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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 095064



The Pilot Cities Program: Phaseout Needed Due To Limited National Benefits

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
Department of Justice

**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our report on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's management of its Pilot Cities Program.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Attorney General; and the Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James B. Stacks".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

GAO General Accounting Office
LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

THE PILOT CITIES PROGRAM:
PHASEOUT NEEDED DUE TO
LIMITED NATIONAL BENEFITS
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 187
Department of Justice 37

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO wanted to determine whether the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration adequately planned and managed its Pilot Cities Program to demonstrate that improved research could bring about better planning of city and county programs to reduce crime.

The Pilot Cities Program was begun in 1970 with a projected cost of \$30 million. It was one of the agency's first major attempts to bring about improvements through direct financing.

Albuquerque, New Mexico; Charlotte, North Carolina; Dayton, Ohio; Des Moines, Iowa; Norfolk, Virginia; Omaha, Nebraska; Rochester, New York; and Santa Clara County, California, were chosen as test locations of how to use new, innovative ideas to fight crime, *which could later be applied nationally*. The program was to operate for 5 years.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Individually, the eight cities benefited from the Pilot Cities Program.

They received Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds for projects they probably could not have otherwise undertaken. They received the benefit of research and technical assistance that could not

have otherwise been obtained. But, *from a national standpoint*, the overall program did not accomplish its goals, for reasons explained below.

The basic approach was to have pilot city teams research their communities' problems in reducing crime and develop projects and technical assistance to solve the problems.

Three of the five teams GAO reviewed in detail--Albuquerque, Dayton, and Omaha--could not develop their efforts as planned. Generally, they had difficulties maintaining a viable pilot city effort.

Two other teams--Norfolk and Santa Clara--maintained relatively stable operations by developing appropriate community support, researching problems, and starting new projects.

The Charlotte team withdrew from the program in April 1974 because of a lack of adequate direction from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and because the team did not anticipate sustained local interest in planning communitywide activities to solve criminal justice problems.

The Des Moines team apparently experienced startup problems and did not accomplish sufficient research and project development during its

first 20 months of operation to achieve useful results.

The Rochester team has apparently made progress.

Overall, therefore, three of the eight teams may have progressed satisfactorily. But the cumulative experience of the eight teams is already sufficient for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to draw useful conclusions about how to promote changes at local levels--one of the program's basic objectives.

Essentially, the problems of the program were that:

- Consistent objectives were not agreed upon.
- Teams interpreted the program differently.
- Participating organizations experienced instability.
- Guidelines were too broad as to what was to be accomplished and how.
- Regional offices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration used different management methods.

In programs of limited duration designed to serve as examples of how the Nation should try to solve problems, these factors can have an adverse effect. This was the case with the Pilot Cities Program.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration should continue to directly finance large efforts of national significance. But it is important that such programs have

clearly defined objectives agreed to by all participants and that monitoring and evaluation procedures be adequately developed by the supporting Federal agency before the project begins. This was not the case with the Pilot Cities Program.

Inadequate program development

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration used a proposal for improving the criminal justice process in one locality as the basis for developing the national Pilot Cities Program.

The first grant--to Santa Clara County--was broadly worded so its team could emphasize (1) improving the process of criminal justice research and planning and (2) developing specific projects. The lack of emphasis on any one goal (such as research or project implementation) over others was not detrimental in Santa Clara County because the team and local officials understood what they wanted to do as a result of more than a year's negotiations with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration before the grant was approved.

At the direction of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, subsequent pilot city teams used the Santa Clara grant as the model for their proposals. But these teams did not have the benefit of Santa Clara's experience. They did not receive appropriate guidance from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to clarify the program's priorities. Each team interpreted the program's objectives and emphasis differently. The result was not a coordinated national pilot city

effort, but eight individual programs.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration published program guidelines in January 1973, 2-1/2 years after the program began. Encompassing all activities of the operating pilot cities, these guidelines were too broad to provide direction to the teams and had little impact on the program. (See ch. 2.)

Financial pressures

Each pilot city team was to be provided \$500,000 per fiscal year during its 5-year life for demonstration projects. Any unused portion at the end of the year was generally not available for future use. Therefore, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration applied pressure to spend the money by developing projects too quickly, which prevented orderly development of the teams' efforts.

This pressure had serious consequences for the Albuquerque and Dayton teams. (See pp. 15 to 19.)

Regional guidance

Regional offices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration often provided inconsistent guidance to the pilot city teams --primarily because the headquarters staff had not adequately specified program objectives.

The Dallas regional office greatly limited the Albuquerque team's ability to perform effectively in December 1972 and most of 1973. The team submitted no new demonstration projects during that time and could find no replacements for three professional staff members who quit.

The Chicago regional office requested Dayton's team to submit proposals for new demonstration projects. The team director attempted to complete research before submitting proposals. Because he and the Chicago office could not agree, he was requested to step down. Between December 1972 and October 1973, the Dayton team had no permanent director. Subsequently, Dayton proposed five projects to reduce specific crimes. Only one was based on adequate research.

Confusion between the Omaha team and the regional office in Kansas City concerning program development resulted in an almost complete turnover of the Omaha staff as of June 30, 1973. As noted above, the Charlotte team withdrew from the program because of such management practices. (See pp. 20 to 30.)

Research and projects

All pilot city teams were expected to develop baseline data on the various aspects of their criminal justice systems. But the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration did not specify types of data to be collected, establish common criteria to insure uniform reporting, or provide a basis for establishing a common reference for comparing teams' efforts.

Inconsistent interpretation of the terms "new" and "innovative" affected the type of demonstration projects undertaken. Generally, if projects were new to the localities, even though not unique nationally, they were implemented.

As of December 1973, 27 percent (about \$2 million) of the program's demonstration funds had gone to

projects to implement or update information systems. Another 23 percent (about \$1.7 million) went to provide new types of community treatment, such as youth service bureaus and alcohol detoxification centers. Many of these projects appear similar to others being supported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in other of its activities.

Pilot cities funds were also used to provide burglar alarms, television security systems, a narcotic squad, a crime laboratory, and more nonwhite police officers. All such efforts benefit the localities. But such projects are not new or innovative and should not be supported directly with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration moneys that are supposed to be used for programs to solve problems of national significance. (See pp. 35 to 44.)

Technical assistance

All pilot city teams rendered technical assistance to their localities and, if judged by this criterion alone, could be considered partly successful. The question GAO asked was whether the experience of the eight teams was already sufficient to derive useful information about the processes the teams used and whether such information could be transferred to State and regional criminal justice planning units. GAO believes so. (See pp. 44 to 47.)

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

GAO met with officials of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in June 1974 and suggested that steps be taken to phase out the program by June 30, 1975. (See

pp. 53 to 55.) These officials agreed to act on the substance of GAO's suggestions. Consequently, GAO has no recommendations to make to the Attorney General.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration began phasing out the program in July 1974 by reviewing the actions of each pilot city team and determining how and when each effort should be phased out and the extent to which worthwhile projects might be continued with other funds.

On the basis of the detailed comments GAO received on its report from some of the pilot city teams, it believes this is the correct approach for phasing out the program.

Many pilot city teams criticized GAO's suggestions and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's acceptance of them. They believed their efforts were worthwhile and that GAO took too narrow a view of the program by not sufficiently emphasizing the benefits that accrued to the eight localities.

From a local perspective, many of their comments are valid. From a national standpoint, an assessment of the need to continue the program had to be based on the cumulative experience of all teams and on a determination of whether that experience was worthy of continued, direct Federal support as part of a national test effort.

Some teams also stated that they had developed projects that were new and advanced and had national application. To date, however, no specific data is available to

determine whether the projects are new and innovative.

Data available to GAO indicated that, although some projects may have national applicability, the projects generally did not appear much different from other efforts funded with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration moneys. Nevertheless, the agency will apparently continue funding some worthwhile projects that might have national applicability or are consistent with the State's overall comprehensive plan for improving the criminal justice system.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-

ministration recognizes the need to better manage projects funded with moneys it controls directly so that such efforts will result in greater national benefits. This report contains no recommendations for action by the Congress.

However, because more thought has recently been given to testing certain new program approaches before considering national application, the lessons learned from managing the pilot city effort should assist the Congress in determining how to better insure that executive agencies adequately plan and operate other test efforts.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One objective of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice is to foster new ways to improve the Nation's criminal justice systems through direct financing. One of LEAA's first major efforts --projected to cost about \$30 million--was the Pilot Cities Program, which began in 1970.

LEAA selected eight locations to research, demonstrate, and integrate new and improved projects into their criminal justice systems to prevent or reduce crime and delinquency. Through the cooperative efforts of action-oriented teams of professionals experienced in criminal justice research and the host locations' criminal justice agencies, the program was to demonstrate that improved research on local criminal justice problems could result in better programs to reduce crime. The cities' efforts were to serve as examples to the Nation of how to develop better planning processes in this critical area.

Most State and local programs financed with LEAA funds receive grants from State planning agencies that have received block grants from LEAA. The remaining funds are allocated as grants or contracts for projects which generally LEAA believes have national significance. These funds are called discretionary funds. In addition, LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice directly funds certain research and demonstration projects. LEAA manages projects, such as the Pilot Cities Program, receiving Institute or discretionary funds, and State criminal justice agencies manage projects which receive money from the block grants awarded to the States.

We wanted to determine whether LEAA had adequately planned and managed the Pilot Cities Program and whether the program was worthwhile in light of LEAA's responsibility to use resources directly under its control as effectively as possible to improve the criminal justice system and reduce crime.

It is especially important to evaluate such efforts as the Pilot Cities Program because, as the Attorney General

said in the fall of 1974, we are not at all sure what the causes of crime are or how to prevent them. Because the Federal Government, primarily through LEAA, supplies only a small portion of all funds spent to prevent and reduce crime and because there are probably not enough resources directed to solving the problem, it is especially vital that funds under LEAA's direct control be used as effectively as possible.

The adequacy and usefulness of any efforts funded with moneys LEAA directly controls, therefore, need to be viewed in that perspective. A key question is whether projects funded with such funds are sufficiently innovative to warrant their receiving direct grants from LEAA, as opposed to being funded by States with block grant funds.

By selecting medium-sized locations with known receptivity to change dispersed throughout the Nation, LEAA intended that the Pilot Cities Program produce efforts to improve the locale's criminal justice system which would not have occurred had the program not existed. LEAA believed that other States and localities could then benefit from the processes developed and the specific projects implemented.

Each location was to have a 5-year term consisting of three successive 20-month funding phases (phases I, II, and III). Grants were awarded to nonprofit organizations or universities, as shown in the following table, for a team to do research and to plan projects. Operating funds amounted to about \$20,000 per month per city, or \$9.6 million.

Funds allotted for demonstration projects amounted to \$500,000 per fiscal year per pilot city, or about \$20 million. Grants for demonstration funds were awarded to State and local criminal justice agencies to finance proposed projects.

