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Efforts To Prevent
Heroin From Illicitly
Reaching The United States B-164031 (2)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Department of Justice
Department of State

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES*

093451

~~113404~~

OCT. 20. 1972



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON DC 20548

B-164031(2)

Dear Mr Rangel:

This is our report on efforts to prevent heroin from illicitly reaching the United States by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice, and by the Department of State. This review was made in accordance with your request of December 7, 1971. You also requested a report on the Bureau of Customs efforts at Kennedy International Airport and at the Port of New York. We will issue you that report at a later date.

Copies of this report are being sent today to the Attorney General and to the Secretary of State.

We believe that the contents of this report would be of interest to committees and other members of Congress. Therefore, as you have agreed, we are distributing this report to such committees and members of Congress.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James B. Peets".

Comptroller General
of the United States

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel
House of Representatives

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ABBREVIATIONS

BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
GAO	General Accounting Office

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the request of Congressman Charles Rangel, the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed the activities of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in Europe and in Turkey. We also inquired into the progress of selected European and Near East countries in controlling illicit narcotics traffic, especially the flow of heroin to the United States.

The data in this report, unless indicated otherwise, was either told to us by BNDD officials or was obtained from BNDD records.

BNDD, an agency of the Department of Justice, takes an aggressive role in assisting foreign law enforcement agencies to stop the flow of illicit narcotics traffic. Following accepted protocol, BNDD does not maintain formal contact with the various ministries of the foreign governments. Matters requiring action by a foreign ministry are brought to the attention of the responsible U.S. Ambassador.

BNDD's responsibilities in the foreign countries where it maintains offices include:

- Assisting foreign narcotics units in the elimination of raw materials, processors and processing facilities, and distribution systems.
- Collecting and analyzing intelligence.
- Assisting in political and diplomatic matters.
- Assisting in training.
- Assisting in material and operations.

At the end of fiscal year 1972, BNDD had allocated 45 special agent positions and had filled 36:

- 23 in region 17, headquartered in Paris, France, with 11 district offices throughout Europe.

--13 in region 19, headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, with seven district offices throughout the Near East.

During fiscal year 1972 combined operating expenses for regions 17 and 19 amounted to \$1,085,000. According to BNDD, this represents about one-fourth of 1 percent of the dollar value of drugs seized in these regions during the same year. The operating expenses include purchase of narcotics for evidence, payments to informants for information on drug trafficking, and other miscellaneous items.

CHAPTER 2

THE HEROIN PROBLEM

Most of the world's opium poppy is grown in a zone extending from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province in China. Of primary importance to the United States is the Near East area where raw opium (opium gum) produced in Turkey for legitimate medical requirements is diverted through illegal channels to the United States. Opium gum is converted into morphine base and smuggled to France where it is refined into heroin in clandestine laboratories. BNDD officials estimate that about 4,000 kilograms of heroin are produced annually in the Marseilles area of France--mostly for shipment to the United States.

A complex distribution system prevents immediate solution of the heroin problem. The system consists of a series of separate and independent transactions handled by various groups brought together by the tremendous profits involved. (The retail price for 1 kilogram of heroin in New York is about \$400,000, but the poppy grower only receives about \$200 a kilogram.)

MORPHINE-BASE TRAFFICKING SYSTEM

The illicit morphine-base trafficking in Turkey consists of a number of separate but interrelated activities.


1. Interior trafficker--This person operates in Turkey and initiates the smuggling process by buying opium gum from farmers. Some traffickers pay farmers in advance for a given quantity of opium gum, others simply send representatives to buy the amount needed to meet their requirements.
2. Conversion into morphine base--The conversion of opium gum into morphine base is a fairly simple cooking process. The basic equipment in a conversion workshop usually consists of such utensils as large tubs, enameled pans, buckets, jugs, drying trays, and an oven or stove. The equipment is generally set up in a large room in an isolated

private residence. Major traffickers have their own conversion facilities.

3. Exterior trafficker--The exterior trafficker is normally the liaison in Turkey between the internal trafficker and foreign customers. There are a number of individuals in a major exterior-trafficking group. Each group usually has one leader who oversees the entire operation, including negotiations with connections in France, purchase of narcotics, and smuggling. On equal footing with the leaders, but divorced from the actual operations, are the silent partners. These individuals are generally high-ranking figures in the Turkish underworld who own legitimate businesses.
4. Commission man--The commission man is a middleman who receives a fee from both the interior trafficker and the exterior trafficker if he is successful in locating opium gum or morphine base for the latter.





