

GAO

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Military Personnel, Committee on
National Security, House of
Representatives

April 1998

BOSNIA

Military Services
Providing Needed
Capabilities but a Few
Challenges Emerging





**United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548**

**National Security and
International Affairs Division**

B-277889

April 29, 1998

The Honorable Steve Buyer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Dayton Peace Accords, signed on December 14, 1995, are designed to end several years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. One part of the accords involves the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition force to Bosnia-Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia, to implement the peace agreement. In February 1998, NATO's North Atlantic Council voted to continue the mission in Bosnia indefinitely.

Concerned about how the military services will obtain the needed capabilities for continued operations, you asked us to examine how the military services (1) have provided the needed capabilities for the operation thus far and (2) plan to provide them in the future. You also asked us to examine the President's ability to call up reserves under his Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority. This report focuses on the Army and the Air Force because they have provided the vast majority of the needed capabilities.

Background

Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces in and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords. U.S. forces are part of a multilateral coalition under the command of NATO. From December 1995 to December 1996, the coalition was called the Implementation Force (IFOR). In December 1996, NATO authorized a new mission and renamed the coalition the Stabilization Force (SFOR). That mission was scheduled to end in June 1998 but has since been extended indefinitely. In voting to continue the mission, the North Atlantic Council retained the name SFOR. The Council stated that the extent of support over time will be adapted to developments in the political and security situation and to progress in the implementation of the civilian elements of the accords. Force levels will be reviewed at regular intervals. The United States has been a major force provider to the mission, as shown in table 1.

Table 1: U.S. Military Personnel Contribution to IFOR and SFOR^a

	Military personnel	
	United States ^b	Total
IFOR ^c	16,200	54,000
SFOR ^d	8,300	31,000

^aU.S. military personnel includes people in both the active and reserve components.

^bAdditional U.S. military personnel were located in the neighboring countries of Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. These persons totaled 6,000 in support of IFOR and 3,400 in support of SFOR.

^cAs of July 1996.

^dAs of February 1998.

The SFOR level will likely remain at 31,000, but the United States is seeking to reduce its troop commitment in Bosnia to 6,900. The United States plans to continue basing about 3,400 troops in neighboring countries.

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission, he may use PSRC authority, which allows for the activation of up to 200,000 reservists at any one time, with each reservist limited to no more than 270 days of involuntary service. In December 1995, the President invoked this authority for the Bosnia mission.

Results in Brief

The military services have successfully provided needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years. The U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has provided the majority of Army forces, augmented with reserve forces and active forces from the United States. Because USAREUR units are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, the Army had to borrow personnel from nondeploying units so that deploying units could deploy with the required number of people. Also, because the operation did not always require entire units, the Army deployed partial ones. These steps enabled the Army to meet the mission's needs but, in some cases, have had an adverse impact on the parent units that have provided personnel. The U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) has provided the majority of air forces, augmented with U.S.-based active and reserve forces. Both services have used their reserve components to meet the mission requirements because some critical support capabilities reside primarily or solely in the reserves and because use of the reserves reduces the high level of activity of some active forces. Most Army reservists were

involuntarily activated through PSRC, while most Air Force Air Reserve Component members were volunteers.

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army and the Air Force are currently developing plans for a follow-on force. Though the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and the aviation-related requirements for the mission can be filled, about a dozen unit capabilities will require special attention in the future because the capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these capabilities have already been used. Requirements for these capabilities have totaled several hundred persons per rotation. To satisfy future mission needs, the military services and the U.S. Atlantic Command are considering using similar capabilities in the other military services, asking for greater participation from other countries, and contracting for some of the needed capabilities.

Some reservists have served for fewer than the 270 days that the PSRC statute allows. Because the statute does not prohibit multiple involuntary activations if the total does not exceed the 270-day limit, some of these reservists could be recalled to serve up to the full activation period. In addition, the Bosnia mission has led to a situation in which in some instances all of the reservists with needed capabilities have been ordered to duty and served the maximum time allowed for a single call-up. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has stated that the current policy is that the Department of Defense will not request that the President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists who have already served 270 days.

