status of selected mobile communications equipment, including some JCS-controlled equipment. This data identifies equipment items by serial number and shows equipment use, availability, present location, reason not operationally ready, and the expected equipment ready date. Further, it shows equipment's OPLAN commitment, departure, and arrival dates for a new location and the new location.

Transportable communications equipment to be reported on is identified by JCS in the UNITREP manual. Organizations authorized possession of and/or possessing those types of equipment are required to report this data.

MAJOR COMBAT UNITS WHICH C-RATE

JCS UNITREP regulations require that combat, combat support, and service-selected combat service support units report C-ratings. This includes active National Guard and Reserve units. Specifically, the following major active units will C-rate:

A. Army

1. Divisions.
2. Separate brigades.
3. Divisional brigades operating separately.
4. Armored cavalry regiments.
5. Parent level table of organization and equipment units of company size or larger that are not organic to a division, separate brigade, or regiment will C-rate, except for onsite air defense and PERSHING battalions, which will report by battery.
6. Atomic demolition munitions platoons and detachments.

B. Navy. Ship and squadron level and separate deployable or deployed detachments and major combat service support units to include aviation intermediate maintenance departments and supply departments of naval air stations and naval stations.

C. Air Force. Squadron level and separate deployable or deployed detachments. Strategic Air Command bomber and missile units, Military Airlift Command strategic airlift units, and Tactical Air Command airborne warning and control units report at the wing level.

D. Marine Corps. Battalion or squadron and separate deployable or deployed company, battery, or detachments.


A PROFILE OF THE JCS UNITREP DATA BASE
(As of March 1982)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marines</u>	<u>Other</u>
1. Registered units	34,585	6,222	10,701	759	1,000
2. Units reporting C-ratings (note b)	834	1,025	838	382	N/A
3. Assigned personnel in C-rated units	451,905	284,723	169,882	109,015	N/A
4. Total active duty military personnel	776,521	546,365	568,650	190,194	N/A
5. Percentage of personnel C-rated	58%	52%	30%	57%	N/A

^aThis figure includes 282 Coast Guard units; the remainder of the units are registered for accountability purposes (i.e., Defense agencies and offices in the executive branch.)

^bData pertains to regular active units in the four services required to be registered by JCS or service and to report readiness and personnel. C-rated units, for which personnel are reported at a higher organizational level (e.g., air defense batteries, Army companies), are not included.


FLOW OF UNITREP REPORTS--U.S. MARINE CORPS



UNITREP FLOW

UNITREP INFORMATION COPY

FLOW OF UNITREP REPORTS--U.S. ARMY




UNITREP FLOW

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^aUnit reports are consolidated at division/installation level and forwarded to major commands.

FLOW OF UNITREP REPORTS--U.S. AIR FORCE




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^aReports are consolidated at wing level.

FLOW OF UNITREP REPORTS--U.S. NAVY



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COMMANDS AND ACTIVITIES VISITEDDepartment of the Air Force

Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1st Tactical Fighter Wing
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

4th Tactical Fighter Wing
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina

354th Tactical Fighter Wing
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina

Department of the Navy

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Virginia

Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Virginia

Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Virginia

Commander, Fighter Wing One
Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia

Fighter Squadron 31
Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia

Fighter Squadron 32
Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia

U.S.S. South Carolina

U.S.S. Dupont

United States Marine Corps

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Norfolk, Virginia

Second Marine Division
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Second Force Service Support Group
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Second Marine Aircraft Wing
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North Carolina

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