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Problems In Managing U.S. Food Aid To Chad

Agency for International Development
Department of State

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

ID-75-67

JUNE 5, 1975

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-152554

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
United States Senate

Dear Senator Roth:

In response to your request of December 5, 1974 (see app. II), we have reviewed selected problems involved in the management of U.S. emergency food aid to Chad. Because of the delicacy of relations since Chad's refusal to accept any further U.S. food aid in October 1974, we did not do any in-country work. As a result, our review consisted mainly of reviewing Agency for International Development records in Washington and discussing the Chad situation with Agency officials. We are enclosing separately a copy of a special report issued by the Agency last September which contains a number of comments on the performance of the Chad Government.

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Appendix I summarizes the information we have gathered in response to your inquiries about (1) the alleged incompetence, apathy, and participation in or toleration of profiteering on the part of Chadian officials, (2) the circumstances surrounding the airlift, including the effect of the trucking monopoly, the necessity for the airlift, and the disposition of the airlifted food, and (3) how the Agency determined the level of food aid which could be effectively used by Chad and steps it took to see that the food reached those in need. It should be noted that the information pertains to activities of the Chad Government as it existed before the April 13, 1975, coup d'etat.

We do not plan to distribute this report unless you agree or publicly announce its contents.

Sincerely yours

Comptroller General
of the United States

Enclosure

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PROBLEMS IN MANAGING U.S. FOOD AID TO CHAD

Since late 1972 the United States has donated more than 22,000 metric tons of food grains worth an estimated \$4.67 million (including freight) to Chad to help alleviate the ravages of a drought which began in 1968. Other donors also have contributed thousands of tons.

The following information on problems of managing U.S. food aid in Chad was developed primarily from reviewing and analyzing records and from discussions with officials at the Agency for International Development's (AID) Washington headquarters. We did not visit Chad because of the tenuous nature of United States-Chadian relations at present and because of the serious difficulties and restrictions, explained below, that would be encountered in attempting to develop any further information in-country on these particular subjects. It should also be noted that this information pertains to activities of the Chad Government as it existed before the April 13, 1975, coup d'etat. However, in our view, the information provides a reasonably accurate picture of the facts surrounding the questions raised.

ALLEGED INCOMPETENCE, APATHY, AND PROFITEERING

In recent months, AID has on at least two separate occasions commented on the many problems in Chad, including the attitudes and weaknesses of its government. In August 1974, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, AID's acting Assistant Administrator for Africa characterized the Chad Government as having a "weak administrative structure and extremely rudimentary infrastructure." He said that Chad had "inadequate information systems, few trained government officials, poor transport and communications, [and] problems of internal security."

In September 1974 AID issued a special report to the Congress entitled "Famine in Sub-Sahara Africa," containing the following comments on the attitudes and weaknesses of the Chad Government.

"* * * Governmental weaknesses and attitudes have been such that the food distribution and relief effort are not yet meeting all national needs, especially the problems facing the 'at risk' population."

* * * * *

"* * * The situation in Chad continues to present serious problems, mostly related to the vastness of the country, its weak administrative structure, political fractionalization, and lack of internal communication. Inadequacy of data and statistics make it difficult to determine with precision the real impact of the drought on all parts of the country."

* * * * *

"* * * Distribution within Chad is hampered by the multiple problems cited above. To this must be added the general security problems in the areas considered the worst affected. At base, however, there is no general plan of relief action. The drought relief coordinator relies upon requests for assistance from prefects and sub-prefects throughout the country. Each request means mobilizing supplies, personnel, transport and fuel. Requests are apparently not forthcoming until the situation has reached crisis proportions - as is the case of Mongo and encampment areas in the Guera Province to the north. There is currently a major effort underway by the Government and donors to resolve this situation. But there is little known about the possible presence of similar pockets of serious deficiencies elsewhere. The long distances, poor or no roads, limited trucking capacity and lack of relief communication network compound the difficulties of effecting timely requests and response."

