

097003
~~75-0131~~



UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

LIBRARY SYSTEM



U. S. Provides Safe Haven For Indochinese Refugees

Department of State and other agencies

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES*

ID-75-71

JUNE 20 1975
~~702883~~ / 097003



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-133001

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

The flood of refugees into the United States has sparked intense interest in the Congress and public at large. This report contains current information on the refugee program based on our independent review and onsite observation of the processing procedures during the 2-week period, May 12 to 23.

The President's Interagency Task Force has not furnished written comments on this report. It has, however, reviewed the report and provided verbal comments which have been incorporated where appropriate.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Attorney General; and the Administrator, Agency for International Development.

James B. Stacks

Comptroller General
of the United States

CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
DIGEST		i
CHAPTER		
1	EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM	1
	Refugee legislation	4
	Funds committed to program	5
2	ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS	7
3	REFUGEE SCREENING AT U.S. RECEPTION CENTERS	19
	Screening process	19
	Processing flow	20
4	WESTERN PACIFIC STAGING AREA	24
	Screening process	24
	Costs of operations	27
	Observations	27
5	U.S. RECEPTION CENTERS	31
	Camp Pendleton	31
	Fort Chaffee	37
	Eglin Air Force Base	41
6	PARTICIPATION OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES	50
	Domestic resettlement	50
	Third-country resettlement	53
7	POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS	55
	Storm disaster	55
	Sponsorship and relocation	56
	Security	57
	Cost control	58
	Weather at Eglin and Pendleton	59
8	SCOPE OF REVIEW	60

ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DCD	Department of Defense
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	General Accounting Office
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IPR	Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Assistance
ORM	Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs

D I G E S T

Collapse of the Governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia produced a flood of refugees, most of whom have come to the United States for safe haven.

Plans to receive, process, and absorb this number of refugees into the United States has sparked intense interest in the Congress and public at large. This report contains information on the refugee program based on GAO's independent review and onsite observation of processing procedures from May 12 to May 23.

The President's Interagency Task Force quickly organized and put into motion machinery needed to receive and process the refugees. Under pressures of time and numbers of refugees the Task Force has performed commendably. As can be expected, there are many serious problems that must be coped with today and in the future. For example:

--Resettlement is not progressing nearly as fast as originally hoped, raising prospects that existing appropriations may not provide sufficient funding.
(See p. 56.)

--Task Force reimbursements to Defense and other agencies for costs incurred will be troublesome unless there is clarification of what is intended to be reimbursable costs. GAO understands that the current Task Force plans call for using the refugee appropriations to pay Federal agencies for only those direct costs they incurred specifically for refugee benefits. (See p. 58.)

Some of the major problems at the Guam Staging Area and at Reception Centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, and Eglin Air Force Base are:

- Bad weather poses a potential problem for the Guam Staging Area where refugees are living in tents. In Guam the threat of a typhoon increases steadily through the summer. (See p. 55.)
- Eglin and Pendleton are not equipped to house refugees during the cool fall and winter months. (See p. 59.)
- A requirement that refugees receive a five-agency security clearance created a backlog of people waiting to be released from the reception centers. AS of June 6, only 61 percent of the refugees had obtained clearance. (See p. 57.)
- Refugee sponsorship is the other major "bottleneck" in release of refugees into the United States. Less than 30 percent of the refugees in reception centers on May 29 had firm sponsorship commitments. Furthermore, while a particular refugee may have been cleared, frequently he has not obtained a sponsor, and vice versa. (See p. 56.)
- Refugees leaving reception centers (about 30,000 at this writing) appear to be concentrating in certain localities. Many refugees are reluctant to leave the centers where they feel secure among other Indochinese. (See p. 57.)

Processing of refugees takes place in two stages--overseas (Wake Island and Guam, mostly) and Stateside (Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, Eglin, and recently, Indiantown Gap). A joint military/civilian task force under a Senior Civil Coordinator has been established at each location. (See pp. 19 and 24.)

Procedures vary at each place, but generally
2 Defense provides support, safety, and 5
3 security. Immigration identifies and 86
processes the refugees, the Social Security
Administration issues account numbers, the
Public Health Service performs medical
screening and tests, certain voluntary
agencies obtain sponsors and provide
personal services, and the Task Force acts
as overall coordinator. (See pp. 19 and 20.)

+ The Department of Health, Education, and 12
Welfare Social and Rehabilitative Service
and the Labor Department assist in
- resettlement. (See p. 20.)
/

CHAPTER 1

EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

In March 1975 Communist forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia strengthened their military efforts. This led to the rapid collapse of government forces and a sudden flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of whom ultimately sought rescue and safe haven in the United States.

Preparation began in March 1975 in South Vietnam to move refugees from northern provinces to other areas. The Agency for International Development (AID) began arranging for civilian U.S. planes--under Department of Defense (DOD) contract--to fly refugees from Da Nang to Cam Rahn. The first flight was scheduled for March 26, to be followed by 24 other flights over a 6-day period. A sealift operation was also used to move refugees to Cam Rahn.

U.S. evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese from Saigon began on April 15, and evacuation flights ended on April 30 when the American Embassy in Saigon closed. A few hours later the Republic of South Vietnam surrendered to Communist forces. For short periods after the American Embassies in Phnom Penh and Saigon closed, Cambodians and Vietnamese, by their own means, continued to flee and seek safety elsewhere--mostly to the United States.

Because of the anticipated volume of refugees, the President of the United States appointed Ambassador L. Dean Brown on April 18 to head a special Interagency Task Force for coordinating all U.S. activities for evacuating Indochina refugees. (Ambassador Brown resigned and Julia Vadala Taft of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare began serving as Acting Director on May 27.)

The Task Force was charged with two basic responsibilities: (1) providing transportation and safety to Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees and (2) initiating and implementing a major refugee resettlement program.

The Director of the Task Force was to carry out these responsibilities, which will involve all U.S. Government agencies, under the direction of the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs. The Assistant for National Security Affairs advised the heads of the agencies that the Director was to receive their full cooperation and support.

The Director quickly assembled a staff composed of officials from DOD, State, AID, and the U.S. Information Agency to carry out continuous operations at the Operations Center in Washington, D.C. Another larger group of senior officials from Federal agencies having both short- and long-range interests in the evacuation and resettlement of Indochina refugees participated in regular planning and decision-making meetings.


Both the groups directed their efforts toward planning and solving the problems of:

- Evacuating refugees from Indochina.
- Selecting staging areas in the Western Pacific.
- Selecting reception centers in the United States.
- Arranging logistical and personnel support for the staging areas and reception centers.
- Helping migration of refugees into the United States.
- Resettling Indochina refugees permanently.
- Obtaining and managing financial support for all activities, from evacuation through resettlement.

The Task Force in Washington, D.C., contains a section responsible for congressional, public, and press queries, and includes toll-free telephone operations for persons wishing to sponsor refugees, and a unit dealing with computer operations designed to permit a centrally located source of data on the flow of refugees into the United States. The unit maintains continuous liaison with DOD and with civil agencies and international organizations and American voluntary agencies.

The normal flow of refugees from Indochina to resettlement in the United States and third countries and the organization of the Task Force is depicted on the following chart. In addition to those refugees going to third countries directly from the Western Pacific area, many are now departing Stateside reception centers for resettlement in third countries.

**FLOW CHART DEPICTING THE BASIC FLOW OF REFUGEES
FROM INDOCHINA AND THE LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR HANDLING EVACUATION OF REFUGEES**



^a President's Inter-Agency Task Force is composed of senior officers from Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Housing, HEW, Justice, Labor, Interior and Transportation and AID, USIA, OMB, and CIA.

^b Western Pacific Restaging Areas include Guam, Wake Island, Clark AB, and Subic Bay where most of the work is done by DOD.

^c About 5,700 refugees were out-processed at Travis AFB in the early stages of the evacuation activities. Travis AFB will not be a continuing processing center.

^d On May 28, 1975, a 4th reception center at Indiantown Gap Army Reservation capable of handling 14,000 to 15,000 refugees was opened.

— ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
- - - GENERAL MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

REFUGEE LEGISLATION

The Secretary of State said that:

"As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the authority to plan, coordinate and implement evacuation activities. Section 2 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2601), authorizes United States financing. Subject to certain limitations, section 801 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2431), and section 36(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (PL 93-559: 88 Stat. 1807) are also available for such purposes. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act and the Foreign Assistance Act include authority to use the services of other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, and to enter into contracts, for example with voluntary relief agencies. It is anticipated that additional authorization and appropriation of funds will be necessary to complete these activities. Finally, section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182) (d) (5), is the authority for the admission of such Vietnamese nationals as may enter the United States and who do not have immigrant or non-immigrant visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act."

The Administration also cited section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, as authority to make \$98 million previously appropriated for Indochina Postwar Reorganization (IPR) assistance available for evacuating and resettling of Indochina refugees. However, before authorizing the use of this \$98 million, pursuant to Presidential Determination 75-13 (which cited as authorizing authority section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962), AID transferred \$5 million to Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM) for assistance to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. Section 2(c) allows during any fiscal year, in cases of national interest, up to \$10 million of funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to be transferred to and consolidated with funds available under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. This money is to be used to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs.

The recently passed Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 authorizes the appropriation of up to \$455 million, in addition to funds otherwise available for carrying out the Indochina refugee relief and resettlement program.

