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DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant Commands



**National Security and
International Affairs Division**

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The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on
Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Nicholas Mavroules
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Investigations
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

In response to letters from you and the late Chairman Bill Nichols, Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, and discussions with both of your offices, we examined the implementation of title II of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). This report describes (1) progress made by DOD in implementing the provisions of title II and (2) related areas of concern.

Background

Before passage of the Reorganization Act, a number of problems were identified in studies of defense organization. During consideration of reorganization legislation, the House Committee on Armed Services addressed these problems in two reports on reorganization bills in 1985 and 1986. Also, staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services summarized problems discussed in the past in an October 1985 study entitled Defense Organization: The Need For Change. The reports and study included two problem areas that led to passage of title II:

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was unable to provide useful and timely unified military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense because it functioned as a committee.
- The unified combatant commanders (combatant commanders are the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands) lacked the necessary authority and influence to ensure that they could effectively carry out their missions.

Title II, which is divided into two parts, addressed these concerns. The first part strengthened the JCS Chairman's ability to provide military advice, required the Chairman to perform new functions, shifted responsibilities from the JCS as a committee to the Chairman, and created the

position of Vice Chairman. The second part defined the combatant commanders' operational responsibilities and provided authority for them to accomplish their missions.

Overall Implementation of Title II

DOD has generally been responsive to the provisions of title II and has made progress in implementing them. DOD identified 33 actions needed to implement these provisions and monitored progress towards accomplishing them. Our analysis of the overall implementation of title II involved determining whether required administrative actions, such as revising policy and procedures documents, were completed. We found that the Chairman initiated actions where required to address the provisions of title II and had not completed five actions. (See app. II for the status of these actions.)

DOD believed that 28 actions were completed for a variety of reasons, including (1) the JCS's policies, procedures, and guidance documents had been reviewed and appropriate revisions made or (2) the first of a continuing cycle of activities had been accomplished by a date specified in the Reorganization Act. We agree that the 28 actions have been completed. However, 2 of the 28 still require the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to revise relevant documents. We agree that the 5 remaining actions were incomplete.

The full impact of the implementation of the provisions of title II will not be realized for some time. According to the Director of the Joint Staff, as many as 5 more years may be needed for some of the actions to become fully effective.

Concerns Related to Implementation of Title II

Based on our preliminary work and the priorities indicated by both offices, we selected several areas related to the implementation of title II for detailed examination. In examining these JCS and combatant command areas and related actions to address the provisions of the title, we identified various DOD concerns.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title II made the JCS Chairman responsible for advising on programs and budgets, reviewing combatant command organization, developing joint doctrine, evaluating preparedness, and performing net assessments. Even though DOD has taken many actions to implement title II, concerns

exist on the implementing actions. For example:

- The 1985 Senate staff study stated that the JCS did not have a significant role in providing joint military input to DOD's programming and budgeting process. Consequently, the resource allocation process did not yield the optimum military capability with the resources available, according to the study. The Reorganization Act provided the Chairman with a role in programming and budgeting.

However, a concern about the implementation of the Reorganization Act remains. The act requires the Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of combatant commanders' requirements and submit fiscally constrained alternative program and budget recommendations. However, DOD has not issued guidance clarifying the functions of the Joint Staff to support the Chairman in the resource allocation process. Such guidance, which is being developed, would ensure that other organizations do not limit the ability of the Joint Staff to support the Chairman in exercising his influence on resource allocation.

- The JCS could not objectively examine the division of responsibilities among the combatant commands because the military service chiefs were incapable of nonparochial evaluations of multiservice issues, according to the Senate staff study. The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to periodically review the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of combatant commands and recommend necessary changes.

For the initial review, the Chairman was required to consider 10 organizational issues, such as changing combatant commands' areas of responsibility and establishing new combatant commands. The Chairman's initial review performed in 1987 considered the issues. DOD decided to take actions related to five of these issues involving two new unified combatant commands, the former Readiness Command, and the Caribbean Command.

DOD has not acted on five of the issues that the Chairman considered. These issues involve the geographic areas of responsibility for three combatant commands and the creation of new unified combatant commands for strategic missions and Northeast Asia. A February 1988 report by the DOD Deputy Inspector General recommended actions be

taken on several of these issues, and DOD considered these recommendations.¹ The Chairman is again addressing many of the remaining issues in his 1989 review.

- The Senate staff study pointed out that joint doctrine was poorly developed or nonexistent because the services dominated doctrine development. The Reorganization Act made the Chairman responsible for developing joint doctrine. According to Joint Staff officials, this will take several years. The Chairman has made progress in managing joint doctrine development and has established a Joint Staff office to be responsible for it. The Chairman approved a master plan for joint doctrine projects, which requires the participation of many organizations, including the combatant commands. However, combatant commands were concerned that they did not have sufficient staff to perform required doctrine development functions, which are complex and require much staff time.
- The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to establish and maintain a uniform preparedness evaluation system for combatant commands. The system is intended to provide a balanced picture of total force capability to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff and combatant commands decided to satisfy this provision by modifying the format of the existing combatant commanders' situation report. The new format is still evolving and has not been incorporated in JCS guidance. DOD officials indicated that increased use of quantified information could improve future preparedness evaluations.
- The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to perform periodic military net assessments that compare the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies to those of their potential adversaries. After completing the initial net assessment in August 1987, DOD officials identified areas needing improvement, including inadequate data, intelligence information, and analytical tools. DOD hopes to make improvements in future net assessments. Also, a study raised the possibility of consolidating some net assessment functions with the net assessment office in OSD, but there is no current effort to do so.

Appendix III contains a more detailed discussion of these areas and related concerns.

¹In December 1987, the Secretary of Defense directed the DOD Deputy Inspector General to conduct a review of the JCS organization and the headquarters and headquarters support activities of the combatant commands. The Secretary stated that the primary objective of the review was to reduce manpower levels and overhead costs.

Combatant Commands

In passing the Reorganization Act, the Congress sought to place clear responsibility for mission accomplishment on the combatant commanders and ensure that their authority was commensurate with their responsibilities. Many provisions of title II affect the operations of combatant commands and the authority of their commanders. We visited most of the combatant commands to examine the effects of actions to implement title II. Although DOD has taken these actions, we identified some concerns. For example:

- The Congress wanted to increase the influence of combatant commanders by giving them control over some resources affecting their commands, according to the 1986 report of the House Committee on Armed Services. In the Reorganization Act, the Congress permitted these commanders to have their own operations budgets. Various alternatives have been proposed for activities that would be funded by combatant command budgets, but no consensus exists within DOD. Officials on the Joint Staff and at most combatant commands believe that the separate budgets could have drawbacks. These include a lack of staff at unified combatant commands to perform budget functions and the potential to duplicate budget functions of the military departments.

DOD decided not to submit separate budgets. Based on comments from combatant commanders, the Chairman recommended that they not be established. After reviewing the legislative history, we believe that the Congress clearly intended for DOD to submit budgets for the combatant commands. However, we concluded that DOD's decision not to submit separate budgets did not violate the Reorganization Act because the Secretary of Defense could determine what activities to include in such a budget. According to Joint Staff officials, separate budgets would be useful if the military departments are not responsive to combatant commanders' needs.

- The responsibilities of unified combatant commanders were not balanced with their limited influence over resource decisions, according to the Senate staff study. DOD has taken various actions intended to enhance their influence, such as requiring the combatant commanders to develop lists of their priority resource needs and requiring the military departments to indicate the extent to which these needs are being met. We believe that these actions could increase the influence of unified combatant commanders.

However, DOD realizes that it could do more by addressing two concerns. First, the combatant commanders' priority lists could be more useful if

DOD provided more specific guidance on their preparation. Such guidance should lead to more consistently prepared lists that would make it easier to compare them. Second, more could be done to ensure that combatant commanders receive the information they need to participate effectively in the programming and budgeting process.

- The Reorganization Act addressed the combatant commanders' authority, direction, and control. In response to the act, DOD incorporated these authorities in key guidance documents. However, the exercise of some of these authorities has been limited in personnel and organizational matters. For example, the multiple responsibilities of combatant commanders' subordinate component commanders could limit the use of authority by combatant commanders.
- The Reorganization Act requires the military departments to assign all their forces, except those with departmental functions, to the combatant commands. The act does not provide for involving combatant commanders in assigning forces. Assignments are done by the military services, reviewed by the JCS, and approved by the Secretary of Defense. Combatant commanders have a vital interest in which forces are assigned; however, they have limited input in the assignment process.

Appendix IV contains a more detailed discussion of these areas and related concerns.

Agency Comments

DOD commented on a draft of this report and partially concurred with it (see app. VI). It stated that sections of our report needed clarification in dealing with the role of senior DOD leaders in programming and budgeting, compliance with the requirement to review combatant commands, and the responsibilities and duties of the JCS Chairman, the JCS, and the Joint Staff. We clarified these areas and included other information provided by DOD as appropriate. In addition, after considering the information DOD provided on two of the actions that we initially concluded were incomplete, we categorized them as complete in the final report.

We conducted our work between November 1987 and January 1989 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is contained in appendix I.

We are sending copies of the report to the Chairmen, House Committees on Armed Services and Government Operations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; the Secretary of Defense; the JCS Chairman; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.



Martin M Ferber
Director, Manpower and
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Abbreviations

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

Introduction

In 1982, General David C. Jones, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman, testified before the House Committee on Armed Services on the inadequacies of the JCS and the need for more authority for the Chairman. This led to a series of congressional hearings with many witnesses, including former secretaries of defense and senior military officials, indicating the need for change. Some of the concerns expressed included the need to redefine the JCS role, improve the quality of military advice, and strengthen the authority of combatant commanders (commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands).

Congressional focus on defense reorganization issues resulted in major legislation when the Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986. The Reorganization Act, which became law on October 1, 1986, made many changes throughout DOD. Title II of the Reorganization Act addresses military advice and command functions.

Background

Before passage of the Reorganization Act, various studies² identified many problems relating to defense organization. These studies included two problem areas that led to passage of title II. First, the JCS was unable to provide useful and timely military advice because it functioned as a committee. Second, unified combatant commanders lacked the necessary authority and influence to ensure that they could effectively carry out their missions.

Title II, which is divided into two parts, addressed these concerns. The first part strengthened the Chairman's ability to provide military advice, required the Chairman to perform new functions, shifted responsibilities from the JCS as a committee to the Chairman, and created the position of Vice Chairman. The second part defined the combatant commanders' operational responsibilities and provided authority for them to accomplish their missions.

²Some of the recent studies are the 1982 JCS Chairman's Special Study Group report, The Organization and Functions of the JCS; the 1983 book by Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization; the 1985 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Toward a More Effective Defense; the 1985 Senate Committee on Armed Services study, Defense Organization: The Need for Change; the 1985 House Committee on Armed Services report, JCS Reorganization Act of 1985; the 1986 House Committee on Armed Services report, Bill Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986; and the 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management report, A Quest for Excellence.

JCS and Combatant Commands

The JCS organization, which has no command authority, is made up of the JCS, the Chairman, and the Joint Staff. The Chairman and the four service chiefs, who are military advisors to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, are a committee known as the JCS. The Chairman, who outranks all other officers of the armed forces, is the principal military advisor and conducts his responsibilities subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense. The JCS organization also includes the Joint Staff that is under the control of the Chairman and assists him and other JCS members in carrying out their responsibilities.

