GAC

United States General Accounting Office 34304 Report to the Secretary of the Air Force

May 1986

AIR RESERVE FORCES

Opportunities for Savings in Transfer of C-5 and C-141 Aircraft





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GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548					
	National Security and International Affairs Division B-221606					
	May 1, 1986					
	The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. Acting Secretary of the Air Force					
	Dear Mr. Secretary:					
	We evaluated the Air Force's actions and plans in transferring C-5 and C-141 aircraft from the active Air Force to the Air Reserve Forces $(ARF)^1$ to determine how the Air Force manages costs associated with such transfers. These transfers are part of an effort to modernize and enlarge the ARF. The transfer of C-141 and C-5 aircraft is to reduce operational costs by decreasing flying hours and the number of active duty personnel.					
	We noted three areas in which increased management emphasis and attention to costs could result in savings.					
	 Initial spares requirements determination. Engine maintenance facility requirements. Basing decisions, particularly with regard to the number of aircraft assigned to bases. 					
Background	The Air Force, over the past several years, has been enlarging and mod- ernizing the ARF. Many of the transfers of aircraft to the ARF have been mandated by the Congress to increase the ARF's contributions to both combat and support missions. One of the primary purposes of such transfers is to lower operating costs through reductions in aircraft flying hours and active duty personnel.					
	The Conference Committee for the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 1984 appropriations directed the Air Force to plan for transferring 36 C-141 aircraft to the ARF. The Air Force believed that such a transfer would increase the operating costs of its active forces because the C-5, a larger and more expensive aircraft to operate, would have to be used					

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instead of the C-141 aircraft. The Air Force recommended transferring C-5 as well as C-141 aircraft to the ARF because of the higher operational costs of the C-5 and the heavy peacetime roles of the C-141. The Air Force's specific proposals included the transfer of 16 C-141 and 44 C-5

¹The ARF consists of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

	aircraft to the ARF in the 1980s, with an additional 64 C-141 aircraft to be transferred in the 1990s.
	The Air Force made the basing decisions for the transfers in the 1980s. The 16 C-141 aircraft will be transferred between July 1986 and July 1987 to Thompson Field, Jackson, Mississippi, and Andrews Air Force Base (AFB), Maryland. The 44 C-5 aircraft will be transferred to three locations—Kelly AFB, Texas; Westover AFB, Massachusetts; and Stewart International Airport, New York. The first eight C-5 aircraft were trans- ferred during the summer of 1985—five to Kelly AFB and three to Stewart International Airport. The remaining 36 C-5 aircraft are sched- uled to be transferred between January 1987 and September 1989.
Overstated Initial Spares Support List Increases Cost of Transfers	Sufficient spares must be acquired by ARF bases receiving new aircraft to preclude excessive grounding of aircraft. Excessive grounding of air- craft affects readiness and results in training cancellations which affect aircrew proficiency and morale. However, excessive spares acquired by ARF bases receiving new aircraft increase costs of storage and transpor- tation and result in unnecessary or premature acquisitions. The Initial Spares Support List (ISSL) for the C-5 and C-141 aircraft, which was used to determine the spares to be initially stocked (reparable items and repair parts) at each base, included many items that appear to be unnec- essary. An alternate method for determining initial spares requirements has also been found to be inadequate by officials at the Military Airlift Command (MAC).
ſ ,	The ISSL is an estimate of the number of spares that will be needed to support aircraft for the initial 2 years of assignment to a base. Until August 1985, the air logistics centers were responsible for generating ISSLs for "new activations"—the first transfer of aircraft to a location. The information used to produce an ISSL included
	 usage data (usually 1 year) from selected bases that have the type of aircraft being transferred, total annual hours flown by these aircraft at the selected bases, and projected flying hours and number of aircraft being transferred to gaining units.
. ч	A computer-generated ISSL showed the type and number of items needed to support the incoming aircraft. Additionally, a requisition was pro- duced for each line item on the ISSL and sent to the gaining unit's base

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supply activity. Unless the gaining unit modified the ISSL, the items were stocked and retained by the unit for as long as 2 years.

Additional analysis at the base level has substantially changed the initial spares acquired among bases receiving the same aircraft. These changes have occurred for both the C-5 and C-141 aircraft.