FUNDS COMMITTED TO PROGRAM

Between March 25 and May 21, 1975, AID made available \$134,272,000 for refugee evacuation.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Allottee</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Net amount available</u>
Mar. 25 to Apr. 30	USAID-Saigon	IPR	\$ 31,272,000
Apr. 10	a/State-ORM	Repayment of loan principal and interest	5,000,000
Apr. 23 to May 2	State-ORM	IPR	<u>98,000,000</u>
Total			<u>\$134,272,000</u>

a/ Transferred from AID to ORM.

Starting at about the time AID began arranging for evacuating Vietnamese refugees from northern provinces, specifically, Da Nang, and during a period of about 15 days ending April 8, AID allotted \$31,272,000 to its Mission program, referred to as Humanitarian and Refugee Relief, about \$16 million of which was earmarked for airlift and sealift operations. However, while some of the remaining funds were used for continuing ongoing projects, most of these funds were for emergency refugee relief.

From April 23, 1975, and in 3 installments ending May 2 (pursuant to Presidential Determination 75-17), AID allotted \$98 million to ORM for evacuating and resettling refugees. This amount was fully obligated by May 23. However, DOD Military Sealift Command had billed ORM for only \$7,020,505 of a \$13,930,505 bill.

Pursuant to Presidential Determination 75-13, dated April 8, AID transferred \$5 million to ORM on April 10 for assisting Indochina refugees. About \$2 million was used for evacuation activities and the balance is available for other authorized uses by ORM.

New funds made available

Pursuant to Public Law 94-24 passed on May 23, 1975, the Congress appropriated \$405 million (of the \$507 million requested and \$455 million authorized) for refugee relief and resettlement. Of this amount, \$100 million will be allocated to HEW for carrying out its role in the resettlement of Indochina refugees; the remaining \$305 million will be used by

State to meet expenses incurred by it, DOD, Justice, and others. Most of the expenses to be reimbursed by State have been and will be incurred by DOD.

The Office of Management and Budget has allocated \$145 million to ORM for fiscal year 1975 and \$160 million for 1976.

CHAPTER 2

ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS

To estimate refugee evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement costs, the President's Interagency Task Force made assumptions that (1) 130,000 refugees would be settled in the United States and 20,000 in third countries and (2) 30 days would be required for refugee processing through the staging areas and 60 days for processing through the reception centers. To the degree that these assumptions prove incorrect, the estimated costs will vary proportionately.

Through June 8, a total of 131,210 refugees had been identified. The 30,340 refugees already released were obviously processed in less than the expected 90 days. However, the processing has now slowed considerably, and many of the remaining 100,870 refugees may require more than 90 days to process.

Officials who prepared the cost estimates emphasized that, in many instances, there was little data available for use in estimating the cost of particular items. As a result, those estimates were made by agency officials on the basis of past experience and group discussions of the factors which might influence costs.

At May 2, 1975, these costs were estimated as shown below.

	(millions)
Sealift (DOD)	\$ 30.0
Airlift (DOD)	132.0
Facilities (DOD)	35.0
Daily maintenance (DOD)	185.0
Resettlement costs (State/ORM)	78.0
Welfare and medical (HEW)	125.0
Movement of refugees to third countries (State/ORM)	<u>20.0</u>
	<u>\$605.0</u>

SEALIFT (DOD) - \$30 MILLION

The estimate for sealift costs, made by the Military Sealift Command, consisted of seven types of costs. Of the total estimate, \$15 million (\$10 million for ocean transportation of foodstuffs and other material and \$5 million for ship repairs) was for items for which there was no input data upon which to calculate an amount. Although it was known that there would be considerable costs for these items, there was no way

to compute what the costs would be. Another item, \$1.1 million for contract cancellation costs, and for the charter of barges and tugs used in the evacuation of the northern provinces has since been dropped.

The remaining \$14 million was based on input data of varying degrees of reliability.

--\$7 million for operating costs of commercial and Government-owned ships was arrived at by using existing time charter rates for commercial vessels and industrial fund rates for Government-owned ships and assuming their use from March 25 through May 10.

--\$2.6 million for war risk insurance was for the period from March 25 through April 8, when the U.S. Government assumed the risk as a self-insurer. Since this cost item was complete when the estimate was prepared and DOD had the insurance rates, we were told by DOD officials that this figure is not subject to much variance.

--\$2.9 million for subsistence costs was arrived at by multiplying the number of refugees (150,000) by an average number of days onboard ship (4 days) by \$5 a day.

--The remaining \$1.5 million is to cover the Government's liability for six barges left in Vietnam by a contractor involved in the evacuation of the northern provinces.

GAO comments

There still is no data available for making better estimates of the ocean transportation of foodstuffs and other material and of ship repair costs. The military's ocean transportation billing mechanism is a long, drawn-out process, and no inspections or surveys have been made to determine the amount of damage done to the ships during the evacuation.

A decision has been made to fund the contract cancellation costs from the appropriations (Military Assistance) used to fund the contracts the vessels were operating under at the time they were diverted to the evacuation effort. Therefore, this \$1.1 million portion of the estimate is no longer an appropriate item for inclusion in the estimates for the evacuation program.

The \$7 million estimate for ship operating costs has proven to be a very close estimate. A breakdown of costs incurred from March 25 through May 15 totaled \$7,001,000, as shown below.

--Three U.S. Government-owned ships, 140 ship days at a cost of \$1,366,000.

--Eight deep draft commercial ships, 311 ship days at a cost of \$4,985,000.

--One small commercial tanker, 35 ship days at a cost of \$105,000.

--One small landing ship tank, 10 ship days at a cost of \$50,000.

--Barges and tugs, 25 contract days at a cost of \$495,000.

We were told by DOD officials that additional charges for ship operating costs should not exceed \$200,000.

Several areas of uncertainty exist at this time, however, which could cause the actual cost of sealift operations to vary considerably, depending on what the facts turn out to be.

--It has not been determined whether the six barges left in Vietnam had to be left there or whether the contractor was negligent and didn't try to get them out.

--It would also appear that figures of 150,000 refugees and \$5 a day used to compute the subsistence cost estimates are high. Some refugees were transshipped and therefore would have to be counted twice (e.g., from the northern provinces to the South and then on to the staging areas, or from Vietnam to Guam and Wake Island via the Philippines), but many went either by air or Vietnamese ships at least part of the way. Fresh produce was purchased on the local market at high prices, but the \$5 a day figure could also turn out to be high. There still is no input data, however, which would either support or invalidate the estimates for subsistence costs.

AIRLIFT (DOD) - \$132 MILLION

This estimate had three components--\$33 million to airlift 110,000 refugees to the staging areas at a rate of \$300 a person, \$69 million to airlift 130,000 refugees from the staging areas to the processing centers at a rate of \$530 a person, and \$30 million to airlift materials and nonrefugee personnel.

The cost of each Military Air Command C-141 flight from Saigon to Guam was \$21,000. We were told that, at that time, the C-141s were equipped to handle only 70 passengers per flight. On this basis the average cost would be \$300 a passenger. Due to the danger involved, it was deemed necessary

to use Government-owned aircraft for the flights from Saigon to the staging areas.

In estimating the airlift cost from the staging areas to the processing centers, DOD assumed that 80 percent of the refugees would fly on commercial charter aircraft and 20 percent on Government-owned C-141s. DOD used a cost per passenger based on rates from Guam to Fort Smith, Arkansas (Fort Chaffee area).

The estimate for airlifting supplies and nonrefugee personnel was a projection based on costs incurred through the date of the estimate.

GAO comments

DOD has decided to discontinue using Military Air Command aircraft and to use only charter aircraft for transporting persons from staging areas to processing centers. This decision was made after 56,000 persons had already been airlifted, but it did cause the estimate to be reduced from \$69 million to \$62.2 million. During our discussion of the rates, DOD officials also discovered that they had used the rate applicable to flights from Clark Air Base in the Philippines to Fort Smith instead of from Guam. This further reduced the estimate from \$62.2 million to \$60.8 million.

On May 16, DOD again revised its estimate, this time for costs of the airlift between Vietnam and Guam, costs of moving cargo, and costs applicable to the babylift. The cost of airlifting the refugees from Vietnam to Guam was reduced from \$33 million to \$27 million (\$15 million to transport 50,000 refugees from Vietnam to Guam at \$300 each and \$12.2 million to transport 60,000 refugees from Clark Air Base to Guam at \$204 each). Based on costs incurred through May 16 of \$20 million, the estimate for cargo and nonrefugee personnel transport costs was increased from \$30 million to \$33.6 million. Military Air Command costs of \$1.2 million for the babylift operation were also added to the airlift cost estimate for the first time.

Based on all these adjustments the total airlift cost estimate has been reduced from \$132 million to \$122.6 million.

Information available to our staff on Guam indicates that actual airlift costs to Guam should be substantially less than the amount included in the revised estimate. There were fewer flights to Guam because each plane carried two to three times more refugees than originally estimated. About half the refugees reached Guam by American, Vietnamese or third-country ships. We believe that actual airlift costs to Guam should

total about \$6.1 million rather than the \$27 million in the revised cost estimate.

The use of the Military Air Command rate as a basis for flights between Guam and Fort Smith could also cause the estimate to be overstated. The per person rate to Fort Smith is \$439 compared with \$363 to Camp Pendleton, California, and \$468 to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. As of May 19, 1975, 31,800 refugees have gone to the closest destination--California--compared with 4,100 to Florida. Therefore, the estimated airlift costs for moving refugees from the staging areas to the processing centers may be excessive.