<u>Location (note a)</u>	<u>Initial award date</u>	<u>Months remaining</u>		<u>Grantee</u>
		<u>after June 1974</u>	<u>(note b)</u>	
San Jose, and Santa Clara County, Calif.	May 1970	12		American Justice Institute
Dayton, and Montgomery County, Ohio	July 1970	12		Community Research, Inc.
Charlotte, and Mecklenburg County, N.C.	Dec. 1970	(c)		Institute of Government, University of No. Carolina
Albuquerque, and Bernalillo County, N. Mex.	Feb. 1971	26		Institute of Research and Development, University of New Mexico
Norfolk (standard metropolitan statistical area), Va. (note d)	Sept. 1971	28		College of William and Mary
Omaha, and Douglas County, Neb.	Sept. 1971	25		School of Public Affairs and Community Services, Univ. of Nebraska at Omaha
Des Moines, and Polk County, Iowa	Sept. 1971	29		Drake University
Rochester, and Monroe County, N.Y.	June 1972	35		University of Rochester

^aAlthough referred to as a Pilot Cities Program, the program included the county in which the major city was located, except in Norfolk, as noted.

^bTotal time may exceed 5 years because of limited extension granted by LEAA.

^cThe grantee withdrew from the Pilot Cities Program as of April 30, 1974. At the conclusion of our fieldwork, there were no plans to resume the program. (See pp. 25 to 27.)

^dIncluded the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach.

To evaluate whether the program was worthwhile, we reviewed the efforts of all eight locations taken as a whole. Although we anticipated variations in the quality of the efforts taken individually, we believed that to evaluate the entire program we had to draw conclusions on the basis of an assessment of the overall effort.

Such an assessment included judging whether the cumulative benefits accruing to the eight locations were sufficient to provide LEAA and the States with new information--not necessarily obtainable through other means, such as evaluating efforts funded with block grants--that would enable them to more effectively fight crime.

Among the primary factors considered in making such a determination were:

- The extent to which program objectives were adequately developed.
- The stability of the teams in the pilot city locations over the projected life of the program in terms of staff continuity and program emphasis.
- The innovativeness of the planning undertaken and projects developed in the locations.

The program objectives should have been clearly defined and clearly understood by all participants from the beginning. The stability of the pilot city teams throughout the test period should have been insured so the program's hypothesis could be proved or disproved. The character of the planning, research, and projects undertaken should have been sufficiently innovative to justify the continued expenditure of noncompetitive, direct Federal grants.

Underlying our assessment of these factors was our belief that for the program to succeed proper Federal management was essential.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

To assess the Pilot Cities Program, we reviewed in detail the operations of the pilot city teams in Albuquerque, Dayton, Norfolk, Omaha, and Santa Clara and briefly visited

and reviewed operations in Charlotte, Des Moines, and Rochester. We also visited LEAA headquarters and appropriate regional offices. Most of the fieldwork was done between August 1973 and April 1974.

CHAPTER 2

INADEQUATE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

From the beginning of the Pilot Cities Program's development in 1969, LEAA did not have a clear idea of the type of program it wanted to test. As a result, eight individual programs have evolved which, while benefiting the local communities to various degrees, when taken together have not been very successful in accomplishing the program's goals.

THE BASIS FOR PILOT CITIES

The program developed out of a January 1969 request to LEAA's National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice by the Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency.¹ The request was for funds to establish a "correctional laboratory at the local government level" in Santa Clara County, California.

The purpose of the proposal was "to see if, and how local people could be engaged to introduce innovations to optimize the criminal justice system on a systematic basis." In addition to planning to study the process of change, the proposal sought funds to "carry out the implementation of criminal justice system innovations developed through the study of the local system and as expressed in a plan of action." The prospective grantee did not propose to describe projects in advance, but to develop them from study and planning.

LEAA reacted positively to the request and discussed the project's development with staff from the American Justice Institute for about a year. However, the perspectives from which LEAA and the American Justice Institute viewed the proposed project were somewhat different.

The American Justice Institute requested funds to establish a specific project at one location. On the basis of previous work it had done in other California communities, the American Justice Institute apparently had a clear idea of what it wanted to do in Santa Clara County. LEAA staff,

¹/Subsequently named the American Justice Institute.

however, had to be concerned with trying to view this one request for funds in a broader national context.

The January 1969 through May 1970 period was a turbulent one for LEAA. During that time the agency developed the specifics of the American Justice Institute grant, which formed the basis for the Pilot Cities Program. LEAA was not established until June 1968. A new administration took office in January 1969 and had to decide what type of emphasis to give LEAA's programs.

The American Justice Institute saw its proposed project primarily as a way to improve the quality of justice in the host community by researching its criminal justice needs and implementing changes suggested by that research. LEAA's view of the proposal is not completely clear--partly because, among other things, seven different LEAA National Institute officials were responsible, at one time or another, for working with the American Justice Institute to develop its proposal and eventually the Pilot Cities Program. According to an American Justice Institute official:

"All LEAA Institute Staff had slightly different ideas and perceptions. Some of them were philosophically and professionally sympathetic to our views--some were not. Because it was a new agency, and because of the staff changes, I don't think a well-defined agency [LEAA] viewpoint existed about whether we had a good project or a bad project, or later whether Pilot Cities was a good idea or a bad idea."

One difference between LEAA and the American Justice Institute concerned the specificity of the proposal. LEAA wanted the proposal to be more specific in terms of the types of projects to be funded. As noted above, the American Justice Institute was not opposed to developing projects but believed they could be described in detail only after research and planning. According to the American Justice Institute official who was primarily involved in the negotiations and became director of the Santa Clara pilot city team, the difference in emphasis represented a divergence in philosophy, style, and approach between the two organizations and produced continual problems once the project was funded.

In June 1969 the proposal was revised somewhat to try to resolve this difference. In October 1969 a new staff member joined LEAA's National Institute and was assigned responsibility for developing an acceptable grant proposal. He apparently wanted to try to change the American Justice Institute's project proposal to fit in with a larger program he was developing. It was about this time, therefore, that LEAA decided to try to use the American Justice Institute's proposal to develop a specific project, in one location, as a basis for a broader national test.

In fact, in October 1969 the Acting Chief of the Center for Demonstration of Professional Services of LEAA's National Institute wrote the president of the American Justice Institute that he would like to "explore the possibility of linking your proposal * * * with the plans of the National Institute for the demonstration of new programs."

In January 1970 another LEAA staff member became responsible for negotiating with the American Justice Institute about the specifics of its grant proposal and about the development of the Pilot Cities Program. During this period LEAA also began considering other possible pilot city locations. The American Justice Institute official dealing with LEAA at this time, however, told us that discussions with LEAA focused on what might be developed in Santa Clara County and did not deal with the development of a broader national program.

But it is clear that within LEAA discussions focused on developing a national effort as a result of the American Justice Institute proposal and that LEAA wanted to emphasize developing specific projects.

The Director of the National Institute stated LEAA's views of the program in a March 1970 memorandum to an LEAA associate administrator:

"The projects in the pilot cities are mainly taken from prior research that has proved either on a research or demonstration basis, or both, that a certain kind of action is feasible and helpful. Therefore, in the projects we are primarily looking to implement prior knowledge rather than establish innovative ways that have not been tried before. As you will recall, the theory of the pilot cities

is to put existing knowledge together in a package and implement it across the whole criminal justice system in these designated areas." (Underscoring provided.)

Apparently, LEAA's view was project oriented. It approved the American Justice Institute's grant in May 1970 for the first pilot city experiment.

Santa Clara's applications noted that its project's goals were to:

- "Establish a place equipped for experimental study of the criminal justice system at the local government level.
- "Develop agreements with Santa Clara county and its principal cities to accept various new programs for implementation, study, and evaluation.
- "Develop new methods which promise to make the criminal justice system more effective.
- "Develop or identify the necessary measurement techniques which are needed to assess the impact of these new methods upon the criminal justice system.
- "Develop and test new methods for determining the impact of experimental programs.
- "Learn more about how successful changes can become part of the daily operation of an agency.
- "Learn more about how best to disseminate and introduce these changes in other jurisdictions."

The application then explained in detail the methods to be used to achieve the goals. It also listed proposed research projects and noted that demonstration projects would be implemented, but stated that the projects were not yet developed and therefore could not be described in detail. From the grantee's standpoint, the program's purpose and emphasis were clear.

The Santa Clara grant was worded so that the American Justice Institute could emphasize (1) improving the process of criminal justice research and planning and (2) developing specific, current, state-of-the-art projects to upgrade the local criminal justice system. The grant did not have to specify the importance of each goal. The lack of emphasis in Santa Clara's grant of any one goal (such as research or project implementation) over others was not detrimental to that pilot city effort because the team and local officials understood what they wanted from the program as a result of their negotiations of more than a year with LEAA before the grant was approved.

But the subsequent pilot city teams that used the wording of the Santa Clara grant, almost verbatim, in preparing their grant applications (at LEAA's direction) did not have the benefit of the Santa Clara team's experience. They could not be expected to clearly understand their program's purpose and to what extent certain goals were more important than others. LEAA should have given them appropriate guidance by making their grant applications more specific. Apparently, however, LEAA was not able to mold the program to clarify its emphasis because, even though the National Institute Director's March 1970 memorandum stated the desired emphasis, the subsequent pilot city grants did not reflect that. In effect, by allowing each remaining pilot city to copy the Santa Clara grant application, LEAA let each city interpret the program's objectives and emphasis. Instead of a coordinated national pilot city effort, the result was eight individual programs.

1973 GUIDELINES

The inability of LEAA to adequately address the program's objectives is further evidenced by its not publishing official guidelines until January 1973, 2-1/2 years after the program began.

If LEAA had adequately planned and managed the Pilot Cities Program, the development and issuance of guidelines would have preceded initiation of any projects and possibly even negotiation of grant applications. Instead, LEAA management decided to fund and implement a test program in diverse locations and, once the program was underway, try to develop it into a cohesive national effort.

In any national test effort involving expenditure of funds directly under a Federal agency's control, guidelines should be developed on the basis of what the test teams should do rather than on what they are doing.

The official pilot city guidelines published in January 1973 were a consensus reached among LEAA staff, State criminal justice planning officials, and the pilot city teams after the programs were operating; as such, they were broad enough to encompass all activities of the operating pilot cities. The guidelines therefore had little impact on what the cities were doing because they were based on what was already happening, rather than on what should happen. LEAA did not use the guidelines to try to provide direction to the program.

Program goals, as stated in the 1973 guidelines, were:

"To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team with exceptional research and analysis capabilities to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.

"To institutionalize the gains made during the Pilot City Program by building into the target area's criminal justice system the research and analysis capability necessary for system-wide, problem oriented planning and program evaluation.

"To understand more clearly the process by which change takes place in the criminal justice system so that more effective means can be devised for the nationwide dissemination and possible implementation of well-tested innovations."

LEAA'S MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Why did LEAA not take a more aggressive role in developing the Pilot Cities Program? Basically because of the general management philosophy that existed at the agency. Because most of LEAA's funds were provided as block grants to the States, LEAA believed the States should have primary

responsibility for developing specific projects and managing them. Generally, LEAA's management approach toward its block grant program was to decentralize decisionmaking and to provide minimum central direction.

On the basis of reviews of LEAA's activities, we concluded that in some instances such a management approach provided inadequate national accountability, and we therefore recommended in our reports¹ that LEAA more actively manage the block grant program. We do not disagree with the block grant concept or with the philosophy that the States and localities know best what their specific problems are and how best to address them. Our concern was to bring about adequate national accountability of such efforts.