* * * * *

"* * * Security is a problem: all official relief ground convoys must be accompanied by military escort. The disaffection and diffusion of populations in the areas considered most affected by the drought only compound the administrative and logistic problems, as requirements for these regions tend to assume a lesser priority in the eyes of the Government. Our Mission in Chad is continuing to press the Chadian Government, in concert with other donors, to allow planning assistance as well as increased direct support to the relief action."

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The following examples illustrate the attitudes and weaknesses of the Chad Government.

1. . Lack of relief plan--In February 1974 the U.S. Embassy reported that the Chad Government's method of determining relief requirements was to estimate the percentage of crop failure, convert that to the number of montns that food should be sufficient, and then to order that food distributions be withheld until that period ended. The Embassy noted that this method assumed that there would be a relatively equitable commercia. distribution of locally produced grains during the first part of the year and that, during the latter part of the year, 100 percent of food needs would have to be met by donated foods. The Embassy observed that the dangers and inadequacies of this type of system are obvious.

Additional reports from the Embassy in May 1974 indicated that the Chad Government still had not established an operational plan for food distribution and that the drought minister could not provide figures or even estimates for the amount of food on hand in each prefecture (province). Late in June 1974, the Embassy pointed out to the Chad Government that, to make effective plans, the Embassy still needed to know tonnage goals for each distribution center in Chad. The Embassy reports also indicated that the Chad Government, for whatever reason, had sometimes failed to order distribution to begin.

2. Trucking problems--Reports from the U.S. Embassy indicate that a lack of trucking capacity and such related problems as fuel have hindered the distribution of donor relief food. Yet, in some cases, donor offers of assistance apparently have not been acted upon in a timely manner by the Chad Government. For example:

--One donor made available a cash credit equivalent to more than \$400,000 for transportation assistance, but the government had not used any of these funds as of June 1974, some 5 months after they became available. In fact, at one donor meeting, the drought minister requested the donors to provide trucks to be used for internal distribution and the donor of the cash credit pointed out that its funds were still unexpended. When the minister stated that purchase and delivery of trucks

would take too long, the donor noted that four new trucks were readily available in a dealer's showroom in N'Djamena.

--In another instance, a donor government offered to make 12 trucks available to assist in internal distribution, complete with drivers, fuel, and spare parts. For several months the donor and the Chad Government negotiated over whether the donor should be required to pay a fuel tax, and the donor finally agreed to pay the tax.

3. Drought not top priority--The general tenor of a number of Embassy reports was that the drought was not the Chad Government's top priority; therefore the government did not make a maximum effort to resolve it. For example, at a multidonor meeting in July 1974 at Cotonou, Dahomey, the Chad Government representative reportedly asked the donors why they were giving food to Chad at all, since what Chad really needed was long-term development aid.

At a U.S. Embassy meeting with the President of Chad in July 1974, the President was asked if 15 recently imported trucks could be used for the drought relief effort. He stated that the trucks had not been sold and had no owners, and therefore could not be put into service.

In June 1974, when the Chad Government told donors that people at Mongo in central Chad were starving, the donors sought to help by bringing in a Red Cross food kitchen to dispense fortified foods. However, in a meeting with the donors, the Chad Government stated that to feed these people at Mongo would keep them from going back into the bush to plant crops. It refused to permit the kitchen's use, stating that it would make all decisions on the use of food aid.

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AID said it has no information to indicate that Chad Government officials directly participated in profiteering from U.S. assistance, and AID records we reviewed cited no such instances. However, one incident that may have constituted toleration of profiteering occurred in 1973. At that time, a trucking cooperative which had a legal monopoly over 85 percent of the transportation across the Chad border

was charging the donors a rate of 8,000 CFA (about \$35.32) a ton to carry relief grains from Nigeria into Chad, whereas Nigerian trucks were charging only 4,500 CFA (about \$19.87) a ton for the same run. Reportedly, the cooperative's rate to the donors was also higher than that charged other customers for the same type of cargo.