General Trafficking Routes in Europe




OPIUM POPPY GROWTH

*TOP—Poppy pod and opium seeds
CENTER—Turkish peasants harvesting crude opium
BOTTOM—Opium being scraped from the poppy pod*



CLANDESTINE LABORATORY REFINING



*LEFT—CALMET HEROIN LABORATORY
This laboratory had a production of
25 30 kilograms of heroin a week
BNDD Agents in cooperation with French
police seized the clandestine operation
in March 1969*

*RIGHT—MINET HEROIN LABORATORY
produced 15 kilograms of heroin a week
This laboratory was seized by French Police
and BNDD Agents*

BOTTOM—CALMET, interior view

MORPHINE-BASE SMUGGLING METHODS

Available evidence indicates that overland smuggling has become the most common means of transporting morphine base to France. The methods a smuggler may use to transport narcotics are limited only by the scope of his imagination. A common practice is to use specially constructed compartments or "traps" built into passenger cars, commercial trucks, and touring buses.

A large part of all narcotics shipped overland is believed to pass through Germany. Trafficking operations in Germany are often similar to those in Turkey. The German groups usually employ a commission man who finds a connection and then the groups hire a courier to transport the morphine base to France.

Smuggling by sea also accounts for a large quantity of narcotics entering France. There are two principal methods: the first is to unload the narcotics before entering a port by either transferring the shipment to a smaller craft or by throwing the shipment overboard at a prearranged location; the second method involves delivery at the port.

The overland and sea smuggling methods are sometimes combined--the narcotics are hidden in a car which is shipped from Turkey to a Western European or Mediterranean port and then driven to France.

HEROIN LABORATORIES

Most of the illegal heroin-producing laboratories are located on the southern coast of France, between Nice and Marseilles, and possibly in Corsica. BNDD estimated that at least five and possibly 10 groups operate laboratories at any one time and employ up to 100 individuals. Each group appears to have its own purchasing, trafficking, and courier operations

The laboratories are not large and a number are undoubtedly mobile. A laboratory requires the services of a chemist and is usually owned by the chemist. No central organization commands the entire operation, although cooperation among groups is not unusual.

HEROIN SMUGGLING

Heroin-smuggling methods are numerous and the value of heroin relative to its weight eliminates transportation cost as a factor in deciding which method to use. The Strategic Intelligence Office of BNDD made a study to identify the transportation and marketing patterns for heroin entering the United States. The study analyzed significant drug seizures from 1967 through 1971. The following tables show the results of the study.

Number of Heroin-smuggling Routes

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
France-U S	5	4	4	1	3
Other European-U.S	2	5	6	-	1
Europe-Canada-U S	3	2	1	3	3
Europe-U S via Latin America or Caribbean	2	2	2	6	8
Far East-U.S	-	1	1	-	3
Middle East-U S.	-	-	2	-	-

Number of Heroin-smuggling Methods

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Body pack	7	7	6	-	-
Suitcase (note a)	3	1	2	4	7
Concealed aboard ship	1	-	1	-	-
Mail	-	-	-	-	1
Concealed in vehicle	-	2	2	2	7
Concealed aboard airplane (note b)	-	3	-	-	-
Clandestine flight (note c)	-	-	-	2	1
Other concealment devices (note d)	1	-	3	-	2
Unknown	-	1	2	2	-

^aSuitcases with false bottoms or sides, but in one instance carried loose in a suitcase and in another shipped as unaccompanied baggage

^bScheduled commercial passenger flight

^cPrivate flight or unscheduled commercial flight made ostensibly for another reason, but the true purpose was to introduce heroin into the United States

^dOscilloscopes, food cans, ski poles, two straw-covered bottles inside flight bag, frozen food boxes, picture frames

INTERNATIONAL SMUGGLING

*On March 1, 1972 this shrimp boat
was stopped between Marseille,
Toulon and Nice by French Port
and Customs Authorities—search
disclosed twenty laundry bags,
three sea bags, one plastic shopping
bag containing 439 kilograms of
pure heroin*

*Data indicates ship was destined
directly for south Florida, U S A*





ABOVE—TRAWLER SEIZURE
*Sacks containing heroin being brought
to the deck*



BELOW—TRAWLER SEIZURE
*Agents examine individually wrapped
plastic bags of heroin*

In summary, once the opium poppy is cut and the opium gum is diverted to the illicit market and processed into heroin, it is a formidable task to prevent the heroin from entering the United States.

