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United States Government Accountability Office  
Washington, DC 20548

July 11, 2011

Congressional Committees

Subject: *Interagency Collaboration: Implications of a Common Alignment of World Regions among Select Federal Agencies*

To carry out complex national security initiatives—such as combating illicit financing of terrorist activities, undertaking development projects in conflict zones, and countering piracy off the Horn of Africa—U.S. government agencies must coordinate with a large number of organizations in their planning efforts.<sup>1</sup> Our prior work on the federal government’s national security initiatives has determined that U.S. agencies face a number of challenges to effectively collaborating with one another, potentially resulting in gaps and overlaps in policy implementation.<sup>2</sup> In particular, we have found that agencies face challenges to developing overarching strategies to achieve common goals, creating effective mechanisms for operating across agencies, and sharing sensitive information.<sup>3</sup> For example, our work has shown that the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development

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<sup>1</sup>For example, the Project on National Security Reform has noted that the actors in U.S. national security policy include government departments that have not traditionally been involved, like the Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury, as well as agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human Services, and elements of state and local government and the private sector.

<sup>2</sup>GAO, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, [GAO-09-904SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).

<sup>3</sup>See related GAO products at the end of this report.

(USAID) have different planning time frames than the Department of Defense (DOD), which poses a challenge for the three organizations.<sup>4</sup>

This report summarizes and formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to Section 1055 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, which required us to examine the need for and implications of a common alignment of world regions in the internal organization of federal departments and agencies with international responsibilities, specifically the Department of Commerce (Commerce), DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (Justice), State, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), USAID, and the agencies comprising the intelligence community.<sup>5</sup> To address the mandate, we organized our review into the following three objectives: (1) describe how federal departments and agencies are geographically organized to address their international responsibilities, whether they share a common geographic alignment, and their rationales for their alignments; (2) examine agencies' views on the advantages and disadvantages of a common geographic alignment, and whether there are obstacles to implementing a common alignment; and (3) assess challenges, if any, to interagency collaboration, including those related to different geographic alignments, and measures agencies have taken to overcome those challenges.

## **Scope and Methodology**

For our first objective—to describe how federal departments and agencies are geographically organized to address their international responsibilities, whether they share a common geographic alignment, and the rationales for those alignments—we examined agency maps, organizational charts, strategic plans, and other relevant documents. We analyzed and compared the agencies' alignments, and confirmed

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<sup>4</sup>GAO, *Defense Management, Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa*, [GAO-10-794](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010).

<sup>5</sup>Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1055, directed GAO to address: (1) problems and inefficiencies that result from a lack of common alignment, including impediments to interagency collaboration; (2) obstacles to implementing a common alignment; (3) advantages and disadvantages of a common alignment; and (4) measures taken to address challenges associated with the lack of a common alignment.

those alignments by meeting with officials from Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice, State, Treasury, and USAID. We also received written documentation from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.<sup>6</sup> We compared and contrasted agency alignments globally, and we graphically depicted the geographic alignment of DOD, State, and USAID, whose primary missions are international in nature.

For our second and third objectives, we reviewed our body of work related to interagency collaboration and used those prior findings to develop a uniform set of interview questions regarding the potential advantages and disadvantages of a common geographic alignment; the obstacles, if any, to implementing a common alignment; the interagency collaboration challenges that agencies may face; and measures agencies have taken to overcome these challenges, as appropriate. Using these questions, we interviewed senior officials and gathered documentation from Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice, State, Treasury, and USAID. We also received responses to our questions from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Policy's regional offices and the State and USAID regional bureaus that are responsible for northern Africa and southwest Asia. We focused on this region of the world for our examination of the relationship between alignment and interagency collaboration because we assessed that the differences in DOD, State, and USAID alignments in this area are significant, and because of sustained congressional interest in our work in national security programs in this region. The regional offices we contacted included the following:

- DOD's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

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<sup>6</sup>In providing us with written responses to our questions, ODNI indicated that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are the federal government's key all-source intelligence agencies.

- State's Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs.
- USAID's Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Sub-Saharan Africa, Assistant Administrator for Asia, Special Assistant to the Administrator for the Middle East, and Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs.