FACILITIES (DOD) - \$35 MILLION

We were unable to determine the basis for the estimate of \$20 million for staging area facilities and \$15 million for processing center facilities. But, DOD advised us that the \$35 million was a very rough estimate based on anticipated costs of \$5 million for opening and closing a refugee facility at Guam and \$5 million for setting up and \$2.5 million for tearing down facilities at each of four processing centers in the United States. No estimates were made for facility costs at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay, or Wake Island.

GAO comments

DOD officials emphasized that these were rough estimates, made without the assistance of any valid cost input data. Although some cost information has now come in, it still is not sufficient to make a good estimate. One official stated, however, that in his opinion the estimate was high.

Preliminary data obtained by GAO staffs at the refugee sites indicate that the estimate for overseas sites was low and estimates for processing centers were high.

Data obtained at Guam indicates that it cost about \$2.8 million to erect facilities there, excluding the cost of tents, cots, and mattresses and will cost about \$2.8 million to dismantle them when operations terminate. The estimated cost of constructing other staging areas at Clark Air Base, Wake, and Subic were not expected to exceed \$1.4 million.

Preliminary data obtained at Camp Pendleton, Ft. Chaffee, and Eglin indicate that construction costs totaled about \$4.6 million at Camp Pendleton; about \$2.2 million, excluding labor, at Ft. Chaffee; and \$1.1 million at Eglin. The costs of dismantling the facilities are expected to be minimal and some costs should be recovered, such as turn-ins of beds,

mattresses, refrigerators, etc. Based on this preliminary data, it appears that the \$35 million estimate is substantially overstated.

DAILY MAINTENANCE (DOD) - \$185 MILLION

The \$15 daily maintenance rate used in computing this estimate was arrived at by DOD after a group discussion of the various factors involved; e.g., food, utilities, medical care, transportation, temporary duty personnel, and contract services costs. There was no attempt, however, to estimate the cost of the individual component items. It was also realized that this was a rough estimate and that better data should be gathered as quickly as possible.

GAO comments

Defense has sent personnel to each processing center to gather the data necessary to estimate the daily maintenance cost. DOD received an estimate of \$12.42 from Ft. Chaffee on May 13 and an estimate of \$8.95 from Camp Pendleton on May 16.

GAO staffs at Guam and at reception centers in the United States also obtained preliminary data on these costs. This data is shown below to permit the reader to make certain comparisons between these sites and with the \$15 rate used in the initial estimate. It is obvious, however, that certain costs are included at some locations and not at others; therefore the rates are not comparable in all respects. In each case, however, the costs shown indicate that the daily maintenance rate will be considerably less than \$15.

Guam--as of May 12 the rate was estimated at \$5.75. This included \$2.41 for food and \$1.85 for camp operations costs.

Camp Pendleton--as of May 15 the rate was estimated at \$7.68. This included \$2.68 for food and \$1.95 for base operations.

Ft. Chaffee--as of May 16 the estimated rate was \$12.56. This included \$7.13 for "materials, consumable supplies, and contractual services" and \$1.50 for food.

Eglin--as of May 16 the estimated rate was \$8.41. This included \$2.41 for food and \$1.75 for medical costs. On May 22 the actual rate had dropped to \$5.17.

Time did not permit us to analyze and verify the basis for the \$7.13 item, which makes up 57 percent of the Ft. Chaffee rate. Since there was no comparable item of this size in the estimates of the other camps, we feel that the Ft. Chaffee rate may be overstated.

There is still no way of estimating the average time it will take to process the refugees. Some were processed rather quickly, but new security clearance procedures have caused the processing to slow down considerably. From the preliminary data described above, it is evident that the estimated daily rate of \$15 may be considerably overstated. Consequently, if the average processing time does not greatly exceed the 90 days used in the estimate, the total daily maintenance cost estimate of \$185 million may be substantially overstated.

RESETTLEMENT COSTS (STATE) - \$78 MILLION

This amount was estimated by ORM by assuming that 130,000 refugees will be resettled in the United States at an average cost of \$600 each, broken down as follows.

Payment to voluntary agency <u>1/</u>	
Overhead--office expense, long distance telephone calls, etc.	\$170
Direct settlement costs	<u>330</u>
	500
Transportation within the United States	<u>100</u>
Total	<u>\$600</u>

It is assumed that the Federal Government will pay for transportation costs directly. However, in the event the voluntary agency does so, reimbursement will be made.

The \$500 amount has been agreed to informally by representatives of the voluntary agencies, according to agency officials. Transportation costs of \$100 per refugee is the ORM estimate that one can travel about half-way across the United States for \$100.

GAO comments

As of May 16 the Special Interagency Task Force was still estimating that 150,000 refugees would be generated by the collapse of Indochina and that 130,000 would settle in the United States while the remaining 20,000 would go to various third countries.

However, three variables exist.

1. The total number of refugees may not reach 150,000. As of May 16 an estimated 126,000 were in the pipeline. The number is changing daily; just 3 weeks ago ORM was estimating the total at only 75,000.

1/ Voluntary agencies are nonprofit organizations established by a group of private citizens for a stated philanthropic purpose and supported by voluntary contributions from individuals concerned with the realization of their purposes. The nine voluntary agencies participating as of May 12, 1975, were the U.S. Catholic Conference; the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees; the Church World Service; the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service; the United HIAS Service, Inc.; the Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.; the International Rescue Committee; the American Council for Nationalities Service; and Traveler's Aid-International Social Services.

2. The total number of refugees may reach 150,000 but less than 20,000 may go to third countries. On May 13 Ambassador Brown estimated the number of resettlements in third countries to be 10,000 to 15,000. Assuming that 5,000 of the estimated 20,000 settle in the United States, the estimate of \$78 million would be increased by \$3 million.
3. The number of refugees who will want to return to Vietnam is not known. It could be sizable and, if so, would impact on the program's cost.

We have no basis for questioning the validity of the estimate of \$100 a person for domestic travel. Comparison of selected point-to-point tourist air fares indicates that \$100 will take one about halfway across the United States. The fare from the West Coast to Fort Smith is \$106, for examples. However, a number of uncertainties exist, such as how many of the refugees are children who can travel at half fare, how many will travel only short distances versus how many will travel long distances, and how many will travel by bus, which is cheaper than air?

The \$500 per refugee cost appears to be a firm figure. ORM has issued small contracts to certain voluntary agencies, providing for payments at the rate of \$500 per refugee (using money made available by Presidential Determination 75-13, dated April 8, 1975), and the draft grant agreements that were being prepared for signature after the appropriation is signed also include the rate of \$500. Agency officials told us that, based on experience with other refugee programs total cost to the voluntary agencies will be much more than \$500; the difference will be made up by private sector charitable contributions to the agencies and by the sponsors of the resettled refugees.

The draft contract agreements that were being prepared made no mention of refugees who have enough money to pay their own costs of resettlement. We were told that internal guidelines have been developed which establish that assets in excess of \$4,000 for an individual and \$15,000 for a family of four would preclude the need for Government financing of resettlement costs.

We also question whether the estimates should have included refugees that are dependents or relatives of U.S. citizens among refugees subject to resettlement by voluntary agencies.

SUBSEQUENT WELFARE AND MEDICAL (HEW) - \$125 MILLION

HEW had requested budget authority of \$125 million for carrying out its responsibilities under provisions of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 for a 14-month period ending June 30, 1976. Cost estimates supporting the request dealt with (1) public health, (2) welfare assistance and services, and (3) educational services. The budget request was based on an estimated 130,000 refugees.

GAO comments

Our comments in the preceding section, concerning the numbers of refugees on which the estimate is based and the impact on resettlement cost estimates that would result from their nonapplicability to affluent refugees and refugees that are related to or dependent on U.S. citizens, also apply to estimates of subsequent welfare and medical benefits.

As shown in the comments below concerning the three elements of the estimate, HEW is restudying the needs and will revise its budgeting data accordingly.

Public health

Budget authority of \$15 million was requested for controlling communicable diseases of refugees upon entry into the United States and for specified care after resettlement. Cost estimates are related specifically to (1) immunizing children, (2) screening for tuberculosis and other conditions, and (3) hospitalizing and out-patient treatment of tuberculosis and other conditions, such as mental defects.

HEW's cost estimates were based on data supplied by top health authorities of HEW's Center for Disease Control and the Health Services Administration. The HEW budget official who compiled the estimates said the health authorities were restudying the estimates and there may be revisions.

Welfare assistance and services

HEW asked for \$80 million to reimburse State and local welfare agencies 100 percent for financial and medical assistance and related social services to the refugees.

The estimate was based on HEW's experience with the Cuban Refugee Program for the number of persons to be served and on actual cost experience in HEW's regular programs.

Educational services

HEW's request for \$30 million was for basic English instruction for children and adults and for vocational education for adults in the reception centers and after placement in local communities.

HEW officials told us that educational needs estimates were based on the Cuban Refugee Program, with other HEW-experienced cost elements added. At the time the estimates were compiled, the Federal Government had had little actual experience with the Indochina refugees. Some experience has now been obtained, and we were told that HEW was compiling new estimates based on something other than the Cuban Refugee Program model.

MOVEMENT OF ADDED 20,000 REFUGEES TO THIRD COUNTRIES
FOR RESETTLEMENT (STATE) - \$20 MILLION

This amount was arrived at by assuming that 20,000 refugees of the estimated 150,000 total will be resettled in various third countries at an average cost of \$1,000 per refugee, broken down as follows.

