


GAO

Report to the Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on
Government Operations, House of
Representatives

August 1993

THE DRUG WAR

Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain



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National Security and
International Affairs Division

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August 10, 1993

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

As requested, we examined the progress being made and problems being experienced by U.S. and Colombian agencies in implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia. This report is the second in a series that we have issued on Colombia. The first one was issued on September 30, 1991.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution on this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Administrators of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Agency for International Development, and the Directors of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and Office of Management and Budget. Copies of this report will also be made available to other interested parties upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Joseph E. Kelley, Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, who may be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

Executive Summary

Purpose

Colombian cartels have been a leading source for cocaine being shipped into the United States. In response, the United States has implemented an antidrug strategy designed to provide about \$504.3 million to disrupt cartel activities. In February 1992, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Government Operations requested that GAO review the progress that was being made and the problems that were being encountered by U.S. and Colombian agencies in implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs.

Background

A primary goal of the U.S. national drug control strategy is to reduce the amount of cocaine and heroin coming into the United States. The Andean Strategy, with its emphasis on disrupting Colombian drug cartels, is an important part of that strategy. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States agreed to give Colombia about \$504.3 million worth of military, law enforcement, and economic aid.

Results in Brief

In the 3 years since the Andean Strategy was announced, Colombia has demonstrated its commitment and political will by taking action to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives. The result is that law enforcement pressure against the cartels has increased and many of the Medellin cartel's activities have been disrupted. U.S. officials admitted that cocaine remains widely available in the United States, but they believe that U.S. programs in Colombia have been effective in meeting U.S. antidrug objectives of disrupting drug-trafficking activities. GAO believes that it is not possible to determine the effectiveness of these programs in disrupting drug-trafficking activities nor their contribution to reducing the supply of cocaine because U.S. officials lack the data needed to make such an assessment. U.S. officials believe that counternarcotics efforts in Colombia will require a long-term commitment on the part of the United States and Colombia to continue antidrug operations and the United States to reduce its demand for cocaine.

Obstacles in and around Colombia are hindering U.S. counternarcotics efforts there. These include the limited ability of some Colombian agencies to plan and implement an effective counternarcotics strategy; increasing insurgency and narcoterrorism activities, which limit Colombia's ability to maintain a presence in some areas; the expansion of the cartels into heroin; corruption in the Colombian government; and the lack of effective antidrug programs in other countries.

U.S. assessments indicate that various U.S. management problems have hindered the implementation of antidrug programs in Colombia. GAO also found that the State Department reduced the funding for military and law enforcement programs because of budgetary constraints. In addition, funding shortfalls will continue to impede programs that U.S. Embassy officials believe are needed to improve Colombia's interdiction capabilities. Furthermore, poor coordination among the Departments of State and Defense has resulted in the inefficient use of resources. Finally, inventory and financial weaknesses are reducing law enforcement program effectiveness.

U.S. officials cannot provide assurance that U.S. policies regarding the use of aid and human rights are being met. U.S. military officials had not completely implemented their end-use monitoring plan to track how U.S. military aid is used. Furthermore, U.S. Embassy officials have not developed procedures to monitor whether Colombian units involved in human rights abuses have received U.S. aid.

Principal Findings

Program Efforts and Effectiveness

Over the past several years, various counternarcotics programs have been implemented in Colombia. For example, U.S. military and law enforcement aid has improved the counternarcotics capabilities of the police and military. Additionally, the United States has agreed to provide economic aid to strengthen the judicial system and other civilian antidrug agencies. Since fiscal year 1990, progress has also been made in implementing various agreements designed to disrupt drug-trafficking activities and improve Colombia's economy and its access to U.S. markets.

Colombia has used this assistance to increase counternarcotics efforts, which have resulted in substantial amounts of cocaine being seized, large numbers of labs destroyed, the arrests of high-level cartel personnel, large amounts of money and other assets being seized, and the disruption of some cartel activities, including those of the Medellin cartel. Even though U.S. officials admitted that cocaine remains accessible to U.S. users, they believe that U.S. programs in Colombia have been effective in addressing U.S. antidrug objectives.

U.S. officials cannot determine how effective U.S. counternarcotics programs have been at either disrupting drug-trafficking activities in Colombia or in reducing the supply of cocaine into the United States because they lack important data, such as the amount of cocaine that is being shipped from Colombia into the United States. Without having this data, U.S. decisionmakers cannot evaluate either the effectiveness of their programs or the extent to which law enforcement activities are impacting drug-trafficking activities. U.S. officials believe that antidrug programs in Colombia will require a long-term commitment by both the United States and Colombia. The Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that the Cali cartel and other trafficker organizations have filled the void left by the Medellin cartel. Furthermore, U.S. officials believe that until the United States, as a primary user of cocaine, is able to complement interdiction with successful cocaine demand reduction, it will remain difficult to reduce the amount of cocaine entering the United States.

Obstacles Limiting Potential Success

Various obstacles in and around Colombia are hindering the potential success of U.S. programs in Colombia. These obstacles include:

- Weaknesses in Colombia's ability to plan and implement effective counternarcotics programs. U.S. reports indicate that some Colombian agencies, such as the National Council for Dangerous Drugs, lack the authority and adequate numbers of staff to make important decisions. As a result, they have not been effective in planning or implementing antidrug strategies and using U.S. aid in an effective, efficient manner.
- Increased active insurgency and narcoterrorism activities hinder Colombian efforts to maintain the presence needed to sustain counternarcotics pressure. In large sections of Colombia, police cannot safely conduct counternarcotics operations without interference from guerrillas.
- The cartels are expanding their activities into heroin. U.S. estimates show that, in less than 2 years, poppy cultivation in Colombia has expanded from about 2,500 to about 32,700 hectares. This dramatic increase has diverted significant counternarcotics assets from cocaine operations to poppy eradication. Current plans indicate that significant increases in aid will be needed for operations against cocaine and heroin.
- Corruption limits the ability of the Colombian government to conduct effective counternarcotics operations. Various reports show corruption throughout much of the government, to include Colombia's civilian aviation agency, the judiciary, the prison system, the legislature, the military, and the police. One of the best known examples of corruption is

Pablo Escobar's, head of the Medellin cartel, mid-1992 escape from prison to avoid prosecution. The U.S. Embassy reported that some Colombian officials received bribes to allow the escape.

- Colombian programs will not be successful unless other regional antidrug programs are effective. Prior GAO reports indicate that the effectiveness of some programs are hindered by obstacles.

**U.S. Management
Difficulties Impede
Program Implementation**

Both the U.S. Embassy and the Department of Defense reported numerous planning and implementation problems. For example the U.S. Embassy had numerous problems procuring equipment for the police in a timely, efficient, and effective manner.

GAO also found that the State Department, which under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is responsible for determining and providing the levels of military and law enforcement aid, had decided to reduce the level of funding under the Foreign Military Financing Program and the International Narcotics Control Program that the U.S. Embassy has estimated is necessary to sustain existing military and law enforcement counternarcotics programs in Colombia because of budgetary constraints. State officials stated that as a result of a \$47 million reduction in the overall Foreign Military Financing Program, they decided to reduce the funds available for all antidrug programs, including the amount of funds being allocated to Colombia. For example, State originally planned to annually allocate \$58 million to Colombia for fiscal years 1992 and 1993. However, because of budgetary constraints, it decided to reduce the amount of the Foreign Military Financing Program to Colombia to \$47 million in fiscal year 1992 and \$26 million in fiscal year 1993. Shortfalls in funding will continue to impact on program improvements that U.S. Embassy officials believe are needed to address expanded drug-trafficking activities in Colombia. These officials added that they did not know what level of additional resources would enable the program to fully achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives in Colombia.

Furthermore GAO found that State and Defense have not coordinated their programs with each other to ensure that equipment is provided in an efficient and effective manner, and the U.S. Embassy has had problems maintaining adequate inventory control over U.S.-provided equipment to Colombian law enforcement agencies and paying expenses related to law enforcement counternarcotics operations in a timely manner.

Incomplete Oversight of U.S. Counternarcotics Programs

U.S. policy requires that recipients of counternarcotics aid use it primarily for counternarcotics purposes and that they not be involved in human rights abuses. However, GAO found that U.S. military officials had not fully implemented end-use monitoring procedures to ensure that Colombia's military is using aid primarily for counternarcotics purposes. For example, at the time of our visit to Colombia, U.S. officials had not received reports from the inspectors general of the Colombian military services even though, in July 1991, the United States and Colombia signed an agreement that the United States would receive these reports. Furthermore, GAO found that the State Department has not established procedures to determine if U.S. assistance has gone to units that had individuals who have been involved in human rights abuses. GAO could not determine to what extent U.S. aid has been provided to military or police units involved in human rights abuses because of the lack of complete data. However, we did find two instances where personnel who had allegedly committed human rights abuses came from units that received U.S. aid.

Recommendations

Because (1) U.S. officials lack the data needed to evaluate program effectiveness in Colombia, (2) various obstacles are impeding implementation of U.S. programs, (3) additional resource requirements have been identified to address the expanding drug trade, and (4) U.S. budgetary constraints will continue, GAO recommends that the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, in coordination with other agencies, reevaluate U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia and throughout the Andean region. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State improve inventory and financial management controls and strengthen end-use monitoring and human rights oversight.

Agency Comments

As arranged with the requesters, GAO did not request written agency comments on a draft of this report. GAO did, however, discuss its contents with officials from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Departments of State and Defense, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Their comments have been incorporated as appropriate. These officials generally agreed with the information and recommendations presented in this report. However, State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration officials said the draft report did not adequately address the progress and impact of the programs and the Colombian government's positive efforts to overcome the obstacles identified in the report. GAO considered these concerns and included additional information as appropriate.

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Abbreviations

AID	Agency for International Development
CNP	Colombian National Police
DAN	Colombian Directorate for Anti-Narcotics
DAS	Colombian Directorate for Administrative Security
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FMFP	Foreign Military Financing Program
GAO	General Accounting Office
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INM	Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
NAS	Narcotics Affairs Section
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
RAMC	Regional Administrative Management Center
SAPOL	Colombian Police Air Service
USMILGP	U.S. Military Group
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

Introduction

Over 3 years have passed since the United States agreed to increased aid to Colombia to help disrupt drug-related activities in that country. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), located within the Executive Office of the President, is responsible for developing the U.S. national drug control strategy and related components, including the Andean Strategy. Various U.S. agencies are involved in the strategy's implementation and management of counternarcotics programs. The agencies responsible for implementing counternarcotics programs in Colombia include the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Primary Colombian recipients of U.S. aid include law enforcement, military organizations, and various civilian agencies involved in planning and implementing counternarcotics programs.

