

GAO

Report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Operations, House of
Representatives

November 1988

**COMPETITION ACT:
Defense Science Board
Recommended
Changes to the Act**



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United States
General Accounting Office
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National Security and
International Affairs Division

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November 2, 1988

The Honorable Jack Brooks
Chairman, Committee on
Government Operations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request, we reviewed certain matters related to the Defense Science Board 1986 Summer Study report, Use of Commercial Components in Military Equipment. The Board is the senior independent advisory body to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Board undertakes tasks that are of high personal interest to the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and prepares reports that are intended to recommend constructive changes relating to DOD missions. Summer studies are relatively short studies done on selected topics. Much of the work is performed during an intensive 2-week period.

As agreed, we concentrated on the statements in the report of the Board's Summer Study panel calling for changes to the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. Specifically, we reviewed

- the evidence used to support these statements;
- the balance of the panel under the Federal Advisory Committee Act; and
- facts pertaining to participation in the panel process, including the panel members' backgrounds, the views expressed on the competition act-related matters during the panel's meetings, and public participation in the meetings.

The results of our work are summarized as follows and described in more detail in appendix I. Appendix I also describes our objectives, scope, and methodology.

The charter for the Board's study provided that its central focus would be on evaluating the cost-effectiveness and performance trade-offs, including the risks and impediments associated with increasing the use of commercial components in military equipment. The panel that was formed to do the study requested and was granted approval to expand its charter to include considering changes in procurement practices that would facilitate buying commercial products.

Before this study, the Acquisition Task Force of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also known as the Packard Commission, had addressed these issues. The Task Force had recommended, among other things, that legislative and regulatory revisions be made to increase the procurement of commercial products and establish "effective commercial-style procurement competition." The Task Force chairman told us that changing the competition act was one objective of the Task Force in making this recommendation.

The Summer Study panel's report, among other things, (1) recommended both increased use of commercial products and use of adapted commercial buying practices in DOD and (2) concluded that expanded use of commercial products in DOD systems will be inhibited until the differences between commercial buying practices and DOD practices are reduced. In its report, the panel recommended the following changes to the competition act:

- Give DOD authority to use lists of selected, qualified sources in order to achieve "effective" rather than "full and open" competition.¹
- Modify the act's bid protest provisions so that (1) a protest must be submitted to the contracting officer for resolution and could be submitted to our Office² only if the contracting officer does not satisfy the protester and (2) neither contract award nor contract work progress is suspended pending a bid protest decision.

The panel identified these competition act-related recommendations as fundamental changes needed to significantly improve DOD's acquisitions. Implementation of these recommendations would directly affect our Office's bid protest function and would conflict with positions we have previously taken in support of the competition act's bid protest provisions, including its "stay provisions" that suspend in many cases contract awards or contract work progress while bid protest decisions are pending. In a congressional testimony on February 28, 1985, before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations, the Comptroller General said with regard to the competition act's bid protest provisions:

¹Full and open competition means, basically, allowing all sources capable of satisfying the government's needs to compete for a contract award.

²Although our Office has issued decisions on bid protests for many years under its authority to determine the legality of public expenditures, the competition act established for the first time an express statutory basis for such decisions.

“(The act) . . . carefully balances competing public interests. Prospective contractors have an inexpensive and expeditious forum in which their claims of illegal exclusions from the government’s business may be heard. The existence of a forum for such claims, made much more effective by the stay of contract performance in many cases, will, as the Congress intended, help insure that agencies comply with the mandate of full and open competition . . .”

Evidence

The panel (1) based its recommendations and other statements calling for changes to the competition act on professional and legal opinion and (2) did not present evidence to demonstrate that the act needs to be changed to expand the purchase of commercial components or that changing the act would have that effect.

The panel’s two cochairmen and other panelists told us they recognized that there was a lack of hard, verifiable evidence to support the report’s statements calling for changes to the competition act. One cochairman stated that the lack of such evidence was a reason why the report recommended using pilot programs to validate the benefits to DOD of using commercial practices.

