Homeland Security
Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service Gao ID: GAO-11-813T July 13, 2011As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that help accomplish the agency's facility protection mission. This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1) risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for FPS's contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard contractors, and guards.
FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission. Specifically: (1) The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS's ability to protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. (2) FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. (3) FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard workforce. Weaknesses in FPS's contract guard program hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer training for its inspectors and guards. (4) FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate design. FPS's current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011. FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28 recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in part because of changes in the agency's leadership, organization, funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO's past recommendations. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its contract guard program.
GAO-11-813T, Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Homeland Security:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET:
Wednesday, July 13, 2011:
Homeland Security:
Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department
of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service:
Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-11-813T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-813T, a testimony before the Subcommittees of the
House Committee on Homeland Security.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal
employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned
or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a
budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200
full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that
help accomplish the agency‘s facility protection mission.
This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses
challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1)
risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight
of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based
funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency.
GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in
responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key
facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and
selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for
FPS‘s contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard
contractors, and guards.
What GAO Found:
FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission.
Specifically:
* The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS‘s ability to
protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the
importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010
that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that
links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead,
FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities
with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their
location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats
and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS‘s
security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance
that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to
address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and
effective manner.
* FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS
continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide
its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended
in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal
staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect
data on its workforce‘s knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet
to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce
does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities.
* FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard
workforce. Weaknesses in FPS‘s contract guard program hamper its
ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010
that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training
and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO
recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer
training for its inspectors and guards.
* FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate
funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in
6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to
develop an informed, deliberate design. FPS‘s current fee structure
has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency
costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and
inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an
alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the
agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011.
FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal
facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is
developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which
could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal
facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS
and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28
recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although
none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in
part because of changes in the agency‘s leadership, organization,
funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new
management systems, such as RAMP.
What GAO Recommends:
DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO‘s past recommendations.
DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk
management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its
contract guard program.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-813T] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-
2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson,
and Members of the Subcommittees:
We are pleased to be here to discuss the challenges the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) faces in carrying out its mission to protect
federal facilities, particularly with regard to (1) risk management,
(2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract
guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure
is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. We will also
discuss FPS's assessment of its performance and the extent to which
FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. Recent events
have exposed weaknesses with FPS's ability to protect federal
facilities, including GAO's covert testing at federal facilities in
2009, FPS's ongoing penetration testing at federal facilities, and
FPS's contract security guards allowing components of an active bomb
to remain in a federal building in Detroit, Michigan, for three weeks
in March 2011 before a bomb squad was called.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FPS is
responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in
approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General
Services Administration (GSA).[Footnote 1] FPS has a budget of
approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time
employees and about 13,000 contract security guards (also known as
protective service officers) that help accomplish the agency's
facility protection mission. FPS's primary responsibilities include
(1) conducting risk assessments of federal facilities and recommending
countermeasures aimed at preventing incidents at facilities; and (2)
undertaking law enforcement activities, including responding to
incidents at federal facilities.
This testimony is based on our past reports and testimonies.[Footnote
2] Work conducted for these reports and testimonies included assessing
FPS's facility protection efforts using our key security practices as
a framework.[Footnote 3] We also visited selected FPS regions and
selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities firsthand.
Additionally, we reviewed training and certification data for 663
randomly selected guards in 6 of FPS's 11 regions. Because of the
sensitivity of some of the information in our prior work, we cannot
specifically identify in this testimony the locations of the incidents
discussed. For all of our work, we reviewed related laws and
directives; interviewed officials and analyzed documents and data from
DHS and GSA; and interviewed tenant agency representatives,
contractors, and guards. These reviews took place between April 2007
and May 2011. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Additional information on
scope and methodology is provided in the previously issued products.
The Absence of a Risk Management Program Hampers FPS's Ability to
Protect Federal Facilities:
For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management approach
that entails managing risk through actions, including setting
strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources
based on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to
undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Risk
assessment, an important element of a risk management approach, helps
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks.