This cooperative has been described as a loose association of independent Chadian truckers over which the government had no control. However, in November 1973, apparently as a result of combined donor efforts over a period of at least 2 months, the government's action resulted in the rate being reduced to 5,700 CFA (about \$25.17) a ton. AID records indicate that the 8,000 CFA rate was paid on 5,000 metric tons of U.S. food furnished through the U.N. World Food Program and that the Program had paid the inland transportation costs.

AID records do not clearly indicate how long this rate problem existed nor the degree of Chad Government interest in resolving it. However, it is clear that the government was, in fact, able to get the rate reduced substantially and that the trucking cooperative did, in fact, use its monopoly rights, granted by the government, to charge donors a rate substantially higher than that charged by Nigerian truckers.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AIRLIFT ITS NECESSITY AND COST

A New York Times article of October 10, 1974, essentially indicated that a Chadian trucking cooperative used its monopoly to exclude Nigerian trucks from carrying relief food into Chad from Maiduguri, Nigeria, and that this caused backlogs of food at Maiduguri, which necessitated the 1974 airlift. Our review of AID records and discussions with AID officials about the airlift indicates that the trucking monopoly undoubtedly was a major contributing factor in delaying movement of relief food over the border from Maiduguri to N'Djamena, capital of Chad. Other factors, however, also contributed to these delays.

The records indicate that much of the food airlifted was not needed for immediate distribution; was being placed in storage; and was planned for phased distribution in later months, beginning probably in February or March 1975. Therefore, the need for this airlift appears to have been somewhat questionable.

Food transport problems

AID's special report to the Congress noted that landlocked Chad depends almost entirely on Nigerian ports for grain movements and that a conflict between Chad and Nigerian trucking associations about moving grains past the Chad border had been difficult to resolve. The problems included using Nigerian trucks in Chad and increasing trucking capacity to reduce accumulation of food at the Nigerian border point at Maiduguri.

Chad has no railroad, and an agreement between the governments of Nigeria and Chad specifies that 85 percent of all cargoes entering Chad must be transported by trucks of the Chadian trucking cooperative.

AID records indicate that during the spring of 1974 thousands of tons of relief foods from the United States and other donors arrived in Nigerian ports. These foods were moved to Maiduguri by Nigerian trucks and by rail. At that point, however, they began to build up because the cooperative's trucking capacity on the Maiduguri-N'Djamena route was not sufficient to keep pace with incoming deliveries. For example, stocks in Maiduguri on April 30, 1974, amounted to about 2,700 metric tons, including about 1,854 tons of mostly U.S. relief foods. Also, total reported trucking deliveries from Maiduguri during April were only about 825 metric tons. By early June, Maiduguri stocks had increased to about 6,700 metric tons of food and other goods, including about 4,173 tons of U.S. relief food. A report on the situation in June noted that donor grain was arriving at a rate of 450 metric tons a day but that only about 170 tons of total cargo a day was moving out for Chad.

Apparently, efforts to increase Chadian trucks on the Maiduguri route were not satisfactory to the donors. Therefore, in May the donors succeeded in obtaining a special one-time Chad Government authorization to use Nigerian trucks to transport up to 12,000 metric tons of relief grain directly to N'Djamena. However, the donors then encountered problems in negotiating with the Nigerian truckers, and only about 4,000 tons were delivered by Nigerian trucks before the rainy season.

The United States put additional pressure on the Chad Government to force the cooperative to improve its performance by diverting several thousand tons of U.S. relief food to Niger during early summer, with replacement expected from later deliveries. Although the government apparently did put

some pressure on the cooperative as a result of donor actions, this pressure was not very effective, as Chadian truckers reportedly were not according a high priority to delivering relief food, and older, smaller trucks were dispatched to Maiduguri while newer, larger vehicles carried other goods elsewhere.

The food continued to back up at Maiduguri, and by July 30 almost 10,000 metric tons of relief supplies were on hand there, including about 6,461 tons of U.S. grain. By this time the rainy season had begun, and this slowed the movement of food into Chad from Maiduguri still more because of road conditions.