Because LEAA was relatively new when the Pilot Cities Program began, the agency's general management philosophy of its block grant programs influenced all projects being funded with LEAA moneys--block, discretionary, and National Institute funds. When the Pilot Cities Program was developed, LEAA apparently did not recognize that a national test of certain concepts called for a different management approach than did a block grant program.

This failure to manage discretionary funded projects differently than other funded projects affected more than just the Pilot Cities Program.

¹"Report on Administration of the Program to Reduce Crime in Minnesota" (B-171019, Jan. 21, 1974).

"Difficulties of Assessing Results of LEAA Projects to Reduce Crime" (B-171019, Mar. 19, 1974).

"Federally Supported Attempts to Solve State and Local Court Problems: More Needs to be Done" (B-171019, May 8, 1974).

Letter report to the Administrator of LEAA on administration of planning funds (June 5, 1974).

"Progress in Determining Approaches Which Work in the Criminal Justice System" (B-171019, Oct. 21, 1974).

In an October 1973 report to the LEAA Administrator, we commented on the extent to which 42 projects funded with LEAA discretionary funds in 3 States during fiscal years 1970, 1971, and 1972 differed from those funded by those States with block grant funds. We determined that there was no appreciable difference between (1) the types of projects funded with either type of funds or (2) LEAA's management of projects receiving either type of funds.

LEAA's management and use of its discretionary funds has improved considerably since fiscal year 1972. However, during the time the Pilot Cities Program was developed, LEAA generally provided minimal central direction for its programs. We believe this is one of the main reasons why it did not properly develop the Pilot Cities Program.

LEAA's failure to initially clarify the program's objectives for its own staff and the pilot city teams greatly affected the overall program's development. Those teams with a sense of direction and strong leadership were, in effect, able to carry out their programs as they saw fit without much direction or interference from LEAA. Teams that needed direction, however, did not receive adequate advice or guidance from LEAA. Instead of a type of national test, the result was eight individual projects. Moreover, most of the pilot city teams experienced significant difficulties in developing and implementing cohesive programs.

CHAPTER 3

STABILITY OF PILOT CITY TEAMS

One problem that affected adequate development of the Pilot Cities Program was the instability of many of the pilot city teams' efforts. The program's plan was to have the teams research their communities' criminal justice problems and develop appropriate projects and technical assistance efforts to help the communities solve the problems.

Three of the five teams we reviewed in detail--Albuquerque, Dayton, and Omaha--did not develop their efforts in this way. They shifted emphasis and generally had difficulty maintaining a viable pilot city effort. The two other teams reviewed in detail--Santa Clara and Norfolk--maintained relatively stable operations; they developed appropriate community support, researched problems, and implemented projects.

Another team, Charlotte, withdrew from the program in April 1974 because of a lack of adequate LEAA direction and because it did not anticipate any sustained local interest in planning communitywide approaches to solve criminal justice problems. The Des Moines team apparently experienced startup problems and did not accomplish sufficient research and project development during its first 20 months of operation. The Rochester team, which began almost a year later than any other, has apparently made progress.

Overall, therefore, three of the eight teams may have progressed satisfactorily. Several team directors said that benefit to the Nation should be judged in terms of the lessons learned from the processes the teams used to try to change their localities' criminal justice systems. In several localities this process was severely interrupted because of the way LEAA managed the program.

What happened as the teams tried to develop? What went wrong in some locations and why? Why did other teams appear to be more stable? Some answers follow.

FINANCIAL PRESSURES

Several teams experienced pressures to spend their project money. Each pilot city team was to be provided discretionary funds of \$500,000 per fiscal year during its 5-year life for implementing demonstration projects. Any unused portion of the \$500,000 expired at the end of the fiscal year and was generally not available for future use by the teams. Because this money was available, LEAA applied pressure to make sure that projects were developed so all the money could be used.

These pressures existed partly because LEAA staff were unclear about the program's objectives. For example, while the Director of LEAA's National Institute believed the program should be project oriented (see pp. 8 and 9), the approved grant applications emphasized development of a general process leading eventually to implementing projects and improvements in the criminal justice system.

Most pilot city team officials believed that demonstration projects should begin only after an initial period during which the team could establish itself in the community, develop lines of communication with criminal justice officials, and research the community's criminal justice problems.

Several pilot city teams did take this approach. As noted in chapter 2, the Santa Clara team worked with the community for over a year, while its grant was being negotiated and developed by LEAA, to secure community support and cooperation. The Norfolk team also spent its initial period familiarizing itself with the pilot city area and its criminal justice problems and establishing working relationships with local officials. After such groundwork the teams began to concentrate on implementing projects.

The Albuquerque, Dayton, and Des Moines teams tried to follow that approach but, because of pressures from LEAA, had to focus on developing projects before they had laid the groundwork for using the projects in the overall process of trying to improve their locales' criminal justice systems. As a result, they could not maintain viable pilot city efforts.

An example of LEAA's approach is reflected in the efforts of its New York regional office to get the Rochester team to quickly develop projects. The Rochester grant became effective in March 1972 and was accepted by the grantee in June 1972. Research commenced as of August and by November 1972 all the staff had been hired.

However, in January 1973 the New York LEAA regional pilot city coordinator wrote the following to the Rochester pilot city team:

"At a recent staff meeting, [the New York regional administrator] expressed some concern that no Rochester Pilot City action programs had been funded. Although we are all aware of the time needed to prepare the background information necessary to develop viable programs, you must understand we are also operating under tremendous pressures from Congress and the LEAA Central Office to move LEAA funds into operating programs as quickly as possible. With this in mind, I think your top priority, once your baseline data has been collected and analyzed, should be to skim the cream off the top and begin developing some discretionary grant applications for programs which address the most obvious criminal justice problems and needs. Later, you can concentrate on developing more innovative, specialized programs."

In April 1973 the coordinator advised the director that the team had to obligate its demonstration money by June 30, 1973, the end of the fiscal year, or lose it.

In response to LEAA's pressure, the Rochester team director wrote a memorandum to her staff in April 1973 requesting them to provide ideas about potential programs within 3 days. Through June 30, 1973, Rochester had \$800,000 in LEAA pilot city demonstration funds that it could obligate: \$300,000 for March to June 1972 and \$500,000 for July 1972 to June 1973. The team submitted proposals to LEAA to obligate all the money, but, according to the pilot city team director, the team could have functioned better if it had been allowed to research problems for about 18 months before having to commit project funds. She added, however, that, on the basis of her previous knowledge of

the community and the staff's research efforts, she believed the projects did address some of the community's problems.

LEAA's efforts to force project development too early in Albuquerque and Dayton had serious consequences.

Albuquerque

Albuquerque's pilot city grant was awarded to the University of New Mexico in February 1971. A team director was not hired until April 1971. In May 1971 an LEAA headquarters official urged the team to gain credibility in the community by developing some demonstration projects and advised the team that fiscal year 1971 grant applications for demonstration projects had to be submitted by June 1971.

With such a short leadtime, an adequate analysis of the location's problems and needs (pilot research) was impracticable, as was the orderly development of projects to meet those needs. The team submitted eight demonstration project applications totaling about \$256,000 to LEAA in early June 1971. The applications were not based on adequate research and planning needed to establish problems and priorities.

LEAA designated only two of the eight projects as fiscal year 1971 projects. Those two projects were approved within 2 months. The remaining applications were not approved until 6 to 10 months later and were designated as fiscal year 1972 projects.

Moreover, on June 6, 1971, an LEAA official advised the Albuquerque team that about \$1 million in competitive discretionary funds were also available and asked the team to demonstrate its competence by assisting local agencies to apply for these funds by June 17, 1971. The team responded by helping local agencies develop nine project proposals totaling \$708,703. LEAA approved only three, totaling \$150,000.

As a result of LEAA's pressure on the pilot city team to use funds quickly:

- Demonstration projects were conceived without proper research and in some cases copied from applications submitted by other teams.

--Research activities had to be postponed.

Also, as a result of LEAA's disapproval of competitive discretionary grants and extensive delays in approving demonstration projects, the team's credibility and its relationships with criminal justice agencies were damaged.

Dayton

The Dayton team also tried to comply with LEAA's request to develop ways to use money and began writing grant applications. As a result, the team discontinued its systems planning approach and disrupted its test of the pilot city concept of developing better projects to reduce crime through better planning and research.

The team's report on phase I described the effect of LEAA's request on the Dayton program as follows:

"The extensive investment of Pilot Cities time and energy in the development of the demonstration programs * * * has had disheartening results. Pilot Cities played a variety of roles in the development of these projects: some they wrote completely; some they helped write; for others they provided technical assistance; and for all, they assisted in obtaining local fund match and necessary governmental approval. These activities, which were encouraged by LEAA, detracted from the main thrust of the Pilot Cities program. * * *"

Ten demonstration project grant applications were submitted to LEAA for approval. Many of these projects were "off the shelf," that is, standard projects used elsewhere and not based on an adequate analysis as to whether they satisfied Dayton's needs. Only five were approved and, as a result, the team's credibility in the community diminished greatly.

Charlotte and Santa Clara

LEAA also tried to persuade the Charlotte and Santa Clara teams to develop projects very quickly. According to the Charlotte team director, in the spring of 1971 an LEAA official requested him to develop enough projects to obligate \$1 million in addition to the normal allotment for

demonstration projects. About a week later, however, the director asked LEAA if the money was still available. He was told it was not, so he did not develop any project proposals.

The Santa Clara team director was also asked by LEAA if he could quickly prepare grant applications for projects to help use an additional \$1 million before the end of the fiscal year. The director said he did not agree to the request because to do so would have disrupted the process of trying to improve the local criminal justice system. His decision was based on three factors:

--The allotted time was too short to develop good projects.

--He did not want to raise the local community's expectations that more money would flow into their area and then not be able to produce, because this would damage his team's credibility and handicap its future efforts.

--Developing project applications very quickly would have meant stopping all other pilot city activity, thus putting the entire project off schedule.

As noted above, these specific adverse effects occurred in Albuquerque because LEAA convinced the team to develop projects very quickly.

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We believe the problem in Albuquerque and Dayton would not have occurred had LEAA and the teams clearly defined the program's goals and emphasis before it began. Because the Santa Clara team had taken more than a year to refine its program and was clear as to what it wanted to achieve, it resisted LEAA's efforts which, in effect, disrupted the program. The Albuquerque and Dayton teams did not have the benefit of that experience; thus, they apparently did not sufficiently understand their objectives to effectively resist LEAA's pressures to develop projects quickly. Had the teams and communities not expected, probably unreasonably, that applications would be approved, the teams' credibility might not have been so greatly impaired.

REGIONAL GUIDANCE

Another factor affecting the stability of many of the pilot city teams was the inconsistent LEAA regional office management and guidance of the program. Inadequate regional guidance was partially responsible for the Charlotte team's withdrawal from the program. It caused considerable problems in Albuquerque, Dayton, Omaha, and apparently in Des Moines.