FPS meets its mission to protect GSA's federal facilities by assessing
the risks that face those facilities and identifying the appropriate
countermeasures to mitigate those risks. Despite the importance of
this mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk management
program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a
comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and
vulnerabilities to resource requirements.[Footnote 4] Instead, FPS
uses a facility-by-facility approach to risk management: we reported
in 2010 that FPS assumes that all facilities with the same security
level have the same risk regardless of their location. For example, a
level IV facility in a metropolitan area is generally treated the same
as one in a rural area.[Footnote 5] This building-by-building approach
prevents FPS from comprehensively identifying risk across the entire
portfolio of GSA's facilities and allocating resources based on risk.
[Footnote 6] Both our and DHS's risk management frameworks include
processes for assessing comprehensive risk across assets in order to
prioritize countermeasures based on the overall needs of the system.
In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing
a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP).
According to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the risk
assessment process, including gathering and reviewing building
information; conducting and recording interviews with GSA and tenant
agencies; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to
develop a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate
countermeasures; and producing facility security assessment (FSA)
reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP to track and analyze workforce
data, contract guard program data, and other performance data, such as
the types and definitions of incidents and incident response times. We
are finalizing our ongoing review of FPS's efforts to develop and
implement RAMP as well as FPS's transition to DHS's National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and expect to report on
these issues soon.
FPS Has Not Fully Addressed Several Key Human Capital Issues:
Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has faced
in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003. As
mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its workforce
to 1,200 full time employees.[Footnote 7] However, FPS continues to
operate without a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009
that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future
workforce planning efforts.[Footnote 8] We have identified human
capital management as a high-risk issue throughout the federal
government, including within DHS. A human capital plan is important to
both align FPS's human capital program with current and emerging
mission and programmatic goals, and develop effective processes for
training, retention, and staff development. In 2009, we reported that
the absence of such a plan has contributed to inconsistent human
capital activities among FPS regions and headquarters, as several
regions told us they have implemented their own processes for
performance feedback, training, and mentoring. In addition, we found
that FPS's workforce planning is limited because FPS headquarters does
not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities.
Without such information, FPS is not able to determine what its
optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce
needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to
fill these gaps. FPS concurred with our recommendation and drafted a
workforce analysis plan in June 2010. According to FPS, the plan must
be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before it is
subject to approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-
based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal
facilities. In 2007, FPS essentially eliminated its police officer
position and moved to an all inspector-based workforce. FPS also
decided to place more emphasis on physical security activities, such
as completing FSAs, and less emphasis on law enforcement activities,
such as proactive patrol. We reported in 2008 that these changes may
have contributed to diminished security and increases in inspectors'
workload.[Footnote 9] Specifically, we found that when FPS is not
providing proactive patrol at some federal facilities, there is an
increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity.
Moreover, under its inspector-based workforce approach, FPS is relying
more on local police departments to handle crime and protection issues
at federal facilities; however, we previously reported that at
approximately 400 federal facilities across the United States, local
police may not have the authority to respond to incidents inside those
facilities.[Footnote 10]
We recommended in 2008 that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities of
local law enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA
facilities.[Footnote 11] While FPS agreed with this recommendation,
FPS has decided not to pursue agreements with local law enforcement
officials, in part because of local law enforcement officials'
reluctance to sign such agreements. In addition, FPS believes that the
agreements are not necessary because 96 percent of the properties in
its inventory are listed as concurrent jurisdiction facilities where
both federal and state governments have jurisdiction over the
property. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that these agreements
would, among other things, clarify roles and responsibilities of local
law enforcement agencies when responding to crime or other incidents.
We are currently reviewing to what extent FPS is coordinating with
state and local police departments to ensure adequate protection of
federal facilities and will issue a report next year.
