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FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES

Opportunities for More Cost-Effective Cleanups

Statement for the record by
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to provide an overview of our work on efforts by the federal government to clean up hazardous waste sites on its facilities and to discuss ways of making this effort, which is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars, more cost-effective. Our testimony is based primarily on our past reviews of the management of federal facility cleanups. (See the list of related GAO products at the end of this testimony.) This statement will focus on the Departments of Defense, Energy, and the Interior, which are responsible for the most numerous and the most expensive cleanups and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which oversees federal cleanups.

In summary, our reviews have shown the following:

-- First, although the federal cleanup effort is more than a decade old and has cost over $15 billion,[1] progress has been limited. Some federal agencies have still not identified sites that need to be assessed for possible cleanup, have not assessed many sites that they have identified, and have completely cleaned up only two high priority sites.

-- Second, although increasing budgetary pressures are forcing agencies to choose among competing cleanup needs, the government has not established an adequate approach for setting federal cleanup priorities either within agencies or across agency lines.

-- Third, contract management problems have driven up the cost of cleanups.

-- Finally, agencies have not adequately developed or used potentially cost-saving innovative technology.

BACKGROUND

In conducting their cleanup efforts, federal agencies must comply with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, as amended and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, as amended, commonly known as

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[1]The $15 billion represents amounts specifically classified as cleanup funding within the Energy and Defense environmental restoration programs. Additional funding for cleanup activities in programs that address cleanup and waste management activities--such as Defense's base realignment and closure program--was not included in our total, because the cleanup funding could not be separated from general hazardous waste management funding.

Superfund. While RCRA authorities are typically used to address contamination at active sites, CERCLA authorities are typically used at sites on the National Priorities List (NPL), EPA's list of seriously contaminated sites, most of which are inactive. For CERCLA cleanups, EPA negotiates and monitors the implementation of cleanup agreements with the responsible federal agency and the affected state. These enforceable agreements, called interagency agreements, establish cleanup plans and milestones and commonly provide that EPA may assess penalties against the federal agency for failure to meet the milestones and other terms of the agreement. EPA also typically negotiates agreements with the federal agency and the state covering RCRA cleanups, and EPA and authorized states may assess penalties against federal agencies for RCRA violations.

Federal hazardous waste sites include highly radioactive sites within Energy's nuclear weapons complex; Defense sites, some of which contain unexploded ordnance; and thousands of abandoned and inactive mines on lands owned by Interior. The costs of cleaning up these sites and complying with hazardous waste laws, could amount to $300 billion with Energy responsible for the largest proportion of these costs. Historically, estimates of federal cleanup costs have grown over time.

For fiscal year 1994, Defense and Energy appropriations for cleaning up hazardous wastes totaled almost $4 billion.[2] Much of this funding was paid to contractors to perform cleanup studies and conduct cleanups. Three agencies--DOE, DOD, and EPA--receive funding for research and development programs to improve the technology for cleaning up hazardous wastes. Recently, both the administration and the Congress have taken steps to reduce the funding for hazardous waste cleanups: The President proposed a $4.4 billion cut in DOE's planned environmental management budget over the next 5 years, and the Congress reduced DOD's budget requests each year by $300 to $350 million for fiscal years 1993 and 1994.

As of October 1994, federal agencies had placed 1,945 hazardous waste sites on EPA's federal facility docket, a listing of facilities needing evaluation for possible cleanup. One hundred and sixty federal sites had been placed on the NPL for cleanup under the Superfund program. Hundreds more are likely to be listed in the future, with additional sites requiring cleanup under state laws.

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[2]The $4 billion only represents amounts specifically classified as cleanup funding. It excludes amounts used for cleanups in accounts that fund cleanups and other waste management activities, as explained in footnote 1.

CLEANUP PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED

Federal agencies, chiefly DOE and DOD, have spent over $15 billion on their hazardous waste cleanup programs,[3] but progress thus far has been limited. Agencies have used their cleanup funding largely to identify contaminated sites, take emergency action to stabilize the contamination, study the extent of the contamination, and prepare cleanup plans. Recently, actual cleanup action has begun at a significant number of sites. However, some agencies have not yet finished identifying their hazardous waste sites, sites have been assessed slowly for listing on the NPL, and only a few cleanups have been completed.