The airlift

On August 2, the U.S. Embassy reported that the Chad drought minister had returned from a 3-day inspection of up-country locations on July 31 and had immediately called a meeting of the donors. The minister reported widespread suffering at a number of locations and requested a donor airlift. AID instructed the Embassy to offer a U.S. airlift in conjunction with other donors and requested it to ascertain from the Chad Government the areas of need and tonnages. AID also asked for the Embassy's own evaluation and recommendations.

Apparently no independent assessment of airlift needs was made. A U.N. logistics expert offered to make an assessment for the donors, but the Chad Government canceled this trip 1 hour before flight time, citing security reasons. On August 10, the U.S. Embassy notified AID that the drought minister said the needs in remote areas far exceeded any foreseeable airlift potential. The Embassy offered to airlift 2,000 metric tons of food. The drought minister was reluctant to set total figures for needs, but he did give the Embassy the names of distribution centers most in need. The Embassy's own evaluation stated that the government's description of the situation, which was largely that of the drought minister's pleas to donors at the July 31 meeting, boiled down to the statement that food and medicine stocks were all but exhausted in the remote areas and that suffering was already apparent. Local U.N. representatives agreed that the needs existed, but the Embassy had little other firsthand knowledge.

AID records indicate that AID approved an airlift of 2,000 metric tons of food on August 19, stating that it had become increasingly apparent during the past 90 days that the Chad Government had been unable to provide sufficient food and relief supplies to assure human survival throughout the then rainy season, when ground transport was drastically curtailed.

AID further noted that, although a precise estimate of remote area needs was not yet available, earlier calculations by the U.S. Embassy suggested that approximately 2,300 metric tons would be necessary to insure meeting immediate food requirements for the most affected areas.

The airlift began on September 14. The Chad Government had said the most immediate needs were in Mongo in central Chad. However, the operational plan developed by the U.S. Embassy with the Chad Government was to airlift 1,000 metric tons of food to Zouar (200 tons), Faya Largeau (300 tons), and Fada (300 tons) in the north and then to airlift the remaining 1,000 metric tons to Biltine (400 tons), Mongo (400 tons), and Abeche (200 tons) in central Chad as the rains receded and airfields in those areas became usable.

During the first week of October, when Mr. Henry Kamm, the author of the New York Times article, visited Faya Largeau with the airlift, local officials told him that the bulk of the 500 tons of airlifted grain delivered there was being stored for distribution in later months. As a result, the U.S. Embassy ordered a temporary suspension of the airlift to Fada, pending the return of an AID official from an inspection trip to the three northern locations. However, the drought minister requested reinstatement of the airlift to Fada, stating that the grain was intended and needed for immediate distribution and that if local officials were attempting to hoard it for later months they would be ordered to distribute it. Relying on repeated assurances by the drought minister that this was the case, the Embassy reinstated the airlift to Fada.

On October 15, the Embassy began reporting the results of AID's onsite inspections of the disposition of the airlifted food. AID files contained reports on the following locations.

Zouar--Although the AID monitor had visited Zouar with the airlift, he was unable to return to examine the disposition of the airlifted grain because of transportation problems. As an alternative, therefore, he talked with the local military commander by radiotelephone and had him prepare, with the endorsement of the provincial governor, a written summary of distribution. That summary indicated that about 39.5 of the 199 metric tons delivered to Zouar had been distributed from September 26 to October 10 to some 320 families, including 812 children.

Faya Largeau--The AID monitor reported minimal current needs and distribution. Specifically, about 467 of 502 metric tons actually delivered to Faya Largeau was being stored, with the rest having been distributed or damaged during transit.

APPENDIX I

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The local prefect told the AID monitor that he anticipated distributing small amounts in coming weeks but that he expected to reserve the major portion of the stocks for distribution during the hungry season, beginning in February and ending in April or May. He said that, if the grain were distributed immediately, the people might sell it or personally store it and that he had distributed 100 metric tons of other reserve grains just before the airlift. The prefect showed the AID monitor records that indicated this same distribution pattern had been followed in the past.

