United States General Accounting Office

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Report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

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UNIT TRAINING

How It Is Evaluated and Reported to the Congress

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National Security and
International Affairs Division

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The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Dear Senator Nunn:

This report is our response to your request that we examine the effect of changing levels of unit training on reported levels of unit readiness. The report discusses some of the methods commanders use to determine if their units can perform wartime missions. It also identifies some of the services' training program output indicators that, if included in the annual Force Readiness Report, would provide you more information about the services' ability to achieve their training goals.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days from the date of the report. At that time we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. We will also send copies to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services; House Committee on Government Operations; and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Copies will be made available to others upon request.

Sincerely yours,

Frank C Conahan
Director

Executive Summary

At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, GAO examined how the Department of Defense (DOD) evaluates the effect of unit training on readiness and whether the evaluation results could be useful to the Congress as it makes budget decisions on training. To do this, GAO addressed the following questions:

- Can training results be measured in terms of changes in unit readiness?
- Can the Congress use the training data which DOD provides in its annual Force Readiness Report to assess past and potential increases in unit readiness?
- Can the services provide more training information to help the Congress make budget decisions?

Background

Unit training, all the training that individuals assigned to operating units perform to develop the skills needed to accomplish the unit's wartime objectives, is a primary contributor to readiness. Readiness is a peacetime measure of how well the force is prepared to go to war. Training is one of four elements considered in assessing unit readiness; the others are equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and personnel availability. Unit training information to support DOD's training requirement is included in the Force Readiness Report. The report is intended to justify funding levels in the DOD budget, and is the most comprehensive readiness source document provided to the Congress Since fiscal year 1980, training activities have increased. As training activity has increased, so have funding requirements and congressional interest about whether increases in readiness are being achieved.

Results in Brief

Although a unit's readiness is heavily influenced by the amount, type, and quality of training it receives, the services cannot determine precisely how readiness is affected by changes in the level of training activity. No one unit training program, evaluation, or inspection gives a commander solid evidence that a unit is trained at any specific level of readiness However, the services individually and collectively evaluate how well units can perform wartime missions. From these evaluations come a myriad of quantitative and subjective indications which highlight unit strengths and weaknesses.

The Congress cannot assess increases in unit readiness because the unit training data DOD currently gives the Congress in the Force Readiness

Report does not identify the amount or type of training accomplished during a given budget year.

Data does exist about unit training that the Congress might find useful in determining the funding needed for training. The Congress could consider having DOD supplement its annual readiness report with more details on unit training and the services' training goals.

Principal Findings

Unit training funds are merged with funds required for operations and some support activities in the defense budget, and the precise amount of unit training being conducted is not known.

Effect of Training

No single indicator or group of indicators quantifies precisely the effect of increased unit training on readiness because the relationship between training activity and readiness is mostly subjective. However, in some cases, the services are conducting more training than needed to make them combat ready according to their interpretation of DOD's readiness measurement criteria. The Air Force flies more hours than its standard requires to report crews as combat ready (see p. 21) and ships spend more time at sea than the Navy says is needed to complete their combat readiness training programs (see p. 26).

Activity Is Not a Measure of Readiness

Training information that DOD gives the Congress, such as flying hours, battalion training days, and steaming days, represents a combination of operational, support, and training activity. Consequently, that portion of increased activity which is specifically related to training is not identified. Such information represents a level of activity and not a measure of readiness. For example, for fiscal year 1986, the Air Force reported to the Congress that its F-16 crews would fly about 39,000 more hours than were flown in fiscal year 1985; however, what portion of the increased flying hours will be used for training or how readiness will be affected is not addressed. The Air Force does not project how much more combat ready F-16 units will be as a result of the increased flying hours. (See p. 20).

More Training Evaluation Data Is Available

The Force Readiness Report gives the Congress general information on training. But it does not discuss how well the services are attaining their training goals or how training has affected readiness. Unit training is evaluated continuously by field commanders, higher levels of command,

and military evaluators assigned to umpire inspections and exercises. Each type of evaluation produces indicators of a unit's performance—for example, numbers of crews qualified, events accomplished, scores achieved, and goals met. Such information, although designed primarily for use within DOD, could be given to the Congress and might enable it to better understand how funding levels are being used to meet the services' training goals. This includes information such as (1) the number of sorties flown and training events completed versus the number planned, (2) proficiency level goals and accomplishments, and (3) the portion of the services' training goals and objectives which will be met with the funding requested.

Agency Comments

DOD characterized the report as an important contribution to the subject of unit training and its evaluation. DOD agreed with GAO's positions on unit training, except for its description of how training is budgeted. Also, DOD disagreed that the Force Readiness Report should contain assurances that the budget being submitted and prior year appropriations together will provide the resources the services need to train personnel at levels identified in the report.

According to DOD, GAO inaccurately reported that training was not being budgeted separately by the services. DOD cited institutional and some specialized training as examples of training that were separately budgeted. GAO agrees and has amended the report accordingly. In addition, while DOD agreed that it did not know how much unit training cost, it disagreed with GAO's conclusion that it did not know how much it trained. GAO found no evidence that either the cost or amount of training is known by DOD or the services. Finally, DOD interpreted the report to imply that it planned to change its budgeting or accounting systems to separate unit training costs from costs of other unit activities. The report only states that if the initiatives DOD is exploring are successful, DOD can better relate training costs to training results and training budgets to training requirements.

GAO recognizes that fully integrating a budget as large as DOD's in order to produce fully executed programs is difficult. It is not unusual for the various elements of the budget not to be fully integrated. For example, as we have reported in the past, since 1980 the Army has not been able to fly the number of hours it needs to qualify its aircrews because of spare parts shortages and the Air Force has used its sustainability stocks to implement its training program because peacetime operating stocks were insufficient to meet its flying hour program needs. GAO

believes that DOD could provide reasonable assurances to the Congress that support and training programs have been coordinated to allow the full execution of training programs requested in the budget.

DOD's comments on the report and GAO's evaluation are included as appendix V

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Tables

Abbreviations

AFCAP	Air Force Capability Assessment Program
AFORMS	Air Force Operational Resource Management System
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
DOD	Department of Defense
FRR	Force Readiness Report
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCC	Graduated Combat Capability
LCD	Logistics and Communications Division
MASAD	Mission Analysis and Systems Acquisition Division
MCCRES	Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System
NATOPS	Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
NSIAD	National Security and International Affairs Division
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PLRD	Procurement, Logistics and Readiness Division
PSAD	Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division
STRAC	Standards in Training Commission
TAC	Tactical Air Command
UNITREP	Unit Status and Identity Report

Chapter 1

Introduction

This is our second report in response to an April 1984 request from the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services (see app. I). Our first report[1] identified the Department of Defense's (DOD) overall combat readiness[2] indicators and assessed their potential use by the Congress. This report discusses how to improve indicators of readiness. Specifically, we have addressed this issue by examining

- how DOD and the services plan, budget, and evaluate unit training, and
- how such training has increased or decreased units' overall combat readiness.

Unit training was selected as the subject for this review because it is one of the key elements DOD addresses in measuring the combat readiness of its forces. Other items measured include personnel availability, equipment and supplies on hand, and equipment readiness.

How the Military Trains

Training is vital to readiness. During peacetime, many military activities can be considered as training. In general, training is conducted in two different environments: (1) in institutions, such as military schools and training centers, and (2) in operational units, where individual on-the-job and team training takes place. This report deals with the latter. In this report, we define a "military unit" as any organization staffed and equipped as a separate entity. A unit, for example, could be an Army battalion or a major command.

Unit training can be divided into four categories:

- Individual training for people within a unit who are assigned to the hundreds of occupations that constitute the military personnel structure. These are occupations such as maintenance technicians, air traffic controllers, communications operators, supply personnel, medical staffs, pilots, and tank commanders.
- Training for people within a unit to develop the teamwork needed to effectively employ complex weapon systems. Such training is given to groups such as missile launch crews, aircrews, tank crews, and infantry squads.

[1] Measures of Military Capability A Discussion of Their Merits, Limitations, and Interrelationships (GAO/NSIAD-85-75, June 13, 1985) See appendix III for a list of recent GAO reports on readiness

[2] DOD defines readiness as "the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays)"

- Unit training, which involves all unit members and is designed to develop the unit's skills needed to carry out combat missions. This includes training for entities such as a Navy ship, an Army or Marine Corps battalion, or an Air Force squadron.
- Joint training of units to develop the intraservice and interservice teamwork needed to carry out missions assigned to theater commanders. This includes individual and multicommand service exercises and interservice exercises directed or coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

How Training Is Budgeted

The services do not budget for unit training as a separate activity. The services' operations and maintenance budgets include a line item that provides funds for unit training; this line item also includes funds for operations and some support. DOD and the services are working on a number of initiatives which should permit better identification of unit training costs and may allow for separate budgeting for training, at a future date. Some of these initiatives are briefly discussed in chapter 3 and appendix IV. If these initiatives are successful, DOD can get closer to relating training costs to training outputs and training budgets to training requirements.

Reporting Training Readiness Requirements and Achievements to the Congress

DOD gives the Congress much readiness data during congressional hearings, as well as in responses to congressional questions and in various reports and conferences. The annual Force Readiness Report (FRR), mandated in 1977 by Public Law 95-79, is the most comprehensive source of readiness information DOD gives the Congress.

The FRR's objective is to inform the Congress of current force readiness and to assess the readiness expected from passing and executing the President's budget request. It provides a myriad of information about personnel, materiel, and military schools and training centers. Training is discussed in terms of the amount of training activity, such as the number of hours flown in prior years and the amount of activity the proposed budget will allow The FRR also includes limited detail concerning new simulators, special purpose and joint exercises, and ammunition consumption.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

As stated earlier, this review was conducted in response to an April 1984 letter from the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, which in part requested us to recommend ways to improve readiness indicators Specifically, we were asked to compare

the level of readiness being achieved by the most current DOD budget with the level of readiness achieved by prior budgets.

To make this comparison, we assembled a team of evaluators and subject area experts. We also consulted with private sector experts on management and training. Our team concluded that the effect on readiness of changing funding levels could not be precisely determined because of the difficulty of identifying and evaluating all the variables that affect readiness, such as technological change, military tactics, people, equipment, and time.

It was subsequently agreed that we would address how changes in funding levels affect a unit's readiness and limit our scope to one aspect of readiness, unit training. Our specific objectives were to determine how the services evaluate training's contributions to readiness and to determine if such evaluation results would be useful to the Congress.

We performed a broad-based examination of DOD's training programs and the methods and practices used by the services to evaluate the effect of training on overall force readiness. For each service, we worked at the headquarters, major command, and subordinate command levels down to the squadron and battalion levels. We looked at training programs planned and conducted at units deployed overseas, as well as at those in the United States. We also examined service reports which evaluate training effectiveness.

We structured our examination to determine if and how the various levels of command from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on down evaluate the type and quantity of training. We examined how

- budget decisions are made and training costs are accounted for to determine if the effectiveness of training is a function of the priority applied in the budget process;
- training plans are developed to determine if they are developed with a full understanding of the limitations that may prevent them from being carried out, such as depot maintenance schedules, spare parts availability, and training range accessibility;
- training plans are carried out to determine if training effectiveness is affected by events outside the unit commander's control;
- training is evaluated by unit commanders to assess unit effectiveness; and
- training results are fed back through the chain of command as input for future operational and budget decisions.

In making this evaluation, we determined what type and quantity of information was available within DOD that may be useful to the Congress during budget deliberations.

We reviewed reports and studied military manuals and regulations on training. We interviewed DOD officials and reviewed academic and technical literature. In addition, private sector training experts helped us prepare our evaluation plan and evaluate the results of our work. Appendix II lists the offices we visited and our consultants.

Our examination was conducted between June and September 1985 in accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.