We also received written responses to our questions from ODNI, on behalf of key intelligence agencies, and from U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command. We compiled and systematically analyzed the agency responses to determine common themes and develop summary observations through a content analysis. Two analysts independently reviewed each agency's response; coded the information to categorize the responses, such as whether an agency indicated that there were obstacles to implementing a common alignment; and entered the coded data into a spreadsheet. The two analysts compared their results, and all initial differences regarding the categorizations of agencies' responses were discussed and reconciled. To obtain additional perspectives on these issues, we reviewed studies by the Project on National Security Reform and met with project officials.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to July 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.

## **Summary**

Global geographic alignments differ among agencies, which have a variety of rationales for how they are organized and aligned in different regions of the world. To address their international responsibilities, DOD, State, USAID, and certain intelligence agencies are organized by geographic region. These agencies also have

functional components or issue-based offices that serve across all geographic regions. The other four agencies we reviewed—Commerce, DHS, Justice, and Treasury—have missions that are predominantly domestic in nature, and are organized primarily by functions or issues; however, these agencies also have some offices and components that are organized geographically. Moreover, we determined that, in northern Africa and southwest Asia, DOD, State, and USAID have alignments that are notably different from one another. Officials we interviewed from all of the agencies stated that the rationale behind their current alignment is related to achieving agency-specific mission objectives. Several agencies also cited other rationales, such as cultural, historical, or economic connections among countries, or the need to balance workloads within the agencies. All of the agencies indicated that they need the flexibility to reorganize their geographic alignments to better meet mission requirements. For additional information on the results on our first objective, see enclosure I, pages 13 through 17.

Four agencies identified advantages to a common geographic alignment. Three of these agencies pointed to DOD’s creation of U.S. Africa Command as an advantage of a common alignment because it improved the coordination among a DOD combatant command, State, and USAID.<sup>7</sup> However, these three agencies—in addition to Commerce, DHS, and Treasury—also identified disadvantages to having a common geographic alignment. For example, State officials indicated that realigning State’s regional bureaus to look like DOD’s combatant commands could lead international partners to view this step as emphasizing a military approach towards U.S. diplomacy. Commerce, DHS, and Justice identified specific obstacles to changing their alignments, such as the potential need to increase personnel or retrain staff, because the agencies are tailored in size and expertise to their current regional

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<sup>7</sup>State and USAID previously raised concerns with us that U.S. Africa Command’s establishment could lead to the perception that U.S. foreign policy was being “militarized” because the newly established command blurred traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense functions. See GAO, *Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, [GAO-09-181](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009).

responsibilities. For additional information on the results on our second objective, see enclosure I, pages 18 through 20.

In examining interagency collaboration challenges in northern Africa and southwest Asia, we found that the different geographic alignment among DOD, State, and USAID does not appear to be a significant factor. However, we also found that agencies continue to face collaboration challenges, consistent with those that we have identified in our prior work, and that agencies are taking some steps to address such challenges. Our prior work identified challenges to interagency collaboration, such as the lack of a comprehensive strategy and milestones for counterterrorism activities in northern Africa,<sup>8</sup> the lack of clear agency roles and responsibilities for undertaking counterpiracy operations,<sup>9</sup> and problems in creating a database of development projects in Afghanistan that is accessible to all relevant agencies.<sup>10</sup> During this review, agencies identified similar challenges, including differences among agency cultures and planning processes, and difficulties in developing consensus around competing priorities. We also found that State, DOD, USAID, and others are taking some steps to address interagency collaboration challenges by elevating the importance of interagency collaboration in their strategic plans and through other measures. For example, U.S. Central Command embeds civilian personnel into its command structure and stated that a “whole of government” approach is integral to the command’s operational design. For additional information on the results on our third objective, see enclosure I, pages 21 through 26.

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<sup>8</sup>GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*, [GAO-08-860](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008).

<sup>9</sup>GAO, *Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, [GAO-10-856](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2010).

<sup>10</sup>GAO, *Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination*, [GAO-11-138](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2010), and *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan*, [GAO-09-615](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009).

We are not making new recommendations based on this review, because many of the examples of interagency collaboration challenges that we identified are similar to those that we have identified in prior work.<sup>11</sup> Agencies generally agreed with the recommendations from our prior work, and have taken steps to implement some of them. For example, the administration implemented a recommendation we made in April 2008 to published a comprehensive plan involving all elements of national power—including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—for meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.<sup>12</sup>

### **Agency Comments**

Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice, ODNI, State, Treasury, and USAID provided us with technical comments on a fact sheet drawn from our draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Commerce, DHS, DOD, ODNI, State, and USAID each told us that the fact sheet accurately presented the agencies’ perspectives. Subsequently, DOD provided us with additional technical comments after reviewing a draft of this report. We incorporated those comments, as appropriate.