CHAPTER 3

PROGRESS TOWARD PREVENTING

FLOW OF NARCOTICS

BNDD's mission in Europe and the Near East is to assist host governments in preventing the flow of narcotics from Europe to the United States by helping them identify and apprehend those persons and organizations engaged in the acquisition of illicit opium, its conversion to heroin, and its transportation to the United States. BNDD's principal functions are to (1) provide foreign law enforcement agencies with strategic intelligence on the movement of illicit traffic to enable them to make drug seizures and arrests, (2) encourage local officials to use techniques and technology which have been proven effective in suppressing illicit drug traffic, and (3) provide a communication link between the various foreign narcotics units, thereby insuring rapid dissemination of all information on traffickers

In carrying out these functions, BNDD has used informants and undercover agents whenever feasible and has emphasized improving the collaboration, coordination, and exchanges of intelligence within and among foreign law enforcement agencies. It also has frequently used diplomatic channels to persuade foreign countries to be more concerned about the international heroin problem and to persuade its foreign counterparts to use effective methods in suppressing the flow of narcotics.

BNDD'S ACHIEVEMENTS

BNDD officials believe that the efforts described above are paying off in increased seizures, arrests, and intelligence information. They believe also that BNDD has been effective if the amount of narcotics seized in Europe by BNDD and its foreign counterparts during the year increases 20 percent over the preceding year. In 1970, 461 kilograms of heroin and morphine base were seized in Europe. In 1971, 1,341 kilograms of heroin and morphine base were seized in Europe, representing 28 seizures. In the first 7 months of 1972, 1,312 kilograms were seized, representing 14 seizures.

From January to June 1972, the Turkish narcotics units, with help from BNDD, seized 288 kilograms of narcotics representing four seizures of opium gum and two seizures of morphine base.

Although the credit due foreign law enforcement agencies participating in the investigations is not to be diminished, BNDD has been primarily responsible for drug seizures because it has initiated and coordinated most of the narcotics investigations. For example, approximately 65 percent of the seizures in Europe resulted from intelligence either supplied by informants recruited by BNDD or obtained through the undercover work of its agents.

The effectiveness of BNDD's enforcement effort in Europe can be measured by the number of trafficking arrests in which BNDD has participated since 1970. In 1970, 74 international traffickers in narcotics were arrested as a result of morphine base and heroin seizures. This number nearly doubled during 1971, with the arrest of 145 traffickers. By the end of July 1972, 170 international traffickers had been arrested.

Most of the individuals apprehended at the time of these seizures were couriers or controllers; that is, persons who delivered the contraband or made arrangements with customers in the United States. However, through information obtained from cooperating defendants and through postseizure investigations by BNDD, major traffickers were later arrested in both the United States and France. For example, indictments filed in the United States in connection with two seizures in France resulted in the arrest of 23 suspected traffickers, including the customer and several leaders, suppliers, and controllers of the two organizations involved. The customer and his associates were responsible for supplying, or attempting to supply, the U S. market with over 971 kilograms of heroin between May 1970 and October 1971.

BNDD has been successful in obtaining the cooperation of foreign law enforcement agencies and in getting them to accept its operation methods. The following case illustrates the high degree of cooperation obtained.

Several months ago the BNDD district office in Rome recruited the services of an informant who formerly was associated with a Marseilles trafficker. The informant traveled to Marseilles and contacted the trafficker, who told the informant that he was no longer engaged in heroin traffic but that he would introduce the informant to another trafficker who could supply any amount of heroin. The following day the informant met this heroin trafficker and plans were formulated for the delivery of 50 kilograms to a city in Italy.

On the appointed day the trafficker met the informant in Italy but without the heroin because he felt that police activity in France during the recent roundup of high-level traffickers might make delivery too risky. Another date was set for the delivery. On the revised delivery date, the trafficker met the informant and two undercover agents--an Italian law enforcement officer and a BNDD special agent. The trafficker took the three to an isolated area on the outskirts of the city, where another car arrived with 25 kilograms of heroin. The trafficker explained that the remaining 25 kilograms would be brought from Marseilles the following morning.

The delivery of the first installment was monitored by BNDD and three Italian law enforcement agencies.¹ Surveillance was maintained throughout the night on the trafficker and the driver and passenger of the vehicle in which the heroin was delivered.

The next morning the trafficker advised the informant and undercover agents that he must be paid before the second installment could be delivered. The authorities therefore decided to arrest the trafficker--Italian law forbids suspected felons to depart from the country. Arrested with the trafficker were the two individuals who delivered the contraband.

¹Publica Sicurezza--usual urban police functions
Guardia di Finanza--customs control.
Arma Carabinieri--a police element of the army, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime.

The trafficker had been under intensive investigation by the French police and was known to BNDD as a trafficker. He also was suspected of operating one or two heroin laboratories in the Marseilles area. The driver of the vehicle in which the heroin was transported was a known heroin courier; the passenger was thought to be a relative of another Marseilles trafficker.