Agency Comments

DOD provided several clarifying comments. It noted that our observation that the services do not separately budget for training applies only to unit training—we changed the report accordingly. In addition, while agreeing that current OSD and service initiatives may help DOD come closer to identifying the costs of collective unit training, DOD believes we may have overstated the potential to provide a clear separation of training costs from costs associated with operational activities. DOD also stated that it did not plan to change its budgeting and accounting system to separate unit training costs from costs of other unit activities. We did not intend to imply that such a result would occur.

Training and Unit Readiness: A Difficult Relationship to Measure

How well training has prepared a unit to achieve its wartime objectives may be the most difficult aspect of unit readiness to measure. This chapter describes the techniques used by the services to measure how ready units are as a result of training. It discusses some training programs and standards, evaluations, and inspections DOD uses to evaluate unit performance.

How DOD Assesses Training Effectiveness

The services are constantly evaluating their capability to carry out wartime missions Capability is a bottom line measure of the unit's organizational structure, people, equipment, and logistical support and its ability to effectively use its resources to accomplish wartime objectives. Training is the bond that forms all these resources into a fighting force.

We did not find any one measure that assures a commander his unit is adequately trained. However, table 2.1 lists several inspections, evaluations, management information systems, and tests that give unit commanders feedback on how training has affected the readiness of their units

Joint Readiness Evaluations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) and exercises in which the services train together under unified commanders are examples of joint training evaluations

Table 2.1: Sources of Training Readiness Measures and Indicators

Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Individual Training			
Skill Qualification Test	Personnel Qualification System	Individual Training Standards System	Air Force Specialty Code Test
Weapons Qualification and Marksmanship Training Field Manuals	Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS)	Weapons Qualification and Marksmanship Training	Standardization and Evaluation
		NATOPS	Air Force Operational Resource Management System (AFORMS)
Aircrew Training Manual		Aviation Training and Readiness Manual	Special Flag Exercises
Team Training			
Crew Weapons Qualification Test	Battle Efficiency Competition Exercise Program	Functional Readiness Inspections	Standardization and Evaluation
			AFORMS
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)	Command Assessment of Readiness and Training	Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)	Special Flag Exercises
Aircrew Training Manual	NATOPS		
Weapons Qualification and Marksmanship Training Field Manuals			
Unit Training			
ARTEP	NATOPS	NATOPS	Operational Readiness Inspection
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises	Operational Readiness Evaluation	MCCRES	Management Effectiveness Inspection
UNITREP	UNITREP	UNITREP	UNITREP
	Command Assessment of Readiness and Training	Aviation Training and Readiness Manual	Exercises
	Exercises and Battle Efficiency Program		AFORMS
Joint Training			
Exercises	Exercises	Exercises	Exercises

Unit Status and Identity Report

All services must report unit status and identity information through the Joint Chiefs of Staff's UNITREP system. UNITREP provides the unit commander's judgment of his state of readiness at a selected point in time.

Although UNITREP is not a test of a unit's readiness, it is a means of identifying units in the force and it establishes readiness criteria against which unit commanders rate their units: (1) C-1, meaning the unit is fully ready, (2) C-2, meaning the unit is substantially ready, (3) C-3, meaning the unit is marginally ready, (4) C-4, indicating the unit is not ready to perform the wartime mission for which it was organized, designed or tasked, and (5) C-5, a special rating created for units that are not combat ready by design, such as ships in overhaul and units being redesigned or reequipped.

Training is one of four readiness areas measured in UNITREP. Depending on the type of unit reporting, the training measure applied is either (1) the number of weeks of training required to make the unit ready, (2) the percent of aircrews assigned to the unit that are combat ready, or (3) the percent of a unit's training program that has been completed.

Large Scale Exercises and Visits to Major Training Areas

Most military officials we interviewed consider joint exercises, such as the annual "Return of Forces to Germany" and combined arms and interservice training engaged in during visits to the Army's National Training Center, the Air Force's Red Flag ranges, and the Navy's Fallon Range to be the best form of training and the source for the best evaluations of unit performance. As one Army commander told us, not only do exercises and visits to the specialized ranges provide the most realistic training environment but the preparation for the exercise, the exercise itself, and the feedback the commander receives on his unit's performance constitute the most comprehensive training and evaluation package available.

Army Evaluations

The Army has consolidated most of its unit training requirements into a single comprehensive training and evaluation program, and has developed training standards applicable to most combat and support units. The training program and standards are used by commanders, Army-wide, to train, conduct exercises, and evaluate unit performance The Army also has a special evaluation exercise to determine a unit's ability to assemble its troops and prepare for deployment.

The Army Training and Evaluation Program

The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is a comprehensive framework for conducting unit training and assessing unit training results. It outlines combat critical tasks and indicates how well units should perform them. Some ARTEP events, especially those covered by gunnery standards, produce quantifiable results. But in many events, evaluators judge unit performance based on their military experience

ARTEP exercises are conducted periodically by unit commanders, and each unit undergoes a major evaluation to ARTEP standards at least once every 18 months. When the exercise is completed, the commander subjectively assigns one of three ratings to his unit. (1) trained, (2) needs more training, or (3) untrained. Although evaluation results are largely subjectively determined, the ARTEP gives the battalion commander a structure for assessing his unit's training and readiness posture.

The Standards in Training Commission

The Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) is not an evaluation but a document that prescribes weapons training standards and allocates training ammunition needed to train to those standards. STRAC can be used as a criterion against which unit performance is assessed STRAC's applicability to an overall assessment of unit readiness is limited to what STRAC measures—a unit's ability to fire weapons and successfully hit targets. STRAC uses established training readiness conditions that determine not only how much training ammunition a unit will get, but also the qualifications a unit must achieve with its weapons. For example, the standards require an armored battalion that must deploy within 14 days to have 75 percent of its tank crews and 66 percent of its platoons qualified on two separate training requirements within the last 12 months.

Air Crew Training Manuals

About the same time the Army was developing STRAC it was also developing aircrew training manuals that set aviation standards—for example, the number of sorties each aircrew must fly and the tasks each must perform during the sorties.

The Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise

This tests a unit's ability to quickly deploy to a specific location. This evaluation is particularly important for units stationed overseas that must move to general defense positions some distance away from their peacetime locations For example, at the 8th Infantry Division in Germany, these exercises are held monthly, and are started without warning to test a unit's ability to assemble and prepare for deployment

Unit commanders use the exercise results to adjust their training schedules to strengthen areas where weaknesses are identified.

Navy Evaluations

The Navy's goal is to prepare its ships to UNITREP combat readiness rating C-1 before deploying Unlike the Army, where the ARTEP is a servicewide program that applies equally to all units, the Navy's training programs are developed independently by the Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet Headquarters to meet the needs of each fleet. While the evaluations discussed below are based on our work at the Pacific Fleet Navy Headquarters, officials told us that Atlantic Fleet training programs are almost identical to those of the Pacific Fleet.

Command Assessment of Readiness and Training

Upon return from deployment, ships either are sent into the shipyard for overhaul or begin to prepare for their next deployment. After a ship comes out of overhaul or after the personnel rotations that normally occur after extended cruises are completed, the commander evaluates how ready the ship is. Using this pretraining assessment, the commander determines the training the ship's crew needs to emphasize in preparing for the next deployment

Total Force Ship Training and Readiness Program

This program allows a commander to evaluate the readiness status of the force It identifies the types and sequences of training for ships both in port and at sea Pacific Fleet commanders use the program's criteria to help prepare ships for deployment.

It establishes training requirements for surface ships using increasingly more complex training sequences that ships must complete before deploying Table 2.2 identifies the Pacific Fleet's three phases of predeployment training, the approximate number of steaming days required to progress from one phase of training to the next, and the mission readiness rates associated with each phase. The M-ratings, assigned as ships progress through the various phases, become the basis for computing combat readiness (C-ratings) ratings for UNITREP

Table 2.2: Predeployment Training Program for Pacific Fleet Nondeployed Ships

Training phase	Steaming days required	Mission ready rate
Basic	51	M–3
Intermediate	10 to 15	M–2
Advanced	18 to 22	M–1

During the advanced phase of training, battle group evaluations are conducted. A battle group consists of an aircraft carrier or a battleship and several escort ships The battle group evaluations require 4 to 5 days to complete and are monitored continuously by observers, analysts, and data collectors.

Operational Training Assessments

This evaluation is a part of the Total Force Ship Training and Readiness program and helps determine how well training has prepared the ship and its crew for deployment. It assesses how well a ship operates with other ships and is the final assessment of a ship's readiness before moving to the advanced stage of training. It is not used for aircraft carriers and the crews of the assigned air wings.

Operational Readiness Evaluation

This evaluation is similar to the Operational Training Assessment except that it evaluates the performance of an aircraft carrier and the crews of the air wings assigned to the carrier during deployment. The evaluation, graded by observers that are not members of the air wing being evaluated, determines how well the air wing and ship operate as a team.

Marine Corps Evaluations

Marine Corps training is similar to the Army's training. Not only is the type of training conducted similar, but so is the type of guidance given commanders. Marine Corps Headquarters has developed standardized training events and evaluation criteria Unit commanders schedule units for these events and evaluate unit performance according to these criteria.

Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System

The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) is much like the ARTEP It provides detailed instructions for the type of training each unit must accomplish, the events constituting each training phase, and the standards that commanders use to evaluate unit training performance The MCCRES, scheduled every 18 to 24 months,

measures a unit's strengths and weaknesses. Like the ARTEP, MCCRES evaluators rely heavily on their experience and judgment to assess readiness.

Air Force Evaluations

Air Force Headquarters guidance establishes aircrew training policy. Major commands follow it to develop unit training programs tailored to their missions.

The following three types of aircrew training are conducted by Air Force units:

- Initial qualification training which develops skills in a particular aircraft without regard for the unit's mission.
- Mission qualification training which extends initial training but is tied to the unit's mission.
- Continuation training which is provided to maintain qualifications aircrew members have acquired during initial and mission training.

During continuation training, aircrews attain mission ready status which, according to officials at Air Force Headquarters and the major commands visited, qualifies the aircrew to be rated C-1 in UNITREP.

Major commands, and in some cases several major commands with similar missions, such as the tactical air forces, have developed special proficiency training programs for their assigned aircrews, in addition to the inspections and evaluations discussed below.

Operational Readiness Inspection

This inspection is the Air Force's primary evaluation of a unit's readiness to accomplish its wartime missions. Conducted about every 18 months, it is planned and conducted by teams led by the Inspectors General of major commands. Inspectors use checklists to ensure that all required events are accomplished in accordance with Air Force and major command standards.

Standardization and Evaluation Flights

These flights are referred to as "check rides" because a specially trained officer rides in the aircraft, or monitors from another aircraft, and evaluates aircrew performance against Air Force standards. Crew members are checked every 12 to 18 months. Sometimes they know of the

upcoming evaluation, sometimes they do not. The check ride is one element used to determine whether crew members are mission ready and will continue to be reported as such.

Conclusions

No one unit training program, evaluation, or inspection provides a commander solid evidence that the unit is trained at any specific level of readiness. However, the services, individually and collectively evaluate how well units can perform wartime missions. From these evaluations come a myriad of both quantitative and subjective indications which highlight unit strengths and weaknesses. The commander's judgment is probably the best overall assessment of how well training has prepared units to go to war. However, some management information that helps commanders assess unit readiness might help the Congress as it considers DOD's budget request. Some indicators used by the services and how they could be used by the Congress to help determine how training affects readiness are discussed in chapter 3.

Agency Comments

DOD concurred with our views on the various ways it and the services assess training effectiveness. It agreed with our conclusion that determining how well training has prepared a unit to perform its mission is probably the most difficult aspect of unit readiness to measure, and that the commander's judgment is probably the best overall assessment of how well training has prepared units to go to war. It also agreed that some indicators which help commanders reach these judgments may be helpful to the Congress in assessing how training affects readiness

DOD did, however, suggest some changes to clarify the report. These have been incorporated in the report.