Another Board study is currently being conducted on the use of commercial components in military equipment. The executive secretary for the new study said that several of the same panel members are “revisiting” the results of the previous study. He stated that the purpose of this study is to (1) consider each of the panel’s previous recommendations, (2) assess whether or not DOD has given it the emphasis or taken the kind of action warranted, and (3) if not, examine in more depth and “reconfirm” the validity of the recommendations.

Balance Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act

The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92-463, as amended, 5 U.S.C. app. I, states that advisory committee membership should be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed. Under relevant case law interpreting the advisory committee act, the degree to which a particular advisory committee must achieve a balance of membership depends upon the mandate assigned to the committee. The act focuses on advisory committee balance with respect to the committee’s overall mandate, rather than individual issues under the committee’s consideration.

In assessing the selection of panelists with respect to the panel’s overall mandate of evaluating cost-effectiveness and performance trade-offs,

including risks and impediments, associated with the increased use of commercial products, we found no basis to question the balance of membership on the panel. The panelists selected to perform the study included civilians in defense industries as well as military officers and civilians who have worked for both DOD and defense industries. The panel also had participation from high-level military advisers. The panel cochairman who played the primary role in selecting the panelists told us that he intended to achieve balance with regard to the members' backgrounds and experience; that is, he sought government and industry experience as well as experience with commercial and government buying practices.

The cochairman also stated that he did not consider the panelists' views on specific issues before selecting them, and that he was not looking for people who had made up their minds, either pro or con, on specific issues. In any case, he said that most of the panelists did not have a detailed knowledge of the competition act's requirements. He added that in selecting panelists he was looking for skeptics who could look with open minds to challenge the system, because he wanted the panel to determine whether the system could be improved.

Panel Members' Backgrounds and Views on Specific Issues

On the specific issues of changing the competition act's provisions, panel members and others associated with the panel told us that during the deliberations none of the panelists or military advisers expressed any (1) support for the act's provisions in question or (2) opposition to the panel's competition act-related conclusions or recommendations.

Six of the 14 panel members, including all of the panelists who were the most involved and influential regarding the competition act-related issues, had previously participated in the work of the Packard Commission's Acquisition Task Force. The panel cochairman who played the primary role in selecting the Board's study panelists had also been the Task Force chairman. He told us that changing the competition act was an objective of the Task Force when it recommended statutory revisions to permit use of commercial buying practices. He also stated that the Board's study was intended to continue the Task Forces's efforts, which it had not been able to complete, to identify statutory and other changes needed for DOD to use commercial buying practices.

Conclusions

In our opinion, the conclusions and recommendations of the Board's panel in regard to the competition act should be viewed with skepticism.

The panel recommended departure from the competition act's full and open competition requirement to eliminate what was seen as an inhibition to the procurement of commercial products. Yet, the panel did not provide any factual evidence demonstrating that full and open competition has impeded the acquisition of commercial products.

Also, the panel's report did not address the long-term effects of denying competitors full and open access to the procurement process. The panel's report indicated that commercial firms sought effective rather than full and open competition but did not address whether there are not fundamental differences between commercial and government operations and accountability which give rise to the need for following different procedures.

As requested, we did not ask DOD to officially comment on a draft of this report. As arranged with your Office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report. At that time we will send copies to the Secretary of Defense and other interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

Sincerely yours,



Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

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Abbreviations

C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CICA	Competition in Contracting Act
DOD	Department of Defense
DSB	Defense Science Board
FACA	Federal Advisory Committee Act
GSA	General Services Administration

Information on the DSB Study of Commercial Components in Military Equipment

In April 1986, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering requested that the Defense Science Board (DSB) convene a Summer Study on the use of commercial components in military systems. The charter for the study indicated that its central focus would be on evaluating the cost-effectiveness and performance trade-offs, including the risks and impediments, associated with increasing the use of commercial components in military equipment. The charter identified some specific areas requiring examination, such as past programs in which commercial components might have been used, potential “down-side” risks of using commercial equipment, and existing impediments to the greater use of commercial components. After the panel responsible for conducting the study was formed, it requested and was granted approval to expand its charter to include considering changes in procurement practices that would facilitate buying commercial products.