The AID monitor, after numerous conversations with local inhabitants and personally observing the market, concluded that proceeds from the sale of dates when being marketed were sufficient to provide the great majority of the population with the means to purchase millet, which was in adequate supply. The Embassy noted that the presence of U.S. sorghum would almost certainly be a factor in helping to keep down commercial prices of grain.

In view of the supplies of grain surplus to current needs at Faya Largeau, the Embassy had instructed the U.S. Air Force airlift commander to terminate the airlift to Fada when 100 metric tons had been delivered. The Embassy suggested to the Chad Government that any additional needs at Fada be met by surface transfer from Faya Largeau and that the remaining 200 tons originally destined for Fada be delivered to central Chad locations as desired by the government. The government agreed to the Embassy's recommendation, and the 200 tons was rescheduled for delivery to Biltine and Abeche.

Fada--On October 19 the AID monitor and another AID official reported that the approximately 100 metric tons of grain airlifted to Fada would not be distributed immediately because the majority of the population was harvesting a wild grain called crepe. They reported that this was the first crepe harvest in 7 years and was expected to be the best in 15 years. The local prefect stated that distribution of the donated grain would be required by February 1975 and would be spaced out in tranches over the entire period of anticipated need and as manifested by rising local commercial prices. In the interim, the grain was reported to be in adequate storage. The report concluded that the airlifted grain was not required in the near term to meet emergency requirements.

Mongo--The AID monitor and another AID official reviewed food storage and distribution plans in Mongo and discussed these matters with the provincial governor and the prefect. Their report stated that 255 metric tons of grain had been airlifted to Mongo, was being stored in modern buildings under good conditions, and a detailed plan had been established for

distributing it throughout the Guera province. However, actual distribution was not scheduled to begin until March 1975 because (1) distribution was planned for approximately 100 points, and the roads, then impassable due to the rains, could not begin to be repaired until the end of the rains in early November and would take until February to complete and (2) the population was then harvesting the current millet crop and some rice and sesame, which would provide adequate food in the near term.

Their report further stated that no food supplies were stored in Mongo before the airlift and authorities indicated that multidonor relief food received during the summer had been greatly needed and had precluded mass hunger. The report concluded that airlifted grain was admittedly not required in the near term to meet emergency requirements but that the stored grain would serve both as a buffer to rising prices and as insurance against hunger as local produce supplies dwindled during later months. U.S. Air Force reports indicate that, ultimately, only 287 of the 400 metric tons originally intended for Mongo were actually delivered there, apparently due to the early termination of the airlift.

Because of U.S. press criticisms of the Chad Government's handling of the drought relief effort, that government announced its decision on October 16 to stop accepting further U.S. bilateral food aid. The airlift was terminated the next day.

At that time, the United States had airlifted about 1,382 of the original 2,000 metric tons. The latest available U.S. Air Force cost estimate for the airlift is \$1.06 million.

AID has informed us that, except for some U.S. food contributed through the World Food Program, no further U.S. bilateral grain has entered Chad since October 17, 1974, and that the food in Maiduguri and elsewhere in the system for Chad was reprogramed for other recipient countries.

From the above reports it appears that, at least in the time frame in which the airlift occurred, the bulk of the airlifted food was not intended or needed for emergency distribution and, therefore, the need for this airlift was questionable at best. The record also indicates that U.S. officials did not condone storage of the airlifted food and instead, attempted to terminate airlift operations for locations where the food was being placed in storage.

DETERMINING LEVEL OF AID AND INSURING THAT
COMMODITIES REACHED THE NEEDYDetermining level of aid

The level of food aid Chad could effectively absorb in 1974 was determined by a multidonor assessment mission sponsored and led by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. This same method was used to assess the food needs in five other Sahel nations. The basic objective was to obtain donor-host agreement as to the total estimated food aid each Sahel nation reasonably needed to get it through the year.

The mission estimated total food aid needs at about 100,000 metric tons, but it also recognized that Chad's internal transportation and storage capacity were limited. Therefore, the mission and the Chad Government agreed on 50,000 metric tons as the goal for food grains that could reasonably be transported into Chad and distributed during 1974. The mission also recommended additional quantities of fortified foods for Chad.