A Full Inventory of Federal Hazardous Waste Sites Has Not Been Completed

CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, required EPA to establish and periodically update a docket, listing federal sites at which hazardous waste has been generated, treated, or disposed. The original docket was published in February 1988, and eight docket updates have since been published. Once a site is listed on the docket, it must be evaluated to determine whether it should be placed on the NPL. Approximately 9 years after the passage of SARA, the federal government still has not completed a comprehensive inventory of the potential hazardous waste sites at its facilities. As we reported in April 1994,[4] DOD, DOE, and several other agencies have made substantial progress toward identifying sites with potential hazardous waste problems, but other agencies, including DOI's Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service, expect that it will take years to identify and assess all potential hazardous waste sites on DOI's land. For example, DOI's Fish and Wildlife Service does not plan to complete environmental audits that would identify potential hazardous waste sites until fiscal year 1999.

The primary factors that have contributed to agencies' slow progress in developing an inventory of hazardous waste sites include (1) the absence of statutory deadlines for completing the inventory, (2) insufficient oversight by EPA, (3) assignment of a low priority to this function by the responsible agencies, and (4) the sheer size of agency land holdings and resource limitations. While federal laws prescribe reporting of potential hazardous waste sites, they do not impose deadlines for completing the inventory. In addition, EPA's oversight of federal agencies consists primarily

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[3]See footnote 1.

[4]Federal Facilities: Agencies Slow to Define the Scope and Cost of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups (GAO/RCED-94-73, Apr. 15, 1994).

of enforcing compliance with milestones at known sites rather than monitoring efforts to discover sites.

In view of the need to complete a comprehensive inventory of federal sites, we recommended in April 1994 that the Congress amend CERCLA to require (1) that agencies submit plans for completing their inventories to EPA for review and approval, (2) that agencies report annually to EPA on their progress in implementing these plans, and (3) that EPA report annually to the Congress on the agencies' progress toward completing their site inventories. We continue to believe that these recommendations are warranted.

Evaluation of Sites for Listing on the NPL Has Gone Slowly

SARA required EPA and the responsible federal agencies to evaluate by April 1989, all of the sites on the original federal docket for inclusion on the NPL. As of October 1994, 268 of the 882 sites on the original 1988 docket still required further analysis to determine whether they should be included on the NPL. According to EPA officials, some of the sites have not been evaluated because some agencies have not yet given EPA all of the information it needs to complete the evaluations and because EPA's resources are constrained.

In the meantime, the docket continues to grow: it now includes 1,945 hazardous waste sites, 1,050 of which still require further analysis. At its current pace, EPA will take much more than a decade to decide whether to place the remaining sites on the NPL.

Few Cleanups Have Been Completed

As of October 1994, EPA had placed or proposed 160 federal sites on the NPL--148 of which, or 93 percent, are managed by DOD and DOE. However, only two of the sites had been cleaned up. Among the reasons for this slow progress is the long time that agencies have spent on the cleanup studies--at federal sites on the NPL, studies of site contamination and cleanup options take an average of almost 2 and a half years. To help speed up the cleanups, EPA, Energy, and Defense, recently issued joint guidance that promotes certain cleanup initiatives, such as efforts to reduce duplicative studies undertaken at sites. Limited cooperation between agencies has also been a problem. As we reported in April 1994, cooperation between EPA and DOD was hindered by EPA offices being hundreds of miles away and rapid turnover of EPA staff. Officials from both agencies generally agreed that better working relationships could greatly reduce the amount of time and money required to study and clean up sites.[5]

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[5]Environmental Cleanup: Too Many High Priority Sites Impede DOD's Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-133, Apr. 21, 1994).

A NATIONAL APPROACH TO SETTING FEDERAL CLEANUP PRIORITIES HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED

The nation needs a well-managed, integrated cleanup approach to ensure that limited public funds are used efficiently to clean up the most serious threats to human health and the environment. However, no such approach is used to set federal cleanup priorities across agency lines, and individual agencies have not established adequate priority-setting systems. We recently reported on the lack of a cross-agency priority system, and noted that further action was needed to adopt a process to set cleanup priorities and allocate funding across agency lines.[6]

We also reported on problems with setting priorities for DOD's and DOE's cleanup programs. For example, our March 1995 report,[7] noted that EPA usually evaluates only the four to six worst sites on a Defense facility to determine whether the facility should be placed on the NPL, even though the facility may encompass hundreds of contaminated sites. Then, if the facility is placed on the NPL, DOD program managers usually must apply the entire CERCLA process to all of the contaminated sites, even if the contamination at individual sites is minor. As of February 1995, there were over 100 Defense facilities on the NPL containing over 5,700 sites. According to DOD and EPA, most of the individual sites would not be designated as Superfund sites. Thus, the current approach leads to designating an excessively large number of sites as high priorities for cleanup. This approach strains cleanup resources and allows other seriously contaminated sites to worsen while less seriously contaminated sites receive greater access to DOD's resources.