The DSB Summer Study report, issued in January 1987, recommended both increased use of commercial products and use of adapted commercial buying practices in DOD. Before this study, the Acquisition Task Force of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also known as the Packard Commission, had addressed these issues. The Task Force had also recommended, among other things, that legislative and regulatory revisions be made to (1) increase the procurement of commercial products and (2) establish “effective commercial-style procurement competition.”¹ The Task Force chairman told us that changing the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) was an objective of the Task Force in making this recommendation.

The DSB study went further by specifically recommending the following changes to CICA:

- Give DOD authority to use lists of selected, qualified sources to achieve “effective” rather than “full and open” competition.
- Modify CICA’s bid protest provisions so that (1) a protest must be submitted to the contracting officer for resolution and could be submitted to our Office only if the contracting officer does not satisfy the protester and (2) neither contract award nor contract work progress is suspended pending a bid protest decision.

The DSB report states that although it includes several other specific recommendations to encourage the use of commercial products and practices, the CICA-related recommendations are fundamental to significantly

¹The Task Force’s report, A Formula for Action, was issued in April 1986.

improving DOD's acquisitions. The panel concluded that the expanded use of commercial products in DOD systems will be inhibited until the differences between commercial buying practices and DOD practices are reduced. However, the report also stated that, notwithstanding this conclusion, there are many examples of commercial products being used in DOD systems.

Evidence

The DSB report's recommendations and other statements calling for changes to CICA were based on professional and legal opinions. The report's supporting documents relating to the CICA issues consist of subjective comparisons of commercial and government buying practices; legal opinions and analyses of current federal procurement laws and regulations; and briefing documents and other analyses of the current DOD procurement system. These documents were prepared or made available for the study by the panelists themselves, the government advisers to the panel, and outside experts.

The DSB report identified "the lack of full data" to support conclusions as the primary risk in making the commercialization decision. The report, therefore, called for "well thought out implementation plans, data gathering, pilot programs and periodic assessment" when the "depth of data is shallow." One of the cochairmen explained that the panel (1) recognized the lack of hard, verifiable evidence to support its conclusions, including those calling for changes to CICA and (2) consequently, recommended that DOD obtain legal exemptions and implement pilot programs to collect such evidence and demonstrate that the use of commercial buying practices is practical and beneficial. The other cochairman and other panelists also said that the panel did not have hard or analytical data that would demonstrate the validity of the report's statements calling for changes to CICA. In addition, the panel's report said that the "depth of data" warrants "going slowly" with regard to commercialization.

Another DSB study is currently being done on the use of commercial components in military equipment. The executive secretary for the new study said that several of the same panel members are "revisiting" the results of the previous study and proceeding under the previous charter. He stated that the purpose of this study is to (1) consider each of the panel's previous recommendations, (2) assess whether or not DOD has given it the emphasis or taken the kind of action warranted, and (3) if not, examine in more depth and "reconfirm" the validity of the recommendation. He added that the panel's plans include, among other things,

reconfirming previous recommendations concerning commercial semi-conductors and pilot programs for using commercial buying practices. This study was started in January 1988 and the executive secretary anticipates issuance of a report in late 1989.

Commercial Practices

The cochairmen said that the underlying assumptions of the 1986 study were that (1) private industry can develop and field equipment faster than DOD and (2) if DOD were to adopt commercial-style procurement practices, it could achieve similar results.

The panel used the Boeing 767 commercial aircraft development as a basis for identifying the significant differences between commercial and DOD acquisition processes. Because CICA's full and open competition and bid protest requirements, as well as other features of DOD's process, are absent from the commercial process, the panel regarded such requirements as a burden that commercial buyers do not have to face. The report did not address the relative costs (or burden) versus the benefits of such requirements, nor did it present evidence demonstrating that the CICA requirements, which took effect during 1985, are responsible for missed opportunities to buy commercial items.