The basic functions of the JCS organization include providing military advice, planning for the employment of forces, and supporting and overseeing military operations. Some of the Chairman's responsibilities include assisting in strategic direction of the armed forces; preparing strategic plans; overseeing contingency planning; evaluating preparedness; advising on requirements, programs, and budgets; developing joint doctrine; and formulating joint training and education policies.

Operational command of military forces is assigned to the combatant commanders. Unless the President directs otherwise, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. Combatant commands are either unified or specified. The eight unified commands (Space, European, Central, Pacific, Atlantic, Southern, Special Operations, and Transportation) are composed of forces from two or more services and have broad and continuing missions. The two specified commands (Strategic Air and Forces) also have broad and continuing missions, but are made up of forces from a single service.

Combatant commands are organized on a geographical or functional basis and are located in the United States and overseas. The combatant commanders of the European, Central, Pacific, Atlantic, and Southern Commands are assigned geographical areas of responsibility for conducting operations. The other combatant commanders have functional responsibilities, as indicated by their titles.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to examine the status of DOD's efforts to implement the provisions of title II and to identify progress made and problems encountered. We reviewed implementing actions taken by the JCS organization, combatant commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

To evaluate the overall implementation of title II, we compared the administrative actions taken by DOD with its planned actions to implement title II (see app. II). We based our analysis on statements made by DOD officials and reviews of implementing documents. Because of the broad scope of our overview of title II implementation and the early stage of DOD's implementing actions, we did not assess the effects of many of these actions.

We also identified areas related to title II for more detailed examination (see apps. III and IV). In examining these areas, we interviewed officials at OSD, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the Department of the Army, and obtained supporting documents. For these areas, we identified DOD concerns related to the implementation of the title and attempted to determine the effects of the implementing actions.

We visited 9 of the 10 combatant commands, several of their subordinate component commands, and other organizations (see app. V). We did not visit the Strategic Air Command. During our visits, we met with the combatant commander or the deputy and other officials to obtain their views on the effects of title II.

Generally, the information we obtained was based on interviews or documentation that described processes for developing joint military advice. DOD did not grant us access to key documentation for several areas, such as programming and budgeting and the periodic review of combatant commands, because it wanted to protect the confidentiality of advice from the JCS and combatant commanders. After discussion with the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, we determined that the objectives of our review could be accomplished without the use of our legislative authorities to obtain this information.

We conducted our work between November 1987 and January 1989 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

The Secretary of Defense assigned this responsibility to the Chairman in DOD Directive 5100.1 in April 1987 and the JCS Unified Action Armed Forces publication in December 1986.

5. The Secretary of Defense may assign responsibility to other DOD components for those aspects of administration and support that the Secretary considers necessary for forces assigned to the combatant commands.

The Director of the Joint Staff recommended that no changes be made to existing responsibility assignments, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration concurred in December 1986.

6. The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual defense budget a separate budget proposal for each combatant command for those activities he deems appropriate.

The Chairman recommended that separate budgets not be established because most of the combatant commanders believed that they were unnecessary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred with the Chairman's recommendation in April 1987. We concluded that the decision not to submit separate budgets did not violate the Reorganization Act (see app. IV).

7. The Chairman shall convene meetings of the JCS, preside over meetings, provide agendas, assist the JCS in conducting business, and determine when an issue is resolved.

According to the JCS Secretary, the procedures were reviewed and found to be adequate.

8. There is a Vice Chairman, appointed by the President, with duties prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

The position of Vice Chairman has been established and the Chairman has prescribed the duties of the Vice Chairman. These duties were approved by the Secretary of Defense in April 1987.

9. The Chairman is responsible for assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

No changes were required, according to Joint Staff officials, because the Chairman assists in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces through the joint strategic planning system.

10. The Chairman is responsible for performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies compared to those of potential adversaries.

The Joint Staff performed the first net assessment, which the Chairman approved and provided to the Secretary of Defense in August 1987 (see app. III).

11. The Chairman is responsible for submitting to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, which are within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary.

According to a Joint Staff official, alternatives were included in the Joint Strategic Planning Document approved by the JCS in July 1987 and submitted by the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense. This document is prepared every other year.

12. The Chairman is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which major manpower programs and policies of the armed forces conform with strategic plans.

According to Joint Staff officials, the Chairman has provided this advice in issue papers, topical analyses, and the JCS Joint Program Assessment Memorandum.

13. The Chairman is responsible for assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

The Chairman delegated this responsibility to the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman is involved in the defense acquisition process by serving as vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board and chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

14. The Chairman is responsible for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

Status of Responses to Title II

The JCS Chairman was responsible for accomplishing 33 administrative actions needed to respond to title II. Our analysis indicated that 26 of the 33 actions were complete. DOD considered 2 of the remaining actions to be closed, which means that they were no longer being monitored. We believe that all 7 remaining actions were incomplete, usually because related documents had not been revised. To comply with many provisions of title II, DOD revised two key documents.

Identifying Needed Actions

In October 1986, OSD issued a plan for implementing the Reorganization Act. The plan outlined the major provisions requiring action, listed the actions to be taken, assigned responsibility for initiating and coordinating those actions, and established completion dates for the actions.

In the OSD plan, the JCS Chairman had responsibility for 11 actions to implement title II. Joint Staff officials identified an additional 22 actions necessary to implement title II. A Joint Staff official in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate monitored the status of these 33 actions for the Director of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff provided periodic reports to OSD on the status of actions taken to implement the plan.

Changes to Key Documents

Important actions taken in response to the Reorganization Act were the revision of two key documents containing functional and organizational guidance. Many provisions of title II were incorporated into DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," and JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces." The DOD directive defines the organizational relationships in DOD and the functions of its major organizations. The JCS publication contains principles, doctrine, and military guidance governing joint activities.

Status of Implementing Actions

We compared title II and DOD's 33 implementing actions to determine whether any additional actions were needed and the status of these actions. We also determined whether required administrative actions, such as revising policy and procedures documents, were completed. We found that actions were initiated where required to address the provisions and that 5 actions were incomplete.

DOD believed that 28 actions were completed for a variety of reasons, including (1) the JCS's policies, procedures, or guidance documents had been reviewed and appropriate revisions made and (2) the first of a continuing cycle of activities had been accomplished by a date specified in

the Reorganization Act. We agreed that the 28 actions were complete, based on these criteria. The Joint Staff considered 2 of the 28 actions to be complete because OSD is responsible for the remaining document revisions. We agreed with the Joint Staff that the 5 remaining actions were incomplete.

The following describes the status of the 33 actions responding to title II. Some of these actions and related concerns are discussed in more detail in appendixes III and IV.

Status: Complete

1. The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the Chairman's advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the advice or opinion of another member of the JCS.

The Chairman revised JCS memorandum of policy 132 on procedures for processing joint actions, and the Secretary of Defense determined in February 1987 that no further action was required.

2. The President shall designate a member of the JCS to perform the duties of the Chairman when there is a vacancy, absence, or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.

Procedures for designating the acting Chairman were contained in JCS memorandum of policy 133 issued in June 1987. The President approves a rotating schedule of service chiefs to perform the Chairman's duties each fiscal year.

3. The Chairman shall review not less often than every 2 years the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command. For the initial review, the Chairman was required to consider 10 issues.

The initial review was conducted and the issues were considered. The Chairman submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense in September 1987, according to Joint Staff officials. We were told that the results of the review were incorporated in the JCS Unified Command Plan, which was approved by the President in February 1988. The force structure of combatant commands was contained in the assignment of forces document approved by the Secretary of Defense in July 1987 (see app. III).

4. The Secretary of Defense may assign responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands to the Chairman.

The Chairman's responsibility was implemented by establishing a joint doctrine development policy in April 1987 and issuing a joint doctrine master plan in April 1988 (see app. III).

15. The Chairman is responsible for formulating policies for coordinating military education and training of members of the armed forces.

This responsibility was incorporated in DOD Directive 5100.1 in April 1987 and the JCS Unified Action Armed Forces publication in December 1986.

16. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders have sufficient authority, direction, and control of their commands.

This provision was incorporated in DOD Directive 5100.1 in April 1987 and the JCS Unified Action Armed Forces publication in December 1986.

17. Combatant commanders have the authority to concur with the selection, evaluation, and suspension of subordinate commanders.

These authorities were incorporated in DOD Directive 5100.1 in April 1987 and the JCS Unified Action Armed Forces publication in December 1986.

18. The Chairman shall evaluate nominees for 3- and 4-star officers. The Secretary of Defense shall provide statements of qualifications for vacancies.

The JCS revised its memorandum of policy 145 for personnel actions on general and flag officers in June 1987 to reflect these provisions.

19. The Chairman shall develop a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of combatant commands.

The Chairman developed a new preparedness evaluation format that was sent to the combatant commanders in October 1987 (see app. III).

20. The secretaries of each of the military departments shall assign forces under their jurisdiction to combatant commands to perform missions assigned to these commands.

The military departments have assigned their forces to combatant commands. The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS assignment of forces document in July 1987 (see app. IV).

21. Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area of a unified combatant commander shall be assigned to that commander.

Forces have been assigned to those unified combatant commanders responsible for geographic areas. The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS assignment of forces document in July 1987 (see app. IV).

22. The Chairman is responsible for preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommending assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces.

The Chairman fulfills this responsibility as part of the joint strategic planning system, according to a Joint Staff official.

23. The Chairman is responsible for preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support contingency plans and recommending assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces.

The Chairman fulfills this responsibility as part of the joint strategic planning system, according to a Joint Staff official.

24. The Chairman is responsible for providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy and guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman's responsibility for the preparation and review of contingency plans is provided for in the joint operations planning system, according to a Joint Staff official.

25. Combatant commanders have general court-martial authority over their subordinates.

OSD published amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial to reflect this change in March 1987.

26. The total number of members of the armed forces and civilian personnel assigned or detailed to permanent duty on the JCS Joint Staff may not exceed 1,627, effective October 1, 1988.

The authorized and assigned strengths of the Joint Staff were within the 1,627 ceiling on October 1, 1988. There were 1,578 military and civilian personnel assigned to the Joint Staff on September 30, 1988.

Status: Completed by the
Chairman, OSD Actions
Are Incomplete

1. The Chairman is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements identified by the combatant commanders and the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other DOD components conform with these priorities.

The DOD instruction and the JCS policy memorandum on the resource allocation process have not been revised to reflect this provision. The instruction is not expected to be revised until after January 1989, according to an OSD analyst (see app. III).

2. Officers of the armed forces assigned to the Joint Staff shall be selected by the Chairman in approximately equal numbers from the military departments. The Chairman may suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.

Joint Staff administrative instruction 1100.1N was revised in March 1988 to reflect these changes. DOD Instruction 1315.7 on military personnel assignments has not been revised to reflect these provisions. DOD expects to do this by May 1989.

Status: Open

1. The Chairman shall submit a report to the Secretary of Defense on the roles and missions of the armed forces not less than once every 3 years. The initial report was due not later than October 1, 1988.

The initial report is being developed. Joint Staff officials originally expected the Chairman to submit it to the Secretary of Defense by the due date. A revision to the report was not completed by January 1989 (see app. III).

2. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, with his approval, the Vice Chairman and other JCS members, in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Joint Staff determined that this change needs to be incorporated in 62 policy guidance documents and is revising them during its normal review process. Most of these documents should be revised by early 1989, according to a Joint Staff official.