As part of its effort to implement the philosophy of the "new federalism," LEAA, during 1971, gave its regional offices responsibility for making most decisions about how the States would spend and be held accountable for LEAA funds, including those of the Pilot Cities Program. LEAA's decision to decentralize operations, however, adversely affected the program's progress for the following reasons:

- No specific description or guidelines existed for regional staffs to follow.
- Regions had just been established and knew little about the program.
- Decentralization was abrupt. Each region received boxes of the appropriate pilot city's records, was briefed by LEAA headquarters staff about the program, and was told to designate a staff member to become the pilot city coordinator.

Because LEAA headquarters staff in the National Institute had not specified the program's objectives, each regional office coordinator's principal problem was perceiving the program's goals as best he could and providing guidance to his pilot city team accordingly. The coordinators' perceptions of the program's goals were not always the same.

Also, at about this time LEAA developed and implemented its High Impact Anti-Crime program--a 5-year program in which eight cities received \$20 million each to reduce rape, homicide, robbery, and burglary. According to LEAA officials, the regional offices concentrated more on implementing the Impact Cities Program than on directing the pilot cities effort. They believed this also contributed to inadequate direction of the Pilot Cities Program.

The Charlotte team's phase I report discussed the reason for the problems that arose during decentralization as follows:

"Most of the confusion stemmed from a failure on the part of the central administration of LEAA to have articulated why they had initiated the Pilot City program in the first place and what it was they were trying to accomplish. In light of that, the difficulty that LEAA's regional offices later found dealing with the project is quite understandable."

The Santa Clara pilot city director told us:

"LEAA emphasis and policy shifted considerably, especially in the early days of the program. One explanation we offer for the apparent success of this Pilot is that the Pilot Program staff had some consistent internal sense of goals and objectives and was able to anticipate and deal with the shifts. We did not have to swing radically from one set of goals or methods of operation to another as these instructions [from LEAA] changed."

The Norfolk team director also believed his team "was able to continue to maintain a steady and planned course of development."

As early as October 1971, LEAA recognized weaknesses in the Pilot Cities Program. At that time its Inspection and Review Committee¹ reviewed the Santa Clara program and noted that:

--Various LEAA officials gave conflicting guidance and direction to this program.

--LEAA did not have a carefully articulated policy for guiding pilot city development.

¹Subsequently called the Office for Inspection and Review and now the Office of Planning and Management.

--Each pilot city was operated differently, reflecting the personality and ideas of its project director.

Overall, the committee found that the Pilot Cities Program had unclear objectives, lacked continuity, and needed a national coordinator.

LEAA headquarters staff, over a period of time, attempted to improve program management by (1) providing regional offices with draft guidelines for establishing and managing LEAA pilot cities, (2) appointing a national pilot city coordinator to oversee the regions' operation, and (3) issuing program guidelines in 1973.

These efforts, however, fell short of providing the central direction needed to insure national cohesion because:

- The Guide for the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities was drafted but never officially issued. Thus, some regions did not believe it was useful because it was not an official document that they could refer to as a source of authority in their dealings with the pilot cities.
- The national coordinator was not appointed until 3 months after decentralization and provided very little coordination. Like his counterparts in the regions, the coordinator had other major duties and faced the same basic problems because the program's terms, concepts, and goals had never been adequately defined.
- The guidelines for the pilot teams were not issued until January 1973, about 2-1/2 years after the Pilot Cities Program started. Moreover, the guidelines represented the team directors' consensus of what their programs had been doing up to that time. Rather than being a document containing LEAA's policy on what the teams should do, the guidelines were so broad that none of the pilot city teams' activities were excluded.

Inconsistent guidance

In addition to structuring itself, each region developed its own approach to managing its pilot cities. Some regions exercised strong control over their teams while others did not. The degree of regional control also varied within regions, owing to high turnover of regional coordinators and the various interpretations of program objectives. The following table shows the turnover from December 1971 to September 1973.

<u>Region (pilot city)</u>	<u>Coordinators</u>
Atlanta (Charlotte)	3
Chicago (Dayton)	5
Dallas (Albuquerque)	3
Kansas City (Des Moines, Omaha)	3
New York (Rochester)	1
Philadelphia (Norfolk)	3
San Francisco (Santa Clara)	1

When the teams sought advice from the regions, the responses varied because each coordinator understood the program differently. The lack of central direction caused individual teams to go different ways and led some to significantly change their program's emphasis, as shown in the following examples.

Albuquerque

The involvement of LEAA's Dallas regional office staff with the Albuquerque team changed from a hands-off approach to one of tight control. According to Dallas regional officials, while Albuquerque's program was under Washington's control, LEAA headquarters staff provided little guidance to the team. When LEAA operations were decentralized, the Dallas regional office became more active in overseeing the Albuquerque team. The extent to which the Dallas regional staff tried to direct the Albuquerque team efforts and the problems arising from the staff's lack of a clear understanding of the program are discussed below.

In November 1972, when the Albuquerque team requested funds for phase II operations, the Dallas LEAA staff required

the team to submit a work plan as part of its application. The work plan was to set forth the team's proposals for accomplishing the program goals.

On December 15, 1972, phase I operational funding terminated, but the Dallas office had not approved phase II funding. The Dallas staff eventually made a phase II incremental award of \$40,000 to Albuquerque on January 2, 1973, only for December 16, 1972, to February 15, 1973, because of the possibility that Albuquerque's program might be terminated.

The Albuquerque team director met with Dallas LEAA officials on January 5, 1973, and submitted the revised grant application based on Charlotte's grant application which LEAA had approved. However, LEAA officials said the application should also include detailed information on demonstration projects to be conducted by local agencies, although this had not been included in Charlotte's application. LEAA Dallas officials agreed that the work plan explaining proposed demonstration projects could be separate from the grant application. The officials then informed the Albuquerque team that approval of its phase II grant application would still be contingent upon LEAA's approval of the work plan.

On February 1, 1973, the Albuquerque director submitted to the LEAA regional office the work plan, including information on the demonstration projects.

The LEAA staff spent over 2 months reviewing the work plan and in a letter dated April 18, 1973, informed the team director that the work plan had to be further revised. According to the director, LEAA had provided no written guidance specifying what was required in the work plan before the April 18, 1973, letter. Furthermore, the Dallas LEAA staff could not give us any written instructions on how to prepare the work plan, other than its April 18, 1973, letter, which it agreed did not provide clear guidance.

The pilot city team director submitted a revised work plan on May 18, 1973, which LEAA did not approve. On May 31, 1973, a meeting was held of Dallas LEAA officials, the team director, and local Albuquerque officials. At this

meeting LEAA said that the following additional information must be included in the work plan: a 100-percent accounting of the future man-day efforts and costs of the team staff, the hypothesis to be tested and anticipated results of each research project, and the transferability aspect and operating agency endorsements for each project.

On July 14, 1973, the Albuquerque director submitted to LEAA a revised work plan covering the period up to October 1, 1973. This plan was approved by the Dallas staff on June 21, 1973. Three work plan updates covering October 1973 to August 15, 1974, were subsequently submitted to LEAA and approved by it.

Because grant funding arrangements had been uncertain since December 1972, the team could not make any long-term commitments. As a result, it submitted no new demonstration projects to LEAA for approval and it could not hire replacements for three staff members who quit because of program uncertainty. In effect, Albuquerque's pilot city team became dormant in terms of producing projects.

According to Dallas LEAA officials, withholding phase II funds was not desirable but it was the only way to insure Albuquerque's compliance with the regional office's requirements. However, if the Dallas staff had specified work plan requirements in November 1972, many of these problems could have been avoided.

Charlotte

The actions of the Charlotte team illustrate the effects of minimal LEAA regional influence over a pilot team. In its phase II proposal, approved by LEAA, the Charlotte team submitted a grant application that omitted one of the basic goals of the Pilot Cities Program--to use action-oriented teams of professionals to induce improvements in the communities' criminal justice systems. The teams were to be active agents for change. But the Charlotte phase II grant application stated that the team would not act in such a role:

"The Pilot Project Team exists only to provide analytical skill and its products. It is not directly

to provide the motive force for mobilizing community energy to seek reform, or to prod action from local institutions."

In a June 1973 interim report on its phase II activities, the Charlotte team indicated its philosophy more specifically.

"The pilot project does not see as its mission the reform, or improvement, of the criminal justice system. It sees itself only as making available an analytical capability. Thus, the purpose of the pilot project is not to improve criminal justice; it is to demonstrate whether the availability of that analytical work will lead to improvement."

* * * * *

"The pilot project has gone to considerable pains to counteract any impression that the project staff has a say-so in whether or not a project is funded from the Pilot City discretionary money. The pilot project sees it as entirely possible that a project seeking those funds could be conceived, an application for it written and submitted, its funding approved, and its implementation carried out without any involvement by the pilot project."

On February 18, 1974, the director of the Charlotte team wrote the LEAA Atlanta regional administrator that the team was withdrawing from the Pilot Cities Program as of April 30, 1974. Among the reasons cited were that the:

- Pilot city effort was somewhat inconsistent with the grantee's other activities, which focused on more statewide problems. The director stated that there was "little to warrant intensive focus on one jurisdiction."
- Team believed it was "working in a void" because of an "absence of purposefulness in the administration of the pilot city program as a whole."
- Team did not anticipate any sustained local interest in planning aimed at developing communitywide approaches

to solving criminal justice problems, believed it was improper for the team to "promote or manipulate towards their end," and saw little indication that LEAA would devise incentives for criminal justice planning in the pilot cities.

--Team did not believe it was possible to disseminate research and planning techniques to other jurisdictions because:

"there was nothing in the experience of the first two phases indicating any effort at the federal level to exploit the experience of the pilot project and [there were] * * * no indications that this would change during the third phase."

Dayton

In December 1971, when decentralization occurred, the Dayton team was still trying to recover from the effects of writing grants to use its first allotment of demonstration funds and part of the extra \$1 million that was available. (See p. 18.) Although Dayton's phase I funding period expired in December 1971, the Chicago regional office did not approve its phase II funding request until May 1972 because the regional office was uncertain about the program objectives.

Between January 1971 and September 1972, all the Dayton team's professional staff members left the program, primarily because they were disenchanted with its efforts. A complete new staff was assembled by November 1972. During this period the team director tried to reemphasize the need to research the community's needs and problems before developing demonstration projects. However, LEAA's Chicago regional office became concerned because the Dayton team had not submitted any proposals for funding new demonstration projects and therefore requested the team to do so. The team director attempted to complete the research. Because LEAA and the director could not agree on the emphasis for the program, LEAA requested him to resign in December 1972.

From December 1972 until October 1973, the Dayton team did not have a permanent director. In April 1973 a con-

sultant was hired to reorganize the team and to develop applications for demonstration projects. As a result, five projects totaling \$500,000 were proposed by the team and approved by the regional office on July 1, 1973. The projects were directed toward reducing specific crimes. An analysis of the projects' descriptions showed that only one appeared to be based on adequate research into the area's problems and needs.

Omaha

Confusion between Omaha team members and LEAA's Kansas City staff about the way the program should develop affected the team's stability.

In a letter to the team director dated July 18, 1972, an LEAA regional official said

"the focus of demonstration projects should be designed primarily to solve specific problems within the criminal justice agencies of the Omaha-Douglas County area and to benefit emphatically that immediate community."

