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Limitations in Leading
Missions Requiring
Force to Restore Peace



**National Security and
International Affairs Division**

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Chairman
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

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The founders of the United Nations intended the organization to play a major role in maintaining international peace and security, using force if necessary. During the Cold War, however, the United Nations did not have many opportunities to carry out peace operations involving military force because the superpowers vetoed most such U.N. actions. On two occasions during that time, in the Congo and Lebanon, the Security Council issued resolutions that required the missions to use some measure of force to achieve their objectives. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has authorized a number of U.N. operations involving the use of force to help restore or maintain peace. For example, the Security Council authorized the use of force in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes "action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." Given the U.N.'s performance in leading peace operations involving the use of force, some experts now question whether the United Nations is an appropriate organization to lead such missions. Others, including a former U.N. Secretary General, believe that the United Nations may be an appropriate organization to lead such missions, but that inadequate resources and operational structure have been the primary factors limiting the U.N.'s effectiveness. We examined this issue, with particular focus on

- what precedents there are for authorizing the United Nations to lead peace operations requiring some measure of force to achieve their objectives and
- whether there are limitations in the U.N.'s ability to lead peace operations calling for the use of force.

This report is based on our studies of U.N. peace operations conducted over the past 5 years,¹ as well as our current work that included (1) field study at several locations where U.N. missions used force conduct operations; (2) interviews at these missions with military commanding officers, peacekeepers, civilian directors, and line staff; and (3) analysis of U.S., U.N., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other documents and situation reports on peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. We conducted this review under our basic legislative authority and are addressing it to you because the matters discussed in this report fall within your Committees' jurisdiction.

Background

According to U.N. reports and Security Council statements, peacekeeping missions are operations in the field using military and/or civilian personnel to help maintain international peace and security, but where the use of force is not authorized except in self-defense. Such missions require voluntary troop contributions from member states, since the United Nations has no troops of its own, and are generally considered to be authorized under chapter VI of the U.N. charter, although Security Council resolutions mandating peacekeeping missions frequently omit specific charter citations. According to the U.N. Secretary General, and based on nearly 50 years of experience, three core principles guide peacekeeping missions led by the United Nations: (1) obtaining the consent of the warring parties to the peacekeeping mission, (2) ensuring the peacekeepers remain neutral and impartial in their actions and do not interfere in the nation's internal affairs, and (3) using force only in self-defense. Although peace operations have been increasingly used to help resolve internal conflicts, these principles still apply.

In addition to peacekeeping missions conducted with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, the U.N. Security Council can also authorize enforcement actions, under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, that call for the use of force to maintain or restore peace. Such operations can be large scale military efforts that obtain international sanction from the United Nations but are led by individual nations or coalitions, such as the actions in Korea (1950-53) and Iraq (1990-91). Or they can be smaller operations led by the United Nations, such as in Somalia. These operations are defined by the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with

¹A list of GAO Products on peacekeeping and peace enforcement is presented at the end of this report.

resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore international peace and order.² Consent by the warring parties is not required in these operations and neutrality may not be relevant. Security Council resolutions mandating such operations usually cite chapter VII of the U.N. charter as their authority. (See app. I for background on the use of force in the U.N. charter.)

Although the United Nations has considerable experience in leading peacekeeping missions and an overall approach to conducting them, it has not worked out accepted core principles and an overall approach to guide operations calling for the use of force.

For this report, we use the term peace operation to refer to the entire spectrum of U.N. activities aimed at maintaining or restoring peace and security, ranging from traditional peacekeeping missions to chapter VII peace enforcement to operations falling somewhere in between.

Results in Brief

The U.N. Security Council has three precedents for mandating the United Nations to lead peace operations where the use of force was authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter—the missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Eastern Slavonia.³ In four other U.N.-led operations, the Security Council established mission objectives that required some measure of force to be achieved, but did not explicitly authorize its use under chapter VII. In these operations—the Congo, Rwanda, Lebanon, and Haiti—the Security Council authorized the United Nations to lead missions and, respectively, to use the means necessary to apprehend, detain, and deport foreign forces; establish secure humanitarian zones; take measures to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty; and help ensure a secure environment. (See app. II for operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council).

Although the United Nations has improved its capability to support peace operations, our study indicates there are, nonetheless, organizational limits of the United Nations that increase the risk of U.N.-led operations calling for the use of force. These limitations have been overcome when a nation with sufficient military prestige, credibility, and the commitment of military forces necessary to conduct operations has taken the lead role in

²U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07*, June 16, 1995.

³The U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission was authorized to redress small-scale violations of the Demilitarized Zone, but is on such a small scale that it is not counted as one of the missions where the use of force was clearly authorized.

the U.N. operation. The limitations stem from the U.N.'s structure as an organization of individual sovereign states, which provides the world forum for international diplomacy. Because the United Nations is an international political body, and as such, does not have the attributes of sovereignty, it cannot conscript troops and arms from member states. Similarly, because member states cannot or will not relinquish command over their own troops, U.N. force commanders cannot always be sure their orders will be carried out. This places the following three limitations on operations calling for the use of force that are led by the United Nations.

- First, the United Nations cannot ensure that troops and resources will be provided to carry out and reinforce operations as necessary, especially since such operations are risky and nations volunteering troops and arms may not have a national interest in the operation.⁴
- Second, the U.N. force commander cannot be assured his orders will be carried out, particularly in dangerous situations where his authority over national contingents may be questioned or second-guessed by national authorities who do not relinquish command of their troops to the United Nations.
- Third, because of the U.N.'s core principle of respecting national sovereignty, it generally seeks the consent of all parties to the conflict in conducting a peace operation and thus has not developed an overall approach to guide operations calling for the use of force.

These three factors have limited the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led peace operations calling for the use of force. For example, despite Security Council approval, the United Nations was not able to obtain adequate troops, equipment, and reinforcements to carry out the operations in Rwanda (1993-96), Bosnia (1992-95), and Somalia (1992-95). Nations were unwilling to provide the necessary troops, reinforcements, and resources when requested. Limits on U.N. command and control during actions in the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), Bosnia (1992-95), and Lebanon (1978 and ongoing) hindered U.N. commanders from effectively deploying U.N. peacekeepers to mission-critical locations. And the U.N.'s use of force in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo was uncertain at key points and lacked credibility as the U.N. operations relied heavily on the consent of the warring parties to conduct operations. (See app. III for background descriptions of these operations.)

⁴Article 43 of the U.N. charter provides for special agreements with member states to make armed forces available on call to the Security Council. The United Nations has never entered into such an agreement with any member state.

In contrast, the second phase of the U.N. mission in Haiti (UNMIH)—(1995-96) has been operationally effective, as has been the operation in Eastern Slavonia to date (1996 and ongoing). For the second phase of UNMIH, a nation with credible and respected military authority provided leadership and command and control structures. The United States acted as the lead nation for the second phase of UNMIH and (1) ensured adequate resources were available for planning; (2) provided the necessary information, troops, armament, and political influence; and (3) used its command and control structure and its doctrine for operations other than war to help guide operations. Under the U.S. doctrine, the core principle of obtaining the consent of the parties was not the predominant principle. In Eastern Slavonia, the operation is conducted as a variant of the lead nation concept. The force commander is Belgian and his Belgian military staff provide headquarters command and control and are assured support by the NATO force in Bosnia.

Precedents for U.N.-Led Use of Force

The United Nations has had considerable experience in conducting peacekeeping missions, but has limited experience in leading operations requiring the use of force to help restore or maintain peace. The United Nations has led and completed two operations where the use of force was explicitly authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter—Somalia and Bosnia. The U.N. operation in Eastern Slavonia is also authorized to use force under chapter VII, and, as of March 1997, it was still ongoing.

The distinction between peacekeeping and those operations authorized to use force is not always clear in practice. As early as 1958, a U.N. report on one of the first peacekeeping missions, the U.N. Emergency Force, noted that a broad interpretation of self-defense might well blur the distinction between peacekeeping and combat. The report concluded that the use of force to defend U.N. personnel, property, and positions that the U.N. commander ordered to be held, constituted self-defense and was peacekeeping. Any use of force that was initiated to attain a forward objective was not authorized.

In four operations, the Security Council mandates established objectives that required some measure of force to be achieved, but the Security Council resolutions did not state that the operations were authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter. The Security Council resolutions for U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) stated that peacekeepers were to take necessary steps to provide the government of the Congo with military assistance in fulfilling their tasks. After ONUC was unable to accomplish its

mandate, Security Council Resolution 169 authorized the U.N. operation to take vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if necessary, to apprehend, detain, and deport all foreign military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers not under U.N. command, and mercenaries.⁵

The U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was authorized to use force for humanitarian purposes. Security Council Resolution 918 of May 1994 directed the U.N. mission to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians by establishing and maintaining secure humanitarian areas, where feasible, and provide security for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations. The resolutions further noted that the 1993 killing of the President of Burundi, as well as the massive exodus of refugees to neighboring countries, constituted a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions and a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, peacekeepers might be required to take action against groups threatening civilians. In June 1994, the Security Council, acting under chapter VII, also authorized France to protect civilians and mandated all countries to enforce an arms embargo on Rwanda.

Security Council Resolution 425 established the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and mandated it to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon and restore international peace and security in the area. The Secretary General report (S/12611) implementing the Security Council resolution stated that the interim force would, among other things, use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and ensure that its area of operation would not be used for hostile activity of any kind. The U.N. operation was also given responsibility to “control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.” It was instructed to use force only in self-defense. Self-defense was defined as including “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it (the U.N. force) from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”

After the first phase of UNMIH was unable to accomplish its mission, a second phase of UNMIH was authorized. The second phase of UNMIH began after a multinational force accomplished its mandate under Security

⁵In an advisory opinion entitled *Certain expenses of the United Nations* (ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151 ff.), the International Court of Justice voted 9 to 5 that ONUC was “not an enforcement action within the compass of Chapter VII of the (U.N.) Charter.” The opinion stated that “it must lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action against a State.” One of the five dissenting jurists noted in his opinion that U.N. planes bombed positions, used antiaircraft batteries, engaged its forces in offensive maneuvers, and used deadly force in doing so. He noted that this would qualify as a common-sense case of enforcement.

Council Resolution 940, of using all necessary means under chapter VII to “facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership. . . and the restoration of the legitimate authorities.” Security Council Resolution 940 also authorized the second phase of UNMIH to (1) assist in sustaining the secure and stable environment established by the U.S.-led coalition in Haiti and (2) protect international personnel and installations.

Limits on U.N.-Led Use of Force

As discussed, the United Nations had little experience leading operations calling for the use of force prior to the end of the Cold War. Since then it has undertaken several, most of which have been less than fully successful. The United Nations and member states have studied these operations and developed a series of lessons learned which they intend to implement for future operations. They have also undertaken a broad range of initiatives to improve the operational support for peacekeeping.

Nonetheless, there remain three limitations on the U.N. effectively leading peace operations that call for the use of force. These are (1) the U.N.’s inability to ensure that sufficient troops, armaments, and reinforcements will be available to effectively use force in operations; (2) the uncertainty that orders of the U.N. commander will be carried out by national contingents in the field; and (3) the U.N.’s lack of an approach to guide the use of force. However, these limits have been effectively dealt with when a nation with sufficient credibility, prestige, and commitment has taken the lead.

Limitations When Armed Forces Are Needed

According to U.S. military doctrine, it is critical for missions to have sufficient armed forces when needed, especially in situations where force may be necessary. This not only provides a credible deterrent to opposition, but also ensures adequate troops and armament to conduct operations. However, U.N. operations, particularly those in which combat may take place, do not have assurance of timely and adequate troops and reinforcement. The United Nations must negotiate voluntary help from member states. This process involves obtaining

- authorization from the Security Council,⁶
- voluntary force contributions from member states,⁷ and

⁶This authorization includes receiving a draft operational plan from the Secretariat, approval of at least 9 of 15 Security Council members, and no veto from the 5 permanent members.