Opportunities to Supplement Unit Training Information in the FRR

Annually, DOD provides the Congress with its Force Readiness Report in support of its budget. DOD acknowledges that the report does not fully accomplish its purpose—that is, identifying the readiness that will be achieved with the budget the Congress is considering. However, in the FRR, DOD does identify some initiatives it is undertaking that, if successful, will help provide a better understanding of the funding-to-readiness relationship, and for unit training, provides details about training activities (flying hours, steaming days, and battalion training days); however, it does not quantify the extent to which training affects readiness.

The FRR as a Medium to Report on Training

In 1977, the Congress enacted Public Law 95-79 requiring DOD to submit an annual materiel readiness report, the FRR. The FRR has evolved into a very extensive readiness source document which now includes a summary, two additional separately published sections on manpower and training, and an annex of National Guard/Reserve topics. Unit training is discussed in one part of the training section.

DOD acknowledges the FRR does not fully accomplish its purpose of advising the Congress how ready our forces are now and how much more ready they will be if the Congress appropriates the funds requested in the defense budget. It states clearly that readiness must be inferred after considering the data presented in the FRR. DOD describes, in the report summary, several things it and the services are doing to bring future issues of the FRR closer to the reporting objective, some of which are discussed in this chapter and in appendix IV.

The unit training data in the FRR is limited to a summary of the hours or days the services have trained during the past two fiscal years, the level of such activities they expect to engage in during the current year, and that which they plan to do in the next fiscal year with the budget the Congress is presently considering. DOD states in the FRR that it has not developed the mechanisms which would permit it to assess the readiness resulting from past training or that anticipated in the future. For example, in the fiscal year 1986 FRR, the Air Force projected that in fiscal year 1986, F-16 crews would fly about 39,000 more hours than in fiscal year 1985. The FRR does not tell how ready aircrews are now or how much more combat ready F-16 pilots will be at the end of the year after flying the increased hours. In addition, the FRR does not disclose that the 39,000-hour increase for fiscal year 1986 is needed to support 138 additional F-16's to be added to the force during the year

Other Data Can Be Included in the FRR

In chapter 2, we discuss some evaluations, inspections, and other ways DOD assesses training effectiveness. We conclude that notwithstanding the array of measures and indicators available from this data, determining the effect of training on readiness is difficult and is probably best assessed on the basis of the commander's experience and judgment

Nevertheless, several additional indicators could improve the training information currently provided in the FRR and could benefit the Congress in its annual budget review

Flying Hour Indicators

Flying hour information, as currently presented in the FRR, has limited utility in budget analyses because it does not address how readiness will be affected if the Congress chooses not to authorize and appropriate funds at levels requested by DOD The following additional service-collected information related to flying could be included in the FRR:

- proficiency level goals and accomplishments,
- sorties flown and training events completed versus planned, and
- training provided to aircrews assigned to operational squadrons compared with that provided to those assigned to staff offices.

Aircrews in all the services are trained using similar programs. Their evaluation techniques do not significantly differ, and similar reporting requirements exist throughout DOD. For example, the Navy's Primary Mission Readiness training program for Navy and Marine Corps tactical air and antisubmarine warfare aircrews is similar to the Air Force's Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) program. The Army has established standards for its aircrews to meet in aircrew training manuals and ARTEP and recently has determined the number of hours necessary to meet these standards. Like the other services, the Army flies sorties to accomplish training events. All the services budget flying time for staff officers while reporting only combat ready aircrews in UNITREP Consequently, the opportunities discussed below to supplement the Air Force information should also apply in principle to the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.

Proficiency Level Goals and Accomplishments

According to officials at Air Force Headquarters, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Pacific Air Force (PACAF), the commands' flying hour programs provide more hours than needed to train aircrews to combat ready status According to Air Force officials, the additional hours are

required to make the aircrews more proficient and thus more able to survive in combat.

We examined the training program at TAC and PACAF These commands have the following two training goals:

- first, to qualify their aircrews as mission ready, thus meeting the highest readiness reporting level for UNITREP, and
- second, to increase individual aircrew proficiency above mission ready levels by flying more hours and conducting more training events than the minimum needed for mission ready status.

Although we did not examine all Air Force commands, the same may be true of US Air Force commands in Europe and the Alaskan Air Command because, like TAC and PACAF, these commands plan and execute the same training program designed to produce an increasing level of aircrew proficiency.

This training program, called Graduated Combat Capability (GCC), is composed of the following three proficiency levels:

- Level A provides the training a crew needs to perform the unit's primary missions and according to Air Force officials, it is the level at which crews are reported combat ready (C-1) in UNITREP.
- Level C requires significantly more training (depending on the type of aircraft, it could be about 50 percent more than level A) and allows a crew to accomplish the unit's complete training program.
- Level B, depending on the approved budget level, can be set at any amount of flying that is greater than level A but less than level C.

According to Air Force Headquarters, TAC, and PACAF officials, almost all crews are qualifying at level A and some at level C; but on the average, tactical aircrews are attaining level B.

We believe the Air Force's training-related readiness reporting could be improved in two ways. First, the FRR could provide the GCC levels, by command and by type of aircraft, being achieved and those expected to be achieved with the new budget. The Congress could then determine if the service was achieving its unit training goals and, if not, how additional training activity was projected to help achieve them. Table 3 1 is one way this information might be reported in the FRR; data could be provided for the same periods now reported, that is, the past year, the current year, and the budget year.

Table 3.1: Tactical Combat Aircrew Training Proficiency (Number of Crews Assigned as of Sept 30)

	GCC Level					
	Planned			Achieved		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Fiscal year						
TAC						
PACAF						
USAFE						
AAC						

Such data would enable the Congress to explore with the Air Force its basis for requesting flying hours beyond that needed to be C-1. For example, if the average number of hours required to make an F-16 pilot C-1 is 15 hours per month, the Air Force should be able to explain why the pilot needs to fly 4 1 hours more per month. A 4 1-hour increase represents a significant increase in flying costs.

Sorties Flown and Training Events Completed Versus Planned

Air Force training programs are developed in terms of training events and sorties required to complete them.[3] For example, the TAC July through December 1985 GCC program for the 1st TAC Fighter Wing called for experienced pilots to maintain level A qualifications by flying 56 sorties; which includes a series of events, such as 1 alert scramble, 4 high target intercepts, 6 encounters with jammers, and 2 escort events. Therefore, another measure of training activity might be the number of sorties flown and training events completed versus those planned. We have no evidence the Air Force is not flying its planned number of sorties; however, with such data, the Congress would be aware, for example, of whether the Air Force was flying its planned number of sorties and whether training events the Air Force considers critical are being accomplished.

Training Given Aircrews Assigned to Combat Squadrons Compared With That Given Those Assigned to Staff Offices

Air Force flying hour programs provide flying time not only for crews assigned to flying positions in operational squadrons but also for staff officers assigned to squadrons, wings, and headquarters.

Flying hours are made available to staff officers based on the duty positions they are filling. Some positions are required to fly level A, and some less

[3]A sortie is completed when an aircraft takes off and the crew completes or tries to complete the events the mission was designed for and returns safely to base

Because readiness is measured only against the training provided to aircrews assigned to operational squadrons, it is also important for the Congress to be aware that a part of the flying hour program is required to maintain the proficiency of some Air Force personnel that are not reported under UNITREP Such information would highlight the extent of training that goes toward improving reported readiness and that which does not.

Ground Forces Indicators

The Army's battalion training days and the Marine Corps' battalion field training days are not descriptive of training. Also, unlike flying hours and steaming days, battalion training days are not costed out in the services' O&M budgets.

The number of days that battalions train as reported in the FRR does not reveal the type of training being accomplished or the significance of the training in that each training day is weighted the same in terms of the unit's training goals. DOD states, for example, that a battalion training day of live fire on the gunnery range may be more valuable to a tank unit than a battalion training day of limited maneuvers without live fire

Training Accomplishments Can Be Compared Against Standards and Goals

The Army's ARTEP and STRAC and the Marine Corps' MCCRES have established standards against which a unit's performance is assessed. While unit performance relative to standards is assessed mostly judgmentally by experienced military personnel, there are standards for which quantitative measures are available. For example, the Army's ARTEP and STRAC require armored units to meet the following standards:

- Seventy-five percent of the units' tanks must be manned by a tank commander and gunner who have qualified on tank table[4] VIII together in the last 12 months
- Sixty-six percent of the platoons must have passed tank table XII and completed the platoon evaluation to ARTEP standards in the last 12 months. A platoon is composed of four tanks. The same four tank commanders must have participated together in both events.

The Congress may not be interested in minute details about individual units or in data aggregated to division, corps, or higher levels. But goal-

[4]A Tank Table is a written standard that tank crews are tested against It identifies a series of events that crews must accomplish, such as destroying particular types of targets while performing combat maneuvers

oriented information, such as the number of battalions in the division achieving selected STRAC standards versus the total number reporting, could help the Congress evaluate the effect of its prior year appropriations. Also, it could help establish accountability standards for the current budget request.

The Impact of Insufficient Training Support on Unit Training Could Be Useful If Reported in the FRR

A commander in Europe told us the STRAC standards might be unattainable because available training ranges were not large enough to maneuver at high speeds nor were they configured with appropriate targets to allow training to standards with the Army's newer, more capable M1 tanks. Another problem that makes meeting standards difficult is the high demand for and limited range time available

The Army has developed a program to build new ranges and upgrade existing ranges. The plan requires support from the Procurement and Military Construction appropriations. The FRR identifies the new range program. But it does not address how achieving programmed training activity levels may be contingent upon support from other than the operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriation, and it does not identify where in the budget funding has been included for range construction.

Naval Forces Indicators

The term "steaming days" means the number of days a ship is cruising with its main engines running. Like the number of flying hours, the number of steaming days is an indicator of resource consumption and is included in the Navy's budget justifications. However, also like the flying hour and a battalion training day, a steaming day does not describe the type or amount of training taking place as the ship is under way. The Navy's goal is to train ships crews to combat readiness, or C-1 in UNITREP, during the year or more period between deployments.

Information on the Nondeployed Fleet's Training Could Add to Visibility Over Training

As discussed in chapter 2, three phases of training constitute the nondeployed fleet training program. Each phase requires an identifiable amount of steaming days to complete, and at the end of each phase, the ship's readiness is expected to be at a measurable level. Table 3.2 is one example of how such information could be presented in the FRR.

Table 3.2: Predeployment Readiness Training (As of Sept 30)

	Number of ships completing		Number of steaming days required	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Fiscal year:				
Training phase				
Basic				
Intermediate				
Advanced				

These data are available and could be presented for both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

We were told by Navy officials that when ships enter training during one fiscal year and complete training during the following year, there is no direct correlation between the steaming days programmed and the number of ships completing the training phases during any given fiscal year. However, the Navy's budget states requirements for operating tempo during the upcoming fiscal year; these requirements should be linked with specific goals and objectives. The Navy should be able to explain its progress toward its goals and to estimate the number of ships that will complete each training phase during the budget year.

Steaming Days Support Other Than Training Requirements

Other important data which could be included in the FRR is how much of the total steaming day requirement is needed to train to make the ships fully combat ready, or C-1, under UNITREP criteria relative to total steaming days requested in the budget. According to a Pacific Fleet official responsible for scheduling training, about 24 of the 27 steaming days programmed, on average, for ships assigned to the Third Fleet are needed to accomplish the fleet training program and the remaining days are available to support nontraining requirements. Also, officials from Navy Headquarters said about 15 percent of the deployed fleet's steaming days were not required to accomplish training. If such information were included in the FRR, it would clearly identify the minimum steaming days required for training that were built into the budget.