USAREUR and USAFE Have Supported Bosnia Mission With Some Help From Reserve and U.S.-Based Active Forces

USAREUR is the major Army command primarily responsible for providing people for the Bosnia mission. Because USAREUR units are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, deployed units were augmented with personnel from other European units and active and reserve forces from the United States. At the same time, the relatively small size of the U.S. force in Bosnia required the Army to deploy partial units. USAFE is the principal Air Force command providing people for the mission. The Air Force's personnel requirements are much smaller and the nature of the Air Force's responsibilities allows for extensive use of reserve component volunteers.

Army and Air Force Reserves Have Supported the Bosnia Mission

Almost 16,000 Army reservists and about 10,000 Air Force Air Reserve Component members have participated in the Bosnia mission between its inception in December 1995 and January 1998. Most of the Army reservists were involuntarily called to active duty under PSRC, whereas most Air Force reservists volunteered to participate in the Bosnia mission. Reserve units have participated because some required support capabilities reside primarily or solely in the reserves. For example, most of the Army's movement control teams, civil affairs units, and fire fighter detachments are in the reserves. Of the 36 civil affairs units in the Army, only 1 is in the active force. The remainder are in the Army reserve. Reserve units also have been used to reduce the high level of activity of some active forces. For example, the Army uses reserve military police to relieve the high personnel tempo of active-duty military police units, and the Air Force uses reserve aircrews to relieve the high personnel tempo of its active-duty aircrews.

Army Personnel Needed to Be Added to Forces/Units Deploying to Bosnia

Augmentation from reserve forces and U.S.-based active forces was required because USAREUR did not possess all the personnel and capabilities the mission needs. According to USAREUR documents, prior to the first deployment to Bosnia in December 1995, the units chosen to deploy were staffed at 87 percent of required strength, whereas deployed forces were required to be at least at 92 percent of required strength. Further, 8 to 10 percent of these units' personnel were not deployable for a variety of reasons. To bring these units to at least 92 percent of required strength, personnel had to be shifted from other USAREUR units and from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, a process known as cross-leveling.

Throughout the Bosnia mission, individuals have been needed to augment headquarters staffs at USAREUR, U.S. European Command, the American contingent of various NATO command elements such as the SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, and actual units. FORSCOM provided 1,035 active component individual augmentees to support Bosnia, while the Army Reserve Personnel Center and the U.S. Army Reserve Command provided another 1,613 Army Reserve individual augmentees.

Army Deploys Some Split-Based and New Units to Bosnia

The relatively small size of the U.S. portion of SFOR has not always required deploying entire units. According to FORSCOM and USAREUR officials, active units have employed split-based operations. Split-based operations occur when only parts of units are deployed and the elements left behind must

continue to perform their missions at the home station. For example, as of January 1998, elements of the First Armor Division's headquarters, military intelligence, signal, artillery, and support command were deployed to Bosnia, while the rest of the division, including its combat brigades, did not deploy. Split-basing has been a strain on USAREUR units. For example, during SFOR, USAREUR reported to the Department of the Army through its Status of Resources and Training System, which is used to measure readiness, that split-basing had a negative impact on the readiness of several of its units because of reduced personnel, equipment levels, or a combination of both factors at home station.

For reserve units, the Army also has engaged in split-based operations. In many instances, the Army extracted elements of existing units and formed them into what is known as derivative units. It has been staffing derivative units with individuals drawn from the original unit and other Selected Reserve units.¹ According to its mobilization data, the Army formed over 700 derivative units for the Bosnia mission since December 1995. Examples of derivative units that have been mobilized for Bosnia include the target acquisition radar elements of National Guard divisions, elements of Army Reserve garrison support units, and platoons from postal companies. According to a FORSCOM operations official, extracting these elements often affects the ability of the parent unit to conduct its normal peacetime activities, such as training, much in the same way that it has affected split-based active units. In responding to a draft of this report, the Army stated that a positive effect of split-based operations is that the redeploying soldiers can bring better developed or newly acquired skills to the unit.

