

GAO

Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House of Representatives

May 2010

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

U.S. Assistance Is
Training and
Equipping Security
Forces, but the
Program Needs to
Measure Progress and
Faces Logistical
Constraints



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Highlights of GAO-10-505, a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House of Representatives

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

U.S. Assistance Is Training and Equipping Security Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints

Why GAO Did This Study

The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the parties meet these obligations.

GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, as State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security assistance to the PA, the Secretary of State should define specific objectives and establish outcome-based indicators enabling it to assess progress.

State partially concurred with this recommendation. It agreed with the need for more performance-based indicators, but noted that factors outside its control influence progress.

View [GAO-10-505](#) or [key components](#). For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov.


What GAO Found

State has allocated about \$392 million to train and equip the PA security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than \$160 million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA's National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately \$89 million to provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about \$99 million to renovate or construct several PA installations, including two of the operations camps it plans to provide (see figure); and (4) about \$22 million to build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning Directorate. State also requested \$150 million for its programs for fiscal year 2011.

Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such performance indicators to a number of factors, including the relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming, rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-based indicators to measure and manage performance against program goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign plan to be released in mid-2010.

The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects. State, USAID, and other international donors have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms, although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the security assistance programs.

Status of USSC Security Assistance to the PA as of March 2010



Sources: GAO analysis of State and USSC data.

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Abbreviations

ATA	Anti Terrorism Assistance Program (State Bureau of Diplomatic Security)
BST	British Support Team
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
ESF	Economic Support Funds
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
JIPTC	Jordan International Police Training Center
JSAP	Justice Sector Assistance Project
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NSF	National Security Forces
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PA	Palestinian Authority
PASF	Palestinian Authority Security Forces
PCP	Palestinian Civil Police
PG	Presidential Guard
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRDP	Palestinian Reform and Development Plan
SLC	Senior Leaders Course
SPD	Strategic Planning Directorate
SPF	Special Police Force
SSWG	Security Sector Working Group
UN	United Nations
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USSC	U.S. Security Coordinator

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May 11, 2010

The Honorable Howard L. Berman
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman
Chairman
The Honorable Dan Burton
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than \$3.5 billion in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, providing humanitarian, development, and security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza. In 2002, the United States outlined the principles for a performance-based strategy for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This strategy— known informally as the Roadmap for Peace (Roadmap)—calls for an independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with the State of Israel and, among other things, presents a plan for establishing the security preconditions necessary for such a state.¹ The United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia—known as the Quartet on the Middle East²—as well as Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) endorsed the strategy in April 2003. To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap obligations and pave the way for a two-state solution, the Secretary of State created the Jerusalem-based office of the United States Security Coordinator

¹“Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” (UN Document S/2003/529, May 7, 2003). Among other things, this agreement obligated the Israelis and Palestinians to undertake a series of coordinated steps to disengage Israeli troops from areas in the Palestinian territories occupied after the 2000 intifada (insurrection) and replace them with consolidated and retrained PA security forces operating under the direction of the PA Interior Minister.

²The Quartet is involved in mediating the peace process between the State of Israel and the PA.

(USSC) in 2005 to facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and coordinate assistance for the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) provided by the United States and other international donors. Beginning in 2007, USSC and the State Department's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) have funded and helped train, equip, and house PA security personnel based in the West Bank.

In this report, we (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007; (2) assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs.

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., and in Israel, Jerusalem, Jordan, and the West Bank. We met with PA and Israeli government officials as well as recognized experts in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance, we also conducted site visits to observe U.S.-sponsored training and construction projects. To assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance programs, we examined whether State's approach identified and applied measurable outcome-based performance indicators to measure and manage performance against its results-oriented goals, which GAO has identified as a good management practice because it helps provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities.³

We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more detailed information about our scope and methodology.

³GAO has described how such outcome-based performance indicators can be developed and applied to program planning and management in a number of reports. GAO has also reported that performance indicators are one of the characteristics of effective U.S. national security strategic planning and a necessary component of campaign plans created to execute those strategies. See list of related GAO products at the end of the report.

Results in Brief

State has allocated a total of approximately \$392 million to train and equip the PASF, oversee construction of related infrastructure projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. State, through the USSC, has allocated more than \$160 million of the total to help fund the training of PASF units. As of January 2010, one Presidential Guard battalion and four National Security Forces (NSF) special battalions had received basic training in Jordan, and State plans to help fund training for six additional NSF special battalions beginning in 2010.⁴ Moreover, USSC has conducted or supported about 24 different specialized courses for PASF personnel in the West Bank since mid-2008. In addition, State has allocated almost \$89 million of the total to provide the NSF and Presidential Guard with vehicles and nonlethal equipment, including uniforms with protective gear; operational equipment such as riot shields, batons, and hand cuffs; computers; tents; and basic first aid kits. The USSC expects to issue each battalion trained in Jordan an initial allotment of this equipment. As of March 2010, one battalion had received its full issuance of equipment, and four more were in the process of being equipped. State also has allocated approximately \$99 million of the total to fund and oversee the renovation or construction of several PASF installations, including two training centers and two operations camps. In addition, USSC and the PA plan to build seven more operations camps to house battalions that receive U.S.-sponsored training.⁵ Finally, State has allocated approximately \$22 million of the total to build the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior, focusing on the creation of the Strategic Planning Directorate, a small group responsible for conducting longer-term strategic planning for the Ministry and the PASF.⁶ State also has requested a total of \$150 million in additional funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011 to continue these activities, including \$56 million for training, \$33 million for equipment, \$53 million for infrastructure, and \$3 million for strategic capacity building activities.

Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West

⁴The NSF is the largest uniformed service within the PASF. A battalion is made up of approximately 500 troops.

⁵State plans to build a total of nine operations camps for the 10 planned NSF battalions; State expects the 10th battalion to be deployed in other installations as a reserve force.

⁶State also allocated about \$23 million for overhead items such as program design costs and the security escorts and armored vehicles State requires for U.S. government personnel to travel in the region.

Bank, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators for assessing the progress of their security assistance programs for the PA. We have previously identified the development of such indicators as a good management practice because it helps provide objective and useful performance information for executive decision makers and overseers. State documents and annual mission strategic plans for the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem identify performance indicators for U.S. security assistance programs; however, the targets they set to measure progress toward these indicators focus on specific program outputs, such as the number of battalions or personnel trained and equipped, rather than on broader program outcomes such as helping the PA meet its Roadmap obligations to achieve the transformation of its security sector and create a professional, right-sized PASF.⁷ U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to a number of factors. For example, the PA plans and capacity for reforming, rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces are changeable and still in a relatively early stage of development, making it difficult for the PA to set targets that the USSC could use to measure the progress and effectiveness of its programs. Nevertheless, State and USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate such performance indicators to the extent possible in a USSC campaign plan being developed for release in mid-2010.

The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces a number of logistical constraints that are largely outside of U.S. control, and these security assistance programs outpace efforts to develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement and access of USSC personnel in the West Bank, a lack of a process to ensure approval and timely delivery of equipment shipments, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects in the relatively small portion of the West Bank in which the PASF is allowed to construct or maintain facilities. For example, State and USSC officials noted that the process for obtaining Government of Israel approval for the shipment and delivery of equipment for the PASF is lengthy and may hamper the timely arrival of U.S. shipments. Moreover, the USSC lacks the means to hold the Government

⁷We have previously defined output measures as measures of an agency's products or services; outcome measures demonstrate to an external party whether the agency is achieving its intended results. See *Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results*, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

of Israel or the PA accountable if shipments are delayed or approvals withheld.⁸ Furthermore, U.S. and PA officials said sustaining the progress they have made with U.S. assistance in the security sector may be difficult due to the lack of capacity in the civil police and the justice sectors with which the USSC-supported security forces must operate. State, USAID, and other international donors have been assisting the PA with civil police and justice-sector reforms, although these programs are not proceeding at the same pace as the programs to train and equip the security forces and build the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior.

As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sector.

State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our recommendation, agreeing that more performance-based indicators are needed. Consistent with our report, State also cited that several factors outside of their control influence progress toward a number of meaningful performance-based indicators.

⁸Approval process and delivery delays also constrain the efforts by other donors to provide the Presidential guard and NSF with light weapons and other lethal equipment. PA officials said the security forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor efforts to transform the security sector would be significantly hampered if these forces could not be fully armed.

Background

The Palestinian territories, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, cover 2,402 square miles and have a combined population of over 4 million people.⁹ (See fig. 1.) Both the PA and Israel administer areas within the West Bank.

⁹An additional 187,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank as of 2009.

Figure 1: Map of West Bank and Gaza and Surrounding Countries



Sources: GAO (data); CIA and Map Resources (map).

Security Assistance to PA since 1993

1993-2003

The U.S. government, along with other countries, has provided intermittent security assistance to the Palestinians since 1993.

In 1993, the Oslo Accord called for limited Palestinian self-rule and security responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰ The subsequent 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip divided the West Bank into three zones and allotted civil and security responsibilities, to varying degrees, to the Israeli government and the PA. The Government of Israel allowed the PA to establish some security forces and coordinated with the PA on the establishment of limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States provided some non-lethal equipment and a small amount of funding for salaries to help the newly created PA security forces improve their professionalism and combat terrorism. Other countries provided the PA with security assistance focused on training and equipping the security forces.

The outbreak of the second intifada (insurrection), which State reports resulted in the death of more than 3,000 Palestinians and about 1,000 Israelis between 2000 and 2004, disrupted security assistance efforts.¹¹ In response to the intifada, the Israeli security forces reoccupied much of the West Bank previously ceded to PA control, set up hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks throughout the territory, erected a wall separating Israel and some Palestinian territory from the rest of the West Bank, and destroyed much of the Palestinian security infrastructure. As a result, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation ceased and other governments curtailed or halted their security assistance to the PA. Amid the violence, efforts to negotiate a Middle East peace agreement began in 2000 at Camp David and continued until 2003.

2003-2007

Security assistance efforts did not resume until after the PA, Israel, United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia agreed in 2003 to implement the Roadmap for Peace, a U.S.-proposed performance-based strategy, which calls for an independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with the State of Israel and, among other things, provides a plan for establishing the security preconditions necessary to create an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap, among other things, obligates the PA and Israel to undertake specific actions to improve

¹⁰The Oslo Accord called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of Gaza and the West Bank and the creation of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

¹¹The first intifada refers to the Palestinian insurrection against Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza between 1987 and 1993.

security as part of the ongoing Middle East peace process. In particular, the Roadmap obligates the PA to perform the following actions:

- Issue an unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Have its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- Consolidate all Palestinian security organizations into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.

In return, the Roadmap obligates the Israelis to perform the following actions:

- Issue an unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions are also to end incitement against Palestinians.
- Take no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan,¹² and
- Progressively withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000, as comprehensive security performance moves forward. Palestinian security forces to progressively redeploy to areas vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces.

¹² The Tenet work plan refers to the plan to implement a cease-fire and restore security cooperation drawn up by then-Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet. The PA and the Government of Israel agreed to the work plan in June 2002.