The number and value of initial spares for the C-5 aircraft varied substantially between Kelly AFB and Stewart International Airport. The ISSL used at Kelly AFB to acquire initial spares for 16 C-5 aircraft contained about 13,950 line items, valued at \$4.9 million. All of these items were requisitioned. An identical ISSL was prepared for 12 C-5 aircraft to be assigned at Stewart.² However, Stewart eliminated about 7,820 of the 13,950 line items, resulting in an amended ISSL valued at about \$1.3 million—\$3.6 million less than items requisitioned at Kelly AFB.

In their analysis, personnel at Stewart utilized the spares usage history for C-5 aircraft assigned to Dover AFB, Delaware, an active Air Force base with about 36 C-5 aircraft. These data showed either no usage history on the 7,820 items or usage that was too low to produce a stockage level. Since it will operate only three C-5 aircraft for the first 20 months, Stewart justified deleting these items from the ISSL because it believed that needed stockage levels would be lower than those at Dover.

The monitor for the C-5 ISSL at the San Antonio Air Logistics Center stated that the criteria used to generate the ISSL inflate requirements. The criteria require repair parts to be included on the ISSL if they are requested at least once by any one of the selected bases during a 12-month period. For the C-5 ISSL, the criteria had a significant effect. Of the 13,950 line items on the ISSL for the C-5, 13,657 were for repair parts and 11,122, or 81 percent, of these had a computed quantity of only one unit.

The ISSL prepared for the C-141 also appears to be inflated. The C-141 ISSL underwent major manual revisions at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. These revisions eliminated about 1,900 repair parts line items and added about 230 high-dollar reparables. The final ISSL included 12,300 line items valued at about \$7.3 million. One of the bases receiving the C-141, Thompson Field, analyzed items stocked for the 57 C-141 aircraft at Charleston AFB, South Carolina. Based on this analysis,

 2 Although Stewart was assigned four aircraft fewer than Kelly, Air Force officials told us that the required ISSL would be the same.

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	Thompson's supply personnel plan to eliminate about 5,750, or 47 per- cent, of the ISSL line items. In addition, they plan to reduce the quantity stocked for about 800 other line items.
	The Air Force was to change the method for determining the initial spares in October 1985. The change would have required the major commands, instead of the air logistics centers, to compile a list of initial spares for weapon systems in service for 3 years or more. This method was to be used for the C-141 activations; however, MAC officials responsible for developing this method stated that the first run produced insufficient stockage levels of spares. A new method is now being considered to produce the spares support list for C-141 activations.
	DOD, in commenting on our draft report, agreed that ISSL requirements for the C-5 and C-141 aircraft were in some cases overstated. They state that actions have been taken and further actions are planned to refine and reduce ISSL requirements. DOD stated that our report overstates the number and the cost of items requisitioned for the C-5 because the ISSLs for Kelly and Stewart were reviewed and adjusted in September 1984. Air Force documents and discussions with Air Force officials support the data in our report. We asked DOD to provide documentation to sup- port their statement. Support was not provided.
t ,	DOD also stated that Stewart's ISSL was reduced because Stewart has vir- tually no intermediate maintenance capability and fewer aircraft than Kelly. As previously noted, Stewart officials justified deleting line items after comparing their ISSL against local demand data at Dover AFB which has full intermediate maintenance capability. For the items deleted, Dover had either no usage history or the usage was too low to produce a stockage level.
Costs of C-5 Engine Maintenance Facility May Outweigh Benefits	The Air Force is planning to establish a jet engine intermediate mainte- nance (JEIM) facility ³ at Kelly AFB as part of the transfer of C-5 aircraft to three ARF units. MAC estimated the cost of facilities and support equip- ment at over \$7 million. A JEIM facility for C-5 aircraft exists at both Travis AFB, California, and Dover AFB, Delaware. MAC estimates that the cost to expand the Dover JEIM facility to handle the work planned for the Kelly JEIM facility would be \$1 million. Also, there may be additional cost for transporting engines to Kelly AFB for repair.
	³ JEIM facilities are used to repair engine problems that require more skill and tooling than is avail-

³JEIM facilities are used to repair engine problems that require more skill and tooling than is available at the organizational maintenance level, but less than is required at the depot maintenance level.

Additional JEIM capability may not be needed to support the C-5 aircraft. MAC conducted a study and determined that a new JEIM facility is not required for peacetime or wartime support. Subsequently, the Air Force decided to proceed with the facility. Air Force officials told us that the facility could be used to augment MAC facilities during wartime surge, reduce total force maintenance vulnerability, maximize the selfsufficiency of the organic ARF, and increase the sustainability of the total force. Air Force officials could provide us with no analysis which considered these factors, together with cost, in support of the decision to establish the third JEIM instead of expending the capacity at existing locations.

