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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives

March 1987

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE's Reinvestigation of Employees Has Not Been Timely



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Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division
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March 10, 1987

The Honorable Mike Synar
Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On November 1, 1985, you requested that we review the Department of Energy's (DOE) personnel security clearance program. Among its missions, DOE makes nuclear weapons for defense programs. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires DOE to ensure that those who have access to weapons components and related technology are trustworthy and do not endanger national security. One mechanism DOE uses to help provide this assurance is its personnel security clearance program.

DOE's security clearance program includes (1) prescreening of job applicants to identify those that should not be hired because their conduct, character, and trustworthiness may adversely affect job performance, (2) determining which employees need clearances, and at what level, based on their need for access to classified information, material or facilities, (3) investigating the background of employees for whom clearances have been requested to ensure their reliability and trustworthiness, (4) periodically—at 5-year intervals—reinvestigating cleared employees to ensure their continued reliability, (5) evaluating through interviews and background investigations the seriousness of problems identified through reports of arrests, bankruptcies, etc., (6) terminating clearances for employees who no longer need them, and (7) reviewing through an employee appeal (administrative review) process proposed DOE actions to revoke or deny a clearance. DOE's Director of Safeguards and Security develops policies covering personnel security throughout DOE, but the director and the managers of DOE's field offices are responsible for implementing personnel security programs at their locations. As agreed with your office, this report addresses the adequacy of DOE's periodic reinvestigations of cleared employees; we plan to report on the other aspects during the summer of 1987.

In summary, we found that DOE headquarters and some field offices have been unable to meet DOE goals to reinvestigate security clearances. Clearance reinvestigations are an important element of DOE's security

program because they are aimed at identifying employees whose lifestyles raise questions about their eligibility for a clearance. DOE's failure to perform timely reinvestigations has contributed to having cleared employees in its workforce who may not be suitable for a clearance because they have serious drug, alcohol, or other problems. DOE needs to develop a plan to ensure that all required reinvestigations are performed on time. Planning should start with a review of the appropriateness of the number and level of active clearances, since these factors largely determine the reinvestigation workload. The plan should then provide for the resources necessary to meet requirements.

Background

The need for—and importance of—periodically reinvestigating cleared employees has assumed added importance as a result of espionage cases in various federal agencies over the last few years. Virtually all these cases involved cleared employees. Furthermore, recent DOE testimony and reports prepared for the Secretary of Defense noted that the individual recruited into espionage after receiving a clearance is the greater and more probable security threat than “outsiders.”

Because of the potential threat cleared employees can represent, DOE is supposed to reinvestigate employees periodically—at 5-year intervals—to ensure their continued reliability for access to sensitive information, nuclear materials, or nuclear weapons technology. DOE's intent is to determine whether personal problems such as indebtedness, alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness have developed since an employee received an initial clearance. Effectively implemented, periodic reinvestigations can highlight these problems and provide DOE information needed to determine whether an employee could be a possible candidate for activities such as espionage that would endanger national security. Even when effectively implemented, reinvestigations cannot provide guaranteed protection against security breaches. Ineffective implementation increases the potential for security risks because these problems can persist undetected for a long time, without an opportunity for DOE to evaluate whether a clearance should be continued or revoked.

In addition to these periodic reinvestigations, DOE also reinvestigates employees when it becomes aware of “derogatory information”—information that raises questions about whether a clearance for that employee continues to be justified. Frequently, DOE becomes aware of derogatory information through arrest reports and comments from other employees who are being investigated. Our evaluation of how DOE

implements periodic reinvestigations is summarized below and discussed in detail in appendix I.

Our work was conducted at DOE headquarters and at three of eight field offices: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Richland, Washington. These offices have about 121,000 or about 55 percent of DOE's 218,000 clearances. Appendix II indicates why these offices were selected and provides a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Reinvestigation of Employees Has Not Been Timely

Prior to December 1985, DOE only required that employees with the highest clearance level—about 6 percent of the total—and a small number of employees with lower level clearances, but with sensitive positions, have their backgrounds reinvestigated periodically. Even with this relatively limited reinvestigation program, DOE offices were not able to perform the required reinvestigations. As a result of management inattention, inadequate budget and staff resources, insufficient support from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and an increase in the workload generated by clearance forms that DOE revised in 1983,

- headquarters did not do periodic reinvestigations for DOE employees until 1982 and did not begin doing them for headquarters contractors until January 1987;
- Richland had no reinvestigation program prior to 1985; and
- Oak Ridge had developed a reinvestigation backlog by early 1984.

Albuquerque appears to have met the pre-December 1985 reinvestigation requirements.

While DOE's clearance offices were already having difficulty meeting the limited pre-December 1985 reinvestigation requirements, DOE revised its Personnel Security Program Order in December 1985, thereby greatly expanding the clearance reinvestigation workload. The new order requires more detailed reinvestigations every 5 years for employees holding all types of clearances. In addition to the 12,000 clearances that required a periodic background reinvestigation under the old order, the new order requires background reinvestigations for another 144,000 clearances and checks with credit bureaus and national agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service for 56,000 holders of lower level clearances.

These actions, along with the revision of the clearance questionnaire, have created significant reinvestigation backlogs throughout DOE. DOE headquarters and the Richland, Oak Ridge, and Albuquerque field offices have almost 76,000 employees who have not been reinvestigated within the last 5 years as DOE now requires. While DOE issued guidance in July 1986 stating that the backlog of reinvestigations should be eliminated by 1991, it provided for no increased allocation of resources and little guidance on how to reduce the backlog within existing resources. The July guidance did, however, recommend that each office take steps to reduce the numbers and levels of clearances for current employees—an area that could have a major impact on clearance workload. As yet, DOE's efforts in this area have had little impact.

Other DOE actions have successfully demonstrated that options exist for reducing the numbers and levels of clearances. For example, after DOE's Inspector General reported in July 1986 that about 36 percent of DOE's headquarters clearances were for people who no longer had an affiliation with DOE, headquarters cut its active clearances by 19 percent. Furthermore, on September 30, 1986, DOE revised its clearance requirements—a step that could result in downgrading 8,700 clearances nationwide.

Assuming the current number of cleared personnel, eliminating the clearance backlog and keeping current with additional clearances coming due for reinvestigations each year will require headquarters and the field offices to greatly increase the numbers of investigations they process. DOE will have to conduct about 24,000 reinvestigations in 1987—up from 4,000 in 1985. The required workload increase at each office ranges from almost 200 percent at headquarters to over 1,100 percent at Albuquerque.