The Andean Strategy and Colombia's Role

An important component of the national drug control strategy is the Andean Strategy, which is aimed at improving the capabilities of the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to disrupt drug-trafficking activities. It places special emphasis on Colombia because it is the leading source country, processing about 80 percent of the cocaine worldwide. Two cartels, the Medellin and Cali cartels, are located in Colombia and are responsible for most of the drug trafficking.

In August 1989, President Bush approved the Andean Strategy, which increased levels of law enforcement, military, and economic assistance from the United States to strengthen the counternarcotics efforts of the Andean governments. The strategy's objectives in Colombia are to:

- Strengthen the political commitment and institutional capability of the government to take the steps necessary to disrupt drug-trafficking activities and organizations.
- Increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and security activities against drug-trafficking activities, particularly in remote and inaccessible areas in which these activities occur.
- Inflict significant damage on the trafficking organizations by disrupting operations, including focusing on trafficking leaders and their key lieutenants, and taking actions such as impeding the transfer of drug-generated funds, and seizing and forfeiting drug assets within the United States and other countries.
- Strengthen and diversify the legitimate economy to enable the country to overcome the destabilizing effects of illegal drugs as a major source of income.

In February 1990, the presidents of the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru signed the Cartagena Accords and agreed to implement comprehensive and intensified counternarcotics programs. The United States also agreed to introduce legislation to enhance trade initiatives.

In April 1990, the United States approved the first set of annual plans for implementing the strategy in Colombia. These plans detail the types of programs and assistance that the United States will provide to meet U.S. counternarcotics objectives.

Data provided by the executive branch indicates that between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States agreed to provide Colombia with about \$504.3 million worth of military and law enforcement assistance, guaranteed loans from the Export-Import Bank, and economic aid. Appendix I provides information on this aid.

Attacking Drug-Related Activities Is Complex

Efforts to disrupt drug-trafficking organizations in Colombia are complex because of the way drug cartels are structured. They are integrated both vertically and horizontally and their activities encompass all aspects of drug trafficking, including such activities as production, transportation, distribution, and seizing profits.

The Andean Strategy envisions a comprehensive attempt to disrupt all aspects of the drug pipeline. Thus, it requires a variety of programs and activities from seizing and destroying raw materials and chemicals needed to produce cocaine; seizing and destroying assets such as labs, airplanes, cocaine, and the profits associated with the activities; and arresting and prosecuting high-level personnel in the drug cartels. Furthermore, to effectively combat illegal drug activities requires the commitment of many countries that are involved in the production and shipment of cocaine from Colombia as well as countries that use the illegal drugs.

U.S. Agencies Involved in Administering Counternarcotics Programs

The ONDCP is responsible for developing all components of the U.S. national drug control strategy and coordinating the funding of the federal agencies implementing the strategy. However, it does not manage the programs themselves. The primary U.S. agencies responsible for managing U.S. counternarcotics programs for Colombia include the Departments of State and Defense, AID, and the DEA.

Department of State

In the State Department, the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters (INM) is responsible for formulating and implementing the international narcotics control policy and for coordinating the narcotics control activities of all U.S. agencies overseas. The Assistant Secretary also manages the International Narcotics Control Program, authorized by section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, which provides aid to law enforcement agencies involved in antidrug activities. In addition the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs manages the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), and the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for ensuring that U.S. human rights policies are implemented.

The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, manages the International Narcotics Control Program. The section's mission is to provide equipment and training, operational support, technical assistance, and coordination to Colombian agencies involved in counternarcotics. At the time of our visit, the NAS had 40 U.S. and foreign national personnel, including contractor personnel to administer counternarcotics aid projects for Colombia's law enforcement agencies and other agencies.

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the section administered over \$63 million in aid authorized under section 481, primarily to train and equip various law enforcement and civilian agencies.

Department of Defense

In the Defense Department, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping and the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) are primarily responsible for planning, implementing, and providing equipment and training to Colombia's military and law enforcement agencies. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, it provided almost \$334 million worth of equipment and training through FMFP; emergency drawdown assistance authorized under section 506 (a)(2) of the FAA of 1961, as amended; excess defense articles authorized under section 517 of the FAA of 1961, as amended; guaranteed loans approved by the Export-Import Bank; and other funding sources.

The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in Panama is the Defense Department's principal liaison with Colombia for coordinating the administration of counternarcotics aid. At the time of our review, two military officers at the Command's Deputy Directorate for Narcotics were

assigned to administer the counternarcotics aid to Colombia to ensure that logistical support is provided for counternarcotics operations. Since 1989, the Command has assigned military personnel on temporary duty to the U.S. Embassy to coordinate intelligence operations in Colombia.

Military aid in Colombia is administered by the U.S. Military Group (USMILGP). It is responsible for coordinating security assistance programs with the Colombian military and other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics operations. During our visit, it was staffed by 11 U.S. military personnel who are prohibited by Defense Department policy from observing or accompanying Colombian military units on antidrug operations. However, these personnel can visit Colombian military units as part of their advisory duties.

Other military personnel also provide limited support to counternarcotics programs in the U.S. Embassy. For example, military personnel in the Defense Attache Office gather information on military forces, insurgents, and narcotics trafficking activities.

**Agency for International
Development**

The Administrator of AID is responsible for planning and implementing U.S. economic assistance to Colombia. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States has agreed to provide about \$107.1 million worth of aid through the Economic Support Fund for various programs such as assisting Colombia in repaying its debt to U.S. and multilateral lenders, improving the Colombian judicial system, drug awareness and education programs, training programs, general project support, and Colombian drug-interdiction efforts. The AID country office in Bogota is responsible for the daily management and implementation of these programs.

**Drug Enforcement
Administration**

DEA is the principal federal agency responsible for coordinating drug enforcement intelligence overseas and conducting all drug enforcement operations. DEA's objectives are to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States through bilateral criminal investigations, collect intelligence regarding organizations involved in drug trafficking, and support worldwide narcotics investigations covering such areas as money laundering, control of chemicals used in the production of cocaine and heroin, and other financial operations related to illegal drug activities. DEA also provides training to Colombian law enforcement personnel through the International Narcotics Control Program managed by INM. At the time of our visit, DEA had 40 personnel assigned in Colombia.

Colombian Agencies Involved in Counternarcotics

U.S. counternarcotics aid has been used to assist both the Colombian law enforcement and military units involved in counternarcotics interdiction operations. Assistance has also been provided to various civilian agencies and the Colombian judicial system.

Colombian National Police

The Colombian National Police (CNP), with about 86,000 active duty personnel, are under the Ministry of Defense. Within the police, the primary organization responsible for counternarcotics operations is the Directorate for Anti-Narcotics (DAN). It has about 2,500 personnel assigned to it for periods of up to 2 years. It consists of 13 interdiction companies, with each company authorized 110 personnel, 1 mobile unit based in Bogota, 13 intelligence cells, and an air service commonly known as the Colombian Police Air Service (SAPOL). Another police element, known as the Colombian Judicial Investigative Police, conducts antidrug investigations.

Department of Administrative Security

The Department of Administrative Security (DAS) is an independent agency equivalent to a combination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Secret Service. It reports directly to Colombia's president.

Armed Forces

The Colombian armed forces include about 133,000 active duty personnel and consist of the army, air force, and the navy, which includes the marines. The navy is in the process of adding a coast guard element. The army has 10 counternarcotics companies. The air force provides air support for military and law enforcement operations when requested. The navy is responsible for patrolling the ocean while the marine corps is responsible for patrolling the 55,000 kilometers of navigable waterways within Colombia's borders.

Civilian Agencies

Various civilian agencies are also involved in counternarcotics programs. These include the Ministry of Justice and the National Council on Dangerous Drugs. Also, the national Attorney Prosecutor was established in July 1992.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Government Operations asked us to follow up on our prior report.¹ We

¹Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

were requested to review the status of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia and to determine the progress that was being made and the problems that U.S. and Colombian agencies were having implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs. We were also requested to determine whether U.S. aid had been provided to units involved in human rights abuses.

In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials and reviewed planning, implementation, and other related documents at the ONDCP, the Departments of State and Defense, AID, and DEA. We also interviewed officials from human rights organizations.

We also visited with officials in Panama and Colombia between May and July 1992. In Panama, we interviewed U.S. military officials at USSOUTHCOM, which is responsible for managing U.S. military assistance to Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Embassy officials from various U.S. agencies who were responsible for implementing counternarcotics programs in Colombia. We interviewed the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission, personnel from NAS and the USMILGP, officials from the DEA and AID, and other Embassy offices involved in implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs. We reviewed reports to obtain information needed to address our objectives.

While in Colombia, we also interviewed officials from Colombia's military and law enforcement agencies and civilian agencies to obtain their views on issues related to this report. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from various human rights organizations to attempt to identify military or police units that were reported for human rights abuses.

We were requested not to obtain formal agency comments on the report. However, we did discuss a draft of this report with appropriate officials from the State and Defense Departments, DEA, AID, and ONDCP. These officials generally agreed with the information and recommendations in the report. However, State Department and DEA officials said that the draft report did not adequately address the progress and impact of the programs and the Colombian government's positive efforts to overcome the obstacles identified in the report. We considered these concerns and included additional information as appropriate. Our work was conducted between March 1992 and May 1993 in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards.

Major Obstacles Hinder U.S. Counternarcotics Programs

To date, U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance has been used to implement programs and initiatives that strengthen Colombian counternarcotics efforts to disrupt drug-trafficking activities. Since the assistance began, Colombia has increased pressure against drug trafficking: there have been large amounts of cocaine seized and opium poppy eradicated, labs destroyed, high-ranking cartel leaders arrested, and many activities of the Medellin cartel, the major trafficking organization when the Andean Strategy was initially implemented, disrupted. Despite these efforts it is not possible to evaluate the impact that these programs are having on disrupting drug-trafficking activities in Colombia or their contribution to reducing the supply of cocaine being shipped into the United States primarily because U.S. officials lack the data needed to make this determination. Although U.S. officials lack this data, they believe that for law enforcement programs to be effective in Colombia a long-term commitment to assist the Colombian government is required. They further believe that, for U.S. programs to be effective, the United States must reduce its demand for cocaine.

The effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics programs is limited by major obstacles in and around Colombia. For example, U.S. Embassy and Defense Department reports indicate that some Colombian civilian and Ministry of Defense agencies had numerous weaknesses that limited their abilities to plan and implement more effective strategies and programs. Also, in some areas of Colombia, the government is unable to maintain the presence needed to sustain pressure against drug-trafficking activities because of increasing insurgent and narcoterrorist activity. Moreover, the increased role of Colombian drug organizations in cultivating opium poppy and producing heroin makes it more difficult to achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives against cocaine. Finally, corruption exists in the government.