FPS Faces Longstanding Challenges in Managing Its Contract Guard
Workforce:
FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of the
agency's operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its
"eyes and ears" while performing their duties. Guards are responsible
for controlling access to federal facilities by checking the
identification of government employees and the public who enter
federal facilities, and operating security equipment to screen for
prohibited items. Since 2009, we have identified weaknesses in FPS's
contract guard program which hamper its ability to protect federal
facilities. For example, we reported in 2009 and in 2010 that FPS does
not have a reliable system to ensure that its 13,000 guards have the
training and certifications required to stand post at federal
facilities or comply with post orders once they are deployed.[Footnote
12]
In 2009, we also identified substantial security vulnerabilities
related to FPS's guard program.[Footnote 13] In April and May 2009,
GAO investigators conducted covert tests and were able to successfully
pass components of an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on
their persons through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards at
10 Level IV facilities in 4 major metropolitan areas. In addition,
FPS's penetration testing--similar to our covert testing--shows that
guards continue to have problems with detecting prohibited items.
[Footnote 14] For example, in March 2011, FPS contract guards allowed
components for an active bomb to remain in a Level IV federal building
in Detroit, Michigan for 3 weeks before a bomb squad was called to
remove them.
We also found in 2010 that although some guard contractors did not
comply with the terms of their contracts, FPS did not take any
enforcement action against them.[Footnote 15] According to FPS guard
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the
contract if, for example, the contractor has a guard working without
valid certifications or background suitability investigations, or
falsifies a guard's training records. If FPS determines that a
contractor does not comply with these contract requirements, it can--
among other things--assess a financial deduction for nonperformed
work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or terminate the
contract for default or cause.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as
we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with
expired certification and training records to determine what action,
if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance.[Footnote 16] According to the documentation in the
contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement action against the
contractors for not complying with the terms of the contract. Instead,
FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts for these 7
contractors. Additionally, although FPS requires an annual performance
evaluation of each guard contractor and at the conclusion of contracts
exceeding $100,000, FPS did not always evaluate the performance of its
contractors as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not
consistent with contractors' performance.
In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to
improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Since July 2009,
FPS has increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number
of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some
metropolitan areas. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing
additional x-ray and magnetometer training for its workforce. Under
the new requirement, inspectors must receive 30 hours of x-ray and
magnetometer training and guards are required to take 16 hours.
Previously, guards were required to receive 8 hours of training on x-
ray and magnetometer machines. Finally, FPS expects to use RAMP, once
it is developed, to determine whether its 13,000 guards have met its
training and certification requirements and to conduct guard
inspections. As stated earlier, we are finalizing our review of FPS's
RAMP.
FPS Has Not Reviewed Its Fee Design or Determined an Appropriate
Funding Mechanism:
We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4
times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100
percent).[Footnote 17] However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to
develop an informed, deliberate fee design. We found that timely,
substantive fee reviews are especially critical for fee-funded
agencies to ensure that fee collections and operating costs remain
aligned. FPS has broad authority to design its security fees, but the
current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection
amounts less than agency costs, is not well understood or accepted by
tenant agencies, and continues to be a topic of congressional interest
and inquiry.[Footnote 18]
In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee-
based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most
appropriate manner to fund the agency. Although FPS agreed with this
recommendation it has not begun such an analysis. Based on our updated
work in 2011, we recommended that such an analysis include the
examination of both alternative fee structures and a combination of
fees and appropriations as well as the options and trade-offs
discussed in our 2011 report.[Footnote 19] FPS agreed with this
recommendation.
FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance:
We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities.[Footnote
20] To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect
federal facilities, FPS has identified some output measures. These
measures include determining whether security countermeasures have
been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes
to respond to an incident, and the percentage of FSAs completed on
time. As we reported in 2010, while output measures are helpful in
assessing performance, outcome measures can provide FPS with broader
information on program results, such as the extent to which its
decision to move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security
at federal facilities.[Footnote 21] Outcome measures could also help
identify the security gaps that remain at federal facilities and
determine what action may be needed to address them.
In addition, we reported in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable
data management system that will allow it to accurately track these
measures or other important measures such as the number of crimes and
other incidents occurring at GSA facilities.[Footnote 22] Without such
a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal employees and
facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk
management decisions. For example, weaknesses in one of FPS's
countermeasure tracking systems make it difficult to accurately track
the implementation status of recommended countermeasures such as
security cameras and x-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has
difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of federal
facilities to crime or a terrorist attack. FPS concurred with our
recommendations and states that its efforts to address them will be
completed in 2012 when its automated information systems are fully
implemented.