Programs Throughout the Budget Affect the Services' Ability to Train and Should Be Reported on

When the budget is discussed in terms of readiness or training, frequently the focus is on the activities funded with the O&M appropriations. O&M funds the services' day-to-day operations, and because during peacetime day-to-day operations are mostly training, the O&M appropriations are considered "readiness dollars." However, the appropriation of the total O&M funding request does not necessarily mean that the training DOD is asking to be funded can be accomplished. Information is also needed about how other programs, such as initial spare parts procurement and availability and training range development, affect training. Each program has a direct bearing on whether the services can train as much as they plan to and are funded for.

Whether the Level of Training Requested Can Be Supported by Spares, Maintenance, and Training Ranges Is Useful Information to Decisionmakers

The advent of new and more complicated weapon systems has emphasized the need for more effective training support. The ability to provide such support as spare parts, depot maintenance, and training ranges are primary considerations when determining training activity levels. For example:

- Spare parts are critical to training. Since fiscal year 1982, the Army has not been able to fully implement its flying hour programs because of insufficient spare parts and the Air Force has used part of its war reserve stocks to complete its flying program.
- Depot maintenance backlogs result when more equipment needs depot work than can be supported with the planned O&M budget. When equipment is part of the backlog, it might not be available to units to train with or if it remains with the unit, the unit might be training with equipment that is probably not as reliable as it could or should be. The backlogs are identified in the materiel readiness portion of the FRR.
- New training ranges are needed and existing training ranges must be expanded and modernized to support the new equipment being added to the force. Funding support for the ranges comes from Military Construction and Procurement as well as O&M.

DOD knows the extent that other budget accounts affect training. The Army's recent aviation training cutbacks as a result of insufficient spare parts highlights the importance of coordinating the various budget accounts that support training. DOD could provide assurances, in the unit training portion of the FRR, that the levels of activity requested for the budget year are executable given the prior year appropriation levels of related programs.

Impact of Changing Technology on Accomplishing Training Objectives Should Be Reported

Changing technology has given the services more objective training evaluations, more realistic training, and more accurate and timely data on the training status of both units and individuals. For example:

- The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System is designed to eliminate guesswork from scoring weapons accuracy The system is a relatively new system that allows on-the-spot determination of whether a crew survived in a simulated battle scenario. It eliminates the "I got you, no you didn't" guesswork of prior years.
- Simulators play a vital role in improving performance and reducing training costs. All the services are procuring new simulators. Because operations and maintenance costs to perform training activities are increasing, simulators are becoming more and more important.

There are advantages to including in the FRR specific contributions of high cost, high technology training support systems. Specifically, the amount of training conducted with simulators could be quantified. For example, the Navy is accomplishing about 2 percent of its Primary Mission Readiness flight training objectives using simulators. With this information, the Congress would be in a better position to raise such questions as: (1) How much of the other services' training readiness is being achieved with a simulator in lieu of consuming fuel, ammunition, and other training costs? (2) What are the cost savings associated with using simulators? (3) Why are simulators used or not used?

Efforts by OSD and the Services to Improve Readiness Measurement and Reporting

The OSD and the services have several efforts under way to improve readiness measurement and reporting. Our June 1985 report to the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, identified most of these. Some of the most promising include the following:

- OSD has established the Training Data and Analysis Center at Orlando, Florida The center is chartered to perform many readiness-related tasks, such as identifying the type of training data presently being collected by the services and developing a centralized training data base The data base will contain detailed training information to facilitate more detailed analyses
- The Training Resource Model, currently being developed by Army Headquarters, is designed to project the UNITREP combat readiness C-ratings that can be achieved given a specific amount of funding and the number and type of training events that can be accomplished with it The model is designed to provide (1) a high level management tool to forecast training costs, (2) a link to unit activation and reorganization plans to

ensure that the costs to train newly organized forces have been comprehensively considered, and (3) an analysis of the effects on Army readiness caused by changes to the amount of training being conducted or changes in plans to add new equipment to the forces. In addition, the Army believes that it will be able to answer the question, What is the cost of training and how does it relate to readiness? When the Training Resource Model is operational, the Congress should be able to ask detailed "what if" questions of the Army concerning the effect of changing funding levels and expect quick, specific, and highly reliable responses.

- The Navy has developed the Operations Summary Cost Information System. Started in March 1985, it provides cost data on ship warfare and air warfare training and exercises. It identifies costs for deployed and nondeployed operations, unit training, major scheduled exercises, and contingency operations, by ship type and aircraft type, model and series. Using this new system, the Navy should be able to estimate the level of effort for training, as opposed to that for other operational activities, and to identify these levels in the fiscal year 1988 budget and the FRR.
- Air Force Headquarters is developing the Air Force Capability Assessment Program (AFCAP) AFCAP estimates capability by evaluating each unit, theatre, and force's ability to perform specific missions by considering the resources available to it Currently, AFCAP's considerations include air base status, aircraft status and inventory, spares inventory, mission ready aircrews, munitions inventory, and POL inventory.

We believe these initiatives are essential to improve defense management and to get a better handle on current levels of readiness and the associated costs.

Conclusions

The FRR is a logical method of reporting unit training information But the information now being reported does not adequately explain readiness resulting from past training or that anticipated in the future The FRR now contains only aggregate data on training activity. It can be supplemented with the following type of information presently collected at the units we visited that might be helpful to the Congress as it considers DOD's budget request

- Training goals and objectives that would be achieved with the budget request and justification for why the services must train more than required to report minimum readiness levels in UNITREP. This would include such requirements as the Air Force's GCC levels, the Navy's

nondeployed and deployed training-essential steaming days, and flying hours required for all services to maintain the proficiency of aircrew personnel not assigned to combat squadrons.

- Identifying training costs that could be saved and the effect on readiness of adding new high technology training aids and devices to the force during the budget year.
- Training program goals and associated training activity required for ground forces. The goals would be set in terms more descriptive of the activities being performed than battalion training days and more closely linked with the services' budget justifications.
- Within DOD, various initiatives are under way to develop methodologies enabling them to link resources and readiness. Initiatives such as the Army Training Resource Model and the Air Force Capability Assessment Program are essential to improving defense management and to get a better handle on current levels of readiness and associated costs. As progress is made in pursuing these initiatives, DOD could report the results in the FRR.

Beyond including selected, additional data to give the Congress a better means of judging the affect of training activity on unit training goals, the FRR could include an assurance from DOD that the budget being submitted and prior year appropriations together will provide the resources, such as spare parts, training ammunition, and training ranges, the services need to accomplish the training activity levels identified in the FRR.

Agency Comments

DOD commented on several aspects of our discussion of the FRR; what it does and does not do, and how it can be improved. It concurred with our conclusion that the FRR is the most comprehensive source of readiness data provided the Congress, that it does not fully accomplish its intended purpose, and that the report could be supplemented with additional data which would benefit the Congress. However, it did not agree completely with the possible changes to the FRR that we identified

DOD agreed that the FRR provides mainly training activity levels but stated that our implication that these activity levels are not related to readiness is incorrect. DOD believes that activity level data provide a useful summary measure of progress in readiness since as activities go up, readiness can be expected to go up. While we agree that activity levels can be related to readiness if the unit is performing tasks required in validated training programs, increased activities will not necessarily make a unit more ready.

Concerning the possibility of additional information in the FRR, DOD essentially asked the question how much is enough. It was concerned about the level of detail that would be helpful to the Congress, whether it would be worth the cost to include many of the indicators we cite as available for presentation to the Congress, and whether including such data would be duplicative of information already provided Congress through other reporting channels. Nevertheless, DOD stated that some expanded or improved reporting may be appropriate and it plans to consider our suggestions on how best to do this DOD stated, and we agree, that it should be allowed the latitude to carefully study the candidate indicators before a final decision is made on how to improve the FRR.

We also suggested that DOD provide specific assurance in the FRR that the resources required to train—such as spares and maintenance capabilities—are sufficient to support the level of training requested in the budget. DOD believes such assurances are unnecessary due to the effectiveness of its internal checks and balances which result from its budget review process. Because of budget integration problems in the past, as evidenced by such examples as the Air Force using its war reserve stocks to support its peacetime flying hour program, we continue to believe that the idea of DOD providing specific assurance that requested funding will provide the necessary support to execute the requested levels of training warrants serious consideration

Finally, DOD stated that it did not agree with our implication that excessive training is being performed. Our draft report noted that certain elements of the Air Force and Navy train more than is required to achieve a C-1, fully combat ready status, as described under UNITREP DOD noted that any training in excess of minimal readiness criteria—as it defines the C-1 category—contributes to a higher level of combat readiness. We did not conclude that excessive training had been performed, but we do suggest that any benefits derived from training activities in excess of that required to reach C-1 levels of readiness be explained in the FRR

Letter Dated April 18, 1984, From the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
April 18, 1984

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 205487

Dear Mr. Bowsher:

The Committee on Armed Services has a continuing interest in improving the readiness and sustainability of our military forces. As the Committee continues its consideration of the Fiscal Year 1985 Defense Authorization request, there are several initiatives in the area of readiness and sustainability in which I would like to ask for your assistance.

First, I understand that the staff of the National Security and International Affairs Division of GAO is completing a review of recent trends in readiness and sustainability across all of the military services. I request that your staff make the results of this review available to the Armed Services Committee staff as soon as possible.

Secondly, Senator Tower recently proposed a series of questions to the Department of Defense, which I supplemented, designed to determine the state of the overall war-fighting capability of the military services today compared to 1980. I have enclosed a copy of these questions for your review. When the Defense Department provides their response to the Committee, I would like GAO to review these responses and give me your comments on the information developed by the Defense Department. I hope that your review of the Defense Department information could be completed within three weeks from the time it is provided to the Armed Services Committee.

Finally, as a longer term effort, I would like GAO to recommend ways to improve the current readiness and sustainability reporting systems. Specifically, I would like you to review the various formal and informal readiness and sustainability reporting measures and indicators currently used in the

Department of Defense, and provide me with your views on the relative merits of these reporting measures and indicators. As examples, GAO should consider whether the UNITREP system provides an accurate picture of unit readiness; whether mission capable rates are a useful indicator of equipment readiness; and to what extent alternative levels of depot maintenance backlogs actually undermine overall military capability. Of course, your review should not be limited to these specific examples. In the course of your review, you should also make recommendations to improve the current readiness and sustainability reporting measures and indicators within the Department of Defense. I hope that you can complete your work in this final area by November 1, 1984.

If your staff has any questions concerning this matter, they should contact David Lyles of the Armed Services Committee Staff (224-9344).

Thank you for your attention to these requests. I look forward to your responses.

