Homeland Security
DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies Gao ID: GAO-11-829T July 15, 2011This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland security needs. DHS acquisition programs represent hundreds of billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of missions and investments including border surveillance and screening equipment, nuclear detection equipment, and technologies used to screen airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. Since its creation in 2003, DHS has spent billions of dollars developing and procuring technologies and other countermeasures to address various threats and to conduct its missions. Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts general research and development and oversees the testing and evaluation efforts of DHS components, which are responsible for developing, testing, and acquiring their own technologies. This testimony focuses on the findings of our prior work related to DHS's efforts to acquire and deploy new technologies to address homeland security needs. Our past work has identified three key challenges: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2) conducting and completing testing and evaluation of technologies and (3) incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. This statement will also discuss recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes.
We have identified technologies that DHS has deployed that have not met key performance requirements. For example, in June 2010, we reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition program baselines. Our prior work has also identified that failure to resolve problems discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date and that addressing such problems during the testing and evaluation phase before moving to the acquisition phase can help agencies avoid future cost overruns. Specifically: (1) In March 2011, we reported that the independent testing and evaluation of SBInet's Block 1 capability to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability was not complete at the time DHS reached its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding to deploy the new Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. (2) In September 2010, we reported that S&T's plans for conducting operational testing of container security technologies did not reflect all of the operational scenarios that CBP was considering for implementation. (3) In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. TSA also lacked assurance that the portals would meet functional requirements in airports within estimated costs and the machines were more expensive to install and maintain than expected. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. For example, we have reported that DHS has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. Specifically: (1) In March 2011, we reported that the decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security to end the SBInet program was informed by, among other things, an independent analysis of cost-effectiveness. However, it was not clear how DHS used the results to determine the appropriate technology plans and budget decisions, especially since the results of SBInet's operational effectiveness were not complete at the time of the Secretary's decision to end the program. Furthermore, the cost analysis was limited in scope and did not consider all technology solutions because of the need to complete the first phase of the analysis in 6 weeks. (2) In October 2009, we reported that TSA had not yet completed a cost-benefit analysis to prioritize and fund its technology investments for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. One reason that TSA had difficulty developing a cost-benefit analysis was that it had not yet developed life-cycle cost estimates for its various screening technologies. (3) In June 2009, we reported that DHS's cost analysis of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program did not provide a sound analytical basis for DHS's decision to deploy the portals.
GAO-11-829T, Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Friday, July 15, 2011:
Homeland Security:
DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies:
Statement of David C. Maurer, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-829T:
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in
developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland security
needs. DHS acquisition programs represent hundreds of billions of
dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of missions and
investments including border surveillance and screening equipment,
nuclear detection equipment, and technologies used to screen airline
passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. Since its
creation in 2003, DHS has spent billions of dollars developing and
procuring technologies and other countermeasures to address various
threats and to conduct its missions. Within DHS, the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts general research and development
and oversees the testing and evaluation efforts of DHS components,
which are responsible for developing, testing, and acquiring their own
technologies. For example, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) is responsible for securing the nation's transportation systems
and, with S&T, researching, developing, and deploying technologies to,
for example, screen airline passengers and their baggage. U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for implementing measures
and technologies to secure the nation's borders. In recent years, we
have reported that DHS has experienced challenges in managing its
multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing
technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not
appropriately tested and evaluated, and has not consistently included
completed analyses of costs and benefits before technologies were
implemented.
My testimony today focuses on the key findings of our prior work
related to DHS's efforts to acquire and deploy new technologies to
address homeland security needs. Our past work has identified three
key challenges: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2)
conducting and completing testing and evaluation of technologies and
(3) incorporating information on costs and benefits in making
technology acquisition decisions. This statement will also discuss
recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition
processes.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from May
2009 through July 2011 related to DHS's efforts to manage, test, and
deploy various technology programs and selected updates conducted in
July 2011 related to DHS's efforts to strengthen its investment and
acquisition processes.[Footnote 1] For the updates, we reviewed recent
DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes,
such as a June 2011 DHS report on the department's progress and
efforts in addressing challenges identified in our biennial reports
addressing high-risk management issues.[Footnote 2] For our past work,
we reviewed program schedules, planning documents, testing reports,
and other acquisition documentation. For some of the programs we
discuss in this testimony, we conducted site visits to a range of
facilities, such as national laboratories, airports, and other
locations to observe research, development, and testing efforts. We
also conducted interviews with DHS component program managers and S&T
officials to discuss issues related to individual programs. We
conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and
methodology from our previous work can be found within each specific
report.