The United States, which had contributed only about 8,000 metric tons for Chad in 1973, decided to make a larger contribution in 1974. Generally, programing documents show the U.S. goal in Sahel was to provide about 35 to 40 percent of the food needs of each nation. Therefore, in 1974 AID decided to donate about 22,500 metric tons to Chad, 20,000 bilaterally and 2,500 through the U.N. World Food Program. However, only about 14,000 of this 22,500 metric tons was ultimately provided to Chad. Because of transportation difficulties in the summer of 1974, about 5,500 tons of this food was transferred to Niger. After the Chad Government decided not to accept further U.S. food aid in late 1974, the remainder was also transferred elsewhere.

It should also be noted that, whereas the multidonor mission set the food aid goals, it was not empowered to control or coordinate donor contributions for each Sahel nation and that other donors, notably the European community, also contributed heavily to Chad in 1974. Total donor contributions delivered to Chad are difficult to ascertain precisely for a number of reasons--late deliveries of 1973 commitments increased 1974 availabilities, and commitments of other donors are not always known or do not sometimes materialize--and the best estimates at this time indicate that between 62,000 and 70,000 metric tons of donor food grains arrived in Chad during 1974. The lower figure is about 25 percent above the 50,000 metric tons figure arrived at by the multidonor mission. That 50,000 ton figure was also felt to be an upper limit for contributions, due primarily to Chad's limited transport capacity.

Insuring that food reached the needy

The agreements under which the United States has furnished bilateral emergency food aid to Chad provide that the United States is responsible for supplying the grains and paying transportation costs to N'Djamena. At that point, title to this food is turned over to the Chad Government, which then is responsible for all distribution within Chad. The Chad Government, however, agrees to keep the United States fully informed on the status of commodity receipts and distribution and to provide complete details upon request.

Notwithstanding the provisions of these agreements, in late 1973 AID auditors found that, generally, the governments of the Sahel nations, including Chad, did not have records permitting adequate or meaningful reporting on the actual distribution and status of food supplies delivered. The auditors recommended that AID review these accountability requirements. The auditors also found that very few end-use checks on distribution were being made either by U.S. or host government personnel and recommended that AID strengthen this aspect of operations.

As a result of that audit report, AID formed a management team to study program operations in the Sahel nations. The team's report, issued in May 1974, concluded that in Sahel it was unrealistic to impose traditional AID reporting requirements on the recipient governments. It recommended that AID/Washington not prescribe reporting requirements to field staffs and that actual reporting formats be left to the field staffs' discretion. The report also recommended that, as an alternative, field staffs place greater reliance on an expanded field inspection function. It concluded that the use of this technique, combined with known data on average daily per capita rations, should permit field staffs to calculate actual distribution and stocks, which could then be reported to AID quarterly.

The team's report also noted that monitoring in-country distribution of food required much more than performing end-use checks. It stated that food program monitoring should cover the entire gamut of activities, from requirements determination to actual distribution, and should include such activities as (1) reviewing and evaluating recipient government capabilities to do the job, (2) reviewing the system used in planning for food distribution and its implementation, and (3) riding herd on problems relating to storage, transportation, etc. The team noted that AID's staffing in Sahel was inadequate for performing these functions and would need to be strengthened. In this regard, AID records indicate that at June 1974 one AID officer was assigned full-time in Chad and

that he had arrived there in February 1974. Before then, AID's Area Development Office in Cameroon was responsible for the emergency food program in Chad.

AID adopted the management team's recommendations, and they were communicated to U.S. Embassies and AID staffs in Sahel as guidance on June 3, 1974. At the same time, AID began planning to increase its staffing in Sahel. Reports from the Embassy in June 1974 indicated that, pending assignment of additional permanent personnel, a Chadian assistant was hired on a 90-day contract to assist in monitoring food relief, followed by the hiring of a former Peace Corps volunteer on a similar contract for the same purposes. By November 1974, after the Chad Government had terminated U.S. food aid, records indicate that two AID officers were onboard in N'Djamena, and in April 1975, AID advised us that it has three officers in N'Djamena.