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We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security; the U.S. Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; and the Director of National Intelligence. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>.

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
<sup>11</sup>For example, in our prior work on U.S. Africa Command’s efforts to develop strategies and engage interagency partners, we recommended that the command expedite the completion of its regional engagement and country plans and its component support plans. See [GAO-10-794](#).

<sup>12</sup>GAO, *Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, [GAO-08-622](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008).

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact either John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or [pendletonj@gao.gov](mailto:pendletonj@gao.gov) or Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or [williamsbridgersj@gao.gov](mailto:williamsbridgersj@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure II.



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Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures - 2



*List of Committees*

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Chairman  
The Honorable John McCain  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate

The Honorable John F. Kerry  
Chairman  
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye  
Chairman  
The Honorable Thad Cochran  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick Leahy  
Chairman  
The Honorable Lindsey Graham  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations,  
and Related Programs  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon  
Chairman  
The Honorable Adam Smith  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
House of Representatives

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen  
Chairman  
The Honorable Howard L. Berman  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young  
Chairman  
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger  
Chairman  
The Honorable Nita Lowey  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,  
and Related Programs  
Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives

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# **Interagency Collaboration: Implications of a Common Alignment of World Regions among Select Federal Agencies**

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**Briefing for Congressional Committees  
July 2011**

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## Congressional Mandate and GAO Objectives

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Section 1055 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, which was enacted on January 7, 2011, required GAO to assess the need for and implications of a common alignment of world regions in the internal organization of federal departments and agencies with international responsibilities and report within 180 days of enactment, or by July 6, 2011.

To address the mandate, we organized our review into the following three objectives:

- Objective 1: Describe how federal departments and agencies are geographically organized to address their international responsibilities, whether they share a common geographic alignment, and their rationales for their alignments.
- Objective 2: Examine agencies' views on the advantages and disadvantages of a common geographic alignment, and whether there are obstacles to implementing a common alignment.
- Objective 3: Assess challenges, if any, to interagency collaboration, including those related to different geographic alignments, and measures agencies have taken to overcome those challenges.

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## Objective 1: How Federal Agencies are Organized and Whether they Share a Common Geographic Alignment

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- DOD, State, USAID, and certain intelligence agencies are organized by geographic region to address their international responsibilities. These agencies also include functional components or issue-based offices that serve across all geographic regions, for example, State's Bureau of Arms Control Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.
- Commerce, DHS, Justice, and Treasury, whose missions are predominantly domestic in nature, are organized by functions or issues. For example, Justice's missions are carried out by components such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration. However, these agencies may have geographically organized offices and components for their international operational responsibilities; for example, Justice's Office of International Affairs in its Criminal Division serves as a nerve center for the agency's international efforts.
- Global geographic alignments differ among agencies; DOD, State, and USAID have different alignments in northern Africa and southwest Asia.

# Objective 1: Regional Alignments of Federal Agencies


Figure 1: Geographic Alignment of Select Federal Agencies



Source: GAO analysis of agency information.

# Objective 1: Different DOD, State, and USAID Alignments in Northern Africa and Southwest Asia

Figure 2: Differences in Alignment among DOD, State, and USAID



Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State Department, and USAID information.

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## Objective 1: Agency Views on Rationales for Specific Geographic Alignments

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Agencies indicated a variety of reasons for their alignments, including:

- To achieve agency-specific mission objectives (all agencies).
- To reflect commonalities among countries with cultural, historical, or economic connections (DHS, DOD, Justice, ODNI, State, Treasury, USAID).
- To address management issues, such as the need to balance workloads within the agency (Commerce, DOD, Justice, State, USAID).

All of the agencies indicated that they need the flexibility to reorganize their geographic alignments in order to better meet mission requirements.

- DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has modified its organization three times since 2005 to adjust to new priorities.
- Treasury placed its Afghanistan Office under the same leadership as its Office of Technical Assistance because of the unique needs with respect to developing Afghanistan's financial sector, which has little or no infrastructure or existing financial systems.