Although the amount seized and the number of arrests were relatively small, the case was important because (1) it was the largest seizure of heroin in Italy, (2) it was the first time that BNDD had coordinated an investigation in which all three Italian law enforcement agencies participated, (3) it was a cooperative effort by the narcotics enforcement agencies of two foreign countries, and (4) it immobilized a suspected heroin laboratory operator. BNDD also believes that the intelligence developed from this case was of benefit to the French authorities in their seizure of a clandestine heroin laboratory approximately 2 months later.

BNDD and foreign law enforcement agencies also cooperate in forming special task forces to combat illicit narcotics traffic. One such task force, which will utilize available information and intelligence to organize and exploit leads, has been established in northern Italy. Profiles will be developed of the characteristics of smugglers and vehicles used in smuggling. Activities based on these profiles will be set up at and behind border points (in cooperation with existing enforcement offices and units) to identify the most likely suspects. When seizures are made, the task force plans to attempt to gain the cooperation of, and adequate control over, the smuggler so that, in cooperation with the French police, a controlled delivery of morphine base can be made to a laboratory in France.

BNDD officials said that many more task forces are being planned, including one in Germany, and that this concept has become an important part of BNDD's strategy. Although the task forces are to operate only for limited periods of time, representatives of the national law enforcement agencies should receive valuable training by participating in the joint effort.

BNDD'S GEO-DRUG ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

BNDD officials advised us that, during July 1972, they implemented a program referred to as the GEO-Drug Enforcement Program. Under this program, BNDD plans to direct its enforcement effort at many illicit drug distribution systems, which are defined by major drug categories and geographic areas of the world. A violator-rating system and regional work plans are essential components of the program. BNDD plans to direct 80 percent of its enforcement resources to the program.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING BNDD OPERATIONS

We noted several areas where BNDD could further improve the effectiveness of its European and Near East operations.

Language training

BNDD, in less than 1 year, doubled its entire overseas staff and assigned a number of special agents to European and Near East countries. Some were fluent in the language of the host country because of ethnic background, some were sent to school but received only minimal training in the language, and, because of the lack of time, some were sent overseas with no training in the host country language.

BNDD agents advised us that they could function without being fluent in the host country language because business with foreign officials could always be conducted through an interpreter. They indicated, however, that, without language proficiency, it had been difficult to develop the rapport with their foreign counterparts that was so important in narcotics control work. We believe that language proficiency in its agents would aid BNDD in its undercover work.

District office staffing

The district offices of regions 17 and 19 were generally staffed by only two special agents. We were told by the special agent in charge at two district offices that with their present staff they had not been able to follow up on all leads and had not been able to do all the necessary investigative work, i.e., monitoring truck traffic at ferryboat

crossings, etc. They said that additional staff would increase their potential for solving cases.

We noted that the special agent in charge of a district office had numerous responsibilities in addition to his investigative work. He performed administrative functions, coordinated BNDD's activities with the activities of other U.S. Government agencies at overseas posts, participated in diplomatic matters, and maintained liaison with foreign law enforcement officials.

BNDD headquarters officials stated that the European staff should be increased by at least 25 percent and that additional agents are needed at the district offices covering such key illicit narcotics traffic centers as Istanbul, Turkey, and Munich, Germany.

BNDD has also had a problem in retaining experienced agents in charge at its overseas district offices. Such agents expressed concern about extended overseas tours because they believed it was a career-limiting assignment. They indicated that the authorized grade level was not commensurate with the responsibilities of the office and that the present organizational structure provided little opportunity for promotion. At the time of our review in April 1972, a district office agent in charge, GS-13, held the highest grade position authorized outside the regional office. Because only a limited number of higher grade positions are available in the regional offices, the agents in charge believe they will not advance as fast overseas as they normally would in the larger offices in the United States.

The need to minimize employee turnover has been brought to the attention of the State Department by its overseas Embassies. The U.S. Embassies emphasized to the Secretary and BNDD the inadequacy of normal placement procedures to meet the need of keeping the experts in the field longer, rather than replacing them with agents with little or no knowledge of the language or the particular situations in the most sensitive countries abroad.

We discussed this situation with BNDD Washington officials and explained that, in our opinion, BNDD policy should permit key personnel promotions, especially promotions of

agents in charge with special language skills and knowledge of a country.

BNDD Washington officials indicated that they had been aware of both the staffing and language-training problems and that they would take some corrective action. On July 9, 1972, BNDD promoted the agent in charge of the district office in Bonn, Germany, to GS-14 which is commensurate with his responsibility. We believe that this should help to alleviate the concern of the experienced agents in charge in extending their tours of duty overseas.