3. The Chairman is responsible for preparing strategic plans that are within resource levels provided by the Secretary of Defense.

JCS memorandum of policy 84 on the joint strategic planning process is being revised to reflect this responsibility of the Chairman. This action was not complete.

4. The Chairman shall advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and on strategic plans.

The Chairman plans to present a summary assessment to the Secretary of Defense.

5. The Chairman is responsible for formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

The Chairman is coordinating the development of a joint training policy and conducting a joint training inventory. These actions were not complete.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Past studies on DOD's organization have criticized the JCS as being unable to provide useful and timely advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. In passing the Reorganization Act, the Congress sought to improve the JCS Chairman's ability to provide military advice. Title II placed responsibilities on the Chairman in various areas, such as programming and budgeting, combatant command organizational reviews, joint doctrine development, preparedness evaluation, and net assessments.

This appendix covers some areas related to significant provisions of the Reorganization Act that involve the function of providing joint military advice. Although actions on many of these provisions have been taken, various concerns related to them need attention.

Programming and Budgeting

In the past, the JCS did not have a significant role in DOD programming and budgeting. According to the Senate staff study, the JCS was unable to provide meaningful input to the services' program objectives memoranda.³ The services dominated the JCS because they retained an effective veto over its actions. Insufficient joint military input caused the resource allocation process to yield less than optimum military capability with the resources available, according to the study.

The Reorganization Act made the Chairman the principal military advisor and provided him with various mechanisms for providing advice on resource allocation decisions. The Chairman's role in programming and budgeting is still evolving, according to the Director of the Joint Staff. Also, current guidance on the functions of the Joint Staff in supporting the Chairman in his role in the resource allocation process is lacking.

Role of the Chairman

The Reorganization Act assigned the Chairman a role in the programming and budgeting process. It required the Chairman to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of combatant commanders' requirements. It also required the Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on combatant commanders' program priorities and on the extent to which programs and budgets of the military departments conform with the priorities and strategic plans. In addition, it required the

³The program objectives memoranda contain the services' proposed programs for the 5 years beyond the current budget year.

Chairman to submit alternative, fiscally constrained program recommendations and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense that conform with the priorities.

Some examples of the Chairman's role include:

- The Chairman approves the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum. This document, provided to the Secretary of Defense, assesses the extent to which the military departments' program objectives memoranda achieve the military strategy.
- The Chairman, as a member of the Defense Resources Board, discusses issues on the services' program objectives memoranda, budgets, and the Defense Guidance. The Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance contains policy and fiscal direction for the services to use in developing their program objectives memoranda.
- The Chairman has frequent, informal contact with the service chiefs and the combatant commanders that often includes discussion of resource issues, according to the Director of the Joint Staff.

Guidance on Chairman's Role Lacking

The Chairman's enhanced role in the resource allocation process is not reflected in DOD guidance for the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Guidance clarifying the functions of the Joint Staff in this process is needed to ensure that other organizations, such as OSD and the services, do not limit the ability of the Joint Staff to support the Chairman in exercising his influence as intended in the Reorganization Act.

DOD Instruction 7045.7 on implementing this system has not been revised since May 1984. An official in the DOD comptroller's office said that a draft of the revised instruction has been developed, but it will not be issued until DOD and the Congress reach agreement on whether a 2-year budget cycle will be adopted. Also, JCS memorandum of policy 136 on JCS and combatant command programming and budgeting involvement is outdated and does not reflect the changes that have been implemented since passage of the Reorganization Act. Efforts to revise this document, which was last revised in July 1985, are being held in abeyance pending revision of the DOD instruction.

In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated we suggested that the senior DOD leaders are awaiting clarification of their roles through publication of directives and instructions. We intended to indicate concern about the Joint Staff's ability to carry out its functions without revised guidance. We changed the report to clarify our intent.

Unified Command Plan Reviews

According to the 1985 Senate staff study, the JCS could not objectively examine the division of responsibilities among the combatant commands. The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to periodically review the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of combatant commands and recommend necessary changes. For the first such review of combatant commands, the Chairman was required to consider 10 organizational issues. DOD decided to take actions related to 5 of the issues.

All 10 issues were addressed in detail in the 1987 review by the Chairman in consultation with the other members of the JCS and specific decisions were made on each issue. The DOD Deputy Inspector General, in a special report for the Secretary of Defense in February 1988, recommended actions related to 4 of these issues. In response, DOD acted on one of these issues when it concluded that the Caribbean Command would be disestablished. The Chairman is again addressing 4 of these issues in his 1989 review, including 3 related to the Deputy Inspector General's recommendations.

Initial Review and Report

The Chairman was required to consider 10 combatant command organizational issues in conducting the initial periodic review of combatant commands. According to Joint Staff officials, a report on the review was prepared in 1987 that considered these issues and incorporated comments of the combatant commanders. We were told that the results of this review were included in the JCS Unified Command Plan, which documents the missions and responsibilities of combatant commands.

The current Unified Command Plan was approved by the President in February 1988. Even though it incorporates several provisions of the Reorganization Act, it did not document any changes to the number of combatant commands or their areas of responsibility—the types of issues that the Chairman considered.

In December 1987, the Secretary of Defense directed the DOD Deputy Inspector General to conduct a special review of the JCS organization and the combatant commands' headquarters and headquarters support activities. The primary objective of the review was to find ways to reduce manpower levels and overhead costs, paying particular attention to overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions, and excessive layering of organizational levels. In performing the review, the Deputy Inspector General examined several of the issues that the Chairman considered.

Actions Related to Four Issues

DOD took actions related to 4 of the 10 issues before the Chairman's initial review. These 4 issues were

- creating a unified command for special operations missions,
- creating a unified command for transportation missions,
- revising the missions and responsibilities of the Readiness Command, and
- revising the division of missions and responsibilities between the Central and Readiness Commands.

The actions involved changes to the combatant command structure. A unified Special Operations Command was established in April 1987 and a unified Transportation Command was established in July 1987. The two issues related to the Readiness Command were no longer relevant because it was disestablished in September 1987.

However, the Deputy Inspector General raised questions on the extent to which the new Transportation and Special Operations Commands are unified. He believes that the military service component commands subordinate to these functional combatant commands should be eliminated. According to him, this would make the combatant commanders' authority commensurate with their responsibilities as intended by the Reorganization Act and result in more effective and efficient use of resources by reducing headquarters positions.

The Deputy Inspector General believes that disestablishing the three subordinate transportation component commands could result in reducing 1,015 positions. In addition, he believes that this would enhance readiness and mobility planning in many ways, including more closely aligning the Transportation Command with how it will operate in wartime.

In commenting on our draft report, DOD indicated that the JCS and combatant commanders recommended against eliminating service component commands. In a September 1988 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense stated that he had elected not to disestablish service components. The Secretary stated that he was persuaded by the senior military leadership that execution of the statutory services' responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces is an appropriate role for the component commanders, thereby freeing the combatant commanders to focus on their assigned wartime tasks.

Status of Other Issues

DOD has not acted on 5 of the 10 issues specified in the Reorganization Act. Four of them were considered again after the Chairman's initial review because they were raised by the Deputy Inspector General. DOD acted on one of the issues when it decided to disestablish the Caribbean Command. These issues and the Deputy Inspector General's positions on them are explained below.

- Creating a unified command for strategic missions. A Joint Staff official told us that DOD does not support creating a unified combatant command for all strategic offensive warfare. One reason is that the current structure provides for redundancy of operational command of these forces. The Deputy Inspector General did not address this issue. DOD considers this issue resolved because creating a strategic command was considered during the 1987 review and rejected.
- Creating a unified command for the defense of Northeast Asia. DOD has not combined the subunified commands in Japan and Korea because of concern about the long-standing animosities between these two nations. The Deputy Inspector General recommended that a combined subunified command be established under the Pacific Command because the defense of Japan and Korea is related. The JCS advised the Secretary of Defense in August 1988 that this recommendation should not be implemented at this time as the Pacific commander opposed it because of concerns about the animosities between the two nations, according to a Joint Staff official.
- Revising the area of responsibility of the Central Command. DOD decided not to act on two subissues involving the Central Command. The first was revising the Command's responsibility to include the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia (now assigned to the Pacific Command). This issue, in part, has been temporarily resolved by creating a joint task force for the Persian Gulf operation, which extended Central Command's responsibility into the Gulf of Oman, according to the Deputy Inspector General. However, the Unified Command Plan has not been modified to reflect this change. The Deputy Inspector General believes that the Central Command should be made permanently responsible for these areas because they contain potential hostility zones and support facilities essential to the Command.

The second subissue was assigning responsibility for the land areas of the Middle East. No action has been taken by DOD on this subissue. The Deputy Inspector General recommended giving responsibility for all of Africa, except for four nations bordering the Mediterranean, to the Central Command. He believes that this action would help to consolidate DOD

planning and operations for Africa and provide a much closer relationship between the mission and functions performed by the European Command and those performed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters. However, having the European Command responsible for much of Africa has proven to be desirable in past contingencies because its combat forces are near Africa, according to a Joint Staff official.

- Revising the area of responsibility of the Southern Command to include the ocean areas adjacent to Central America. DOD has not added these ocean areas to the Southern Command's area of responsibility. The area of responsibility remains the land areas of Central and South America, excluding Mexico. The Deputy Inspector General did not address this issue.
- Revising the area of responsibility of the Pacific Command. This issue relates to the responsibility for Alaska. According to the Deputy Inspector General, the responsibility for the air defense of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and the ground defense of the Aleutian Islands is confusing and would probably not work in an emergency. Both the JCS and the Deputy Inspector General advocate the creation of a new subunified command for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands subordinate to the Pacific Command. This action had not been accomplished in the past because of congressional concerns about the defense of Alaska.
- Eliminating the Caribbean Command. The Caribbean Command, located in Key West, Florida, is a subunified command under the Atlantic Command. The Deputy Inspector General believed that the Caribbean Command was not essential because it was not involved in the Grenada operation and probably never would be involved in any significant contingency. He recommended that the Caribbean Command be disestablished and its functions returned to the Atlantic Fleet, where they were prior to 1980. In December 1988, DOD decided that the Caribbean Command would be disestablished and its necessary functions transferred to the Atlantic Command.

In its comments on our draft report, DOD disagreed with our observations on the Unified Command Plan review and expressed the view that the report implied DOD did not comply with the requirements of the Reorganization Act. We characterized the issues on which no action had been taken as incomplete because, at that time, they were under consideration as a result of the Deputy Inspector General's report. We changed the report to reflect that the issues were considered during the Chairman's 1987 initial review. Additionally, DOD informed us that they have acted on the Deputy Inspector General's recommendations. These

actions are expected to result in a reduction of 3,000 combatant command headquarters and component command manpower spaces.

Joint Doctrine Development

Before the Reorganization Act, joint doctrine was poorly developed or nonexistent because the services dominated doctrine development, according to the Senate staff study. The act made the Chairman responsible for developing joint doctrine, which is a major new responsibility that will take several years to accomplish.

The Chairman has made progress in meeting his joint doctrine development responsibility. The Chairman established an office responsible for joint doctrine development and approved a plan for conducting needed doctrinal projects by various organizations, including combatant commands. However, combatant commands are concerned that they will not have sufficient staff to perform doctrine development functions because they are complex and require much staff time.