Apparently on the basis of the above comment, a University of Nebraska official wrote to LEAA about a year later and said

"As I understand it, an agreement was reached among the pilot cities and LEAA that projects funded need not be nationally innovative so long as they were innovative for the jurisdiction concerned."

LEAA responded,

"Innovation as you have defined its use for the Omaha pilot program would in our opinion adjust the program from national in scope to parochial in nature."

During phase I (from September 1971 to June 30, 1973) the Omaha team identified potential projects and selected the best methodologies to study them. The team developed 9 project proposals and discussed 25 potential proposals. It generally believed that any projects that were new or

innovative to the community could be funded. For example, the team proposed projects to improve law enforcement agencies' use of computers, to provide a new method of handling the drunk offender, and to provide better processing of court information.

LEAA approved the following three pilot city demonstration projects during Omaha's first phase.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Approval date</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Community Based Resources for Criminalistics Examination	9-11-72	\$ 78,687
Mobile Teleprinter System	3-22-73	5,775
The Resource-Investigative Need of the Public Defender's Office	5-10-73	121,821

None of the projects were based on adequate research into the community's criminal justice needs and priorities. The Mobile Teleprinter System and the Community Based Resources for Criminalistics Examination projects were initially conceived by the Omaha police division. The Mobile Teleprinter System, however, was canceled because of the city's inability to lease equipment. The Resource-Investigation Need of the Public Defender's Office project, which concerned ways for organized labor to provide employment for offenders, was conceived and developed by the pilot city team. According to a team member, all three projects resulted mainly from a series of meetings between team members and Omaha criminal justice officials.

Through June 30, 1973, the team issued eight baseline data reports. But, according to the pilot city research associate, the only project developed as a result of the baseline data was not funded with pilot cities money because LEAA did not find it new or innovative. The project was to develop and implement a crime information analysis unit in the Omaha police division to directly assist decisionmakers. The project, costing about \$33,000, was subsequently funded by the State with LEAA block grant funds. Moreover, according to LEAA's evaluation of Omaha's phase I activities, most project proposals submitted did not contain "sound research methodology and evaluation components."

From September 1971 to June 30, 1973, the Omaha team had received about \$261,000 in operating funds from LEAA. Although not many projects had been implemented, the team had done some research and developed some project proposals. LEAA reviewed Omaha's phase I activities and issued a report on its operations concluding that the program was ineffective. As a result, there was an almost complete turnover of staff as of June 30, 1973.

Phase II began on July 1, 1973. However, as of October 1973 very little had been accomplished because of the time needed to hire the new staff and a decision to concentrate on only the corrections area, rather than on all elements of the criminal justice system. During that time no additional projects were proposed by the team for funding with pilot cities money. According to a subsequent LEAA review of the Omaha team's activities as of the spring of 1974, there was still considerable instability within the team and little cooperation between the team and most segments of Omaha's criminal justice community.

A misunderstanding about the program's objectives between the Kansas City regional office and the Des Moines team apparently caused some of the same type of confusion that existed in Omaha. Both the regional office and the pilot city team noted that LEAA's National Institute had not provided adequate criteria to determine whether proposed projects were new or innovative. Team officials also said that problems resulted from regional office pressure to fund projects quickly. They believed it would have been better to initiate demonstration projects only after the team had had time to establish itself and develop lines of communication with the criminal justice community.

SELECTION OF PILOT CITIES

Another factor affecting the stability of one team was the way LEAA applied its criteria for selecting pilot locations.

LEAA's criteria were essentially those used by the American Justice Institute to select the Santa Clara area in which to try to implement its specific project proposed to LEAA in 1969. One of the primary factors to be considered

was the extent to which the community and the criminal justice system were receptive to change.

Specific criteria and bases to be used by LEAA to select the pilot cities follow.

- | | |
|---|---------------------------|
| 1. City of 200,000 to 500,000 population | 1970 census |
| 2. Substantial minority population (10 to 20 percent) | 1970 census |
| 3. Average or worse crime problem | FBI Uniform Crime Reports |
| 4. Geographically separate from other major urban areas | U.S. Atlas and other maps |

Cities not meeting these criteria were to be eliminated. The remaining cities were then to be examined according to the following:

- Reasonable stability of local political and governmental management leadership.
- Political and governmental management leadership disposed to support criminal justice agency development.
- Law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership proven receptive to change.
- Compatible relationships among political, management, and criminal justice agency leadership in operations and/or development planning.
- Some unification of law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership.
- Availability of a university or private nonprofit organization with law enforcement or criminal justice research capability as a possible applicant for the pilot city grant.

LEAA also believed that the pilot city teams should locate in the host communities and that each region should have a pilot city.

Albuquerque was selected even though LEAA's analysis indicated it should not have been. LEAA documents show that Albuquerque and Tulsa were among the primary cities being considered as possible pilot cities in region VI. National Institute staff visited the candidate cities and concluded that Tulsa best met LEAA's criteria and should be the pilot city. The staff rejected Albuquerque because it believed (1) the community's criminal justice leaders did not show much interest in the pilot city program, (2) the police chief appeared reluctant to implement innovative projects, and (3) friction between the police and courts on the one hand, and the city and county managers on the other, indicated an unstable political environment.

The LEAA decision paper of October 21, 1970, contained profiles on the seven cities considered in region VI and recommended to the Associate Administrators that Tulsa be selected. LEAA's Associate Administrator in charge subsequently told the National Institute to select Albuquerque. (There was no Administrator of LEAA at that time.)

We could find no conclusive documentation indicating why Albuquerque was selected over Tulsa. However, New Mexico and Albuquerque officials, National Institute staff members, and LEAA Dallas regional office staff members indicated that they believed Albuquerque was chosen primarily for political reasons.

Some of the problems the Albuquerque team has experienced--such as loss of credibility and difficulties in developing a phase II program--may have been partly related to the city's not meeting LEAA's criteria for selection. From the beginning there was a lack of cooperation between the pilot city team and some local officials. This made it extremely difficult for the team to try to effect positive changes in the community's criminal justice system.

Several other localities did not meet LEAA's criterion of having a minority population of 10 to 20 percent. For example, neither collectively nor individually did the

cities in the Norfolk program meet the minority population criterion. The 1970 census statistics showed the minority population of the four cities to be:

Norfolk	28 percent
Chesapeake	23 percent
Portsmouth	40 percent
Virginia Beach	9 percent

Collectively, the minority population was about 25 percent. Albuquerque's minority population was 37 percent; Charlotte's, 30 percent; and Des Moines', 6 percent. None of these deviations apparently adversely affected the teams' efforts. But the deviations do bring into question why LEAA developed criteria and then did not follow them.

CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITIES OF PILOT CITY TEAMS

Another way of judging whether the Pilot Cities Program should continue is to assess the teams in terms of the type of research and projects undertaken and the impact the teams have had on their criminal justice communities. We believe the key question that the Federal Government must ask is whether the cumulative effect of the efforts of the teams is sufficiently innovative to justify the further expenditure of funds directly under LEAA's control.

Some teams were more successful than others; however, taken as a whole, the efforts of the eight pilot city teams did not appear to be sufficiently innovative, compared to efforts being undertaken in other States with LEAA block grant and discretionary funds, to warrant continued financing of the program with LEAA discretionary and National Institute funds. This does not mean that some of the projects developed by the teams were not worthwhile and should not be continued. But such efforts should be funded with other than pilot city moneys.

Several pilot city team directors stressed that their efforts had benefited their communities considerably, both in terms of the innovativeness of the projects and in terms of the new way the communities address criminal justice planning. They therefore believed it was unfair to characterize their programs as failures. We do not doubt that some of the communities have benefited from the efforts of the pilot city teams and that such efforts could be considered successful. But it is parochial to try to assess the need to continue a national test on the basis of specific benefits that might accrue to certain localities. Such an assessment must be based on the overall experience of all the teams and on an evaluation of whether the experience merits continual, direct Federal support.

RESEARCH AND PROJECTS

The teams were to research the communities' crime problems, identify the major issues to be addressed, and help implement demonstration projects to alleviate the problems. Research was critical to the Pilot Cities Program. It was to be the basis for developing projects. It was also to be used to determine how to improve the communities' criminal justice planning.

Although it was clear from the approved grant applications that the pilot city teams had to do research, LEAA did not clearly define the type of research to be conducted. On the basis of the experience of the pilot city teams, however, LEAA's 1973 program guidelines noted that

"[The research was] to concentrate on common problems in a real life setting and to develop tools, measurement techniques and methodologies which will be transferable to other jurisdictions. In this respect, the pilot city serves as a laboratory site to develop and test new methods for reducing crime in America."

One type of research expected of the pilot city teams was baseline data research. This should have been done with some consistency so the various experiences could be compared and conclusions could be made as to the possible transferability of various research methods. Once basic research was complete, the teams were to analyze and research specific problems (pilot research) and develop demonstration projects.

Baseline data research

All pilot city teams were to develop baseline data on the various aspects of their criminal justice systems. For example, LEAA required the Santa Clara team to submit a report outlining the scope and nature of the data to be developed. Santa Clara's grant application explained how this requirement would be carried out:

"From present knowledge of the available data, it appears to be possible to prepare a general description of each of the workloads of the criminal justice system during the past year. This initial system description will describe the workload and outcomes of the various phases of the criminal justice processes. Information will be obtained on the occurrence of crimes by geographical areas, the distribution of effort in the various departments, rates (or percentages) of the outcome of each process. This system will be gradually improved as better data and additional information is obtained; either through research projects, through demonstration projects, or as a result of on going county efforts to improve their information base."

Each pilot city obtained some information on the workloads and problems of the various components of its criminal justice systems. However, the teams had to determine what specific baseline data they wanted to collect.

As the teams developed the data, they realized that it was necessary to establish some common criteria because:

- The program was supposed to be national, thus requiring some reporting uniformity.
- The data would establish a common reference for comparing such things as different approaches used to solve similar problems.

The teams met several times and discussed this problem. In August 1972 six of the eight teams agreed to classify their baseline data as follows:

- Community characteristics.
- Crime statistics.
- Police systems.

--Courts systems.

--Corrections systems.

--Criminal justice system configuration.

The Dayton team developed baseline information on the manpower resources, workload factors, and budgets of various components of its criminal justice community. The Omaha team published 10 baseline data reports dealing with such factors as crime and arrest trends and the organization of the components of its criminal justice system. The Albuquerque team obtained baseline demographic data and developed information on such things as opinions of citizens and criminal justice professionals on important crime problems.

The Norfolk team obtained such information as the organization and functions of the area's criminal justice agencies, staffing patterns, budgetary data, arrest data, number of court cases, and criminal offense trends. Whenever data was available, information was obtained covering the entire criminal justice system of each city. The information was compiled and analyzed by the pilot city team. However, the director of the research effort said LEAA provided no guidance on developing the data or using it to determine in which specific area the team should concentrate its pilot research and project efforts.

Although the teams obtained general baseline data, most could not obtain accurate information on the occurrence of crimes by geographical area. Other types of baseline data are important, but, without adequate information on crime occurrence, it is extremely difficult to determine where the real crime problems are and whether the teams' efforts affect the problems. One way to accurately develop such information is through victimization studies.