The projected increase in the numbers of needed reinvestigations may understate the workload DOE's clearance offices will face. For example, Oak Ridge's Director of Safeguards and Security told us that alleged drug use information has increased several-fold since January 1984 following introduction of the revised clearance questionnaire. If a similar trend develops at other DOE clearance offices, their workload may also be greatly increased. In addition, investigations that turn up suspected employee drug use may also identify other employees with suspected drug use who will also have to be investigated sooner than planned.

DOE's field offices and headquarters have been slow in developing plans for meeting the requirements of the revised order. After nearly 2 years

of draft review and comment, the current order was issued in December 1985. In July 1986, headquarters issued guidance to the field offices which identified the numbers of clearances each office will have to process under the new order and called for all offices to be current within 5 years.

During August and September 1986, we discussed with the field offices the expanded workload requirements and their plans for meeting them. Each office believed that they could not meet the required workload and none had requested added resources or developed a plan for how they would get current on reinvestigations by 1991.

On September 25, 1986, the headquarters Director of Safeguards and Security wrote to all the field office managers asking whether they had or were making plans to have adequate staff to process the additional investigations. In October 1986, Richland's Personnel Security Branch requested—and in November 1986 received—approval from the Richland manager to obtain the resources that Richland believes it needs to eliminate the backlog. Albuquerque advised headquarters in November 1986 that they have several steps underway to obtain the additional resources needed to eliminate its backlog.

On October 2, 1986, we discussed similar matters with headquarters clearance officials who said that in order to meet the new reinvestigation requirement, they had requested authority from the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs to fill two vacant positions and hire four additional staff. They received approval to fill the vacancies and to obtain temporary help from OPM. Five OPM employees have been temporarily assigned to DOE for 4 months. The first vacancy was filled when DOE transferred one individual in January 1987 to administer the contractor reinvestigation program. The second vacancy had not been filled at the completion of our work, and the request for four additional staff has not been acted on.

At none of these offices—headquarters, Richland, or Albuquerque—had all the requested and/or approved resources been provided at the end of our review.

In addition, the Oak Ridge Director of Safeguards and Security notified headquarters on September 30, 1986, that they did not have the staff to process the reinvestigations needed to meet the 1991 target. Furthermore, they have neither developed a plan to identify the resources they

will need to eliminate the backlog nor requested additional resources, according to the Chief, Personnel Clearance and Assurance Branch.

What Reinvestigations Can Find: Examples of DOE Employees With Clearances

Our review of DOE's clearance files identified specific cases that highlight the importance of promptly implementing and keeping current with required reinvestigations. The following case examples show that DOE's workforce included cleared employees who held sensitive jobs in weapons production facilities and who had serious drug, alcohol, or other problems that have raised questions about their suitability for clearances. Other examples are discussed in appendixes IV and V.

- Nuclear process operator - This individual controls the flow and chemical composition of waste from nuclear reactors. The individual's clearance was received in December 1974; Richland conducted no reinvestigation until February 1983 after learning that the employee filed for bankruptcy. Richland discovered the individual had four arrests for driving while intoxicated prior to 1983. Between October 1983 and September 1985, the individual had an additional five arrests for driving while intoxicated—in several of these arrests the subject was also cited for possession of marijuana. Richland suspended the clearance in October 1985; the contractor terminated the individual's employment in November 1985.
- Steamfitter - This individual works on installing and repairing all piping for steam, gas, air, and liquids throughout a defense plant. The individual's clearance was received in April 1977; no clearance update was performed, although one was required in 1982. Oak Ridge conducted no reinvestigation until August 1984 after learning that the employee had been arrested for shoplifting, receiving stolen property, and selling cocaine. Prior to receiving the April 1977 clearance, however, Oak Ridge knew the individual used a variety of drugs including LSD, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, and barbiturates. An October 1985 reinvestigation showed that the employee had used drugs three to four times a day for the last 5 to 6 years—costing about \$500 a week. Oak Ridge suspended the clearance in February 1986; case pending as of July 1986.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Although DOE's guidance calls for eliminating the backlog by 1991, in our opinion DOE may not meet this target unless headquarters and the field offices develop and implement plans that match the workload and the resources available to meet it and headquarters evaluates performance against those plans. Furthermore, as more reinvestigations are done,

derogatory information may be obtained on more employees than anticipated, which could increase the number of reinvestigations to be performed. Therefore, DOE management will need to be attentive to this or any other workload increase in developing a meaningful plan for eliminating the backlog. Developing such a plan may indicate the need for obtaining additional resources. It may also require taking steps to reduce the reinvestigation workload. Because the reinvestigation workload is directly related to the levels and numbers of active clearances, reduction in both clearance levels and numbers provide two approaches for reducing the reinvestigation workload.

Absent these steps, DOE probably will not meet the December 1985 policy because of the large workload increase it faces. In addition, funds for reinvestigations must compete with resources for conducting initial security clearance investigations—the latter historically received a higher priority with DOE. Furthermore, at the field offices, analysis of security clearance workload requirements and requests for needed staff has been slow. At all offices, approval for and provision of needed staff has also been slow. Neither headquarters nor the Richland and Albuquerque field offices have received the resources they believe necessary to meet the 1991 target. The Oak Ridge field office has not identified the resources it believes necessary for its clearance branch to meet the 1991 target.

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy develop a plan to bring headquarters and the field offices into compliance with the December 1985 Personnel Security Program Order. Because the reinvestigation workload is directly related to the numbers and levels of active clearances, the first step in the planning process should focus on how those numbers and levels can be reduced. DOE may be able to reduce clearance numbers and levels by ensuring that only employees who require clearances have them, that employees have the lowest clearance level needed to do their jobs, and that clearances for individuals who are no longer associated with DOE are promptly terminated. The results of our ongoing work on the remainder of DOE's security clearance activities may provide more specific suggestions for reducing clearance numbers and levels. The plan should then consider (1) reinvestigation workload requirements and (2) resources needed to meet those requirements. In addition, the Secretary should direct the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs to review and approve the plans; monitor their implementation; and annually report to him on compliance with the order.