DHS Has Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key
Performance Requirements for Various Technologies:
Our past work has found that program performance cannot be accurately
assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the
program start. Without the development, review, and approval of key
acquisition documents, such as the mission need statement, agencies
are at risk of having poorly defined requirements that can negatively
affect program performance and contribute to increased costs.[Footnote
3] We have also identified technologies that DHS has deployed that
have not met key performance requirements. For example, in June 2010,
we reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded
contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or
department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions,
setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition program
baselines.[Footnote 4] We made a number of recommendations to help
address these issues as discussed below. DHS has generally agreed with
these recommendations and, to varying degrees, has taken actions to
address them.
In addition, our past work has found that DHS faces challenges in
identifying and meeting program requirements in a number of its
programs. For example:
* In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its explosive detection
system (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and plans
to implement these requirements in a phased approach. However, we
reported that only some of the EDSs in TSA's fleet are configured to
detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005 requirements.
The remaining EDSs are configured to detect explosives at 1998 levels.
When TSA established the 2005 requirements, it did not have a plan
with the appropriate time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the
requirements. To help ensure that EDSs are operating most effectively,
we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy and operate EDSs to
meet the most recent requirements to ensure new and currently deployed
EDSs are operated at the levels in established requirements. DHS
concurred with our recommendation.[Footnote 5]
* In September 2010, we reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) was simultaneously engaged in the research and
development phase while planning for the acquisition phase of its
cargo advanced automated radiography system to detect certain nuclear
materials in vehicles and containers at ports.[Footnote 6] DNDO
pursued the deployment of the cargo advanced automated radiography
system without fully understanding the physical requirements of
incorporating the system in existing inspection lanes at ports of
entry. We reported that this occurred because, during the first year
or more of the program, DNDO and CBP had few discussions about
operating requirements for primary inspection lanes at ports of entry.
DHS spent $113 million on the program since 2005 and canceled the
development phase of the program in 2007.
* In May 2010, we reported that not all of the Secure Border
Initiative Network (SBInet) operational requirements that pertain to
Block 1 were achievable, verifiable, unambiguous, and complete.
[Footnote 7] For example, a November 2007 DHS assessment found
problems with 19 operational requirements, which form the basis for
the lower-level requirements used to design and build the system. As a
result, we recommended that the Block 1 requirements, including key
performance parameters, be independently validated as complete,
verifiable, and affordable and any limitations found in the
requirements be addressed. DHS agreed with these recommendations and
CBP program officials told us that they recognized the difficulties
they experienced with requirements development practices with the
SBInet program. In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced her decision to end the program as originally conceived
because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards.
[Footnote 8]
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA passenger screening checkpoint
technologies were delayed because TSA had not consistently
communicated clear requirements for testing the technologies.[Footnote
9] We recommended that TSA evaluate whether current passenger
screening procedures should be revised to require the use of
appropriate screening procedures until TSA determined that existing
emerging technologies meet its functional requirements in an
operational environment. TSA agreed with this recommendation and
reported taking actions to address it.
DHS Has Encountered Challenges in Conducting and Completing Testing
and Evaluation:
Our prior work has also identified that failure to resolve problems
discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and
rework at a later date and that addressing such problems during the
testing and evaluation phase before moving to the acquisition phase
can help agencies avoid future cost overruns. Specifically:
* In March 2011, we reported that the independent testing and
evaluation of SBInet's Block 1 capability to determine its operational
effectiveness and suitability was not complete at the time DHS reached
its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year
2012 funding to deploy the new Alternative (Southwest) Border
Technology.[Footnote 10] We reported that because the Alternative
(Southwest) Border Technology incorporates a mix of technology,
including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to
that currently used in SBInet, the testing and evaluation could have
informed DHS's decision about moving forward with the new technology
deployment.
* In September 2010, we reported that S&T's plans for conducting
operational testing of container security technologies did not reflect
all of the operational scenarios that CBP was considering for
implementation.[Footnote 11] We reported that until the container
security technologies are tested and evaluated consistent with all of
the operational scenarios, S&T cannot provide reasonable assurance
that the technologies will function as intended. For example, S&T did
not include certain scenarios necessary to test how a cargo container
would be transported throughout the maritime supply chain. We
recommended that DHS test and evaluate the container security
technologies consistent with all the operational scenarios DHS
identified for potential implementation. DHS concurred with our
recommendation.