Sincerely,

Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member

Enclosure

Offices and Units Visited

Office of the Secretary of Defense	Office of the Assistant Secretary (Force Management and Personnel), Washington, D C Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D C. Defense Training Data and Analysis Center, Orlando, Florida
Army	Headquarters, U S Army, Washington, D C Headquarters, U S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia Divisional Artillery 24th Mechanized Infantry, Fort Stewart, Georgia 1/35th Field Artillery Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia Headquarters, U S. Army, Europe, Heidelberg, West Germany Headquarters, V Corps, Frankfurt, West Germany 8th Mechanized Infantry Division, Mannheim, West Germany 5/68th Armor Battalion, Mannheim, West Germany 8th Combat Aviation Battalion, Finthen Army Air Field, West Germany 7th Army Training Center, Grafenwoehr, West Germany
Navy	Headquarters, U.S Navy, Washington D.C. Headquarters, Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D C Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Headquarters, Commander, Third Fleet, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Headquarters, Commander, Naval Surface Group, Middle Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Headquarters, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, San Diego, California Headquarters, Training Command, Pacific, San Diego, California Headquarters, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia Headquarters, Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Marine Corps	Headquarters, U S Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
Air Force	Headquarters, U S Air Force, Washington, D C Headquarters, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base, Shiloh, Illinois Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
22nd Air Force, Travis Air Force Base, Fairfield, California
314th Tactical Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Jacksonville, Arkansas
8th Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Bossier City, Louisiana
7th Bombardment Wing, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas
Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines
3rd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines
90th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines

Consultants

Mr. William Blake, Texas Instruments, Dallas, Texas
Mr. Charles Meyers, Jr., Aerocounsel, Inc., Arlington, Virginia
Dr. Wallace Prophet, Seville Training Systems, Irving, Texas
Dr. Peter Sassone, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia

GAO Readiness Reports

Measuring Military Capability: Progress, Problems, and Future Direction (GAO/NSIAD-86-72, February 24, 1986)

Measures of Military Capability. A Discussion of Their Merits, Limitations, and Interrelationships (GAO/NSIAD-85-75, June 13,1985)

Flying Hours for U.S. Air Forces in Europe Exceeded Logistical Support Capability and Reduced Reported Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-85-1, Jan 8, 1985)

The Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) System—What It Does and Does Not Measure (GAO/NSIAD-84-39, Mar. 12, 1984)

Navy Tactical Air Forces—Readiness, Deployability, and Implications for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-84-11, Oct. 31, 1983)

The Readiness and Sustainability of U S. Forces in Korea: Considerations for Decisionmakers (GAO/PLRD-83-2, May 1983)

Evaluation of the DOD Readiness Report in Response to Public Law 96-342 (GAO/PLRD-82-96, July 19, 1982)

Personnel and Training Problems Continue to Plague Readiness of M-60 Fleet—Intensive Management Required (GAO/PLRD-82-7, May 7, 1982)

Navy Needs to Increase S-3A Readiness to Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (GAO/MASAD-83-6, Jan. 26, 1983)

The Effectiveness and Readiness of the S-3A Aircraft Weapon System Needs to Be Improved (GAO/PSAD-78-89, May 4, 1978)

Supply Support Costs of Combat Ships Can Be Reduced by Millions and Readiness Enhanced (GAO/LCD-81-9, Jan. 15, 1981)

Survey of the Readiness of Minuteman Missiles (GAO/LCD-80-102, Sept 16, 1980)

DOD's Materiel Readiness Report to the Congress—Improvements Needed to Better Show the Link Between Funding and Readiness (GAO/LCD-80-5, Oct 12, 1979)

Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Military Exercises—An Important Tool for Military Readiness (GAO/LCD-80-2, Dec 11, 1979)

Navy Overhaul Policy—A Costly Means of Insuring Readiness for Support Ships (GAO/LCD-78-434, Dec. 27, 1978)

Readiness of U.S. Air Forces in Europe—Selected Aspects and Issues (GAO/LCD-78-430A, Feb. 16, 1979)

Navy's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Force Is Highly Ready (GAO/LCD-78-429A, Dec 21, 1978)

Marine Amphibious Forces: A Look at Their Readiness, Role and Mission (GAO/LCD-77-417A, Feb 6, 1979)

Military Readiness Reporting Improvements (GAO/LCD-77-442, Dec. 21, 1977)

Survey of the Military Command Structure in Europe and Its Relationship to the U.S. Readiness Posture (GAO/LCD-77-431, July 11, 1977)

Readiness of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Forces in Europe Needs Improvement (GAO/LCD-77-428, Apr. 7, 1978)

Another Look at the Readiness of Strategic Army Forces (GAO/LCD-76-457, June 9, 1977)

Readiness of First Line U.S. Combat Armored Units in Europe (GAO/LCD-76-452, July 23, 1976)

Evaluations, Evaluation Aids, Training Standards and Goals, and Management Information Systems and Project Initiatives

The following is a description of tools available to decisionmakers relative to training and readiness. The descriptions are not intended to fully educate the reader, merely to alert the reader to their availability

Types of Evaluations

After-Action Reports	Units participating in training exercises are evaluated, and the results are recorded in after-action reports. These identify units' capabilities and problems and highlight their strengths and weaknesses in such areas as tactics, combined arms employment, command and control, communications, survivability, and personnel and logistics support. Commanders also use these reports to help develop training plans
ARTEP Based/Qualification Tests	These are required by the U S. Army Forces Command at least every 18 months for nuclear capable field artillery cannon units. Using ARTEP standards, observers evaluate unit performance and assess unit proficiency for handling nuclear weapons
ARTEP	This program gives the unit commander the framework for developing training programs, evaluating unit proficiency, and formulating future training requirements.
Command Assessment of Readiness and Training	This program is used by naval ship commanders to evaluate how crews perform all assigned missions. Immediately after returning from a deployment, commanders assess the training required by the crew based on this evaluation The training identified is then performed prior to the next deployment.
Command Readiness Inspections	These are performed by the unit or command Inspector General staff. The inspections validate specific individual (e g , weapons) or collective (e.g., platoon) tasks relative to units' ability to accomplish their wartime mission.
Common Task Tests	These are Army tests to evaluate a soldier's proficiency on fundamental combat and survival skills, such as individual weapons and first aid

Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises	These are Army no-notice exercises used to test units' ability to deploy within a specified time frame. Unit commanders use the exercise results to plan unit training programs.
Individual Training Evaluation Program	An Army program that uses commander evaluations, Common Task Test results, and Skill Qualification Test results to judge individual and unit proficiency and adjust unit training plans.
MCCRES	MCCRES standards, applicable to both ground and air units, are used to develop training programs and conduct training and are a basis to evaluate unit proficiency. Units destined to deploy are evaluated every 18 months; other units are evaluated every 24 months.
Management Effectiveness Inspection	These are Air Force functional activity inspections and evaluations. Performed by the Inspector General, the inspections take an in-depth look at units' ability to perform in specific functional areas, such as command post operations.
Naval Inspections	These inspections also deal with evaluations of functional activities In these inspections, a specially convened board examines every aspect of the ship's operation, including training, maintenance and administration, and casualty drills.
Operational Readiness Evaluations	These are naval air activity evaluations of ship crews as ships complete their nondeployed training and before they deploy to the fleet. These evaluations test the units' operational performance and evaluate the ability of squadrons, wings, and ships to operate as teams using advanced combat tactics in executing assigned tasks. Unit performance is graded as outstanding, low outstanding, high excellent, and excellent.
Skill Qualification Tests	These are annual written tests used to evaluate soldiers' military occupational specialty skills. The results are used by the Army for personnel management purposes.

Standardization and Evaluation	This program assesses aircrew proficiency and ability to perform flying duties. Evaluations are conducted on a notice, no-notice, or spot evaluation basis and are performed by specially organized evaluation teams either from the squadron, wing, numbered Air Force, or major command level and are generally conducted annually A three level grading system is used to assess aircrew qualifications—qualified, qualified with additional training, and unqualified.

Evaluation Aids

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center	Located at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, this center is used to conduct combined arms training. Units are evaluated against MCCRES performance standards. An after-action report and a post-exercise report are prepared which comment on lessons learned and identify any deficiencies in equipment, training and doctrine. Annually 10 units, 8 Active and 2 Reserve, are rotated through the center.
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System	This system uses laser impulses to record kills or near kills. It helps commanders evaluate unit training and proficiency
National Training Center	This Army center, located at Fort Irwin, California, is used to train units in an environment which closely parallels actual warfare. The center uses a permanently stationed aggressor force and technologically advanced instruments to improve the objectivity with which it assesses organizations, doctrine, weapons, equipment, and training. An instrumented battlefield allows for real-time analyses, and results are reported in after-action reviews and unit take home packages The take home packages can be used as bases for evaluating units' past training programs Twenty-eight Active and Reserve battalions rotate through the center annually
Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System	This Navy system permits instantaneous replays of simulated air-to-air engagements Computers calculate whether simulated missile firing scored hits or misses Using video and sound replay, instructors can evaluate and critique each pilot regarding performance during the exercise

Tactical Information Management System	This is a computerized system used by the Navy to plan, collect data on, analyze, and document exercises and other at-sea operations. This system helps fleet commanders evaluate operational capabilities and assess tactics by reconstructing and analyzing the exercise
Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer	This system is a tank training device designed to simulate the tank crew's operational capabilities. The tank crew uses it to train in tracking and engaging targets An instructor monitors the crew's performance and controls the difficulty of the training exercise.

Training Standards and Goals

Graduated Combat Capability	This system rates pilot combat proficiency. Used by the Tactical Air Forces, a pilot's GCC rating is based on flying a predetermined number and type of sorties during a specified period. The system uses three rating levels—A, B, and C
Mission Area Rating (M-Ratings)	This rating system is used in the Navy in conjunction with the UNITREP C-rating. An M-rating indicates the degree to which a unit can perform a specific primary naval warfare mission it was designed for, such as anti-submarine warfare There are five mission area ratings, M1 through M5; M1 represents a fully combat ready unit. All surface, subsurface, and aviation units report M-rating information for personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and training. In the training resource area, M-ratings are determined by comparing the percent of unit training completed with prescribed training requirements.
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures	These are annual Navy evaluations of individual and unit compliance with naval air training and operating procedures. Evaluations of individual pilot, flight officer, or crewmember determine whether an individual is qualified, conditionally qualified, or unqualified. These evaluations provide squadron commanders with objective looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the training program.

Personnel Qualification Standards	These are required to qualify an individual for a specific work assignment. Guidelines are provided for demonstrating, qualifying, and certifying an individual's capability to perform the assigned duty
Strategic Air Command T-Ratings	These are similar to the UNITREP C-ratings; they are used to identify the extent of potential training problems for B-52 pilots. An event is rated T-1 if 85 percent or more of the mission qualified crew force satisfy minimum continuation training requirements, T-2 if 70 to 85 percent qualify, T-3 if 55 to 70 percent qualify, and T-4 if less than 55 percent qualify.
Marine Corps Aviation Training and Readiness Manual	This program standardizes aviation training and specifies flight qualification performance requirements. It prescribes the number of sorties, tasks to be accomplished, and maximum amount of time elapsed between flights before demonstrated proficiency is expected to degrade Four combat readiness codes have been established. For example, to be fully combat qualified, an individual pilot or crewmember must complete 100 percent of the training while a combat capable pilot or crewmember needs to complete 60 percent of the training
STRAC	This is an Army strategy for prescribing the quantities and types of ammunition needed for soldiers, crews, or units to achieve and maintain a specified level of gunnery proficiency. Training programs have been developed for four different training readiness conditions (A to D), which equate the training readiness levels with prescribed quantities of training resources. The training readiness condition levels are also correlated to the unit's deployment time. For example, an armored battalion which is required to deploy within 14 days and has a training readiness condition level A should have qualified 75 percent of its tank crews and 66 percent of its platoons on tank tables 8 and 12, respectively, within the past 12 months.

Management Information Systems and Project Initiatives

Air Force Capability Assessment Program	The Air Force Capability Assessment Program (AFCAP) is a system under development designed to provide commanders at all levels a means to assess readiness.
Air Force Operations Resource Management System	The Air Force Operations Resource Management System (AFORMS) is a computerized data base, which accumulates flying data for commanders. It can be used to compare training requirements with scheduled and completed training events. A command can use AFORMS to perform comprehensive training trend analyses by type of aircraft or by aircrew. For example, the Strategic Air Command uses AFORMS to analyze B-52 aircrew training; the system shows training completion rates and identifies specific training that needs to be emphasized.
Aerospace Vehicle, Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting System	This Air Force system collects information on aircraft inventory, status, and usage. It provides information that helps track the execution of the flying hour program, i.e , the number of hours and sorties flown by each unit.
Army Battalion Level Training Model	This relates unit training activities in terms of events, missions, tasks, exercises, and other requirements to a given level of readiness.
Flight Readiness Evaluation Data System	This Marine Corps system collects flight activity data on aircraft and crews. It is used to analyze and report flight activity to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Also, local commanders use it to develop readiness assessments of their pilots, crews, and units.
Individual Flight Activity Reporting System	This Navy data base system is the primary source of individual flight data, including flights in simulators. It provides data for flight safety analysis, past and future program evaluations, and pilot compliance with minimum standards.