Views on Factors That May Discourage Using Commercial Products

The DSB report argues that (1) the requirement to use full and open competition and the threat of "almost unlimited" protests by losing bidders creates a climate in which government buyers depend on rigid specifications in order to protect themselves from the protesters and (2) this use of detailed specifications, rather than functional specifications or commercial item descriptions, discourages or excludes the purchase of commercial items.

Panel members and backup material used by the panel cited factors other than the CICA provisions that might also explain why government buyers tend to prefer items built to military specifications over similar or equivalent commercial products. These additional factors include (1) the loss of leverage to ensure that contractors provide quality items if detailed specifications are not used, (2) other concerns about the quality, reliability, or suitability of the commercial product alternatives in relation to the military requirements, (3) government buyers' inexperience with the commercial marketplace, (4) the lack of existing, equivalent functional specifications, (5) logistics and supportability concerns, such as concern about the proliferation of different items to be maintained and reproced, and (6) resistance to change.

Balance of the Panel's Membership Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Public Law 92-463, as amended, 5 U.S.C. app. I, section 5(b), states that advisory committee membership should “be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed.” The “balance” of membership which advisory committees must achieve is not specifically defined in FACA or in implementing regulations promulgated by the General Services Administration (GSA).² The GSA regulations implementing FACA in effect at the time the Summer Study panel was composed³ stated generally that, for the purpose of achieving balance, agencies should consider having advisory committee membership represent a “cross-section of interested persons and groups with demonstrated professional or personal qualifications or experience to contribute to the functions and tasks to be performed.”⁴ According to explanatory material accompanying the GSA regulations,⁵ the guidance on achieving balance was drawn from the 1983 court ruling in National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,⁶ the leading case on FACA's balance requirement.

In the National Anti-Hunger Coalition case, the plaintiffs complained that virtually all members of the Executive Committee of the President's Private Sector Survey were drawn from major corporations and, therefore, the Committee was not “balanced” as required by FACA. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the principal purpose of the Survey—which was to seek detailed advice on cost-effective corporate management—justified selection solely of members with experience in fiscal management of large private organizations. Under the holding in National Anti-Hunger Coalition, the determination of whether an advisory committee is fairly balanced under FACA depends on the nature of the committee's mission.

As noted previously, the charter for the Summer Study provided that its central focus would be on evaluating cost-effectiveness and performance trade-offs, including risks and impediments associated with increasing

²Nor is the concept of balance defined in DOD's directive on advisory committees (DOD Directive 5105.18, March 20, 1984), which restates FACA's balance requirement without elaboration.

³48 Fed. Reg. 19,324 (1983) (codified at 41 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) 101-6.1001 through 101-6.1035).

⁴41 C.F.R. 101-6.1007.

⁵48 Fed. Reg. 19,324 at 19,326 (1983).

⁶557 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir. 1983), on remand, 566 F. Supp. 1515 (D.D.C. 1983).

the use of commercial components in military equipment. In assessing the selection of DSB panelists in light of the panel's mandate, we found no basis to question the range of qualifications and experience represented on the panel.

According to the executive director of the DSB secretariat, the DSB panel selection process is undocumented. The standard practice is for panel chairmen to play a major role in selecting panel members who are not regular DSB members. In this case, 7 of the 14 panel members were regular DSB members who volunteered, and were essentially self-selected, to serve on the panel. The cochairmen selected the remaining seven panelists.

The panel cochairman who played the primary role in selecting the panelists told us he intended to achieve balance with regard to the members' backgrounds and experience; that is, he sought government and industry experience as well as experience with commercial and government buying practices. The panelists selected included civilians in defense industries as well as military officers and civilians who have worked for both DOD and defense industries. The panel also had participation from high-level military advisers. The panel cochairman also told us that he did not consider the panelists' views on specific issues before picking them, and he was not looking for people who had made up their minds, either pro or con, on specific issues. In any case, he said that most of the panelists did not have a detailed knowledge of CICA's requirements. He added that in picking panelists he was looking for skeptics who could look with open minds to challenge the system, because he wanted the panel to determine whether the system could be improved.