Meeting Doctrine Development Responsibility

The administration of joint doctrine development has changed since the passage of the Reorganization Act. Accomplishments include identifying areas where joint doctrines are needed and planning projects for their development. However, completing these projects will take 3 to 5 years, according to DOD, because joint doctrines in many areas are outdated or nonexistent.

The Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Division was added to the Joint Staff in February 1987. This new division has the responsibility for managing the joint doctrine program and it includes a joint doctrine branch with six staff. In an August 1987 meeting among representatives from the Joint Staff, the services, and combatant commands, doctrinal voids were identified, decisions on the validity of existing doctrine were made, and planned doctrine publications were identified.

The Chairman approved a master plan for developing joint doctrine in February 1988. Many of the planned doctrinal projects have been assigned to sponsors for development. Specifically, the master plan approved 24 new projects and incorporated 11 ongoing projects. For example, joint maritime operations doctrine is assigned to the Atlantic Command and interdiction of follow-on forces doctrine is assigned to the European Command. These two ongoing projects were initiated in 1983 under a pilot program.

Concerns on Joint Doctrine Staffing

Although strides have been made in planning for developing joint doctrine, Joint Staff and combatant command officials indicated that the work load for joint doctrine development and coordination is a problem. Officials at the Atlantic, Central, Space, and Transportation Commands told us that they were not able to meet joint doctrine development and coordination requirements with the existing staff. In commenting on our draft report, DOD noted that the Transportation Command has formed a joint logistics division and its staff has grown so that it can now meet these requirements.

Experience at the European Command before passage of the Reorganization Act demonstrates the complexity of developing joint doctrine. In 1983, the Command was assigned responsibility for developing doctrine in two areas: theater counterair operations and interdiction of follow-on forces. Much staff time was needed to develop these doctrines, according to Command officials. In addition, the theaters have differences in alliances and commitments that require JCS coordination to resolve, according to the Command.

Preparedness Evaluation

The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to establish and maintain a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out its assigned mission. The purpose of the new preparedness evaluation is to provide a balanced picture of total force capability to the Secretary of Defense on an annual basis. In establishing this evaluation system, the Chairman was required to consult with the combatant commanders.

The Joint Staff and combatant commands decided to satisfy this requirement by modifying the existing situation report from the combatant commanders. This new format is still evolving and has not yet been institutionalized in JCS guidance. DOD officials indicated that increased use of quantified information could improve future preparedness evaluations.

Establishing the Preparedness Evaluation System

The preparedness evaluation system was established after coordination among the Joint Staff, the services, and the combatant commands. In October 1987, the combatant commanders were provided the revised format and requested to prepare their first submissions. In addition to reporting on the capability of his command, each combatant commander was asked to comment on the support provided by other combatant

commanders and defense agencies. The Joint Staff prepares a consolidated preparedness evaluation based on the combatant commanders' submissions.

Guidance for developing and executing the preparedness evaluation has been provided by messages to the organizations involved. Formal policy guidance has not been issued on the new preparedness evaluation. The JCS is waiting for the system to fully evolve before issuing a revised policy document to institutionalize the preparedness evaluation format, according to the responsible Joint Staff official.

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD noted that a formal policy will begin to be developed in January 1989 for use in the fiscal year 1989 preparedness evaluation. DOD also noted that it has initiated the No-Notice Exercise Evaluation Program. It assesses the preparedness of combatant commands' training of their staffs and components, as well as that of the Joint Staff, the JCS, and the Chairman, without prior notice of the assessment.

Improvement of Preparedness Evaluations

According to Joint Staff and combatant command officials, preparedness evaluations could be improved by use of more quantitative data. Pacific Command officials stated that DOD attempted to incorporate quantitative data in the first report, but acceptable measures were not agreed to in time for the initial evaluation. A Southern Command official indicated that developing quantitative measures was difficult, since they had to be consistent for all the services under the combatant command. European Command officials believed that they did not have the expertise to develop quantitative measures of capability.

Even though the second preparedness evaluation report will not contain changes in the use of quantitative measures, DOD is continuing to consider their use in the future. A DOD-wide steering group is looking at developing and standardizing measures of sustainability, which could be used in future preparedness evaluations. Also, the Rand Corporation is now conducting a study on measures of effectiveness, according to a Joint Staff official.

Net Assessment

The Reorganization Act requires the Chairman to perform periodic military net assessments to determine the capabilities of U.S. armed forces and its allies compared with those of their potential adversaries. The Chairman's initial net assessment was completed in August 1987.

DOD officials recognized that the initial net assessment had shortfalls in its preparation, including inadequate databases, lack of intelligence information, and lack of analytical tools. DOD hopes to make these improvements in future net assessments. Also, since OSD has an Office of Net Assessment, a study raised the possibility of consolidating some net assessment functions. However, there is no current effort to consolidate these functions.

Improvement of Future Net Assessments

In testimony before the Congress in September 1987, the Chairman expressed concern that net assessments required in-depth expertise and a wide database, which his office did not have. According to the Chairman, lack of information on potential U.S. adversaries resulted in the net assessment overestimating their capability and underestimating our capability. A number of factors used in preparing net assessments were not well documented or quantified, according to the Chairman. In congressional testimony in March 1988, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel also cited concerns identified in preparing the initial net assessment. These include the need for improved data, better models, and improved analytical tools for future net assessments.

According to the responsible Joint Staff official, the net assessment is intended to reflect both the current situation and predictions based on fiscal projections. The Chairman wants the effects of projected budget levels reflected in net assessments. Such predictions were difficult in the initial net assessment because detailed fiscal projections were not used. The Joint Staff used fiscal projections from the Office of Management and Budget that assumed a 3-percent overall real growth per year. The Joint Staff has contacted the services about obtaining more detailed fiscal projections for future net assessments.

According to the Joint Staff official, the initial net assessment did not include an analysis of military strategy options to meet the threat. A military options analysis was initiated, but the services never approved it for inclusion in the net assessment. The analysis was not approved because it could have resulted in the realignment of programs between the services, according to the official. The instructions for the next net assessment will provide for a military options document, according to the official.

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OSD Also Performs Net Assessment

In October 1987, a study of OSD required by the Reorganization Act questioned whether the division of net assessment effort between OSD's Director of Net Assessment and the Chairman was the most efficient. Although this contractor-performed study concluded that the functions were not duplicative, it said that they could eventually be consolidated under the Chairman, if arrangements were made to ensure appropriate participation by OSD. In commenting on the draft report, DOD stated that the study's recommendation to consolidate the military net assessments was not implemented and it has no current effort to consolidate this function.

OSD's Director of Net Assessment told us that his assessments are different from those required of the Chairman. OSD's assessments have tended to look at long-range trends along mission and functional lines and to focus on particular regional areas, according to the Director. In contrast, he also said that the Chairman's military net assessment has focused on evaluation of global war and the performance of programmed force structures.

Roles and Missions Study

The 1985 Senate staff study observed that insufficient mechanisms for change within DOD resulted in less than optimum assignment of services' roles and missions. One cause was that the JCS Chairman was unable to effectively address the services' roles and missions because of his lack of independent authority.

The Reorganization Act required the Chairman to prepare a report on the services' roles and missions not less than once every 3 years. The report is required to consider such matters as changes in enemy threats, unnecessary duplication among the armed forces, and changes in warfare technology. The report must indicate changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation that are necessary to implement the Chairman's recommendations.

The Joint Staff is preparing a study for the Chairman. According to Joint Staff officials, developing the report is a formal joint action requiring consideration by the JCS. The services provided input and the combatant commanders commented on the draft. The study is being done without contractor assistance because Joint Staff officials believe that they have the necessary analytical capability and knowledge.

The study will focus on the assignment of functions to the four services and consider the authorities for them, such as the Key West Agreement,⁴ according to Joint Staff officials. The report is expected to emphasize potential unnecessary duplication and adequacy of interfaces between the services in such areas as close air support, amphibious operations, and lift capability. Joint Staff officials originally expected to submit the report to the Secretary of Defense by October 1988. A revision to the report is undergoing review and the estimated completion date was January 1989.

⁴The Key West Agreement, approved by the President in April 1948, assigned primary and collateral functions to each service. It is now embodied in DOD Directive 5100.1. No major changes have been made to the services' primary functions since 1948, according to the 1985 Senate staff study.

Combatant Commands

Operational command of military forces is assigned to the combatant commanders. The 1985 Senate staff study indicated that unified combatant commanders lacked the necessary influence and authority to carry out their responsibilities. In passing the Reorganization Act, the Congress sought to place clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for mission accomplishment and ensure that the authority of the combatant commanders was commensurate with their responsibilities.

Many provisions of title II affect the operations of combatant commands and the authority of their commanders. We visited most of the combatant commands to examine the following areas and related actions taken to implement the title's provisions. Even though actions have been taken, this appendix discusses concerns related to them.

Separate Budget Proposals

The 1986 House Committee on Armed Services' report on the Reorganization Act recommended that the Congress increase the influence of combatant commanders by giving them control over some resources affecting their commands. Accordingly, the Reorganization Act permitted combatant commands to submit their own operations budget proposals. Various alternatives have been proposed for the types of activities that could be funded by separate combatant command budgets, but no consensus exists within DOD. Joint Staff and combatant command officials believe that separate budgets could have drawbacks. For example, unified combatant commands lack staff to perform budget functions and the potential exists to duplicate some functions of the military departments.

DOD decided not to submit separate budgets. Based on comments from the combatant commands, the Chairman recommended that they not be established. However, separate budgets would be useful if the military departments do not respond to the needs of combatant commanders, according to Joint Staff officials.

Decision to Not Submit Separate Budgets

The Chairman asked the combatant commanders for comments on the separate budget provision of the Reorganization Act in January 1987. Only the Southern and Central Commands wanted their own budgets. The other combatant commanders believed that DOD's recent changes to the programming and budgeting process and the increased authority provided to them in the Reorganization Act made separate budgets unnecessary. Also, the unified combatant commanders (except for the

Central Command, which did not respond to the question on this subject) said that they did not have sufficient staff or the necessary expertise to implement the separate budget provision. The specified combatant commands have programming and budgeting staffs.

Based on the views of the combatant commanders, the Chairman recommended that separate budgets not be established. The Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred. According to DOD's Office of the General Counsel, the Reorganization Act did not require it to submit separate budgets.

We reviewed the Reorganization Act and legislative history concerning the submission of separate combatant command budgets (10 U.S.C. 166). We believe that the Congress clearly intended for DOD to submit separate budgets for the combatant commands. However, the statute as enacted did not require this because the Secretary of Defense was given discretion to determine what activities are appropriate for the budgets. Therefore, we concluded that DOD's decision not to submit separate budgets did not violate the act.

Activities for Separate Budgets

Congressional intent concerning separate combatant command budgets was expressed in the 1986 House Committee on Armed Services' report on the Reorganization Act. They were to be limited operations budgets that would include far less than 1 percent of the defense budget. The budgets were to provide the combatant commanders with control of (1) resources for activities that directly affected their ability to accomplish missions and (2) a limited amount of resources to increase their influence within DOD.

The Reorganization Act provides that funding may be requested in combatant command budgets for such activities as joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations. However, no consensus exists within DOD on what activities would be funded by separate combatant command budgets, even though various alternatives have been proposed.

In January 1987, the Chairman asked combatant commanders to provide examples of the types of activities, within the four categories specified by the Reorganization Act, that should be included in a separate budget. Various suggestions were received from five combatant commands including joint exercises, contingencies, force training, humanitarian and civic assistance, in-theater special operations, and drug

enforcement. These commands cited flexibility and control or the ability to protect the funding as rationales for including these activities.