Overseas transportation	\$ 400
Transportation within third country	100
Voluntary agency resettlement cost	<u>500</u>
Total	<u>\$1,000</u>

The \$500 amount has been agreed to informally by representatives of the voluntary agencies, according to agency officials. Overseas transportation costs of \$400 per person is an average amount that ORM assumed would be needed. The ORM is not sure where the refugees will go nor from which point--Guam, Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, or Eglin--they will depart. ORM officials said the transportation cost could range from \$300 to \$800 per refugee but hope the costs will average out to \$400.

The Interagency Task Force plans to resettle refugees in third countries with the help of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. As of May 16, 1975, no formal agreement had been signed with either organization.

GAO comments

The Task Force has revised its estimate of refugees who will be resettled in third countries from 20,000 to a range of 10,000 to 15,000. Assuming the estimate of 150,000 refugees is accurate, the difference will obviously have to be resettled in the United States. If only 15,000 of the estimated 20,000 refugees go to third countries, estimated costs for overseas transportation will be reduced by \$2 million, or \$400 for each of the 5,000 refugees who would have to settle in the United States.

The number that will be resettled in third countries is really a question of how many want to go or will be accepted by those countries. On May 19, 1975, the Task Force had commitment for about 4,500.

The \$500 resettlement payment to the voluntary agencies is the same as the amount estimated for domestic resettlement. We have no basis for questioning its validity.

The estimated cost of \$400 per refugee for overseas transportation is too nebulous to analyze at this time. Appropriate analysis will have to await the further development of information on the numbers of persons to be transported from each point of departure to each third-country destination.

CHAPTER 3

REFUGEE SCREENING AT U.S. RECEPTION CENTERS

As of June 8, 1975, 56,667 refugees were at reception centers for processing and future release. At that time 30,340 refugees had been released from reception centers and 43,158 were at installations in the Western Pacific awaiting movement to the U.S. reception centers. A total of 1,557 had requested they be returned to Vietnam.

Refugees are being processed at both overseas and U.S. locations.

SCREENING PROCESS

Before being released into the United States, Indochina refugees were being processed through one of three U.S. reception centers, at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, and Eglin Air Force Base. A fourth reception center at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, was opened May 28.

At each center a joint military-civilian task force, under a senior civil coordinator, has been established and is responsible for the orderly reception, care, processing, and resettlement of Indochina refugees entering the reception centers from Western Pacific Staging Areas.

The functions of each agency located at the reception centers is described below.

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Function</u>
DOD: Marine Corps (Pendleton Army (Chafee) Air Force (Eglin)	Cooperates with Senior Civil Coordinator in operation of the center. Responsible for general support, safety, and security of the center.
State	Coordinates the civil activities relative to the care, processing, and resettlement of refugees. Primary contact point for Interagency Task Force

<p>Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)</p>	<p>Identifies and processes refugees entering the United States and ensures they have met requirements for security clearances and sponsorship</p>
<p>HEW: Social Security Administration</p> <p>Public Health Service</p> <p>Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS)</p>	<p>Issues Social Security numbers to refugees processed through the center.</p> <p>Ensures that refugees receive basic medical examinations and tests and that medical problems are identified.</p> <p>Assists the voluntary agencies in locating and certifying sponsors.</p> <p>Investigates financial resources of refugees.</p> <p>Assists refugees in mak- ing travel arrangements.</p>
<p>Labor</p>	<p>Determines occupational, educational, and training background of refugees seeking employment in the United States.</p>
<p>Voluntary agencies</p>	<p>Obtain sponsorship for refugees leaving the center. Provide personal services to refugees within the center.</p>

For the most part, agencies involved in operating reception centers were functioning on an ad hoc basis at the time of our review. Processing refugees is not their normal operation and they had few implementing instructions. Notable exceptions to this were (1) the military commands, which were providing an ordinary support function, (2) INS, which was generally following its standard procedures for processing parolees, and (3) voluntary agencies, which customarily provide resettlement assistance to refugees.

PROCESSING FLOW

Different timing and positioning of certain procedures were used at reception centers, but at the three centers

we visited the basic processing flow of refugees was identical. The screening process was basically as follows:

1. Refugees deplaning were placed under immediate control by the military command involved. Living quarters were assigned, with family groups remaining intact if possible. Through personal interviews and reviews of identification cards, military personnel obtained such data as name, sex, age, citizenship, family size, occupation, religion, and proficiency in English. Former U.S. employees were identified.
2. Refugees were transported to their quarters at the reception centers. From this point the military personnel were required to ensure that refugees began processing through INS.
3. INS fingerprinted and photographed refugees. Each refugee was then interviewed by an INS officer, who obtained basic biographical information and determined the need for sponsorship and security clearance. Each refugee was required to sign a sworn statement attesting to his moral character and admissibility to the United States. The officer completed the appropriate INS forms, prepared an immigration file, and assigned a control number to each refugee. This completed initial INS processing.
4. Refugees also went through Social Security Administration processing, during which Social Security numbers and cards were issued, refugees were interviewed, and available documents were reviewed by Administration personnel.
5. Under Public Health Service supervision, refugees went through a basic medical screening, including a basic physical and mental examination, tuberculosis and venereal disease screenings, and necessary immunizations. Refugees with diseases were being treated at the military hospitals in the reception centers. Upon release, medical records were being forwarded to local health authorities in the resettlement area for followup.

6. Refugees were being processed by the Social and Rehabilitation Service and Labor Department, which have somewhat different procedures at each reception center. Generally, interviewers accumulated information on a refugee's financial condition, relatives or other possible sponsors in the United States, occupational and educational background, and general biographical data. This information was being forwarded to the voluntary agency responsible for the refugee's sponsorship.
7. Voluntary agencies match refugees with sponsors. Refugees were questioned as to their needs, occupational aspirations, and location preferences. A complete biographical profile was accumulated on each refugee family. The agencies then contacted each prospective sponsor to determine his intent, financial ability, and general acceptability. The sponsor is required to make a moral (not legally binding) commitment to assist the refugee family until it achieves self-sufficiency.
8. Voluntary agencies must verify to INS that sponsorship has been found. The refugee is eligible for release from the reception center as soon as INS receives a security clearance from its headquarters. This clearance represents verification by the FBI, DOD, CIA, State, and DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) that the refugee is not "undersirable".
9. When neither the refugee nor his sponsor can provide funds for travel to the resettlement location, the Department of State has been authorized to assume the necessary travel costs. Voluntary agencies and the Social and Rehabilitation Service verify the need for Government expenditures for travel, and the amount is charged against an allotment provided by State at each reception center.
10. Refugees who can provide assurances of release by INS, sponsorship, and travel arrangements are released from the reception center by the military command. INS forwards the appropriate files to the immigration area office having jurisdiction in each case.

— — — — —

There are certain exceptions to this general processing flow, such as: ..

- Dependents of U.S. citizens and of permanent resident aliens can be released without security checks or medical examinations.
- Refugees who demonstrate a proficiency in English, a general plan for resettlement, and adequate financial resources (\$4,000 per family member) can be released without sponsors.
- Refugees 14 years of age and under do not have to receive security clearances.
- Refugees who wish to be transferred to third countries do not have to receive security clearances or sponsorship if the third countries will receive them and the refugees or the third countries pay the travel costs.

The processing flow at each of the reception center has been in a continuous state of refinement since the centers were opened; however, most of these changes have been minor. The screening process described above reflects the situation as of May 23, 1975. Reception center officials said no significant changes are planned.

CHAPTER 4

WESTERN PACIFIC STAGING AREA

Officials on Guam advised us that the Vietnam and Cambodian evacuees were not being processed nor being held for lengthy periods of time in Thailand or the Philippines. Refugees are being processed on both Guam and Wake Island, and we were advised that processing procedures are identical on both islands. During May, about 50,000 refugees were either continuously being processed or were awaiting transportation to the continental United States. On June 8, 43,158 were awaiting transportation to the United States. While on Guam we obtained the following information.

SCREENING PROCESS

INS inspectors on Guam interview all evacuees to establish their identities and eligibilities for parole into the United States. Certain background information is also obtained and submitted to INS in Washington for use by investigative agencies in making security checks.

INS inspector interview procedures varied. Officials said that the inspectors were all experienced INS personnel and were following written alien criteria. We observed, however, that the preprocessing being accomplished on Guam was different because:

- Many refugees do not have documents, such as birth certificates, marriage licenses, identification cards, etc. Yet, inspectors process them for entry into the United States.
- Inspector interviews were somewhat strained because interpreters were used. Refugee volunteers who were awaiting transportation to the mainland often served as interpreters.
- The criteria the inspectors used to establish eligibility for parole into the United States was being interpreted "liberally" in that refugees were being admitted who had been "assisted by the United States." 1/ As of

1/ This category includes all refugees arriving at the Western Pacific staging area.

May 20, 1975, 9,653 evacuees had been processed in this category. The majority of the refugees remaining on Guam at May 29, 1975, would be eligible for parole into the United States under this criteria.

In addition to potential problems caused by these situations, the ability of INS to identify "undesirables" is questionable.

INS officials on Guam agreed with us that investigations of background information sent to Washington for security checks would be limited by inability to cross-check the information with Vietnamese local police, hospitals, and officials. At the time of our departure from Guam, INS had not identified any "undesirables" among the 81,000 refugees processed for departure to the United States.

Results of screening operations

As of May 20, Guam had received 104,764 Indochina evacuees, of which 57,814 had been sent to continental U.S. processing centers or third countries. On that same day, INS finished processing 81,218 refugees, who were categorized as follows.