The success of U.S. efforts in Colombia also depends on effective counternarcotics programs in other Latin and Central American countries. However, these programs also face obstacles that impede their effectiveness.

Programs and Initiatives Are Being Implemented to Meet U.S. Counternarcotics Objectives

Since 1990 the United States and Colombia have implemented programs and initiatives in accordance with U.S. counternarcotics objectives. For example:

- The first objective of the program in Colombia is to strengthen the political will of the government and its institutions to pursue drug activities. Improving the judicial system is a high priority to meeting this objective. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States provided about \$1.6 million worth of law enforcement aid to protect members of the judiciary. In 1990, AID began developing a 6-year, \$36 million program to assist the Colombian government in its efforts to improve various aspects of the judicial system. We recently reviewed the program's implementation and found that progress is beginning to be made to improve the judicial system.¹ Moreover, Colombia is demonstrating its political will by taking action against drug-trafficking activities and the cartel leadership.
- The second and third objectives are to strengthen the counternarcotics capabilities of the Colombian law enforcement and military organizations and to disrupt drug-trafficking organizations. Most of the approximately \$397 million in military and law enforcement aid and guaranteed loans from the Export-Import Bank has been used to equip and train forces to improve counternarcotics capabilities. The aid has been used to enhance airlift capabilities of the police and airlift support capabilities of the air force, the riverine capabilities of the marine corps, air surveillance capabilities of the air force, and the ground capabilities of the army. The aid has also been used to construct police and military bases to extend the government's capabilities into remote areas, and to create a coast guard. In addition about \$5 million worth of Economic Support Funds in fiscal year 1992 has been authorized to support antidrug operations.
- The fourth objective is to strengthen and diversify Colombia's economy. As of April 1992, the United States had provided \$41 million in Economic Support Funds to reduce Colombia's debt to the United States and multilateral lenders. This allowed Colombia to use its own funds to soften the economic impact of reducing illicit drugs, finance alternative development projects, and support drug awareness and prevention programs. Furthermore, in July 1992, as part of an effort to improve economic conditions in Colombia, the United States approved duty free entry of eligible Colombian imports under the provisions of the Andean Trade Preference Act enacted in 1991.

¹Foreign Assistance: Promising Approach to Judicial Reform in Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-92-269, Sept. 24, 1992).

Section 490 of the FAA of 1961 requires that the President certify that major drug-producing or transit countries are cooperating fully with the United States or have taken steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Although Colombia had signed the Convention in 1988, the government has not ratified it. Despite this, U.S. officials believe that Colombia is meeting most of the goals and objectives of the Convention and other elements in the Cartagena Accords because during the past 2 years, Colombia and the United States have signed several bilateral agreements covering such drug-related activities as money laundering, asset sharing, and controls over chemicals used to make cocaine. Additionally, Colombia agreed to conduct joint counternarcotics operations with Venezuela and is discussing similar arrangements with Brazil and Ecuador. An ONDCP official stated that Colombia remains the most committed of the Andean countries to eliminating drug-trafficking activities.

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Is Disrupting Drug-Related Activities

Colombia has strengthened its counternarcotics interdiction efforts, which have resulted in large quantities of cocaine being seized, large numbers of labs being destroyed, numerous arrests of major drug personnel, and valuable assets being seized or confiscated. Table 2.1 shows the results of Colombian counternarcotics operations, as reported by the State Department, against illegal drug activities for the period of January 1, 1990, through December 30, 1992.

Table 2.1: Results of Colombian Interdiction Operations for Calendar Years 1990-92

Activity	1990	1991	1992	Total 1990-92
Labs destroyed	269	243	225	737
Cocaine seized (metric tons)	53	86	38	177
Opium destroyed (hectares)	0	1,156	12,715	13,871
Arrests	6,150	1,170	1,700	9,020

U.S. Embassy statistics indicate that law enforcement agencies were responsible for most of these results. For example, over 80 percent of cocaine seizures and opium destruction were made by the police.

Both the United States and the Colombian government made law enforcement operations against the Medellin cartel, headed by Pablo Escobar, their initial priority. The primary emphasis was placed on that

cartel because, according to U.S. estimates, it managed most of the cocaine being shipped to the United States and was involved in various terrorist acts against the Colombian government and population. In March 1993, DEA reported that the Colombian government's efforts had resulted in disrupting many of the cartel's activities. In 1991, Pablo Escobar turned himself in to the Colombian government for trial. Although he escaped in mid-1992, U.S. officials believe that his power has substantially declined.

The Colombian government has also begun to take law enforcement action against the Cali cartel, which, according to DEA officials, was initially thought to be untouchable. One law enforcement operation has resulted in the seizure of more than \$54 million from accounts maintained by high-ranking traffickers in banks located in five countries. Furthermore, DEA officials stated that significant information has been obtained from various Cali raids that will provide the basis for additional operations against the cartel.

Despite these efforts, U.S. officials stated that cocaine remains readily available in the United States, particularly among hard-core users in the inner cities. NAS has also reported that it is difficult to reduce the supply of cocaine because traffickers are resilient, well entrenched, and well financed. However, U.S. officials continue to believe that even though cocaine remains available in the United States and drug-trafficking activities continue, U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia are effective in disrupting drug-trafficking activities and in meeting U.S. counternarcotics goals and should continue to be funded.

Data to Measure Program Impacts and Contributions Are Lacking

Since the initial national drug strategy was published in 1989, various goals for reducing the amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States have been established. For example, the 1989 and 1990 strategies established a goal of reducing the amount of cocaine being shipped into the United States by 15 percent over 2 years and 60 percent over 10 years. The 1991 national drug control strategy established a goal of a 20-percent reduction below the 1988 level of estimated cocaine and heroin entering the United States by 1993 and a 65-percent reduction below the 1988 level in estimated levels of cocaine and heroin entering the United States by 2001. The 1992 national drug control strategy did not contain similar goals. It relies on the disruption of drug-related activities in source countries, including Colombia, to help achieve these goals.

To determine the extent to which U.S. programs are effective in disrupting drug-trafficking activities and their contribution to reducing the supply of cocaine being shipped from Colombia to the United States, measurable, valid, and reliable criteria are needed. Although various indicators are used to show the results of interdiction and eradication programs, U.S. officials lack the basic data needed to make this determination.

U.S. officials recognize that there are problems measuring the effectiveness of interdiction efforts. For example, they stated that the amount of cocaine that is being produced and shipped from Colombia into the United States is not known, the deterrent effect of these programs is difficult to measure, and the cost effectiveness of interdiction efforts is not easily determined. Without knowing the amount of cocaine that is being shipped out of Colombia into the United States, neither the percentage of cocaine being interdicted nor the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts in reducing the amount of cocaine can be easily determined. U.S. officials in various agencies, including ONDCP, DEA, and the Departments of State and Defense, stated that it is highly unlikely that this information can be obtained.

Measuring the deterrent effect of interdiction operations is another problem. U.S. officials stated that the existence of drug interdiction programs does deter some drug trafficking and causes the organizations to change their tactics or operations. For example, U.S. military personnel in USSOUTHCOM stated that one of the lessons learned from a recent counternarcotics operation was that sustained pressure caused traffickers to change air routes and methods of distributing cocaine. However, they admitted that the disruption was only temporary. U.S. officials stated that Colombia's efforts have had a deterrent effect, but conceded that it is difficult to measure the impact of deterrence.

Measuring the effectiveness of interdiction alternatives is not easy. This is because seizure data reflects only the results of successful operations, not unsuccessful ones. U.S. officials did not maintain data on how many times intelligence provided to the Colombians failed to uncover drugs or how many hours and resources the Colombians spent on each operation.

Decisionmakers frequently use annual changes in statistics, such as seizures, as indicators of the success or failure of U.S. programs. However, we previously reported that comparing statistics from one year to the next

cannot be used as a basis for comparing the success of programs.² While increased seizures are generally viewed as an indicator of success, a decrease in seizures between one year and the next does not necessarily mean a program is less effective than it was previously or less effective than other programs making more seizures. It could mean that smugglers are switching to other transportation modes.

Furthermore, some U.S. agencies' reports use changes in the price and availability of cocaine to assess the impact of interdiction programs. In 1988, we reported³ that data used to prepare estimates of drug availability and consumption are generally not designed to measure the effectiveness of U.S. interdiction programs.

Future Efforts in Colombia Require Long-Term Commitment and an Effective Demand Reduction Program

Even though U.S. officials lack the data needed to determine program success, they continue to believe that the effectiveness of U.S. programs in Colombia requires a long-term commitment from the United States to continue supporting Colombian law enforcement efforts and from Colombia to continue its law enforcement efforts against the cartels. U.S. officials also stated that for the strategy to succeed, it will be necessary for the United States to reduce its demand for drugs.

Long-Term Commitment Will Be Required

Although Colombia has been successful in disrupting some drug-related activities, it faces a difficult task because the established cartels are dispersing their operations and other organizations are entering the drug trade. U.S. officials believe it will require a long-term commitment on the part of the United States and Colombia to continue law enforcement efforts against the cartels and other organizations.

As a result of increased counternarcotics efforts, the cartels have dispersed their operations throughout the country and into neighboring countries. As the cartels expand their operations, the Colombian government will need to improve its ability to continue attacking the traffickers organization and infrastructure.

According to U.S. officials, Colombia's efforts against the cartels are similar to U.S. law enforcement actions against organized crime. These officials stated that organized crime in the United States has existed for

²Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase but Program Effectiveness Is Unknown (GAO/GGD-91-10, Dec. 11, 1990).

³Controlling Drug Use: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-89-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

many years, and although the United States has spent tremendous amounts of money to dismantle it, illegal activities continue to be a serious problem in the United States. Colombia faces even greater obstacles because it has limited resources and technologies available to fight the cartels. Furthermore, U.S. officials consider the cartels to be as powerful or more powerful than many criminal organizations in the United States.

DEA officials stated that the Cali cartel is more businesslike than the Medellin cartel, which retains a complex international network of drug transportation, distribution, and money laundering systems, and therefore will present a greater challenge, and that the Cali cartel and other trafficking organizations are filling the void left by the Medellin cartel. U.S. officials believe that, based on experience with organized crime in the United States, it will take Colombia years before drug activities are significantly reduced.