MAC officials believe that JEIM requirements for all C-5 aircraft can be satisfied by expanding the JEIM facility at Dover. Table 1 compares MAC cost estimates to build a C-5 JEIM facility at Kelly AFB with those to expand the Dover facility. This cost comparison considers the total C-5 aircraft force, including the new C-5 aircraft being acquired by the active forces.

Table 1: C-5 JEIM Estimated Cost Comparison

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Dollars in millions

Cost elements	Construct new JEIM	Expand existing JEIM
Facilities	\$3.5	\$1.0
Engine test cell modification	7	•
New support equipment	3.0	•
Training	.1	•
Total	\$7.3	\$1.0

In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that costs for a new JEIM will be less than the costs determined by MAC. This position is based on plans to renovate an existing facility and to use existing support equipment. Modifying existing facilities and using equipment that is excess to needs elsewhere could reduce the overall cost of establishing a third JEIM at Kelly AFB. DOD and Air Force officials said that engineering studies have not been done which would substantiate that an existing facilities could be used at lower cost. MAC's study concluded that existing facilities could not be used. Furthermore, ARF has not determined that existing equipment could be used.

Additional transportation costs could be incurred if, in accordance with Air Force plans, the facility at Kelly AFB repairs C-5 engines for the

	other ARF bases. Kelly AFB is about 1,550 nautical miles from Westover AFB and about 1,460 nautical miles from Stewart International Airport. These two units are about 240 and 152 nautical miles, respectively, from Dover AFB, which has JEIM capability. However, to the extent that the Air Force can use its regularly scheduled channel or training missions to transport these engines as opportune cargo, additional cost would be avoided.
Future Basing Decisions Will Affect Transfer Costs	The Air Force plans to transfer an additional 64 C-141 aircraft to the ARF in the 1990s. Decisions on the number of bases and the number of aircraft assigned to each base have not been made. These decisions will significantly affect the overall cost of those transfers. We recognize that factors other than cost, such as personnel recruiting requirements, must be considered in making basing decisions. However, consideration of these factors should not lessen the Air Force's consideration of the cost implications of various alternatives.
	When transfers of aircraft are made, the gaining unit must have the facilities and ground support equipment to support the aircraft. Meeting these requirements can be costly. For example, the Air Force estimated that military construction cost for the transfer of the 16 C-141 and 44 C-5 aircraft will be \$223.5 million and the cost for ground support equipment will be \$46.4 million.
ſ ,	Basing aircraft in larger quantities at fewer locations would reduce the cost of ground support equipment, military construction, and spares. Costs would be incurred for these at each gaining unit. However, the costs do not increase at the same rate with increasing numbers of aircraft per base. For example, Air Force data show that about \$5.3 million can be saved in ground support equipment if 16 C-141 aircraft are placed in one location rather than 8 aircraft in two locations.
	Similar opportunities may exist to reduce construction cost for JEIMS, apron space, hangars, and other facilities. For example, all six active Air Force C-141 locations have JEIM facilities. JEIM facilities are being considered for all ARF locations that will receive C-141 aircraft. The estimated cost to construct a C-141 JEIM facility is \$1.75 million. If the Air Force, in basing the remaining 64 C-141 aircraft, places 8 aircraft at eight locations and constructs a JEIM facility at each location, the cost for these facilities would be about \$14 million. If, however, the Air Force places 16 aircraft at four locations, the cost for associated JEIM facilities would

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		be about \$7 million—a potential savings of about \$7 million for just one element of construction costs.
		In commenting on our draft report, DOD agreed that basing decisions should be made in the most economical manner consistent with military readiness and capability. DOD stated that an economic analysis is done when a force structure change is considered.
	elusions and mmendations	The transfer of C-141 and C-5 aircraft is to reduce operational costs. However, we believe the Air Force needs to focus greater attention on the costs involved to ensure that such transfers are completed in the most cost-effective manner. With the number of such transfers, consid- eration of costs is essential. The three areas discussed in this report— spare parts, JEIM facilities, and basing decisions—are examples of opportunities where the Air Force can reduce costs involved in trans- fers. Cost reductions, when transferring aircraft, are realized through decreasing active duty personnel requirements and flying hours. The Air Force needs to weigh fully all costs incurred in transfers if maximum savings are to be achieved.
	1	We recommend that you require indepth cost analyses be prepared for future transfers so that the most cost-effective decisions are made. We also recommend that you require a review of the costs involved in the current transfers to determine how those costs can best be minimized, particularly with regard to reducing initial spares requirements and con- structing the jet engine intermediate maintenance facility at Kelly AFB.
0	ncy Comments and Evaluation	DOD provided comments on a draft of this report and either concurred or partially concurred with our findings. We have revised the report where appropriate to recognize DOD's comments. DOD's comments are in appendix II.
		As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Com- mittee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.