In late June 1974, AID also made the Embassies in Sahel responsible for reporting on conditions in relief camps and the status of the so-called at-risk populations--that is, those people who were unable to provide for their own food. AID stated that it was increasingly concerned over the lack of reporting on situations, conditions, and assistance being provided to at-risk populations, whether inside or outside of camps. It requested the Embassies to begin regularly providing information on (1) areas of need and estimated populations, (2) relief camps and estimated populations, (3) calculations of rations, food distribution, and food stocks on-hand, (4) distribution systems for needy areas and encamped populations, including frequency of distributions, and (5) reports of onsite inspections, either by voluntary agencies or others. AID stated that it was prepared to assist the Sahel governments in establishing information systems.

On July 27, 1974, the U.S. Embassy responded that most of the information requested on relief camps and at-risk populations was not available either from the Chad Government or other donors. The Embassy further stated that all of its efforts to obtain information about foods onhand and rates of consumption in or out of camp had led nowhere and that in Chad the problem was rendered more difficult by that government's sensitivity to outside agencies making direct contact with rural officials to assemble information or to propose assistance. The Embassy noted that large areas of Chad were almost inaccessible because of bandits, outlaws, or rebels and that the government was sensitive about outsiders making direct contact with rural populations.

In summary, it appears that U.S. officials in Chad were not able to fully insure that the food provided was managed effectively due to a combination of factors, including (1) the Chad Government's sensitivities to what it deemed outside interference, desire to make all decisions and control all operations for food aid in Chad, and lack of a relief plan, (2) poor communications and transportation facilities, (3) Chad's vastness and primitive infrastructure, (4) problems of security, which reportedly existed on a large scale, and (5) the small U.S. presence.

Nevertheless, some steps were taken to assist and oversee the distribution of food, including diverting food to more immediate uses, making field trips to observe actual food storage and distribution operations, and attempting to establish a Red Cross food kitchen at Mongo. AID also donated \$400,000 to help deliver relief foods in Chad. In July 1974 it granted \$150,000 to CARE, the international relief agency, primarily to purchase and operate trucks to deliver food and medicines to areas of Chad most affected by the drought, and in November it approved another \$150,000 for this project. In August, AID granted \$100,000 to the Chad Government to help defray fuel costs in the relief effort.

APPENDIX II

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.
DELAWARE

4327 DELAWARE STATE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: 202-424-5441

APPENDIX II

COMMITTEES:
FINANCE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 5, 1974

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats
Comptroller General of the United States
General Accounting Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

I am enclosing recent newspaper articles which make certain allegations concerning United States aid to Chad. I will appreciate it if you will undertake to determine the existence and extent of the alleged incompetence, apathy, and participation or tolerance of profiteering from United States aid on the part of officials of the government of Chad in connection with U. S. aid efforts in that country.

In addition, it is alleged that the wife of the President of Chad has a financial interest in the trucking monopoly in that country which is blamed for sabotaging delivery of aid commodities, necessitating an expensive airlift. Please investigate the circumstances surrounding this airlift, the necessity for it, and the cost.

It is also reported that the commodities airlifted were subsequently stored instead of being distributed and I will appreciate it if you will determine the role of any U. S. official who participated in or condoned the storage of the commodities.


Since it is alleged that large quantities of aid sorghum and possibly other aid commodities were allowed to spoil or become contaminated, please attempt to learn what steps, if any, were taken by U.S. officials to determine the level of aid which could be effectively used by Chad before ordering or shipping aid commodities, and what efforts these officials made before and after arrival of the shipments to see that the commodities reached those in need.

I will appreciate it if your report contains as many examples as possible of any incompetence or acts of profiteering that may have taken place in connection with this program.

FS

WVR/bj
Enclosures

Sincerely,



William V. Roth, Jr.
U. S. Senate

Copy microfilmed was of poor quality.