We believe that it will be difficult to significantly reduce the supply of cocaine coming from Colombia into the United States. Although high-ranking individuals of drug organizations may be captured or certain drug-related activities disrupted, drug-trafficking organizations are resilient and flexible, and they can adapt their activities to minimize government law enforcement efforts. Furthermore, unless the government is able to apply sustained pressure against these organizations, they will resume operations once law enforcement efforts no longer pose a threat.

Complementary Demand Reduction Programs Are Needed to Reduce the Flow of Drugs

An important part of the national drug control strategy is to reduce the demand for illegal drugs through various education and drug treatment programs. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, such programs are needed to complement law enforcement efforts. U.S. officials stated that unless demand is significantly reduced, interdiction activities will not reduce the supply of drugs, because no matter what level of resources are made available or what amount of drugs are seized, the cartels will be able to meet the demand. These officials stated that without the demand, the cartels would not have a market; therefore, they would reduce the supply. However, they also stated that the two efforts must complement one another to be successful.

If the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia is to be effective, major obstacles that are currently limiting the strategy's effectiveness need to be resolved.

Obstacles Impacting U.S. Programs

U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia face major obstacles to their effectiveness. Parts of the Colombian government are not yet prepared to plan and implement effective antidrug programs. Increasing active insurgency and narcoterrorism hinder counternarcotics efforts and limit the government's ability to control areas and conduct sustained operations. Drug-trafficking organizations are expanding their operations into the heroin trade. Corruption exists in much of the civilian government as well as the military and the police. Finally, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy depends on counternarcotics programs in neighboring countries, some of which are currently ineffective.

Some Organizations Lack the Ability to Effectively Plan and Implement Antidrug Programs

U.S. reports indicate that various Colombian civilian and ministry of defense agencies lack the ability to effectively plan and implement counternarcotics programs. The U.S. Embassy has reported that historically there has not been a consolidated, sustained attack on the trafficking system. A major reason for this is that various Colombian agencies are not prepared to plan and implement an effective counternarcotics program because they lack the resources and capabilities that are necessary for such an attack.

The National Council of Dangerous Drugs is the government's counternarcotics policy-making body and is chaired by the Minister of Justice and composed of Ministers of Defense, Foreign Relations, Education and Health, along with members of the National Police and the DAS. It also has a support staff of approximately 40 people. According to a report by the Narcotics Affairs Section, the council should have an important role in establishing and executing Colombian counternarcotics policy but that it has been ineffective. According to the report, when it meets, it seldom addresses significant issues. The 40-person staff does not coordinate positions and priorities of the various ministries. The report suggested that the staff should be totally revamped. U.S. officials stated that progress has been made in strengthening the council's role but that additional improvements are needed to ensure that effective government counternarcotics policies and programs can be planned and implemented.

Furthermore, an October 1991 U.S.-interagency assessment found numerous problems in the DAN's structure for carrying out counternarcotics operations. For example, the report stated that the DAN's command and control structure cannot provide adequate coverage over Colombian territory. Also zone commanders lack a dedicated staff needed to accomplish management tasks associated with operational and

intelligence planning, as well as the necessary tasks related to logistics and administration. Furthermore, the DAN lacks the operational and intelligence capabilities necessary to plan effective counternarcotics missions. U.S. Embassy officials stated that the numerous weaknesses discussed in the U.S.-interagency assessment would take a long time to resolve.

In October 1991, the NAS reported that Colombia lacks quality, fully dedicated personnel to investigate and develop cases against drug-trafficking personnel. Later in May 1992, the U.S. Embassy reported that these inadequacies made it difficult to achieve one of the primary U.S. counternarcotics objectives—inflicting significant damage on drug-trafficking organizations. In March 1993, DEA officials stated that Colombia's ability to investigate and develop cases against high-level drug-trafficking personnel has improved. Furthermore, they stated that as a result of recent decisions by Colombia to establish public order courts for trying drug-related and terror-related crimes, conviction rates have substantially improved. DEA officials stated that the conviction rates increased from 12 percent to 70 percent. Although progress is being made, DEA officials stated that additional training would be required to continue improving the investigative capabilities of Colombian law enforcement agencies.

**Increasing Active
Insurgency and
Narcoterrorism Activities
Erode Government Control**

Increasing active insurgencies limit Colombia's ability to gain and maintain the control over territory needed to sustain counternarcotics operations. The largest insurgent group is the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, which, according to U.S. reports, is involved in drug-related activities, such as providing security for drug operations. The other principal insurgency group is the Liberation National Army, which, according to the DEA Attache at the U.S. Embassy, is also involved in drug-related activities.

Large sections of Colombia, particularly in the sparsely populated south, are controlled or influenced by guerrillas. U.S. Embassy reports indicate that these groups are involved in firing on police and military units. For example, in May 1992, the DEA Attache reported that both groups had attacked military and police personnel during counternarcotics operations. The U.S. Embassy also reported that the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces fired upon a SAPOL helicopter and that a fixed-wing aircraft was hit in July 1992.

The cartels have committed various acts of terrorism against public and private officials. According to U.S. Embassy reports, 350 judges and judicial personnel have been killed since 1980. In May 1992, the DEA Attache reported that terrorist groups had also targeted other organizations, such as banks and American-owned companies. In December 1992, carbombs killed 15 policemen and civilians and injured 19 people in Colombia.

U.S. Embassy and Colombian officials believe that until the government is able to exert a continuous presence in areas controlled by the insurgents and drug traffickers, it will not be possible to conduct sustained operations against the drug cartels. According to the U.S. Ambassador, sustained operations require government control over these areas, which means that the military must conduct both counterinsurgency and counternarcotics missions. However, DEA officials stated that continuous military and government control was not necessary to take effective law enforcement actions against drug-trafficking activities.

Increasing Involvement in Heroin Trafficking Impacts Upon Counternarcotics Efforts

Although U.S. officials remain most concerned about the drug-trafficking activities associated with cocaine, they have recently become concerned about the prospects of various drug organizations becoming involved in heroin production that can be shipped into the United States. Prior to 1991, opium poppy cultivation had been observed in small areas. However, concern was heightened when U.S. estimates on the amount of land for producing poppies used to make heroin increased from about 2,500 hectares in 1991 to about 32,700 hectares in 1992. U.S. officials estimate that the growers can harvest three crops per year.

Various U.S. government reports indicate that Colombia's role in the heroin trade is becoming of great concern to U.S. officials. For example, in January 1992, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that the entry of the Colombian cartels into the heroin trade was very troublesome. In April 1992, the DEA Administrator reported that Colombian drug traffickers may be ready to become key participants in the global heroin trade within the next 2 to 5 years and that, in the United States, concerns about Colombian heroin traffickers are increasing because investigations in several cities reveal attempts by Colombian traffickers to establish heroin distribution networks through pre-existing cocaine channels. In May 1992, the DEA Attache reported that the Defense Minister had stated that 40 persons from Pakistan, 10 persons from India, and 2 from Sri Lanka had entered Colombia within the past 6 months to begin establishing heroin

production and transportation activities. Other unconfirmed DEA reports also indicate that chemists from heroin-producing countries, such as Mexico, Afghanistan, and Thailand, have provided guidance and training to Colombian heroin-trafficking organizations.

In early 1992, the government formally approved an aerial eradication program to supplement its manual eradication program because it was concerned about opium poppy expansion. Aerial eradication of opium poppy has replaced cocaine as the top priority of the national police because the government considers it to be not only a danger to current and potential drug users but also to Colombia's cultural, political, and economic structure. Under the program, the Colombian police are using helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft originally supplied by the United States for cocaine operations to spray plants using a herbicide known as glyphosate, which is widely available in the United States. Although the State Department reported that the Colombian police eradicated about 12,000 of the estimated 32,700 hectares in 1992, the growers will be able to replant within a relatively short time after eradication and the police may have to go back and eradicate many of these areas again.

The assets that Colombia has for counternarcotics operations remain limited and as a result, cocaine disruption operations have declined as opium poppy eradication operations have increased. Both U.S. and Colombian officials stated that aircraft and other assets have had to be diverted from cocaine operations and that aircraft are being heavily utilized. As a result, the amount of cocaine seized dropped from 86 metric tons in 1991 to 38 metric tons in 1992. In order to improve the operational capability of the police, the United States provided 10 additional UH-1H helicopters during August and September 1992. Moreover, current plans indicate that additional equipment and support will have to be provided.

Corruption Exists

Corruption exists throughout Colombia's civilian government, its military, and police. Even though Colombia is taking action, this corruption will be difficult to reduce because of its pervasiveness.

Various U.S. Embassy reports indicate that corruption among government officials is pervasive. For example:

- Corruption exists in Colombia's legislative branch. According to a high-ranking U.S. Embassy official, the Embassy has information

indicating that a large number of legislators have ties with the narco-traffickers.

- According to 1992 Embassy reports, the government had suspended or dismissed guards at a prison where two high-ranking drug personnel were being held. The two prisoners were being visited by their families and children even though such visits were prohibited by prison policy.
- In 1990, DEA, with the assistance of Colombia, launched an operation with one of its objectives being to disrupt the flow of money from illegal drug activities back to Colombia. During the investigation, DEA found that one high-ranking member of the Colombian government who had access to foreign currency transactions and controlled investigations of international companies was involved in money laundering activities.
- In July 1992, the Embassy reported that a public order judge was investigating civil aviation personnel in Bogota and Cali for complicity in narco-trafficking. They allegedly approved blank flight plans that could be used by narcopilots to land at whatever airport they chose.
- In May 1992, the Embassy reported that one judge was convicted of illegal enrichment for improperly releasing a high-ranking member of the Medellin cartel.

Corruption also occurs within the National Police. In July 1992, the U.S. Embassy reported that two police officers were removed for corruption associated with drug trafficking. One was involuntarily removed because he allowed a narco-plane to refuel and take off from a major airport. Another officer, a DAN commander, was removed because his superiors observed that he was negligent in controlling narco-trafficking activities in his area. The U.S. Embassy also reported that 29 policemen were fired for complicity in robbing cocaine from a crashed aircraft in July 1991.

There is also corruption within the military. For example, in June 1991, Pablo Escobar along with several of his key personnel surrendered to the Colombian government. They were confined in a compound guarded by military personnel near Medellin to await trial. In July 1992, the government decided to move them to another prison after reports that they were conducting drug-trafficking activities, including murders. When the government forces arrived to transport them, hostages were taken and the prisoners escaped. According to the State Department, the Colombian President reacted quickly and ordered the censure, retirement, or indictment of responsible officials.