The Army has also created derivative units, such as various mobilization support detachments, that are not elements of existing units. These detachments are ad hoc units created for the sole purpose of activating individuals with assorted capabilities that are needed to meet miscellaneous individual requirements. According to an Army Reserve Personnel Center official, this was done because PSRC authority did not allow for the call-up of individuals unless they were members of a unit in the Selected Reserve. The requirements have been met in part by members who initially belonged to the Individual Ready Reserve² but volunteered to join the Selected Reserve temporarily so that they could be subject to PSRC.

¹The Selected Reserve includes individuals assigned to units, trained personnel assigned to active organizations, and individuals who have not completed initial training.

²The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised of officers and enlisted soldiers with prior military service who are completing their 8-year military service obligation or who are not assigned to units.

Of the previously mentioned 1,613 reservists provided by the Army Reserve Personnel Center and the U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1,068 were reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve who transferred to the Selected Reserve, including 551 who were placed into derivative units.

Follow-on Force Planning Underway

The Army has conducted multiple force rotations for varying lengths of time to support the Bosnia mission. With the recent extension of the mission for an unspecified duration, the Army is planning to (1) replace forces currently deployed to Bosnia; (2) identify forces needed for future rotations; and (3) relieve pressure placed upon USAREUR, which has provided most of the forces for the Bosnia mission to date.

Formal guidance has not been finalized regarding Bosnia mission needs after June 1998. In the meantime, USAREUR is making plans for a follow-on force. It intends to provide personnel for the initial follow-on force according to the current SFOR organization and authorized troop level of 8,500 troops in Bosnia. If the United States succeeds in its effort to have other troop-contributing nations provide more troops, the U.S. force level in Bosnia could drop to 6,900. A smaller force, according to USAREUR and FORSCOM officials, would most likely have fewer combat support and combat service support units. For example, one of the potential reductions involves having only one aviation brigade—a combat support unit—responsible for supporting the forces in Bosnia and the SFOR Commander's reserve force. Additional force reductions will come from units such as the Army Center for Lessons Learned and military history units.

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army canceled its June 1998 troop withdrawal and extended its plans for providing personnel beyond June. A USAREUR document on providing future forces specifies that the initial follow-on force deployment will be from June 1998 through October 1998. The Department of the Army has assigned USAREUR responsibility for providing the Army portion of this force. USAREUR has developed a strategy and identified those specific requirements that it can fill, which is most of the initial follow-on force requirements. According to USAREUR and FORSCOM officials, FORSCOM will provide most of the requirements that cannot be met by USAREUR units through October 1998.

The Army plans for FORSCOM to provide most of the forces for the next two follow-on rotations—one in October 1998 and the other in April 1999. This

decision was made to relieve USAREUR of the high operating and personnel tempo it has experienced since the Bosnia mission began and to allow it to focus on training for its wartime mission. According to USAREUR officials, FORSCOM's providing the bulk of the forces for the Bosnia mission for a year will allow USAREUR to recover from the adverse impacts of almost 3 years continuous deployment to Bosnia. For example, in June 1995, 6 months before the first deployment to Bosnia, 46 percent of USAREUR's units achieved the readiness rating expected of these units; by August 1997, that percentage had dropped to 30 percent as a result of personnel, equipment, and training required for wartime missions being diverted to peacekeeping operations.³

The Air Force has rotated aircraft, aircrews, and ground support personnel to support the Bosnia mission. According to a USAFE operations official, to support the mission in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 the Air Force has identified capabilities and units possessing those capabilities it plans to deploy. USAFE will continue to be the principal force provider.

Providing Needed Capabilities for the Mission Is Becoming Difficult in a Few Instances

Extending the Bosnia mission beyond June 1998 is causing the services to seek alternative ways to provide some needed capabilities. Although the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and aviation-related requirements can be filled, about a dozen unit capabilities will require special attention in the future because the capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these capabilities have already been mobilized and deployed in support of the operation. Requirements for these capabilities have totaled several hundred persons per rotation. Solutions have been developed for providing some of these capabilities and are being sought for the others.