FPS Has Begun Some Initiatives, but Most GAO Recommendations Have Not
Been Fully Implemented:
FPS has begun several initiatives that, once fully implemented, should
enhance its ability to protect the more than 1 million federal
employees and members of the public who visit federal facilities each
year. Since 2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to
address its challenges with risk management, strategic human capital
planning, oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based
funding structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these
recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the
process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully
implemented. Of the remaining 7, 5 were recommendations from our May
2011 report, and we would not necessarily expect them to be fully
implemented yet. According to FPS officials, the agency has faced
difficulty in implementing many of our recommendations because of
changes in its leadership, organization, funding, and staffing levels.
In addition, FPS officials stated that its progress in implementing
our recommendations has been affected by delays in developing several
new management systems, such as RAMP.
Table 1: Status of GAO Recommendations to the Federal Protective
Service:
GAO Report: Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal
Protective Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for
Security, GAO-11-492, May 2011:
Recommendation: Conduct regular reviews of FPS's security fees and use
this information to inform its fee setting;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Include systemwide capital investments when estimating
costs and include them when setting basic security fee rates;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Make information on the estimated costs of key
activities as well as the basis for these cost estimates readily
available to affected parties to improve the transparency and
credibility--and hence the acceptance by stakeholders--of the process
for setting and using the fees;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Assess and report to Congress on: (1) the current and
alternative fee structures, to include the options and trade-offs
discussed in this report, and if appropriate, and (2) options to fund
FPS through a combination of fees and direct appropriations, to
include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Evaluate and report to Congress on options to mitigate
challenges agencies face in budgeting for FPS security costs, such as:
(1) an alternative account structure for FPS to increase flexibility,
while retaining or improving accountability and transparency or (2) an
approved process for estimating fee rates;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate list of points of
contact of customer agency officials responsible for budget and
billing activities as well as facility designated points of contact as
we previously recommended in 2010;
Status: In process.
GAO Report: Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities,
GAO-10-901, August 2010;
Recommendation: Develop and implement procedures that, among other
things, outline the facility security committees' organization
structure, operations, decision-making authority, and accountability;
Status: In process.
GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of
Contract Guards, GAO-10-341, April 2010:
Recommendation: Identify other approaches and options that would be
most beneficial and financially feasible for protecting federal
facilities;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors'
and guards' performance and step up enforcement against contractors
that are not complying with the terms of the contract;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Complete all contract performance evaluations in
accordance with FPS and Federal Acquisition Regulations requirements;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure
that contract files have required documentation;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at
federal facilities outside metropolitan areas;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Provide building-specific and scenario-based training
and guidance to its contract guards;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Develop and implement a management tool for ensuring
that reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are
available on a real-time basis;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Verify the accuracy of all guard certification and
training data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test
the accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS
management has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard
program;
Status: In process.
GAO Report: Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices
Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility
Protection, GAO-10-142, October 2009:
Recommendation: Provide the Secretary with regular updates, on a
mutually agreed-to schedule, on the status of RAMP and the National
Countermeasures Program, including the implementation status of
deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones,
and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: In conjunction with the National Countermeasures
Program, to develop a methodology and guidance for assessing and
comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology alternatives;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Reach consensus with GSA on what information contained
in the building security assessment is needed for GSA to fulfill its
responsibilities related to the protection of federal buildings and
occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that
shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees
to use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but
unclassified designations; provisions for training on making
designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and
other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this
information sharing process is working, with results reported to the
Secretary regularly on a mutually agreed-to schedule;
Status: In process.
GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should
Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants,
GAO-09-749, July 2009:
Recommendation: Improve how FPS headquarters collects data on its
workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities to help it better manage
and understand current and future workforce needs;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Use these data in the development and implementation
of a long-term strategic human capital plan that addresses key
principles for effective strategic workforce planning, including
establishing programs, policies, and practices that will enable the
agency to recruit, develop, and retain a qualified workforce;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate and comprehensive
list of all facility-designated points of contact, as well as a system
for regularly updating this list;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Develop and implement a program for education and
outreach to all customers to ensure they are aware of the current
roles, responsibilities, and services provided by FPS;
Status: In process.