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## Objective 1: Examples of Rationales for Specific Geographic Alignments

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- DOD placed Pakistan and India in separate geographic combatant commands in order to foster U.S. military relationships with each country, given their history of tension and conflict. In contrast, State placed Pakistan and India in the same regional bureau because of political-military issues between the two nations, as well as other crosscutting issues that affect the region as a whole.
- DOD brought all African countries other than Egypt into U.S. Africa Command in order to bring focus to African issues, whereas State and USAID draw distinctions between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa because of historic, cultural, and economic differences between the regions.
- State and DOD each distributed the countries of the former Soviet Union into separate regions for a variety of reasons, including to balance the workloads across different DOD or State offices and because of historic, cultural, linguistic, and trade ties among the newly independent countries and their neighbors.

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## Objective 2: Agency Views on Common Geographic Alignment – Advantages

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Three agencies (DOD, State, and USAID) pointed to DOD's creation of U.S. Africa Command as an advantage because it created a more common geographic alignment between a DOD combatant command and civilian agencies.

- State and USAID indicated that the U.S. Africa Command's establishment was beneficial because they can now coordinate with one combatant command on African issues, compared to coordinating with three in the prior situation, and DOD stated that the consolidation helped elevate African issues.
- However, during our prior work State and USAID had raised concerns that U.S. Africa Command's establishment could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense functions.

Four agencies (Commerce, DHS, Justice, and ODNI) did not identify any advantages of a common alignment, while Treasury stated that a common alignment could be advantageous if the realignment also accounted for the agency's changing priorities and missions.

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## Objective 2: Agency Views on Common Geographic Alignment – Disadvantages

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Six agencies (Commerce, DHS, DOD, State, Treasury, and USAID) identified disadvantages to having a common geographic alignment.

- DOD, State, and USAID indicated that regional relationships could suffer if agencies were required to implement a common geographic alignment. For example, State indicated that realigning its regional bureaus to look like DOD's combatant commands could lead international partners to view this step as emphasizing a military approach toward U.S. diplomacy.
- DOD, State, and Treasury indicated that a requirement to implement a common geographic alignment could impair their flexibility to realign based on mission objectives. For example, State and Treasury indicated that a common alignment would limit their capabilities to group countries based on the agency's changing policy and program priorities, such as financial markets and refugee populations.

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## Objective 2: Agency Views on Implementing a Common Geographic Alignment – Obstacles

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Three agencies (Commerce, DHS, and Justice) identified resource limitations and organizational biases as being obstacles to implementing a common geographic alignment.

- Commerce indicated that the International Trade Administration and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would have to increase or retrain staff because they were tailored in size and expertise to their current regional responsibilities.
- Stating that its components were individually aligned to perform border protection, customs enforcement, and other responsibilities, DHS indicated that it would be unlikely to concur with a proposal that DHS or its components reflect another agency's alignment because other agencies' responsibilities are different.

Five agencies (DOD, ODNI, State, Treasury, and USAID) did not identify specific obstacles to changing their alignments.

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## Objective 3: Challenges to Interagency Collaboration and Measures Taken to Overcome Them

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- Our past work has identified challenges to interagency collaboration other than differences in geographic alignment; these factors included different strategic planning timelines and processes, difficulties in creating interagency mechanisms for collaboration, and problems in information sharing.
- We focused this review on northern Africa and southwest Asia because we assessed that the differences in DOD, State, and USAID alignments in this area were significant, and because of sustained congressional interest in our work on programs in this region. Our review determined that
  - the agencies continue to face interagency collaboration challenges that are similar to those that we've identified in this region in the past, and
  - different geographic alignments do not appear to be a significant factor.
- Agencies have taken some measures to address interagency collaboration challenges, but these measures have not emphasized geographic realignment.