FORSCOM recently identified 12 unit types that it may have difficulty providing from its forces in future rotations primarily because most of these types of units are predominately or exclusively in the reserves and have already been called up and participated in the Bosnia mission. Each succeeding call-up has reduced the available pool of members and units available for future rotations. Table 2 lists the number of these units in the Army and their distribution between the active and reserve components. Table 3 provides details on the 12 unit types, including the number of units needed per rotation, the number of reserve units remaining, and additional information on the active units. According to an Army operations official,

³These data are based on USAREUR reporting on 207 or about 90 percent of its units. Each unit's readiness goal is based on the staffing authorization.

other Army commands, such as the U.S. Army Pacific and Eighth U.S. Army, have some of the 12 unit types that FORSCOM has identified as difficult to fill. However, units assigned to those commands generally would not be able to meet Bosnia mission requirements because many of the units would be committed to missions in their command's primary area of responsibility.

Table 2: Distribution of Hard-to-Fill Army Units Between the Active Force and the Reserves

Type of unit	Active units ^a	Reserve units	Reserve units activated for Bosnia	Total units in force
Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment	0	3	3	3
Replacement Battalion Headquarters	0	3	3	3
Rear Tactical Operations Center	0	5	4	5
Target Acquisition Battery/Detachment ^b	12 ^c	8 ^d	8	20
Movement Control Battalion Headquarters	3	4	4	7
Centralized Movement Control Team	2	3	3	5
Air Terminal Movement Control Team	1	9	9	10
Public Affairs Detachment	12	10	10	22
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment	1	40	24	41
Engineering Fire Fighter Detachment	1	19	11	20
Military History Detachment	1	16	8	17
Medical Distribution Unit	4	5	1	9

^aSee table 3 for additional detail on the active units.

^bTarget acquisition batteries are a part of heavy divisions; target acquisition detachments can be a part of light divisions and corps. Both types of units can meet the Bosnia mission requirement.

^cSix of these units are target acquisition batteries; six are target acquisition detachments.

^dSeven of these units are target acquisition batteries; one is a target acquisition detachment.

Table 3: Hard-to-Fill Army Units

Type of unit	Units needed per rotation	Reserve units remaining	Number of active units
Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment	1	0	0
Replacement Battalion Headquarters	1	0	0
Rear Tactical Operations Center	1	1 ^a	0
Target Acquisition Battery/Detachment	2	0	12 ^b
Movement Control Battalion Headquarters	1	0	3
Centralized Movement Control Team	2	0	2 ^c
Air Terminal Movement Control Team	2	0	1
Public Affairs Detachment	1	0	12 ^d
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment	4	16 ^e	1
Engineering Fire Fighter Detachment	2	8 ^e	1
Military History Detachment	1	8	1 ^c
Medical Distribution Unit	1	4 ^f	4

^aThe Army National Guard has seven rear tactical operations center units that differ somewhat from the Bosnia requirement, but, if modified, they could be used to meet mission requirements.

^bThese are artillery elements within the divisions or corps and, if deployed independently, would adversely impact the parent unit's combat capability.

^cThese active force units have already deployed to Bosnia.

^dFour of these 12 public affairs detachments have already deployed to Bosnia.

^eReserve units remaining cannot meet readiness requirements for deployment. With 1-12 months notice, these units can be made ready to meet deployment standards.

^fTwo of the four remaining units cannot meet readiness requirements. With 1-12 months notice, these two units can be made ready to meet deployment standards.

Three of the 12 unit types—Broadcast Public Affairs, Replacement Headquarters, and Rear Tactical Operations Center—do not exist in the active force. The active Army does maintain force structure for the nine remaining unit types, but two have already deployed to Bosnia and the availability of others may be limited. For example, a FORSCOM official told us that each Army division's artillery has a target acquisition battery or detachment, but deploying the target acquisition element independently would severely degrade the readiness of the remaining division. The active centralized movement control teams and the military history detachment have already deployed to Bosnia at least once, and FORSCOM would prefer to not deploy them again. The active movement control battalion headquarters, air terminal movement control team, mobile public affairs

detachment, engineering fire fighter detachment, and medical distribution units have not been deployed to Bosnia.