GAO Report: Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, GAO-08-683, July 2008:
Recommendation: Develop and implement a strategic approach to manage
its staffing resources including determining the optimum number of
employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and
allocate these resources based on risk management principles;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Clarify roles and responsibilities of local law
enforcement agencies in regard to responding to incidents at GSA
facilities;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by
developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing
security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee
structure takes into consideration the varying levels of risk and
service provided at GSA facilities;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based
system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate
manner to fund the agency;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: Develop and implement specific guidelines and
standards for measuring its performance, including outcome measures to
assess its performance and improve the accountability of FPS;
Status: In process.
Recommendation: Improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes
data to help it better manage and understand the results of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities;
Status: In process.
Source: GAO:
Note: We reviewed information from FPS regarding our recommendations
and, based on this information, categorized our recommendations
accordingly. "In process" indicates that FPS has actions ongoing but
has not completed them. "Not implemented" indicates that FPS has not
yet taken any action to address our recommendations.
[End of table]
Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson,
and members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other
members of the Subcommittees may have at this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Colin
Fallon; Chelsa Gurkin; Alicia Loucks; Jackie Nowicki, Assistant
Director; Justin Reed; and Susan Michal-Smith.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective
Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for Security.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. Washington, D.C.:
May 20, 2011.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective
Service's Workforce Analysis and Planning Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-802R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2010.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards
Requires Reassessment and More Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-614T]. Washington, D.C.: April 14,
2010.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program
Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]. Washington, D.C.:
April 13, 2010.
Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective
Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-506T]. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2010.
Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve
the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. Washington, D.C.:
October 23, 2009.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial
Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1047T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 23, 2009.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human
Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749]. Washington, D.C.: July 30,
2009.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective
Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By
Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2009.
Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several
Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-897T]. Washington,
D.C.: June 19, 2008.
Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several
Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-914T]. Washington,
D.C.: June 18, 2008.
Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several
Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2008.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective
Service's Efforts to Protect Federal Property. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-476T]. Washington, D.C.: February
8, 2008.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In this testimony, we refer to property that is owned by the
federal government and under the control and custody of GSA as GSA-
owned property.
[2] See related GAO products at the end of this statement.
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901] (Washington, D.C.:
August 5, 2010).
[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901].
[5] The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal
facilities varies depending on the building's security level. Based on
the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 1995 Vulnerability Assessment
Guidelines, there are five types of security levels. A level I
facility is typically a small storefront-type operation such as a
military recruiting office which has 10 or fewer employees and a low
volume of public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150
employees, a level III facility has from 151 to 450 federal employees
and moderate to high volume of public contact, a level IV facility has
over 450 employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high
risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have
responsibility for Level V facilities which include the White House
and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Security
Committee has recently promulgated new security level standards that
will supersede the 1995 DOJ standards.
[6] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008). See also [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901].
[7] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-329, Division D, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659-3660 (2008). This
requirement for FPS to maintain a minimum number of full time
equivalent positions has been included in subsequent appropriations
acts. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2156-2157 (2009), and Department
of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 142-143 (2011).
[8] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve
Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749] (Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 2009).
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683].
[10] At approximately 400 federal facilities nationwide, the federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction of its facilities, whereby the
federal government has all of the legislative authority within the
land area in question and the local police have no residual police
power.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683].
[12] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2009). See also GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's
Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use
of Contract Guards, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341] (Washington, D.C.: April 13,
2010).
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T].
[14] FPS employs Operation Shield to systematically assess the
effectiveness of FPS countermeasures, including Protective Service
Officers, at federal facilities.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341].
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492].
[18] Pub. L. No. 109-295, title II, 120 Stat. 1355, 1361 (Oct. 4,
2006).
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492].
[20] GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would
Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility
Protection, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]
(Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142].
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142].
[End of section]
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