In April 1993, the State Department reported that Colombia does not condone corruption and that the current Defense Minister appears

committed to rooting it out. However, the report also states that corruption continues to exist and sometimes adversely impairs counternarcotics operations. Further, the report states that although mid-level field officers are often fired or court martialed for corruption, charges of corruption against high-ranking officers are rare.

Other Neighboring Efforts Also Face Obstacles That Impair Their Effectiveness

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy relies heavily on the efforts of countries surrounding Colombia to implement effective counternarcotics programs against the cartels. These countries include the cocaine producing countries of Bolivia and Peru; neighboring countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela; and transiting countries such as Mexico and Panama. This regional cooperation is essential if the strategy is to be successful.

We have reviewed counternarcotics programs in Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico.⁴ Our results show that these programs also face significant obstacles that impede their effectiveness. For example, in some countries programs do not receive the priority attention that is necessary to disrupt drug-trafficking activities.

U.S. officials stated that even if Colombia were successful in eliminating drug-trafficking activities within its borders, the trafficking would spill over into other countries, especially countries that were not aggressive in interdiction efforts.

Conclusions

Under the Andean Strategy, U.S. counternarcotics programs are continuing to improve Colombia's ability to disrupt drug-trafficking activities. As a result, many activities of the Medellin cartel have been disrupted, and actions are being taken against the Cali cartel, two of the largest Colombian drug-trafficking organizations. Nevertheless, because important data is not available, the extent to which these efforts are effective in disrupting drug-trafficking activities in Colombia and the extent to which they contribute to reducing the supply of cocaine entering the United States cannot be determined. However, cocaine remains readily accessible in the United States, particularly to inner-city users. U.S. officials believe that both the United States and Colombia will have to make long-term commitments to disrupting drug organizations and that

⁴The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991); The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5, 1992); The War on Drugs: Narcotics Control in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233, July 16, 1991); and Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

Chapter 2
Major Obstacles Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Programs

the United States must also significantly reduce demand. Finally, various obstacles will have to be overcome if the strategy is to be effective.

U.S. Management Difficulties Hinder Counternarcotics Programs

While U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia face serious obstacles that are outside of U.S. control, we found some management problems that are impeding the implementation of counternarcotics programs. Since the inception of the Andean Strategy, State and Defense Department assessments have raised concerns about the ability of the United States to plan and implement counternarcotics programs in Colombia in a timely manner.

We also found other management problems that are inhibiting the programs' implementation. Specifically we found that:

- The State Department decided to reduce the funding levels needed to fully support counternarcotics programs because of budgetary constraints.
- The Departments of State and Defense are not coordinating various programs with each other.
- The State Department has experienced problems with inventory management and payments of expenses.

Assessments Indicate That Management Problems Hinder Programs

The U.S. Embassy and the Defense Department have assessed the first 2 years of implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs. These assessments indicate that significant problems in various U.S. agencies are impeding the implementation of programs in Colombia.

In April 1991, the U.S. Embassy reported to the Secretary of State on problems that it was having implementing U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia. The report concluded that although the strategy was rapidly approaching its second anniversary, it had little to show for the hundreds of millions of dollars that had been allocated. The report discussed numerous problems with how U.S. agencies were planning and implementing the programs. It also stated that:

- The U.S. Embassy was not given sufficient time to prepare detailed plans for using the assistance. Although the strategy substantially increased the amounts of military, law enforcement, and economic assistance over prior years, the U.S. Embassy was given only 3 working days to prepare a comprehensive implementation plan incorporating various U.S. agency programs.
- State Department policies and procedures for procuring goods and services are time-consuming and result in substantial delays in providing support to the Colombian government. For example, the U.S. Embassy had to wait 4 months for the State Department to approve a \$1 million

modification to a regional aviation contract to perform work on helicopters. Until the State Department approved the modification, no work on the helicopters was performed. As a result, several multimillion dollar helicopters could not be used and several companies of police units could not conduct interdiction operations. In discussing the contents of a draft of this report, INM officials stated that the problem was more complex than simply approving a contract modification. They stated that additional information was required from the NAS and various reviews and approvals were required within the State Department.

Although INM officials were aware of these shortfalls, they have not fully resolved them. For example, in September 1991, the U.S. Embassy reported numerous examples where the State Department continued to be unable to provide timely procurement support to the police. As a result, the report concluded that operations were being significantly degraded. INM officials stated that some improvements have been made. However, they also stated that the State Department has not provided the personnel or procurement support needed to ensure that counternarcotics programs are being effectively implemented.

In November 1991, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict prepared an internal assessment on the development and implementation of the Andean Strategy. Although the assessment described numerous problems with the planning and implementation of the counternarcotics programs, the results of the assessment were never formally approved by the Defense Department.

Funding Shortfalls Exist in Military and Law Enforcement Assistance Programs

Under authority of the FAA of 1961, as amended, the Secretary of State is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring U.S. counternarcotics programs. The Congress must authorize and approve the funding levels for these programs before they can be implemented. In Colombia, the United States has relied on two primary funding sources—the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), managed by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and the International Narcotics Control Program, managed by INM.

Military Assistance Funding

The State Department decided to reduce the fiscal year 1992 funding FMFP levels below those it had justified before the Congress as being needed to support military and law enforcement programs in Colombia. In its budget

justification, the State Department planned to allocate \$58 million in FMFP to support counternarcotics programs in Colombia. Of this amount, the Colombian National Police were scheduled to receive about \$23.5 million and the military the remainder.

However, because of budgetary constraints in FMFP funding, the State Department decided to cut Colombia's allocation to \$47 million in fiscal year 1992. U.S. Embassy officials stated that the funds provided to the police remained relatively unaffected, but the military funding had to be significantly reduced. For example, the Embassy had planned to provide the air force with \$4.3 million worth of aircraft and \$2.4 million worth of helicopter training and C-130 engines. However, the Embassy reduced these programs to \$2.2 million for aircraft and \$1.9 million for training and engines. The Embassy also had to reduce funding levels to support navy programs. For example, it planned to provide the navy with \$500,000 worth of fuel. However, because the program was reduced, this aid was not provided.

State Department officials stated that it decided to reduce the amount of funds allocated to Colombia because budgetary constraints forced reductions in the overall amount of FMFP available worldwide in fiscal year 1992. The State Department planned to provide about \$4.4 billion in FMFP worldwide. However, because of budget constraints, the total program was reduced by \$47 million. State Department officials stated that most of the FMFP is earmarked for countries such as Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. As a result, the \$47 million reduction had to be allocated among other programs, including Colombia. However, despite these constraints, Colombia still received the largest portion of the FMFP in relation to Bolivia and Peru.

Law Enforcement Funding

Each year the NAS prepares an annual budget plan for various law enforcement programs. The plans indicate that, at a minimum, the funding level needed to sustain law enforcement programs is between \$25 million to \$30 million annually.

Because of funding constraints in the International Narcotics Control Program, INM decided that it would not be able to provide the funding NAS requested for law enforcement programs in Colombia. In fiscal year 1992, the NAS estimated that about \$31.3 million was needed for projects. The largest of these projects, the national police program, needed about \$25 million; the remaining programs needed about \$6.3 million. However,

because of budget constraints, the State Department allocated only \$20 million to Colombia. It subsequently decided to increase the available amount to about \$23.4 million. According to INM, this increase was made because funds were not used in other programs under the International Narcotics Control Program.

Even though INM increased the aid, it was not enough to cover the amount that NAS officials believed was needed to sustain even the largest project, let alone the other projects. INM personnel recognized that more funds are needed to support programs in Colombia, but they stated that given the reductions that occurred in the overall International Narcotics Control Program in fiscal year 1992, funds available for Colombia had to be reduced because Colombia had to also compete with other counternarcotics programs. However, with the exception of Mexico, Colombia received the largest portion of the total amount of funds available under International Narcotics Control Program in fiscal year 1992.

Funding Shortfalls Are Likely to Continue

In early 1992, the U.S. Embassy identified the need to continue strengthening the counternarcotics capabilities of both law enforcement and military organizations above those already contained in their budgets for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Its enhancement plan identified millions of dollars worth of additional aid. U.S. Embassy officials stated that Colombia already approved significant increases in its funding levels to support its portion of the enhancements plan.

It appears highly unlikely that the United States will fully fund the programs already approved. Because of budgetary reductions, the State Department reduced the amount of the FMFP for fiscal year 1993 from its plan of \$58 million to \$26 million. In March 1993, USMILGP officials stated that the military programs require substantially more than even the \$26 million for programs to be effective and that the NAS has requested that \$10 million of the \$26 million be provided to support law enforcement programs. In May 1993, the NAS Director stated that police programs had been allocated \$6 million and military programs \$20 million.

Current plans indicate that the amount of FMFP available to support counternarcotics programs in Colombia will increase to \$30 million in fiscal year 1994, substantially less than the \$58 million that the State Department planned to provide. According to U.S. officials, these

reductions will sustain existing U.S.-provided equipment and programs but will not provide for new systems.

Like the FMFP, funds available to support law enforcement programs in Colombia under the International Narcotics Control Program are also being reduced and are not sufficient to support needed improvements. The NAS estimates that, before the enhancements identified in fiscal year 1992, the fiscal year 1993 programs would need about \$30.8 million. Of this amount, the national police program needed about \$27 million, the remaining programs about \$3.8 million. However, the State Department only requested \$22 million. According to State Department documents, the national police program will receive about \$19.5 million of the \$22 million being requested. This is almost \$8 million less than the NAS stated was necessary to support the national police program developed before the enhancements were identified. In discussing the contents of a draft of this report, INM officials stated that INM subsequently allocated another \$3 million to Colombia, all of which will support the national police program.

Finally, in reviewing the enhancement program developed by the U.S. Embassy, the executive branch decided that before funding would be provided, the program would have to meet two criteria. First, requirements had to meet critical needs, and second, the Colombian government had to be able to absorb the equipment. Based on the analysis, the executive branch identified about \$12 million worth of aid that would be provided. According to ONDCP, most of this aid was delivered in April and May 1993 and was funded through the 506(a)(2) drawdown authority and Economic Support Fund (ESF) reprogrammed from Peru. Even though the executive branch recognized that other requirements contained in the enhancement program may be needed, they did not include any further funds for this program in the fiscal years 1993 and 1994 budget requests to the Congress because they were studying the requirements further and the new administration is reviewing U.S. counternarcotics policy and programs. According to INM, U.S. officials believe that it may be unlikely that these requirements would be fully funded because of congressional pressure to reduce further counternarcotics assistance.