The availability of the Reserve Component to meet some of the future Bosnia mission requirements at current force levels is limited to some extent. According to FORSCOM, all Reserve Component Broadcast Public Affairs, Replacement Headquarters, Target Acquisition, Movement Control Headquarters, and some movement control teams already have been called up under PSRC. Only the Rear Tactical Operations Center, Military History and Medical Distribution missions can currently be met from existing reserve force structure. Moreover, FORSCOM told us that some of the remaining Reserve Component Mobile Public Affairs, Engineering Fire Fighters, and Medical Distribution units currently cannot meet the criteria for deployment. According to FORSCOM, these units could be used, but, depending on the unit, would require from 1 month to 12 months of notice before deployment to receive personnel, equipment, training, or a combination of these sufficient to meet the deployment criteria.

FORSCOM requested the U.S. Atlantic Command, which can draw forces from all services in the continental United States, to assess whether other services can provide these capabilities. Solutions were identified for two of these areas for the next rotation. An air movement control unit requirement will be met by an ad hoc Marine Corps unit, and the Broadcast Public Affairs unit requirement will be met by an ad hoc unit that was formed by pooling individuals from the military services because no one unit was available in any service. According to FORSCOM and USAREUR, the use of ad hoc units will increase as the Army's ability to provide specific capabilities (active or reserve) decreases.

As of April 1998, the U.S. Atlantic Command was developing solutions for the other areas. If the Atlantic Command is unable to find other services to meet these requirements, other solutions will be considered. These include using more ad hoc units, contracting civilians to perform the function, and seeking to have other NATO partners assume some of these responsibilities. For example, according to USAREUR, engineering fire fighter requirements will be contracted out.

In addition to FORSCOM's identification of types of units that will be difficult to fill, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has also identified certain components of its civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities that may be difficult to fill. However, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command told

us that some of these difficulties will be mitigated as the command improves its utilization of these capabilities and trains officers from other nations to undertake some of the mission.

Air Force Has Not Had to Involuntarily Call Up Many Reservists

The only instances in which PSRC has been used by the Air Force to support Bosnia is for the air traffic control and combat communications missions. Of these two missions, only air traffic control has posed a problem. Two-thirds of the Air Force's air traffic control capability is in the Air National Guard, and the Guard recently reduced its air traffic control force structure by almost 50 percent. Initially the mission was handled by volunteers on a rotating basis from air traffic control units, but, beginning in June 1996, PSRC was used to call up Guard personnel for between 120 days and 179 days to perform this function. All Guard air traffic control units already have been activated under the Bosnia PSRC. In October 1997, the Air National Guard informed the active Air Force that it would be unable to solely meet these requirements beyond July 1, 1998, and asked to have the active Air Force provide the personnel to meet the requirement.

Active and reserve Air Force officials have been seeking short- and long-term solutions to air traffic control requirements for the extended mission. To attract more volunteers from the Guard, rotations for Guard personnel will be decreased from 120 days to 45 days. Overall radar operator and tower personnel requirements will be reduced, and Guard personnel will fill only about half of these requirements with the balance to be filled by active Air Force personnel.

Beginning in October 1998, U.S.-trained Hungarian controllers are expected to replace U.S. controllers, further reducing operator requirements. USAFE plans to implement contractor maintenance for the maintenance portion of the mission by November 1998. This will leave only one person from the Air National Guard involved with air traffic control maintenance. The Air Force hopes these actions will reduce the need to involuntarily activate Guard personnel for the air traffic control mission.

Air Force Reserve Component officials told us that as the mission lengthens additional capabilities may require changes from current practices for providing personnel. Most requirements are now met by volunteers, but according to an Air Force Reserve official the longer the

mission lasts the greater the probability PSRC will have to be used to ensure that needed capabilities are provided.

PSRC Permits Involuntary Activation of Selected Reserves Subject to Limits

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission, he may initiate a PSRC call-up under 10 U.S.C. § 12304. With this authority, units and members of the Selected Reserve may be ordered to active duty without their consent. The statute does not limit the number of missions that may be undertaken with reserve support. However, reservists cannot be required to serve on a mission for “more than 270 days.” The 270-day time limit on PSRC activations is long enough to allow for multiple involuntary activations that cumulate to less than 270 days, and the statute does not prohibit such multiple involuntary activations.