Additionally, we have reported[8] that DOE does not set priorities by comparing risks among sites. Instead, its program has been driven by goals and milestones in interagency cleanup agreements. At some DOE facilities, large expenditures for cleanups may result in limited improvements in the protection of public health and safety. We recommended that the Secretary of Energy (1) set national priorities for cleaning up DOE's contaminated sites and (2) initiate discussions with regulators to renegotiate milestones that no longer reflect national priorities. DOD and DOE are currently attempting to develop better approaches that involve comparing actual risks among sites.

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[6]Superfund Program Management (GAO/HR-95-12, Feb. 1995).

[7]Environmental Protection: Challenges in Defense Environmental Program Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-121, Mar. 24, 1995).

[8]Department of Energy: National Priorities Needed for Meeting Environmental Agreements (GAO/RCED-95-1, Mar. 3, 1995).

Establishing a national cross-agency, risk-based approach to setting priorities for cleaning up federal facilities could have many benefits, including (1) better protection of human health and the environment through attention to the worst sites first, (2) more cost-effective investment of cleanup funds, and (3) more consistent decisions about cleanups across agencies. This approach was supported by the then-Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who testified in 1993 that cleanup priorities must be set as part of a comprehensive governmentwide approach to achieve faster, more effective cleanup decisions and results.[9] Additionally, the National Research Council recommended that the government consider developing a unified national process for ranking hazardous waste sites for cleanup to replace the multiple approaches now in use.[10] However, there are certain obstacles to implementing a nationwide risk-based approach, including (1) the need to renegotiate current cleanup agreements between responsible agencies and regulators and (2) political opposition from agencies, states, and others whose facilities might receive a lower priority.

FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY MANAGED CONTRACTS

The government has not adequately overseen the hundreds of contracts it has awarded to identify, investigate, and clean up thousands of contaminated sites. Fundamental weaknesses in federal contract management include insufficient oversight of contractors and lack of essential management and financial information. Despite their extensive reliance on contractors, many agencies--especially DOE and EPA--have devoted limited resources to managing contractors.[11] Furthermore, because of limited financial and management information, federal agencies do not have the complete picture of contractors' activities that is required for adequate oversight. To a large extent, contracts have been placed on "automatic pilot" after being awarded.

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[9]Testimony of Alice Rivlin, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, September 21, 1993. Additionally, Ms. Rivlin announced the formation of the Federal Facility Policy Group, which is considering options for improving federal facility cleanups, including setting priorities among federal cleanups. The group expects to issue an options paper in the summer of 1995.

[10]Ranking Hazardous Waste Sites for Remedial Action (1994).

[11]While EPA does not contract for cleanups of federally-owned hazardous waste sites, it does contract for cleanups at privately-owned sites and, therefore, confronts contract management issues that are similar to the other federal agencies.

Federal agencies, such as DOE and EPA, have relied heavily on cost-reimbursable contracts for their cleanup programs. However, these contracts require extensive monitoring of contractors' performance because they provide few incentives for contractors to operate cost-effectively. Historically, this oversight has not occurred. As we have reported, EPA has not obtained independent estimates of contractors' costs before approving the contractors' budgets. In addition, we found that EPA has not reviewed contractors' monthly invoices to ensure that the charges are reasonable.[12] For example, we found that an EPA Superfund contractor billed the government for costs--for entertainment, tickets for sporting events, or alcoholic beverages--that either were not allowable or appeared questionable under applicable regulations.[13]

DOE's problems were compounded by its failure to ensure the effective oversight of its contractors' financial management. Standard contract clauses governing accounting requirements, the management of federal property, and cost accounting standards were either omitted from or significantly altered in several DOE contracts, undermining the agency's ability to exercise adequate financial management oversight.[14] The effects of such weak oversight were evident in the findings of DOE's Project Performance Study, which reported that inappropriate contracting strategies, together with poor definition of projects' requirements, raised the agency's environmental cleanup costs 32 percent above those of the private sector and 15 percent above those of other federal agencies.