One alternative for separate budgets is to provide funds to support combatant commanders for unexpected contingencies. Although special funds do exist, such as a command and control fund, no such fund for contingencies exists, according to an OSD analyst. Consequently, the additional costs associated with contingencies, such as the Persian Gulf operation, must be covered by funds programmed for other purposes.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that one combatant command, the Special Operations Command, has been provided with authority in other legislation to have a separate budget. However, this budget is different from those intended by the Congress in the Reorganization Act because it will provide for development and acquisition of unique equipment, materiel, supplies, and services for special operations forces. According to DOD, the Special Operations Command is now obtaining appropriate staffing and expertise to develop and manage this budget.

Potential Problems With Separate Budgets

The implementation of separate budgets could cause potential problems. Although officials at most combatant commands we visited believed separate budgets were unnecessary, they noted some potential problems with separate budgets, such as concern about lack of qualified staff.

For example, European Command officials believed that separate budgets are not needed if the other provisions of the Reorganization Act intended to enhance the resource allocation roles of the Chairman and the combatant commands are adequately implemented. The officials said that preparing even a relatively limited separate budget would be a problem because they lacked the necessary personnel, expertise, and databases.

The Director of the Joint Staff believes that combatant commands will not have separate budgets without a specific legislative requirement. Separate budgets could be inefficient because the potential exists to duplicate the programming, budgeting, and accounting functions of the military departments. The Director believes that the combatant commanders must be warfighters and not programmers or comptrollers.

Separate budgets for combatant commands may have additional drawbacks, as shown by an earlier report. In our review of the management

of the reserve components,⁵ we found that a separate appropriation for procuring National Guard and Reserve equipment created problems. Specifically, additional administrative burdens resulted from the separate appropriation because most of the reserve components had to perform functions previously performed for them by the services' active components. Also, the funds provided to the reserve components in the separate appropriation were partially offset by reductions to the amounts the services budgeted for the reserve components.

Role in Resource Allocation

The 1985 Senate staff study concluded that there was an imbalance between the responsibilities of unified combatant commanders and their limited influence over resource decisions. Actions taken by DOD since the early 1980s have the potential to increase the influence of the unified combatant commanders in the resource allocation process.

DOD recognizes that more could be done to increase the combatant commanders' influence by addressing two concerns. First, the lists of high priority resource needs submitted by the combatant commanders could become more useful if DOD provided more specific guidance on their preparation. Second, more could be done to ensure that combatant commanders receive the information they need to effectively exercise their influence on resource allocation decisions.

Influence on Resource Allocation

Recent actions by DOD have the potential to increase combatant commanders' influence on the resource allocation process. The combatant commanders are now involved in the three interrelated phases of the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting system. In the planning phase, the combatant commanders have been directly involved in developing the Defense Guidance since 1981. They provide comments on drafts of the Defense Guidance and participate in Defense Resource Board meetings before the guidance is signed by the Secretary of Defense.

⁵Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs (GAO/NSIAD-89-27, Nov. 17, 1988).

The Deputy Secretary of Defense enhanced the combatant commanders' role in the programming phase in November 1984 by requiring

- each commander to prepare a list of his higher priority needs and to rank the needs across service and functional lines considering reasonable fiscal constraints,
- each military department to respond to the lists by preparing an annex to its program objectives memorandum indicating how the priorities are addressed and providing supporting rationale for those priority needs not met, and
- combatant commanders to participate in reviewing military departments' program objectives memoranda, including meetings with the Defense Resources Board during program reviews.

In October 1987, DOD adopted initiatives to increase the involvement of the combatant commanders in the budget phase. A major aspect of the initiatives was adopting procedures to track theater-specific and small programs of interest to the combatant commanders during budget review and execution.

The resource allocation influence of combatant commanders was evident during consideration of DOD budget reductions for fiscal year 1989. The Chairman requested the combatant commanders' views on how to implement a \$35 billion DOD budget cut. The Deputy Secretary forwarded the services' proposed reductions to the combatant commanders for their assessments and invited them to personally discuss their concerns with him. The Deputy Secretary held a Defense Resources Board meeting with the combatant commanders in December 1987 to hear their views on these proposed reductions.

Officials at the Pacific Command and its component commands said that the increased influence of the combatant commander is most noticeable in resource allocation decisions. They cited the following examples: (1) the Pacific Commander intervened to prevent the Navy from eliminating funds for operations and maintenance for the aircraft carrier Midway in fiscal year 1988 and (2) the combatant commander's opposition prevented DOD from cutting military construction funding for projects in the Philippines and the Aleutian Islands. They said that prior to the Reorganization Act the combatant commander's views on these matters would not have carried much weight, and he may not have been consulted.

Usefulness of Priority Lists Could Be Improved

Combatant commanders use integrated priority lists to provide visibility to those few key problem areas which, in their judgment, require the highest priority by the services in finding solutions. However, a DOD study and officials indicate that the priority lists are difficult to analyze because they are not consistently prepared. We agree with DOD that the usefulness of the lists could be improved by providing more specific guidance on their preparation.

According to a study of OSD conducted by the service secretaries in response to title I of the Reorganization Act, combatant commands use various methods to determine priorities for the lists. This made it difficult for the Chairman, OSD, and the services to judge which items on the lists are the highest priority. For example, some commanders base their lists on how well various programs are faring in the Congress or in DOD's resource allocation process, whereas others rank shortfalls in war reserves needed for immediate mobilization.

The study recommended that OSD take the lead in developing standardized instructions for preparing the lists. These instructions should (1) define what constitutes a priority, (2) require justification based on both national military strategy and regional plans, and (3) provide guidelines for integrating and ranking the priorities.

Joint Staff officials said that the lists lack consistency and the numbers of priorities have increased greatly because of the lack of specific guidance. The lack of consistency made it difficult for the Joint Staff to do an overall analysis of the lists. Instead of ranking each item on the lists, the Joint Staff placed them in six broad categories, such as readiness and sustainability, and ranked the categories.

An OSD analyst said that the lack of guidance was a concern. He said that it is difficult to determine common themes in analyzing the lists because they are not consistently prepared. According to the analyst, the usefulness of the lists could be improved if OSD provided more specific guidance on their preparation. He said that such guidance has not yet been developed because (1) OSD did not want to constrain the combatant commanders' flexibility in preparing the lists and (2) combatant commands needed to obtain more experience in preparing the lists.

Information on Resource Allocation for Combatant Commands

We believe that effective participation of the combatant commanders in the resource allocation process is a challenge because they are located throughout the United States and overseas. According to officials at some combatant commands, they do not always receive the program and budget information they need on time to effectively participate in the process. DOD is implementing an automated system that should provide a better information flow to and from the combatant commands. Also, DOD is considering ways to provide more information by theater to combatant commands.

Officials at the Space Command said that DOD needs to develop better tools to provide program and budget information to combatant commands in a timely manner. For example, the combatant commands were often not able to review draft program budget decisions before they were made final because of the limited time available for review. Pacific Command officials said that various resource allocation documents, such as draft program decision memoranda, were not always provided to them in sufficient time to allow them to comment fully.

OSD realized the need for improved document delivery to combatant commanders for program objectives memoranda review in the programming phase in 1985. After studying several alternatives, the Deputy Secretary approved development of an electronic delivery system in June 1987. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System Electronic Delivery System was first used in April 1988 for the transmission of documents necessary for reviewing the services' program objectives memoranda.

The new electronic delivery system also has the potential to enhance the participation of the combatant commanders in the budgeting and planning phases. The Joint Staff, which is responsible for operating the system, is working with the DOD Comptroller to use it for budget review. However, the lack of compatibility of DOD's Comptroller system with the new electronic delivery system needs to be resolved. In addition, DOD may use the new system for reviewing and commenting on the Defense Guidance in the planning phase.

The unified commanders also want information on the services' programs by theater, which would allow better assessments of the risks of resource shortfalls, according to an OSD analyst. OSD and the services have studied this, but they have not fully provided the information needed to measure capability improvements associated with allocation

levels and the impact of shortfalls on these capabilities. DOD will continue to consider ways to satisfy this need in the future, according to the analyst.

Command Authority and Relationships

The authority of unified combatant commanders over their service component commanders was weak, according to the 1985 Senate staff study. The services dominated the unified commands, primarily through the strength and independence of their component commanders and constraints on the authority and influence of unified commanders.

In the Reorganization Act, the Congress wanted to ensure that the combatant commanders' authority was fully commensurate with their responsibility for accomplishing assigned missions. The Reorganization Act addressed the commanders' authority, direction, and control. In response, DOD incorporated these authorities in key guidance documents and revised its definition of operational command. However, the exercise of some of these authorities in personnel and organizational matters has been somewhat limited.

Changes Made to Command Authority Guidance

Many of the combatant command authorities legislated in the Reorganization Act were incorporated in JCS Publication 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces), which contains principles, doctrine, and guidance governing joint activities. Operational command is defined as the authority to perform those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command is exercised solely by combatant commanders.

Before the Reorganization Act, the Congress considered DOD documents describing the combatant commanders' authority overly restrictive. For example, JCS Publication 2 defined operational command so as to exclude authority over administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requested assistance. The definition also specified that operational command will normally be exercised through service component commanders.

DOD made changes to the definition of operational command in JCS Publication 2 issued in December 1986. The new definition expands operational command to provide full authority to organize forces as the

combatant commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions. The revised publication also lists 21 specific authorities of combatant commanders for guidance in exercising operational command, many of which are related to various provisions of the Reorganization Act.

Authorities Over Subordinates

The Reorganization Act provides combatant commanders with various authorities over subordinate commanders and other personnel. However, the practical exercise of these authorities appears somewhat limited. The Congress intended for subordinate commanders to perceive their combatant commander, rather than other officers in their military departments, as the superior whom they serve. Some of these authorities include assigning command functions to their subordinate commanders, concurring with the selection of their subordinate commanders, and suspending and court-martialing subordinates.

The exercise of authority over subordinate commanders could be affected by their command's multiple responsibilities. For example, the 3rd U.S. Army, which is the Army component headquarters of the Central Command, has multiple responsibilities. The 3rd Army headquarters is assigned to the Central Command that exercises operational command over it. The 3rd Army headquarters also has a relationship with the Forces Command for service-related matters, including resources, training, readiness, and mobilization. This situation could create the potential for divided loyalty for component commanders, according to the former Central Command Commander.

The process for selecting the combatant commanders' key subordinates has been modified since the passage of the Reorganization Act. A JCS policy document was reissued in June 1987 to provide guidance on filling high-ranking vacancies. According to the JCS Secretary, after discussion between the services and the combatant commander about his needs, a formal request for personnel goes to the respective service. Because of this informal interaction, the JCS Secretary said that service nominations are rarely rejected after the combatant commander goes to the service.

The Reorganization Act gives combatant commanders the authority to suspend and court-martial subordinate officers. OSD published amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial to reflect the authority to convene courts-martial. The authority to suspend subordinates has been

used several times since the act's passage, but the court-martial authority has not.