⁷The contributors specify the number and type of forces provided, command and control arrangements, and other troop-contributing agreements such as mission and area of operations.

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- approval by the General Assembly for the operation's budget that is usually paid for by member nations in addition to their regular U.N. assessments.⁸

Although the United Nations has been working on standby force arrangements to ensure the right troops and forces are available for missions, nations could still refuse to provide these forces. Several examples help illustrate that (1) the United Nations, as an organization could not ensure troops, arms, and reinforcements would be available when needed, particularly, in U.N.-led operations that called for the use of force; whereas (2) lead nations have provided the resources, command, and direction to make the U.N. force credible in carrying out operations calling for the use of force.

Rwanda

Civil war erupted in Rwanda beginning in 1990. In 1994, the United Nations was mandated to protect civilians at risk and establish secure humanitarian zones. But the United Nations could not obtain military forces to do so. The U.N. Secretary General planned a deployment in three stages during the spring of 1994. In the first stage, UNAMIR would concentrate on providing security in the capital, Kigali, and escorting relief convoys; in the second and third stages, troops would fan out across the country and protect displaced persons and humanitarian organizations. This deployment was estimated to take 31 days, or until mid-June 1994. However, the United Nations fell far short of meeting this goal. UNAMIR, which had been reduced to 444 troops in May 1994, did not begin to receive additional forces until early August; it did not reach its full troop strength until November. UNAMIR command officials who were in charge during the eruption of civil war said UNAMIR had repeatedly requested additional support, but no nation would volunteer troops as the war escalated in and around Kigali. As a result, UNAMIR was not able to respond to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians. In New York, the Security Council did not authorize additional troops as it debated about the mission's objectives, about whether the objectives were practical and politically feasible, and about whether member states would actually provide the resources needed. (See app. II for background on the Rwanda mission.)

Delays in UNAMIR's budget approval process further illustrate the U.N.'s basic limits in obtaining resources when needed. The General Assembly did not approve the total budget for UNAMIR's first 6 months of

⁸This approval must include a draft budget prepared by the Secretariat and review by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which implies compromise on the activities and overall cost.

operation—October 5, 1993, to April 4, 1994—until April 5, one day after the budget period had ended. To conduct its operations, UNAMIR received funding in advance of formal approval, but the advance was 25 percent less than requested. Similarly, the budget for UNAMIR's next 8 months of operation—April 5, 1994, to December 9, 1994—was approved just 10 days before the end of the budget period. Further, the advance funds covered only about 53 percent of the requested budget (\$70 million of an approved \$132 million). According to U.N. officials, the lack of funds hindered the procurement of needed vehicles, spare parts, food rations, and contracts to airlift troop contingents to Rwanda. In addition, from October to late November 1994, UNAMIR had neither advance funding nor an approved budget and, consequently, operated without legal financial authority.

Bosnia

In Bosnia, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could not obtain approval for the number or range of fully equipped troops required to carry out the operation. The U.N. Secretary General reiterated in March 1994 that 34,000 additional troops would be required to carry out its mandate to deter attacks against 6 safe areas. However, the Security Council only authorized an additional 7,600 troops. As a result, the United Nations considered UNPROFOR's troop strength insufficient to carry out the Security Council mandates. The unavailability of troops meant that UNPROFOR could not deploy sufficient troops in safe areas such as Gorazde. And, in Bihac, troops without enough weapons and supplies were rotated in. Safe areas were attacked on several occasions, and in July 1995 Srebrenica and Zepa were overrun and, according to reports from the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, possibly thousands of civilians and soldiers were executed.

Somalia

In Somalia, the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was not authorized sufficient troops to carry out its mandate. Although UNOSOM II's mandate was broader both in terms of functions and area of deployment than the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), 24 percent fewer troops were authorized. Also, according to U.N. reports, troops were volunteered late, and equipment was not provided in a timely manner and was inadequate. Operations began in May 1993, and by July 20,000 of the 28,000 UNOSOM II-authorized troops had been deployed; the full strength was only reached by October 1993, 6 months after UNOSOM II's mandate had been approved. Moreover, some contingents arrived without appropriate weapons and equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and communications capability, and had inadequate intelligence. As a result, the factions on the ground were emboldened to act. During a June 5, 1993, planned U.N. inspection of militia weapons storage sites, U.N. forces, including

Pakistanis and Nigerians, were attacked in incidents orchestrated by one of factions. Because of a lack of common communications equipment, neither the Pakistanis nor the Nigerians were able to request help directly from the Italian brigade, which had armored vehicles. Twenty-four Pakistanis were killed, 57 were injured, and 6 were missing.⁹ In subsequent reports, the U.N. Secretary General acknowledged that insufficient troop strength and lack of proper equipment limited UNOSOM II's ability to fulfill its mandate.

Lebanon

Several factors have prevented UNIFIL from effectively carrying out its mandate of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, helping restore Lebanese sovereignty and ensuring that its area of operation is not used for hostile activity of any kind. A primary factor is that UNIFIL does not have the support from U.N. member states to effectively carry out its mission. The size of the force has in fact been reduced in recent years. Despite UNIFIL's mandate, which limits it to weapons of a defensive character only, UNIFIL does not have sufficient armament and troops to credibly deter the warring parties from violating Lebanese territory or to deploy its forces in their designated areas of operation. For example, on June 6, 1982, after worldwide Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attacks on Israeli civilians and officials, Israel invaded Lebanese territory to retaliate against PLO strongholds in Lebanon. At some points, UNIFIL attempted to deter the Israeli advance but, it quickly abandoned the effort and the entire UNIFIL area of operation was soon completely behind Israeli lines. In addition, UNIFIL has been unable to prevent attacks by Hezbollah (the Islamic fundamentalist organization) on Israel and, according to the Secretary General, has no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force.

While UNIFIL has not been able to accomplish its mandate, it remains deployed as a signal of the international concern about the area, and its humanitarian efforts contribute to providing order in the area as well as providing a neutral authority to which the civilian population of southern Lebanon can turn.

Haiti

In contrast, UNMIH was able to marshal resources as needed because a sovereign nation, the United States, declared restoration of democracy in Haiti a national interest and led the operation. The United States ensured adequate troops and resources were available to prepare the environment for UNMIH, plan for the operation, and implement it. For example, the

⁹Of the six missing Pakistanis one died in captivity and five were later released. Also injured were one Italian and three U.S. soldiers.

United States led a multinational force (MNF), committing over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, including carrier battle groups, a special operations task force, a marine air ground task force, and other support to ensure a secure environment for UNMIH. In planning UNMIH, the United States provided the United Nations with information, military logisticians, and military planners. Of crucial importance was U.S. assistance during the transition from the MNF to a U.N.-led operation. The United States sponsored training programs on command and control, doctrine, and operations for many of the UNMIH troop contingents and U.N. personnel. Logistical support contracts for rations, supplies, and equipment already in place were extended for UNMIH until formal U.N. bidding could take place. And a quick reaction force of 1,500, including 550 special forces and helicopters, remained to help provide security. According to DOD officials, if reinforcements were needed, the United States would quickly make additional resources available.

Eastern Slavonia

The U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) is tasked under chapter VII of the U.N. charter to demilitarize the region (mainly of Serbian military and paramilitary forces) and take other steps in returning the area to Croatia. UNTAES has NATO commitment for military support when needed. UNTAES also obtained credible force protection of its own, including four mechanized infantry battalions, organized into monitoring and protection forces, one tank company, one reconnaissance company, and transport and antitank helicopter squadrons. Although UNTAES did not receive the troop level requested by the Secretary General, it more importantly has NATO commitment for close air support and further assistance from the NATO-led force in Bosnia if needed. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, leadership by NATO members is a critical factor in the operation's effectiveness thus far, given the former warring factions' belief that a U.N.-led operation is not credible in using force. Moreover, the former warring parties in the region clearly understand that NATO will make resources and support available to UNTAES if necessary. This support provides assurance that resources will be available if needed and adds credibility to the UNTAES operation.

Limits on Command and Control

According to military experts, effective command and control of military units is essential in peace operations calling for the use of force because quick and consistent responses to orders are critical in combat. However, reflecting the political reality of national sovereignty in the United Nations,

command over national contingents—the right to issue orders concerning all military aspects of missions—has not been given to the United Nations.

From the U.S. perspective, this point is made clear in The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, which describes Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), issued in 1994. The paper strongly notes that no President has ever ceded command over U.S. forces. It goes on to state that “[t]he sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, the federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field.”

PDD-25 does distinguish between command and operational control. It states that under some circumstances it may be advantageous to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander and this will be done if it serves the national interest. Similarly, the United Nations makes a distinction between overall command, which sovereign states exercise over their troops, and field command, which the U.N. commander exercises in issuing operational orders.

However, member states even limit U.N. operational control through agreements that specify their troops' area of operation and acceptable missions. Moreover, commanders of national contingents frequently contact their national capitals for instructions on whether or how to execute operational orders given by the U.N. commander. However, in the two peace operations where respected sovereign member states took the lead military roles, they provided strong leadership and had the credibility and respect necessary to effectively control the national contingents within their command. Several examples help illustrate the limits of U.N. command and control and the greater control over operations by credible lead nations.

Congo

In the Congo, command and control was at times unclear. At the very outset of operations, the U.N. force commander's arrival was delayed and a general from one of the troop contributing nations declared himself de facto commander until the force commander arrived. According to U.N. reports, this was a serious problem and the general had to be replaced immediately by a U.N. official. In the field, some national contingents worked outside of the U.N. chain of command. For example, one U.N. contingent began to disarm elements of the Congolese national force without authority to do so and had to return the weapons later. Another contingent was ordered to apprehend mercenaries as authorized by

Security Council Resolution 169. Nevertheless, the contingent refused to carry out the order, saying it was beyond the contingent's mandate. According to analyses, a lack of unity of purpose existed among the various troop contributing nations as some nations favored one faction over another and there was a larger competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each nation tried to gain a political advantage in Africa and used the Congo to demonstrate it was interested in decolonization and national sovereignty in Africa. According to expert and U.N. reports, the lack of clear command and control hampered ONUC and weakened its effectiveness in carrying out operations.

Somalia

The situation in Somalia also illustrates the limits on U.N. command and control. During operations in 1993, UNOSOM II troop contingents waited for instructions from their national authorities before following orders from the U.N. force commander. For example, one contingent did not follow orders to remain in the capital, Mogadishu. Thus, when fighting erupted in its sector, other national contingents were at a disadvantage. Further, the contingent had begun independent negotiations with one of the warring parties, refused to participate in certain actions in Mogadishu, and then successfully requested redeployment. In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary General said the structure of command and control in UNOSOM II was weakened by the independent actions of some contingent commanders. Some contingents appeared to act independently of the directives and orders issued by the force commander.¹⁰

Bosnia and NATO

Questioning an order also occurs when national contingents might be endangered or there is doubt about the U.N. commander's authority. In Bosnia, such weaknesses limited UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandates. For example, one troop contingent was ordered to redeploy to Mostar, where intense fighting was endangering the civilian population. The troop contingent did not redeploy, saying that the order exceeded UNPROFOR's mandate. The issue was raised to higher levels and resulted in an exchange of letters between the Security Council and the troop contingent's government. According to U.N. officials, the Security Council believed the order to redeploy was a valid part of UNPROFOR's mandate, while the troop contingent's government believed it was an unacceptable risk and outside of its agreement. These delays and refusals to carry out orders prevented UNPROFOR from providing security for the area and limited its ability to deter further conflict.

¹⁰Another unit that supported UNOSOM II was the U.S. quick reaction force. Although actions were coordinated with the U.N. special representative in Somalia, the quick reaction force was not under U.N. command.