FACA requires fairly balanced membership on an advisory committee in terms of the committee's overall mandate, and does not require that a committee achieve balance on every issue under its consideration.

Participants in Panel Meetings

Six of the 14 panel members had previously participated in the work of the Packard Commission. Based on the information we obtained from all the panelists, four of these six panelists were the most involved and influential of all the panel members regarding the CICA-related issues. One of the six panelists was a DSB panel cochairman who (1) had previously served as the chairman of the Packard Commission's Acquisition

Task Force and (2) played the primary role in selecting the other five.⁷ (See app. II for additional information on the individuals serving on or associated with the panel.)

This panel cochairman told us he regarded (1) the Task Force's efforts to identify statutory and other changes needed for DOD to use commercial buying practices as incomplete and (2) the DSB study as a follow-on study to the Task Force's work on these matters.

Panel members and others associated with the panel told us that none of the panelists or the panel's military advisers expressed any (1) support for CICA's full and open competition and bid protest provisions or (2) opposition to the panel's CICA-related conclusions or recommendations.

Regarding the views of other participants, we were told that, with one exception, panel members were not exposed to views favoring CICA's bid protest or full and open competition requirements. In addition, we did not find evidence of such views expressed in the panel's documents. The exception was a House Armed Services Committee staff person who addressed the panel on legislative initiatives and expressed, among other views, the opinion that neither CICA's bid protest nor full and open competition requirements were major inhibitors to the government buying commercial items.

Section 10 of FACA states that (1) advisory committee meetings shall be open to the public, unless a determination is made to close them under specific exemptions, (2) timely public notice of both open and closed meetings shall be published in the Federal Register, and (3) if a meeting is open, interested persons shall be permitted to attend, appear before, and file statements with the advisory committee, subject to reasonable restrictions. All of the panel's meetings were closed to the public. Timely notices of the meetings were published in the Federal Register. DOD's determinations to close all of the panel's meetings cited the expectation that discussions would involve classified materials throughout and that

"... Such classified material is so intertwined with the unclassified material that it cannot reasonably be segregated into separate discussions without defeating the effectiveness and meaning of the overall meeting."

⁷In other words, five of the seven panel members that the panel cochairmen selected had participated in the Packard Commission's work.

According to the panel's executive secretary, the panel expected classified briefings from the National Security Agency's representative; however, very little classified material was actually discussed at the panel's meetings. Another attendee from the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us DSB anticipated that highly classified "black" programs would be discussed but that the briefings presented were limited to general procurement methods used for such programs. The DSB executive director also told us that the basic reason the panel's meetings were closed was the expectation that classified material relating to the National Security Agency's programs would be discussed.

The panel cochairman who played the primary role in selecting the other panelists told us that in retrospect the panel probably should have organized at least one unclassified meeting open to the public.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) determine what evidence was used to support statements in the DSB Summer Study calling for changes to CICA, (2) examine the balance of the panel under FACA, and (3) review facts pertaining to participation in the panel process, including the panel members' backgrounds, the views expressed on the CICA-related matters during the panel's meetings, and public participation in the meetings.

Section 10(c) of FACA requires that detailed minutes be kept for all advisory committee meetings. Minutes were prepared for the three preliminary DSB Summer Study meetings held in Redondo Beach, California, and Washington, D.C. However, no minutes were prepared for the full panel meetings during the final 2-week session in Colorado Springs, Colorado. We were told that minutes were not prepared because of the demands of other administrative duties during the meetings. Consequently, we had to rely on oral comments from panel members to help establish the panel's positions in more detail than presented in the final DSB report.

Section 10(b) of FACA requires that all documents made available to or prepared by an advisory committee be available for public inspection in a single location during the existence of the advisory committee. After an advisory committee terminates, FACA's requirement for maintaining documents in a single location ceases to apply. Because some documents used by the panel were not in the official file after the panel's work was completed, we had to rely on panel members to provide copies of these documents.