Reward payments

As indicated on page 27, intelligence on illicit narcotics traffic frequently must be purchased. In this regard BNDD pays informers for information about traffickers and also offers rewards for certain other types of information. In fiscal year 1972, three rewards were paid for information which led to the seizure of three heroin laboratories, two of which were in Europe. The rewards were determined by using \$10,000 as the basic reward for the laboratory with an additional amount for each kilogram of heroin, morphine base, and opium seized. The maximum reward paid as of July 1972 was \$50,000.

In an attempt to obtain more information, suggestions have been made that the reward for information leading to the seizure of a heroin laboratory be increased to \$200,000.

At the June 1972 Franco/Canadian/American Conference held in Ottawa, Canada, BNDD announced that it had adopted a new reward policy for laboratory seizures. BNDD stated that this policy allowed payment of rewards up to \$200,000 in laboratory seizure cases.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

We believe that BNDD has been effective in its efforts toward preventing the organized illicit narcotics traffic in Europe and the Near East. However, BNDD can further increase the effectiveness of its European and Near East operations. We recommend that the Attorney General take the necessary action to:

- Establish a policy which would encourage agents with special interests and skills to accept long-term overseas assignments.

- Insure that special agents assigned to foreign posts are proficient in the host country language.

CHAPTER 4

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN HOST COUNTRIES' EFFORTS

TO CONTROL ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC

U.S. Embassy and BNDD officials have succeeded in persuading foreign countries to be more concerned about the international heroin problem and to take action to improve their capability to control illicit narcotics traffic. However, we believe that the narcotics control efforts of these countries could be improved if certain actions were taken to increase the effectiveness of their narcotics law enforcement agencies.

HOST COUNTRIES' ACTIONS TO IMPROVE NARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT

We analyzed the actions taken by Turkey, France, Germany, and Italy to improve their narcotics control capability. Much of the heroin entering the United States flows from or through these countries.

Control of opium production

The Government of Turkey has enacted the Opium Licensing and Control Law and has issued an edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and opium production after the 1972 harvest. Embassy officials believe that the Government will make a thorough effort to implement the law.

Opium Licensing and Control Law

The Opium Licensing and Control Law, enacted in August 1971, requires poppy farmers to be licensed. To obtain a license, a farmer must file an annual application with the Turkish Soil Products Office. The size of the poppy-growing area and an estimate of the quantity of opium gum to be produced must be included in the application, with a simple sketch of the area to be planted. The law further provides that:

--A single agency, the Soil Products Office, is responsible for all opium operations. Until 1971, the

Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for controlling opium cultivation, and the Soil Products Office was responsible for purchasing and exporting opium gum in legal trade.

- Penalties are prescribed for persons cultivating poppy without a license or in an area not covered by a license.
- Bonuses can be paid to informants who provide information leading to the seizure of illicit opium.

At the time of our review, the Soil Products Office was implementing a program to control poppy production during the 1971-72 season. The program requires control teams to be organized in the four provinces authorized to cultivate poppy. These control teams will determine whether the actual planted area conforms to the area recorded on the farmer's license and will estimate the amount of opium that must be turned in to the Turkish Government.

To discourage opium production during the current season, the Government is willing to compensate farmers for withdrawing from production. Farmers who voluntarily withdraw can receive 525 Turkish lira (about \$40) a kilogram for the quantity of opium gum sold to the Government in 1971.

Ban on opium cultivation

By decree dated June 30, 1971, the Government of Turkey banned opium production after the 1972 harvest. This decree is not irrevocable. A Government official stated that:

"The government, in banning opium by its decree of June 30, has not entered into any bilateral or unilateral decision. If our economy, our farmers, cannot fill the gap created by this ban, we have no commitment to prevent our returning to planting."

The United States agreed to grant the Government of Turkey \$35 million to help it make the transition from poppy to other crops. About \$20 million was to be used to help finance a crop substitution program, and the balance was to

be used to provide subsidies to the farmers while the crop substitution projects were being developed.

The Government of Turkey completed its study on means of improving farm income in poppy regions and planned to select projects to be started sometime in 1972.

Border inspections being improved

Germany and France were making a special effort to improve inspections at border crossings. German customs authorities established groups with special equipment to screen vehicles for hidden drugs. Plans were also being made for concerted raids by German border and security police units at specific border crossings. BNDD officials informed us in July 1972 that Germany was inspecting all trucks coming from Turkey.