Operations that NATO carries out face similar issues with command and control in that member countries retain authority over their troops. However, NATO has worked on its command and control arrangements for nearly 50 years. It has an integrated command structure that builds each participating nation into the command. Moreover, the organizational basis of NATO has a unity of purpose. It is a military organization intended to accomplish security objectives. U.N. operations, on the other hand, reflect the organization's emphasis on respecting the interests of all members. The dual chain of command in the U.N.'s Bosnia operation provides a telling example. In order to launch airstrikes against parties attacking safe areas in Bosnia, both NATO and the United Nations had to provide authorization. The United Nations insisted on the "dual key" system because it had to take into consideration the interests of all member countries, particularly those on the ground. On several occasions Bosnian Serbs attacked areas declared safe by the United Nations and NATO authorized airstrikes to deter the attacks. However, the United Nations refused to give its own authorization. This refusal led to a loss of credibility for the mission but preserved the U.N.'s core political concern of ensuring its own neutrality and taking into account the concerns of national contingents opposed to the airstrikes.

Haiti

Unlike other U.N. operations, the second phase of UNMIH had clear and effective control of troop contingents. Although UNMIH was a U.N. operation, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) played a central role in planning operations for both the MNF that preceded UNMIH and the transition to a U.N. operation. The UNMIH force commander was a U.S. Major General who reported to the U.N. special representative of the Secretary General, but for military issues was directly responsible to USACOM. There was a clear understanding that the Major General was in command of military decisions. Operational orders were communicated to all national contingents through a unit of 550 U.S. special forces troops who had the communications equipment to act as liaisons with national contingents. Further, about 40 percent of the UNMIH peacekeepers were U.S. troops, and U.S. contingents were co-located with other national contingents in key locations such as Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives. The chain of command for military matters was clearly headed by the U.S. commander, and operational orders were expected to be carried out.

Eastern Slavonia

Command and control of UNTAES is also clear and unambiguous. Both the U.N. transitional administrator and the force commander are from NATO member countries and, according to UNTAES officials, national contingents

participating in UNTAES clearly accept their orders, authority, and control of operations. The force commander is a Belgian Major General who has adapted the NATO command and control structure for UNTAES, staffing key positions on all shifts with Belgian military personnel. This ensures a unity of command and direct communications links to NATO. The U.N. transitional administrator is a U.S. foreign service officer, seconded to UNTAES, who is responsible for political aspects, but leaves military implementation to the military professionals. For example, unlike UNPROFOR, which initially required extensive consultation between the United Nations and NATO prior to close air support, authorization for air support has been delegated directly to UNTAES and Allied Forces South (the NATO command carrying out the airstrikes). Although there is technically a dual-key arrangement, the strategic working relationship between the commands of UNTAES and Allied Forces South and their uniformity with NATO procedures makes command and control for air support efficient and uniform. According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, this clear and unambiguous command and control arrangement is possible because of NATO's full commitment and support for the operation and because UNTAES leadership is provided by NATO members.

U.N. Approach to Peace Operations Limits the Effective Use of Force

The importance of respecting the sovereignty of member states also shapes the U.N. approach to conducting peace operations for operations with objectives requiring the use of force. This limits the effective use of force when it is needed. The U.N. basic approach to conducting peace operations is to (1) obtain the consent of the warring parties for the U.N. action and (2) maintain strict neutrality in carrying out operations. According to U.N. documents, these principles recognize that a U.N. operation is an intrusion into the domestic affairs of a nation. Therefore, even when the use of force is authorized, the U.N. operation tries to obtain the consent of whatever national authority exists.

In recent years, U.N. member states have debated the dimensions of consent without agreeing on a doctrine for how consent fits into operations calling for the use of force. The United Nations recognizes there are limits to respecting sovereignty, particularly when violations of human rights occur and national authority has broken down.¹¹ In such situations, humanitarian intervention to protect civilians and others at risk

¹¹For example, in *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary General stated, "(t)he foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress." But he also acknowledged that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had passed and the United Nations had a commitment to address brutal ethnic, religious, and cultural strife.

may override concerns of sovereignty and obtaining the consent of all warring parties is not viable. Another issue advanced by some member states is that legitimacy rather than consent is the right approach for operations calling for the use of force. Legitimacy requires, first of all, international sanction and support, based on a Security Council resolution that has been debated and agreed upon by the Security Council. Legitimacy, particularly when national authority has broken down, also requires that order be firmly restored, rather than obtaining the consent of all warring factions. Once order is restored, broad support for using force to maintain order should be sought within the population. Despite these debates, a U.N. doctrine or a basic approach has not yet been developed for operations calling for the use of force, and in recent discussions, some member states stress that all U.N. operations must respect the fundamental sovereignty of member countries.

In UNMIH and UNTAES, the two instances where respected member states provided strong military leadership, the member states used their own doctrines to help guide the operations' use of force. These doctrines emphasized security for troops and personnel and the legitimacy of the operations. In both cases, the approaches stressed that the international resolutions, based on the overall consent for the operations, gave the peace operations legitimacy to use force to carry out the mission. The operations thus did not require the continuing consent of the warring factions for their actions. Attaining the missions' objectives was the primary purpose rather than ensuring respect for sovereignty. This approach differentiated UNMIH and UNTAES from other U.N. operations calling for the use of force. Several examples illustrate how relying on consent has placed limits on the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led missions calling for the use of force.

Congo

During ONUC's initial phases, operations were carried out only with the consent of the warring parties. U.N. member states were concerned with balancing the need to restore order in the Congo with the need to avoid interfering in its internal affairs. Obtaining consent from the warring factions led to severe disruptions in building up troop strength and redistributing forces within the country to carry out the mission's mandates. In the province of Katanga, which had broken away from the rest of the Congo, the United Nations wanted to deploy greater numbers of troops to restore civil order and expel foreign forces, particularly European mercenaries who were supporting the Katangan forces. In negotiating with the Katanga provincial government, the United Nations agreed to place troops in restricted locations and subject to a number of

conditions. As a result, while troop deployment proceeded rapidly to 18,000 in the country, it took 2 years to reach sufficient troop strength in Katanga. An average of 500 U.N. troops per month were deployed in Katanga. Consequently, it took 2 years to build up to the authorized troop strength and delayed the U.N. forces from building a credible presence.

Bosnia

In Bosnia, UNPROFOR's enforcement authority was expanded under chapter VII of the U.N. charter (particularly in U.N. Security Resolution 836) to deter attacks against safe areas and provide security for humanitarian relief convoys. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR continued to (1) obtain movement clearances for its vehicles from warring factions before driving from one area to another, (2) acceded to roadblocks that prevented delivery of both humanitarian aid and equipment and supplies for its own troops, and (3) allowed warring factions to influence the deployment of troops along confrontation lines. According to the director of UNPROFOR's civil affairs group, operations in Bosnia were carried out as though it was a peacekeeping mission in which consent was required to conduct operations, even though new mandates authorized the use of force in certain situations.

Another example from Bosnia illustrates the U.N.'s emphasis on getting consent and maintaining the appearance of neutrality even when the use of force is authorized. During air, missile, and ground attacks on the safe area of Bihac during November 1994, UNPROFOR tried to negotiate an end to the bombardment by sending letters to Bosnian Serb authorities. When the letters did not work, NATO flew numerous reconnaissance missions over Bihac and pressed for U.N. authorization to launch broad airstrikes against the Bosnian Serb positions threatening the area. The United Nations denied authorization. The United Nations also insisted on providing specific warnings of airstrikes to the offending party and debated with NATO about providing the parties with the targets selected. NATO officials believed providing such information was inappropriate and it not only jeopardized its pilots but also weakened its credibility. Subsequently, towns surrounding Bihac fell to the Bosnian Serb Army, and five peacekeepers were wounded and one was killed. Regarding the airstrikes, U.N. officials were concerned that airstrikes would undermine U.N. neutrality and hinder any cooperation it was receiving from the parties. U.N. officials were also concerned that airstrikes against one of the warring parties, even if they were carried out to enforce a Security Council mandate, were acts of war, not peacekeeping, and had no place in a U.N. mission. The Secretary General also said that airstrikes were not used partly because of U.N. doctrine and partly because he was concerned

about possible retaliation against UNPROFOR's other ground forces throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Military observers, civilian personnel, and hundreds of peacekeepers from several nations were taken hostage or detained during certain periods when U.N. action was being contemplated.

Somalia

Somalia provides a similar example of how obtaining consent can limit enforcement operations. Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use force to achieve disarmament and the U.N. Secretary General regarded disarmament as crucial for the overall success of the mission, UNOSOM II initially sought to act with the consent of the parties. UNOSOM relied on the warring factions to voluntarily disarm and store their weapons in areas under their control. To verify compliance, UNOSOM provided the factions with written notice of planned inspections of weapons storage sites. Emphasizing the importance of cooperation and consent over effective enforcement, debates within UNOSOM II focussed not on whether written notice should be provided, but how much warning time should be given to the factions before inspections. By mid-1993, the Secretary General realized that requiring the consent and cooperation of the parties was ineffective and inappropriate.

Haiti

In contrast to other U.N. operations that relied on consent as the principal operating approach in the field, the second phase of UNMIH (1995-96) used the U.S. doctrine for operations other than war to help guide field operations. The U.S. doctrine is based on six principles: (1) implementing explicitly defined objectives, (2) emphasizing unity of effort, (3) ensuring adequate security for itself, (4) exercising restraint, (5) being perseverant, and (6) ensuring legitimacy. Under this doctrine, consent was an important element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH and the consent of Haitian government authorities was obtained before the second phase of operations began. But once there was consent on UNMIH's mandate, operations proceeded with vigor and certainty rather than by negotiation. Moreover, legitimacy was only one portion of the doctrine. The second phase of UNMIH also stressed security by retaining military, political, and informational advantage over potential warring parties. UNMIH also adopted robust rules of engagement that allowed it to be proactive and to take the initiative in using force beyond self-defense. For example, in ensuring a secure environment, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches and actively disarmed Haitians in certain situations. UNMIH's quick reaction force also acted promptly and proactively to disturbances in November 1995.

Eastern Slavonia

The Eastern Slavonia operation was authorized after Croatia and the local Serb population requested the United Nations to implement the basic

agreement to demilitarize and peacefully transfer the area from Serb to Croatian control. However, once consent was obtained in the basic agreement, UNTAES adopted NATO doctrine and rules of engagement to carry out the operation. Under this doctrine, developed for the Implementation Force in Bosnia,¹² force protection and legitimacy are fundamental tenets. Consent of the parties on the ground, as well as agreement from Serbia and Croatia, was important in legitimizing the mission. However, consent was obtained to use force if necessary to carry out the mandate. Thus operations on the ground are carried out forcefully if necessary. On several occasions, UNTAES made it clear that it would be reasonable in implementing operations, but also that force would be used when needed. For example, when the Scorpion paramilitary unit occupied oil fields in Eastern Slavonia, UNTAES first expressed its concern and told the paramilitary unit to withdraw. When it did not withdraw, an armored unit was sent directly to the area and forced it to disperse.

Conclusion

The United Nations has successfully led peacekeeping missions as part of its mandate under the U.N. charter. However, its record in effectively carrying out operations requiring the use of force has been less noteworthy. This is due, in part, to several limitations of the organization: the United Nations must rely on sovereign member states to volunteer the means for carrying out missions; U.N. force commanders cannot always be sure that orders will be carried out; and the U.N.'s core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and seeking consent of warring parties have limited effective action to restore peace. In Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon, and the Congo, U.N. missions had operational problems because they lacked the necessary resources, did not have an effective command and control structure, and did not have an approach appropriate to conducting operations calling for the use of force. However, in the cases of Haiti and Eastern Slavonia, the limitations were overcome. In these situations, the prestige and credibility of the nations' leading the operations and the assurance of adequate forces made it possible to conduct effective operations, with all parties assured that force would be used if necessary.