Measuring Improved Capability of Army Forces	This Army model measures, reports on, and monitors increases in war-fighting capability as new items, units, and organizations are introduced into the force. It will be used to make modernization decisions and to trace progress toward meeting programmed war-fighting capability increases
Naval Flight Record System	A Navy initiative to develop a new flight data recording system that combines existing information systems into a single system. It is expected to increase the accuracy, validity, and utility of all flight activity data
Resources-To-Ship Training Readiness	This is an OSD initiative to develop an overall concept of analysis for ship operational tempo and funding. It considers the various types of ships and their multimission capabilities. One project objective is to develop a prototype model that relates resources to the training readiness of naval general-purpose force ships.
Training Management Control System	A system to help Army commanders plan training, evaluate the resource impact of training plans, and record training accomplished and resources expended.
Training Resource Model	An Army project that merges two ongoing efforts—the Program Resource Methodology, which forecasts recurring operating and support costs, and the Battalion Level Training Model, which relates training to unit status levels. This model could be used by commanders in forecasting training costs, analyzing alternative programs, and performing training impact analyses.
Unit Combat Capability Report	This is a U S. Army Forces Command unique reporting requirement. Monthly, all Active infantry, armor, cavalry, field artillery, and air defense units submit this report as a supplement to the Unit Status Report The report highlights the unit's capability to man selected squads, crews, sections, and weapons. Summary unit capability reports give the command information on the authorized level of men and equipment versus the number considered qualified as combat capable. Also, information is provided on the number of tanks that can be considered manned by qualified tank commanders and gunners although they were not qualified together as a team.

Unit Status Report	This is an Army mechanism for unit status reporting. In determining the unit's C-rating for training, the battalion commander must, for the most part, subjectively assess a number of factors, such as the demonstrated tactical proficiency, personnel turnover rates, and individual and crew weapons proficiency, in estimating the number of weeks required to complete training which corresponds to a specific C-rating.
UNITREP	This is a management information system used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services to monitor the status of military units. Under UNITREP, units report in terms of combat readiness ratings—C-1 through C-5. It is designed to measure the unit's ability to perform its wartime tasks by assessing the peacetime availability and status of resources possessed or controlled by the unit in the four resource areas of personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training. There are five readiness conditions: C-1, fully combat ready, C-2, substantially combat ready; C-3, marginally combat ready; C-4, not combat ready; and C-5 service programmed, not combat ready. A unit's C-rating is computed in each resource area. However, Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance permits a unit's overall rating to be raised or lowered based on the commander's judgment and evaluation of his unit's status.

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix

THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D C 20301-4000

FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

14 MAR 1986

Mr. C. William Moore
Associate Director
National Security and International Affairs Division
US General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Moore:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, "Unit Training: What It Consists of, How It Is Evaluated, and How It Is Reported to the Congress", transmitted by your letter of February 13, 1986 (GAO Code 390031, OSD Case 6925). The DoD comments on the detailed findings in the draft report are at the enclosure.

In general, the DoD considers the GAO report to be a useful contribution on the subject of unit training and its evaluation. The Military Services have made considerable progress in the evaluation of unit training and reporting to the Congress, and DoD expects to make more progress. The GAO suggestions will receive careful and continuing consideration in this effort. Adopting wholesale all of the GAO suggestions for additional reporting to the Congress would, however, duplicate other submissions and quite likely lead to confusion rather than increased understanding. The DoD, therefore, plans to proceed selectively in adopting innovations from the GAO suggestions.

See Comment 9

One GAO suggestion is that DoD provide an annual assurance in the Force Readiness Report that its training programs are executable with the resources requested or previously appropriated. DoD does not concur with this suggestion and recommends that it be omitted from the final report. The multiple reviews that budgets undergo assure that any known imbalances are corrected before submission to the Congress. Further assurances would be redundant.

See Comment 11

At several points in the draft report the existing language implies that the Navy and Air Force are conducting more training than is required--for example, that the Navy steams more days than are justified. This implication is not correct. DoD requests that GAO pay particular attention to the DoD comments on this issue in the enclosure.

See Comments 5 & 6

The DoD appreciates having the opportunity to comment on this important report. The DoD also appreciates having the opportunity to meet with your representatives on February 4 and subsequently, and to provide recommended technical corrections and clarifying changes to the report language.

Sincerely,

E. A. Chavarrie
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Military Manpower & Personnel Policy)

Enclosure

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1986
(GAO CODE 390031) - OSD CASE 6925

"UNIT TRAINING: WHAT IT CONSISTS OF, HOW IT IS EVALUATED, AND HOW IT IS REPORTED TO THE CONGRESS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS

* * * * *

FINDINGS

Now on pp 8-9

- **FINDING A: How The Military Trains.** The GAO observed that one major environment for training is in the operational unit, where individual on-the-job and team training takes place. According to the GAO, a "Military Unit" is defined as any organization staffed and equipped as a separate entity--for example, an Army battalion. The GAO found that unit training can be divided into four categories: (1) individual training for people within a unit who are assigned to the hundreds of occupations that constitute the military personnel structure, (2) team training for people within a unit to develop the teamwork needed to effectively employ complex weapon systems, (3) unit training, which can involve all members of the unit and is designed to develop unit skills needed to carry out combat missions, and (4) collective training of units to develop the intraservice teamwork needed to carry out the mission assigned to theater commanders (which includes individual and multicommand Service exercises and interservice exercises directed and coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The GAO generally concluded that training is vital to readiness. (p. 1; pp. 1-3/GAO Draft Report)

  DoD RESPONSE: Concur. For clarification, it should be noted, however, that the GAO definitions of the components of "unit training" differ from those DoD habitually uses. In DoD usage, GAO's terms "team," "unit" and "collective" (or "joint") training are, taken together, "collective unit training," which is the training discussed in the annual Force Readiness Reports. "Unit training," in DoD usage, is collective unit training plus on-the-job training of individuals within the unit.

  In addition, although not specifically referred to in this summary finding, p. 1 of the draft report indicates it "... addresses the question of how to improve indicators of readiness and sustainability." The report does not deal with sustainability, only readiness. The reference to sustainability should be deleted.

  Also, in Footnote 2, the definition of "readiness" is not the DoD definition. The DoD defines readiness as "the

ability of forces, units, weapon systems or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays)."

- **FINDING B: How Training Is Budgeted.** The GAO found that the Services do not budget for training as a separate activity. Instead, unit training funds are merged with funds required for operations and some support activities. The GAO, therefore, concluded that the precise amount of training is not known. The GAO found that the DoD (OSD) and the Services are working on a number of initiatives which will permit separate budgeting for training. The GAO further concluded that if these initiatives are successful, the DoD can then get close to relating training costs to training outputs and training budgets to training requirements. (pp. iv-v; p. 3/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p. 9

DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. This finding generally misstates how training is budgeted. In addition, the DoD is not contemplating separate budgeting for unit training.

-- The finding is applicable to unit training (by DoD's definition) only, not to all training. All institutional training, as well as certain specialized training activities of the operating forces, is budgeted separately.

See Comment 1

-- It is not correct (GAO Report, p. iv) that the "amount of training" is not known. What is correct is that the exact cost of unit training is not identifiable, since it is merged with operational costs in Service budgets and is not readily separable.

See Comment 2

-- The DoD initiatives mentioned by GAO should assist in better identification of the costs of collective unit training. However, since this training frequently goes on while the unit concerned is engaged in operational activity, it is unlikely that a clear separation would be feasible. In any case, contrary to the GAO claim, the DoD has no plans to change its budgeting or accounting systems to separate unit training costs from costs of other unit activities in the manner described by GAO.

See Comment 3

- **FINDING C: Reporting Training Readiness Requirements And Achievements To The Congress.** The GAO noted that readiness is a peacetime measure of how well the force is prepared to go to war. The GAO reported that the DoD provides the Congress much readiness data during congressional hearings,

as well as in response to congressional questions, and in various reports and conferences. According to the GAO, the annual Force Readiness Report (FRR) mandated by the Congress in 1977, Public Law 95-79, is the most comprehensive source of readiness information that the DoD provides the Congress. The GAO observed that the FRR's objective is to inform the Congress of current force readiness and to assess the readiness expected from passing and executing the President's budget request. The GAO reported that the FRR provides a myriad of information about personnel, materiel, training and military schools, with training discussed in terms of the amount of training activity, such as flying hours flown in prior years and the amount of activity the proposed budget will allow. The GAO noted that the FRR also includes limited detail concerning new simulators, special purpose and joint exercises, and ammunition consumption. The GAO concluded that the information provided in the FRR generally represents a level of training activity and not a measure of readiness. (pp. iv-v; pp 3-4/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp 9, and 20

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees that the FRR reports mainly training activity levels, but it does not support the GAO implication that these activity levels are unrelated to readiness. Flying hours, steaming days, etc., represent opportunities to train. Taking account of changes in operational commitments, when these activity levels go down, readiness can be expected to go down; when they go up, readiness can be expected to go up. The activity levels are, therefore, at least a useful summary measure of progress in readiness.

See Comment 4

- **FINDING D: Services Accomplishing More Training Than Needed.** The GAO noted that the DoD is unable to quantify precisely the effect of increased unit training on readiness because the relationship between training activity and readiness is mostly subjective. The GAO found, however, that in some cases the Services are accomplishing more training than they say is needed to make them combat ready. According to the GAO, this evaluation is based on the Services' own interpretation of the DoD readiness criteria. The GAO cited, for example, that the Air Force flies more hours than its standard requires to report crews as combat ready. In addition, the GAO pointed out that ships spend more time at sea than the Navy says is needed to complete their combat readiness training programs. (pp. iv-v, pp. 20-25/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp 21, 26

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD does not agree with the implication that excessive training is being

See Comment 5

performed. It is important to recognize that readiness criteria represent minimum, not maximum, standards. Additional training, therefore, contributes to a higher level of combat readiness. In addition, if the real purpose of this finding is to distinguish between operational and training activity (as was indicated in informal discussions), it should be stated explicitly.

- **FINDING E: How DoD Assesses Training Effectiveness.** The GAO observed that how well training has prepared a unit to achieve its wartime objectives may be the most difficult aspect of unit readiness to measure. The GAO found that the Services are constantly evaluating their capability to carry out wartime missions. The GAO defined "capability" as a bottom line measure of the unit's organizational structure, people, equipment, logistical support, and its ability to use effectively its resources to accomplish military objectives. The GAO concluded that training is the bond that forms all these resources into a fighting force. The GAO did not, however, find any one measure that assures a commander that his unit is adequately trained--rather, many tools are used--i.e., inspections, evaluations, management information systems and other tests that provide unit commanders feedback on training. Although unit readiness is heavily influenced by the amount of training the unit receives, the GAO concluded that, today, the Services cannot determine with any precision how readiness is affected by changes in the level of training activity. (pp. ii-iii; pp. 8-9/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp 2-4, & 12 19

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING F: Collective Readiness Evaluation: Unit Status And Identity Report (UNITREP).** The GAO reported that all the Services must report unit status and identify information through the Joint Chiefs of Staff UNITREP system. The GAO observed that UNITREP establishes three readiness criteria against which unit commanders rate their units--(1) C-1, meaning the unit is fully ready, to C-3, meaning the unit is ready, but it has some serious problems, (2) C-4, indicating the unit is not ready to perform its assigned missions, and (3) C-5, a special rating created for units that are not combat ready by design (such as ships in overhaul and units being redesigned or reequipped). The GAO further reported that training is only one of four readiness areas measured by UNITREP. (p. 10/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 14

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The finding contains some definitional errors. To be correct, p. 10 of the draft

See Comment 6

report (the source for this finding), should be changed to read as follows (revised words are underscored):

"All Services must report unit status and identity information through the Joint Chiefs of Staff UNITREP system. UNITREP provides the unit commander's judgement of his state of readiness at a selected point in time.