To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap obligations and pave the way for a two-state solution, the Secretary of State created the office of the USSC in 2005. The USSC, which operated with no project funding until mid-2007, initially focused on providing advice and guidance to the PASF on its reform efforts while also coordinating the programs of several other security donors. In addition, USSC officials coordinated and consulted with Israeli and Palestinian authorities in connection with the PA's assumption of responsibility for security in Gaza following Israel's August 2005 withdrawal.

In January 2006, the Palestinian people elected a Hamas majority to the Palestinian Legislative Council.¹³ Following the results of the January 2006 election and the subsequent formation of a Fatah-Hamas unity government in 2007, the Quartet on the Middle East announced it would continue to provide support and assistance to the Hamas-led government only if the government would agree to nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and respect previous Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements.¹⁴ Hamas never accepted these conditions. U.S. direct assistance to the Palestinians was reduced and restructured, with the focus shifting to providing humanitarian and project assistance indirectly through international and non-governmental organizations. During this time, USSC focused on coordinating international assistance aimed at improving Gaza's economy and helped coordinate the efforts of Israel, Egypt, and the PA to regulate and control the key Gaza border crossings. USSC also coordinated with Britain and Canada to provide training assistance to the PA's Presidential Guard, a security organization under the control of the PA president with responsibility for protecting PA officials and facilities and manning the border crossings.

¹³Hamas is a U.S. designated terrorist organization. Provisions in U.S. annual appropriations have placed restrictions on funds being provided to Hamas. The most recent provision placed restriction on funds being provided to Hamas, a Hamas-controlled entity, or any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member, though assistance may be provided to such a power-sharing government if the President certifies that Hamas has taken certain steps such as publicly acknowledging the Jewish state of Israel's right to exist, or for national security reasons. *See* Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Public Law No. 111-117, December 16, 2009. Likewise, U.S. law also places restrictions on assistance to a Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority unless the President certifies that certain steps have been met or for national security reasons. *See* 22 U.S.C. § 2378b.

¹⁴Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and dominant faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969. The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993. Since the establishment of the PA and limited self-rule in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except for the period of Hamas participation during 2006 and 2007.

2007-2010

In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip. This led the PA President to issue an emergency decree suspending the operation of the PA government and appointing a new government, without Hamas participation, to administer the affairs of the West Bank during the state of emergency, under a politically independent Prime Minister. As a result, the United States decided to re-engage with the PA directly and increased the amount of U.S. assistance aimed at improving the economic and security climate in the West Bank and increasing the capacity of the PA.

As described by USSC and State officials, the USSC's current mission is to

- (1) facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the PASF;
- (2) lead and coordinate international assistance for the PASF provided by the United States and other international donors to eliminate duplication of effort;¹⁵ and
- (3) help the PA rightsize, reform, and professionalize its security sector by advising the PA and by training and equipping the PASF to meet the Palestinians' obligations outlined in the Roadmap.

The head of the USSC, a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, also serves as the deputy for security issues to the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace.¹⁶

¹⁵USSC security assistance activities are conducted in conjunction with a broader international effort to implement PA security-sector reforms and develop government capacity. State, USAID, Canada, and other international donors provide assistance for the PA justice and penal systems, according to U.S. officials, while the European Union advises and coordinates training and other assistance for the civil police. The international community pledged \$242 million at the June 2008 donor conference to support rule of law efforts and the Palestinian Civil Police through fiscal year 2011. In particular, the European Union's Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) is coordinating member nation efforts to increase the capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police with equipment donations and training support. Moreover, according to State documents, the PA Ministry of the Interior reported 16 countries and international organizations sponsored or conducted training sessions for PASF personnel between late 2008 and early 2009.

¹⁶In January 2009, the President appointed a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace who named the head of the USSC as his deputy for security issues. In this role the USSC head is responsible for, among other things, ensuring that U.S. security assistance efforts are effective and fully integrated with other political and economic efforts being undertaken by the U.S. government in support of the PA and peace in the region. However, the USSC formally reports through State's Near East and Asia Bureau.

The office of the USSC has a core staff of approximately 45 personnel as of March 2010. Headquartered in Jerusalem, the USSC includes up to 16 U.S. military personnel and several U.S. civilians. About 17 military staff provided to USSC by Canada operate in the West Bank, and two or more British military personnel from Britain support the USSC at the PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah.¹⁷ USSC also maintains staff at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv as liaisons to the government of Israel. State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) maintains staff in Jerusalem to implement INL program funds, most of which underwrite USSC activities. About 28 INL-directed Dyncorps International contractors assist with USSC training programs in the West Bank and Jordan. Other INL staff and contractors manage equipment warehouse operations in Jerusalem and oversee construction projects in the West Bank under this program.

PASF

Under the current president and prime minister, the PA formalized plans to reorganize and rebuild ministries and security forces in the West Bank with donor assistance between 2008 and 2010. The PA has consolidated a 23,000-strong security force under Presidential and Interior Ministry control, as called for in the Roadmap Agreement.¹⁸ As shown in figure 2, the PASF is comprised of uniformed services, civilian organizations, and intelligence offices.¹⁹

¹⁷DOD limits the participation of U.S. military personnel in the USSC to 16, according to State and DOD officials. The Canadian Forces' Operation Proteus provides military officers in support of the USSC, including mobile observation teams deployed to the West Bank. USSC officials stated that Turkey also contributed military officers in support of the USSC.

¹⁸The force of 23,000 personnel represents a significant decrease from the 86,000 active and retired personnel on the PASF payroll in early 2007, according to State sources.

¹⁹The PASF operates under the concept of policing primacy. This is a metropolitan police concept from the United Kingdom, applied in the West Bank by the European Union to define the PASF as a national-level policing organization that has all of the capabilities, minus an army, required to deliver law and order in accordance with Roadmap security obligations for a new Palestinian state.