Given its limitations in leading operations requiring the use of force, the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for heading missions where force is required to restore peace and order if vital U.S. national interests are at stake, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military

¹²The Implementation Force (IFOR) was the NATO operation that replaced UNPROFOR. IFOR's mission was to implement provisions of the peace settlement for Bosnia, also known as the Dayton Accords. IFOR was authorized by the United Nations but has no U.N. involvement.

capability and commitment leads the operation. In missions that do not involve vital national interests but call for the use of force, the United Nations will most likely still confront fundamental limitations as an effective lead organization. Nonetheless, U.N. missions may still be an appropriate vehicle in such situations. They can assist in the provision of humanitarian relief, signal the international community's concern, and demonstrate a willingness to provide some level of support.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State and DOD commented on a draft of this report. The State Department generally concurred with the conclusions of the report. DOD agreed with the conclusion of the report that, given its limitations, the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for heading missions where force is required to restore peace if vital U.S. national interests are at stake, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military capability and commitment leads the operation.

DOD further commented that the causal factors of success or failure are many and diverse and indicated that geopolitical and other contextual variables had affected the execution of the missions requiring the use of force that were executed over nearly four decades. Moreover, DOD stated that U.N. capabilities to carry out such operations are a function, in part, of the organization's institutional structure and the commitment of member states. Finally, DOD indicated that lessons had been learned from peace operations over the past few years and that as a result a more effective approach to conducting peace operations had been developed by the United Nations and member states.

We agree, and have previously indicated that geopolitical factors and a variety of operational variables may affect the degree of success or failure attributed to any specific U.N. operation.¹³ However, our analysis indicates that missions requiring the use of force and led by the United Nations have consistently had in common the three limiting factors we discuss in this report. Moreover, our research led us to conclude that even if the specific geopolitical and operational variables were to have been addressed for each mission, the limitations discussed in this report would have remained, thus placing at risk the missions' success. This brought into question whether the United Nations could be an effective vehicle for implementing missions requiring the use of force. Clearly the factors we point to—resources, command and control, and overall

¹³For example, in *U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions* (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993), we discussed political feasibility and the importance of a comprehensive political framework.

approach—weakened the day-to-day conduct of the operations and compromised the U.N.'s ability to respond to the field challenges. The impacts on operations are documented in U.N. reports and our prior reports and are recognized in U.N. Security Council resolutions. We agree with DOD's comments that these factors are a function of the U.N.'s institutional structure and member states' commitment. As stated in our report, the United Nations is at its core a political body of individual members and not an organization that has independent resources and power of its own.

Our review indicated that the United Nations and member states have learned from recent missions that call for the use of force. We have attempted to reflect this in the report, particularly in our discussion of the decisions that were taken regarding the structure of the operation in Eastern Slavonia. However, we believe that the fundamental lesson learned is reflected in State's and DOD's concurrence that the United Nations may not be the appropriate organization to undertake peace operations requiring the use of force.

The Department of State and DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To assess the U.N.'s operational effectiveness and limitations in undertaking peace missions, we analyzed the mandates of all U.N. peace operations, reviewed Secretary General and field mission reports on these operations, and synthesized information and analyses of our past reports of these missions. Over the past few years, we have also conducted field study at numerous peace missions while they were in operation, such as those in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Haiti, Rwanda, northern Iraq, Cambodia, the Sinai, Cyprus, El Salvador, Honduras, and Syria. At these peace missions, we observed operations and obtained data on casualties, troop deployment, and civilian activities; situation reports; standing orders for both civilian and military peacekeepers; force commander operations orders; faxes and cables on operations; and other documentation. We also interviewed U.N. officials and military observers, peacekeepers, contingent commanders, and civilian staff from a full range of participating countries in every region. From these interviews, we obtained valuable international perspectives on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Among the officials we interviewed were the special representatives of the Secretary General and the force commanders for the

operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Cambodia.

To obtain the U.N.'s perspective on the effectiveness of its peace operations, we received from the U.N. Secretariat, official reports on operations, operating procedures, manuals, budgetary documents, and policy and planning documents. We also interviewed officials from the U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Administration and Management, Humanitarian Affairs, and Political Affairs and the Office of Legal Affairs. Among the officials we interviewed were the under secretaries general of these departments and the professional line staff in the offices implementing operations. For several of the missions, we were updated by the U.N. Observation Center, which provides 24-hour coverage of all U.N. peace operations.

Since refugee and humanitarian operations are such an important part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, we obtained detailed reports and operational documents from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and interviewed UNHCR officials both in Geneva, Switzerland, and in the field at several of the missions. We also spoke with officials and representatives of many human rights and humanitarian organizations both in the field and at their headquarters. Some of these included the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, the International Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, the International Organization for Migration, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Rescue Committee.

To obtain U.S. perspectives on U.N. peacekeeping and enforcement operations, we conducted work at DOD, the Departments of State and Justice; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and the U.S. Mission to NATO. Some of the State and USAID locations where we conducted work were Washington, D.C.; New York, N.Y.; London, England; Paris, France; Brussels, Belgium; Thailand; Cambodia; Israel; Egypt; Cyprus; El Salvador; Haiti; Croatia; Bosnia; and Rwanda. We also conducted work at DOD locations, including Washington, D.C.; the European Command in Stuttgart, Germany; and the Atlantic Command in Newport, Virginia.

From the U.S. agencies, we obtained their regulations, doctrine, and manuals on the conduct of peace operations; their situation reports on the countries where peace operations were ongoing; their reports of the security and political situations; and cables on the U.N. peace operations.

We observed interagency working groups on several of the missions and received security and political briefings from the agencies. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, USAID, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. Mission to NATO about specific peace operations and obtained their perspectives and analysis on the conduct of operations.

We also sought the views and opinions of scholars and researchers and obtained comments on a draft of this report from those at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for International Studies, and the Henry L. Stimson Center, which we have taken into consideration in finalizing this report.

We performed our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, House Committee on National Security, and Senate Committee on Armed Services. We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.



Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
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Abbreviations

| | |
|----------|--|
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| IFOR | Implementation Force |
| MNF | multinational force |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| ONUC | U.N. Operation in the Congo |
| PDD-25 | Presidential Decision Directive-25 |
| PLO | Palestinian Liberation Organization |
| RPF | Rwanda Patriotic Front |
| UNAMIR | U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda |
| UNHCR | U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNIFIL | U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force |
| UNMIH | U.N. Mission in Haiti |
| UNOSOM | U.N. Operation in Somalia |
| UNPROFOR | U.N. Protection Force (Bosnia) |
| UNTAES | U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium |
| USACOM | United States Atlantic Command |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |

U.N.'s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N. Charter

The history of the United Nations shows that its founders intended the world organization to be an effective instrument in maintaining world security. The U.N.'s first purpose, as set forth in its charter, is to maintain international peace and security and to collectively prevent aggression and threats to peace. This fundamental purpose was born out of the destructiveness of World War II and the determination by the allied forces to construct an international organization capable of preventing further wars. After conferences among the major powers in Cairo and Yalta, the Prime Ministers expressed a common sentiment: "We affirm that after the war a world organization to maintain peace and security should be set up and endowed with the necessary power and authority to prevent aggression and violence."¹

The U.N. charter sets forth the organization's principles and builds further the foundation for U.N. action to restore peace. Article 2(3), states that "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." Expanding on this principle, article 2(4) states that "all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." Article 24 gives the U.N. Security Council primary responsibility to maintain peace and security and authority to act on behalf of the other member states. Finally, article 25 obligates member states to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

With the foundation for forceful U.N. action, chapter VII of the U.N. charter (articles 39-51) lays out the implementing framework and member states' obligations.² The Security Council can call upon U.N. member states to impose complete or partial interruption of economic relations, travel, and communication with nations endangering peace, or, under article 42, may itself "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 43 obligates member states to "undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with an agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." These agreements on the number and types of forces to be

¹Quoted from *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, ed. Bruno Simma (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 8.

²In chapter VI (articles 33-38) of the U.N. charter, measures are set forth to peacefully resolve disputes likely to endanger international security, including mediation, arbitration, and investigation by the United Nations. Although peacekeeping is not mentioned in the charter, chapter VI provides the basis for U.N. peace operations not involving enforcement.

provided “shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council.” Any such agreement is subject to the constitutional procedures of the contributing member state. Chapter VII of the U.N. charter further establishes a military staff committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members, to assist the Security Council in planning and determining the strategic direction of U.N. military action.

To date, no nation has ever arranged to provide armed forces to the United Nations as called for under article 43. In 1946, an attempt was made to establish ground rules for contributing military forces and armaments to the Security Council, designating where the forces should be garrisoned, setting a time limit for committing U.N. forces to an enforcement action, and specifying what base facilities should be made available. This attempt failed because of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the four other permanent members of the Security Council and among the allies themselves.

During ratification of the charter, U.S. Senators clearly recognized the power potentially authorized to the United Nations to undertake peace enforcement. According to Congressional Records at the time, one Senator commented that article 43 was an “innovation in international law. . . . Unlike the League of Nations, here is something that has teeth to keep the peace of the world.”³ Another Senator noted that “collective action to curb the aggressor seems to be the only answer to this problem.”⁴

Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress expressed reservations about ceding control of military forces to the United Nations. These concerns were expressed in the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 as amended, and in the debate about ratifying the U.N. charter. The U.N. Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate article 43 agreements with the United Nations but expressly reserves approval to Congress. The act further states that with regard to article 43, nothing within the act “shall be construed as an authorization to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance” The act also prohibits the President from employing the armed forces under chapter VII of the U.N. charter without prior congressional consent. In addition, it limits other U.S. participation to 1,000 U.S. armed forces personnel.

³Congressional Record (Vol. 91, S8021, 1945).

⁴Congressional Record (Vol. 91, H7958, 1945).

Nations Insisted on Autonomous Role

Although the U.N. charter gives the Security Council a central role in maintaining international security, it also formally recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense outside of the United Nations. According to reports of the founding conferences, article 51 of the U.N. charter (right of individual and collective self-defense) and chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements, articles 52-54) were drafted to address nations' concerns that enforcement authority was too concentrated in the Security Council.⁵ The underlying debate reflected the desire for a world body capable of maintaining peace versus the interests of nations to retain power in their geographic regions. Article 51, for example, explicitly recognizes the legitimate role of individual nations and groupings in maintaining security.⁶ It also recognizes the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."

Numerous defense alliances have used article 51 to legitimize their collective security outside the formal U.N. framework, and nations have relied on it to justify their independent enforcement actions.⁷ For example, the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shall be considered an attack against all. The treaty further commits its members, acting under article 51 of the U.N. charter, to take all measures, including the use of armed force to restore the security of the North Atlantic area. Other security arrangements, including the Western European Union, the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the

⁵For example, according to a State Department report, the Latin American and Arab states desired that regional autonomy be preserved; the Soviet Union and the United States did not want a United Nations dictating action in their spheres of influence, and smaller states generally expressed uneasiness over the power of the Security Council.

⁶In drafting the charter, national representatives recognized the necessity of individual or collective response outside of the U.N. framework if a member state was attacked but a permanent member vetoed Security Council action. Additionally, Latin American nations and others advocated the need for autonomous collective action through regional security arrangements. Inclusion of the term "collective" self-defense was to legitimize security arrangements in the Americas under the Act of Chapultepec, which declared that an act of aggression against one American state shall be considered an act of aggression against all. (U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin No. 297 [Mar. 3, 1945], p. 297.

⁷Writing 12 years ago, Oscar Schachter went even further, stating, "We are bound to conclude that the collective security system of the U.N. Charter has now been largely replaced by fragmented collective defense actions and alliances founded on article 51." Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," *Michigan Law Review*, v. 82 (April/May 1984), pp. 1620-46. According to Schachter in 1996, there is now greater hope for the United Nations as a collective security system, but such a system would certainly not be a panacea.