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace
portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers
at airport checkpoints, even though TSA officials were aware that
tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals
suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an
airport environment.[Footnote 12] TSA also lacked assurance that the
portals would meet functional requirements in airports within
estimated costs and the machines were more expensive to install and
maintain than expected. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the
explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high
installation costs. We recommended that to the extent feasible, TSA
ensure that tests are completed before deploying checkpoint screening
technologies to airports. DHS concurred with the recommendation and
has taken action to address it, such as requiring more-recent
technologies to complete both laboratory and operational tests prior
to deployment.
DHS Has Not Consistently Incorporated Information on Costs and
Benefits in Making Acquisition Decisions:
Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional
and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments
and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives and that
without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost
overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. For example,
we have reported that DHS has not consistently included these analyses
in its acquisition decision making. Specifically:
* In March 2011, we reported that the decision by the Secretary of
Homeland Security to end the SBInet program was informed by, among
other things, an independent analysis of cost-effectiveness.[Footnote
13] However, it was not clear how DHS used the results to determine
the appropriate technology plans and budget decisions, especially
since the results of SBInet's operational effectiveness were not
complete at the time of the Secretary's decision to end the program.
Furthermore, the cost analysis was limited in scope and did not
consider all technology solutions because of the need to complete the
first phase of the analysis in 6 weeks. It also did not assess the
technology approaches based on the incremental effectiveness provided
above the baseline technology assets in the geographic areas
evaluated. As we reported, for a program of this importance and cost,
the process used to assess and select technology needs to be more
robust.
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA had not yet completed a cost-
benefit analysis to prioritize and fund its technology investments for
screening passengers at airport checkpoints.[Footnote 14] One reason
that TSA had difficulty developing a cost-benefit analysis was that it
had not yet developed life-cycle cost estimates for its various
screening technologies. We reported that this information was
important because it would help decision makers determine, given the
cost of various technologies, which technology provided the greatest
mitigation of risk for the resources that were available. We
recommended that TSA develop a cost-benefit analysis. TSA agreed with
this recommendation and has completed a life-cycle cost estimate and
collected information for its checkpoint technologies, but has not yet
completed a cost-benefit analysis.
* In June 2009, we reported that DHS's cost analysis of the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program did not provide a sound analytical
basis for DHS's decision to deploy the portals.[Footnote 15] We also
reported that an updated cost-benefit analysis might show that DNDO's
plan to replace existing equipment with advanced spectroscopic portals
was not justified, particularly given the marginal improvement in
detection of certain nuclear materials required of advanced
spectroscopic portals and the potential to improve the current-
generation portal monitors' sensitivity to nuclear materials, most
likely at a lower cost.[Footnote 16] At that time, DNDO officials
stated that they planned to update the cost-benefit analysis. After
spending more than $200 million on the program, in February 2010 DHS
announced that it was scaling back its plans for development and use
of the portals technology.
DHS Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen Acquisition and Technology
Development:
Since DHS's inception in 2003, we have designated implementing and
transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22
agencies--several with major management challenges--into one
department. This high-risk area includes challenges in strengthening
DHS's management functions, including acquisitions; the impact of
those challenges on DHS's mission implementation; and challenges in
integrating management functions within and across the department and
its components. Failure to effectively address DHS's management and
mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and
economic security.[Footnote 17]
In part because of the problems we have highlighted in DHS's
acquisition process, implementing and transforming DHS has remained on
our high-risk list. DHS currently has several plans and efforts
underway to address the high-risk designation as well as the more
specific challenges related to acquisition and program implementation
that we have previously identified.