Authority to Organize Commands

Combatant commanders' authority to organize their commands is included in the Reorganization Act. However, in some cases their ability to exercise this authority has been limited by factors such as congressional review and relationships between combatant commands and subordinate commands. For example:

- The combatant commanders' authority to prescribe their chains of command was exercised in creating the command structure for operations in the Persian Gulf. In congressional testimony in September 1987, the JCS Chairman said that the Central Command Commander used this authority to eliminate two layers from the Persian Gulf command structure. He contrasted the three layers of command in the Persian Gulf (Secretary of Defense, Central Command commander, and Joint Task Force commander) with the five layers that existed for the command of the Marine Corps detachment during the Lebanon crisis (Secretary of Defense, European Command commander, European Navy commander, Mediterranean 6th Fleet commander, and U.S. Forces Lebanon commander).
- The Pacific Command Commander wanted to reorganize his command to consolidate component commands for his Army forces. Currently, these forces are under three major commands in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea. The Pacific Commander supported an Army proposal to establish a new command in Hawaii having responsibility for the forces currently under the commands in Hawaii and Japan. The proposal would have upgraded the 3-star general at the command in Hawaii to 4 stars as the commander of a new Army Pacific command. The Secretary of Defense approved the proposal in January 1987 and indicated that it would improve the command structure. However, the Congress opposed it because the duties and responsibilities of the new command appeared to be insufficient to justify upgrading the commander, according to an October 1987 letter from the Senate Committee on Armed Services to the Secretary of Defense. Additional attempts may be made to consolidate these commands, according to Pacific Command officials.
- The exercise of the Southern Command Commander's authority is limited by the relationship of the Command to one of its components. The 12th Air Force recently became the Air Force component for the Southern Command. The Southern Command believes that some difficulties exist with this relationship: (1) the component is not an Air Force major command so the component does not control its budget and, therefore,

cannot be fully responsive to the combatant commander, (2) the component commander cannot structure his organization to fully support the combatant commander because of his other responsibilities, and (3) the combatant commander is not adequately involved in selecting the Air Force commander because of the component's other responsibilities. In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that the 12th Air Force has considerably greater stature than the Air Division it replaced and that the Tactical Air Command's budget contains line items submitted by the 12th Air Force.

Assignment of Forces

The Reorganization Act required the military departments to assign all their forces to combatant commands to accomplish their missions, except those forces with military departmental functions, such as recruiting, organizing, training, and supplying. The act does not provide for involvement of combatant commanders in assigning forces. Although combatant commanders have a vital interest in which forces are assigned, they have little input to the assignment process.

Since the 1960s, a JCS document called the Forces For Unified and Specified Commands has been used to list the assignments of forces to each combatant command. In response to the Reorganization Act's requirement, the Chairman submitted an updated assignment of forces document to the Secretary of Defense, who approved it in July 1987. The revised assignment of forces document incorporated changes, including assignment of the National Guard and Reserve for the first time.

Each of the forces are assigned to only one combatant command for peacetime purposes. Joint Staff officials told us that these assignments are supposed to be in harmony with planned wartime missions as much as possible. In wartime planning, forces are apportioned to one or more combatant commanders to support various scenarios.

Process of Assigning Forces

The services and the Joint Staff assign forces in a combined effort. The process begins when the latest version of the assignment document is sent to the services for their proposed changes. The services and the JCS must agree on the assignments before the document goes to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Events that would change assignments include establishing or disestablishing combatant commands, realigning missions, or changing geographical areas of responsibility.

Combatant commanders have a limited role in assigning forces. They are responsible for their missions and have a vital interest in which forces would be used to accomplish them. Joint Staff officials responsible for preparing the assignment of forces document said that the combatant commanders are not required to be involved in assigning forces and do not normally provide input during the approval of assignments.

In commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that combatant commanders have always been able to make comments during the assignment process. It also noted that the current Forces for Unified and Specified Commands document reminds the combatant commands that comments on the next such document are due by July 1989. The Joint Staff expects to receive combatant commands' comments during the next document revision.

List of Organizations Visited

Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary of Defense	Comptroller, Washington, D.C. Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C. Inspector General, Arlington, Virginia
Department of the Army	Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
Combatant Commands	Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida European Command, Vaihingen, Germany Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
Other Commands	Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii Army Western Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Other Organization	Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

Comments From the Department of Defense



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reply Zip Code:
20318-0300

11 January 1989

Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International
Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20508

Dear Mr. Conahan,

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) Draft Report, "DEFENSE REORGANIZATION: Progress and Concerns At JCS And Combatant Commands," Dated October 24, 1988 (GAO Code 391078), OSD Case 7815.

The Department partially concurs with the report. Three areas require clarification, however. First, with regard to updating the Department's directives concerning the DoD role in programming and budgeting, while these directives are currently in process, it is emphasized that there is no question the senior leaders of the Department understand their role in the process. They are not awaiting further instruction or clarification, as implied in the report. Second, the report implies that the Department did not comply with the provisions of Section 212 of the law. Section 212 listed ten organizational issues that were to be considered in the review of the missions, responsibilities and force structure of the combatant commands. All ten issues were considered, which resulted in changes in four of the issues. Third, throughout the report there appears to be some confusion as to the responsibilities and duties of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff. Clarifications have been provided where necessary.

The detailed DoD comments on the draft report findings are provided in the enclosure. Additional technical corrections have been separately provided to members of your staff. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Goetze, Jr.", written over a horizontal line.

RICHARD B. GOETZE, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED OCTOBER 24, 1988
(GAO CODE 391078) OSD CASE 7815

"DEFENSE REORGANIZATION: PROGRESS AND
CONCERNS AT JCS AND COMBATANT COMMANDS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS

* * * * *

FINDINGS

FINDING A: DoD Progress in Implementing Title II Provisions.
The GAO reported that Title II of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Act) contains provisions intended to (1) improve the usefulness and timeliness of military advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and (2) increase the authority of the combatant commanders to accomplish their missions and functions. The GAO found that, in response to the Act, in October 1986, the DoD issued a plan for implementing the Title II provisions and also revised two key functional and Organizational guidance documents. The GAO reported that, overall, the DoD identified 33 actions needed to implement the Title II provisions, has implemented a number of the actions and monitored progress to accomplish them. The GAO reported that, as of August 1988, the JCS considered 28 of the 33 actions completed for a variety of reasons. The GAO agreed that 24 of the 28 actions are completed. The GAO, however, considered the DoD actions on the other four actions to be incomplete primarily because needed changes to other DoD documents to implement the JCS actions had not been completed. The GAO agreed with the JCS that, as of August 1988, actions are incomplete for the remaining five items. Overall, the GAO concluded that the DoD has been generally responsive to the Title II provisions and has made progress in implementing them. (pp. 1-3, pp. 15-16, pp. 20-29/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees that it has been responsive in implementing the provisions of Title II. However, three issues located at Appendix II of the draft (pp. 28) require comment - issue number 2 needs clarification, while issues number 3 and 4 should be considered as closed.

Regarding issue number 2, the GAO states that DoD Instruction 1320.4 on military officer action has not been revised to reflect these provisions (i.e. Chairman's selection, suspension from duty or reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff). This is expected to be done by December 1988. However, it should be noted that the JCS administrative instruction pertaining to this authority was rewritten and published on March 23, 1988. Additionally, the appropriate DoD Instruction is 1315.7 rather than 1320.4. It is estimated that DoD Instruction 1315.7 will be revised by May 1989.

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Now on pp. 2, 13-14, and
19-20.

On Item 3, the GAO found that in March 1987, the OSD published amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial to reflect Combatant Commanders general courts-martial (GCM) authority over their subordinates, but that DoD Directive 5510.3 on authority to convene the GCM has not been revised to incorporate this provision. While this is true, the law categorically authorizes the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands to convene the GCM. This authority flows directly to the unified and specified commanders and needs no implementation by DoD Directive. Accordingly, no purpose with regard to implementation of statutory authority would be served through Directive revisions. As with any directive, it will no doubt be revised in due course and will likely reflect relevant changes in the law. However, revision is not necessary to the exercise of authority. This item, therefore should be considered closed.

Item 4 continues to be listed in the "Incomplete" category because, in the law, the Joint Staff ceiling of 1,627 assigned personnel target was to be met by October 1, 1988. In fact, the authorized and assigned strengths of the Joint Staff were within the 1,627 on October 1, 1988, and had been so since October 1986. This item, therefore, should be considered closed.

Finding B: Involvement of the JCS in Programming and Budgeting. The GAO reported that, although the DoD has taken actions to address the provisions of the Reorganization Act, some concerns remain. According to the GAO, one such area involves the role of the JCS in the DoD programming and budgeting process. The GAO reported that, in the past, the JCS has been criticized for not playing an effective role in providing joint military input, resulting in concerns by combat commanders that areas, such as readiness, sustainability and lift, were under funded compared to major weapon systems. The GAO reported that, as a result, the Act provided the Chairman with an increased role in programming and budgeting. The GAO found, however, that this role is still evolving. In addition, the GAO found that the DoD has not issued revised guidance to clarify the JCS role. The GAO noted that a revised DoD instruction has been drafted but, according to an OSD official, will not be issued until the DoD and the Congress reach agreement on the adoption of a two year budget cycle. The GAO also noted that a JCS policy memorandum revision is being held in abeyance until the DoD instruction is revised. The GAO concluded that clarification of the JCS role in relation to the Services would ensure that other organizations do not infringe on the ability of the Chairman and his staff to exercise their influence on resource allocation, as intended in the Act. (pp. 4-5, pp. 30-33/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Concur. The role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the planning, programming and budgeting function is still evolving. Publication of an updated DoD

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Now on pp. 3, 21-22.

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Directive and an accompanying instruction governing the Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System will assist staffs throughout the Department in knowing what event is to occur when, the purpose of that event, and the requirements that particular event will impose on their principal. Two other initiatives that should serve to further define roles and relationships are the Chairman's Assessment of Operation Plans, which will be submitted in March 1989, and the Commanders in Chief Warfighting Requirements System (CWRS) study. However, it should be recognized that the general programming and budgeting responsibilities of the Department's senior leadership are well understood and are NOT awaiting further clarification through publication of directives or instructions.

FINDING C: Review of the Unified Commands by the JCS Chairman. The GAO reported that another concern raised involved the ability of the Chairman to review objectively the division of responsibilities among the combatant commands. The GAO pointed out that, according to a Senate staff study, the Service chiefs were incapable of non-parochial evaluations of multi-service issues. The GAO reported that, as a result of this concern, the Act required the Chairman to periodically review the missions, responsibilities and force structure of the combatant commands, including ten specific organizational issues for the first review. The GAO found that the JCS performed the first review in the summer of 1987, and addressed four of the ten issues. The GAO observed, however, that six of the ten issues have not been resolved, including the geographic areas of responsibility for several commands, the creation of new unified commands for strategic missions and for Northeast Asia, and elimination of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command. In this regard, the GAO noted that a February 1988 DoD Deputy Inspector General report recommended action on four of these six issues, raising questions on the extent to which the new Transportation and Special Operations Commands are truly unified. The GAO reported the Deputy Inspector General concluded, for example, that unifying the three subordinate Service component commands with the Unified U.S. Transportation Command's headquarters could result in a reduction of 1,015 positions and enhance readiness and mobility planning. The GAO noted that the DoD has not yet acted on the Deputy Inspector General recommendations. The GAO concluded that the JCS should continue to consider the six unresolved issues. (pp. 5-7, pp. 34-41/GAO Draft Report)

DoD Response: This finding encompasses several related issues, which have been separately addressed:

"Unresolved Issues." Nonconcur. The DoD does not agree with the GAO conclusion that six issues remain unresolved--the Chairman fully met the requirements of the law. All ten issues which were to be considered were addressed in detail by the Chairman in consultation with the other members of the JCS and specific decisions were

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Now on pp. 3, 23-27.