U.S. Embassy officials stated that these reductions would impact on implementing the enhanced U.S. antidrug programs in Colombia. However they agreed that they did not know if funding levels, initially proposed by the U.S. Embassy, were adequate to achieve U.S. antidrug objectives in

country or whether additional funds would be needed to achieve them. It is difficult to determine what funding levels are needed to fully meet U.S. antidrug objectives because the cartels are flexible and can easily adjust their operations to elude law enforcement efforts, and are expanding their activities in Colombia and elsewhere.

Lack of Coordination Hinders Program Implementation

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy depends on providing the equipment, training, and support necessary to ensure that Colombia's law enforcement and military organizations are capable of conducting counternarcotics missions. However, U.S. agencies have not coordinated their efforts with each other to ensure that Colombians have the equipment and training needed to plan and conduct coordinated counternarcotics operations.

Radios in some of the military helicopters cannot communicate with police ground units. The NAS has procured another type of radio that enables the military and police to communicate. However, according to the NAS ground advisor, these radios are not the long-term solution to the communications problems.

Over the past several years, the Defense Department has provided numerous items to the Colombian military. However, some cannot be used because they lack accessories, are not the correct type for the major end-item, or the major end-item is not operational. For example, in September 1992, the Inspector General of the Colombian air force reported that machine gun ammunition for its A-37 aircraft could not be used because it was not compatible with the guns on the aircraft; 40 helmets for aircrews are in the warehouse and cannot be used because they lack accessories; and 2.75-inch rockets cannot be fired in bursts because of faulty rocket launcher motors.

The U.S. Embassy has been using training funds provided under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, which is managed by the USMILGP, to train police, coordinated by the NAS, in U.S. military schools. The lack of effective coordination between the USMILGP and the NAS and Colombian agencies is resulting in wasted training funds and in not providing the number of training slots needed to ensure that Colombia will have enough personnel trained to fly or maintain U.S.-provided helicopters. For example, in January 1992, the IMET program was charged a cancellation fee of approximately \$297,000 when the police did not send students to a helicopter pilot course. In June 1992, late

cancellation of two training slots for a UH-1H night flying course resulted in a fee of \$23,000 being charged to the IMET program for reasons similar to what happened in January 1992. According to a U.S. program official, there are still difficulties, and improvements in coordination and cooperation among U.S. agencies and with Colombian agencies are needed.

**Inventory and
Financial
Management
Weaknesses Hinder
Program
Implementation**

The implementation of U.S. assistance programs is also being hindered by weak inventory and financial controls. Failure to maintain control over inventories to ensure that spare parts are available when needed and to maintain an accurate system for paying expenses and costs have adversely affected the counternarcotics capabilities of the police.

**Inventory Problems Hinder
Program Implementation**

Because of the time it takes for U.S. agencies to procure spare parts and other assistance for the Colombian police, it is important that U.S. officials have accurate information on what spare parts are available. Without this information, officials may not know when to contract for and procure spare part items to have them available in a timely manner.

NAS controls U.S. material provided to the DAN through site visits and by maintaining a warehouse with an automated inventory system. At the time of our visit, U.S. officials did not know how much stockage they had for various spare parts because they had not conducted a detailed inventory. Furthermore, our review of warehouse records indicated that they were sometimes inaccurate because NAS does not compare the automated records to actual stocks. During our inventory control tests, the NAS and the DAN could account for U.S.-provided material at their warehouses in over half of our tests. The remaining items tested showed errors with regard to key property accounting data. For example, actual on-hand balances did not agree with property record balances, some items were actually out of stock (zero-balance) but had positive balances in records, and other items had incorrect pricing information.

The U.S. Embassy is aware that the lack of spare parts has hindered the police's ability to conduct counternarcotics operations. In its fiscal year 1992 Post Operating Plan, the NAS reported that in 1991 it came close to grounding the 50 aircraft fleet used by the police in counternarcotics operations because of the lack of spare parts. Furthermore, it reported

that because of the lack of parts, some aircraft were cannibalized to keep others flying. As a result of this problem, the NAS began using the Defense Department supply system to procure parts.

Despite this change, spare parts shortfalls continued to impact operations in fiscal year 1992 and, as a result, the Embassy was unable to meet its established availability goal for aircraft of 70 percent. According to NAS statistics, the average availability rate for 1992 was 58.4 percent for helicopters and 58.2 percent for fixed-wing aircraft. This is lower than the annual 67.6 percent for helicopters and annual 60.3 percent for fixed-wing aircraft that the NAS reported in 1991.

The U.S. Embassy is taking steps to establish control over its inventory in the NAS-controlled warehouses. For example, in December 1992, the NAS reported that it had completed its first ever thorough inventory. Also, the NAS Director stated that \$4.2 million has been budgeted to purchase spare parts and establish an on-hand inventory system.

Disbursement Problems Hinder Program Implementation

U.S. Embassy contracted services and procurement actions for counternarcotics programs are disbursed by the State Department's Regional Administrative Management Center (RAMC) in Mexico. According to the NAS Director, the NAS submits vouchers through the U.S. Embassy for services rendered that are processed by RAMC for payment. He stated that because of numerous administrative problems, RAMC, among other things, has been slow paying vouchers for services completed by the contractors.

Because of the scope of the request, we did not visit RAMC to verify what problems existed. However, INM officials stated that the U.S. Embassy is also responsible for the slow payment of vouchers. For example, they stated that U.S. Embassy personnel used inadequate contract procedures for procuring fuel and did not maintain financial control over the contract. According to these officials, this was not RAMC's fault.

These difficulties have reduced the ability of police to conduct counternarcotics operations. In 1992, vendors complained and threatened to withhold their services until overdue payments were made. These difficulties were noted during our visit, and U.S. officials said the problem could be overcome. However, the problem has continued and the U.S. Embassy reported, in December 1992, that deficiencies in processing vouchers for payment were having a detrimental effect on the

counternarcotics program, and at least four critical interdiction helicopters were sitting at an operational location because the fuel supplier would not refuel the aircraft due to nonreceipt of payment. According to U.S. officials, these problems are creating increased tension and strained relationships between CNP and NAS officials. INM officials stated that they will continue to work with both RAMC and the NAS until they can resolve the problems.

Conclusions

As we discussed in chapter 2, U.S. officials lack key data that is necessary to determine the impact that U.S. antidrug programs are having on disrupting drug-trafficking activities or on reducing the amount of cocaine being shipped into the United States. Furthermore, U.S. programs in Colombia face significant obstacles to their potential effectiveness. In addition, it is highly unlikely that, given current budgetary constraints, existing or planned programs will be provided the funding necessary to ensure that they could be fully implemented. Given these matters, we believe that the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia needs to be reevaluated. Since Colombia is only one of the countries in the Andean Strategy, it is also necessary to reevaluate the entire strategy to determine what types of programs the United States can afford and the impact that they can have on disrupting drug-trafficking activities and their contribution to reducing the supply of cocaine being shipped into the United States.

We also believe that management of the programs needs further improvement. In particular, improving the controls over inventory of law enforcement aid and resolving the financial management problems will better ensure that U.S. law enforcement aid is provided in an efficient and effective manner. U.S. officials are aware that improvements need to be made and are taking corrective action.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Director of ONDCP, in coordination with other federal agencies, reevaluate the counternarcotics programs in Colombia as well as the entire Andean Strategy to determine what U.S. counternarcotics objectives and goals should be for each of the countries, what types of programs should be included in the counternarcotics strategy, what funding levels will be necessary to support these programs, and whether these levels will ensure that programs can significantly disrupt drug-trafficking activities and reduce the supply of cocaine being shipped into the United States. As part of this reevaluation, U.S. officials

should establish a quantitative baseline to evaluate the progress that U.S. antidrug programs in Colombia and the other Andean countries are having on meeting the established U.S. antidrug objectives and goals.

Furthermore, we recommend that the Secretary of State ensure that the U.S. Embassy continues its efforts to establish better control over inventory of assistance provided to police programs and resolve the administrative financial problems that are impacting law enforcement antidrug programs.

Incomplete Oversight of U.S. Counternarcotics Programs

U.S. counternarcotics policy stipulates that aid to the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru must be used primarily for counternarcotics purposes. Furthermore, the aid may not be provided if the government is engaged in a consistent pattern of human rights abuses.

A staff study for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded that the United States must develop and implement rigorous monitoring for the specific components of military assistance programs to ensure that they are being used for their intended purposes and, specifically, that mechanisms must be in place to monitor and investigate all allegations of human rights abuses. To ensure that U.S. policy is followed, the State Department has directed the various U.S. Embassies, including the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, to develop effective end-use monitoring procedures to ensure that all aid could be accounted for and that it would not be used to abuse human rights.

We reviewed various military items to determine if U.S. and Colombian military officials could account for the aid to ensure that it was being used as intended. Although we did not find any major problems with accountability of military aid, we do not believe that U.S. officials in Colombia can provide assurances that U.S. counternarcotics policies are being followed. U.S. military officials have not implemented the requirements that they identified in 1991 as being needed to implement an end-use monitoring system. Furthermore, U.S. Embassy officials have not established procedures nor do they have access to the data that is needed to determine the extent to which aid has been provided to units involved in human rights violations.

System for Monitoring Military Aid Has Not Been Fully Implemented

In August 1990, the State Department stated that it was necessary to establish an end-use monitoring system to ensure that the aid was being used in accordance with U.S. policies. According to the State Department, counternarcotics programs are different from traditional military assistance activities. They require more than normal monitoring for human rights abuses. Moreover, periodic reviews of the utilization of all equipment provided under the program would be required. Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM developed broad end-use monitoring principles for monitoring U.S.-provided aid. These principles included a requirement for (1) reports from all host-nation units receiving aid on how the aid is being used during operations and (2) routine recurring reports on either a quarterly or annual basis from the host-nation that includes serial numbers and locations of

certain items such as vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons, supplemented by inventory reviews and audits by U.S. Embassy personnel.

Procedures Were Not Fully Implemented

In January 1991, the U.S. Embassy informed us that they would develop a monitoring program jointly with the Colombian government. The program would rely on the military inspectors general to inspect the assistance and provide U.S. officials with periodic reports of their inspections. U.S. officials also informed us that they would periodically review inventory reports and periodically conduct site visits using these reports as a basis for spot checks of such items as munitions, arms, computer items, and vehicles. On April 30, 1991, the Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Embassy signed an agreement that requires the Colombian military to develop policies and procedures for systematically reviewing and reporting on counternarcotics aid. It also allows U.S. officials to conduct visits to determine how the aid was being used. According to the 1991 End-Use Monitoring Report for Colombia, U.S. officials had implemented an end-use monitoring system for military aid, had conducted periodic reviews with Colombian military officials using various inventory reports, and were satisfied that the aid was being used for counternarcotics purposes.