Appendix I
Information on the DSB Study of Commercial
Components in Military Equipment

We interviewed 8 of the 14 Summer Study panelists, including both cochairmen and all the other panelists who were identified to us as having played a major role concerning commercial buying practices and other CICA-related issues. We also solicited the views of the remaining panelists and the government advisers by mail. In addition, we interviewed other DSB and DOD officials. We collected and reviewed the relevant documentation from the DSB study, the panelists, and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. Our review was performed from June to November 1987 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Information on Panel Membership

Information relating to individuals serving on or associated with the panel is show below.

Panel Cochairmen

Dr. James R. Burnett—Vice President and Deputy General Manager, Electronics & Defense, TRW, Incorporated. Member, DSB.

Dr. William J. Perry—Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, H&Q Technology Partners, Incorporated. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Directed the Acquisition Task Force of the Packard Commission. Member, DSB.

Panel Members

Mr. John C. Beckett—Management Consultant. Retired in 1982 as Director of Government Relations, Hewlett-Packard Company. Senior Consultant to the Packard Commission.

Mr. Robert L. Cattoi—Senior Vice President for Research and Engineering, Rockwell International Corporation.

Mr. Dale W. Church—Partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, specializing in International and U.S. Government Contracting. Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Technical Advisor to the Acquisition Task Force of the Packard Commission.

Mr. Vincent N. Cook—Vice President, IBM Corporation; Assistant Group Executive, Operations Staffs, IBM World Trade Asia/Pacific Group, Tokyo. Former President, IBM Federal Systems Division. Member, DSB.

Dr. Malcolm R. Currie—President, Delco Electronics Corporation; Executive Vice President, Hughes Aircraft Company; Group Director for Military Operations, General Motors Corporation. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Member, DSB.

Mr. Robert A. Fuhrman—President and Chief Operating Officer, Member of the Board of Directors, Lockheed Corporation. Member, DSB.

Dr. Jacques S. Gansler—Senior Vice President and Director, The Analytic Sciences Corporation. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition); Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics). Senior Consultant to the Packard Commission.

Appendix II
Information on Panel Membership

Mr. Kenneth F. Holtby—Retired 1987 as Senior Vice President for Engineering, Technology and Product Development, The Boeing Company.

Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.—U.S. Navy, retired in 1978 as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Supreme Allied Commander. Former Chief of Navy Material Command. Member, DSB.

Rear Admiral Walter M. Locke—President, The Competitive Advantage. Retired from the U.S. Navy in 1982 as Director, Joint Cruise Missile Project. Technical Advisor to the Acquisition Task Force of the Packard Commission.

Dr. Bill B. May—Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, ARGOSYSTEMS, Incorporated; Vice President, The Boeing Company. Technical Advisor to the Acquisition Task Force of the Packard Commission.

Dr. Joseph Shea—Senior Vice President for Research and Engineering, Raytheon Corporation. Member, DSB.

Government Advisers

Lieutenant General Peter G. Burbules, U.S. Army—Deputy Commanding General for Material Readiness, Army Material Command.

Vice Admiral Glenwood Clark, U.S. Navy—Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.

Colonel Robert J. Gadwill, U.S. Marine Corp.—Head, Engineering/MT/General Supply Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics.

Mr. Charles Gandy—National Security Agency, R Group.

Major General Donald L. Lamberson, U.S. Air Force—Assistant Military Deputy for Acquisition, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition.

Major General Richard Smith, U.S. Air Force—Deputy Chief of Staff for Material Management, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command.
Major General Bernard Weiss, U.S. Air Force—Commander of the Air Force Contract Management Division, Air Force Systems Command, Kirkland Air Force Base.

Appendix II
Information on Panel Membership

Executive Secretary

Mr. Andrew Certo—Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement and Logistics.

Military Assistant

Lieutenant Colonel Herbert R. Vadney—DSB secretariat.

Working Group

Colonel Korpi—U.S. Air Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Terry Marlow—U.S. Air Force.

Commander Roy Murphy—U.S. Navy.

Major Gary Poleskey—U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Greg Saunders—Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics.

Mr. Richard Shomper—Air Force Logistics Command.

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