Table 1: Overview of the PASF

	Service	Responsibilities	Reports to	Direct recipient of USSC assistance
Uniformed Services	National Security Forces (NSF)	A lightly armed and equipped gendarmerie-style force charged with supporting the civil police; delivering law and order; and combating terrorism, short of acting as a true military force. ^a To include 10 special battalions, with approximately 500 troops each.	Minister of Interior	Yes
	Presidential Guard	Elite force of about 2,300 personnel organized into 4 battalions, each specialized in different functions, including protection of important PA officials and facilities, quick reaction, and some gendarmerie tasks.	PA President	Yes
Civilian Security Organizations	Palestinian Civil Police	Approximately 7,300 officers responsible for daily policing, including arresting criminals, controlling traffic, and keeping general order. A relatively small, special rapid deployment unit handles complex situations such as riots or counterterrorism activities.	Minister of Interior	No
	Palestinian Civil Defense	About 650 personnel responsible for common protection services, such as emergency rescue and fire department services.	Minister of Interior	Yes
Intelligence Agencies	General Intelligence Service	Responsible for collecting intelligence inside and outside the territories, conducting counterespionage, and serving as the Palestinian liaison with other governments' intelligence agencies.	PA President	No
	Preventive Security Organization	Responsible for conducting counterterrorism efforts, monitoring opposition groups, and conducting reconnaissance and intelligence operations.	Minister of Interior	No
	Military Intelligence	Responsible for arresting and interrogating opposition activists considered a threat to the PA.	National Security Forces	No

Source: GAO analysis.

^aGendarmeries are specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds. According to a State document, the NSF serves as a “gendarme-like” organization and a back-up for the Palestinian civil police if the latter encounter overwhelming forces with heavier weapons than the police possess. The NSF is expected to function in small unit or company-size formations, in a military fashion, to support civil police to subdue civil disorders and address situations in which police Special Weapons and Tactics teams would ordinarily be used in the United States.

U.S. Security Assistance to the PA Emphasizes Training, Equipment, and Infrastructure and also Supports Capacity Building

The U.S. government, through USSC and INL has allocated over \$160 million in funding for the training of certain units of the PASF's uniformed services, primarily the NSF, since 2007. USSC has also helped provide State-funded vehicles and nonlethal individual and unit equipment to both the NSF and Presidential Guard, totaling about \$89 million. In addition, State has allocated approximately \$99 million toward the renovation or construction of numerous PASF installations. Finally, USSC and INL have undertaken activities to increase the PA's capacity, including building the Ministry of Interior's capacity to plan and oversee the PASF and coordinate international donor assistance. State allocated \$22 million in funding for these programs since 2007. (See table 1.)

Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Security Assistance Funding for the Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Programs, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2010 Appropriations

(Dollars in millions)

Project area	FY 07 appropriation ^a	FY 08 supplemental appropriation ^b	FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation ^c	FY 09 appropriation ^d	FY 09 supplemental appropriation ^e	FY 10 appropriation ^f	Total FY 07-10
Training	\$28.6	\$13.0	\$22.6	\$13.5	\$42.0	\$41.0	\$160.7
Equipment (non-lethal)	22.6	12.0	0	7.0	30.0	17.0	88.6
Infrastructure	18.6	0	18.4	0	31.0	30.5	98.5
Strategic/capacity development	6.0	0	4.0	3.5	2.0	6.5	22.0
Program development & support ^g	10.6	0	5.0	1.0	1.0	5.0	22.6
Total	\$86.4	\$25.0	\$50.0	\$25.0	\$106.0	\$100.0	\$392.4

Source: INL.

Note: All funding shown is from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement appropriations (INCLE) for fiscal years 2007-2010.

^aRevised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. Law No. 110-5, Feb. 5, 2007. Funds from the Economic Support Fund appropriated in Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 were transferred and consolidated into the fiscal year 2007 INCLE account pursuant to Presidential Determination No. 2007-11 of January 26, 2007.

^bSupplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June 30, 2008.

^cSupplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June 30, 2008.

^dOmnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-8, March 11, 2009.

^eSupplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-32, June 24, 2009.

^fConsolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-117, Dec. 16, 2009.

^gProgram Development and Support includes overhead items such as salaries, travel, and housing for INL officials, program design costs, and a contribution to the consulate's personal security detail costs, which includes the security escorts and armored vehicles required for travel by U.S. government personnel in the region.

State also has requested a total of \$150 million in additional INCLE funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011, including \$56 million for training activities, \$33 million for equipping, \$53 million for infrastructure activities, and \$3 million for strategic capacity building activities.

USSC Supports Training Focused Mainly on the NSF

Since 2007, State, primarily through USSC, has allocated more than \$160 million to support training of PASF units in Jordan and the West Bank. USSC has focused its training programs mainly on the NSF, and to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard.


Battalion-Level Training in Jordan

The main component of the USSC training-related activities is battalion-level basic law enforcement and security training conducted at the Jordanian International Police Training Center outside Amman, Jordan. As of January 2010, the Jordanian International Police Training Center had trained four NSF battalions and one Presidential Guard battalion totaling about 2,500 personnel. The trained units include both existing units (Presidential Guard 3rd and NSF 2nd special battalions) and newly recruited battalions (NSF 3rd and 4th special battalions).²⁰ This training consists of 19 weeks of basic training for all members of a battalion, which usually comprise approximately 500 troops.²¹ USSC officials told us that they currently plan to train a total of 10 NSF battalions at the Jordan center. State department officials reported that U.S. security assistance allocated to training from 2007 through 2010 covers the training of 7 of the proposed 10 battalions as shown in figure 2. This would allow one trained NSF special battalion to be deployed in each PA governorate in the West Bank (except in the municipality of Jerusalem, where the PA does not have security control) and one battalion to serve as a reserve for use as needed in any governorate.