As agreed with your office, we did not obtain agency comments on a draft of this report. With this exception, our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report for 30 days from the date of issuance. At that time we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

This work was performed under the direction of Keith O. Fultz, Associate Director. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J. Dexter Peach". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

J. Dexter Peach
Assistant Comptroller General

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Abbreviations

DOE	Department of Energy
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	General Accounting Office
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PSQ	Personnel Security Questionnaire
RCED	Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division

DOE's Reinvestigation Program

DOE operates under a decentralized management structure whereby 8 field offices oversee the activities of contractors at 27 DOE-owned facilities. This structure allows the field office managers flexibility in interpreting and implementing DOE orders and regulations. Many of DOE's programs involve sensitive, national security issues; the nuclear weapons program is one of the most sensitive. For example, facilities managed by the DOE office in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, produce and process highly enriched uranium and make weapons components; facilities managed by the Richland, Washington, office produce plutonium; and facilities managed by the Albuquerque, New Mexico, office make detonating devices and combine them with uranium and plutonium to make nuclear weapons.

Because of the sensitivity and national security implications of its programs, DOE requires employees—its own and those of its contractors—to obtain and maintain a security clearance. DOE Order 5631.2A, December 1985 sets out the agency's security clearance policy, program, and requirements. DOE's Director of Safeguards and Security develops policies, standards, guides, and procedures to implement the order. Program implementation is the responsibility of the director at headquarters and of the managers at each field office. Approximately 209,000 DOE and other federal employees and contractor employees hold about 218,000 clearances (an employee can have more than 1 clearance). DOE employees hold about 4 percent of the total; contractor employees, about 93 percent; and other government agencies and congressional staff, the remaining 3 percent.

DOE is responsible for conducting reinvestigations for all its clearance holders except other governmental agencies' employees, whose reinvestigations are the responsibility of their own agency. DOE Order 5631.2A requires periodic reinvestigations to determine whether employees' lifestyles have changed such that they would be susceptible to engaging in espionage, sabotage, or theft of nuclear materials. The level of clearance determines the scope and depth of the reinvestigation performed; the level of clearance also dictates the type of information, facilities, and material to which an employee has access. DOE issues five levels of clearances: Q sensitive, Q nonsensitive, L, top secret, and secret. An employee with a secret clearance has access to weapons related information; disclosure of this information could result in serious damage to the nation. On the other hand, an employee with a Q sensitive clearance has access to nuclear weapons design, manufacture, or use data; disclosure could cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

Therefore, DOE's policy requires that an employee with a Q sensitive clearance receive a more rigorous reinvestigation than an employee with a secret clearance. For example, after the first 5 years of employment, a person with a Q sensitive clearance should receive a full background investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducts the investigation for DOE that includes (1) interviews with references, employers, and neighbors, (2) checks with local law enforcement agencies and federal agencies such as the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency for records of criminal and subversive activity, and (3) credit bureau checks to confirm financial status and/or identify problems such as excessive debt or bankruptcy. In contrast, a person with a secret clearance receives a much less extensive investigation after 5 years. OPM requests (1) the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal agencies to check their records, (2) the FBI to check fingerprints against its files, and (3) credit bureaus to check financial status. The FBI and OPM charge DOE for the reinvestigations they provide.

DOE's reinvestigation requirements have changed over time. Before December 1985 DOE had no periodic reinvestigation requirements for top secret and secret clearance holders; it now requires a background investigation after 5 years for top secret clearance holders and an FBI check of its files and fingerprint records after 5 years for secret clearance holders. Under DOE's old and new policies, all reinvestigations begin with the employee filling out a clearance form (commonly called a personnel security questionnaire (PSQ)), which provides basic background data on places of residence, employment, education, and family members, and affiliations with the communist party. In August 1983, the questionnaire was revised to also request information concerning financial or mental problems, and drug or alcohol abuse. Appendix III shows DOE's clearance levels and its pre- and post-December 1985 reinvestigation requirements for each.

On July 23, 1986, DOE headquarters sent guidance to its field offices stating that all employees should be reinvestigated by 1991 and offered several suggestions to meet this target. The guidance provided that within existing budget and staff each office should (in the following order) (1) review the need for Q sensitive clearances and, where appropriate, downgrade them to lower clearances—which are cheaper to obtain, (2) schedule reinvestigations for all Q sensitive clearances by March 30, 1987, (3) conduct reinvestigations for Q nonsensitive and top secret clearance holders in the order that the clearances were granted,

and (4) conduct reinvestigations of L and secret clearance holders in the order that the clearances are granted.

Of its 218,000 total clearances, DOE headquarters and the Richland, Oak Ridge, and Albuquerque offices have 6 percent, 7 percent, 20 percent, and 22 percent, respectively. Table I.1 shows the types and numbers of clearances for these locations on the basis of information DOE provided its field offices in July 1986.

Table I.1: Types and Numbers of Clearances

Location	Types of clearances					Total
	Q sensitive	Q nonsensitive	L	Top secret	Secret	
DOE headquarters	3,685	7,593	1,085	189	1,016	13,568
Richland	245	10,516	3,828	0	7	14,596
Oak Ridge	1,290	34,396	6,906	243	1,352	44,187
Albuquerque	3,831	44,017	998	2	14	48,862
Total	9,051	96,522	12,817	434	2,389	121,213

However, DOE headquarters information differs from that reported by the three field offices. For example, Albuquerque reports that it had 2,348 Q sensitive and 49,358 total clearances rather than the 3,831 and 48,862 respectively, shown by DOE and Richland reports 15,656 clearances compared to 14,596 shown by DOE. These discrepancies occur because each field office maintains a computerized clearance file separate from the Central Personnel Clearance Index that DOE headquarters maintains, and DOE is updating the information on the Index. Although we recognize these differences, we decided to use headquarters data because DOE gave that data to the field offices to help them estimate the number of reinvestigations that must be performed by 1991. We do, however, plan to assess the accuracy of DOE's clearance data bases during our subsequent work.

Pre-December 1985 Reinvestigation Policy Was Not Fully Implemented

Before December 1985, DOE followed the reinvestigation policy that the Atomic Energy Commission established in 1968, a policy that required DOE to reinvestigate only the 6 percent of DOE and contractor employees having Q sensitive clearances—the highest level—and a small number of employees with Q clearances, but with sensitive positions. For nearly all others, DOE was only required to obtain and review updated PSQS. At headquarters and the Richland and Oak Ridge field offices, about 41

percent of the Q sensitive clearance holders were overdue reinvestigation. Albuquerque officials said they had no overdue reinvestigations for Q sensitive clearance holders.