"UNITREP establishes five readiness criteria against which unit commanders rate their units: (1) C-1, meaning the unit is fully ready, (2) C-2, meaning the unit is substantially ready, (3) C-3, meaning the unit is marginally ready, (4) C-4, indicating the unit is not ready to perform the wartime mission for which it was organized, designed or tasked, and (5) C-5, a special rating created for units that are not combat ready by design, such as ships in overhaul and units being redesigned or requipped.

See Comment 7

Training is one of four resource readiness areas measured in UNITREP. Depending on the type of unit reporting, the training measure..."

- **FINDING G: Joint Chiefs Of Staff Coordinated And Directed Exercises.** The GAO reported that most military officials it interviewed considered the joint exercises (such as the annual "Return of Forces to Germany") and combined arms and interservices training engaged in during visits to the Army's National Training Center, the Air Force Red Flag ranges, and the Navy's Fallon Range to be the best form of training and the source for the best evaluations of unit performance. The GAO further reported that not only do exercises and visits to the specialized range facilities provide the most realistic training environment, but the workup preparing for the exercises, the exercise itself, and the feedback the commander receives on his unit's performance is the most comprehensive training and evaluation package available. (p. 11/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 14

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING H: The Army Training And Evaluation Program (ARTEP).** The GAO found that the Army has consolidated most of its training and evaluation programs. The GAO reported that the ARTEP is a comprehensive framework for conducting unit training and assessing unit training results. According to the GAO, ARTEP outlines combat critical tasks, and indicates how well units should perform them, with some

ARTEP events (especially those covered by gunnery standards) producing quantifiable results. The GAO found that ARTEP exercises are conducted periodically by unit commanders and, at least every 18 months, each unit undergoes a major ARTEP evaluation. The GAO further found that when the exercise is completed, the commander subjectively assigns one of three ratings to his unit--i.e., (1) trained, (2) needs more training, or (3) untrained. Although the results are mostly unquantifiable, the GAO concluded that the ARTEP provides the battalion commander a structure for assessing his unit's training and readiness posture. (pp. 11-12, pp. 45-46/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 15

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING I: Army Standards In Training Commission (STRAC).** The GAO found that the STRAC is not an evaluation, but rather a criterion against which unit performance is assessed. The GAO further found that STRAC's applicability to an overall assessment of unit readiness is limited to what STRAC measures--i.e., a unit's ability to fire weapons and successfully hit targets. According to the GAO, STRAC uses established training readiness conditions that determine not only how much training ammunition a unit will get, but also the qualifications a unit must achieve with its weapons. (pp. 12-13/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 15

DoD RESPONSE: **Partially Concur.** For correctness with reference to STRAC, it should be described as follows: "...not an evaluation, but a document which prescribes weapons training standards and allocates training ammunitions necessary to train to those standards."

See Comment 7

- **FINDING J: Army's Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise.** The GAO found that the Army's emergency deployment readiness exercise tests a unit's ability to quickly deploy to a specific location. The GAO concluded this evaluation is particularly important for units stationed overseas that must move to general defense positions some distance away from their peacetime locations. The GAO reported these exercises are started without warning to test a unit's ability to assemble and prepare for deployment, and unit commanders use the exercise results to adjust their training schedules in order to strengthen those areas where weaknesses are identified. (p. 13, p. 46/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 15

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

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- **FINDING K: Navy's Command Assessment Of Readiness And Training.** The GAO reported that the Navy's goal is to prepare ships at the UNITREP combat readiness rating C-1 before deployment. The GAO further reported that upon return from deployment, ships are either sent into the shipyard or begin to prepare for the next deployment. The GAO found that after a ship comes out of overhaul or after the personnel rotations that normally occur after extended cruises are completed, the commanders evaluate how ready the ship is and using this pretraining assessment, determines which type of training the ship's crew needs to emphasize as they prepare for the next deployment. (p. 14/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 16

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING L: Navy's Total Force Ship Training And Readiness Program.** The GAO found that the Navy's Total Force Ship Training and Readiness Program is a training program that allows a commander to evaluate the readiness status of the force. The GAO reported that it identifies the types and sequences of training for ships, both in port and at sea, and that the Pacific Fleet Commanders use the program's criteria to help prepare ships for deployment. (The GAO noted that while its review of this Navy evaluation program was limited to work with the Pacific Fleet, it was advised the Atlantic Fleet operates very similarly.) The GAO further reported that this training and readiness program establishes training requirements for surface ships, using increasingly more complex training sequences and the M-ratings (assigned as ships progress through the various training phases--basic, intermediate and advanced), and become the basis for computing combat readiness ratings (C-ratings) for UNITREP. The GAO observed that during the advanced phase of training, battle group evaluations are conducted, which require four to five days to complete and which are monitored continuously by observers, analysts and data collectors. (pp. 14-15, p. 50/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp 16-17

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING M: Navy's Operational Training Assessments.** The GAO found that the Navy's Operational Training Assessment is a requirement of the Total Force Ship Training and Readiness Program and is an evaluation designed to determine how well training has prepared the ship and its crew for deployment. The GAO observed that it is the final assessment of a ship's readiness before moving to the advanced stage of training and is designed to assess how well a ship operates with other ships. (The GAO noted that this assessment is not

Now on p 17

used for aircraft carriers or the crews of the assigned air wings.) (p. 15/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING N: Navy's Operational Readiness Evaluation.** The GAO found that the Navy's Operational Readiness evaluation is similar to the Operational Training Assessment, except it evaluates the performance of an aircraft carrier and the crews of the air wings assigned to the carrier during deployment. According to the GAO, the evaluation, graded by observers who are not members of the air wings being evaluated, determines how well the air wings and the ship operate as a team. (p. 16, p. 47/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 17

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING O: Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES).** The GAO noted that the Marine Corps training is similar to the Army's training, not only in the type of training conducted, but also in the type of guidance provided to commanders. The GAO found that the MCCRES is much like the ARTEP--i.e., it provides detailed instructions for the type of training each unit must accomplish, the event that constitutes each particular phase of training, and the standards that commanders use to evaluate their units' training performances. The GAO also found that, again like ARTEP, MCCRES is largely subjective in terms of evaluation criteria and evaluations rely heavily on the experience and judgement of the evaluators. (p. 16, p. 47/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 17

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING P: Air Force Evaluations.** The GAO found that Air Force headquarters guidance establishes aircrew training policy, which major commanders use to develop unit training programs tailored to their missions. According to the GAO, three types of aircrew training are conducted by the Air Force units--(1) initial qualification training, (2) mission qualification training, and (3) continuation training. The GAO reported that during continuation training, aircrews attain mission ready status, which qualifies the aircrews to be rated C-1 in UNITREP. (pp. 16-17/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 18

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING Q: Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection.** The GAO found that the Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection is the primary Air Force evaluation of a unit's

Now on p 18

readiness to accomplish its wartime mission. According to the GAO, it is planned and conducted by a team led by the Inspectors General of major commands. The GAO reported that the inspections are done about every 18 months and the inspectors use checklists to ensure all required events are accomplished in accordance with Air Force and major command standards. (pp. 17-18/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING R: Air Force Standardization And Evaluation Tests.** The GAO found that the Air Force Standardization and Evaluation Tests are referred to as "check-rides," because a specially trained officer rides the aircraft and evaluates aircrew performance against Air Force standards. According to the GAO, this evaluation is conducted every 12-18 months (with some of the tests unannounced), and is designed to determine whether the aircrew is mission ready. (p. 18/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 18-19

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING S: Unit Training: No One Program Provides Readiness Level.** The GAO found that no one unit training program, evaluation, or inspection provides a commander solid evidence that his unit is trained at any specific level of readiness. The GAO observed, however, that the Services nevertheless both individually and collectively evaluate, on a continuing basis, how well units can perform wartime missions. The GAO concluded that from these evaluations come a myriad of both quantitative and subjective indications which highlight unit strengths and weaknesses. The GAO further concluded that the commander's judgement is probably the best overall assessment of how well training has prepared a unit to go to war. The GAO also concluded that some of the management information that helps commanders assess unit readiness might also help the Congress as it considers the DoD budget request. (p. iii-iv; p. 18/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p 19

DoD RESPONSE: Concur.

- **FINDING T: The Force Readiness Report As A Medium To Report On Training.** The GAO reported that in 1977, the Congress enacted Public Law 95-79 requiring the DoD to submit an annual material readiness report--i.e., the Force Readiness Report (FRR). The GAO observed that the FRR has evolved into a very extensive readiness source document, which now

Now on p 20

includes a summary, two additional separately published sections on manpower and training, and an annex of national guard/reserve topics--with unit training discussed in one part of the training section. According to the GAO, the DoD acknowledges that the FRR does not accomplish its purpose, i.e., it does not specifically advise the Congress how ready the forces are now, and how much more ready they will be, if the Congress appropriates the funds requested in the Defense budget. The GAO observed that the FRR states clearly that readiness must be "inferred" after considering the data presented in the FRR. The GAO described the unit training data provided in the FRR as limited to a summary of the hours or days the Services (1) have trained during the past fiscal year (i.e., flying hours, steaming days and battalion training days), (2) the levels of such activities they expect in the current fiscal year, and (3) the activities planned for the next fiscal year with the budget the Congress is presently considering. The GAO reported that the FRR specifically states that the DoD has not developed the mechanisms which would permit it to assess the readiness resulting from past training or from training anticipated in the future. (The GAO cited, for example, in the FY 1986 FRR, the Air Force projected that in FY 1986 F-16 crews would fly about 39,000 more hours than in FY 1985, but does not tell how much more ready F-16 pilots will be at the end of the year, after flying the increased hours, or why there is a need to increase the flying hours.)
(pp. iv, v, 19-20/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. With two exceptions, the DoD agrees with this finding. The DoD disagrees that FRR does not accomplish its purpose at all, as implied by the GAO finding. What the DoD does agree with is that "... the FRR does not fully accomplish its purpose," which is a much more correct assessment of the FRR. In addition, the last example cited in this finding can be incorrectly construed to mean that in FY 86 the Air Force is flying more F-16 hours than required. What the report does not disclose is that the 39,000 flying hours increase for FY 1986 is needed to support the 138 additional F-16s which will be in the force during FY 1986.

See Comment 8

- **FINDING U: Other Data Can Be Included In The Force Readiness Report.** As the GAO previously noted, there are many (internal) indicators used by the DoD to assess the effectiveness of training. The GAO concluded that, notwithstanding the array of measures and indicators

Now on p. 21

available from this data, determining the effect of training on readiness is difficult and probably best assessed on the basis of the commander's experience and judgement. The GAO further concluded, however, that several additional indicators could improve the training information currently provided in the FRR, which, in turn, could benefit the Congress in its annual budget review. According to the GAO, this would include expansion of flying hour indicators, ground forces indicators and Naval forces indicators. (p. 21/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The DoD agrees that some additional indicators could benefit the Congress. The FY 1987 FRR, which was not completed until after the GAO had finished its field work, contains considerably fuller and more detailed information on progress in training than previous editions of the FRR. The DoD expects that improved indicators will be developed for future reports; the indicators discussed by the GAO will be among the alternatives considered. The DoD cautions, however, that it would not be useful to the Congress for the FRR to include all of the indicators and data discussed by the GAO. Some of them would duplicate information already received by the Congress in budget submissions, witness statements and other documents. The sheer volume of information could make it more difficult, in some respects, for the Congress to make sound judgements on developments in training and readiness. In addition, the creation of new reporting systems to gather data not now centrally available could entail prohibitive costs and staff effort. For these reasons, DoD must be allowed the latitude to study candidate indicators carefully, before final decisions are made to adopt them for congressional reporting.