²⁰The term “special battalion” distinguishes the new USSC-trained and -equipped units from the older NSF units these new battalions are replacing.

²¹The newly recruited battalions also receive preliminary training in the West Bank prior to their arrival in Jordan.

Figure 2: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion Level Training in Jordan as of March 2010



Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.

The basic training includes a mix of classroom and practical exercises focused on the broad areas of firearms operations, crowd control, close quarters operations, patrolling, detainee operations, and checkpoint operations. This training is also designed to help the PA transform and professionalize its security forces by producing well trained, capable graduates able to perform security-related duties supporting the Palestinian Civil Police or other duties as directed by the PA. According to U.S. officials, the training is structured to train by battalion to foster unity of command and build camaraderie among the troops. Although USSC and INL designed the syllabus for this training in consultation with the PA, instructors from Jordan’s Public Security Directorate conduct the training under the supervision of INL contractors. According to State and USSC officials, the United States fully vet all troops participating in USSC-sponsored training to ensure that no U.S. assistance is provided to or through individuals or entities that advocate, plan, sponsor, engage in, or have engaged in, terrorist activities.²² In addition, the PA, Israel, and Jordan also vet participants.

Prior to the commencement of each battalion’s basic training course, the program trainers conduct three concurrent 4-week preliminary training courses for the battalion’s officers, noncommissioned officers, and drivers. These preliminary courses, intended to provide personnel the fundamental

²²We have reported previously on the extent to which USAID vetting procedures for its Palestinian aid program contractors complied with its antiterrorism policies, and the extent to which State and UN policies and procedures conform with U.S. statutory requirements that, among other things, no Palestinian refugee who has engaged in any act of terrorism receives funding. See GAO, *Measures to Prevent Inadvertent Payments to Terrorists under Palestinian Aid Programs Have Been Strengthened, but Some Weaknesses Remain*, [GAO-09-622](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009).

Specialized Training in the West Bank

skills needed during the battalion training, focus on leadership skills for the officers and noncommissioned officers and advanced driving skills for the drivers. The Jordanian International Police Training Center also offers four 4-week concurrent specialized training courses for select graduates following their completion of the basic training course.

The USSC also supports and INL funds specialized courses in the West Bank to train and assist members of the NSF special battalions and some other PASF organizations in areas such as leadership, human rights, media awareness, equipment maintenance, and food service operations. Some of the courses continue specialized training for selected members of the NSF battalions that received basic training at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. However, other courses—including a senior leadership course and an intermediate leadership course—are open to all branches of the PA security services. The senior leadership course, first offered in late 2008, is a 2-month course for about 40 commanding officers from all branches of the PASF; as of February 2010, USSC had offered the course 6 times. International trainers taught the initial sessions, and a team comprised of PA and international instructors conducted the most recent senior leadership course. The intermediate leadership course is a new class for middle ranking and noncommissioned officers that adapts principles taught in the senior leaders' course. Altogether, USSC has conducted or supported 24 different specialized courses for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and plans to continue sessions of many of these courses while offering at least two new courses by the end of 2010. Appendix II provides details on current and planned USSC courses.

Other, smaller U.S. programs train Presidential Guard and Civil Defense troops. In 2008, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security provided limited training exclusively to the Presidential Guard through its Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.²³ This training focused on police tactical unit operations, leadership development at the middle and senior levels, investigative skills, and crisis response capabilities to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Presidential Guard. Finally, USSC and INL


²³In fiscal year 2007, INL provided \$4.6 million for this training. While State budget documents note that the department allocated \$2.5 million from its fiscal year 2010 budget for anti-terrorism assistance, State officials noted that they intend to reprogram those funds as they had no plans to conduct anti-terrorism activities with the PA in 2010.

plan to support limited civil defense training for the Palestinian Civil Defense corps at Jordan’s regional civil defense training academy.²⁴

USSC Provides the NSF and Presidential Guard with Nonlethal Individual and Unit Equipment

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately \$89 million to provide nonlethal equipment to 7 NSF battalions and the Presidential Guard. State plans to equip 10 NSF special battalions, as shown in figure 3. USSC is working to ensure that these security forces are properly equipped while garrisoned in their operations camps, and while operating throughout the West Bank. USSC intends to accomplish this by providing an initial issuance of nonlethal equipment to the battalions that have received basic training at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. As of March 2010, the USSC had provided the 3rd Presidential Guard battalion with an initial issuance of equipment, and had provided partial issuances of equipment to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th NSF special battalions. State also reported that they have submitted the 5th NSF special battalion’s equipment package list to the Israeli government for approval.

Figure 3: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion-Level Equipping as of March 2010



Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data.

USSC and INL, in consultation with the PA, developed the lists of equipment provided to each battalion, which the Government of Israel must also approve. The initial issuance of nonlethal individual and unit equipment for each NSF special battalion includes uniforms with protective gear and operational equipment, including riot shields, batons, and handcuffs as well as computers, tents, basic first aid kits, and support vehicles. (For a list of the specific equipment provided to an NSF battalion see app. III.) USSC also provided the Presidential Guard battalion with a

²⁴USSC has also funded the participation of PASF officials at a number of conferences and seminars in 2008 and 2009 on security and terrorism issues at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and at the National Defense University’s Near East-South Asia Center in Washington, D.C.


similar initial issuance of nonlethal individual and unit equipment, adapted for their mission specific needs. The USSC and INL also plan to provide search-and-rescue vehicles to the PA civil defense forces.