The costs of cleaning up federal facilities have also increased because the government has not developed adequate financial management information systems. At DOE, for example, we found that staff relied on contractors for basic information and support systems needed to supervise the same contractors.[15] At EPA, the agency was not independently estimating the costs of contract work

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[12]Superfund: EPA Has Not Corrected Long-Standing Contract Management Problems (GAO/RCED-92-45, Oct. 24, 1991).

[13]Federally Sponsored Contracts: Unallowable and Questionable Indirect Costs Claimed by CH2M Hill (GAO/T-RCED-92-37, Mar. 19, 1992).

[14]Financial Management: Energy's Material Financial Management Weaknesses Require Corrective Action (GAO/AIMD-93-29, Sep. 30, 1993).

[15]Department of Energy: Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform (GAO/RCED-94-150, Mar. 21, 1994).

or performing timely audits.[16] Recent agency reviews continue to find problems with EPA's preparation of independent cost estimates and monthly reviews of contractors' invoices.

In December 1992 and again in February 1995, we identified contract management as a high-risk activity at both DOE and EPA because it is susceptible to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Spurred by strong congressional oversight and recommendations from GAO, the agencies' Inspectors General, and others, DOE and EPA have begun to change their contract management culture. At DOE, in June 1993, the Secretary of Energy formed a Contract Reform Team that made over 45 recommendations to improve DOE's contracting practices, including developing alternatives to cost-reimbursable contracts, strengthening financial information systems, and better managing and controlling certain costs. Recently, DOE announced the implementation of an efficiency improvement program that, it believes, will save over $9 billion through efforts that include contracting reforms. For example, DOE expects to eliminate 12,000 contractor employees by fiscal year 1997. Similarly, EPA's management has focused greater attention on controlling contractors' costs, improving contractor performance, and other problems. For example, EPA recently required its contract administrators to prepare independent government cost estimates for contractor work assignments over $25,000 and the agency is improving its award fee process for contractors. The changes under way within DOE and EPA are good initial steps toward reforming the agencies' contract administration. However, changes in the culture of contract management can take hold only if the agencies make their managers directly accountable for implementing the initiatives and reward good performance.

FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF INNOVATIVE CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES

Innovative technologies hold the promise of generating significant cost savings in cleaning up hazardous waste sites at federal facilities. According to EPA analyses, innovative technologies have saved an average of $21 million per site, or 62 percent, over conventional technologies at the 17 sites studied.[17] The Congressional Budget Office has reported that developing technologies could reduce the costs of investigating and cleaning up sites by 50 percent or more.[18] However, although EPA, Energy and

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[16]Superfund: EPA Has Not Corrected Long-Standing Contract Management Problems (GAO/RCED-92-45, Oct. 1991).

[17]EPA Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation Program: Innovation Making a Difference (EPA/540/F-94/505, May 1994).

[18]Cleaning up Defense Installations: Issues and Options (Jan. 1995).

Defense have spent substantial sums to develop waste cleanup technologies, few new technologies have found their way into cleanups. Our work shows that even when a new technology has been successfully demonstrated, agency officials are often reluctant to try it, preferring to rely on a conventional technique.[19]

Our work has also documented the obstacles facing federal agencies that are trying to use innovative cleanup technologies. These include the absence of adequate cost and performance information, the association of newer technologies with unacceptable levels of risk, the preference of contractors for traditional technologies, and the belief of local officials that using a new technology might lead to missing milestones.

Federal agencies have begun to address some of the problems we have noted. DOD, DOE, DOI, and EPA are beginning to collect and disseminate cost and performance data on innovative technologies. Additionally, a number of agencies, including EPA, DOD, and DOE, created the Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable to (1) exchange information on technologies for cleaning hazardous waste sites, (2) pursue cooperative efforts of mutual interest, and (3) develop strategies for increasing the application of innovative technologies. Federal agencies are also collaborating with one another and with the private sector to develop and commercialize innovative technologies through the newly created Interagency Environmental Technologies Office. Finally, EPA agreed with Clean Sites, a nonprofit organization formed to facilitate Superfund cleanups, to create public-private partnerships for developing and promoting innovative technologies. These partnerships allow the private sector partners to see how innovative technologies work before they make the commitment to use the technologies in their own cleanups. Additionally, the partnerships allow federal agencies to take advantage of the private sector's expertise in developing the technologies.