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We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House Committee on Government Operations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Sincerely yours,

Fronk C. Constan

Frank C. Conahan Director



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Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to assess how the Air Force managed the costs associated with the transfers of the C-5 and C-141 aircraft to the ARF. We focused our review on Air Force actions related to high cost areas such as spares requirement determination, facility requirements, and basing decisions.

To accomplish our objective, we obtained documents from and held discussions with representatives of the Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Specifically, we visited

- Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
- San Antonio Air Logistics Center Kelly AFB, Texas;
- Warner Robins Air Logistics Center Robins AFB, Georgia;
- Air Force Reserves 433rd Military Airlift Wing Kelly AFB, Texas;
- Air National Guard 105th Military Airlift Group Stewart International Airport, New York;
- Headquarters, Military Airlift Command Scott AFB, Illinois;
- Plans and Operations Division, National Guard Bureau Washington, D.C.;
- Personnel, Programs, and Resources Division Office of Air Force Reserve, Washington, D.C.;
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Engineering Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

Additionally, we reviewed current and proposed regulations, which discuss the responsibilities and procedures involved in preparing a list of initial items needed to support the transfer of aircraft to new locations. At Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, we held discussions with Air Force Audit Agency auditors and logistics command personnel regarding procedures used to establish a spares support list.

We also discussed with the logistics monitors, who developed the lists of initial spares at the San Antonio and Warner Robins Air Logistics Centers, what steps they took to develop the lists for the units scheduled to receive the C-5 and C-141 aircraft. We also asked the base supply

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Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology		 	5 t	ł	ţ.	. (

officers at Kelly and Stewart their opinions on the initial supply lists prepared by the logistics center ISSL monitors.

We discussed the need for an additional JEIM facility with personnel from Kelly's Military Airlift Wing, Headquarters, Military Airlift Command; and Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D. C. The cost analysis information regarding the additional JEIM facility for the C-5 aircraft was prepared by personnel from Headquarters, Military Airlift Command.

Information on the cost of the ground support equipment was obtained from personnel at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. The personnel from the 433rd Military Airlift Wing and the 105th Military Airlift Group provided the estimated cost of facility construction.


We made our review from January through September 1985, and it was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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
Comments From the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
	WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
	February 28, 1986
RESERVE AFFAIRS	
Mr. Frank	C. Conahan
	National Security and ational Affairs Division
	ral Accounting Office
Washingto	n, D.C. 20548
Dear Mr.	Conahan:
General A Reserve F	is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the ccounting Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Air orces Opportunities for Savings in Transfer of C-5 and craft," dated January 14, 1986 (GAO Code No. 392103, OS) 6921).
agrees wi the past C-5 and C actions have refine and monetary of The Air F Maintenand be incurre by GAO. considerin military analysis, study, is	Department agrees in part with the report's findings and th GAO's recommendations. The DoD recognizes that in Initial Spares Support List (ISSL) requirements for the -141 aircraft were in some cases overstated. However, ave been taken, and further actions are planned, to d reduce ISSL spares requirements. There are also non- costs that must be considered in an ISSL development. orce plans to establish a third Jet Engine Intermediate ce facility at Kelly AFB; however, some costs will not ed and others will be substantially less than reported The DoD agrees that basing decisions should be made ng the most economical alternatives consistent with readiness and capability. Accordingly, a detailed cost in conjunction with a demographic and site feasibility always done when an Air Reserve Forces force structure considered.
detail in	findings and recommendations are addressed in greater the enclosed response and we appreciate the opportunity e comments.
	Sincerely,
	- UI All
	James H. Webb, Jr.
Enclosure	

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
Appendix II Comments From the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)