DOE Headquarters

DOE headquarters security officials told us that before 1982 they did not perform scheduled reinvestigations as required. DOE's Administrative Review Chief pointed out that between 1977 and 1981 the personnel clearance branch requested funds for reinvestigations but in each year, either DOE, the Office of Management and Budget, or the Congress cut those funds. Funding improved in 1982, and DOE began conducting scheduled reinvestigations for DOE headquarters' employees with a Q sensitive clearance but not for contractor employees assigned to headquarters. Although DOE's reinvestigation objectives were limited, headquarters found that it could not meet them. As a result, DOE gave priority to Q sensitive clearance holders in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. DOE's July 1986 data showed that it had a backlog of 1,282—about 25 percent—Q sensitive clearances that were overdue reinvestigations under the 1968 policy—about 18 percent were for contractor employees.

A February 1985 report by DOE's Office of Security Evaluation noted that DOE's lack of attention to reinvestigating contractor employees assigned to headquarters significantly reduced DOE's ability to assess the continued reliability of these employees. The report concluded that, although DOE was aware of this deficiency, it did not have adequate funds or staff to implement such a reinvestigation program. We found, however, that between fiscal year 1984 and fiscal year 1986, DOE's budget submissions to the Congress stated that it had adequate resources to meet its clearance requirements. Early in 1987, DOE implemented a contractor reinvestigation program to cover about 3,964 contractor employees at headquarters with security clearances.

Richland

Richland officials told us that Richland did not conduct scheduled reinvestigations from 1975 until 1985, and although it received updated PSQs, they were not carefully reviewed to identify and/or address derogatory information. Early in 1984, Richland management established a task force to examine the requirements and practices related to employment and security clearance processing activities at Richland.

In June 1984 the task force—composed of the Chief, Operational Security Branch, two Richland attorneys, and a staff member from Richland's personnel division—completed the study requested. The task force found that Richland was the only field office without a formal reinvestigation program and that it did not conduct reinvestigations for any type of clearance holders. Therefore, Richland did not comply with DOE's 1968 policy. The Richland Director of Safeguards and Security said that Richland did not comply with the policy because (1) the security clearance staff could barely keep up with processing investigations for newly hired employees, (2) Richland had not requested funds for a reinvestigation program, and (3) DOE's headquarters Office of Safeguards and Security did not encourage Richland to conduct reinvestigations.

The task force also noted that in 1977 Richland had about four people working on security clearance matters. As a result, according to the task force report, less than full attention was given to investigation reports and/or derogatory information. The task force pointed out that "eventually this trend continued to the point that virtually everyone being hired was granted a security clearance." It also noted that DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security did not discourage this practice until 1980 when headquarters placed increased emphasis on the threat insiders pose to security. In our opinion, the weaknesses in Richland's clearance process between 1977 and 1980 heighten the need for it to reinvestigate employees cleared during this period to ensure that their clearances are warranted.

Oak Ridge

Oak Ridge officials told us that until 1984, they complied with the 1968 policy because the work force consisted mainly of employees who had worked for more than 5 years. Therefore, Oak Ridge only had to request OPM to check the FBI's files and fingerprint records or obtain updated PSQs for most clearance holders and conduct between 25 and 50 background investigations annually for Q sensitive clearance holders.

The situation at Oak Ridge changed in 1984 as a result of the revised PSQs. After reviewing the new PSQs, Oak Ridge identified many employees with derogatory information—Oak Ridge estimated the number to be between 2,500 and 3,000—that required a background reinvestigation. Oak Ridge officials said they had the funds to pay for these reinvestigations from OPM, but OPM could not meet the demand. By the end of 1984, OPM had a backlog of over 970 cases with unresolved derogatory information that were returned to Oak Ridge. Oak Ridge

screened these cases and resubmitted the 600 with the most serious derogatory information; Oak Ridge held the remaining 370 cases for further evaluation. These cases were later sent to OPM on the basis of Oak Ridge's priority system.

In late 1984 and early 1985, OPM expanded its staff and increased its reinvestigation processing from about 100 to 200 per month. As a result, OPM completed and returned a large number of cases to Oak Ridge. OPM returned the cases at a rate that exceeded Oak Ridge's ability to analyze them and a backlog developed at Oak Ridge. Oak Ridge notified headquarters' Director of Safeguards and Security that it did not have adequate staff to conduct its part of the reinvestigation review. Oak Ridge asked for assistance but was turned down.

Oak Ridge's workload expanded further during 1985 when it identified a potential drug problem among employees at one facility—the Y-12 plant. Throughout 1985 and into early 1986, DOE identified about 250 employees who had to be interviewed and/or reinvestigated to determine whether they used drugs. Oak Ridge obtained help from headquarters to interview employees and analyze investigative results. If DOE's current reinvestigation policy had been in effect sooner, Oak Ridge might have identified the drug use problems earlier.

Albuquerque

Although DOE headquarters and its offices in Richland and Oak Ridge did not fully meet the 1968 reinvestigation policy, Albuquerque officials stated they did meet it, primarily by increasing staff overtime. In addition, the 1983 PSQ revision had only a limited impact. Albuquerque officials could not, however, identify the specific number of investigations resulting from the new PSQ. They explained they would have to review each investigation to make this determination. When DOE issued its revised reinvestigation policy in December 1985, Albuquerque had no backlog and was in a better position than Richland and Oak Ridge to fully implement it.

Our review of all 33 cases in the administrative review process—a process DOE provides to clearance applicants to contest a DOE decision not to grant a clearance and to current clearance holders to contest a DOE decision to revoke a clearance—at Albuquerque between January 1985 and July 1986 showed that no employee was overdue for a reinvestigation. On the basis of this limited information, it appeared that Albuquerque had met the 1968 requirements.

Obstacles DOE Faces in Implementing New Requirements

In December 1985, after nearly 2 years of draft review and comment, DOE issued a new Personnel Security Program Order (Order 5631.2A) that greatly expanded the scope and depth of the reinvestigations required nationwide. In addition to requiring 5-year background reinvestigations for about 12,000 Q sensitive clearance holders, the new order required background investigations for an additional 144,000 Q nonsensitive and top secret clearance holders, and credit and national agency checks for another 56,000 L and secret clearance holders. This policy change resulted in an immediate backlog of about 75,600 employees requiring some type of reinvestigation at Richland, Oak Ridge, Albuquerque, and DOE headquarters. Table I.2 shows the impact of the new order at these locations for clearances in effect in July 1986.