# Objective 3: GAO’s Prior Work Has Identified Challenges and Enablers to Interagency Collaboration

Table 1: Key Characteristics, Challenges, and Enablers to Interagency Collaboration		
Characteristics	Challenges	Enablers
Developing and implementing overarching strategies to achieve collaborative goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Agency-specific strategies developed without coordination with other agencies or with overarching strategies</li> <li>➤ Unclear agency roles and responsibilities for implementation</li> <li>➤ Insufficient guidance to set agency priorities</li> <li>➤ Lack of goals, milestones, and performance metrics</li> <li>➤ Unclear or ineffective mechanisms to assess performance</li> </ul>	Strategic planning and coordination; identifying roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; identifying agency priorities; setting milestones; and establishing and tracking performance measures
Creating effective interagency mechanisms that facilitate integrated national security approaches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Unclear lines of authority and accountability for each agency involved</li> <li>➤ Not all stakeholders are involved</li> <li>➤ Participant planning processes are misaligned or incompatible</li> <li>➤ Lack of policies, procedures, resources, trained personnel, and other means to effectively operate across different agencies</li> </ul>	Key organizational factors that enable common or compatible organizational structures, planning processes, funding sources, and coordination mechanisms
Sharing and integrating information across agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Lack of standards for data collection, usage, storage, protection, or a combination of these</li> <li>➤ Cultural or political barriers that inhibit information sharing</li> <li>➤ Lack of interagency agreements on procedures for sharing information</li> <li>➤ Security clearance requirements are not harmonized</li> </ul>	Communications mechanisms to appropriately share and integrate information in a timely manner among federal, state, local, and private-sector partners, to plan for, assess, and respond to current and future threats to U.S. national security

Source: Based on GAO, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, [GAO-09-904SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).

# Objective 3: Examples of Interagency Collaboration Challenges from GAO's Prior Work

Figure 3: Interagency Collaboration Challenges in Northern Africa and Southwest Asia Identified in Prior GAO Work



Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State Department, and USAID information, and previous GAO reports.

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## Objective 3: Recommendations from Our Prior Work on Interagency Collaboration

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GAO has made multiple recommendations in its prior work that would address interagency collaboration challenges, and agencies have generally agreed with them. For example:

- Treasury partially agreed with our recommendation that it work with other agencies involved in anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing issues to develop and implement (1) compatible policies and procedures for working together, and (2) a mechanism for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on interagency collaboration ([GAO-09-794](#)).
- State and USAID agreed, and DOD partially agreed, with our recommendations to enhance the implementation of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest Africa ([GAO-08-860](#)).
- DOD and USAID agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. government develop a comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas ([GAO-08-622](#)); the administration has implemented this recommendation.



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## Objective 3: Continuing Interagency Collaboration Challenges Surfaced in the Current Review

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- Challenges to strategic planning. State indicated that differences among agency cultures, communications processes, and planning structures inhibit strategic planning.
- Differences in planning processes. DOD and State indicated that differences between the agencies' planning processes and lines of authority create challenges to synchronizing and collaborating on regional and country-level plans.
- Challenges to working across different agencies. Commerce, DHS, and Justice identified difficulties in developing consensus around their priorities with other agencies.


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## Objective 3: Measures Taken to Address Challenges to Interagency Collaboration

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
- Emphasizing collaboration in strategic plans.
  - DOD's 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* indicated that planning and executing "whole-of-government" operations requires significantly improved interagency collaboration.
  - State and USAID's 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* identified the need to turn to other government agencies for experience and expertise in performing international functions. DHS and Justice officials told us that they viewed this recognition as positive.
- Establishing coordinating mechanisms. U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command embed personnel from civilian agencies into their command structures. U.S. Central Command stated that a "whole-of-government" structure involving civilian personnel from other agencies is integral to the command's operational design.
- Identifying agency priorities. DHS is preparing the department's first-ever International Strategic Framework in order to articulate its priorities and improve its ability to collaborate with State, USAID, and DOD.

# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and DOD Combatant Commands)




Source: GAO analysis of agency information.

# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and OUSD Policy)



Source: GAO analysis of agency information.


# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and USAID)



Source: GAO analysis of agency information.




# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (USAID and DOD Combatant Commands)




Source: GAO analysis of agency information.

# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (USAID and OUSD Policy)



Source: GAO analysis of agency information.

# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (OUSD Policy and DOD Combatant Commands)



Source: GAO analysis of agency information.



# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (Other Agencies)