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made pertaining to each issue. As indicated, the 1987 review resulted in changes on four of the issues, while six of the issues did not result in a change. Of the six issues that did not result in a change during the 1987 review, four are again being addressed in the draft 1989 Unified Command Plan deliberations (i.e., the establishment of a Northeast Asia Command, and the geographic areas of the U. S. Central Command, the U. S. Southern Command and the U. S. Pacific Command).

Of the remaining two issues, the first, the issue of creating a strategic command, was considered during the 1987 review and rejected. In the note at Appendix II, Page 38, the GAO points out that, according to several experts, the Soviets have established a unified command structure for their strategic nuclear forces. This implies that such a reorganization would be appropriate for the United States, simply because of this reported shift in Soviet command structure. The fact that the Soviets have such a structure is not considered a compelling reason for the U. S. to alter its command structure. It is the Department's position that there is no "command structure gap" in the U. S. strategic force posture. This, therefore, is not considered an "unresolved issue."

The last issue, the proposed disestablishment of U. S. Forces Caribbean Command, was also considered in the 1987 review and was rejected. It was readdressed in the Reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specific Commands to the Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters, provided to the Secretary in July 1988. It has been determined that the U. S. Forces Caribbean Command will be disestablished, with necessary functions transferred to the U. S. Atlantic Command. This issue is, therefore, also no longer "unresolved."

Disestablishment of Component Commands. Partially Concur. It is correct that the Deputy Inspector General's report recommended the disestablishment of Service component commands for the non-theater Unified Commands--i.e., the U. S. Space Command, the U. S. Special Operations Command and the U. S. Transportation Command. Subsequent to the GAO onsite audit work, however, the Secretary rejected this proposal. In his September 26, 1988 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Attachment 1), the Secretary stated, "I am persuaded that execution of the statutory Service responsibility to organize, train and equip forces is an appropriate role for the component commanders, thereby freeing the CINCs to focus on their assigned wartime tasks."

Implementation of the Deputy Inspector General Recommendations. Partially concur. At the time the GAO conducted its onsite audit work, the Secretary had not yet

made his decision with respect to the Deputy Inspector General recommendations. While not accepting the recommendations related to disestablishment of the Service Component commands for the three non-theater Unified Commands, the Secretary's September 26 memorandum did direct that, based on the study, Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters, actions be taken to reduce a total of 3,000 Unified and Specified Command Headquarters spaces (including some contained in the Service component commands). The Secretary also specifically directed that the reductions are to include an appropriate share of General/Flag Officers. It is anticipated that implementation of the Secretary's direction will produce the following impacts on Unified and Specified Command Headquarters and supporting organizations:

<u>Services</u>	<u>Total Spaces</u>
Army	-1,123
Navy	- 654
Air Force	-1,168
Marine Corps	- 41
Joint Staff	- 14
TOTAL	-3,000

On December 1, 1988, a summary of the actions resulting from the Secretary's decisions, was provided to the cognizant congressional committees by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Attachment 2).

FINDING D: Development of Joint Doctrine. The GAO reported that concern raised by the Senate staff study involved joint doctrine. According to the GAO, the staff study pointed out that joint doctrine was either poorly developed or lacking, because Service-specific interests dominated doctrine development. The GAO reported that, as a result, the Act assigned the major new role of joint doctrine development to the Chairman, JCS. The GAO found that the JCS have made considerable progress in managing joint doctrine development and noted that a JCS office responsible for it has been established. As examples of JCS progress, the GAO noted that a master plan for joint doctrine projects has been established, areas where joint doctrine is needed have been identified, and many of the planned projects have been assigned for development. While acknowledging the progress made, the GAO also pointed out that concerns remain. The GAO reported, for example, JCS and some combatant command officials are concerned that, because joint doctrine development is complex and requires much staff time, they will not have sufficient staff to perform this required function. In addition, the GAO noted there are differences between theaters that require JCS coordination to resolve. The GAO concluded that, while the JCS have made considerable progress in joint doctrine development, completing the projects will take many years. (p. 7, pp. 41-44/GAO Draft Report).

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Now on pp. 4, 27-28.

DoD Response: Concur. The DoD acknowledges that Joint Doctrine will take time to complete (3-5 years). This does not, however, alter the fact that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in charge. Joint doctrine will be developed under the leadership of the Chairman to meet the needs of the Department. As constraints to doctrine development are identified, such as staff support or resources, they will be addressed in the appropriate forums.

FINDING E: Evaluation of Command Preparedness. The GAO reported another requirement of the Reorganization Act was that the JCS establish and maintain a uniform system to evaluate the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out their assigned missions. The GAO reported that the JCS and combatant commanders decided to satisfy the requirement by modifying the existing commander's situation report. The GAO reported that the JCS is currently preparing a consolidated preparedness evaluation, which was scheduled for approval in October 1988. The GAO pointed out, however, that the new format is still evolving and has not been institutionalized in JCS guidance. The GAO acknowledged that the DoD is currently considering ways to improve preparedness evaluations, such as through increased use of quantified information, but observed that combatant commanders believe this will be difficult. The GAO further pointed out that a DoD-wide steering group is looking to develop and standardize sustainability measures, and the Rand Corporation is conducting a study of effectiveness measures. (pp. 7-8, pp. 44-46/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Concur. While preparedness evaluation of command is still evolving, this evolution demonstrates the Department's commitment to fully integrating the processes into the decisionmaking by tailoring the products over time to meet the needs of the leadership. This evolution is evident in a number of initiatives that have been instituted. For instance, in lieu of formal policy guidance, the Preparedness Evaluation System (PES) reporting cycles for FY 1988 began with the issuance of message guidance for the preparation of the CINC's Preparedness Assessment Reports, which were due November 30, 1988. Additionally, staffing of formal guidance will begin in January 1989 with the goal of policy guidance in place to guide the FY 1989 reporting cycle. Another initiative is the No-Notice Exercise Evaluation Program which assesses, as the name implies on a no-notice basis, the preparedness of combatant command's state of training of their staffs and components, as well as that of the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FINDING F: Net Assessment of Military Capabilities. The GAO reported that another requirement of the Reorganization Act is that the Chairman is to perform periodic military net assessments, comparing the capabilities of the U.S. and its

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Now on pp. 4, 28-29.

Now on pp. 4, 29-31.

allied armed forces to those of potential adversaries. The GAO found that an initial net assessment was completed in September 1987, but the JCS Chairman identified several shortcomings. According to the GAO, some of these shortcomings included (1) the absence of needed expertise and data to perform assessments, (2) the lack of intelligence on the capabilities of adversaries, and (3) the absence of adequate documentation to verify the factors used to prepare the assessments. The GAO reported that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Personnel also cited concerns with the initial net assessment, including the need for improved data, better models and improved analytical tools. In addition, the GAO noted that an October 1987 OSD study questioned whether the division of net assessment effort between the OSD Director of Net Assessments and the JCS was the most efficient. Although this question has not been resolved, the GAO acknowledged that the DoD hopes to make improvements in future net assessments and is considering the possibility of consolidating this function with the OSD net assessment office. (pp. 8-9, pp. 46-49/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Partially concur. The OSD study was done by a civilian contractor, but the recommendation to consolidate the military net assessment function of the Joint Staff into the OSD Net Assessment office was not implemented. There is no current DoD effort to consolidate this function. The GAO may also overstate the benefits of combining the JCS and OSD net assessment functions, because the Chairman's net assessment for strategic planning is specifically designed to remain a strictly military assessment.

Now on pp. 31-32.

FINDING G: Report on the Role and Missions of the Services. According to the GAO, the Senate staff study reported that there were insufficient mechanisms for change within the DoD, resulting in less than optimum assignment of roles and missions to the Services. The GAO reported that, as a result, the Reorganization Act required the Chairman, JCS, to prepare a report on the Services' roles and missions at least once every three years, including factors such as changes in enemy threats, unnecessary duplication and changes in warfighting technology. The GAO found that the JCS have initiated the study and established milestones for its completion. The GAO noted that the study will focus on the assignment of functions to the Services and consider the authorities for them. The GAO also noted that the report is expected to emphasize potential unnecessary duplication and the adequacy of interfaces between and among the Services. According to the GAO, the JCS expects to submit the report to the Secretary of Defense by October 1988. (pp. 49-50/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Concur. A revision to the Chairman's Report on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces is currently undergoing Joint Staff review, with an estimated completion date of January 1989..

FINDING H: Separate Budgets for the Combatant Commands. The GAO reported that the Senate staff study also indicated concern that combatant commanders lacked the necessary influence and authority to carry out their responsibilities. According to the GAO, one such concern was that the combatant commanders did not have adequate control over the budgets for their subordinate forces. The GAO reported that, to address this concern, the Reorganization Act provided the authority for the commanders to have their own budgets. The GAO found that there have been various alternatives proposed for activities to be funded by separate combatant command budgets, but no consensus has been reached. In addition, the GAO reported that both JCS and combatant command officials have identified drawbacks to separate budgets, including the lack of adequate budget staff at the unified commands and the potential for duplication of functions with the Services. The GAO found that both the OSD and the JCS agreed that separate budgets were not needed and, therefore, decided not to submit them. The GAO pointed out, however, that the OSD could still use the separate budget authority if it finds the Military Departments are not responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders. (pp. 10-11, pp. 51-56/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 5, 33-36.

DoD Response: Concur. It should be recognized, however, that the USSOCOM is an exception. Current legislation provides the specific authority for the USSOCOM to have a separate budget. Major Force Program 11 was created for this purpose. The USSOCOM is in the process of obtaining appropriate staffing and expertise to develop and manage its own budget.

FINDING I: Role of the Combat Commanders in Resource Allocation. The GAO reported that another concern raised by the Senate staff study was that the responsibilities of the combatant commanders were not commensurate with their influence over resource decisions. The GAO acknowledged that, since the early 1980s, the DoD has taken various actions which potentially could increase the influence of the commanders in the resource allocation process. As examples, the GAO discussed the increased involvement of the combatant commanders in the DoD planning, programming and budgeting system. The GAO concluded that, while these actions could increase the influence of combatant commanders, more could be done. The GAO pointed out, for example, that the priority lists could become more useful if the DoD provided more specific guidance on their preparation and, thereby, lead to more consistently prepared lists to ease comparison across the commands. The GAO also found that more could be done to ensure that the commanders receive the information needed to more effectively participate in the programming and budget process. The GAO acknowledged that the DoD has indicated it will continue to consider ways to satisfy the combatant commanders' information needs. The GAO also acknowledged that the DoD is currently implementing an automated system, which the GAO concluded would provide better information flow to and from the combatant commands. (p. 11, pp. 56-63/GAO Draft Report).

Now on pp. 5, 36-40.

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DoD Response: Partially Concur. The GAO's conclusion that ". . . while these actions could increase the influence of the combatant commanders, more could be done. . ." does not recognize the Department's achievements of increasing the influence of the Unified and Specified Commanders. In addition, more is being done now to review the combatant commander's role in resource allocation and implement improvements as appropriate.