United States and Korea, rely on article 51 as a legal basis for their collective security arrangements.⁸

Nations also broadly cite article 51 to legitimize the use of force outside the formal U.N. framework. For example, in 1978, Uganda and Tanzania made sustained attacks against each other along their common border, justifying the inherent right of self-defense under article 51. Between October 12 and 29, Uganda claimed it had repulsed Tanzania and proceeded to capture several hundred square miles of Tanzania. Tanzania waged retaliatory attacks and intervened in Uganda, claiming its action was an act of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. charter. These uses of force took place outside of the U.N. apparatus but justified actions based on the U.N. charter. Similarly, U.S. action in Grenada and Panama were justified partly on the right of self-defense.

Chapter VIII of the U.N. charter explicitly recognizes the role of regional organizations within the U.N. framework of collective security. Article 52 states that nothing precludes regional arrangements for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for regional action, provided the actions taken are consistent with the U.N. charter. Article 53 continues: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."

Although the U.N. charter authorizes regional organizations to help maintain international security within the U.N. framework, they can also act autonomously under article 51. For example, the League of Arab States, a regional organization with observer status at the United Nations, asserts that armed aggression directed against one of its members is directed against them all. The members are to undertake all means available, including armed force, to repel the aggression. In its Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, the League cites article 51 of the U.N. charter and the right of legal defense as its standards. Other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Economic Community of West African States, have similar arrangements.

⁸Considerably more security arrangements, both active and defunct, cited article 51 of the U.N. charter to legitimize their security arrangements. These treaties, such as the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty; the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance; and the Gulf Cooperation Council are all justified explicitly or implicitly on the basis of article 51.

Appendix I
U.N.'s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.
Charter

Regional organizations have also undertaken independent initiatives under article 51. For example, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States sent a monitoring force to Liberia to help bring about a cease-fire in its civil war. Fighting had begun in 1989 when Liberia's National Patriotic Liberation Front launched an attack against the forces of the President of Liberia; by August 1990, a third party, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia, entered the fight. In subsequent fighting, over 150,000 civilians were killed, 700,000 became refugees, neighboring Sierra Leone was used as a rebel base and invaded by one of the factions, and the peacekeeping force became involved in enforcement measures against the warring factions. The Security Council was not consulted nor had it approved the peacekeeping action before it took place. Nonetheless, in January 1991, the President of the Security Council commended the peacekeeping action, and in November 1992 the Security Council passed its first resolution in support of the Economic Community of West African States.

Regional organizations have also cooperated with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other operations. Subsequently, the Security Council and General Assembly have passed several resolutions encouraging further cooperation with regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping and other operations.

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading Peacekeeping

From its inception in 1945, the United Nations has led peacekeeping operations to help maintain international order. In 1946, military observers attached to a field mission established by the Security Council investigated allegations by Greece that neighboring states were making cross-border incursions. From 1948 to March 1997, the United Nations led 42 peace operations—34 peacekeeping, 4 authorized in whole or in part under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, and 4 where the mandates implied force was to be used to conduct operations. According to U.N. documents, over 750,000 military, civilian, and police personnel have participated in these missions. Table II.1 lists the peacekeeping and other missions led by the United Nations since 1948.

Table II.1: U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Peace Missions Since 1948

| Mission | Location | Years | Mandate and key U.N. authorizing documents |
|--|--------------------|--------------|---|
| The following are Peacekeeping missions (consent of parties; force authorized only in self-defense) | | | |
| U.N. Trace Supervision Organization | Palestine | 1948-ongoing | Supervise observance of truce in Palestine and various ceasefires. (Security Council Resolutions—S/Res/50, 73, 101, 236, 339) |
| U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan | India/Pakistan | 1949-ongoing | Supervise observance of ceasefires and agreements. (S/Res/47, 91, 201) |
| U.N. Emergency Force I | Egypt/Israel | 1956-67 | Secure and supervise ceasefire. (General Assembly Resolutions GA 998, 1000, 1001, 1125) |
| U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon | Lebanon | 1958-58 | Ensure no illegal infiltration of arms and personnel across Lebanese border. (S/Res/128) |
| U.N. Security Force in West Guinea | Indonesia | 1962-63 | Monitor ceasefire and help ensure order under U.N. supervised transfer of national administration from Netherlands to Indonesia. (GA 1752) |
| U.N. Yemen Observation Mission | Yemen | 1963-64 | Observe disengagement between Saudi-Arabia and Yemen. (S/Res/179) |
| U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus | Cyprus | 1964-ongoing | Use best efforts to prevent recurrence of fighting and contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order; supervise ceasefire. (S/Res/186; Aide-memoire of the Secretary General S/5653) |
| U.N. India Pakistan Observer Mission | India/Pakistan | 1965-66 | Supervise ceasefire. (S/Res/211) |
| Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic | Dominican Republic | 1965-66 | Observe and report on violations of ceasefire among warring parties. (S/Res/203) |

(continued)

**Appendix II
United Nations Has Precedent for Leading
Peacekeeping**

| Mission | Location | Years | Mandate and key U.N. authorizing documents |
|---|---|--------------|---|
| U.N. Emergency Force II | Egypt/Israel | 1973-79 | Supervise implementation of ceasefire and redeployment of forces. Use best efforts to prevent recurrence of fighting. (S/Res/340 and 341; Secretary General Report—S/11052 Rev.1) |
| U.N. Disengagement Observer Force | Israel/Syria | 1974-ongoing | Use best efforts to maintain ceasefire and its observance. (S/Res/350; S/11302/ADD.1) |
| U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan | Afghanistan/ Pakistan | 1988-90 | Assist personal representative of the Secretary General in ensuring implementation of agreements. (S/Res/622, 647) |
| U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group | Iran/Iraq | 1988-91 | Verify, confirm, supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. (S/Res/598, 619, 631, 642, 651) |
| U.N. Transition Assistance Group | Namibia (Angola, Cuba, South Africa) | 1989-90 | Help ensure cessation of hostilities, troop confinement to bases; supervise and ensure conditions for free and fair elections. (S/Res/435, 632) |
| U.N. Angola Verification Mission I | Angola | 1989-91 | Verify redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops. (S/Res/626) |
| U.N. Observer Group in Central America | Central America | 1989-92 | Verify agreement to cease arms and troop infiltration. Facilitate voluntary demobilization of Nicaraguan Contras. (S/Res/644, 650, 653) |
| U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia | Cambodia | 1991-92 | Assist parties to maintain ceasefire. (S/Res/717, 728) |
| U.N. Angola Verification Mission II | Angola | 1991-95 | Verify and monitor ceasefire; observe and monitor electoral process and elections. (S/Res/696, 747) |
| U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador | El Salvador | 1991-95 | Monitor, observe, and verify all aspects of agreements—human rights, cessation of armed conflict, and security situation, and elections. (S/Res/693, 729, 832) |
| U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara | Western Sahara | 1991-ongoing | Monitor and verify ceasefire, demobilization, prisoner exchanges; organize and ensure free and fair referendum. (S/Res/690, 907) |
| U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia | Cambodia | 1992-93 | Ensure implementation of Comprehensive Political Agreement; organize free and fair elections; oversee disarmament, reconstruction, repatriation, and control of government. (S/Res/745, 860, 880) |
| U.N. Operation in Somalia I | Somalia | 1992-93 | Monitor the agreed ceasefire, provide security for humanitarian relief operations, and assist in establishing security. (S/Res/751, 775, 794) |

(continued)

**Appendix II
United Nations Has Precedent for Leading
Peacekeeping**

| Mission | Location | Years | Mandate and key U.N. authorizing documents |
|---|----------------------------|--------------|---|
| U.N. Operation in Mozambique | Mozambique | 1992-94 | Help implement peace plan, including monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and demobilization of troops, monitoring elections, and help in the provision of humanitarian aid. (S/Res/797, 850, 879, 957) |
| U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda | Ugandan side of the border | 1993-94 | Monitor/verify that no military assistance crosses Rwanda-Uganda border. (S/Res/846, 872, 891, 928) |
| U.N. Mission in Haiti—initial phase | Haiti | 1993-96 | Help implement provisions of the Governor's Island agreement; assist in modernizing armed and police forces (S/Res/867, 905, 933) |
| U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia | Georgia | 1993-ongoing | Monitor and verify implementation of ceasefire agreement and observe situation; act as liaison with ongoing CIS peace missions. (S/Res/849, 854, 858, 881) |
| U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia | Liberia | 1993-ongoing | Monitor peace agreement in cooperation with ECOWAS peace operation. (S/Res/866, 911, 950, 972) |
| U.N. Aouzou Strip Observer Group | Chad | 1994-94 | Verify withdrawal of Libyan forces from Aouzou Strip between Libya and Chad. (S/Res/915) |
| U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan | Tajikistan | 1994-ongoing | Assist in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire and cessation of hostile acts and act as liaison with ongoing peace operations. (S/Res/968, 999, 1030, 1061) |
| U.N. Angola Verification Mission III | Angola | 1995-ongoing | Assist in compliance of the Lusaka Protocol, including ceasefire and humanitarian assistance. (S/Res/976, 1008, 1045) |
| U.N. Preventive Deployment Force | Macedonia | 1995-ongoing | Monitor and report on situation in border area. (S/Res/983, 1027, 1046) |
| U.N. Confidence Restoration Operations in Croatia | Croatia | 1995-ongoing | Assist in implementation of ceasefire agreement between Croatia and Serbia and controlling movement over Croatia's international borders. (S/Res/981, 990) |
| U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1995-ongoing | Assist and monitor law enforcement activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (S/Res/1035) |
| U.N. Mission of Observers in the Prevlaka | Croatia | 1996-ongoing | Observe and monitor situation along a narrow strip of land separating Croatia and Bosnia. (S/Res/1038) |
| U.N. Special Mission in Haiti | Haiti | 1996-ongoing | Assist the government of Haiti in maintaining a secure environment and professionalizing the civilian police. (S/Res/1063; S/1996/813) |

(continued)

**Appendix II
United Nations Has Precedent for Leading
Peacekeeping**

| Mission | Location | Years | Mandate and key U.N. authorizing documents |
|---|----------------------------|--------------|--|
| The following missions have mandates with objectives requiring some measure of force to be accomplished. | | | |
| U.N. Operations in the Congo | Congo (now Zaire) | 1960-64 | Take necessary steps to provide government of Congo with military assistance in fulfilling their tasks. Use requisite measure of force, if necessary, to apprehend, detain, and deport all foreign military and paramilitary personnel. (S/Res/143, 145, 146, 169) |
| U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) | Lebanon | 1978-ongoing | Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces; restore international security; assist government of Lebanon regain authority. Use best efforts to prevent recurrence of fighting and ensure area of operation is not used for hostile activity of any kind. Control movement and take all measures to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. (S/Res/425, 426; S/12611) |
| U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda | Rwanda | 1993-96 | Contribute to the security of Kigali; monitor ceasefire agreement. Assist in humanitarian relief. Contribute to security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk; establish secure humanitarian areas, where feasible; provide security for humanitarian relief operations. (S/Res/872, 918, 925) |
| U.N. Mission in Haiti—second phase | Haiti | 1995-96 | Assist in sustaining the secure and stable environment; protect international personnel and installations, and professionalize armed forces and police. (S/Res/940, 975) |
| The following missions were authorized under chapter VII to use force to carry out some objectives. | | | |
| U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission | Iraq-Kuwait | 1991-ongoing | Observe and, by its presence, deter violations of demilitarized zone. Take physical action to prevent or redress small-scale violations of DMZ. (S/Res/687, 806) |
| U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) | Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) | 1992-95 | Provide security for humanitarian relief; deter attacks against 6 safe areas, using air power from regional organizations, if necessary. (S/Res/764, 776, 836) |
| U.N. Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM) | Somalia | 1993-95 | Use enforcement measures to ensure a secure environment, disarm the warring factions, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and assist in rebuilding Somali institutions. (S/Res/814) |
| U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) | Eastern Slavonia | 1996-ongoing | Supervise demilitarization of Eastern Slavonia and organize elections. (S/Res/1037, 1043) |

**Appendix II
United Nations Has Precedent for Leading
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The U.N. Security Council has authorized member states or coalitions to lead several actions where the use of force, embargo, or sanctions were authorized. Table II.2 lists several important actions.