Table I.2: Impact of DOE's December 1985 Reinvestigation Policy on Clearances in Effect in July 1986^a

Location	Clearances requiring reinvestigations under 1968 policy ^b	Clearances requiring reinvestigations under 1985 policy	Backlog which policy created
Richland	244	14,561	8,911
Oak Ridge	1,282	43,985	29,940
Albuquerque	3,817	48,756	33,314
DOE headquarters	2,936	7,577	3,434
Total	8,279	114,879	75,599

^aAll data in this table are taken from information DOE provided its field offices in July 1986 and is intended to show the increase in clearance workload solely attributable to the December 1985 reinvestigation policy. Data exclude clearances for other government agency employees.

^bAs discussed earlier, Richland, Oak Ridge, and DOE headquarters did not meet these quotas.

In July 1986 DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security issued program guidance that called for these backlogs to be eliminated by 1991. To meet the 1991 target, DOE headquarters officials estimate they will have to increase reinvestigations from 376 and 368 in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 respectively, to 1,050 annually. Richland estimates it will need to conduct about 2,800 reinvestigations annually; in 1985 it submitted 491 and in 1986, 1,199. Oak Ridge, which conducted about 2,400 reinvestigations in 1985 and 1986, estimates it will have to conduct about 11,650 in fiscal year 1987 and between 6,000 and 7,000 annually thereafter through 1991. Albuquerque, which submitted about 690 and 5,400 reinvestigations in fiscal years 1985 and 1986, respectively, will have to increase this, starting in fiscal year 1987, to about 8,500 per year.

The projected increase in the numbers of needed reinvestigations may understate the workload DOE's clearance offices will face. For example,

Oak Ridge's Director of Safeguards and Security told us that alleged drug use information has increased several-fold since January 1984 following introduction of the revised PSQ. If a similar trend develops at other offices, the DOE clearance offices will have to have OPM conduct more background investigations, and the clearance branch staff will have to conduct more interviews to resolve problems and more administrative reviews when serious questions arise about whether a clearance should be continued. In addition, investigations that turn up suspected employee drug use may also identify other employees with suspected drug use who will also have to be investigated sooner than planned.

DOE Offices May Not Meet December 1985 Policy

The large workload increase, which the December 1985 policy created, will require, according to clearance officials, a large increase in DOE clearance branch and OPM investigative resources, and/or a large reduction in the number of clearances. DOE has been slow in identifying resource needs and requesting, approving, and providing those resources. Also, steps to reduce the number of active clearances are slow in bearing fruit. Finally, OPM may not be providing needed resources for its Oak Ridge office.

During August and September 1986, we discussed with field office clearance officials the impact of the December 1985 reinvestigation policy on their workload and how they planned to meet the increase. None had a plan for meeting the increased workload, all said they could not get current with reinvestigations by the 1991 target with their current staff, and none had requested additional staff.

On October 2, 1986, we discussed similar matters with headquarters clearance officials who told us that they had requested authority to fill two vacancies and to add four staff members to handle the increased workload; it received approval to fill the vacancies, including one to begin a contractor reinvestigation program and to obtain OPM assistance. As of January 1987, the staff member for the contractor program was on board, and five OPM investigators had begun a 4-month temporary duty assignment.

Richland and Albuquerque had taken similar steps to acquire additional resources. On October 27, 1986, Richland requested—and in November 1986 received—authority to contract for three additional staff members. Also, on November 5, 1986, the manager of the Albuquerque field office notified headquarters that Albuquerque was attempting to contract for 13 new staff members and requesting headquarters to

authorize Albuquerque to obtain temporary staff support from OPM. He also noted that he had authorized \$30,000 of overtime for the clearance branch. The Albuquerque manager said he believed the clearance workload could be managed by utilizing the above methods.

As of November 1986, the Oak Ridge office had not requested additional staff to meet the workload increase, and the Oak Ridge manager notified headquarters that Oak Ridge could not meet the new reinvestigation policy.

In addition, DOE headquarters and the three field offices have taken steps to reduce the number of clearances and thus, the number that must be reinvestigated to meet the December 1985 policy and the July 1986 guidance. For example, DOE headquarters tasked one of its contractors to review the headquarters computerized clearance file to determine whether terminated employees had active clearances. At the same time, DOE's Inspector General also reviewed the headquarters clearance file and found that about 36 percent (5,500) of the 15,500 clearances in effect in October 1985 were for individuals who no longer had an affiliation with DOE. The Inspector General's report concluded that these individuals retained clearances granting unwarranted access to DOE facilities, and therefore, to classified information if custodians of classified information did not strictly limit access to those with a specific need for the information.

As a result of the contractor's and Inspector General's findings, by August 31, 1986, DOE headquarters reduced the number of active clearances by 19 percent—from about 16,000 clearances to 13,000 clearances. Further, on September 30, 1986, the Under Secretary approved a revised order changing the requirements for a Q sensitive clearance. An official in the Office of Safeguards and Security estimates the revision could result in DOE's downgrading 8,700 Q sensitive clearances nationwide but could not estimate when this action would occur. By downgrading these clearances to Q nonsensitive, DOE would save money because less extensive reinvestigations would be required.

The field offices have also begun reviewing individual clearances to determine whether they can be eliminated or the classification lowered. In addition, the field offices are assessing work areas to determine whether they could be reconfigured, that is, changing fence locations, revising building access points, or consolidating locations in which classified material is used. Such actions could reduce the number of people who require high level clearances to work in secured areas. Field office

officials could not estimate when these efforts would be complete or what their impact would be.

Another issue that would affect DOE's meeting the 1991 target date is availability of OPM investigators to do the reinvestigations required. OPM performs over 90 percent of DOE's reinvestigations. OPM officials told us they expect to hire 180 additional investigators nationwide to help meet DOE's increased reinvestigation needs; this may not be enough, at least at Oak Ridge. OPM's Supervisory Investigator that serves Oak Ridge stated that OPM can process about 2,400 reinvestigations a year; in fiscal year 1987, OPM plans to have 49 investigators (an increase of 28) and could increase the number of annual reinvestigations performed to about 4,800. However, the 4,800 will fall short of the 11,650 reinvestigations Oak Ridge estimates it will need during fiscal year 1987 to eliminate the backlog by 1991. Oak Ridge officials told us that in addition to OPM not having sufficient staff to perform the required reinvestigations, they do not expect to have funds to purchase all the reinvestigations required. Conversely, a headquarters clearance official told us the limiting factor at Oak Ridge is Oak Ridge's inability to process the number of reinvestigations needed. Headquarters asked OPM to staff its Oak Ridge office based on Oak Ridge's projection of what it would process.