Because all U.S.-provided equipment is subject to end-use monitoring, INL officials and documents note that State maintains the right to examine the property and inspect the records that govern its use. In addition, the United States provided the PA with equipment and training to implement and maintain an inventory system to record and track all U.S. equipment deliveries and disbursements.

USSC Supports Renovation and Construction of PASF Installations

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately \$99 million to renovate or construct PASF installations. The main focus of USSC and INL infrastructure activities is to fund and oversee construction of operations camps for 9 of the 10 NSF battalions trained at the Jordanian International Police Training Center.²⁵ U.S. security assistance allocated to infrastructure from 2007 through 2010 covers the renovation or construction of six of the proposed nine camps (see fig. 4). The operations camps will serve as garrison facilities for the battalion as well as function as a base for conducting operations in the West Bank.

Figure 4: Status of USSC- Sponsored NSF Operations Camps as of March 2010




Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data.

USSC and INL are also funding and overseeing the construction or renovation of training and ministry facilities in the West Bank. Figure 5 shows the six planned and six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects, including the two NSF operations camps, as of March 2010.

²⁵State expects the 10th battalion to be deployed in other installations as a reserve force.

Figure 5: Map of Planned and Ongoing USSC-funded Infrastructure Projects




Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps).

The six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects include NSF operations camps, training facilities, and Ministry of Interior facilities, and account for about \$41 million of the total allocated for infrastructure. They are in varying stages of completion; however, INL officials expect that all ongoing infrastructure projects will be completed by early 2011.

NSF Operations Camps and Garrison Facilities

- **Jericho NSF Operations Camp.** This operations camp is to serve as the garrison for the 2nd Special Battalion. The camp is to accommodate approximately 750 personnel and provide workspaces, basic vehicle maintenance facilities, parking for approximately 145 squad vehicles and 40 large vehicles, clinical facilities, tactical communications facilities, separate officer berthing and accommodation spaces, a logistic warehouse facility, and K-9 animal housing spaces. State allocated about \$11.3 million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by mid-2010. (See figs. 6 and 7.)
- **Jenin NSF Operations Camp.** This operations camp will consist of two barracks buildings that will accommodate approximately 576 troops, one officers' accommodations building that will house over 100 officers, an operational center, mess hall, and gym. State allocated \$11 million to this renovation, which USSC and INL officials expect to complete by the end of 2010.
- **Hebron NSF and Special Police Force (SPF) Building.** In this joint NSF and Special Police Force building, the police occupy the ground floor and the NSF the first floor. The goal is to make this building habitable by units from the NSF special battalions deployed to Hebron and make it usable for its intended security functions, including the provision of a safe and secure operating environment, that is capable of being shared with other PA security services. State allocated \$170,000 for this renovation, which USSC and INL expect to complete in mid-2010.

Figure 6: Location of NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho



Source: GAO photo.

Figure 7: U.S. Funded Construction at the NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho



Source: GAO photo.

Training Facilities

- **Nuweimah Training Center.** The current training facility in Nuweimah is being refurbished and expanded with funding from INL, to serve as an NSF training facility. The facility is to include accommodations for approximately 2,000 troops and 24 classrooms for approximately 1,500 students. The PA's initial plan was to renovate two NSF basic training facilities in Jericho—Nuweimah and Alami. However, according to an INL official the PA and USSC decided not to renovate the Alami site, owing to difficulties in securing needed land titles, and instead to shift all funds to Nuweimah. State allocated about \$8 million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by early 2011.
- **Presidential Guard Training College (Jericho).** The PA intends to use the college to house and train 500 law, order, and security personnel at any given time. This facility has classroom space and accommodations for 250 personnel, as well as dining and support facilities for 500 personnel. State has allocated about \$9 million to construct this facility. According to an INL official, original work on the facility was carried out by the UN Office

for Project Services, under INL supervision.²⁶ This facility is currently fully operational, and USSC and INL expect construction to be complete by mid-2010.

Ministry Facilities

- **Ministry of Interior’s Strategic Planning Directorate renovation (Ramallah).** USSC is renovating space in the Ministry of Interior to provide additional office space and a training hub for the Strategic Planning Directorate. The renovation is to add 90 spaces for new staff and two large classrooms, a meeting room, and a security room. State allocated \$1.1 million to this renovation, which was completed in February 2010.

To spend the remaining \$58 million in infrastructure funding, USSC and INL proposed additional projects, including building NSF operations camps in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Tubas, and a civil defense center in or near Ramallah. However, one U.S. official told us that, because of difficulties in obtaining suitable land and other delays, the USSC is reviewing other options for the NSF operations camps, including constructing temporary operations camps until a permanent site can be identified or renovating existing joint security force facilities to allow them to be used to garrison NSF special battalions. As of March 2010, preliminary design work had begun on a temporary operations camp near Tubas.

USSC Has Centered Capacity Building Programs on Interior Ministry

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately \$22 million for capacity-building activities, focused mainly on creating the Ministry of Interior’s Strategic Planning Directorate. The Minister of Interior oversees all the security forces reporting to the PA prime minister. According to an INL document, the directorate conducts strategic planning to support security decision making at the executive and ministry level to help the PA establish law and order and facilitate other longer-term security-sector reforms. The directorate is staffed by individuals with strategic planning, logistics capability, and other expertise. According to USSC officials, when

²⁶The UN’s Office for Project Services oversaw the initial construction. State and PA officials said they replaced this office with Palestinian contractors due to concerns about the quality of the building construction. GAO previously reported that this UN office had not assessed the effectiveness of management reforms undertaken to address key concerns raised by various audits and investigations of its operation. See *UN Office for Project Services: Management Reforms Proceeding but Effectiveness Not Assessed, and USAID’s Oversight of Grants Has Weaknesses*, [GAO-10-168](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2009).