Scope of PSRC Authority

Authority to mobilize the reserves is governed by statute. Upon declaring a national emergency, the President is authorized to mobilize the Ready Reserve under 10 U.S.C. § 12302. That section’s involuntary activation authority extends to 1 million reservists for up to 24 months’ of service. In 1976, Congress recognized that circumstances at times may exist that would require access to the reserves but would not support an emergency declaration.

Congress enacted the PSRC statute to broaden nonconsensual access to the reserves. This authority was expected to complement DOD’s “Total Force Concept,” under which well-trained reserves became more fully integrated into the force structure. The President can initiate a PSRC call-up when he determines “that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission.”⁴

Units and members of the Selected Reserve are subject to involuntary activation under PSRC authority. The Selected Reserve is a component of the Ready Reserves.

Prior to 1995, PSRC authority had been used twice—for the Gulf War and the operation in Haiti. In each instance, an executive order stated the need for activating the Selected Reserve and defined the mission. As implemented in the past, the mission statements were broad in scope. Consistent with that practice, the scope of the Bosnia PSRC mission is

⁴The statute prohibits involuntary activation under PSRC to respond to domestic emergencies and disasters.

defined in Executive Order 12982 as the “conduct of operations in and around former Yugoslavia.”

The PSRC statute allows the Secretary of Defense to prescribe policies and procedures concerning such matters as the number and types of Selected Reserve units to be activated, the timing of the calls-ups, the number of reservists to be activated, and the time required for each reservist to remain on active duty. These matters are discussed in DOD Directive 1235.10, July 1, 1995. In addition, an end date for the use of PSRC authority may be set by the Secretary of Defense. The end date for the Bosnia PSRC was first set at May 1997, then extended to August 1998, and, as of February 1998, the end date was extended indefinitely. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has stated that the current policy is that the Department of Defense will not request that the President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists who already have served 270 days.

In November 1997, Congress enlarged the reserve components available for PSRC call-up. Section 511 of Public Law 105-85 directed the Secretary to create a PSRC mobilization category for members of the Individual Ready Reserves. Up to 30,000 of the Individual Ready Reserve members who volunteer for the mobilization category can then be involuntarily activated as individuals. Before passage of this amendment, members of the Individual Ready Reserves sometimes volunteered to temporarily join the Selected Reserve to allow them to be subject to PSRC. Department of Defense officials believe that this authority is not available for a Bosnia-type mission because they interpret it as being available only as a bridge to partial mobilization.

The statute also caps at 200,000 the total number of reservists who may be serving on active duty under PSRC “at any one time.” This number has grown since the statute was first enacted in 1976. Originally, the total number of selected reservists who could be activated at any one time was set at 50,000. This was increased to 100,000 in 1980 and to 200,000 in 1986.⁵

The PSRC statute has always included a limit on the number of days a reservist could be required to serve without consent. As originally enacted, the involuntary activation period was “not more than 90 days.” Over the years, that limit has been expanded to the current level of “not more than 270 days.” A 270-day limit is long enough to permit multiple involuntary

⁵We have previously reported on reserve component responsiveness as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201). See *Reserve Forces: Proposals to Expand Call-up Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations* (GAO/NSIAD-97-129, April 18, 1997).

activations, and the statute does not prohibit such multiple activations. The Army's policy, however, is not to allow reactivations. The Air Force does not have a similar policy, and may soon face the necessity of reactivating some air traffic controllers who have already served 120 days under the current PSRC.

Conclusions

The military services have successfully provided the needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years. The Army, which has provided the bulk of the armed forces, has taken a number of steps to match its existing units to the mission requirements, including deploying partial units, creating derivative units by borrowing personnel from nondeploying units, and creating ad hoc units to deploy individual augmentees. These steps have met the mission's needs with varying impacts on parent units that have provided personnel and have required the Army to operate in a fashion different from the way in which it organizes its forces, which is as entire units to fight a major theater war. The Army also has relied on the reserves both to provide support capabilities that reside primarily or solely in the reserve component and to reduce the high level of activity of some active forces. The Air Force has required a smaller number of forces, and the nature of the Air Force's responsibilities has allowed for extensive use of reserve and guard volunteers.