The Supervisory Investigator of the OPM office that serves Albuquerque told us that OPM expects to have 35 investigators (an increase of 21) in fiscal year 1987 and should be able to handle the projected increase in Albuquerque's workload. Officials in the OPM office that serves Richland believe that with the 15 additional investigators being hired in fiscal year 1987, they can do the 2,800 annual reinvestigations Richland will need to meet DOE's 1991 target.

Importance of Conducting Timely Reinvestigations

Security leaks at various federal agencies over the last few years have focused increased attention on the susceptibility of cleared employees to become targets for espionage. For example, during April 1985 hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, DOE's Deputy Director, Security Division, noted that the most serious problem and the most attractive targets for hostile intelligence services are cleared employees, not outsiders. In addition, a November 1985 report to the Secretary of Defense by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy noted that the individual recruited into espionage after receiving a clearance is the greater and more probable threat to Defense's security than outsiders. Recent spy cases provide further evidence that cleared employees present the

greatest risk. The Walker case discussed below may be the most striking example.

John Walker, a retired Navy communications specialist, received a top secret clearance in 1965 but was never reinvestigated before retiring in 1976. Mr. Walker had conducted espionage activities since at least 1970. These activities included providing the Soviets with cryptographic and other technical information that may have enabled the Soviets to break a highly sensitive Navy communications code. The Secretary of the Navy said it will take years and perhaps cost about \$100 million to repair the damage done by Mr. Walker.

DOE's nuclear weapons program also involves highly sensitive classified information that is entrusted to cleared employees. Thus, DOE could be subject to espionage by cleared employees just as the Department of Defense has been. DOE has over 209,000 cleared employees with potential access to classified information and/or material, which could be of interest to foreign powers. Some of these employees have lifestyles that could make them susceptible to espionage. For example, by reviewing PSQs, Oak Ridge identified between 2,500 and 3,000 employees who had possible personal problems that required a background investigation to determine whether the employees posed a security risk. In addition, late in 1985 and early in 1986, Oak Ridge identified more than 250 employees who used—or were suspected of using—drugs, including six security guards (one allegedly used drugs on the job) who had access to a facility where various weapons parts were manufactured.

We also reviewed clearance files at headquarters and the field offices. At the Richland and Oak Ridge field offices, we found specific examples where DOE cleared employees with alleged personal problems should have had some type of reinvestigation but did not. We found 11 of 102 cases in the administrative review process at Richland and 11 of 69 cases in this process at Oak Ridge that met these criteria. DOE learned of the derogatory information through police reports and interviews with—or investigations of—other employees. After identifying the derogatory information, Richland and Oak Ridge began to investigate the subject employees. These employees held Q or L clearances, held sensitive jobs such as armed security inspectors, and had serious alcohol and drug problems—including on-the-job drug use. If DOE had reviewed these employees' PSQs, it may have identified these problems earlier in that the PSQs ask questions that often illicit derogatory information. Appendix IV provides specific examples.

In reviewing the clearance files, we also identified other cases that demonstrate the importance of DOE's conducting periodic reinvestigations to identify derogatory information. We found instances where background investigations effectively identified derogatory information that raised concerns about an employee's suitability, and other cases where DOE identified information that required it to take action before the 5-year reinvestigation was due. These cases included Q cleared individuals who held sensitive positions in defense plants and who allegedly used cocaine on the job, supplied drugs to coworkers on the job, carried weapons on the job, and sold drugs. Appendix V provides detailed examples of the cases reviewed.

Conclusions

DOE orders require that cleared employees be reinvestigated periodically to ensure that their lifestyles have not changed in such a way that they would no longer qualify for their security clearances. Prior to December 1985, DOE required all employees to submit PSQs for review but only required background reinvestigations for employees holding 12,000 of its 218,000 clearances. Three of the four offices did not fully comply. Headquarters had no periodic reinvestigation program for DOE employees until 1982 and none for contractors until January 1987. Richland had no program until 1985. Oak Ridge kept up-to-date with DOE's reinvestigation requirements until 1984 when better reporting of employee activities caused a backlog to develop. The shortcomings in the headquarters, Richland, and Oak Ridge program implementation existed because of management inattention, inadequate budget and staff resources, and insufficient support from OPM. The Albuquerque office appears to have complied with the reinvestigation requirements in effect before December 1985.

The new reinvestigation policy, which DOE issued in December 1985, increased the number of clearances requiring employee reinvestigations from 12,000 to more than 218,000 and subsequent guidance called for DOE to have all reinvestigations up-to-date by 1991. The annual workload increase at each office, since fiscal year 1985, could range from almost 200 percent at headquarters to over 1,100 percent at Albuquerque.

However, the number of planned periodic reinvestigations may understate the workload increase. As these reinvestigations are performed, they may identify a large number of cases that need additional processing, investigation, and analysis. In addition, they may identify

derogatory information about other employees who will then have to be reinvestigated sooner than planned.

Because the numbers and levels of clearances have a direct relation to the reinvestigation workload, DOE headquarters asked the field offices to reduce both the numbers and levels of clearances. The steps taken so far have had little impact as yet. During August and September, we discussed with each field office their plans for meeting the expanded workload. Although none believed they could meet the workload increase with their current staff, they had not requested added resources or developed plans for meeting the workload.

We discussed with headquarters on October 2, 1986, whether they would meet the 1991 target. Headquarters officials told us they had requested approval to add four staff positions and to fill two recent vacancies. They obtained approval to fill the vacancies (the staff member needed to start its contractor reinvestigative program came on board in January 1987) but have not received approval to add staff. Instead, they obtained approval to use five OPM staff temporarily. Subsequently, on October 27, Richland requested added staff; it received approval in November. On November 5, the Albuquerque office advised headquarters that they have several steps underway to obtain the additional resources needed to eliminate its backlog.

Oak Ridge had not requested added resources as of November 1986, although it believes it can not meet the 1991 target with existing resources. In addition to its own resource problems, Oak Ridge does not believe OPM has enough staff to process the reinvestigations it needs.