BNDD's records indicated that French customs officials became particularly thorough after a radical change of policy in 1969 when they were directed to search every individual and vehicle that appeared out of the ordinary. One of the more important drug seizures during 1972 was made by French customs officials at an Italian-French border crossing.

Increased penalties for narcotics violations

Persons now convicted of narcotics offenses can be imprisoned for longer periods of time because of amended narcotics laws. For example, in December 1970 France increased its penalty for narcotics trafficking from a maximum of 5 years to 20 years, and Germany raised its penalty from 3 years to 10 years in November 1971. Individuals convicted in Turkey of exporting heroin or morphine base or of attempting to perpetrate such offense are subject to life imprisonment.

Narcotics police forces increased

The Director of BNDD and U.S. Embassy officials have directed extensive and largely successful efforts to persuade the governments of foreign countries to expand their police forces assigned to narcotics control. In 1969 the

French Police Judiciare had only 33 policemen assigned exclusively to narcotics control. This force was increased to 63 in 1970 and to 145 in 1971 largely because of encouragement from the Director of BNDD and from the U.S. Ambassador. Furthermore the narcotics squad at Marseilles has been ordered to devote its entire efforts to international cases.

Italy has three national police forces, each of which has personnel assigned full time to narcotics work throughout Italy. As indicated below, the number of policemen assigned to this work has increased significantly.

	<u>Number of personnel assigned full time to narcotics control</u>	
	<u>December 1970</u>	<u>March 1972</u>
Publica Sicurezza	9	54
Arma Carabinieri	20	25
Guardia di Finanza	<u>16</u>	<u>22</u>
Total	<u>45</u>	<u>101</u>

The number of policemen assigned to narcotics control has also increased in Turkey and Germany.

Most of the countries that took the actions mentioned above did not have a heroin addiction problem; therefore, their actions demonstrated an increasing concern about the heroin problem in the United States.

NEED FOR POLICE FORCES TO
IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS

Progress toward immobilizing the major traffickers engaged in illicit narcotics traffic will be limited until national police forces begin using more effective law enforcement practices and have an effective means of exchanging intelligence.

Need to recruit and develop informants

BNDD pointed out that, unlike other crimes, a narcotics crime does not produce a victim who furnishes law enforcement officials with the details of the crime. Intelligence on illicit narcotics traffic has to be developed from other sources. BNDD officials advised us that in the United States such information was frequently obtained from paid informers (usually underworld figures) who provided information which law enforcement authorities needed to direct their surveillance activities toward appropriate traffickers. BNDD has initiated most of the investigations which resulted in the major drug seizures in Europe, and these investigations resulted from information provided by informers

The police forces of the countries we visited generally did not use informers. BNDD officials advised us that this investigative technique is not a normal practice in Europe.

BNDD officials have frequently stated that one of the greatest weaknesses of police narcotics units is a lack of informants and that national police forces should not be dependent on BNDD but should develop their own sources of information.

Need to change laws to permit
undercover work

Narcotics policemen in the countries we visited did not work undercover--i.e., buy narcotics to gain the confidence of traffickers and to gather intelligence on the movement of narcotics--because the policemen would be subject to penalties or to criminal prosecution. Thus an effective method of penetrating a criminal organization could not be used.

The following situation in one country, as told to us by a BNDD agent, was representative of conditions noted:

"One handicap under which [local] law enforcement agencies must operate is the provision of *** [local] law whereby the buyer of narcotics [whether he is a law enforcement officer or not] is as guilty as the seller of narcotics. This restriction eliminates the possibility of conducting undercover investigations in the drug field in the most effective manner. In order to penetrate any criminal organization, the agent must be able to gain the confidence of the people with whom he is dealing. In effect, he must often appear to be as much of a criminal as the criminals. Because the *** [local] law enforcement officer cannot 'buy' narcotics, but must arrest the violator for possession as soon as he delivers the drugs, he is already working at a serious handicap. The violators know that the officers cannot purchase narcotics and this makes their enterprises much more successful."

Need for granting immunity or reduced sentences

A major law enforcement tool in the United States is plea bargaining--the ability to grant immunity or reduced prison sentences to defendants who cooperate with the police. Persons charged or convicted of a crime are rewarded for providing information about other individuals involved in criminal activities. The value of such inside information in narcotics control work is obvious.

Law enforcement authorities in only one of the countries we visited (Turkey) had this bargaining power. Elsewhere, persons convicted of illicit trafficking in narcotics had no incentive to implicate others.

Need for effective intelligence exchange

We believe that national narcotics control efforts in European countries will not be fully effective until a reliable means of exchanging intelligence has been established. A natural rivalry among the various narcotics law

enforcement authorities prevents free exchange of intelligence.