U.S. citizens	1,561
Vietnamese with U.S. relatives	10,111
Other Vietnamese	9,653
Cambodians	28
High-risk Viet- namese (note a)	<u>59,865</u>
Total	<u>81,218</u>

a/ Vietnamese whose lives would be in danger in Vietnam.

About 3,000 refugees had applied for passage to third countries; 1000 evacuees had expressed a firm intent to return to Vietnam, most of whom, we were told, were young men who had evacuated rather hastily and whose families and relatives remained in Vietnam.



GUAM: CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS WHILE REFUGEES ARRIVE. Official U.S. Navy Photograph



GUAM: CHOW LINE FOR REFUGEES. Official U.S. Navy Photograph

COSTS OF OPERATIONS

The Naval Supply Depot finance center was responsible for maintaining centralized cost accounting information for all Navy costs incurred on Guam. Costs are being maintained by the various cost centers. May 29 total costs reported were \$6,760,686.

In addition to these direct military costs, the Government of Guam has incurred additional costs in support of the refugee camps. An early estimate prepared for us totaled about \$2 million but did not include any costs for the direct support of refugees being permanently paroled on Guam.

The Task Force now plans for eligible Government of Guam costs to be reimbursed through DOD. However, we observed uncertainties on Guam as to what costs, or portions thereof, are reimbursable to DOD from ORM. For instance, whether the costs of installing a temporary sewer system in the tent city and of spraying against insects were proper costs was discussed while we were on Guam.

OBSERVATIONS

It was apparent to both military and civilian officials on Guam that there were two general classes of refugees: (1) the first 60,000 who were airlifted from the metropolitan Saigon area and (2) the approximately 60,000 who came to Guam by ship, primarily from the northern provinces. Various profiles have been made on early U.S. arrivals from the first group, which usually show that many of them speak some English, are skilled or semiskilled workers, and generally should be able to adapt fairly well in their new country. However, various medical men have expressed concern that some people in this first group face grim prospects of adapting to the American lifestyle.

By contrast, the second group were much poorer and less educated. Many people left Vietnam with only the clothes on their backs, and a few salvaged pots and pans. These refugees are mostly farmers, fishermen, and former military men accompanied by their families. In our opinion, they will have a harder time adjusting to life in the United States.

Although no profile data was available on this second group, it was apparent to us that they were very apprehensive about what was going to happen to them when they reached the United States. Farmers asked about the kind and amount of land they would be given. Fishermen asked about the kind of boat and fishing equipment they would receive. Soldiers and sailors were even less sure of their job chances and asked

about the kinds of job training they would be given. Compared to the first group, it is likely these people will require much longer term assistance and much higher expenditures for education, job training, and welfare.

The first refugees arrived on Guam on April 23, one day after the local military command was asked to draw up a plan to provide a safe haven for up to 50,000 refugees for 90 days. The effort expended by the military and the scope of its task was enormous. Abandoned barracks buildings were cleared up, local private construction company barracks were rented, a deserted hotel was leased, and bachelor officers and enlisted men were doubled up and their quarters used as the refugees came pouring in.


Very soon every available building was used and a main tent campsite was chosen, an abandoned airfield at Orote Point on the Naval Station. This site was picked because it was flat land, had adequate water supply, was under military control, and was near the Naval Supply Depot facilities which would be necessary to support the population.

Navy Seabees were flown to Guam, and the massive construction program began. More than 500 acres of land were cleared, 20 miles of waterpipe laid, 11 miles of electric lines strung, 8 field kitchens set up, and 3,200 tents erected. Tent city housed as many as 40,000 refugees.

Living conditions

Refugee living conditions on Guam vary from good to poor, with conditions at "tent city" being the worst. Outdoor shower and latrine runoff has contaminated the soil and created a severe sanitation problem. Health conditions had deteriorated to the point that the military was considering moving the earlier sections of tents to new ground and installing a temporary sewer system within tent city. This will be an expensive undertaking. Cost estimates in a message to higher headquarters included a figure of \$6.4 million for a sewer system and improvements in the water supply system.

Food service varies from good to fair. Again, the more temporary facilities at tent city are the worst. Long lines for food were being shortened with the opening of more field kitchens. Also, the issuance of ration cards should allow one person to obtain food for an entire family. In general, the refugees were getting adequate amounts of food, and the diet was balanced. A much sought-after sauce for rice was expected to arrive on Guam shortly after our departure and should make the rice more acceptable to the refugees.



Official U.S. Navy Photograph

GUAM: OROTE POINT EVACUEE CENTER,

Banking facilities were available to the refugees, and Deak & Company was buying gold from the refugees. Cash was limited by camp military authorities to \$50 and the remaining value was paid in travelers checks or Deak & Company checks, most of which were used to open savings and loan or bank savings accounts.

Although we were not permitted to examine the records of these private companies, it was apparent that several million dollars worth of gold had changed hands in Guam but that the average transaction was for one or two teals of gold (each teal is about 1.2 ounces) valued at \$175 each. No other data was available to us on Guam on refugee assets. U.S. Customs officers were asking for declarations of gold or currency in excess of \$5,000 at the outprocessing points just before the refugees' departure from Guam, but refugees who had sold their gold and opened savings accounts were not required to make this declaration. Customs officials told us that very few refugees had made such declarations.

As the U.S. reception centers became filled, the outflow from Guam reduced to a few hundred refugees a day, and their idle time increased. The Red Cross and military civil action teams increased their efforts to organize games for the children and the Office of Civil Coordinator started English classes and some short-term skill classes, such as sewing and knitting. But, if the refugees are going to remain on Guam for long periods, more efforts are needed.

The most striking thing about the refugee operations on Guam is the overriding concern of all officials--military, civilian, and local government--for the weather. Guam is not a good place to be living in a temporary tent city. The probability of a tropical storm or typhoon hitting Guam increases each day. The average rainfall for May through July is 19.7 inches, and it often rains continuously for days.

The actions taken by the military to safeguard the refugees during a storm, and the local government views on the situation are discussed more fully in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 5

U.S. RECEPTION CENTERS

The official ceiling for refugees at the Camp Pendleton reception center is 18,000; at Fort Chaffee, it is 24,000 increased from the original 20,000; and at Eglin Air Force Base, it is 5,000 increased from 2,500 on May 13, 1975. The fourth reception center at Indiantown Gap Army Reservation opened on May 28, 1975, to support 15,000 refugees.

Below are discussions and comments on our work and observations at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, and Eglin.

CAMP PENDLETON

Cost of operation

The Interagency Task Force requested that Camp Pendleton maintain detail funding records to insure documentation for DOD reimbursement of costs by the Department of State. Accordingly, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed Camp Pendleton to (1) separate requisitions/costs for subsequent reporting and reimbursement, (2) procure food for evacuees from available military sources, and (3) spend prudently, although dollar limits were not imposed.

Camp Pendleton officials stated that cost centers had been established and job orders were being used to document incremental costs. When we left Camp Pendleton, \$4,893,901 had been obligated and an additional \$3,085,170 committed for support of refugee activities.

Results of processing operations

As of June 8, a total 30,429 refugees had arrived at Camp Pendleton, 14,194 had departed, and 16,235 remained there.

Of the total 18,074 refugees there as of May 22

--5,100 had received clearances but were without sponsors,

--6,800 had sponsors but were not cleared,

--6,100 needed both clearances and sponsors,

--380 refugees had been released for resettlement in Canada,

- 35 had been released for resettlement in France,
- 32 had requested return to Vietnam, and
- others have applied for resettlement in a least 12 other countries.

Delays in resettlement are caused by difficulties in obtaining clearances and sponsorship. It appears that the clearance problem will be alleviated, because the paperwork for obtaining clearances is now being prepared in Guam. Camp Pendleton INS officials said clearances have been received for refugees who have not yet arrived.

Sponsorship continues to be a problem. Camp Pendleton officials said some alleviation is expected because funds are becoming available to the voluntary agencies.


During the first 7 to 10 days of processing, INS was authorized to release certain refugees categorized as U.S. citizens and resident aliens and their relatives, well-known Vietnamese, and employees of American organizations and their relatives for completion of processing at local offices near their destinations. Task Force officials said the names, destinations, and alien registration numbers are available for about 3,800 of those individuals.

On May 13, INS officials were advised that individual States, municipalities, and large well-known corporations could sponsor refugees without voluntary agency participation. The State of Washington made arrangements to sponsor 500 refugees and intended to process them at Camp Murray, near Tacoma, for subsequent resettlement. After the first 48 refugees were transferred to Camp Murray--some without sponsorship other than the State--INS put a "hold" on transfers of additional refugees. The project has restarted and a Task Force official said the State of Washington will receive \$500 for each refugee, similar to the arrangements with voluntary agencies.

As of May 23, 8,100 persons had departed Camp Pendleton, 3,271 transported at Government expense. According to Task Force guidelines, Government-paid travel is preferable to jeopardizing sponsorship or depriving the refugee of funds required for resettlement.

Observations

Camp Pendleton was established as the first reception center in the United States on April 29, 1975, and the first



CAMP PENDLETON: REFUGEE CAMPS NUMBERS 4, 5, and 6.

refugees were received the same day. The base is required to furnish support for 18,000 refugees at any given time, and it reached this capacity by May 8, 1975.

The reception center consists of InterAgency Task Force headquarters, the processing center and eight living areas, five with tents and three with quonset huts.

The following utilities were provided to make the reception center operational.