In summary, management attention, particularly at the operations office manager level, has not been focused on promptly developing plans that consider reinvestigation requirements, resources available to meet those requirements, and other possible steps that will bring resources in line with requirements and ensure the new reinvestigation policy is met within DOE's time frames. While recent decisions to provide added resources suggest the situation is improving, needed staff are not in place and competition for resources could delay or prevent them from being provided.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy develop a plan to bring headquarters and the field offices into compliance with the December 1985 Personnel Security Program Order. Because the reinvestigation

workload is directly related to the numbers and levels of active clearances, the first step in the planning process should focus on how those numbers and levels can be reduced. DOE may be able to reduce clearance numbers and levels by ensuring that only employees who require clearances have them, that employees have the lowest clearance level needed to do their jobs, and that clearances for individuals who are no longer associated with DOE are promptly terminated. The results of our ongoing work on the remainder of DOE's security clearance activities may provide more specific suggestions for reducing clearance numbers and levels. The plan should consider (1) reinvestigation workload requirements and (2) resources needed to meet those requirements. In addition, the Secretary should direct the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs to review and approve the plans; monitor their implementation; and annually report to him on compliance with the order.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

On November 1, 1985, the Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, House Committee on Government Operations requested that we review DOE's personnel security clearance program. On the basis of subsequent discussions, we agreed to conduct the work in two phases. During the first phase, we would determine whether DOE is conducting timely personnel security clearance reinvestigations and the ramifications of its not doing so. In the second phase, we would determine the adequacy of other aspects of DOE's overall security clearance program, such as preemployment investigations, initial investigations, clearance terminations, and the employee appeal (administrative review) process. This report provides information concerning DOE's security clearance reinvestigation activities. We expect to report on the other issues by the summer of 1987.

Our work was conducted at DOE headquarters and its Richland, Washington; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, field offices. We selected Richland because it is one of three sites DOE is considering for a high-level radioactive waste repository, and it has an operating reactor of a design similar to Chernobyl; Albuquerque because it has the largest number of DOE clearances; and Oak Ridge because of allegations of widespread drug use among employees at one facility under its auspices. To obtain a perspective on DOE's personnel security clearance program, we reviewed the Atomic Energy Commission's (predecessor to DOE) Appendix 2301, 1968; DOE Order 5631.2A, December 1985; DOE's July 1986 reinvestigation guidance; and field office procedures for implementing DOE's policies and guidance.

We also obtained additional information from DOE headquarters officials in the Office of Safeguards and Security; Albuquerque's Security Division Director and Chiefs of the Personnel Security Branch, Processing Section, and Analyses Section; Oak Ridge's Director, Safeguards and Security Division, and Chief, Personnel Clearance and Assurance Branch; and Richland's Director, Safeguards and Security Division and Chief, Personnel Security. We obtained pertinent documentation from these officials such as statistics on the number of clearances, extent of reinvestigation backlogs, and cases in the administrative review process. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of Personnel Management's Investigations Background Division in Washington, D.C., and the chief OPM investigators at Richland, Albuquerque, and Oak Ridge.

To determine whether DOE headquarters and the three field offices met DOE's 1968 reinvestigation policy, we interviewed the officials cited above and obtained supporting data at each location. We also reviewed

102 cases at Richland that entered the administrative review process prior to July 1986; 69 cases at Oak Ridge that entered the process since January 1985; and 33 cases at Albuquerque that entered the process between January 1985 and July 1986.

As requested, we did not ask DOE to review and comment officially on this report. With this exception, our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our work was conducted between December 1985 and November 1986.

Types of Reinvestigation Required by Clearance Levels

Clearance level	Reinvestigation requirements prior to December 1985^a	Reinvestigation requirements after December 1985
Q sensitive	FBI background reinvestigation after 5 years. FBI file and fingerprint check every 5 years thereafter.	FBI background reinvestigation after 5 years. National agency and credit check after 10 and 15 years. FBI background reinvestigation after 20 years. National agency and credit check every 5 years thereafter.
Q nonsensitive (With special access)	OPM background reinvestigation after 5 years. FBI file and fingerprint check every 5 years thereafter.	OPM limited background reinvestigation after 5 years. National agency and credit check after 10 and 15 years. OPM special background reinvestigation after 20 years. National agency and credit check every 5 years thereafter.
Other Q nonsensitive	DOE review of updated personnel security questionnaire every 5 years.	Same as above for all Q nonsensitive clearances.
L	DOE review of updated personnel security questionnaire every 5 years.	National agency and credit check after 5 years. DOE review of updated personnel security questionnaire plus FBI file and fingerprint check after 10 and 15 years. National agency and credit check after 20 years. DOE review of updated personnel security questionnaire and FBI file and fingerprint check every 5 years thereafter.
Top Secret	None.	Same as Q nonsensitive.
Secret	None.	Same as "L."

^aDOE's Deputy Director for Security interpretation of requirements.

Cases Where DOE Has Identified Employees Who Were Not Appropriately Reinvestigated

Our review of personal clearance files at the field offices identified 22 cases at Richland and Oak Ridge where employees were overdue a reinvestigation because regulations required either a PSQ review or a more detailed investigation, or because derogatory information was identified that should have been followed up on. In these cases, DOE first learned of employee problems through sources such as police reports and interviews with other employees. Sample cases are discussed below.

Richland

Of the 102 administrative review cases at Richland, 11 employees had not been reinvestigated for 5 years or more, including one who controls the flow and chemical composition of radioactive waste from nuclear reactors, a truck driver who transported special nuclear material (plutonium and enriched uranium), and two armed security inspectors. All employees held Q nonsensitive clearances. The following briefly summarizes these cases.

- Process operator - clearance received in December 1974; Richland conducted no reinvestigation until February 1983 after learning that the employee filed for bankruptcy. Richland discovered the individual had four arrests for driving while intoxicated prior to 1983. Between October 1983 and September 1985, the individual had an additional 5 arrests for driving while intoxicated—in several of these arrests the subject was also cited for possession of marijuana. Richland suspended the clearance in October 1985; the contractor terminated the individual's employment in November 1985.
- Truck driver - clearance received in April 1975; reinvestigation was due in 1980, but was not done. In July 1984, Richland learned that the employee had spent 4 weeks in an alcohol and chemical dependency center, had a 9-year alcohol abuse problem, and had used heroin since 1979. Richland suspended the clearance in August 1984 and revoked it in December 1985.
- Security inspectors - clearances received for two inspectors in 1980. Reinvestigations were due in 1985, but were not done. Richland officials were informed that these inspectors were using illegal drugs both on and off the job. Both employees had their clearances suspended in May 1986 and were reassigned to nonsecured areas. Both were in the administrative review process as of September 1986.

Oak Ridge

Of the 69 administrative review cases at Oak Ridge, 11 were overdue for reinvestigation or a PSQ review. The 11 cases included a steamfitter with a Q nonsensitive clearance who worked on installing and repairing all

**Appendix IV
Cases Where DOE Has Identified Employees
Who Were Not Appropriately Reinvestigated**

pipng for steam, gas, air, and liquids in the Y-12 complex and could have seen Secret Restricted Data, a material handler with a Q sensitive clearance and extensive access throughout the Y-12 complex, and a janitor with an L clearance with access to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The following briefly summarizes these cases.