	Appendix II Comments From the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
	must be measured against training, readiness, and mission capability. All of these factors are considered when the Air Force establishes or revises an ISSL.
on pp. 4-6.	• FINDING B: C-5 Engine Maintenance Facility Plans and Costs. GAO reported that, as part of the C-5 transfer, the Air Force is planning to establish a Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM) facility at Kelly Air Force Base at a cost of \$7 million, as estimated by the Military Airlift Command (MAC). However, according to GAO a study conducted by MAC determined that a new JEIM is not required for peacetime or wartime support. In addition, GAO reported that MAC officials believe JEIM requirements for all C-5 aircraft can be satis- fied by expanding the existing Dover Air Force Base JEIM facility at an estimated cost of \$1 million. GAO found, how- ever, that the Air Force decided to proceed with the third JEIM. GAO reported that increasing survivability and main- taining ARF self-sufficiency were cited as justifications by Air Force officials for the third JEIM, but no analysis exists to support this justification. Further, GAO reported that additional transportation costs could also be incurred, amounting to about \$4 million annually, if the facility at Kelly repairs C-5 engines for the other ARF bases as planned by the Air Force. GAO concluded that the costs of the JEIM facility planned by the Air Force as part of the C-5 transfer may outweigh the benefits. (pp. 6-7, GAO Draft Report)
1	DOD POSITION: Partially Concur. The Air Force plans to establish a third JEIM at Kelly; however, the cost should be considerably less than reported by GAO. The costs cited by GAO to establish the capability at Kelly; however, were extracted from a MAC study. The costs cited in this study were generic to the construction of a new facility. However, the Air Force has determined that some of these costs will not be incurred and other costs will be less than indicated in the study.
	Based on GAO analysis of the MAC study, the report implies that a new facility must be constructed at Kelly. Actually, the Air Force Reserve (AFRES) plans to use a build- ing that would become available in FY 1988, with estimated renovation cost of \$450,000. Adding installed equipment will render a facility cost of less than \$2 million instead of the \$3.5 million reflected in the GAO report.
	The MAC study also determined that a complement of sup- port equipment, valued at \$3 million, would be required for the JEIM. However, AFRES plans to investigate the avail- ability of existing support equipment for Kelly to reduce the overall equipment costs. In fact, the support equipment issue will be considered during a MAC/AFRES meeting in March 1986. Additionally, AFRES has formed a logistics working group to

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
Appendix II **Comments From the Assistant Secretary of** Defense (Reserve Affairs) concluded will significantly affect overall transfer costs. For example, GAO reported that the gaining unit in a transfer must have the facilities and equipment to support the air-craft which, in the case of the C-141 and C-5 aircraft now being transferred, will amount to \$223.5 million for construction and \$46.4 million for ground support equipment according to Air Force estimates. On the other hand, GAO found that opportunities exist to reduce costs if aircraft are based in larger quantities at fewer locations, citing as an example an Air Force estimate that \$5.3 million can be saved in support equipment by basing 16 C-141s at one location rather than eight aircraft at two locations. GAO noted that similar opportunities may exist to reduce construction cost for JEIMs, apron space, hangars, and other facilities. GAO concluded that the Air Force needs to fully weigh all costs involved in transfers if maximum savings are to be achieved. Now on pp. 6-7. (pp. 8-9, GAO Draft Report) DOD POSITION: Concur. The DoD agrees that basing decisions should be made considering the most economical alternative consistent with military readiness and capability. In fact, an economic analysis is done when a force structure change is considered. Two additional considerations, employed during any ARF force structure change, are location demographics and basing capabilities. The ARF is dependent on demographics to support personnel increases required by a force structure change. Identified bases must have the physical capacity to absorb new or additional assets and mission activities. These fiscal, demographic, and basing capability factors must be considered in all force structure changes. Past force structure changes demonstrate responsible basing decisions by the Air Force for all aircraft types. prime consideration in basing C-5s at Westover, for example, was the availability of hangar space. The decision to base 1 32 C-5 aircraft in two 16-aircraft units versus 8-aircraft units is testimony of DoD's effort to reduce construction costs. Also, the buildup of Peterson Field from 8 to 16 C-130 aircraft was the result of a construction cost judgement. The DoD does not agree that JEIM facilities are planned for all ARF locations that will receive C-141 aircraft, as the Air Force has not made that decision. As the Air Force acquires C-17s and additional C-141s are transferred to the ARF, much of the C-141 maintenance capability (e.g., JEIM) must be transferred accordingly. However, the number of required C-141 JEIM facilities will depend on the number of aircraft assigned and the proximity of the ARF C-141 bases. The decision on the location of JEIM facilities will be made only after the ARF C-141 bed-downs have been determined.

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Appendix II Comments From the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)



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