In June 2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps to strengthen
its investment and acquisition management processes across the
department by implementing a decision-making process at critical
phases throughout the investment life cycle. For example, DHS reported
that it plans to establish a new model for managing departmentwide
investments across their life cycles. Under this plan, S&T would be
involved in each phase of the investment life cycle and participate in
new councils and boards DHS is planning to create to help ensure that
test and evaluation methods are appropriately considered as part of
DHS's overall research and development investment strategies. In
addition, DHS reported that the new councils and boards it is planning
to establish to strengthen management of the department's acquisition
and investment review process would be responsible for, among other
things, making decisions on research and development initiatives based
on factors such as viability and affordability and overseeing key
acquisition decisions for major programs using baseline and actual
data. According to DHS, S&T will help ensure that new technologies are
properly scoped, developed, and tested before being implemented. DHS
also reports that it is working with components to improve the quality
and accuracy of cost estimates and has increased its staff during
fiscal year 2011 to develop independent cost estimates, a GAO best
practice, to ensure the accuracy and credibility of program costs. DHS
reports that four cost estimates for level 1 programs have been
validated to date.
The actions DHS reports taking or has under way to address the
management of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies
are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the
department address many of these challenges. However, showing
demonstrable progress in implementing these plans is key. In the past,
DHS has not effectively implemented its acquisition policies, in part
because it lacked the oversight capacity necessary to manage its
growing portfolio of major acquisition programs. Since DHS has only
recently initiated these actions, it is too early to fully assess
their impact on the challenges that we have identified in our past
work. Going forward, we believe DHS will need to demonstrate
measurable, sustainable progress in effectively implementing these
actions.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact David C. Maurer at
(202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement include Chris Currie, Assistant Director; Bintou Njie; and
Michael Kniss. John Hutton; Katherine Trimble; Nate Tranquilli; and
Richard Hung also made contributions to this statement. Key
contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are
listed within each individual product.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection
Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740].
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011).
Homeland Security: Improvements in Managing Research and Development
Could Help Reduce Inefficiencies and Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-464T]. (Washington D.C.: March. 15,
2011).
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key
Southwest Border Technology Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T]. (Washington D.C.: March 15,
2011).
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278]. (Washington D.C.: February
16, 2011).
Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security
Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios To
Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887]. (Washington D.C.: September
29, 2010).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight
Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to
Detect Nuclear Materials. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T]. (Washington D.C.: September
15, 2010).
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex
Acquisitions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP].
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
Secure Border Initiative, DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed
Investment in Key Technology Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340]. (Washington, D.C.: May 5,
2010).
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance
Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158]. (Washington, D.C.: January
29, 2010).
Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun
Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to
Face Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
(Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T]. (Washington, D.C.: June 25,
2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show
Limits of the New Technology. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655]. (Washington, D.C.: May 21,
2009).
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See the related products list at the end of this statement.
[2] Department of Homeland Security, Integrated Strategy for High Risk
Management, Implementation and Transformation, Bi-annual Update to the
Government Accountability Office, June 2011.
[3] The mission need statement outlines the specific functional
capabilities required to accomplish DHS's mission and objectives,
along with deficiencies and gaps in these capabilities.
[4] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected
Complex Acquisitions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2010).
[5] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection
Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740]
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011). An EDS machine uses computed
tomography technology to automatically measure the physical
characteristics of objects in baggage. The system automatically
triggers an alarm when objects that exhibit the physical
characteristics of explosives are detected.
[6] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography
System to Detect Nuclear Materials, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 15,
2010).
[7] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its
Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340] (Washington, D.C.: May 5,
2010) and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2010). SBInet Block 1 is a surveillance, command, control,
communications, and intelligence system fielded in parts of Arizona
that is intended to mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities along the
international border between ports of entry. Block 1 is an element of
DHS's Secure Border Initiative, a comprehensive, multiyear plan to
secure the borders of the United States and reduce illegal cross
border activities such as smuggling of economic migrants, illegal
drugs, and people with terrorist intent.
[8] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Key Southwest Border Technology Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 15,
2011). After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had
directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived.
According to DHS, the Secretary's decision was informed by an
independent analysis of cost-effectiveness, a series of operational
tests and evaluations, and Border Patrol input.
[9] GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed,
and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2009).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T].
[11] GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate
Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified
Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as
Intended, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887]
(Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2010).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T].
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
[15] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS
Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T] (Washington, D.C.: June 25,
2009). The ASP program is an effort by DHS to develop, procure, and
deploy a successor to existing radiation detection portals. Radiation
detection portals, also known as radiation portal monitors, are
designed to detect the emission of radiation from objects that pass by
them. The current portals are generally deployed at the U.S. land and
sea borders by DHS's DNDO and operated by DHS's CBP.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T]
[17] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: February
2011).
[End of section]
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