See Comment 9

- **FINDING V: Supplementing Flying Hour Indicators In The FRR.** According to the GAO, flying hour information (as currently provided in the FRR) has limited utility in the budget analysis process because it does not address how readiness will be affected if the Congress chooses not to authorize and appropriate funds at levels requested by the DoD. The GAO concluded that additional information collected by the Air Force related to flying could be included as supplements to the FRR--i.e., (1) proficiency level goals and accomplishments, (2) sorties flown and training events completed as planned, and (3) training provided to aircrews of operational squadrons compared with that provided to those assigned to staff offices, and thus not reported under UNITREP. Specifically, the GAO concluded that Air Force

Now on pp 21-24

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training-related readiness reporting would be improved if it provided, in the FRR, the Graduated Combat Capability levels being achieved, by command and type of aircraft, and those expected to be achieved with the new budget. The GAO also concluded that these same opportunities to supplement the Air Force flying hour information would also apply in principle to the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps. (In reaching these conclusions, the GAO implied that the Air Force does more flying than can be justified for training.) (p. v, 21-25; p. 50/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. As the GAO indicates, some additional information on flying programs could be used to supplement the FRR. The DoD does not agree, however, that the level of detail suggested by the GAO would be useful or cost effective. Providing some of the information suggested by GAO would require new reporting systems. Information at the sortie and event level is not, in most cases, reported to the Service Headquarters level, since it is not ordinarily used at that level for management purposes. Furthermore, information at this level of detail is not used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for program or budget review. Nonetheless, DoD will consider the feasibility and value of selected expansion or other improvements in reporting on flying activities in future editions of the FRR.

See Comment 9

The DoD also disagrees with the GAO implication that the Air Force does more flying for training than can be justified. It appears this implication is largely due to ambiguities in definitions of combat readiness between the UNITREP system and the Air Force's Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) system. While the Air Force reports units at C-1 under UNITREP when they achieve basic or minimal combat ready status, the necessity for a high probability of success in combat requires a higher level of proficiency and more flying hours than this minimal level. The problem is a definitional one and is not evidence of excessive flying.

See Comment 5

- **FINDING W: Supplementing Ground Force Indicators In The FRR.** According to the GAO, the information on the Army's battalion training days and the Marine Corps battalion field training days (as currently provided in the FRR) is not descriptive of training. In addition, the GAO noted that unlike flying hours and steaming days, battalion training days are not costed out in the Services' O&M budgets. The GAO observed that the number of days that battalions train

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does not reveal the type of training being accomplished or the significance of the training, inasmuch as each training day is weighted the same in terms of the unit's training goals. (The GAO noted that reporting is done in this way despite the fact that the the DoD states that a battalion training day of live fire on the gunnery range may be more valuable to a tank unit than a battalion training day of limited maneuvers without live fire.) The GAO observed that the Army's ARTEP and STRAC and the Marine Corps MCCRES have established standards against which a unit's performance is assessed. The GAO concluded that while unit performance relative to these standards is assessed mostly judgementally by experienced military personnel, there are some standards for which quantitative measures are available. The GAO further concluded that, although the Congress may not be interested in the minute details about individual units, such comparative data aggregated to division, corps or higher levels could help the Congress evaluate the effect of prior year appropriations, and help establish accountability standards for the current budget. In addition, the GAO concluded that the impact of insufficient training support on unit training could be useful if reported in the FRR. The GAO noted, for example, that while the FRR identifies the Army's new and upgraded training ranges, (1) it does not address how achieving programmed training activity levels may be contingent upon support from other than the O&M appropriation, and (2) it does not identify where in the budget funding has been included for range construction. (pp. 26-28/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD position on this finding parallels its position on Finding V. Some degree of expanded or improved reporting for ground unit training may be appropriate, and the DoD will consider how this may be best accomplished.

- **FINDING X: Supplementing Naval Forces Indicators.** The GAO noted that the term "steaming days" means the number of days a ship is cruising with its main engines running. The GAO noted that like flying hours, the number of steaming days is an indicator of resource consumption and is included in the Navy's budget justification. The GAO concluded, however, that also like the flying hour and the battalion training day, a steaming day does not describe the type or amount of training actually taking place as the ship is underway. The GAO observed, for example, that information on the

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nondeployed fleet's training could add to visibility of training. The GAO further concluded that when the Navy's budget states requirements for an operating tempo during the upcoming year, these requirements should be linked with specific goals and objectives. According to the GAO, the Navy should be able to explain its accomplishments toward its goals and to estimate the number of ships that will complete each training phase during the budget year. In addition, the GAO observed that steaming days support other than training requirements. The GAO, therefore, concluded that other important data, which could be included in the FRR, is how much of the total steaming day requirement is needed to train to make sure the ships are fully combat ready (or C-1, under UNITREP criteria), as compared to total steaming days. The GAO noted that Navy officials estimated that about 15 percent of the deployed fleet's steaming days were not required to accomplish training. The GAO observed that if such information were included in the FRR, it would clearly identify the discretionary steaming days not required for training that are built into the budget. (pp. iv-v, 28-31/GAO Draft Report)

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. With two exceptions the DoD agrees with this finding. The DoD disagrees with the GAO observation that "... it would clearly identify the discretionary steaming days required for training ..." No "discretionary" steaming days are built into the budget. A more correct statement would be "... it would clearly identify the minimum steaming days..."

See Comment 10

As to separately identifying training steaming time and operational steaming time, the Navy is currently gathering data which could allow estimation of the training portion of total steaming days. If these data prove credible, they could provide a means of accomplishing what the GAO suggests. Given the facts that operational activity has training value and that some training requirements are completed during operational missions, this is a fairly complex task and the outcome is uncertain.

- **FINDING Y: Programs Throughout The Budget Affect The Services' Abilities To Train And Should Be Reported On.** The GAO observed that when the budget is discussed in terms of readiness or training, frequently the focus is on the activities funded with the O&M appropriations. The GAO concluded, however, that appropriation of the total funding request does not necessarily mean that the training the DoD

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is asking to be funded can be accomplished. According to the GAO, this has been complicated by the advent of new and more complex weapon systems, which, in turn, has emphasized the need for more effective training support. The GAO concluded that whether the level of training requested can be supported by spares, maintenance and training ranges would be useful information to decision makers. The GAO further concluded that the DoD could provide assurances, in the unit training portion of the FRR, that the levels of activities requested for the budget year are executable given the prior year appropriation levels for related programs. In addition, the GAO concluded that the impact of changing technology on accomplishing training should be reported. The GAO noted that changing technology has given the Services more objective training evaluation, more realistic training, and more accurate and timely data on the training status of both units and individuals. The GAO observed, therefore, that there are advantages to including specific contributions of high cost, high technology training support systems in the FRR--for example, the amount of training accomplished with simulators could be quantified. (pp. 31-34/GAO Draft Report)

See Comment 11

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees that many factors other than operations and maintenance funding are necessary for sound collective unit training programs and force readiness. The FY 1987 edition of the Force Readiness Report includes a considerable additional amount of information on range improvements, simulator availability and utilization, developments in training technology, training munitions consumption, theater perspectives on training, etc. The question is, how much is enough? The FRR is not intended to replicate other budget documents submitted to the Congress, rather it is intended to show status and trends in readiness. The GAO report objects to activity levels as readiness indicators for collective unit training but then, in this finding, proposed adding a mass of information and data which are much more akin to activity levels than to readiness indicators. The DoD intends to improve on the equality of information of the type proposed by GAO in future editions of the FRR. It would not, however, be useful to the Congress to receive the volume of information, much of it duplicative, suggested by the GAO in this finding.

In addition, the DoD does not concur that it should provide assurances, in the collective unit training portion of the

FRR, "that the levels of activities requested for the budget year are executable." Service programs and budgets are formally reviewed in detail and adjusted twice by each Service Headquarters and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), before budgets are submitted to the Congress. This process assures, among other objectives, that budgets are balanced and executable. If it is discovered during budget formulation that proposed resources cannot be spent for the designated purposes, the Services and OSD have every incentive to transfer them to priority unfunded projects or delete them. Further assurances are unnecessary and would, in any case, do nothing to prevent the occasional undetected error that might prevent full execution of some portion of a Service program.

- **FINDING Z: Efforts By The OSD And The Services To Improve Readiness Measurement And Reporting.** The GAO found that the OSD and the Services have several efforts under way to improve readiness measurement and reporting. According to the GAO, some of the most promising are (1) OSD establishment of the Training Data and Analysis Center at Orlando, Florida, (2) the Training Resource Model currently being developed by the Army to project UNITREP combat readiness C-ratings, (3) Navy development of the Operations Summary Cost Information System, and (4) the Air Force Integrated Readiness Measurement System (AFIRMS). The GAO concluded that these initiatives are essential to improve defense management and to get a better handle on current levels of readiness and the associated costs. The GAO further concluded that as progress is made in pursuing these initiatives, the DoD should report the results in the FRR. (pp. 34-36, pp 37-38; p. 52/GAO Draft Report)

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DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees that efforts are underway to improve readiness measurement and reporting. This is, and has been, an ongoing effort. The DoD does not, however, agree with the extent of the GAO conclusions. The Air Force Capability Assessment Programs, which has superseded AFIRMS, is intended to allow better estimation of unit and theater capability to perform specific missions. It is not intended to create a link between readiness and training costs. The Navy's Operations Summary Cost Information System has the potential to provide a training activity indicator for steaming days and flying hours, but a credible data base for the system has not been established. Consequently, the GAO language overstates the potential of these two systems for "getting a better handle on current levels of readiness and the associated costs."

See Comment 12

The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter dated March 14, 1986

GAO Comments

1. We agree and changed "training" to "unit training" where applicable in the report.

2. We could not find any source in OSD or the military services that could summarize the cost or amount of unit training; therefore, no change was made to the report. However, for clarification purposes, we added the word "unit" to our statement on page 3 of the executive summary] which comments on the ability to determine the precise amount of "unit" training that is being conducted.

3. Our intent was simply to point out that if the services' initiatives are successful, DOD's ability to relate training costs to training outputs and training budgets to training requirements will improve. We do not state that DOD's budgeting or accounting systems will be changed.

4. We agree that activity levels can be related to readiness if the unit is performing tasks required in validated training programs. However, increased activity alone does not necessarily make a unit more ready.

5. The report states that Air Force tactical fighter units and Navy nondeployed ships train more than is required to report C-1 (fully combat ready) in UNITREP We did not conclude that excessive training was being performed.

6. DOD suggested changes were incorporated into the final report.

7. DOD's suggested language is included on page 14 of the report.

8. To avoid any misinterpretation, on page 20 of the report we added the word "fully" to our description of the extent to which the FRR meets its intended purpose In addition, we added the suggested information provided by DOD regarding the reason the additional 39,000 hours were requested by the Air Force.

9. The report identifies information that is currently available and not included in the FRR. We agree that DOD and the Congress should jointly determine the proper type and level of new information to be included The report does not advocate new reporting systems or recommend that DOD provide more data to the Congress merely because it is available,

the information provided to the Congress should be commensurate with the benefits to be derived.

As pointed out in note 5, we did not conclude that the Air Force does more flying than can be justified. Our point is that achieving the lowest level of GCC proficiency allows that unit to report crews C-1, or fully combat ready, under UNITREP But significant flying hours are consumed to accomplish GCC sorties beyond the level required for C-1, and the benefits derived should be explained in the FRR.

10. DOD's suggestion is included on page 26 of the report.

11. GAO recognizes that fully integrating a budget as large as DOD's is difficult. Even with internal DOD checks and balances, it is not unusual for the various elements of the budget not to be fully integrated. As we reported, since 1980 the Army has not been able to fly the number of hours it needs to qualify its aircrews because of spare parts shortages and the Air Force has used its sustainability stocks to fly its training program because peacetime operating stocks were insufficient to meet its flying hour program needs. Accordingly, we believe the idea of DOD providing specific assurance that requested funding will provide the necessary support to execute the requested levels of training warrants serious consideration .

12. We agree that directly linking the cost of training activity and specific levels of readiness is not likely to result from the current activities. However, we believe that if the ongoing initiatives are successful, they have a potential to allow the services to better relate the costs and activities that produce readiness in the future.

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