--20 miles of electrical distribution lines.

--Approximately 200 telephone poles.

--35,000 feet of water mains and feeder lines.

--14 shower huts (rehabilitated) and 8 portable shower units.

--3 sewage plants (placed in operation).

The reception center is located in an area used for summer training of reserve units.

Age and nationality of refugees

Data extracted from printouts furnished by the Marine Corps shows ages and nationalities as follows.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Percent</u>
12 and under	34
13 through 18	16
19 through 25	16
26 through 35	17
36 through 45	10
46 and over	7

Nationality (based on 18,937 refugees)

Vietnamese	17,728
Cambodian	727
American	283
Other	199

Services and goods provided

Except for babies, who are provided with cribs and baby blankets, refugees sleep on cots and are each provided with an air mattress, 3 blankets, 2 sheets, a pillow and pillow case. In addition, they are furnished with field jackets for use while at the center, and, according to age and sex, are provided with health and comfort kits.

Cooking facilities consist of 22 serving lines and 203 cooks. About 700 messmen are used to prepare and serve meals, and the refugees furnish some assistance in the kitchens.

Both military and civilian medical services are used. The Public Health Service


- screens all refugees 15 years and over in order to meet the requirements for immigrant visas,
- provides surveillance of infectious diseases and environmental conditions in order to minimize the risk of epidemic diseases, and
- ensures adequate treatment and follow-up of illnesses of public health significance.

Military and voluntary agency personnel staff dispensaries providing out-patient care in trailers, and the base hospital is available if needed. The trailers are handling some 1,200 patients a day. As of May 19, 217 refugees had been admitted to the base hospital.

Refugees are kept well informed of camp operations and of local, national, and worldwide news through daily newsletters published in the Vietnamese and Cambodian languages.



Official Marine Corps Photograph
CAMP PENDLETON: REFUGEES FORM LINES TO RECEIVE THEIR NOON MEAL AT
CAMP NUMBER 8.



Official Marine Corps Photograph
CAMP PENDLETON: YOUNG VIETNAMESE REFUGEES PASS THROUGH A CHOW LINE AND
ARE ASSISTED BY MARINE COOKS AND MESSMEN.

FORT CHAFFEE

Results of screenings

As of June 8, 28,661 refugees had arrived at Fort Chaffee. There was a gradual influx of about 500 to 3,000 daily, starting on May 2. The installation has released 5,625, with 23,036 remaining there. Fort Chaffee refugee-housing capacity is about 24,000.

Through May 22, INS requested security clearances on 15,805 refugees, and the status of these clearances is shown below.

<u>Agencies granting clearance</u>	<u>Cleared</u>	<u>Not cleared</u>
FBI	2,847	a/ 12,958
CIA	9,835	5,970
DOD	4,650	11,155
DEA	5,382	10,423
State	10,504	5,301

a/

The FBI must clear only those refugees who had previously been in the United States.

There were 3,572 refugees cleared for release but awaiting sponsorship. Of 2,669 refugees released by May 22, 226 are U.S. citizens, 2,316 are Vietnamese, and 20 are other nationalities.

The departing refugees have relocated nearly all over the continental United States and in about five foreign countries. The largest resettlements have been in California, Texas, Florida, and the District of Columbia. Canada and France have been the primary sites for refugees relocating to foreign countries. More than 200 refugees have requested return to Vietnam, and the Civil Coordinator's office has forwarded their names to the State Department and is awaiting instructions.

Of the 23,699 refugees at Fort Chaffee on May 15, 164 were U.S. citizens, 23,383 were Vietnamese, 68 were Cambodians, and 84 were other nationalities.

Processing delays

Based on daily refugee status reports and our observations, refugees are being processed within 2 to 3 days, but some are being retained longer because their security clearances have not been approved or they do not have sponsors.

INS officials agreed that the initial holdup in screening was the delay in obtaining clearances, but they said this has been corrected by the request for security clearances being submitted to INS Headquarters from Guam rather than from the reception center.

INS officials said 10 refugees have been identified as undesirables. INS was notified by a security agency that these refugees were not cleared but was not instructed as to the reason for rejection. INS officials have notified their headquarters and are awaiting instructions for further processing procedures.

Cost of operation

The cost of operating the Fort Chaffee Reception Center has been paid by the Army through its fiscal year 1975 operating and maintenance funds in anticipation of reimbursement by the State Department.

On April 30, the Army issued instructions to Fort Chaffee for establishing an accounting system to identify costs of the Indochina refugee program. The Army said "all incremental cost" will be reimbursed, and identified incremental cost as those actual and estimated costs incurred over normal operating costs.

The actual cost will ultimately be accumulated by the Department of Army from input of the various Army Commands involved. Fort Chaffee has military personnel from numerous Army Commands supporting the refugee program. However, the primary supporting command is "Forces Command."

The majority of support cost is being processed through the computer system at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the parent organization for Fort Chaffee. A special designation code has been assigned to the refugee program, and costs are being accumulated by elements of expense.

As of May 14, 1975, the Fort Sill weekly computer print-out showed actual costs of \$726,710. The total had increased to \$1,761,235.47 as of May 25.

Information about the costs of civilian agencies' activities at Fort Chaffee were not available for all agencies, but our discussion with agency officials revealed that the most support is being provided by the Army. Reimbursement costs incurred by the civilian agencies should be limited to personnel travel, salaries of temporary hires, overtime,

and additional supplies provided by the agencies. For example, HEW had incurred the following costs as of May 16.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Salaries	\$181,921
Travel	58,733
Supplies, medical	3,300
Supplies, administrative	<u>6,700</u>
Total to date	<u>\$250,654</u>

According to Civil Coordinator personnel, the only special funding from the Interagency Task Force was \$200,000 for transporting the refugees to sponsor locations. As of May 21, 1975, 426 refugees had used Government transportation funds of about \$46,000, which amounts to about \$108 per refugee.

Observations

Ft. Chaffee is located adjacent to the city of Ft. Smith, near the Arkansas-Oklahoma boundary. It has been used for summer Army training since it was deactivated in 1966. The refugee camp is centrally located within the Fort and is adjacent to the processing offices.

The refugees are housed in 238 one- and two-story barracks, which have been partitioned into semiprivate family quarters with three to five Army-type bunk beds. Mattresses, liners, bedding, and wall-high storage areas for clothes and miscellaneous items are provided.

Dining facilities are overloaded by three to five times their capacities. But, except for space and the rush to get the food prepared and served on time, the facilities appear to be adequate to handle the needs on a short-term basis.

There are special areas for recreation and sports activities and green or wooded areas open to the refugees. The YMCA is providing some sports equipment and has set up four recreation centers in the camp.

Interagency Task Force officials reported that many refugees were skilled workers or were in the professional fields; i.e., doctors, lawyers, educators, etc. Officials estimated that about 70 percent of the first several thousand refugees arriving understood English. The volunteers working with the Government and voluntary agencies spoke English.



FORT CHAFFEE: BARRACKS USED FOR HOUSING REFUGEES.

U.S. Army Photo



FORT CHAFFEE: CHILDREN PLAYING IN AREA AROUND REFUGEE BARRACKS.

U.S. Army Photo

Banking facilities, except for boxes for safe-keeping of valuables, have been set up in trailers.

The refugees have organized a governing unit within the installation. A "mayor" has been elected and barrack leaders chosen to help organize and control the population. A newspaper, Tan Dan, in Vietnamese, and radio broadcasts (loud speakers network) have been started to organize and direct the refugees and to keep them informed about activities and processes of the operation. The loudspeakers are also used for contacting individuals who need additional processing or followup.

Processing through the various screening steps appeared orderly, with staff in control despite the large number of refugees being processed during our visits.

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE

Cost of operation

The costs of operating the Eglin Reception Center have been paid by the Air Force through its fiscal year 1975 operating and maintenance funds, in anticipation of eventual reimbursement by the State Department. On April 30, the Interagency Task Force authorized the military commander to provide the necessary support services for the reception center and to maintain detail funding records in order to insure documentation for DOD reimbursement of incremental costs from the Department of State.

The Air Force maintains records--by element of expense--of all costs incurred in support of the reception center, except military pay and regular civilian pay. Cost information is accumulated by individual commands and given to Air Force Headquarters for inclusion into overall DOD cost summaries.

Most support services for the Eglin Reception Center are provided by the Armament Development and Test Center at Eglin. These support costs pertain to such items as civilian overtime and additional hires, vehicle rental, utility charges, supplies, equipment, refugee subsistence, and maintenance. Reimbursable costs not accumulated generally include travel costs of temporary duty personnel from other Air Force installations that report costs through their respective commands.

As of May 22, the Armament Center had accumulated the following data on its costs.

Budget estimate through August 31, 1975	\$5,101,651
Actual costs as of May 22	\$1,646,238
Average daily maintenance cost per refugee	\$5.17

Information about the costs of civilian agency activities at Eglin were not available; however, our discussions with military and civilian officials at the reception center revealed that the Air Force is providing virtually all support. Therefore, reimbursable costs incurred by civilian agencies should be limited to personnel travel, overtime, and additional supplies.

The Senior Civil Coordinator at Eglin relies almost exclusively on the Air Force for funding. The only additional funding at his disposal was a \$20,000 authorization by the Task Force for transportation of not more than 200 refugees who are otherwise eligible for release to their sponsors. As of May 21, 1975, 91 refugees had received transportation through this fund, at a total cost of \$9,100.