In one country, all law enforcement was under the jurisdiction of the various state police departments; however, efforts were complicated by regional rivalries and a lack of communication and coordination. Another country had two police forces, the city police and the rural police. The city police forces were given the responsibility of centralizing and coordinating both national and international narcotics investigations. This stifled the initiative of the rural police to develop information. Still another country had three distinct national police agencies. Each agency was jealous of its prerogatives and cooperation among the agencies depended upon personalities.

Germany is developing a program to improve collection of criminal intelligence and to promote the rapid exchange of that intelligence. The plan calls for the Federal Criminal Office, an agency without law enforcement responsibility, to serve as a central office for the collection and processing of criminal intelligence. Such a program appears to have great potential as a means of exchanging intelligence.

BNDD Washington officials informed us that BNDD is establishing an international narcotics data bank which they hope all foreign law enforcement agencies will contribute to and use.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the governments of the countries mentioned in this report were concerned about the heroin problem of the United States. However, it appears that the national police forces of the various countries were not making much progress toward immobilizing the major systems responsible for the flow of illicit narcotics traffic because their capabilities were limited by national laws and they were not using some methods which BNDD considered to be effective.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The national police forces are responsible for stemming the flow of illicit narcotics traffic through their countries. Therefore we recommend that the Secretary of State, with technical advice and assistance from the Director of BNDD, take action to insure that a major goal of the ambassadors to the various countries is to achieve the improvement of the law enforcement capability of national police forces. The ambassadors should impress on host country officials that special attention should be given to

- modifying laws which prohibit undercover work or plea bargaining--two proven methods of gaining intelligence,

- encouraging police forces to develop and use paid informants, and

- establishing exchange of intelligence between all narcotics law enforcement authorities by encouraging them to contribute to and use the international narcotics data bank being developed by BNDD.

We recognize that any approach to correcting the problem should be responsive to the needs of the individual governments and should not infringe upon the sovereignty of that country.

CHAPTER 5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We examined the progress that was being made to stop the flow of illicit heroin from Europe to the United States. We were primarily concerned with the activities of BNDD, but we also reviewed the narcotics control activities of U.S. Embassies. We performed the review at the following locations.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
European Regional Office, Paris, France

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Near East Regional Office, Ankara, Turkey

U.S. Embassies at Paris, France;
Bonn, Germany; Brussels, Belgium; Rome,
Italy; and Ankara, Turkey

U.S. Consulates at Munich and
Frankfurt, Germany, and Istanbul, Turkey

We reviewed BNDD's investigative files and other information related to the U.S. agencies' efforts to stop the flow of narcotics into the United States. Discussions were held with officials at the U.S. Embassies, BNDD's regional headquarters, and BNDD's district offices in both Europe and the Near East. We also discussed our findings and conclusions with BNDD's Washington officials.

CHARLES B RANGEL
18TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

H PATRICK SWYGERT
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON D C 20515
TELEPHONE: 202-225-4365

MRS VIRGINIA BELL
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

144 WEST 125TH STREET
NEW YORK NEW YORK 10027
TELEPHONE 866-8600

December 7, 1971

Honorable Elmer Staats
Comptroller General of the
United States
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

As you may know, since my election to Congress I have been devoting the major part of my efforts to fighting the flood of heroin that is destroying my community, Harlem. As a result, I am greatly concerned by the obvious failure of American attempts to block that flow of narcotics, both before it reaches the United States and once it arrives at our borders

For this reason, I am requesting the General Accounting Office to prepare two reports for me dealing with this critical matter

The first would be an analysis of the Bureau of Customs efforts at Kennedy International Airport and the Port of New York, with recommendations as to how the Bureau could do a more effective job in intercepting and confiscating illicit drugs, primarily heroin, being smuggled into the United States. Observing the search procedures of individuals entering the country at Kennedy International Airport, for example, one can easily see that Customs inspectors often make little more than cursory examinations of luggage. Recommendations from your office to make Customs inspections more effective can help us block at least part of this deadly traffic.

APPENDIX I

Honorable Elmer Staats
December 7, 1971
Page Two

The second report would be an analysis of the effectiveness of European operations of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, with recommendations for increasing the Bureau's ability to fight narcotics overseas

I certainly appreciate your attention to this most urgent problem

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Charles B. Rangel". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent "C" at the beginning.