The need for this information is supported by an LEAA study which showed that nationally only about a third of the violent crimes committed were reported to the police.¹ The data can be used to establish a baseline against which to measure changes in the incidence of crime and shifts from one crime to another or one location to another and to analyze other trends. Periodic collection of this data could also be used to evaluate the success of the teams' efforts in reducing crime locally and the impact of the national program.

At the conclusion of our fieldwork in April 1974, most pilot city teams had not completed adequate victimization studies. In late 1970 LEAA contracted with the Bureau of the Census to provide victimization studies for Santa Clara and Dayton for about \$197,500. The reports were issued in June 1974. According to LEAA officials, delays in completing the studies were caused by difficulties in computer program development and data analysis.

The Charlotte team supplemented a limited statewide survey by adding 56 interviews to it. The survey was not very useful, however, because the number of residents interviewed was too small to reliably project statistics. The director of the Rochester program said that a communitywide victimization study was not attempted in Rochester because of expense. The Norfolk director advised us that the team began a victimization study in the fall of 1973 and was analyzing the data as of August 1974.

The unavailability of such studies before the teams began developing projects to address specific criminal justice problems implies that the real problems may not have been known and that the projects may not have been properly focused. For example, during one phase of its effort, the Dayton team focused on developing demonstration projects to reduce specific crimes, such as shoplifting and robbery, in commercial areas. But, because the results of the victimization survey were not known at the time, it was impossible to know whether this was a proper area on which to focus. In fact, according to the Dayton victimization study, published in June 1974, only 12 percent of all robberies were committed against commercial establishments. The rest were committed against individuals.

¹"Criminal Victimization in the United States, January-June 1973," Department of Justice, LEAA, November 1974.

In the final analysis, the purpose of the Pilot Cities Program is to develop better ways to reduce crime. But the lack of adequate victimization studies means that no quantifiable criteria exist against which to measure the program's impact on the true incidence of crime.

Pilot research and project implementation

Each team's understanding of the terms "new" and "innovative" greatly affected the way it approached pilot city research and developed and implemented projects. LEAA, however, did not adequately define the terms. Consequently, the teams did not know whether they should implement projects that were (1) truly innovative, (2) newly tried and proven but not used widely, or (3) widely used but not employed in their respective host communities. Inconsistent interpretation of the terms affected LEAA's decisions regarding approval of project demonstration grants, which in turn affected the emphasis of the teams' operations.

Some LEAA and pilot cities officials interpreted the terms literally. They believed that unless projects were truly new and innovative they could be considered parochial and would have little, if any, national application. Other officials believed that projects did not have to be literally new and innovative but only new to the host community for LEAA to approve their implementation.

Generally the latter view prevailed--if the projects were new to the pilot city communities, LEAA approved them. This emphasis has serious implications in deciding whether to continue the Pilot Cities Program. If the projects are new to the locations involved but have been tried elsewhere with LEAA block grant or other discretionary funds, is LEAA justified in continuing to support such efforts with discretionary and National Institute funds as part of the Pilot Cities Program? From a national standpoint we do not believe so.

No specific data was available to determine whether the projects were new and innovative. But available information indicated that the types of projects developed in most pilot cities were not much different from other efforts being funded with LEAA block grants or other discretionary funds.

A breakdown of the expenditures of pilot city demonstration funds through December 1, 1973, provided some indication of the program emphasis. Overall, about 27 percent of the funds (about \$2 million) had gone to projects to implement or update information systems. LEAA's National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service is responsible for providing national direction to such efforts and for making direct, discretionary grants to States and localities to improve criminal justice information systems. Through fiscal year 1974 LEAA had spent about \$52 million on such efforts. Although we did not compare in detail information system projects funded with pilot city funds to those supported by the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, descriptions for both types of projects were similar.

About 23 percent of the pilot city demonstration funds (about \$1.7 million) went to provide new types of community treatment efforts. These efforts included developing such activities as youth service bureaus for coordinating community services to prevent youth from committing crimes and to rehabilitate those that have and alcohol detoxification centers to divert persons arrested for drunkenness from the criminal justice system. A comparison of some of the descriptions of such projects with projects funded by States with LEAA block grant funds suggests that the projects have similar approaches and goals.

The rest of the funds were allocated among the following programs.

Management studies of criminal justice system components	\$ 362,000	4%
Hiring of additional staff for criminal justice agencies	406,000	6
Improving police training and training facilities	489,000	7
Problem analyses to improve allocation of criminal justice resources	1,330,000	18

Education and participation of the community in criminal justice	431,000	6
Diagnostic treatment and counseling of juvenile and adult offenders	<u>627,000</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	<u>\$3,645,000</u>	<u>50%</u>

These projects included:

- Providing funds to stores in Dayton to purchase burglar alarms and television security systems.
- Supporting a full-time five-man narcotic squad in Metropolitan Albuquerque.
- Increasing the number of nonwhite officers in the Chesapeake Police Department.
- Supporting a crime laboratory in Omaha.

(See app. I for a complete list of projects funded.)

In addition, all six of Albuquerque's demonstration projects submitted to LEAA for approval during March, April, and May 1972 were for reducing property crimes because the team, in cooperation with the area's criminal justice agencies, had determined that such crimes were a major problem.

From a local standpoint such an effort appears worthwhile, but from a national perspective such a use of pilot city funds is questionable. LEAA's Impact Cities Program was designed to finance projects in certain cities to reduce specific types of crimes. We question whether any national benefit could be gained from financing similar efforts with pilot city funds.

The Dayton, Norfolk, and Santa Clara teams provided pilot city funds to improve their localities' police planning. But LEAA did not approve a similar project in Omaha to assist the police to better relate crime information to decisionmaking. LEAA said the project was not new or innovative. However, it was eventually funded with block grant funds.

The Norfolk team's expenditure of about \$353,000 for similar juvenile justice information systems in all four of the Tidewater's pilot cities is another example of pilot city funds being used to support a project similar to other efforts being funded by LEAA. The expenditure represented about 32 percent of Norfolk's pilot city demonstration funds spent as of December 1973.

The Norfolk team decided to concentrate on juvenile delinquency and, after researching the issue, apparently determined that basic information on juveniles should be computerized. It therefore developed similar juvenile-based transaction statistics information systems for all four cities.

The LEAA regional pilot city coordinator said that offender-based tracking efforts--such as the Norfolk team's system--had been tried at various locations throughout the country. Nevertheless, he recommended that they be funded with pilot city money because they were new to the cities involved and, if successful, would help future planning, management, and reform in the Tidewater's juvenile justice system. The Norfolk team director said the four systems are the most advanced in Virginia. They will apparently be of considerable benefit to the area if properly implemented.

But are the systems of the four cities innovative enough compared to other similar LEAA-funded efforts to warrant continued use of pilot city funds?

Other localities are apparently developing similar systems using LEAA funds. The Norfolk director believed his system's "Correctional Probability Aid Module" was unique. In 1971 the juvenile courts of the city and county of St. Louis developed an automated, juvenile-based information system for their administrative, judicial, and correctional information requirements. Among the apparently significant, unique, and progressive capabilities of the St. Louis system is a so-called "Correctional Probability Aid Module" which computes correlations between a child's characteristics and delinquent behavior, delinquent correction program success, and counseling success. A statewide computerized juvenile information system in Utah also has a module that attempts to predict recidivism, to evaluate and recommend intervention alternatives, and to refine recidivism measures and help develop prediction formulas.

According to a 1972 LEAA survey, about 27 jurisdictions have introduced some form of automation into their juvenile courts. An official of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges has noted that one of the two major trends in juvenile justice information systems is using the computer for diagnostic and predictive purposes. The other major trend involves developing complete youth services information systems. Among other juvenile justice information systems that he believed were advanced were those in Florida and Colorado and local systems in Fulton County, Georgia (Atlanta), and Jackson County, Missouri (Kansas City). Many of these efforts are being assisted with LEAA funds--some through block grants, others as part of LEAA's Comprehensive Data System Program.

The Norfolk project appears worthwhile and very advanced, but we question whether it is sufficiently innovative to justify continued funding with pilot cities moneys rather than, say, with other LEAA funds more directly associated with its overall information systems improvement effort. Cities without pilot city teams have apparently had considerable success in persuading juvenile courts to adopt such systems. Thus, we question what further national lessons or benefits can be gained from continued use of pilot city funds to support such an effort. A comparative analysis of how the Norfolk team and other localities implemented such systems might have greater potential for providing useful information about how to get juvenile courts to implement such systems.

Santa Clara's efforts provide an example of a unique project because the team was able to follow the program's planned methodology--research, problem identification, project implementation.

The Santa Clara team determined that pretrial jail overcrowding was a major problem in the county and undertook to develop a population control model to answer three questions:

- Given any number or type of bookings, how long will it take to "fill" the jail (when will overcrowding occur)?
- Is the overcrowding the result of an increase in the number of admissions or the result of changes in the average length of stay?

--What particular "subset of prisoner types" is creating the problem and how much of the problem can be attributed to each type?

The answers to these questions would permit jailers to begin controlling the intake and discharge of prisoners to prevent jail overcrowding.

As a result of the research, the county implemented a demonstration project that provided a data collection and analysis capability for the jail population so that overcrowding could be monitored, predicted, and eventually controlled or prevented. The specific objectives of the project were to

--collect and analyze data,

--use the data to identify overcrowding alternatives and to simulate the process of implementing various alternatives, and

--transfer the system to other jurisdictions.

We did not evaluate the project to determine how effective it was or, for example, what would occur if the jail were full and the police continued to arrest offenders. However, the project was obviously developed as a result of the type of process the pilot city teams were supposed to adhere to and appears new and innovative.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Providing technical assistance was to be a primary way for the pilot city teams to effect positive changes. The impact of such efforts, however, is difficult to measure.

LEAA's pilot city guidelines noted that, because it was not visible and does not normally generate a "product," technical assistance is difficult to measure. Examples cited in LEAA's guidelines of activities technical assistance was to improve were:

- Criminal justice agency planning skills, including grant writing and coordination activities.
- Criminal justice agency management.
- Criminal justice research and evaluation.

All pilot city teams have rendered technical assistance to their localities and, if judged by this criterion alone, could have been considered partly successful. But, we believe the teams have sufficient experience for LEAA to analyze how they provided technical assistance and to derive information on the process and that such information could be transferred to other criminal justice planning units. Examples follow of the types of technical assistance provided by the teams.

According to the Santa Clara team director, technical assistance is advisory and always person to person and includes attending meetings, providing access to resources, helping people structure problems so they can be solved, and engaging the community in a dialog. Various Santa Clara County criminal justice officials indicated that the team was successful in doing these things.

For example, the county district attorney said that the team had been instrumental in bringing additional funds into the community and that because of the team's approach and capabilities he had supported projects that he previously might not have accepted. The chief adult probation officer told us that the team had suggested new ways for his staff to look at problems. The chief juvenile probation officer stated that before receiving help from the pilot city team his office could not prepare adequate grant applications. Because of the team's efforts, about \$1 million in grants had been processed for developing projects directly affecting his program. He also said the team had been instrumental in initiating departmental planning. The director of a local public safety department said the team had provided invaluable advice on operational problems.