Various portions of the end-use monitoring plan had not been implemented at the time our visit. Specifically, U.S. military officials had not received inspector general reports from the militaries nor had they requested these reports because the military services were providing other reports on where aid was going, how it was being utilized, and results from operations, which they believed to be sufficient. However, U.S. military personnel stated that they had not used these reports to conduct periodic inventory checks to ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is being accounted for during their visits. Officials stated that they did not have enough people to visit and conduct end-use monitoring duties at the locations where aid has been provided.

To ensure that aid is going to units involved in counternarcotics operations, U.S. and Colombian officials must be able to account for it. We used various inventory reports to determine if the aid could be accounted for. We conducted a limited review of such items as radios, weapons and ammunition, and aircraft spare parts at 13 military locations. Our review indicates that, in general, the U.S. Embassy and the Colombians appeared to have adequate accountability over the U.S.-provided aid we reviewed. Some U.S.-maintained property records did not contain complete

information such as quantities and serial numbers. However, when we visited the various locations where the assistance went, we found that the Colombian military generally maintained accurate information. Also, we did not find any major items missing or that could not be accounted for by Colombian officials.

Even though we did not find any major accountability problems, we do not believe that U.S. officials, without relying on the Colombian military inspectors general and periodic visits by U.S. military personnel to review how units use the aid, can provide assurances regarding how the aid is used. After we completed our visit, the USMILGP commander requested completed reports from the military inspectors general. He received four reports—two reports from the army in 1991 and one each from the air force and the navy in 1992. These reports indicated problems with the accountability and usability of equipment. For example, both the army and navy inspectors general reported discrepancies between the quantities of assistance provided and the quantities actually on-hand for such items as 9mm ammunition, troop equipment items, and components of mortar weapons systems. The air force inspector general reported that some U.S.-provided equipment included faulty weapons systems, inappropriate munitions, and unusable aircrew helmets. Furthermore, according to USMILGP reports, at least two army counternarcotics units lacked equipment, such as night vision goggles, that they were supposed to have been issued for training.

Progress Is Being Made to Implement End-Use Procedures

Since we completed our visit in 1992, the USMILGP has made changes to its original end-use monitoring procedures for military aid. The USMILGP Commander directed U.S. military personnel to

- determine, prior to any site visits, what U.S. assistance is at those sites;
- check on any assistance at the sites they visit, including how such assistance is being used; and
- report their observations in writing. These reports will be maintained in the USMILGP and will be available for audit.

Furthermore, a USMILGP official stated that the military inspectors general have assured him that they will conduct reviews and provide the USMILGP with copies of these reports.

U.S. Officials Lack Procedures and Data to Determine If Human Rights Policies Are Being Followed

U.S. legislation authorizing counternarcotics aid to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru stipulates that it may not be provided if the country is engaged in a consistent pattern of human rights abuses. Although reports indicate that military and law enforcement personnel commit human rights abuses, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these individuals are assigned to units that received U.S. aid because the United States has not established procedures to make such a determination and data to make the determination has not been readily available.

Reports Indicate That Military and Law Enforcement Personnel Commit Human Rights Abuses

Annual State Department human rights reports, information obtained from human rights organizations, and information obtained from Colombian officials indicate that, although human rights conditions are improving, both military and police officials and units continue to engage in human rights abuses. For example, in its 1992 annual human rights report, the State Department stated that individual members of the army and the police were responsible for many human rights violations. In urban areas, the police committed human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, arbitrary killings, and threats of violence. The report continues by stating that members of the armed forces were responsible for violations including murders and torture, particularly in areas of high guerrilla activity and little government presence. The report indicates that both officers and enlisted persons and in some cases entire units have participated in right-wing paramilitary activity targeting guerrillas and others sought by the military.

The State Department is concerned about human rights abuses and the potential that U.S. aid could be used by individuals involved in these abuses. Consequently, it has included support for human rights activities in the bilateral agreements.

Insufficient Information Exists to Determine Extent to Which U.S. Aid Is Being Provided to Units

In many instances, we were unable to determine the extent to which specific units involved in human rights abuses had received U.S. aid. For example, most reports by human rights groups did not provide information on the type or name of the units involved in the violation. In other instances, names of individuals were mentioned, but information on their unit was either not available from the Colombian government because the incident was being investigated or because the U.S. Embassy did not have information on the unit to which the individual was assigned. Various U.S. officials, including the Ambassador, Colombian government officials, and officials from human rights organizations, stated that although the military

and police have committed human rights abuses they could not provide any evidence that U.S. aid was involved.

In two instances, we were able to determine that individuals reportedly involved in human rights abuses belonged to particular units that had received U.S. aid. According to the 1991 State Department's annual human rights report, criminal charges have been filed against eight brigade members and administrative charges against two officers. U.S. Embassy records indicate that the Thirteenth Brigade had received U.S. counternarcotics assistance such as ammunition, hand grenades, and radios. Furthermore, the United States reported that an individual from a DAN counternarcotics unit has been reportedly involved in human rights abuses. According to the NAS director, this unit received U.S. assistance. At the time of our visit, both these cases were being investigated by the Colombian government.

Although the State Department requires the U.S. Embassy to report on human rights violations, it has not developed procedures that require U.S. officials to determine if U.S. aid is being assigned to units with individuals involved in human rights abuses. No procedures exist that require U.S. Embassy officials to obtain the names of individuals and their units involved in human rights violations and determine from U.S. files whether U.S. equipment has been provided to those units. Without this information, U.S. officials cannot provide reasonable assurances that U.S. assistance is not being provided to units that may be involved in human rights abuses.

U.S. Embassy officials also stated that such a determination could not be currently made because information was incomplete, widely scattered, and not readily accessible. The Embassy's human rights officer had some information on human rights violations but did not have a complete list of violators in military and law enforcement units receiving U.S. assistance. However, even in those instances where the officer had information, she had not provided it to the NAS or the USMILGP to determine if U.S. aid was provided.

Although the Colombian Attorney General is in the process of developing a data base to track human rights abuses, neither U.S. nor Colombian officials could provide a specific date as to when it would be available. Furthermore, Colombian officials stated that the data base may not contain complete information that would enable U.S. officials to identify the name of either a unit or individual involved in human rights abuses.

Conclusions

Some progress has been made to ensure that U.S. military aid is being used as intended. Colombian officials have provided U.S. officials with some end-use monitoring, equipment utilization, and operations-related reports. However, U.S. officials cannot currently ensure that U.S. aid has not been provided to units or individuals who have been involved in committing human rights abuses. Further improvements in the U.S. program could be made to strengthen oversight.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of State:

- In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, require that future Colombian inspector general reports certify that the aid is being used for counternarcotics purposes and ensure that the USMILGP implement its revised 1992 end-use monitoring procedures for military aid.
- Require the U.S. Embassy to work closely with the Colombian government to establish procedures for determining whether U.S. aid has been provided to units involved in human rights violations. The results of this determination, if appropriate, should be included in the annual Department of State human rights report.

Status of Counternarcotics Assistance

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States agreed to provide approximately \$397.2 million in military and law enforcement aid to Colombia's military and law enforcement agencies using a variety of funding sources, including emergency drawdown assistance, known as 506(a)(2) assistance; the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP); Excess Defense Articles (EDA); the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program; the International Narcotics Control Program; loan guarantees from the Export-Import Bank; and other funding sources. Also, data supplied by AID indicates that between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States agreed to provide about \$107.3 million in economic support funds (ESF) to Colombia. Table I.1 provides a summary of funding levels that the United States agreed to provide to Colombia to achieve counternarcotics objectives between fiscal years 1990 and 1992.

Table I.1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Provided to Colombia by Fiscal Year

Dollars in millions				
Funding Source	1990	1991	1992	Total
506(a)(2) Drawdown Authority	\$20.0	0	\$7.0	\$27.0
FMFP	79.8	\$47.0	47.0	173.8
Excess Defense Articles	0	7.1	3.2	10.3
IMET Program	1.5	2.5	2.5	6.5
International Narcotics Control	20.0	20.0	23.4	63.4
Export-Import Bank Loans	0	84.0	28.0	112.0
ESFs	2.1	50.0	55.0	107.1
Other Funding Sources	3.8	0.4	0	4.2
Total	\$127.2	\$211.0	\$166.1	\$504.3

Source: DSAA, INM, and AID.

506(a)(2) Drawdown

Under section 506(a)(2)¹ of the FAA of 1961, as amended, the President approved \$27 million for counternarcotics assistance to Colombia between fiscal years 1990 and 1992. This act gives the President the authority to approve drawdown of U.S. military goods and services to a foreign country for counternarcotics assistance when it is in the U.S. national interest.

In 1990, the President approved \$20 million under 506(a)(2), of which \$17 million went to the Colombian military, and the remaining \$3 million

¹In August 1989, the United States provided Colombia with \$65 million in Emergency Drawdown Aid pursuant to section 506(a)(1) of the FAA of 1961, as amended. Our prior report on Colombia discusses the status of that aid.

went to law enforcement agencies. The United States did not provide any 506(a)(2) assistance in fiscal year 1991. However, in fiscal year 1992, the United States provided \$7 million worth of equipment and training to the Colombian air force and police.

Under 506 (a)(2), the Defense Department has provided Colombia's military and police with one C-130B aircraft, 15 OV-10 observation aircraft and support, 6 22-foot Boston Whaler boats, 6 fuel tanks and pump units, 43 trucks and spares, 4 ambulances, 1 R-11 aircraft adaptor to refuel aircraft, 1 UH-1H helicopter and spares, and pilot training to 16 police students. Also, the police and military both received small arms and ammunition, computers, medical supplies, and field equipment.

In February 1993, the DSAA estimated that 90 percent of the fiscal year 1992 aid should be delivered by mid-March 1993. A DSAA official stated that the remaining 10 percent of the items, such as individual and field equipment items, are currently on order and that they would not be delivered until DSAA receives delivery instructions from the USMILGP.

Foreign Military Financing Program Assistance

Pursuant to the International Narcotics Control Acts,² the President is authorized to provide counternarcotics law enforcement and military aid to Colombia under the FMFP. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the Defense Department provided Colombia with about \$173.8 million worth of FMFP aid for counternarcotics purposes.