Gaza fell to Hamas in mid-2007 and the PA President issued presidential decrees declaring a state of emergency, suspending the current government, and forming a new, more moderate government, the Ministry of Interior lost its entire staff, leaving the newly appointed minister the task of building an entirely new ministry. INL-funded activities include providing technical assistance to the Strategic Planning Directorate, in particular, funding and assigning six international technical advisors to work within the directorate, and training for Ministry and Strategic Planning Directorate staff. According to State documents and officials, as of April 2010, after 2 years of service, the contracts of all six of these advisors had expired, and, at the request of the Minister of Interior, State did not renew them. According to a State official, the Minister of Interior stated in January 2010 that this effort had been concluded to the Ministry's satisfaction, so there are no plans to replace these advisors. He noted that State has offered to make technical assistance available on an ad hoc basis and at the request of the Minister, and, along with other international donors, plans to continue to fund other training and equipping efforts at the Ministry in fiscal year 2011.

In addition to forming the Strategic Planning Directorate, USSC and INL have undertaken other programs to increase the PA's capacity. Examples include the following:

- USSC and INL are providing assistance in building the PA's capacity to coordinate international security assistance. As part of this effort, USSC serves as a technical advisor to a security sector aid-coordinating body co-chaired by the Interior Minister and the government of the United Kingdom.
- USSC and INL are supporting a Canadian-funded effort to develop PASF capacity at the governorate level through the creation of Joint Operations Centers, which are intended to give PASF area commanders in each governorate the command and communications facilities necessary to conduct integrated security operations.
- In support of the PA justice sector, INL launched a \$1.5 million small scale justice sector assistance project in Jenin.²⁷ The program provides technical

²⁷The Justice Sector Assistance Program in Jenin is designed to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PA justice sector. It seeks to build on INL's previous assistance to the PASF by improving the capacity of the Jenin justice sector, primarily the police and public prosecution, to more effectively and transparently investigate and prosecute cases.

assistance, training, and modest amounts of equipment to improve capacity of the police to conduct criminal investigations and help the public prosecutor's office manage its caseload. A U.S. official reported that this program could be replicated if successful in other governorates.

Although Improvements in West Bank Security Conditions Have Been Reported, State and USSC Have not Established Clear and Measurable Outcome-Based Performance Indicators

U.S. and international officials have observed improved security conditions in some areas of the West Bank since the PA began deploying units trained and equipped with USSC assistance, although they acknowledge these improvements may not be directly or wholly attributable to USSC programs. However, State and USSC have not assessed how their programs contribute to the achievement of the PA's Roadmap obligations because they have not developed clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and targets linking their program activities to stated U.S. program objectives.

Numerous U.S. and International Officials Observed Improved Security Conditions in the West Bank since PA Began Deploying USSC-Trained and Equipped Units

Numerous U.S., PA, Israeli, and other government officials stated that both the PA and the Government of Israel are satisfied with the impact USSC-trained and -equipped PASF battalions have had on improving the security conditions in the West Bank. PA and U.S. officials cited these improvements as examples of how U.S. security assistance is aiding PA progress toward attaining its security obligations under the Roadmap, including having its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations to dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. These improved conditions include the following.

- **Better PASF capacity to control potentially violent situations.** According to U.S., international, PA and Government of Israel officials, USSC-supported and -trained PASF units contributed successfully to restored security and conducted counterterrorism operations in Jenin,

Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas between 2008 and 2009.²⁸ Several U.S. and international officials also noted the lack of spontaneous or organized violence in PASF-controlled areas in response to the December 2008 through January 2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza was an indicator of the PASF's growing capacity to anticipate and handle large scale demonstrations and limit potential violence.

- **Fewer Israeli government checkpoints.** Several U.S. officials suggested that the USSC also could point to some indicators as measures of the growing effectiveness of USSC-supported security forces, including the decline in the key manned Israeli security checkpoints in the West Bank. However, the officials stated they could not independently verify the validity or accuracy of the reported declines, nor would they directly attribute these outcomes to USSC activities.²⁹
- **Revived economic activity.** According to PA and U.S. officials and documents, the subsequent revival of private investment in Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas where USSC-trained and -equipped PASF battalions were deployed is another indicator that USSC assistance has influenced the security situation, although a senior PA official noted that PA fiscal policies may have also contributed to this revival.
- **Improved public attitudes toward security forces.** In addition, both State and PA officials noted that Palestinian polling suggests people's views of the PASF have improved, and a State report cited such a poll as indicating growing understanding and confidence of the West Bank populace in their security forces.

²⁸PA units initiated some security operations before they received USSC assistance. For example, the PASF initiated an ongoing effort to secure Nablus in November 2007, before the start of USSC-sponsored training.

²⁹While State officials agreed that there has been a decline in the number of significant roadblocks, there is not a common agreement on the number or the definition of what constitutes a significant roadblock. Some officials stated they based this assessment on data from the government of Israel indicating the number of such roadblocks declined from 41 to 14, although the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports do not highlight this particular decline. OCHA reported that the total number of barriers (including staffed and unstaffed checkpoints, roadblocks, and mobile or other temporary barriers) rose from 561 in October 2007 to 630 in September 2008, before decreasing to 578 by October 2009. The number of staffed checkpoints (both within the West Bank and along the security barricade separating it from Israel) decreased from 93 to 69 in the same period between September 2008 and October 2009.