From the outset the Albuquerque team assisted criminal justice agencies with LEAA grant applications because the agencies were not capable of submitting applications on their own. The team was instrumental in planning and organizing a local criminal justice conference in November 1971 to develop a strategy for improving the criminal justice planning and budgetary process for programs using LEAA and Model Cities Program funds. The meeting--the first of its kind in New Mexico--brought together city, county, State, and Federal officials, who decided that reducing property crime should be the highest priority in the metropolitan area.

The team also helped establish the regional criminal justice planning unit for the Albuquerque metropolitan area. Community criminal justice officials said the team had provided technical and research assistance which improved their planning and management capabilities. Thus, in spite of the other problems the team experienced, it helped improve the locality's systemwide criminal justice planning.

The Norfolk team undertook numerous technical assistance projects to assist not only the four participating cities, but also State and regional criminal justice planning units. The team helped Norfolk and Chesapeake develop applications which resulted in LEAA funding of two major projects--the High Incident Target Program and the Family Crises Intervention Unit. The Norfolk city manager commented as follows about the team's technical assistance in an April 1973 letter to LEAA:

"Our criminal justice planning has benefited from pilot city assistance in significant ways: identification of priority, the agencies projecting necessary projects over the next five years, more sophisticated development applications from state block grant funds, and development of sound juvenile projects amounting to \$190,769 in discretionary funds to date."

The processes that these and the other pilot city teams used to provide technical assistance are important for providing LEAA, and thus the Nation, with program benefits. Factors apparently affecting a team's ability to help improve a locality's criminal justice planning process are the competence of the team, the interest of local officials in change, the organization of the local government, and the general political stability of the area. These are factors that LEAA considered to be criteria for selecting the pilot cities. (See pp. 31 to 32.)

Several of the pilot city directors criticized us for not focusing more on the processes the teams used to effect positive changes in their communities. The primary purpose of our work was not to assess the process by which the localities benefited from the Pilot Cities Program, but to determine whether it was worth continuing as a national effort. The processes through which all eight teams established themselves in the communities, gained the criminal justice agencies' cooperation, and then began research and developed projects occurred early in the program. Each team's periodic reports on its activities documented this to some extent.

We believe the appropriate question is whether there is a need to continue the pilot cities effort to learn more about the change process. Has the experience of the teams to date been sufficient to learn useful lessons? Several pilot city directors apparently believed so. One believed the program had produced considerable information on useful methods and knowledge for developing and evaluating criminal justice improvements. Another said LEAA's current national evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program (see ch. 5) should provide useful information about these processes. We also believe the teams' experiences have been sufficient for LEAA's informational needs.

DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS

Without a well-developed plan for systematically publicizing pilot city results, other communities may not benefit from the program. LEAA's National Institute was responsible for developing an adequate dissemination strategy. However, it failed to do so.

Initially the National Institute's Center for Demonstrations and Professional Services was responsible for transferring research findings to criminal justice agencies at various levels of government and the community at large. However, the National Institute's newly created Technology Transfer Division assumed this responsibility when LEAA reorganized in 1971. Neither group disseminated any pilot cities information. According to its director, the Technology Transfer Division expects to begin disseminating information on the pilot cities in the middle of 1975, after the national Pilot Cities Program has been evaluated. The director hoped the evaluation would identify "something worth disseminating."

Neither organization specified the type of information the teams should submit to LEAA for further dissemination. The Technology Transfer Division did not, for example, require the teams to:

- Describe the research methodology used to identify problems.
- Disclose recurring and nonrecurring project costs, total costs, or changes in the cost of immediate and peripheral activities affected by the project.
- Relate how they effected changes.
- Show how the project was evaluated and give the evaluation results.
- Provide the names of project personnel to contact for assistance in starting a similar project elsewhere.
- Describe weaknesses in the project so others could benefit by the teams' experiences.

The Santa Clara director stated that "cookbooks filled with good projects" mailed to law enforcement officials will not work. Thus Santa Clara's dissemination philosophy has involved more than just demonstrating a project to show its validity. According to the director, effective dissemination can be achieved only by

"* * * training people to carry out the process. It requires sizing up where the client is, then working with him, showing him, supporting him, opening doors for him, helping him learn how to structure a problem; how to select an alternative."

The team has tried to follow this approach in dealing with other criminal justice communities in California and with other States.

The teams had to develop their own criteria for transmitting information to LEAA. As a result, there has been little consistency as to the type of information LEAA has received. All the teams, however, on their own initiative, have distributed their research reports to other teams, LEAA regional offices, State planning agencies, and other agencies who request the information.

For example, the Norfolk team developed a "Police Juvenile Handbook" as a guide for uniformed patrol officers to follow when dealing with juveniles. The handbook received a favorable response and led the team to pursue broader dissemination. LEAA, however, did not attempt to disseminate the handbook. Consequently, the Norfolk team printed about 2,000 copies and mailed them to numerous criminal justice agencies throughout the country. All pilot cities tried to at least disseminate information on their activities to other pilot cities. However, although the type of dissemination discussed above is worthwhile, the process leaves too much to chance.

The teams have done a reasonable job in disseminating their information, given the resources available to them. For the program to have had a significant national impact, however, LEAA should have been much more active in developing a dissemination strategy. Its failure to do so brings into question the seriousness of its commitment to obtaining national benefits from the program.

CHAPTER 5

LEAA'S CONTRACT FOR EVALUATING

THE PILOT CITIES PROGRAM

In November 1973 LEAA's National Institute awarded a contract for about \$309,000 to the American Institutes for Research to evaluate the Pilot Cities Program. The evaluation, estimated to take about 18 months, was initiated because LEAA's Office of Inspection and Review found that no evaluation had previously been developed.

The evaluation's objectives were to

- monitor program progress,
- measure program effects, and
- increase understanding of change processes.

The contractor was given two tasks. One was a qualitative evaluation of the direction taken by each team, the relationships between the teams and the communities' criminal justice agencies, and the improvements of such agencies' operations as a result of the teams' efforts. The other task was a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of pilot-related projects and the adequacy of existing data collection schemes and an assessment of possible additional data requirements and feasible collection approaches.

The objective of studying the teams' efforts in terms of understanding the change process is worthwhile. Our findings indicated that many of the teams experienced considerable instability and that this had affected their ability to establish good relationships with the community, complete adequate research, and develop meaningful demonstration projects. Although we question whether there is enough data available to allow comparisons of various teams' strategies for effecting change, we believe the cumulative experience of the teams is sufficient to develop useful information.

However, the need to fully carry out other aspects of the evaluation may be questionable.

The contractor is to assess the existing data collection scheme and suggest more data requirements and feasible collection approaches. But, as noted on pages 35 to 37, LEAA provided inadequate guidance on the type of data the teams were to collect and the way it was to be collected. There is no standard against which to compare teams' data collection activities. Moreover, it may not be reasonable to expect the teams to collect additional data on the contractor's recommendation because the evaluation will not be complete until the program is almost over.

Another purpose of the evaluation is to monitor program progress, assist LEAA's regional offices in monitoring the program, and give the pilot city teams feedback on their programs and those of other pilot cities. However, this objective may be difficult to realize because the evaluation and the program will end at about the same time.

The evaluation plan may also have difficulty addressing the program's impact on reducing crime. As stated in LEAA's January 1973 Pilot City Guidelines, one goal of the program is:

"To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team * * * to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice." (Underscoring supplied.)

The evaluation plan, however, states that

"There are serious impediments to answering this question. [The extent to which the pilot cities program helped reduce crime.] * * * Such data is simply not available for the pilot cities."

The evaluation will not, therefore, try to answer the question. Thus, in the final analysis, no specific basis will exist for measuring whether this goal has been achieved. Although not much can be done to solve this problem, the evaluation's inability to relate the program's effort to the crime rate will make it more difficult to convince other

communities that teams of experts can, through better research and planning, effect improvements in the criminal justice system.

In summary, we believe there are important reasons to continue the evaluation. But, in view of the planned termination of the program, it may be possible to cut back on certain parts of the evaluation, such as program monitoring and assessing existing and alternative data collection schemes. We discussed this possibility with LEAA officials who said they would consider it.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The Pilot Cities Program has not been as successful as it could have been, primarily because of problems LEAA experienced in developing and managing the program. This, however, does not negate the fact that, individually, the communities participating in the program benefited from it. They received LEAA funds for projects they probably could not have otherwise implemented. They received the benefit of research and technical assistance that would not have otherwise been obtained.

But, from a national standpoint, we do not believe the cumulative experience of the eight teams, either in terms of the innovativeness of the research undertaken or the demonstration projects implemented, has been very successful in accomplishing the program's goal of developing efforts with national applicability. For example, many of the projects were similar to those implemented by other localities and States with LEAA block grant funds. Perhaps it was unreasonable to expect the cities to be able to do otherwise, but this fact brings into question the need to continue a test effort in which each team receives \$20,000 a month in operating expenses and each locality \$500,000 a year in funds to implement projects.

Another possible benefit to the Nation is the knowledge gained from examining the processes the teams used to try to effect changes. Lessons applicable to other areas can be learned from evaluating such efforts. That is what LEAA's evaluation is supposed to do. We do not believe it is necessary to continue the program further to gain such knowledge. We believe the most feasible approach is for LEAA to insure that its evaluation examines those processes so lessons learned can be used to improve the States' planning for the allocation of LEAA block grant funds.

Some of the pilot city directors were very critical of our efforts. They charged that we took too narrow a view of the program's purpose and did not emphasize enough

the benefits that the local communities received. From their perspective these benefits are significant, but from a national perspective we question whether that should be the primary concern.

In commenting on our conclusion that the program should be phased out, one of the directors said:

"If discontinuation is the only prescription for programs about which it is 'discovered', for example, that consistent objectives weren't agreed upon before implementation, that different grantees interpreted the program differently, that participating organizations experienced instability, that operations reflected the personality and ideas of their directors, that there were no guidelines providing clear answers, and that regional offices vacillated in their approach, there will be few survivors."

Some of the problems enumerated above should not be grounds for discontinuing all types of programs, especially those of fairly long-term duration. But when such problems significantly affect the efforts of programs of limited duration designed to serve as examples of how to solve nationwide problems, we believe such a prescription is valid. Too frequently governments, at all levels, have been unwilling to admit that such efforts have failed, to stop them, and to try a different approach.

When resources are plentiful such an unwillingness to admit mistakes does not have a great impact. But when resources are scarce, when we do not know all the reasons why problems (such as the crime problem) exist, we believe the Federal Government must spend its moneys in the most effective ways possible to try to find the answers.

Because of our findings regarding the Pilot Cities Program, we met with LEAA headquarters officials on June 5, 1974, to discuss the problems we found--including the limited achievement of the program's goals and the desirability of terminating the program by June 30, 1975. LEAA generally agreed with our observations and suggestion that steps be taken to terminate the program by that date.

AGENCY ACTIONS

LEAA agreed to implement the substance of our suggestions by reviewing the actions of each pilot city team and determining how and when each effort should be phased out and the extent to which worthwhile projects might be continued with other funds. (See app. II.) LEAA said that, in some cases, it could not meet the exact timetable we suggested for phasing out the program.