- Steamfitter - clearance received in April 1977; no PSQ update although one was required in 1982. Oak Ridge conducted no reinvestigation until August 1984 after learning that the employee had been arrested for shoplifting, receiving stolen property, and selling cocaine. Prior to receiving the April 1977 clearance, however, Oak Ridge knew the individual used a variety of drugs including LSD, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, and barbiturates. An October 1985 reinvestigation showed that the employee had used drugs three to four times a day for the last 5 to 6 years—costing about \$500 a week. Oak Ridge suspended the clearance in February 1986; case pending as of July 1986.⁵
- Material handler - clearance received in April 1974; required background reinvestigation was not performed although PSQs were updated in 1978 and 1983. In January 1979, the employee was arrested and subsequently signed a drug certification agreeing not to use drugs again. The employee reported a driving-while-intoxicated and possession of marijuana arrest in February 1985. In an interview with DOE, the employee admitted to using marijuana since 1979. DOE revoked the clearance in June 1986.
- Janitor - clearance received in February 1976; no PSQ update although one was required in 1981. Oak Ridge conducted no reinvestigation until July 1985 when the employee was identified by a coworker as a marijuana user—both on and off the job. Oak Ridge suspended the clearance in May 1986; case pending as of July 1986.

Cases Where DOE Has Identified Problems With Cleared Employees Not Due Reinvestigation

We also reviewed cases where reinvestigations were not due but derogatory information came to DOE's attention that prompted reinvestigations. The reinvestigations identified serious concerns that led DOE to suspend the employees' clearances, place the employees in the administrative review process and/or revoke their clearances. These cases included a security inspector with a Q clearance and unlimited access to (1) all areas of a defense complex, (2) information classified as Secret-Restricted Data, (3) weapons parts and assembly areas, (4) materials access areas, and (5) a variety of sophisticated firearms. They also include a secretary at a defense plant, a laboratory technician at a gaseous diffusion plant, a technologist at a national laboratory, a metal fabricator, and a senior chemical technologist at a defense plant—all with Q nonsensitive clearances.

- Security inspector - clearance granted in November 1976. DOE requested a background investigation in 1983; it was not done until August 1985. The investigation found that the employee used cocaine and amphetamines on the job. DOE suspended the clearance in March 1986.
- Secretary - clearance granted in May 1978; PSQ updated in 1983. In January 1985, DOE received information from another employee that the secretary might be involved with drugs at work. A background investigation, requested in March 1985 and received in May 1985, concluded that the employee used—and may have sold—drugs. In a February 1986 interview, DOE found that the employee routinely used drugs, the employee's spouse sold drugs, and the employee supplied cocaine to the security inspector discussed above. DOE suspended the clearance in August 1985; the case is in administrative review.
- Senior Laboratory Technician - clearance granted in 1974; employee submitted updated PSQs in 1978 and 1984 with no derogatory information identified. After a sheriff advised DOE of the employee's arrest for carrying a weapon and having an expired license plate, DOE initiated a reinvestigation in August 1985. The investigation was received in April 1986 and disclosed allegations that the employee
 - smoked marijuana continuously since the early 1970's and regularly used cocaine, amphetamines, and quaaludes,
 - sold cocaine and marijuana to individuals in other states,
 - manufactured synthetic drugs in a laboratory at work,
 - impersonated a police officer,
 - habitually carried a concealed weapon and at least once carried a weapon into the plant,
 - repeatedly assaulted and threatened individuals, particularly women,
 - committed burglaries, trafficked in stolen property, and committed arson for hire so individuals could collect insurance,

**Appendix V
Cases Where DOE Has Identified Problems
With Cleared Employees Not
Due Reinvestigation**

- associated with numerous felons,
- raped juvenile girls, and
- sold classified documents and uranium to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

DOE suspended the clearance in July 1986; OPM was conducting additional investigations as of October 1986.

- Senior Technologist - L clearance granted in 1967 and upgraded to a Q clearance in January 1977, despite admitted, regular marijuana use from 1972 to 1976. A PSQ was submitted in 1982 and a second one submitted in 1985 identified problems with alcohol and drugs. A reinvestigation was requested in April 1985 and received in October 1985. The reinvestigation disclosed that the employee (1) had a heavy dependency on alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine, (2) trafficked in illegal drugs and was arrested for selling cocaine, (3) smoked marijuana regularly while operating a furnace in a high enriched plutonium laboratory, and (4) gave drugs to friends at work. DOE discharged the employee in July 1986.
- Metal fabrication trainee - clearance granted in November 1982. After learning of derogatory information concerning the employee, DOE requested a background investigation in August 1983. In March 1985, the investigation found the employee used marijuana, carried a concealed weapon, and performed sexual acts—all while on the job. DOE suspended the clearance in April 1986; the case is in administrative review.
- Senior chemical technologist - L clearance granted in 1981 and upgraded to a Q nonsensitive in August 1984 to allow the employee to work in a plutonium processing facility. After learning of derogatory information concerning the employee, DOE requested a background investigation in December 1985 and interviewed the employee in October 1986. The employee admitted to using drugs heavily for the preceding 11 years (marijuana, heroin, LSD, hashish, PCP, and cocaine), selling marijuana and cocaine, and lying about this drug use when applying for both the L and Q clearances. The employee also had an extensive arrest record for offenses such as speeding, driving with a revoked license and with an invalid registration, passing bad checks, and resisting arrest. DOE suspended the clearance in November 1986.

Major Contributors to This Report

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C.

Keith O. Fultz, Associate Director, 275-1441
Carl J. Bannerman, Group Director
Mary Ann Kruslicky, Group Director
Brian C. O'Malley, Advisor
Robert E. Cronin, Evaluator-in-Charge
Irene P. Chu, Evaluator
Gloria M. Sutton, Editor
Rena M. Gilbert, Typist

Atlanta Regional Office

Coy E. Belew, Site Senior
Katherine P. Chenault, Evaluator

Denver Regional Office

John D. Gentry, Regional Assignment Manager
Suzanne MacFarlane, Site Senior
Gloria J. Gonzales, Evaluator
Yvonne I. Rodriguez, Evaluator

Seattle Regional Office

Leonard L. Dowd, Regional Assignment Manager
John E. Cass, Site Senior
Brian A. Estes, Evaluator
Brent L. Hutchison, Evaluator

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