Table II.2: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Authorizing Member State Action

| Location and initial date | Leader and action | Main Security Council resolutions |
|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Korea 1950 | U.S.-led coalition defended South Korea against invasion by North Korea. | S/Res/83, 84, 85 |
| Rhodesia 1965 | British naval vessels imposed embargo and prevented ships from unloading oil in Rhodesia. | S/Res/217, 232, 253 |
| South Africa 1977 | All states impose arms and economic embargo International economic embargo without specific leadership. | S/Res/418 |
| Iraq 1990 | All states impose economic embargo on Iraq and Iraq forces in Kuwait; impose air and maritime embargo. U.S.-led coalition enforced Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. | S/Res/661, 665, 670, 678 |
| Iraq 1991 | U.S.-led coalition undertook humanitarian intervention (Operation Provide Comfort) to ensure security for Kurds in Iraq. Imposed a no-fly zone. | S/Res/688 |
| Former Yugoslavia 1991 | NATO countries lead a maritime, arms, and economic embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. | S/Res/757, 787 |
| Libya 1992 | All states impose economic sanctions on Libya. | S/Res/742 |
| Rwanda 1992, 1994 | International community imposes arms embargo on Rwanda. France uses all necessary means to protect safe areas and provide humanitarian relief. | S/Res/918, 929 |
| Somalia 1992-1993 | All states impose and arms embargo on Somalia. U.S.-led coalition uses all means necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief. | S/Res/733, 794 |
| Liberia 1992 | All states impose a weapons embargo on Liberia. | S/Res/788 |
| Bosnia 1993 | NATO enforces no-fly zone; and uses air power, with U.N. concurrence, to deter attacks against safe areas. | S/Res/816, 824 |
| Haiti 1993, 1994 | United States imposes maritime embargo against Haiti; leads multinational force to restore rightful authority to Haiti and provide secure environment. | S/Res/841, 873, 875, 917, 940 |

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

This appendix provides information on U.N. peace missions in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon, the Congo, and Haiti.

Somalia

The United Nations established UNOSOM I in April 1992, in response to civil war and the death of an estimated 500,000 Somalis. UNOSOM I was authorized to monitor a cease-fire, which had been negotiated among Somalia's warring clans, and escort relief convoys to feed the starving population. Within months, however, the U.N. Secretary General concluded that clan leaders were using force and the threat of force to prevent UNOSOM's deployment—only 564 of the authorized level of 4,219 troops had been allowed into Somalia by the end of 1992.

Accordingly, in December 1992, the United Nations authorized a U.S.-led mission, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, to create a secure environment for the humanitarian relief effort. With 37,000 troops, UNITAF opened the airport and seaport, repaired roads and airfields, and protected international agencies and nongovernment organizations. The Secretary General reported in January 1993 that UNITAF had escorted convoys delivering 25,000 tons of food. UNITAF also undertook limited disarmament by banning and confiscating heavy weapons and arms in its area of operations. However, UNITAF was deployed only in central and southern Somalia. Although UNITAF relied for the most part on a credible show of force to achieve its objective, it responded aggressively to occasional incidents of armed opposition. For example, when one faction violated the cease-fire by attacking another faction, UNITAF destroyed the heavy weapons of the aggressor and forced the faction to withdraw. In another incident, Nigerian forces under UNITAF repelled an attack by militias in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.

The United Nations resumed leadership of operations in May 1993 with UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II was authorized under chapter VII to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, disarm warring factions, assist in political reconciliation, and foster social and economic reconstruction. Its authorized troop level was 28,000 and, in addition, the United States provided a quick reaction force.

However, in transferring the mission from U.S. command to U.N. command, there were unresolved issues: the United States and United Nations did not agree on (1) the meaning of UNITAF's mandate, (2) the criteria for its withdrawal, or (3) the timing of the transition. The Secretary General expected UNITAF to create a secure environment throughout

Somalia by “neutralizing heavy weapons, disarming irregular forces and gangs, and inducing individuals to hand in their weapons.” However, UNITAF did not interpret its mandate as including coercive or large-scale disarmament of the Somali factions. Also, UNITAF established security not throughout the country, but only in the hardest-hit areas of central and southern Somalia. In regard to timing, the United States expected UNITAF to be a quick turnaround operation, with a U.N. takeover immediately as UNITAF withdrew. The Secretary General expected the transition to be gradual—but by the date of the transfer—May 4, 1993—most of the U.S. troops and senior civilian personnel had already been withdrawn.

Resource Constraints

Although UNOSOM II had a broader mandate than UNITAF in providing a secure environment and disarming the warring parties throughout the country, it was authorized 25 percent fewer troops. By July 1993, only 20,000 of the 28,000 authorized troops had been deployed. It was not until October 1993—6 months after UNOSOM II’s mandate had been approved—that full troop strength was reached. Furthermore, some contingents did not have armored personnel carriers and radio equipment capable of communicating directly with other contingents.

As a result, on June 5, 1993, barely 1 month after the transition, UNOSOM II troops were unable to respond adequately when faced with attacks from Somali factions during a planned U.N. arms inspection. Assaults were launched against the recently deployed Pakistanis, Nigerians, and Italians. The Pakistanis and the Nigerians were unable to contact the Italian brigade to ask for help. In those attacks, 24 Pakistanis were killed.

Command and Control Issues

A number of incidents revealed the limits on U.N. command and control, particularly in regard to following orders issued by the U.N. force commander. Waiting for instructions from their own national authorities, U.N. contingents sometimes did not adhere to orders from the force commander. For example, in one instance a contingent did not follow orders to remain in its area of responsibility in Mogadishu. Therefore, when fighting commenced in the contingent’s area, other national contingents were in a disadvantageous position. Moreover, the contingent appeared to act autonomously, starting negotiations with one of the warring Somali factions, declining to be a part of actions in Mogadishu, and successfully seeking to redeployment in another region of the country.¹

¹For an analysis of Somalia operations see U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).

On October 3, 1993, a U.S. force not under U.N. command executed a military strike against the stronghold of one of the faction leaders believed responsible for the killing of the peacekeepers. After the U.S. force came under extreme hostile fire, an extraction operation was mounted that included armored units from UNOSOM units. But the operation was not successful and the incident resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a consequent U.S. announcement that it would withdraw the bulk of its troops by March 31, 1994. Other nations also decided to remove their contingents but provided a holding action until March 1995, when all U.N. troops were removed.²

U.N. Approach to Conducting Operations

Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use force, it relied on the militias to voluntarily disarm and store their weapons in areas under their control. UNOSOM also provided the militias with written notice of planned inspections of weapons sites. However, when one such inspection on June 5, 1993, provoked attacks on the U.N. troops, UNOSOM beginning on June 12 launched a series of air and ground offensive operations against the militias. After 1 month, the Secretary General decided to return to peaceful disarmament of all factions and militias. However, the militias continued offensive operations and in November 1993, the Secretary General acknowledged the failure of this approach and further attempts to disarm the rival factions were halted.

UNOSOM II did not achieve major aspects of its mandate. It did not enforce the cease-fire, disarm the factions, or successfully repel attacks against its own troops. Clan fighting, looting, and banditry continued, attacks against relief organization personnel increased, and anti-UNOSOM propaganda was widely used.

However, UNOSOM II aided the delivery of humanitarian relief by escorting humanitarian convoys and providing security for humanitarian organizations and activities. UNOSOM II also facilitated discussion among the Somalis to promote national reconciliation, conducted field surveys and inspections for demining projects, refurbished office buildings and repaired court and prison facilities, certified district and regional councils, trained judicial personnel, and helped to establish a police force.

The Former Yugoslavia

Fighting began in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 when Serbia, the largest of the republics, forcibly attempted to prevent Croatia from becoming an

²For a discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia see, Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia (GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

independent nation. After fierce fighting, Croatia and Serbia signed a cease-fire. The Security Council established UNPROFOR in February 1992 to help (1) supervise the withdrawal of Serbian forces and demilitarize disputed areas and (2) return displaced persons to their homes and monitor human rights.

Bosnia, another republic, voted for independence in March 1992, and fighting broke out between the new Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs, who were opposed to independence from Serbia. In June 1992, the United Nations recognized Bosnia as an independent nation, and UNPROFOR's mission was extended to Bosnia. Over the following 3 years, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was mandated under chapter VII of the U.N. charter to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and (2) use necessary means, including air power from regional organizations, to deter attacks against six areas declared safe. Over the course of its existence, UNPROFOR gradually increased in size to an authorized strength of nearly 58,000 in June 1995. It was further supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which agreed to provide airstrikes to carry out UNPROFOR mandates and give close air support to defend UNPROFOR troops coming under hostile fire.

Overall, UNPROFOR had limited effectiveness in carrying out its enforcement mandates. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR did not effectively (1) deter attacks on the six safe areas or (2) protect its troops and staff from being taken hostage. Sarajevo, 1 of the 6 safe areas, was bombarded regularly by Bosnian Serbs, resulting in an estimated 10,000 killed or missing and 60,000 wounded between 1992 and February 1995. Bihac, another safe area, was attacked in November 1994, with airstrikes and missiles launched from an airbase in Croatia. The Security Council authorized limited NATO airstrikes on the airfield, but Bosnian and Croatian Serbs continued their attacks on the ground and nearly overran Bihac. During this time, UNPROFOR troops were taken hostage. On successive days in early December 1994, between 316 and 439 UNPROFOR personnel became hostages.³

Lack of Resources

The inability to obtain Security Council approval for troops to carry out the U.N.'s mandate to deter attacks against the six safe areas hindered U.N. efforts in Bosnia. In January 1994, the U.N. Secretary General had stated that 34,000 additional troops would be necessary to fulfill the mandate. The Security Council, however, responded by authorizing only

³For an analysis of U.N. operations in Bosnia see, *Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia* (GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995) and *Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia* (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, April 13, 1994).

7,600 more troops. Thus, the United Nations did not deploy armed forces sufficient to deter attacks against the safe areas of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa.

Issues of Command and Control

Problems also occurred with command and control of the troops in Bosnia, limiting UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its mandates. Similar to the incident in Somalia, one troop contingent refused to redeploy to Mostar, saying that the order exceeded UNPROFOR's responsibilities. When the matter was discussed by the Security Council and the troop contingent's government, it became clear that a difference in interpretation of the mandate was at issue. According to U.N. officials, the Security Council considered the order to redeploy to be a valid part of UNPROFOR's mandate; on the other hand, the troop contingent's government regarded redeployment as an unacceptable risk and outside of its agreement.

U.N. Approach to the Use of Force

Although UNPROFOR had authority under chapter VII to use force to carry out some of its tasks, it still sought consent from the warring parties to take certain actions. UNPROFOR asked for permission for its vehicles to move from one area to another, agreed to the imposition of roadblocks that impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as equipment for its forces, and permitted warring parties to have a say in where troops would be placed along confrontation lines. Thus, according to the director of UNPROFOR's civil affairs group, Bosnian operations functioned as peacekeeping missions (where consent is a requirement) despite the mandates' authorization of enforcement authority. UNPROFOR was also reluctant to call for NATO airstrikes to help it deter attacks against areas declared safe by U.N. mandates.

In July 1995, Croatian Serb forces crossed the Bosnian border to join with Bosnian Serb troops for another attack on the Bihac pocket. But Bihac did not fall. In July 1995, the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa were attacked and fell to Bosnian Serb forces, resulting in the flight of thousands of inhabitants and the killing of others, as confirmed in July 1996 investigations of mass gravesites near Srebrenica.