Agency	Geographic alignment
<b>Commerce<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Office of Market Access and Compliance</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Europe</li> <li>• Western hemisphere</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asia</li> <li>• Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia</li> </ul>
	<b>Commercial Service</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Europe</li> <li>• Western Europe</li> <li>• Western hemisphere</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• East Asia and Pacific</li> <li>• Africa, Near East, and South Asia</li> </ul>
	<b>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration<sup>b</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• China</li> <li>• Latin America and the Caribbean</li> <li>• Arctic</li> <li>• Antarctica</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South America</li> <li>• Europe</li> <li>• Middle East and South Asia</li> <li>• Africa</li> <li>• East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands</li> </ul>
<b>DHS</b>	<b>Office of International Affairs</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• Mexico</li> <li>• Latin America and the Caribbean</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middle East, Africa, and South Asia</li> <li>• Europe and Multilateral Affairs</li> <li>• Asia-Pacific</li> </ul>
<b>Justice</b>	<b>Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• United Kingdom (and overseas territories), Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, English-speaking Caribbean, Haiti, Belize, Guyana, and Gibraltar</li> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• Asia, Middle East, and Africa</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South America (except Guyana)</li> <li>• Central, Eastern, and Western Europe, former Soviet republics, and Dutch and French-speaking Caribbean (except Haiti)</li> <li>• Mexico, Central America, and Spanish-speaking Caribbean</li> </ul>
<b>Treasury</b>	<b>Office of International Affairs</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middle East and North Africa</li> <li>• Sub-Saharan Africa</li> <li>• Western hemisphere</li> <li>• Europe and Eurasia</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• East Asia</li> <li>• South and Southeast Asia</li> <li>• Afghanistan</li> </ul>
	<b>Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime<sup>c</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asia/Europe</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middle East/Africa/Western Hemisphere</li> </ul>

Source: GAO presentation of Commerce, DHS, Justice, and Treasury information.

<sup>a</sup>Commerce lacks a headquarters-level geographic alignment. The Offices of Market Access and Compliance and Commercial Service are part of the Department's International Trade Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has its own geographic alignment. Components of DHS (e.g., the Transportation Security Agency) and Justice (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation) have their own geographic alignments.

<sup>b</sup>The following represents the alignment of the Office of International Affairs at NOAA headquarters, and does not necessarily represent the geographic alignment of NOAA's line offices.

<sup>c</sup>This office is part of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.


# Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (Select Intelligence Agencies)

Agency	Geographic alignment
Office of the Director of National Intelligence <sup>a</sup>	<b>National Intelligence Managers</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa</li> <li>• East Asia</li> <li>• Europe</li> <li>• Iran</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South Asia</li> <li>• Near East</li> <li>• Russia-Eurasia</li> <li>• Western hemisphere</li> </ul>
	<b>National Intelligence Council</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa</li> <li>• East Asia</li> <li>• Europe</li> <li>• Iran</li> <li>• South Asia</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Near East</li> <li>• North Korea</li> <li>• Russia-Eurasia</li> <li>• Western hemisphere</li> </ul>
Defense Intelligence Agency	<b>Directorate of Analysis</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asia-Pacific</li> <li>• Latin America, Europe-Eurasia, and Africa</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middle East and North Africa</li> </ul>
	<b>Defense Intelligence Officers</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa</li> <li>• East Asia</li> <li>• Eurasia</li> <li>• Europe-NATO</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Latin America</li> <li>• Middle East-North Africa</li> <li>• South Asia</li> </ul>
Central Intelligence Agency	<b>Directorate of Intelligence</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asian-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa</li> <li>• Iraq</li> <li>• Middle East and North Africa</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia and Europe</li> <li>• South Asia</li> </ul>
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research	<b>Analysis and Production</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa</li> <li>• East Asia and Pacific</li> <li>• Europe</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Near East and South Asia</li> <li>• Russia and Eurasia</li> <li>• Western Hemisphere</li> </ul>

Source: GAO presentation of Office of the Director of National Intelligence information.

<sup>a</sup> The following does not reflect information pertaining to functional managers.

# Appendix 2: Noninteractive Graphic and Text for Figure 3



Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State Department, and USAID information, and previous GAO reports.

## Related GAO Products

- Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Strategies and Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven.* [GAO-11-713T](#). Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011.
- Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa.* [GAO-11-449T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2011.
- Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees.* [GAO-11-124](#). Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2010.
- Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination.* [GAO-11-138](#). Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010.
- National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration.* [GAO-11-108](#). Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010.
- Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa.* [GAO-10-856](#). Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
- Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users.* [GAO-10-799](#). Washington, D.C.: September 1, 2010.
- Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation.* [GAO-10-801](#). Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
- Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa.* [GAO-10-794](#). Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
- Iran Sanctions: Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions.* [GAO-10-375](#). Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2010.
- Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan.* [GAO-09-615](#). Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
- Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan.* [GAO-09-120](#). Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.
- Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.* [GAO-08-860](#). Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
- Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.* [GAO-08-622](#). Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008.

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Enclosure II

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