Results of screening operations

The Eglin Reception Center was established April 30, and the first flight of refugees arrived May 4. Although a limit of 2,500 refugees at any given time was set originally, the ceiling was raised to 5,000. Military and civilian officials at Eglin are aware of no plans to further raise this limit nor of a date set for closing the reception center.

Refugees processed

The reception center reported that as of June 8, 6,269 refugees had entered the center, 1,996 had been released, and 4,273 were still there.

All Indochina refugees entering the center were Vietmanese evacuees.



EGLIN AFB: REFUGEE SHELTER UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

USAF PHOTO

Relocation statistics

Relocation information on refugees processed through Eglin is incomplete; however, the following States were the most common resettlement areas as of May 21.

<u>State</u>	<u>Total refugees</u>	<u>Percent of refugees known to have resettled in the United States</u>
Florida	136	38
California	38	11
New York	26	7
Texas	25	7
Virginia	21	6

Fifty refugees have resettled in Canada, 5 have gone to other third countries, and 15 have requested return to Vietnam.

Personal statistics

Statistics developed as of May 17, on the ages of 3,802 refugees show:

<u>Age</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
18 and under	43
19 through 30	33
31 through 55	21
56 through 74	3
75 and over	less than 1

Thus, over three-fourths of the refugees entering Eglin are under 30 years of age, and 54 percent are of working ages 19 through 55.

The Department of Labor has begun to accumulate certain information on the occupational and educational backgrounds of refugees seeking employment. As of May 21 the following statistics had been developed through interviews with 857 refugees:

<u>Occupational category</u>	<u>Number of refugees</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Professional, technical		
managerial	303	35
Clerical and sales	125	15
Service	70	8
Farming, fishery, forestry	38	5
Machine trades	145	17
bench work	46	5
Structural work	62	7
Miscellaneous	68	8

Reception center officials said they anticipate refugees on future flights to be less skilled than those now being processed.

As of May 22, no refugees had been identified as "undersirable" or inadmissible to the United States.

Processing delays


Security clearances and sponsors have developed into the two major areas of delay in processing refugees at Eglin. As of May 23, 473 refugees had security clearances out no sponsors, 823 had sponsors but no security clearances, and 2,815 needed both security clearance and sponsors. No statistics on average processing time are readily available; however, some refugees had been awaiting security clearances for up to 15 days.

Reporting requirements

Each agency at Eglin has its own internal and external reporting requirements; however, the Center issues one official report on its operations, the daily Situation report. This report provides updated information on total arrivals and departures, types of refugees processed, relocations, delays, and problem areas. It is issued to the Interagency Task Force jointly by the Senior Civil Coordinator and the military commander, with copies to supporting Air Force commands and the other reception centers.

Observations

The Eglin Reception Center is located on a deserted airfield within the confines of Eglin Air Force Base, which is situated in the northern "panhandle" region of Florida, about 10 miles from the Gulf of Mexico. The climate is



EGLIN AFB: TYPICAL STREET SCENE IN REFUGEE CAMP.

USAF PHOTO

temperate and, according to center officials, very nearly like that of Saigon during the summer.

The center is actually a tent city, with only two small permanent structures within the entire facility. Refugees are housed in tents, usually in family units. Administrative personnel work in tents or trailers. The center is not secured, as there are no fences around the airstrip; however, the center's perimeter is patrolled by military personnel, and refugees are not permitted to leave the camp before completing processing.

The center is orderly and neat, and there is no evidence of sanitation problems or health hazards. Shower and laundry tents are centrally located. Portable toilets are located at various intervals within the living and administration areas. Volunteer agencies provide recreational activities and personal services for the refugees.

Dining facilities are centrally located, and food services are provided by military personnel. The refugees are given a "bland" diet, with large quantities of rice, pork, and fish. Water coolers are provided throughout the center.

Medical needs are met by an Air Transportable Hospital unit from England Air Force Base, Louisiana. The hospital is equipped to take care of most types of medical treatment, although serious medical problems (such as major operations) are referred to the main hospital at Eglin Air Force Base.

The living quarters are very basic, but adequate. Most refugees sleep on cots, with cribs provided for infants. There are few furnishings in the tents, which consist of canvas-covered wooden frames approximately 34 feet long and 16 feet wide, with partially enclosed sides and wooden floors. There are usually 8 to 12 persons to each tent, with family units quartered together when possible. Quarters for 5,000 refugees have been built.

Clothing has not been a problem as local volunteer groups have provided clothing in large quantities. Comfort kits are provided by both the Air Force and the Red Cross.

Volunteer committees have been formed by the refugees to assist the Air Force in tent construction and maintenance of facilities.



EGLIN AFB: DISTRIBUTION OF DONATED CLOTHING.

USAF PHOTO

There were some refugee complaints about delays in processing. However, the processing seemed to move smoothly as a large percentage of the initial refugees spoke in English.

There are a large number of Air Force personnel working at the reception center for the relatively small number of refugees. Air Force officials said this was necessary due to the nature of the mission it was required to provide.

CHAPTER 6

PARTICIPATION OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

DOMESTIC RESETTLEMENT

The Interagency Task Force expects that about 130,000 refugees will be resettled in the United States. Several public and private agencies will work toward the goal of making "Indochinese refugees self-supporting members of their communities in the shortest possible time." Nine voluntary agencies will play the major role in this resettlement effort. (See p. 14.) The Task Force has estimated that \$78 million will be necessary for resettlement. As of May 29, contracts and grants of \$33,070,000 had been or were being signed.

The refugees have been divided into four categories for more efficient processing and resettlement from the Centers.

- Relatives of American citizens and permanent-resident aliens.
- Refugees with independent means.
- Refugees with job offers from previous employers.
- Refugees without sponsors.

The planned role of the voluntary agencies in each category is discussed below.

Relatives of American citizens and permanent-resident aliens

HEW, with the assistance of the Red Cross, will verify the willingness and ability of relatives to "sponsor" and resettle the refugees. Once confirmed, INS will release those refugees without additional sponsorship requirements. If HEW decides the relatives are unable to care for the refugees, the case is referred to a voluntary agency.

Refugees with independent means

A board at each camp--comprised of officials of State, INS, and HEW--will determine self-sufficiency and may authorize release from camp. Refugees determined to have adequate personal funds are not supposed to be maintained at camps at Government expense once security checks are completed.

Some refugees may require only brief counseling to direct them to a resettlement location if they are single adults, or families with at least one adult, with facility in English, and have (1) vocational skills, (2) a general idea of resettlement location, and (3) average resources of \$4,000 each exclusive of transportation.

If the board determines the refugee meets this test of self-sufficiency, he will be certified for departure from camp without referral to a voluntary agency or being required to have a sponsor.

Offer by former employers

The offer will be reviewed by the board and if the former employer is deemed to be responsible--a major corporation, charitable group or the U.S. Government--the refugee will be released to the employer without voluntary agency assistance. If the employer cannot offer the full range of sponsor services, he should be put in touch with an approved voluntary agency.

Refugees without sponsors

This category is expected to be the largest. It is here that the voluntary agencies are expected to do most of the resettlement by matching refugees to offers of sponsorship; obtaining support of individual business firms, churches, and other organizations; and handling offers of employment, housing, and material assistance. The proposed agreements between the U.S. Government and the voluntary agencies call for each voluntary agency to:

"Assemble and put into place at restaging sites * * * those personnel* * * required to perform normal and traditional resettlement services to refugees from Indochina."

Specifically, the voluntary agencies are to:

1. Counsel refugees in the selection of resettlement locations and arrange with sponsors to provide necessary facilities.
2. Assist refugees in identifying and developing employment opportunities and implementing employment.
3. Secure and authorize required transportation from staging sites to resettlement locations.
4. Provide financial assistance to all sponsored refugees to meet requirements for employment, normal medical care, maintenance, and other legitimate needs during resettlement periods.
5. Assist refugees in assuring continuing stability in employment, shelter, and health services.
6. Develop continuing relationships with sponsors or other assisting authorities or individuals to monitor the successful implementation of refugee resettlement.
7. Stand ready to reassist refugees who face future specific resettlement problems.
8. Give other traditional supportive services as required.

When are refugees considered
to be settled?

It was stressed to GAO that item 7 above was one of the most important functions of the voluntary agencies because it provides long-term support for the refugee. When asked how long a period of settlement is contemplated, we were told that this has not been decided. However, the period has traditionally been 2 years. Presumably after 2 years, a refugee needing assistance would turn to the ongoing programs existing in his community.

Are all refugees assigned
to an agency?

Refugees without sponsors are expected to be the main task for the voluntary agencies. The other three categories--relatives and permanent-resident aliens, refugees with independent means, and refugees with job offers from previous employers--will not be assigned to voluntary agencies.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

Given these conditions, the agencies obviously will provide more services for some refugees than for others. The interim grant agreement, however, does not provide for partial services rendered, either in the scope of work (other than to authorize "normal and traditional services * * * to be performed as necessary") or in the method of billing. The grant agreement requires only that the agency invoice contain the name, alien registration number, and location of the refugee.

ORM told us that its intention is for the voluntary agencies to receive \$500 per refugee. Some resettlements will cost more than \$500 and some less but it is expected that these costs will average out to \$500.

Unpaid voluntary agencies
working in the refugee camps

At the time of our field visits May 12 through 23, we found that all the voluntary agencies had arrived in the camps and were actively helping to resettle the refugees. In addition to the agencies that work under grants, a number of religious and charitable groups work in the camps to comfort the refugees and provide what help and assistance they can. These groups, national and local, vary from camp to camp in numbers and services, but in general do such things as run day care centers, assist the voluntary agencies in the resettlement process, provide personal comfort kits, etc.