In response to such attacks, the Security Council authorized a rapid reaction force composed of heavily armed troops, artillery, and helicopters. The rapid reaction force reported to the U.N. command but operated under robust rules of engagement and did not wear the traditional blue helmets signifying peacekeeping or paint its vehicles white

as did other UNPROFOR units. Following the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the North Atlantic Council further agreed to take more vigorous steps to prevent further Bosnian Serb aggression and stated that airstrikes would be carried out under existing Security Council resolutions and did not need further U.N. authorization. In December 1995, UNPROFOR ended its mission and was replaced with a peace enforcement mission led by NATO.

Although UNPROFOR did not achieve its enforcement mandates in Bosnia, it did help the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations provide vital humanitarian aid for three winters. UNPROFOR provided logistical support, security, and escorts. It also operated Sarajevo airport from 1992 to 1994, which allowed Sarajevo to receive most of its food when road access was cut off. Finally, UNPROFOR helped deter banditry and undertook confidence-building measures, such as joint patrols to facilitate the federation between Bosnian Muslims and Croats; helped negotiate arrangements to reduce fighting in besieged enclaves such as Maglaj and Vitez; and arranged for the demilitarization of hundreds of kilometers of confrontation lines.

Rwanda

A 3-year civil war between Rwanda's two main ethnic groups—the Hutu, who led the Rwandan government, and the Tutsi, who led the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—ended in August 1993 when the two sides signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. Two months later, the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor the cease-fire, contribute to the security of Kigali, and coordinate humanitarian assistance.

The civil war resumed after the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed when their airplane was shot down on April 6, 1994. Hutus began massacring Tutsis. In response, the RPF launched a military offensive, and the government collapsed. The Security Council withdrew all but 440 of the 2,486 UNAMIR troops and adopted a second mandate on April 21, directing UNAMIR to act as an mediator between the warring parties. As ethnic and political violence intensified, the Secretary General reported that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 people had been massacred and well over 1 million had either been internally displaced or had become refugees in neighboring countries. On May 17, 1994, the Security Council approved a third mandate, establishing UNAMIR II and authorizing it to (1) protect displaced persons, refugees, and civilians under threat, using force to establish safe zones and (2) provide security for the distribution of humanitarian aid.

Lack of Resources

The U.N. Secretary General had planned a deployment of U.N. military forces in three stages during the spring of 1994. This deployment was to take 31 days, or until mid-June. Nevertheless, full troop strength did not occur until November, despite UNAMIR's repeated requests. During this time, the Security Council debated about whether member states would actually provide the needed resources. Because of this delay, UNAMIR was not able to provide security to the hundreds of thousands of displaced and endangered civilians.

During the month of July, the RPF defeated the Rwandan government army, unilaterally declared a cease-fire, and established a new government, effectively ending the civil war. However, as a result of the RPF's advance in the northwest, about 1.2 million Hutus began to flee toward the southwest and crossed into Zaire. An estimated 10,000 refugees per hour went over the border and entered the town of Goma, Zaire. This massive influx of refugees created a severe humanitarian crisis. In November 1994, the Security Council approved UNAMIR's fourth mandate, adding to its existing tasks the responsibilities of (1) providing security for the U.N. International Tribunal for Rwanda⁴ and human rights officers and (2) assisting in training a national police force.

Although UNAMIR was not authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, its mandates to protect displaced persons and refugees as well as establish secure sanctuaries for endangered civilians implied that force was to be used to carry out the mandate. However, UNAMIR was not able to prevent or significantly mitigate the ethnic and political violence during the civil war. Weak command and control as well as the absence of a U.N. enforcement doctrine were not major factors in the Rwandan situation. According to the U.N. officials and representatives of humanitarian organizations, an estimated 500,000 men, women, and children—or over 45 percent of the Tutsi population—were murdered during the conflict. Estimates are that from 200,000 to 300,000 of them were killed after UNAMIR II's mandate was approved.

After a Rwandan government was reestablished in late July 1994, UNAMIR had only limited success in fulfilling its mandate. The operation did not protect displaced persons and refugees from government soldiers and other armed groups. For example, UNAMIR was unable to protect refugees enroute to their home communes, according to the Secretary General's reports. In January and April 1995, UNAMIR did not protect displaced

⁴On November 8, 1994, the U.N. Security Council established an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighboring countries.

persons at two camps in southwest Rwanda when government soldiers opened fire on the camps, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people—including women and children. Finally, UNAMIR has not been able to create a secure environment within Rwanda to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees. According to U.N. reports, the security situation continues to deteriorate, the number of people detained by the government for their alleged involvement in the genocide remains high, reports of government executions and torture persist, and banditry as well as other acts of violence against civilians have occurred.

The operation has, however, provided security to human rights monitors, the International Tribunal, U.N. specialized agency personnel, and nongovernmental organizations; escorted humanitarian convoys; helped resettle thousands of displaced persons; and trained candidates for Rwanda's national police force.

Lebanon

The United Nations established UNIFIL in 1978 after an Israeli incursion into South Lebanon in response to a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) attack near Tel Aviv that killed 37 and wounded 76. UNIFIL had three major objectives: (1) confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the international border, (2) restore peace and security to South Lebanon, and (3) help the government of Lebanon restore its authority there. To that end, UNIFIL was directed to establish and maintain an area of operation in South Lebanon to serve as a buffer between the combatants, supervise and monitor the established cease-fire, and ensure the "peaceful character" of its area of operations by making certain that no unauthorized armed personnel entered and by controlling movement within. UNIFIL was authorized to use force only in self-defense, which included resistance to attempts by forcible means to prevent UNIFIL from accomplishing its mandated objectives. UNIFIL was directed to take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. As the daunting nature of its task became apparent, the United Nations increased UNIFIL's size from 4,000 to 6,000 personnel in 1978, and to 7,000 in early 1982. Currently, UNIFIL has about 4,500 U.N. peacekeepers.

According to U.N. reports, UNIFIL was unable to accomplish its mandate from its inception, in part because the Israeli government and PLO authorities never fully accepted it. UNIFIL could not establish a clear and effective area of operation in South Lebanon. Israeli and PLO authorities were unable to agree on the tasks UNIFIL should undertake, and so could not consent to an area of operation. In addition, Israeli forces did not

withdraw fully from South Lebanon and turned some positions over to the “de facto” forces (the Christian militia, led by Major Saad Haddad and later known as the South Lebanon Army) instead of UNIFIL. The de facto forces, which were financed, trained, and equipped by Israel, at times denied UNIFIL units freedom of movement in South Lebanon and subjected them to severe harassment. Israeli, de facto, and PLO forces also opposed any movement of the Lebanese Army into parts of South Lebanon, preventing the government of Lebanon from restoring its authority in these areas.

As a result, intense exchanges of fire and infiltration continued after UNIFIL deployed. Attempting to reduce infiltration, UNIFIL units were redeployed and efforts were made to improve its surveillance capabilities. However, given the difficulty of the terrain, the lack of clear enforcement powers, and the noncooperation of the parties, the United Nations recognized that it was virtually impossible to prevent infiltration attempts. In June 1982, in response to worldwide PLO attacks on Israeli civilians and officials, Israel again invaded Lebanon. UNIFIL forces attempted to delay the Israeli advance, but lightly armed UNIFIL units were no match for heavily armed Israeli forces. The entire UNIFIL area of operation was soon completely behind Israeli lines.

Lack of Resources

Part of the problem in restoring order in Lebanon is that no political consensus has emerged on how to deal with the situation. Consequently no nation has been willing to provide the troops and equipment necessary to effectively carry out the mandate. UNIFIL has lacked the forces to prevent Hezbollah (the Islamic fundamentalist group) from attacking Israel. Nevertheless, UNIFIL stands as a symbol of U.N. resolve to provide humanitarian assistance to the local Lebanese population.

Regarding command and control, weaknesses in this area remain. These weaknesses inhibit UNIFIL’s ability to coordinate actions and most effectively deploy U.N. forces. However, the underlying operational issue is the lack of clear international will and consensus to effectively carry out the U.N. mandates.

In a January 1996 report, the Secretary General stated that the situation in Lebanon was unchanged, with Southern Lebanon still occupied and UNIFIL’s mandate to help restore Lebanese sovereignty unfulfilled. This situation was underscored in April 1996, when Hezbollah launched rocket attacks on northern Israel from locations near UNIFIL headquarters. In retaliation, Israel fired artillery fire at the locations, and several days of

exchanges ensued. During one of the exchanges, over 100 Lebanese civilians were killed in the compound area of one of the UNIFIL contingents.

The Congo

The U.N. Operations in the Congo⁵ (ONUC) was not authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter but stands as the earliest example of a large U.N. peacekeeping effort that used force in carrying out its mandate. The Congo, an area the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River and with 14 million people, became independent of Belgium in June of 1960, but was ill prepared for this responsibility. Belgium had allowed little freedom in the Congo, with rights to free speech and a free press permitted just 6 months before independence. Thus, the Congolese lacked the political traditions to function as a nation state. Belgium agreed to assist in the transition by providing administrators and technical assistance. Belgium also agreed to help maintain security for the transition to independence and was to continue to command the 24,000-man Congolese national police. Just days after independence and the election of the first President, the police force rioted after promotions and pay increases were denied by the Belgian commander. Belgium subsequently sent in troops to protect its citizens from the general breakdown of order.

On July 14, just 2 weeks after the police revolt, the first of six U.N. mandates for intervention was adopted. The two main goals of this early phase were to (1) establish law and order and (2) facilitate the withdrawal of the Belgian forces. The Security Council viewed the Belgian and other foreign mercenary presence as a threat to decolonization. However, Belgium insisted it had no further territorial designs on the Congo, and the official Belgian troops left speedily. As the U.N. intervention proceeded, the new government suffered a civil and constitutional crisis: the resource-rich Katanga province seceded, with the help of foreign mercenaries. In addition, the President and Prime Minister of the newly organized government emerged as combatants, using their own forces and supporters to fight each other.

Lack of Resources

At its peak strength in July 1961, ONUC numbered over 19,800 troops. According to U.N. military officials at the time, the total number of forces were insufficient to provide security for a country as large as the Congo. Nevertheless, according to U.N. and other studies, this lack of troops was

⁵The former Congo, or Leopoldville, changed its name to Zaire in 1971. The country now known as the Congo is a small neighbor that has never been the subject of peacekeeping.

not as great a problem as the inability to deploy them to strategic locations.

Command and Control

Regarding weaknesses in command and control, some national contingents operated outside of the U.N. chain of command to bolster their own national interests. For example, one U.N. contingent disarmed parts of the Congolese police and were later told they had acted beyond their mandate and had to return the weapons. Another contingent was ordered to apprehend mercenaries as called for under Security Council Resolution 144. However, the contingent resisted this order, saying it exceeded the contingent's mandate.

In another instance during operations in Katanga, ONUC troops executed a plan to both eliminate the foreign mercenaries and secure ONUC's unimpeded movement throughout the country. After successfully advancing and executing phases of the plan, ONUC troops were ordered to halt. However, they continued to advance and secured the town of Jadotville, a major stronghold of one of the political factions. The failure to halt operations was blamed on a communication failure. However, a report explained "The commanding officer in the field decided that militarily, at any rate, he had no choice but to deal with the military situation before him. In this decision he had in mind, particularly, his military training; the security and morale of his troops; the scorched-earth threats of Mr. Tshombe; the information obtained from two captured mercenaries that Mr. Tshombe had just been exhorting them to hold up the ONUC advance for three days after which world public opinion would force the United Nations to withdraw . . ."⁶

Approach to Conducting Operations

Because of concerns about intruding into the Congo's domestic sovereign affairs, ONUC operated with the consent of the warring factions and this limited its ability to effectively conduct operations. Disruptions in building up troop strength and redistributing forces throughout the country occurred. The United Nations, in dealing with the provincial government in Katanga, agreed to restrictions and introduced about 500 U.N. troops per month to the area, leading to a 2-year buildup to full strength. Further, ONUC assented to its troops being placed in restricted locations.