The recent decision to extend the Bosnia mission will require rotating military forces for the foreseeable future. While formal guidance has not been finalized regarding mission needs, the Army is planning for follow-on forces through late 1999. The first follow-on force is expected to deploy in June 1998 to relieve the forces that are currently deployed. Although the vast majority of the types of capabilities needed do not represent challenges in providing personnel, a handful do, principally in the Army. These challenges exist because in a few instances all the needed capability is in the reserves and has already been involuntarily called up under the current PSRC and in other instances because there is limited capability in the active force structure or because the active capability is vital to its parent unit. For these capabilities, the Army's force structure does not match the needs of a mission of the duration and with the continuing requirements of the one in Bosnia. Solutions are being developed to meet these challenges. These challenges may exist as long as the mission continues at its current size and with its current tasks.

The President has statutory authority to involuntarily activate units and members of the Selected Reserve. The Bosnia mission has led to a situation in which in some instances all of the units with needed capabilities already have been ordered to duty and served the maximum time permitted. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has said that the Department of Defense's current policy is that the Department will not request that the President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists who already have served 270 days.

In some instances, the services have activated reservists involuntarily for shorter periods of time than the statute allows. It is possible that some of these reservists could be recalled to serve the full activation period under a single PSRC of 270 days. The statute does not prohibit multiple activations as long as the total number of days on active duty does not exceed 270 days.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense partially concurred with the report. (See app. I.) The Department said that operations in Bosnia have been and will continue to be a success story. The Department further said that the overall tenor of our report implies that despite success in mission accomplishment and active and reserve component integration, challenges in manning a follow-on-mission to Bosnia are insurmountable.

We state in the report that the Department has successfully provided needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years and do not mean to imply that the Department will be unable to successfully staff the mission in the future. We do, however, point out that there are a few types of units that will become increasingly challenging to fill and that solutions are being developed to meet these challenges. The Department stated in its technical comments that there are some types of units that will require more management and we agree.

The Department also stated it will continue to rely on the reserves and to task organize, split-base, and cross level units to get the right force mix to accomplish the mission. Our report describes how the Department has used these capabilities and techniques to meet mission requirements and explains why they have been used.

The Department also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To determine how the military services are providing needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission and plan to provide follow-on forces for the extended mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed personnel at the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs; Department of the Army headquarters and Department of Air Force headquarters, Washington, D.C.; U.S. European Command, USAREUR, and USAFE, all located in Germany; U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). Because the Navy and the Marine Corps provided few personnel directly to the Bosnia mission, we did not include them in our work.

To gain reserve component perspectives on the ability to provide capabilities in the future, we reviewed documents and interviewed personnel at the Chief, Army Reserve, Army and Air National Guard, Washington, D.C.; Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. Although we obtained documents showing the number of individual reservists that the Army has deployed to Bosnia, the data did not identify the specific military skills possessed by these individuals.

To examine the PSRC authority, we reviewed the applicable U.S. statutes and their legislative history. We also requested and received the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel's written interpretation of the statute with regard to multiple activations within the 270-day call-up limitation and the ability to invoke the statute's authority for a second time for a similar mission.

We performed our review between July 1997 and April 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government accounting standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3504.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Richard Davis". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent underline under the word "Davis".

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis

Comments From the Department of Defense



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

24 APR 1998

Mr. Richard Davis
Director, National Security Analysis
National Security and International
Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Davis:

This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report "*BOSNIA: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities But A Few Challenges Emerging*," dated April 15, 1998 (GAO Code 701120/OSD Case 1589). The Department partially concurs with the report.

Operations in Bosnia have been and will continue to be a success story, both in terms of mission accomplishment and AC/RC integration. Despite these successes, the overall tenor of the report leaves the impression that the challenges in manning a follow-on force for Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG) are insurmountable. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Department has done a superb job of targeting the right mix of capabilities to meet mission requirements and will continue to do so in the future.

The Department will continue to rely on its full spectrum of capabilities to meet future mission requirements. We will continue to rely on the Reserve components. As in the past, we will task organize, split-base, and cross level units to get just the right force mix to accomplish the mission.

Technical corrections to the report are enclosed. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Cragin", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Charles L. Cragin
Acting

Enclosure:
Technical corrections

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