THIRD-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT

The Interagency Task Force expects about 10,000 to 15,000 refugees to be settled in third countries, including those who decide to return to Indochina; 3,405 have gone to third countries as of June 8.

Three organizations are involved in third-country resettlement.

--United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

--Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

--International Committee of the Red Cross.

As of May 29, 1975, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration had received a grant of \$1.1 million from the U.S. Government. The other two organizations have received no funds.

At the time of our field visit to Guam, all three organizations were at work. In addition, the American Red Cross, the International Rescue Committee and the U.S. Catholic Conference were also helping to process refugees.

CHAPTER 7

POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

We recognize that the suddenness and magnitude of the evacuation of Indochina refugees prevented the Task Force's complete preparation and implementation of definitive plans for the temporary care, formal processing, and eventual resettlement of refugees. Therefore, we believe the U.S. Government, and more specifically the Task Force, has done a commendable job of organizing and using resources to handle refugees. However, we have observed a number of matters which we consider potential problem areas.

We have not attempted to fully analyze the various aspects of these potential problems nor to forecast their full implications. Neither have we attempted to place a level of priority upon the seriousness of the potential problems.

Storm disaster

As discussed in chapter 4, tent-camp living on Guam during the rapidly approaching typhoon season could be hazardous. The risk that the tents will be upset by wind is high. Sanitary conditions have already deteriorated and the medical authorities have urged that a sewer system be installed and the water supply system be upgraded, which will cost an estimated \$6.4 million.

The military commander on Guam has planned for the evacuation of the tent-camp refugees into nearby warehouses and other temporary storm shelters and is providing these shelters with C-rations, water, and medical supplies. Cooking and sanitary facilities are not available, of course, and living conditions in these temporary shelters will be difficult. In view of this, the military urged an immediate withdrawal of at least 20,000 refugees. Although the opening of the fourth processing center at Indiantown Gap should allow 20,000 refugees to leave Guam by mid-June, there is still an urgent need to remove the entire tent-camp population before disaster occurs.

The message of May 12 from Guam to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces, outlined various steps that will be taken to safeguard lives and property and points out that the existence of the tent camp during the typhoon season is also a hazard and significant threat to the adjoining military barracks and family quarters. Military authorities on Guam suggested that plans be made for a poststorm airlift

of 6 to 8 thousand refugees a day, similar to the Darwin, Australia, emergency airlift evacuation.

In response to the Guam message, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces, cabled that a poststorm airlift would be authorized and that Hawaii had been designated the "safe-haven" for the refugees.

Reportedly, a Guam legislator asked the Department of State to relocate the refugees off Guam before the rainy season. He was reported to have said that "for purely humanitarian reasons we should get these people out of those tents * * * the rainy season will bring mosquitoes and increase the possibility of malaria and dengue fever."

Our field staff was told that the Governor of Guam had also expressed his concern about potential damage and the safety of the refugees because of the approaching typhoon season.

SPONSORSHIP AND RELOCATION

Except for extremely isolated cases, all refugees processed through the reception centers are required to have sponsors before they can be released. This requirement is imposed to ensure that the refugee does not become a public charge. In this regard, the Interagency Task Force requires a sponsor to make a moral commitment to receive the refugee and his family and to provide (1) shelter, food, clothing, and pocket money until self-sufficiency is achieved, (2) assistance in finding employment and enrolling children in school, and (3) ordinary medical needs.

The Task Force reiterated that this is a moral commitment, not a legal obligation. Voluntary agencies at each reception center assist refugees who do not already have sponsors to obtain sponsorship.

Sponsorship has proven to be a bottleneck in the processing system; 33,332 refugees, 72 percent of total arrivals, in the reception centers did not have sponsors as of May 29. Much of the delay was created by initial problems in developing sponsorship programs, including verifying the genuineness of sponsorship offers. These problems are lessening as the sponsorship program becomes established.

Future problems in the sponsorship program could be created by the large volume of refugees who will require sponsorship. Individual offers of sponsorship will probably decline as the volume of refugees through the reception centers decreases. However, the effects of this may be partially offset by the establishment of a sponsorship program within each voluntary agency.

The slowing down of the release of refugees to sponsors can ultimately raise costs above the amounts already appropriated. Furthermore, slow-downs can extend resettlement needs past June 30, 1976--the planned termination of the program.

Refugees have resettled in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. We analyzed 13,360 resettlements and found that 64 percent of the refugees had resettled in only 10 states and the District of Columbia. It appears that refugees are resettling in "warm weather" States, areas near Washington, D.C., and States with large urban areas. These could be significant factors when considering the need for resettlement assistance.

Many refugees at reception centers have expressed reluctance to leave the centers where they feel secure among other Indochinese people. Furthermore, some refugees released have returned to the centers.

SECURITY

The requirement that all refugees, except former U.S. employees, relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent-resident aliens, and children under age 14 receive a five-agency security clearance before release was a major bottleneck in the processing system. Originally, clearances were to be obtained within 7 days of the time requests were issued. Although accurate statistics are not available on the average time required for clearance, it is apparent from the total number of refugees waiting to be cleared that it is taking much longer than the original estimate. About 61 percent of all the required clearances had been completed by June 6.

Many problems relative to the timelag for security clearances should be alleviated by new procedures which provide for preparing security clearance requests at Guam rather than at the reception centers and establishing a central control point for all clearances at INS Headquarters. If clearances continue to require an inordinate amount

of time, however, the final effect will be further delays in processing and prolonged operating periods for the Guam staging area and the three U.S. reception centers.

We did not review the procedures used by the five agencies involved in the security-clearing process. We did, however, observe some problems at the processing camps which may make positive refugee identification more time consuming and difficult. For example, nearly all refugees arriving on Guam had some form of identification. But, INS inspectors had no assurance that a refugee had not obtained another person's documents. (Several instances were reported of stolen documents in the camp, and INS identified several cases of refugees trying to process with documents that had been used previously.) Additional identification problems were experienced with refugees who had lost their Vietnamese photo-identification cards and other papers during the evacuation.

The extent of this problem is not known, but it is apparent that a refugees who processes with stolen or forged documents either does so in an effort to speed up his entry into the United States or to conceal his true identity.

COST CONTROL

Chapter 2 discussed in detail the issues related to estimated total costs of handling the Indochina refugees. At this point we only say with regard to cost estimates that, based on experience to date, a more realistic cost estimate is computable.

During our visits at refugee locations, we have observed uncertainties among Federal, State, and local agencies as to what are reimbursable costs--costs they incur that will be paid from Indochina Migration and Refugee moneys. In the situation described in this overall report, most of the refugee costs will be met through reimbursements and there appeared to be some problems of definitizing what costs are reimbursable. Therefore, we believe much effort is needed in establishing and maintaining accounting procedures which will control the actual amounts spent under the auspices of refugee costs.

Task Force officials said their plans call for using refugee funds to pay other agencies for only those direct costs incurred specifically for refugee benefits.

WEATHER AT EGLIN AND PENDLETON

Although the summer weather at Eglin and Pendleton is similar to that of Saigon, refugees will be subjected to cold and inclement weather during the fall and winter months. According to military and Task Force officials, the winter months are usually very cool, with occasional freezing temperatures. It would be difficult to heat the tents during this period, and the likelihood of fire would be greatly enhanced. Military officials expressed hope that Eglin and Pendleton would not remain active into this period.

CHAPTER 8

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We have reviewed authorizing legislation, accumulated pertinent data on evacuation and resettlement activities, and held discussions with Interagency Task Force officials in Washington, D.C. We also contacted officials of other agencies participating in the Interagency Task Force.

At the Western Pacific Staging Area on Guam from May 8 through May 21 and at Reception Centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, and Eglin Air Force Base, from May 13 through May 22, our representatives observed the screening procedures used to process refugees into the United States and the physical condition of the facilities. They interviewed selected refugees, U.S. Government officials, and representatives of U.S. voluntary agencies at these locations.

Our work was directed primarily toward (1) obtaining and understanding the evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement program as it was being implemented and (2) quickly providing the program results to elements of the Congress. We have not attempted to make an indepth analysis or evaluation of the manner in which the U.S. agencies have carried out their respective program activities.

Our review efforts were necessarily limited, in addition to the unusually short time frame, because the program was initiated and being implemented on an ad hoc basis to deal with an emergency situation. Under these circumstances, documentation and detailed records either had not been completed or were not readily available.

Later in 1975 we plan to review various aspects of U.S. involvement in the evacuation and resettlement of Indochina refugees.

Copies of GAO reports are available to the general public at a cost of \$1.00 a copy. There is no charge for reports furnished to Members of Congress and congressional committee staff members; officials of Federal, State, local, and foreign governments; members of the press; college libraries, faculty members, and students, and non-profit organizations.

Requesters entitled to reports without charge should address their requests to:

U.S. General Accounting Office
Distribution Section, Room 4522
441 G Street, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20548

Requesters who are required to pay for reports should send their requests with checks or money orders to:

U.S. General Accounting Office
Distribution Section
P.O. Box 1020
Washington, D.C. 20013

Checks or money orders should be made payable to the U.S. General Accounting Office. Stamps or Superintendent of Documents coupons will not be accepted. Please do not send cash.

To expedite filling your order, use the report number in the lower left corner of the front cover.

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE



THIRD CLASS