Thousands were killed and atrocities occurred, but ONUC could not prevent many of the human rights violations in Katanga. Further, the U.N. forces

⁶Report of the Secretary General, S/5053/Add. 14, Annex XXXIV.

were viewed by some as intrusive and partisan and sometimes exceeded their mandate by either taking action or refusing to take action. The Security Council issued further mandates in an effort to deal with the complex, evolving situation, first authorizing ONUC to use of “force in the last resort” to prevent civil war in February 1961. Later mandates included wording, such as “to bring Congolese forces under control,” that led to a severe breakdown in U.N.-Congolese government relations. The President of the Congo accused the Secretary General of duping him into agreeing to a U.N. force and claimed the international attorneys had deceived him. Indeed, disgruntled by ONUC’s actions, the various factions attacked the U.N. forces. In one incident in April 1961, 44 Ghanian peacekeepers were killed in an ambush by ANC troops and in November 1961, 13 Italian peacekeepers were killed.

ONUC finally did help restore security and end the secession of Katanga province, but many other elements in the ONUC mandate were incompletely fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. For example, the Congolese police force was not reformed. The deaths of 234 peacekeepers and of U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and the disputes about whether member states were obligated to pay for the Congo action resulted in a political and financial crisis for the United Nations.

Haiti

The crisis in Haiti began in September 1991, when the democratically elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide went into exile after being deposed in a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras. In June 1993, following nearly 2 years of human rights abuses by the coup leaders, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic and political sanctions on Haiti. In July, President Aristide and General Cedras met at Governors Island, New York, and signed an agreement for President Aristide’s return to power in October 1993. In September 1993, the Security Council authorized UNMIH to implement the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement. However, armed groups of individuals prevented UNMIH contingents from landing in Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital. The Security Council reimposed sanctions, but political assassinations and human rights abuses continued.

Then, in July 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 940 under chapter VII of the U.N. charter and mandated a multinational force (MNF) led by the United States to use the means necessary to (1) facilitate the departure of the military leadership and to restore the legitimate government to power and (2) establish and maintain a secure and stable

environment during the transition. In September 1994, hours before the MNF planned to intervene in Haiti, General Cedras stepped down.

Consisting of approximately 20,000 troops from more than 25 countries, the MNF quickly established itself throughout Haiti. The majority of troops were in the two major cities, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, but MNF special forces teams were also based in 27 towns and operated in about 500 locations. The MNF disbanded the Haitian army and took control of its heavy weapons. Army officers above the rank of major remained in place without function until the beginning of 1995, when they were dismissed by President Aristide. In addition, the MNF disbanded paramilitary groups and confiscated about 33,000 weapons—20,000 from seizures, including heavy weapons from the Haitian army units—and more than 13,000 from a buy-back program. Both the U.N. and the Haitian government expressed concerns that weapons were still in the hands of government opponents. However, the MNF found no evidence of remaining weapons caches, although it had conducted confiscation raids and instituted traffic checkpoints in the capital. According to the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and local human rights organizations, a significant decrease occurred in political violence and human rights abuses compared to previous levels.

Resources

Because the United States considered actions in Haiti to be in the national interest, the second phase of UNMIH was able to call on U.S. resources as needed. The United States led the MNF that preceded UNMIH, committing 18,000 U.S. military personnel, helicopters, and naval support. In addition, the United States gave the United Nations considerable information and provided military logisticians and planners. When the MNF made its transition to a U.N.-led activity, the U.S. sponsored training programs on command and control, doctrine, and operations for many of the UNMIH troops and civilians. Valuable logistical support contracts for rations, supplies, and equipment already in place were supplied to the second phase of UNMIH until the U.N. bidding process could begin. Of considerable assistance, too, was the quick reaction force of 1,500, including 550 special forces and helicopters, that stayed in place to bolster security. And it was clear that should trouble reoccur, further U.S. resources would be close at hand.

By March 1995, the MNF had successfully completed its mandate and returned control of operations to UNMIH, which under its second phase was authorized 6,000 troops and 800 civilian police. Although UNMIH was

authorized under chapter VI of the U.N. charter, its expectations were to ensure a secure environment while the Haitian government resumed full civilian control. By the end of March, the United Nations had successfully deployed nearly all its troops and most of its senior civilian staff to Haiti. About 70 percent of UNMIH had been part of the MNF, and the United Nations had to arrange for the additional deployment of contingents from seven countries. Five of these had arrived by the transition date—only two small contingents had not yet come.⁷ Similarly, the U.N. civilian staff landed in Haiti according to plan, as the 50-person advance team in the country since November 1994 was gradually augmented. With its military and civilian leadership in place, the United Nations commissioned the United States to conduct a week-long training course for military and civilian officials in early March to foster implementation of command and control arrangements, common understanding of rules of engagement, and coordination between military and civilian components of the mission.

Command and Control

While the second phase of UNMIH was a U.N. operation, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was a primary actor in planning maneuvers for both the MNF and the transition to U.N. command and control. The UNMIH force commander was a U.S. Major General who reported to the U.N. special representative of the Secretary General; however, for military issues, he was directly responsible to USACOM and in command of military decisions. All other national contingents received their operational orders through coordination with the U.S. special forces troops, who had the communications equipment to ensure that orders were accurately relayed. In addition, about two-fifths of the UNMIH forces were U.S. troops. These troops were placed with other national contingents in such important areas as the Haitian capital, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives. While UNMIH was clearly a U.N. operation, the chain of command for military matters was led by the U.S. commander. Furthermore, operational orders were expected to be carried out through the liaison process led by U.S. special forces.

Approach to Conducting Operations

In the second phase of the UNMIH operation, an accepted, clear doctrine was present. This doctrine relied on six principles: (1) implementing explicitly defined objectives, (2) emphasizing unity of effort, (3) ensuring adequate security for itself, (4) exercising restraint, (5) being perseverant, and (6) ensuring legitimacy. The United States employs these principles in operations other than war. While obtaining the consent of the warring

⁷Negotiations were continuing for the possible deployment of a small contingent from a third country.

parties was an important element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH, it was only one portion of the doctrine. Stressing a united team effort and security, UNMIH retained military, political, and informational advantage over potential warring parties. UNMIH also was proactive and took the initiative in using assertive actions when necessary to carry out the mandate. For example, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches, actively disarming Haitians in certain situations in order to ensure a secure environment.

From April to July 1995, UNMIH assisted the government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment, professionalizing the armed forces, creating a separate police force, and establishing an environment conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections. Since the MNF had destroyed military opposition to the government, criminal and vigilante activity was the major threat to public safety. During March, there were 101 reported murders; this number dropped to 79 in April, 75 in May, and 63 in June. The June 1995 local and parliamentary elections were held in a relatively secure environment. However, election rallies and meetings of the opposition were disrupted, and 94 vigilante murders occurred between March and June, including the assassinations of prominent Haitian politicians and former members of the disbanded Haitian armed forces.

To maintain a secure environment for run-off elections and the presidential election in December, UNMIH increased patrols and provided greater protection for the President of Haiti. However, in November, an attack on two supporters of the President caused violent demonstrations. The quick reaction force was proactive in responding to the demonstrations, and UNMIH increased patrols in the area to stabilize the situation. Nevertheless, following an emotional funeral speech by the President, violence broke out, particularly in Port-au-Prince, Gonaives, and Cap Haitien. At least seven people were killed. UNMIH again reestablished control, but the violence underscored the fragile security situation. In December 1995, presidential elections were held in a secure and generally peaceful environment.⁸

The gradual withdrawal of UNMIH's contingents began in December 1995, and the final U.S. contingent of UNMIH withdrew from Haiti in April 1996. The Secretary General, however, recommended UNMIH continue with a small force to help ensure a peaceful transition. In April 1996, a force of 1,500 troops and 250 police was approved by the Security Council and remains in place.

⁸See *Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process* (GAO/NSIAD-96-147, July 5, 1996).

Comments From the Department of State



United States Department of State

Chief Financial Officer

Washington, D.C. 20520-7427


February 20, 1997

Dear Mr. Hinton:

The Department of State has reviewed your draft report, "UNITED NATIONS: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace," GAO Job Code 711093, and generally concurs with the conclusions of the report. The Department appreciates the opportunity to review this and other GAO studies.

We have faxed to your staff some suggestions for technical corrections to the report. If you have any questions concerning this response, please call Mr. Norman Hastings, IO/PHO, at (202) 736-7740.

Sincerely,


Richard L. Greene

cc:

GAO - Mr. Miyabara
STATE/PHO - Mr. Hastings

Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr,
Assistant Comptroller General,
National Security and International Affairs,
U.S. General Accounting Office.

Comments From the Department of Defense



STRATEGY
AND
REQUIREMENTS

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FEB 1997

Mr. Benjamin F. Nelson
Director, International Relations and Trade Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Nelson:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "UNITED NATIONS: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace," dated January 14, 1997, (GAO Code 711093/OSD Case 1279). The Department welcomes the opportunity to comment on the report. Our technical comments were provided separately.

We have reviewed the draft report and have three points that we want to highlight. First, the report concludes that "[g]iven its limitations in leading operations requiring the use of force, the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for heading missions where force is required to restore peace and order if vital U.S. national interests are at stake, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military capability and commitment leads the operation." We agree with this conclusion. The Administration has held for three years that peacekeeping operations led by the UN are not likely to be the best mechanism to meet our vital national interests and that we should not rely on the United Nations or any other international organization to safeguard these interests. In fact, the Clinton Administration's policy as outlined in *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* issued in May 1994 states: "... the U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake."

Second, the report identifies three factors that limit the United Nations ability to execute missions requiring the use of force. These factors are: (1) the UN must rely on sovereign member states to volunteer the means for carrying out missions; (2) UN force commanders cannot always be sure that orders will be carried out; and (3) the UN's core principles of total neutrality and seeking consent of warring parties have limited the organization's effective use of force to restore peace. We believe that in any mission, the causal factors of success or failure are many and diverse. The GAO analysis and attribution of cause are, in our view, too limited in scope, given the complexity of events in the seven disparate operations that occurred over a period of nearly four decades. For example, the report compares the 1960 UN operation in the Congo




(ONUC) with several post-Cold War operations but does not adequately address the differences in geopolitical and other contextual variables that affected the execution of these missions. Further, we are not convinced by the argument presented that the three factors enumerated in the report were the causal factors. We note that the limitations on UN capabilities to carry out operations requiring the use of force are a function, in part, of the organization's institutional structure as well as such critical points as the level of consensus among member states and member states' commitment to the mission and their willingness to bear its costs. The complexity of undertaking operations requiring the use of force should not be underestimated; neither should we underestimate the complexity of synthesizing the diplomatic and military viewpoints of the member states that constitute the UN Security Council in order to initiate action.

Third, the report fails to highlight the lessons that have been learned regarding peace operations by the United States, other states and the United Nations Secretariat over the past few years. The Somalia and Bosnia operations led the international community to reassess the conditions under which force can be used effectively for peacekeeping both under direct UN auspices and in multinational coalition operations endorsed by the UN. Consequently, the United States, working with other interested states and the UN Secretariat, has developed a more effective approach to peacekeeping as illustrated by the operations in Haiti, that is, the Multi-National Force (MNF) and UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) which followed it, and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.

With a clear understanding of their limits, our policy is to continue to view UN peacekeeping operations as an important option through which force may be exercised collectively by the international community to address problems of international peace and security. Of course, the Administration will never relinquish its right to act unilaterally to protect the nation's interests. In the dynamic environment of today's world, we need a wide range of approaches to address the many challenges to peace and stability that we face.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the report.


Edward L. Warner, III

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Related GAO Products

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates
(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).

Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).

Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).

Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).

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Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States
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Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995)

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Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).

Haiti: Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991 Military Coup
(GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 5, 1993).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability
(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).

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