Fiscal Year 1990 FMFP Assistance

In fiscal year 1990, the Defense Department provided about \$79.8 million worth of aid to Colombia to support the following law enforcement and military programs:

- About \$10 million was used to provide spare parts and support for UH-1 helicopters provided to the police prior to fiscal year 1990.
- About \$4.7 million was used to provide a radar command and control center; tactical intelligence command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; and secure communications for joint command programs.
- About \$17.8 million was used to equip and train army strike companies. Funds provided mobile training teams, a firing range, weapons and

²Fiscal year 1990 funds were authorized under the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, and the fiscal year 1991 funds were authorized under the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990. DSAA stated that fiscal year 1992 funds were authorized under a continuing resolution.

ammunition, communications equipment, troop clothing and equipment, individual equipment, and spares.

- About \$4.8 million was to improve the marine's river assault capabilities by providing 22-foot boats, maintenance support and training, fuel, spare parts, publications, uniforms, ammunition, mobile training teams, technical assistance, and communications equipment.
- About \$11.5 million provided the air force with such equipment and support as helicopter fuel, weapons systems to upgrade helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, spares for C-130 and A-37 aircraft, and training.

In addition, a DSAA official stated that the State Department reprogrammed \$30.95 million worth of FMFP assistance from the fiscal year 1990 military program for Peru because Peru's president did not agree to accept the aid. According to this official, the aid is included in the fiscal year 1990 program for budget purposes, but it was used to provide assistance in fiscal year 1991. However, DSAA could not provide detailed information on how this aid was distributed.

FMFP Assistance for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992

In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, Colombia received approximately \$94 million in FMFP funding—\$74 million of which is grant aid and about \$20 million that is repayable through FMFP loans. DSAA could not provide information regarding how the \$20 million was distributed between the military and law enforcement agencies nor could they provide information on the types of aid provided through the loans.

The total fiscal year 1991 FMFP was \$47 million, of which about \$27 million was grant aid and the remaining \$20 million repayable. Of the \$27 million, the army received about \$5.2 million worth of FMFP grant aid to provide small arms, ammunition, communications equipment, commercial vehicles, and training. The air force received about \$7.6 million to provide items such as aircraft spare parts, construction, and other types of smaller equipment items and training. The navy and marines received about \$3.7 million to provide items such as boats, communications equipment, and training. The Ministry of Defense received about \$7.5 million to support the intelligence school and provide radios to be used jointly across all services. Law enforcement agencies received about \$3.2 million to provide items such as 9mm pistols, machine guns for helicopters, training, and aircraft spares.

The fiscal year 1992 FMFP was also about \$47 million. The army received nothing in fiscal year 1992. The air force received about \$15.4 million

worth of aid, mostly for aircraft support and airfield construction. The navy and marines received about \$10.3 million, primarily to improve the marine's abilities to patrol rivers. Approximately 50 percent of the program will provide boats and spare parts. The remainder will be used to purchase a variety of items such as ammunition, communication equipment, construction, and other miscellaneous items. The Ministry of Defense received about \$2.3 million, mainly for intelligence and communications equipment. Law enforcement agencies received about \$19 million, the majority for helicopters and other aircraft, training, and logistical support.

A DSAA official stated that about \$35 million worth of fiscal year 1992 FMFP aid would be provided to Colombia by the end of fiscal year 1993. However, this official did not know when the remaining \$12 million would be provided.

Excess Defense Articles

Pursuant to authority of section 517 of the FAA of 1961, as amended, the Defense Department provides equipment considered to be EDA from existing stocks to major drug producing countries. Defense provided Colombia with about \$10.3 million worth of EDA assistance between fiscal years 1991 and 1992 but none in fiscal year 1990. In fiscal year 1991, Defense provided about \$7.1 million of EDA that included one C-130B aircraft, OV-10 observation aircraft support and spares, T-37 engine spares, and one utility landing craft. In fiscal year 1992, Defense provided about \$3.2 million in EDA that included 1 C-130B and 1 T-37 aircraft, 74 trucks, aircraft spares, and food rations.

International Military Education and Training

Under authority of section 541 of the FAA of 1961, as amended, the United States provides grant aid training to officials from foreign countries in various U.S. military schools in the United States. The primary objectives of the IMET Program are to improve the abilities of foreign officials in all aspects of the military, to expose these officials to the United States, and to increase their awareness of U.S. concerns with human rights.

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, DSAA reported that about \$6.5 million in IMET funds were allocated to send Colombian military and law enforcement officials to U.S. schools to improve their counternarcotics capabilities. According to DSAA statistics, Colombia sent about 2,125 military and police personnel to U.S. schools.

International Narcotics Control

Pursuant to section 481 of the FAA of 1961, as amended, the State Department provides funds under the International Narcotics Control Program to foreign law enforcement agencies. According to INM, the State Department has provided Colombian law enforcement agencies with about \$63.4 million worth of grant assistance between fiscal years 1990 and 1992. The assistance was used to support the National Police, Judicial Protection, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Infrastructure Support, Public Awareness and Demand Reduction, and Program Development and Support.

National Police Project

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, INM data indicates that approximately \$56 million worth of aid was allocated to support national police units involved in counternarcotics. The major recipients of this aid were the DAN, intelligence units, and the SAPOL. This project is designed to improve the police's capability to disrupt drug trafficking. Funds have been used to provide a variety of equipment and associated support such as both helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft and associated support, vehicles, communication equipment, training, equipment maintenance, night vision equipment, field gear and intelligence equipment. Furthermore, this aid has been used to construct or improve major police bases as well as forward operating bases.

DAS Project

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, INM data indicates that approximately \$1.1 million worth of aid was allocated to support the DAS' ability to monitor and control the movements of drug-trafficking personnel. Funds have been used to provide a variety of equipment such as secure communications and computers.

Judicial Protection Project

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, INM data indicates that \$1.6 million worth of aid was allocated to improve the security of Colombian judges. The United States has provided commodities such as vehicles; communications equipment; small weapons and ammunition; and training to security personnel, administrators, and judges. According to INM the program was phased out at the end of fiscal year 1992.

Infrastructure Support Project

This project began in fiscal year 1992. According to INM, about \$300,000 was allocated to the infrastructure project, which is designed to support Colombia's National Drug Control office. The aid will be used to upgrade

communications and information management systems, and to help members attend international counternarcotics meetings.

**Public Awareness and
Demand Reduction Project**

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, INM data indicates that approximately \$700,000 was allocated to assist Colombian government and private organizations to assess drug abuse in Colombia. Funded activities include collecting, collating, analyzing, and disseminating substance abuse data, publishing and distributing educational literature, and sponsoring high-ranking Colombian personnel to attend national and international conferences.

**Program Development and
Support Project**

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, INM data indicates that approximately \$3.7 million was allocated to cover salaries and expenses associated with managing, monitoring, and evaluating the programs in Colombia.

**Export-Import Bank
Loan Guarantees**

Pursuant to authority provided in section 4703 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the United States provides Colombia with loan guarantees from the Export-Import Bank for counternarcotics purposes. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, about \$112 worth of loan guarantees have been provided. About \$84 million of this amount was used by Colombia to purchase Blackhawk Helicopters and spares between fiscal years 1990 and 1991. A DSAA official stated that in fiscal year 1992, Colombia used about \$28 million in loan guarantees to purchase training helicopters, communications equipment, vehicles, construction equipment, and boats. These guarantees covered both direct commercial sales and military sales.

Economic Support

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States has agreed to provide Colombia with \$107.1 million worth of economic aid for counternarcotics activities. In fiscal year 1990, AID allocated \$2.3 million to provide protection for the justice sector. As part of the Cartagena Accords, the United States agreed to support Colombia's multiyear antidrug and economic revitalization programs. Between fiscal years 1991 and 1992, the United States agreed to provide Colombia with about \$105 million worth of ESFs to support Colombia's antidrug and economic revitalization program. Of this total, the United States agreed to provide about \$77 million in cash transfers to assist Colombia in paying off its international debt, about \$23 million to support AID-managed projects, and

\$5 million that was reprogrammed at the end of fiscal year 1992 from the ESF program in Peru to support police poppy eradication efforts.

The amount of ESF that AID will provide to Colombia in fiscal year 1993 has been reduced from the original plan of \$50 million to about \$20 million. According to AID, no cash transfer funds will be provided and the entire \$20 million will be used to support existing AID-managed projects.

Cash Transfer

Colombia's external debt service interest and amortization reached \$3 billion and 48 percent of exports in 1988. About \$2.7 billion was to service public sector debt. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, the United States agreed to provide \$77 million in ESF funds, through cash transfers to support Colombian balance of payments. AID documents indicate that (1) these funds must be used exclusively for amortization and interest payments on Colombia's external debt to the United States and multilateral lenders and (2) as Colombia withdraws these cash transfers from the account that Colombia will be required to establish in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it must also deposit at least equivalent quantities of pesos, its local currency, in a separate bank account to support government projects for antinarcotics and economic revitalization.

In fiscal year 1991, AID provided Colombia with \$41 million worth of ESF funds in two equal payments. The first payment was made on July 23, 1991, and the second on January 3, 1992. In fiscal year 1992, AID agreed to provide Colombia with an additional \$36 million in ESF to continue supporting Colombia's debt reduction. According to AID, no funds will be provided for cash transfers in fiscal year 1993.

AID-Managed Projects

Between fiscal years 1991 and 1992, AID has allocated about \$23 million in ESF to support specific AID-managed projects. The largest project is the Justice Sector Reform Project, which is scheduled to receive \$36 million over 6 years. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, AID allocated \$19 million—\$6.5 million in fiscal year 1991 and \$12.5 million in fiscal year 1992 to the project. AID plans to provide an additional \$17 million in fiscal year 1993.

The remainder, about \$4 million, will be used to support a training project, a drug awareness project, and a management information system project. AID plans to provide \$3 million in fiscal year 1993 to support both the

training and drug awareness projects. AID has no plans to currently provide ESFS to support the management information system project.

Transfer From Peru

In fiscal year 1992, the executive branch allocated an additional \$5 million worth of ESF assistance to support Colombia's police program. According to U.S. officials, these funds were transferred from the fiscal year 1992 ESF program in Peru. On September 14, 1992, the State Department notified the Congress that these funds would be used to support Colombia's eradication and aviation support costs. However, INM officials stated that the funds were not actually transferred to Colombia until November 1992. According to State Department officials, these funds will be managed by the NAS in Colombia.

Other Funding Sources

Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, the United States provided \$4.2 million in assistance from other funding sources. About \$3.8 million went for equipment, training, and support in fiscal year 1990 to improve police counternarcotics information collection and analysis capabilities. According to an INM official, no similar types of funds were provided in fiscal years 1991 and 1992.

Also, in fiscal year 1991, the Department of Defense, under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, provided \$400,000 worth of training to the Colombian police. The training, provided by U.S. military trainers in Colombia, was designed to provide newly assigned Colombian police with training in light infantry operations and human rights.

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