On the basis of the detailed comments received from some pilot city teams, we believe LEAA has taken the correct approach in phasing out the program. There are apparently some worthwhile projects that should be continued. LEAA is phasing out their pilot city funding in a way that enables them to be adequately financed with other LEAA or with State funds--even though some of them might continue receiving pilot city funds past June 30, 1975.

Some teams also provided us additional extensive comments on our report. We have considered them as they applied to the specific sections of the report and have recognized them, where appropriate, throughout the report. We are not including them because of their length.

PROJECTS FUNDED WITH LEAA PILOT CITIES FUNDS
AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1973

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Santa Clara:		
Center for Urban Analysis	To create within the local government a center to provide criminal justice agencies with baseline data and information on crime problems.	\$160,880
Countywide "CAPER" System	To implement a countywide information system.	103,137
57 Santa Clara Pretrial Release Program	To provide timely data to pretrial release decisionmakers; to demonstrate that people released on well-founded decisions will less often fail to appear in court or commit a criminal act than people released on bail.	78,507
San Jose Police Program Planning Project	To provide the police department with a program planning group for 1 year.	91,218
Jail Population Management Project	To install a data collection and analysis system to prevent jail overcrowding.	37,293
Custody Classification Preprocessing Center	To sort out persons who do not require pretrial detention by providing for district attorney evaluation of the charge before booking.	297,913

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Methadone Treatment and Rehabilitation Program	To reduce heroin addiction by establishing clinics throughout the county.	\$204,863
Methadone Treatment and Rehabilitation Program	Continuation of the above project.	195,363
Alcoholism, Detoxification and Rehabilitation Planning Center	To divert from the criminal justice system persons arrested for drunkenness.	143,469
Dayton:		
Police Reorientation Survey	To determine how to decentralize the police department and reorient it to community needs.	45,000
Comprehensive Delinquent Youth Program	To implement a juvenile information system.	156,690
Design of a Concept of Information Retrieval for Crime and Law Enforcement	To design an information system.	210,000
Dayton/Montgomery County Criminal Justice Center	To establish an interdisciplinary training institute for the criminal justice agencies in the Dayton/Montgomery County area.	350,000

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Crime Analysis Team	To measure unreported crime levels, to develop mechanisms for community involvement, to support the rational selection of enforcement priorities, and to serve as means for crime pattern recognition.	\$ 83,310
Task Force on Target Hardening	To establish task forces to reduce crime by promoting security through public education, insurance coverage, and financial aid for purchasing security devices.	125,000
Youth Service Bureaus	To mobilize community resources in a coordinated attack on juvenile delinquency and to develop two Youth Service Bureaus.	216,018
Comprehensive Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Program	To provide a full range of addiction services and provide for central administration of these services.	375,000
Diagnostic and Treatment Center for Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center	To reduce recidivism by providing professional diagnostic and corrective services.	110,000
Personal Crisis Intervention	To intervene in a family crisis and provide followup treatment.	90,000

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Charlotte:		
Mecklenburg County Criminal Justice Information System	To design and implement a court-oriented defendant-in-process system.	\$500,000
Mecklenburg County Criminal Information and Retrieval Study	To define the information requirements of the courts and to determine the best method for information transmission among the courts and related agencies.	27,112
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Program	To reduce the factors that cause an individual to have a habit of abusing drugs and reduce the supply of illicit drugs. Not designed to solve the drug problem, but to test the effectiveness of proposed projects and the validity of the assumptions upon which these projects were based.	287,742
Mecklenburg Youth Services Bureaus	To establish a Youth Resources Agency consisting of a director and five counselors. To provide an alternative to enable the juvenile to be diverted from the court and to allow him to remain in his community.	82,954
Mecklenburg Youth Services Bureaus	Continuation of the above project.	68,906

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Community-Based Reception, Diagnostic, and Satellite Mental Health Center	To establish a presentence psychiatric and psychological examination unit at the community level.	\$106,761
Albuquerque:		
Criminal Justice Agency Management Analysis	To conduct a management analysis of criminal justice agencies in Albuquerque and Bernalillo County.	43,938
Survey of Regional Criminalistic Laboratory	To gather data that will be used to implement a crime lab project planned by the State of New Mexico.	27,596
Team Policing Study	To study various forms of team policing.	22,971
Criminal Division Administration and Records Improvement	To support a continuing data collection effort to evaluate the Albuquerque Property Crime Reduction Program.	31,713
Metropolitan Narcotics Enforcement Unit	To support a full-time five-man narcotics squad.	65,710
Property Crime Prosecution	To hire two additional assistant district attorneys to handle the increased workload generated by the Property Crime Reduction Program.	25,150

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Property Crime Reduction Program, Bernalillo Sheriff's Department	To add two new warrant officers to the police force, eliminating the requirement for patrol officers to serve warrants, and to create a Criminal Intelligence Unit in the Sheriff's Department.	\$ 70,639
Race and Cultural Relations Training	To provide police officers with training in race and cultural relations.	12,174
Job-Related Spanish Course	To develop a self-instructional Spanish course for Albuquerque's policemen.	46,100
Police Salary Incentive Plan for Education Achievement	To increase the education level of the members of the police department.	9,500
Psychological Consultation Program	To provide psychological training for police officers.	27,600
Property Crime Reduction Program, Albuquerque Police Department	To establish an operations-oriented crime analysis and planning unit.	183,527
Reduction of Youth-Related Property Crime	To establish a counseling team for juveniles aimed at early identification of and intervention in regard to youths with a high crime potential.	99,889

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Centro Legal	To establish a law office with law students for the benefit of low-income Mexican-Americans.	\$ 25,500
Norfolk:		
Juvenile Justice Services	To develop a basic automated juvenile data processing system. To create a Diagnostic and Evaluation Team for juveniles in Norfolk.	190,769
Juvenile Based Transaction Statistics Information System	To establish a juvenile information system in Chesapeake.	107,250
Juvenile Based Transaction Statistics Information System	To establish a juvenile information system in Portsmouth.	76,100
Juvenile Based Transaction Statistics Information System	To establish a juvenile information system in Virginia Beach.	73,074
Youth Services Unit, Chesapeake Police Department	To establish a Youth Services Unit in the Chesapeake Police Department.	165,416
Chesapeake Police Minority Recruitment and Manpower Development Project	To increase the number of nonwhite officers in the Chesapeake Police Department.	43,313

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Police Planning and Analysis Office	To establish a Planning and Analysis Unit within the Norfolk Police Department.	\$108,267
Portsmouth Police Planning and Analysis Unit	To establish a Planning and Analysis Unit within the Portsmouth Police Department.	53,373
Volunteer Program for the Portsmouth Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court	To augment the Portsmouth probation services with volunteers from the community.	18,727
Norfolk Juvenile Pre-Adjudication Non-Institutional Outreach Detention Project	To demonstrate the practicality of returning alleged juvenile offenders who would otherwise be detained in a secure facility before trial to their own or a substitute home under the supervision of an outreach detention worker. To eliminate overcrowding at the Norfolk detention home.	36,754
Virginia Beach Juvenile Status Offender Diversion and Treatment Program	To establish a family crisis counseling unit in Virginia Beach that would divert many status offenders from the juvenile court.	152,565
Portsmouth Juvenile Court Specialized Services--Behavior Modification Program	To decrease delinquent behavior of juveniles through behavior modification.	91,422

Objective

Amount

Omaha:

Community Based Resources for Criminalistics Examination	To establish local scientific laboratory services for the police department by using available community services and by adding a criminalist to the police department.	\$ 78,687
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Resource-Investigative Need of the Public Defender's Office	To develop an alternative to incarceration for offenders to reduce crime. To develop ways for active participation by organized labor in the recruitment, employment, and adjustment of offenders.	121,821
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Des Moines:

Comparative Legal Defense Services	To compare public defender services with court-assigned counsel services and with privately retained counsel.	94,914
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Model for Lay Administrator Utilization in Medium-Sized Prosecutors' Offices	To analyze and evaluate the functions of the county prosecutor's office. To introduce improved management and administrative techniques. To develop a planning and evaluation capability in the office.	57,080
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	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Follow-up Study of State Training Schools	To collect data to use in a followup evaluation of youths committed to Iowa's two State training schools.	\$ 38,820
Iowa Runaway Service	To reduce juvenile court referrals for runaways by offering an alternative for law enforcement agencies other than juvenile court and detention in jail.	67,225
Rochester:		
System for Management Information Research and Control	To establish an information system for the courts and related agencies.	314,094
Police and Citizens--Together Against Crime	To assess the benefits to law enforcement, social control, and police-community relations of incorporating civilians into "parapolice" roles.	282,417
Monroe County Family Court Probation Project	To reorganize the Family Court Probation Department from a nongeographical case assignment system to a geographical system. To establish trained probation teams.	113,068

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Rehabilitative Inter- vention Program for Sentenced Prisoners	To establish a service team which will identify and treat problems which impair the social functioning of an of- fender.	\$61,454
Probation Employment and Guidance Pro- gram	To help unemployed and under- employed adult probationers to obtain better employment.	57,633



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number

NOV 19 1974

Mr. Victor L. Lowe
Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Lowe:

This letter is in response to your request for comments on the GAO draft report titled "The Pilot Cities Program: Inadequate Federal Management Limits National Benefits" (B-171019).

[55]

As indicated on page 70 of the draft report, the [See GAO Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has note] agreed to implement the substance of the GAO recommendations regarding the phaseout of the Pilot Cities Program. In doing so, however, the exact timetable as set forth by GAO in the report may not be able to be met in all cities. We would also like to point out that we are not in total agreement with some aspects of the report findings, but our views are being withheld because of our decision to fully implement the recommendations.

The following actions have been taken to date with respect to the recommendations:

1. All Pilot City Directors and LEAA Regional Offices have been advised of LEAA's decision to phaseout the Pilot Cities Program.
2. LEAA officials have met with four cities to discuss specific phaseout actions. Meetings with other Pilot City officials will be scheduled in the near future.


GAO note: The number in brackets refers to the final report.

3. A memorandum outlining the results of the meetings with Pilot City officials and providing specific recommendations for phaseout implementation is being prepared as a basis for administrative review and subsequent action.

The recommendation that LEAA "reevaluate the scope of its national evaluation in light of GAO's findings" will be accomplished. However, since its inception, the national evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program has been structured to make a sound and objective examination of the program and to extract from it knowledge which is potentially most useful to LEAA in the design of future programs and strategies. Any significant curtailment of the contract at this time entails the very serious risk of wasting the resources that have already been put into the program.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,



Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

APPENDIX III

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES

DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
ATTORNEY GENERAL:		
William B. Saxbe	Jan. 1974	Present
Robert H. Bork (acting)	Oct. 1973	Jan. 1974
Elliot L. Richardson	May 1973	Oct. 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst	June 1972	May 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)	Mar. 1972	June 1972
John N. Mitchell	Jan. 1969	Feb. 1972
ADMINISTRATOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION:		
Richard W. Velde	Sept. 1974	Present
Donald E. Santarelli	Apr. 1973	Aug. 1974
Jerris Leonard	May 1971	Mar. 1973
Vacant	June 1970	May 1971
Charles H. Rogovin	Mar. 1969	June 1970

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