We believe that the efforts outlined above should assist federal agencies in developing innovative cleanup technologies. Further exploration of incentives to encourage the use of such technologies at federal facilities would also be beneficial.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the federal effort to clean up contaminated hazardous waste sites is expected to cost hundreds of billions of

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[19]Superfund: EPA Needs to Better Focus Cleanup Technology Development (GAO/T-RCED-92-92, Apr. 28, 1993), Environmental Protection: Challenges in Defense Environmental Program Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-121, Mar. 24, 1995), and Department of Energy: Management Changes Needed to Expand Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies (GAO/RCED-94-205, Aug. 10, 1994).

federal dollars and take many decades to complete. Already, the effort has cost billions of federal dollars, but only two NPL sites have been completely cleaned up. Given the continuing constraints on federal resources, it is very important for federal agencies to find ways of most effectively using their resources. During the current debate on reauthorizing Superfund, it is important to address the issues we have discussed today--identifying the full inventory of federal hazardous waste sites, establishing a priority-setting process for federal facility cleanups based on relative risks, better controlling site cleanup costs through better management of cleanup contracts, and exploring incentives to promote the use of innovative cleanup technologies. We look forward to assisting the Subcommittee in subsequent discussions of these and other issues related to the Superfund reauthorization debate.

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Environmental Protection: Challenges in Defense Environmental Program Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-121, Mar. 24, 1995).

Nuclear Weapons Complex: Establishing a National Risk-Based Strategy for Cleanup (GAO/T-RCED-95-120, March 6, 1995).

Department of Energy: National Priorities Needed for Meeting Environmental Agreements (GAO/RCED-95-1, Mar. 3, 1995).

Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

Superfund Program Management (GAO/HR-95-12, Feb. 1995).

Nuclear Cleanup: Difficulties in Coordinating Activities Under Two Environmental Laws (GAO/RCED-95-66, Dec. 22, 1994).

Environmental Cleanup: Defense Indemnification for Contractor Operations (GAO/NSIAD-95-27, Nov. 25, 1994).

Environmental Cleanup: Case Studies of Six High Priority DOD Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-8, Nov. 18, 1994).

Superfund: Status, Cost, and Timeliness of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups (GAO/RCED-94-256, Sept. 21, 1994).

Environment: DOD's New Environmental Security Strategy Faces Barriers (GAO/NSIAD-94-142, Sept. 30, 1994).

Environmental Compliance: DOD Needs to Better Identify and Monitor Equipment Containing Polychlorinated Biphenyls (GAO/NSIAD-94-243, Aug. 24, 1994).

Environmental Cleanup: Better Data Needed for Radioactively Contaminated Defense Sites (GAO/NSIAD-94-168, Aug. 24, 1994).

Nuclear Cleanup: Completion of Standards and Effectiveness of Land Use Planning Are Uncertain (GAO/RCED-94-144, Aug. 26, 1994).

Department of Energy: Management Changes Needed to Expand Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies (GAO/RCED-94-205, Aug. 10, 1994).

Environmental Cleanup: Inconsistent Sharing Arrangements May Increase Defense Costs (GAO/NSIAD-94-231, July 7, 1994).

Nuclear Health and Safety: Sites Used for Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Alaska (GAO/RCED-94-130FS, July 6, 1994).

Nuclear Waste: Much Effort Needed to Meet Federal Facility Compliance Act's Requirements (GAO/RCED-94-179, May 17, 1994).

Federal Facilities: Agencies Slow to Define the Scope and Cost of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups (GAO/RCED-94-73, Apr. 15, 1994).

Environmental Cleanup: Too Many High Priority Sites Impede DOD's Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-133, Apr. 21, 1994).

Department of Energy: Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform (GAO/RCED-94-150, Mar. 21, 1994).

DOE Management: Implementing the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor Concept (GAO/T-RCED-94-86, Dec. 1, 1993).

Environmental Restoration Management Contracting Follow-up (GAO/RCED-94-49R, Oct. 27, 1993).

Federal Lands Cleanup: Major Issue With Opportunity for Organizational Innovation (GAO/SERO-93-2, Sept. 1993).