Charles B Rangel
Member of Congress

CBR b
cc Hon. Benjamin Rosenthal
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	Tenure of office	
	From	To
<u>DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE</u>		
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:		
Richard G. Kleindienst	June 1972	Present
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)	Feb. 1972	June 1972
John N. Mitchell	Jan. 1969	Feb. 1972
Ramsey Clark	Oct 1966	Jan. 1969
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS:		
John E. Ingersoll	Aug. 1968	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</u>		
SECRETARY OF STATE		
William P. Rogers	Jan. 1969	Present
Dean Rusk	Jan. 1961	Jan. 1969
AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE:		
Arthur K. Watson	May 1970	Aug. 1972
R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.	May 1968	Apr. 1970
AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY:		
Martin J. Hillenbrand	June 1972	Present
Vacant	Mar. 1972	May 1972
Kenneth Rush	July 1969	Feb. 1972
Vacant	Feb. 1969	June 1969
Henry C. Lodge	May 1968	Jan. 1969

APPENDIX II

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (continued)

AMBASSADOR TO ITALY

Graham A. Martin

Oct. 1969 Present

H. Gardner Ackley

Apr. 1968 Sept. 1969

AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY

William J. Handley

July 1969 Present

Robert W. Komer

Dec. 1968 June 1969

~~COMPTROLLER GENERAL G. RICHARD HO~~
~~THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL~~
~~HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES~~

EFFORTS TO PREVENT HEROIN FROM
ILLICITLY REACHING THE UNITED STATES --
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Department of Justice AND
Department of State B-164031(2)

10-20-72

A Report to Congressman Charles Rangel, pursuant
to his request. The report concerned

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Heroin addiction is one of the major social problems in the United States. Official intelligence indicates that most heroin reaching the United States has traveled through international narcotics pipelines controlled by Turkish and French traffickers, for instance, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) estimates that about 4,000 kilograms of heroin are manufactured annually in the Marseilles area of France from opium produced in Turkey. At the request of Congressman Charles Rangel, the General Accounting Office (GAO) made this review to determine what progress was being made in Europe and the Near East to control this illicit narcotics traffic.

part to

It is reported that the Bureau of

~~FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS~~
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) mission in Europe and the Near East is to help host governments to stop the flow of opium/heroin at its most vulnerable point before it reaches the United States. BNDD and U.S. Embassy officials have succeeded in getting foreign governments to improve their capability to control illicit narcotics traffic. The more important actions taken include

- Controlling opium production (Turkey)

- Increasing police forces assigned to narcotics control work (France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey)
- Increasing the maximum prison sentence for serious narcotics crimes (France, Germany, and Turkey)
- Improving border inspections (France and Germany)

These actions have resulted in significantly increased seizures of heroin and morphine base in Europe since 1970, when 461 kilograms were seized. In 1971, 1,341 kilograms of heroin or morphine base were seized in Europe. In the first 7 months of 1972, 1,312 kilograms were seized.

Problems

Even with increased drug seizures and arrests on the part of host governments with United States help, however, much remains to be done to overcome the following obstacles

- a. National police forces lack a reliable means of exchanging intelligence and make little effort to recruit and use informers
- b. National laws prevent police forces from doing undercover work
- c. National laws in some countries do not permit law enforcement authorities to grant immunity or to bargain for reduced sentences

~~Text sheet~~

~~OCT. 20, 1972~~

1. BNDD special agents assigned overseas do not have enough language training

2. A BNDD policy encouraging agents with special interests and skills to accept long-term overseas assignments is lacking

~~RECOMMENDATIONS~~

We recommended that
The Attorney General should take the necessary actions to

1. Insure that all special agents assigned to foreign posts have proficiency in the host country language

2. Establish a policy which would encourage agents with special interests and skills to accept long-term overseas assignments

We recommended that

The Secretary of State should encourage U S Ambassadors ~~to the appropriate countries~~ to continue their efforts in getting the host governments to improve the narcotics control capabilities of their law enforcement agencies. Special attention ~~should be given~~ to:

with

1. Modifying the laws which prohibit undercover work or plea bargaining--two proven methods of gaining intelligence

2. Encouraging police forces to develop and use paid informants

3. Establishing exchange of intelligence between all narcotics law enforcement authorities by encouraging them to contribute to and use the international narcotics data bank being developed by BNDD

~~AGENCY ACTIONS~~

~~GAO did not submit this report to the Departments of Justice and State for written comments, however, the contents of the report were discussed with officials of the agencies. BNDD officials agreed with the findings and conclusions contained in the report and told GAO that actions had been or would be taken to implement its recommendations. State Department officials also agreed with the findings and conclusions and told GAO that the recommendations coincided with the Department's ongoing programs.~~

Copies of this report are available from the
U S General Accounting Office, Room 6417,
441 G Street, N W , Washington, D C , 20548

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bers of Congress, congressional committee
staff members, Government officials, members
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