FINDING J: The Authority and Relationships of the Combatant Commands. The GAO reported that, to ensure the authority of the combatant commanders was fully commensurate with their responsibility for assigned missions, the Reorganization Act clarified the overall authority, direction and control. The GAO found that, in response to the Act, the DoD incorporated these authorities into its key guidance documents and revised the definition of operational command. The GAO also found, however, that the exercise of these authorities has been restricted in practice as it relates to personnel and organizational matters. As one example, the GAO reported that, although the Act allowed combatant commanders to court martial subordinate officers, this authority has not been used because the DoD guidance has not been revised to include it. The GAO also identified examples where the combatant commanders' organizational authority has been limited by factors such as congressional relationships and combatant command/subordinate command relationships. (p. 12, pp. 63-69/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Partially concur. Regarding general courts martial authority, there is no question that the 1986 Reorganization Act gave this specific authority to the Unified and Specified Commanders.

The GAO notes that there is a potential for divided loyalties when a component force is assigned to more than one combatant command. The report uses, as an example, the relationship of the Third U.S. Army to U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM). This statement is in error. Forces may only be "assigned" to one unified or specified command -- i.e., the command that has operational command of that force. Headquarters Third U.S. Army is assigned to the U.S. Central Command. Headquarters Third U.S. Army has only one "role" - Army component command headquarters of the U.S. Central Command. The observation that the Third Army is also responsible to the FORSCOM for "many support functions" is not accurate. The FORSCOM relationship with Headquarters Third Army is for Service-related matters only, to include resources, training, readiness, and mobilization of Army forces apportioned for planning to the Central Command. Furthermore, Army Regulation 10-42 states that Headquarters Third Army is under the operational command of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and responsible to CINCCENT for Service component tasks, stated in JCS Publication 2, DoD Directive 5100.1 and the Unified Command Plan.

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Now on pp. 5, 40-43.

The phrase "Third Army's Forces" is also inaccurate. Major combat army forces are apportioned for planning to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT) and other combatant commands by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Supporting army forces are similarly apportioned for planning to the USCINCCENT and other combatant commanders by Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System Vol II. A key to understanding this area is that "assignment" is not the same as "apportionment" for contingency planning. Third Army has apportioned forces, not assigned forces.

The GAO also questions the sufficiency of the budgetary capacity of 12th Air Force as a component of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). While it is true 12th Air Force is not a major air command, it is of considerably greater stature than the Air Division that it replaced. Additionally, the Tactical Air Command budget contains line items submitted by 12th Air Force in support of its function as the Air Force component of the USSOUTHCOM.

FINDING K: Assignment of Military Forces. The GAO reported that the Reorganization Act required the Military Departments to assign all forces to combatant commanders to accomplish their missions, except those with Military Department missions. The GAO pointed out that it was congressional intent that all personnel, units and other entities would be assigned. The GAO found that an updated assignment of forces document was submitted and approved in response to the Act's requirement, and several additional revisions have also been made. The GAO explained that assignments are generally done by the Military Departments, reviewed by the JCS and approved by the Secretary of Defense. The GAO found, however, that even though the combatant commanders are responsible for their missions and have a vital interest in which forces would be assigned, the combatant commanders have a limited role in assigning forces. In addition, the GAO noted that the combatant commanders do not normally provide input to the process of approving assigned forces. The GAO concluded that the assignment of forces continues to be an area of concern. (p. 12, pp. 70-71/GAO Draft Report).

DoD Response: Partially concur. While it is true that combatant commanders are not required to respond to complete the assignment of forces, the combatant commanders have always had the opportunity to respond or make comment during the assignment process. The document "Forces For Unified and Specified Commands--FY 1989," includes a statement that reminds the combatant commands that the next document is due to the Secretary of Defense on October 1, 1989, and that comment for correction to the document is due to the Joint Staff by July 1, 1989. The Joint Staff expects to receive combatant command comments for the next document revision. Further, force assignment is closely linked to the Joint Strategic Planning System. The Combatant Commanders do have opportunity to impact and comment at numerous points in this system.

10

Now on pp. 6, 43-44.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

26 SEP 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I have reviewed carefully the Reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands to the Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters conducted by the DoD Deputy IG. The senior military leadership make a compelling case on a number of counts, particularly with regard to preserving the Service components of the joint commands. I am persuaded that execution of the statutory Service responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces is an appropriate role for the component commanders, thereby freeing the CINCs to focus on their assigned wartime tasks.

With respect to other categories proposed for reductions in the Review, I agree with the JCS and CINC proposals for actions which would eliminate on the order of 500 spaces.

However, in addition to the above reductions, I support the Review's general recommendations in the area of Base Operations Support. It is my understanding that a study of manning for this function is currently underway in the Eighth U.S. Army, with sizable savings anticipated. I fully support this initiative and further direct that the effort be expanded to all the Unified and Specified Commands, with an objective of attaining total reductions on the order of 1000 spaces.

Finally, I am directing that the headquarters staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands and their Service components be reduced by an additional 1500 spaces. These reductions should be associated with the Review's policy recommendation to eliminate or reduce staff in selected management areas, but they may be taken by improving efficiencies in other management areas within the Unified and Specified Commands. I will leave the specific distribution and nature of these reductions to the judgment of you, the other members of the JCS, and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands.

In closing, let me make clear that I anticipate the foregoing actions will result in manpower savings on the order of 3000 spaces, including the appropriate share of General/Flag Officers. However, I recognize that a rigorous review of the functions identified for reduction may argue for some cuts from other categories identified in the Review but not specified in this memorandum. Please report back to me no later than November 10 on your proposal to meet the goals I have established. I intend to use your report as a basis for my December 1 response to Congress on specific actions taken with respect to the Review's recommendations. Accordingly, to meet that requirement, please include the detailed rationale for adopting or rejecting each recommendation in the Review.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Carlisle".

41508

ATTACHMENT 1



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 DEC 1988

Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Armed Services Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

SIMILAR LETTER SENT TO:

CHAIRMAN NUNN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(and several Subcommittee Chairmen)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to Section 8113 of the FY 1989 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 100-463), which requests the Secretary of Defense to submit an evaluation of the report, "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters, February 1988." This review has come to be known as the "Vander Schaaf Report."

The Secretary had tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform a detailed evaluation of the Report recommendations, including the rationale for implementing or rejecting each individual recommendation. Using the Chairman's detailed evaluation of the Vander Schaaf Report recommendations, we have determined that the Unified and Specified Command Headquarters organizations can be reduced by 3,000 military and civilian spaces without seriously damaging the National Command Structure or military readiness. We have directed that these reductions be reflected in the FY 1990/FY 1991 DoD President's Budget submission, but the Secretary and the Chairman have also discussed the possibility of reinvesting these savings in validated positions in existing and funded combat units, as the Vander Schaaf Report had recommended.

The Vander Schaaf Report based its manpower reduction recommendations on five basic policy issues which were identified in the introduction to the Report. We have used these five policy issues as the basis for imposing the actual manpower reductions, and for planning additional adjustments in the future. These five Vander Schaaf Report policy recommendations and their associated manpower reductions are identified at Enclosure 1 to this letter. An OSD and congressional focus on the Vander Schaaf Report's policy recommendations is the best way to consider the impacts and repercussions of manpower reductions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands agreed or partially agreed with 53 of the 157 specific organizational recommendations included in the Vander Schaaf Report, and they disagreed with the remaining 104 recommendations. The disagreements and partial concurrences were based on their belief that the Vander Schaaf Study Team had inadequate time to perform research

ATTACHMENT 2


on the Unified and Specified Command Headquarters and that the Study Team did not fully comprehend the relationship between the Unified/Specified Commands and the Military Departments. The Joint Chiefs/CINCs maintain that these incorrect perceptions led the Study Team to make recommendations which would adversely affect Unified and Specified Command operations. In addition, the senior military leadership made a compelling case with regard to preserving the Service components of the joint commands. We were persuaded that execution of the statutory Service responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces is an appropriate role for component commanders.

The initial Joint Chiefs/CINCs review resulted in a recommendation for savings of 505 military and civilian spaces out of the 7,309 spaces recommended in the Report. Our subsequent review of their recommendations indicated that an additional 1,000 spaces could be taken by streamlining the policy and oversight functions for base operations efforts, and an additional 1,500 spaces could be taken by additional reductions to the policy, plans, operations, and logistics directorates of the major staffs. Based upon our decision to preserve the Service components of the joint commands, we rejected most of the reductions associated with that policy recommendation. These final reductions would be taken through a process which prioritizes work loads and streamlines processes. Thus, manpower less closely related to priority work loads or missions will be eliminated. Enclosures 2 and 3 display the approved adjustments by year and by officer, enlisted, and civilian detail.

With these adjustments, I feel that the Secretary has accomplished his initial Review objectives, which were to reduce manpower levels and overhead costs by reviewing overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions, and excessive layering of organizational echelons.

The Department is finishing the preparation of the FY 1990/FY 1991 DoD President's Budget Submission. If the Joint Staff and Military Services can identify validated combat manpower requirements and OSD can validate them in time, we intend to fund these requirements with the appropriate manpower savings. We request your support for this initiative.

We have sent similar letters to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; the Chairmen of the Defense Subcommittees, House and Senate Appropriations Committees; to the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel; and to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation.


William H. Taft IV

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

VANDER SCHAAP REPORT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>POLICY RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>Manpower Savings</u>
1. Eliminate Service Component Commands for the Unified Commanders who do not have geographical areas of responsibility.	94
2. Reduce or eliminate policy and oversight functions for base operations at Unified and Specified Commands and at Corps, Numbered Air Force, Air Division, and Fleet Command Headquarters.	1,052
3. Eliminate staffing increases in the policy and plans, operations, and logistics directorates of the major staffs which are not closely related to work load or mission accomplishment.	1,854
4. Alter geographic areas of responsibility for USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM, disestablish FORSCOM as a Specified Command, and reduce the size of two other supporting commands.	No Savings Adopted
5. Implement a series of improvements and studies which would have resource implications in the future. For example, U.S. manpower in NATO and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System should be studied.	No Savings Adopted
Total Savings	3,000

ENCLOSURE 1

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

DOD IMPLEMENTATION OF
VANDER SCHAAP REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
CUMULATIVE MILITARY/CIVILIAN REDUCTIONS

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARMY	-59	-534	-1,123	-1,123
NAVY	-115	-361	-654	-654
AIR FORCE	-330	-887	-1,168	-1,168
MARINE CORPS	-13	-28	-41	-41
JOINT STAFF	<u>-3</u>	<u>-8</u>	<u>-14</u>	<u>-14</u>
TOTAL	-520	-1,818	-3,000	-3,000

ENCLOSURE 2

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

VANDER SCNAAF REPORT

DCD MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY OFFICER/ENLISTED/CIVILIAN

	FY 1989				FY 1990			
	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
ARMY	-17	-19	-23	-59	-47	-103	-384	-534
NAVY	-42	-53	-20	-115	-103	-158	-100	-361
AIR FORCE	-171	-151	-8	-330	-321	-454	-112	-887
MARINE CORPS	-5	-8	0	-13	-10	-18	0	-28
JOINT STAFF	-3	0	0	-3	-6	0	-2	-8
TOTAL	-238	-231	-51	-520	-487	-733	-598	-1818

	FY 1991			
	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
ARMY	-163	-216	-744	-1123
NAVY	-167	-292	-195	-654
AIR FORCE	-383	-654	-131	-1168
MARINE CORPS	-12	-29	0	-41
JOINT STAFF	-10	0	-4	-14
TOTAL	-735	-1191	-1074	-3000

ENCLOSURE 3