Financial Management: Energy's Material Financial Management Weaknesses Require Corrective Action (GAO/AIMD-93-29, Sept. 30, 1993).

Superfund: Backlog of Unevaluated Federal Facilities Slows Cleanup Efforts (GAO/RCED-93-119, July 20, 1993).

DOE Management: Consistent Cleanup Indemnification Policy Is Needed (GAO/RCED-93-167, July 12, 1993).

Nuclear Regulation: Cleanup Delays Continue at Two Radioactive Waste Sites in Ohio (GAO/RCED-93-156, June 28, 1993).

Department of Energy: Cleaning Up Inactive Facilities Will Be Difficult (GAO/RCED-93-149, June 25, 1993).

Radioactive Waste: EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and Coordination Problems (GAO/RCED-93-126, June 3, 1993).

Environmental Cleanup: Unresolved Issues in Reimbursements to DOD Contractors (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-12, May 20, 1993).

Superfund: EPA Needs to Better Focus Cleanup Technology Development (GAO/T-RCED-93-94, Apr. 28, 1993).

Military Bases: Transfer of Pease Air Force Base Slowed by Environmental Concerns (GAO/NSIAD-93-111FS, Feb. 3, 1993).

Hazardous Waste: Much Work Remains to Accelerate Facility Cleanups (GAO/RCED-93-15, Jan. 19, 1993).

Contract Pricing: Unallowable Costs Charged to Defense Contracts (GAO/NSIAD-93-79, Nov. 20, 1992).

Environmental Cleanup: Observations on Consistency of Reimbursements to DOD Contractors (GAO/NSIAD-93-77, Oct. 22, 1992).

Superfund: EPA Needs to Better Focus Cleanup Technology Development (GAO/T-RCED-92-92, Sept. 15, 1992).

DOE Management: Impediments to Environmental Restoration Management Contracting (GAO/RCED-92-244, Aug. 14, 1992).

Federal Facilities: Issues Involved in Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste (GAO/T-RCED-92-82, July 28, 1992).

DOD Environmental Cleanup: Information on Contractor Cleanup Costs and DOD Reimbursements (GAO/NSIAD-92-253FS, June 26, 1992).

Superfund: Current Progress and Issues Needing Further Attention (GAO/T-RCED-92-56, June 11, 1992).

Nuclear Health and Safety: More Can Be Done to Better Control Environmental Restoration Costs (GAO/RCED-92-71, Apr. 20, 1992).

Cleanup Technology: Better Management for DOE's Technology Development Program (GAO/RCED-92-145, Apr. 10, 1992).

Federally Sponsored Contracts: Unallowable and Questionable Indirect Costs Claimed by CH2M Hill (GAO/T-RCED-92-37, Mar. 19, 1992).

Nuclear Weapons Complex: Improving DOE's Management of the Environmental Cleanup (GAO/T-RCED-92-43, Mar. 30, 1992).

Cleanup Technology: DOE's Management of Environmental Cleanup Technology (GAO/T-RCED-92-29, Feb. 26, 1992).

Nuclear Weapons Complex: Major Safety, Environmental, and Reconfiguration Issues Facing DOE (GAO/T-RCED-92-31, Feb. 25, 1992).

Hazardous Waste: DOD Estimates for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites Improved but Still Constrained (GAO/NSIAD-92-37, Oct. 29, 1991).

Superfund: EPA Has Not Corrected Long-Standing Contract Management Problems (GAO/RCED-92-45, Oct. 24, 1991).

Nuclear Health and Safety: Problems Continue for Rocky Flats Solar Pond Cleanup Program (GAO/RCED-92-18, Oct. 17, 1991).

Hazardous Waste: Management Problems Continue at Overseas Military Bases (GAO/NSIAD-91-231, Aug. 28, 1991).

Managing the Environmental Cleanup of DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex (GAO/T-RCED-91-27, Apr. 11, 1991).

Nuclear Health and Safety: Long-Term Plans to Address Problems of the Weapons Complex Are Evolving (GAO/RCED-90-219, Sept. 28, 1990).

Correcting Environmental Problems Facing the Nuclear Weapons Complex (GAO/T-RCED-90-85, May 17, 1990).

DOE's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Weapons Complex (GAO/T-RCED-90-52, Mar. 22, 1990).

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