State and USSC Officials
Have Not Established
Clear and Measurable
Outcome-based
Performance Indicators for
PA Security Assistance

Although State and USSC report on PASF program outputs such as the number of personnel vetted, trained, and equipped, USSC has not defined or established outcome-based performance measures to assess the progress, impacts, and estimated costs of achieving USSC objectives. For example, USSC documents and officials note that USSC objectives include helping the PA create right-sized, professional security forces in support of its Roadmap obligations but do not specify measurable outcome-based program performance indicators.³⁰ USSC and State officials attributed the lack of clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and their associated targets for their programs to three factors—(1) changing force requirements, (2) the early stages of PA planning and its limited capacity to rebuild and sustain its security forces, and (3) lack of detailed guidance from State about USSC program objectives, time frames, and reporting requirements.

First, the PA's planned force requirements have undergone several revisions. According to a U.S. official, and as U.S. and PA documents demonstrate, the planned size and composition of the NSF has changed from seven special battalions (five in the West Bank, two in Gaza) in early 2007, to five special battalions solely in the West Bank after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007. According to State officials and documents, the PA increased the number of battalions for the West Bank from five to seven by mid-2008, although the projected total number of personnel remained at 3,500 as each battalion was reduced in size from 700 to 500 personnel in part to create smaller units better suited for the urban environment in which they would operate. In 2009, the PA raised the projected size of the NSF to 10 special battalions, according to USSC officials.³¹ Some State officials and documents also noted that the PASF has not clarified the role of the Presidential Guard and that some of its units had assumed gendarmerie tasks beyond its original mandate, which may overlap with NSF responsibilities.

³⁰GAO defines performance measurement as the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward preestablished goals, and is typically conducted by program or agency management. Program measures or indicators may address, among others, the direct products and services delivered by a program (outputs), or the results of those products and services (outcomes). See GAO, *Performance Measurement and Evaluation, Definitions and Relationships*, [GAO-05-739SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 2005).

³¹According to a former USSC official, the PA also decided to increase the size of the NSF in part to compensate for perceived shortfalls in civil police capabilities.

The revised and unclear requirements reflect that the parties to the Roadmap agreement—the PA and Israel—have not agreed on common measures to assess progress in meeting their Roadmap security obligations, according to USSC officials. For example, a September 2008 USSC report noted that the Government of Israel and the PA have not developed “effects-based metrics” needed to define a successful PASF security or counterterrorism effort under the Roadmap.³² State officials stated that the Government of Israel prefers not to establish objectives or measures that might limit its flexibility to conduct security operations within the West Bank.

Second, the PA’s plans and capacity to reform, rebuild, and sustain its security forces are still in a relatively early stage of development.³³ As a result, State and USSC officials said it is difficult to set outcome-based targets to measure the progress or outcomes of their programs. For example, the PA’s capacity to direct its own transformation was lacking until recently. According to a senior PA official, the Minister of the Interior did not consolidate within the ministry the authority to request, accept, and coordinate all foreign donor security assistance until August 2009.

Third, USSC officials said that State did not give USSC a “blueprint” for attaining defined and measurable objectives for its programs within a set period of time, or for estimating the amount and type of resources needed to achieve such USSC goals as aiding in the transformation of the PA security sector and the creation of a professional, right-sized security force. According to State, this stemmed from the absence of a requirements-based budget allocation process for USSC programs until 2008. Since then, however, State officials said they required USSC and INL to provide performance indicators beginning with the fiscal year 2009

³²For example, PA officials expressed concerns about their ability to conduct effective counterterrorism efforts, and the USSC has contemplated additional counterterrorism programs in the West Bank and considered further developing specialized counterterrorism units to conduct high-risk arrests and other specialized duties. However, an Israeli official stated that his government is not in favor of the counterterrorism courses proposed by the USSC. State noted a final decision by the U.S. government on holding these courses had not yet been made as of April 2010.

³³For example, the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for 2008 through 2010, which set out basic, broad goals for Security Sector Reforms, was only adopted in 2007. The more detailed Plan for the Reorganization, Restructuring and Development of the Palestinian Security Establishment proposed in 2008 to develop the broad objectives set in the PRDP, may undergo further revision as a result of a PASF strategic review undertaken in January 2010, according to USSC officials.

Jerusalem mission strategic plan. Furthermore, a senior USSC official said they had little incentive to emphasize or develop performance targets because State had shown little interest in tracking performance in the past; in fact, regular monthly reports from USSC to State on its activities resumed only in November 2009 after a hiatus of more than a year.

Despite these factors, deriving indicators to measure and manage performance against an agency's results-oriented goals has been identified by GAO as good management practice because it would help provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities.³⁴ GAO has previously reported that while agency managers encounter difficulties in setting outcome-oriented goals or collecting useful data on expected results in general, it is difficult to design effective strategies or measure the impact of programs without them.³⁵ State and USSC officials noted that USSC was developing a campaign plan for release in mid-2010 to help the Palestinians implement their own revised security strategy—which was still not released as of March 2010—and expected the plan to incorporate performance indicators to the extent possible. According to U.S. military doctrine, effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the desired end state and the conditions that must exist to in order to end the operation. Moreover, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or termination. Determining when conditions are met requires “measures of effectiveness,” such as outcome-based performance measures.³⁶ GAO has reported on the importance of outcome-based performance indicators as a key characteristic of effective national security strategy planning and a

³⁴GAO described how such performance indicators can be developed and applied in a number of reports, including *Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals*, [GAO-06-437](#) (Washington, D.C.: April 2006). See list of related GAO products at the end of the report.

³⁵Previous GAO reports have noted that effective U.S. government strategies encompass certain desirable characteristics, including providing outcome-related performance measures that address priorities and milestones for progress; identify risks; and assess plans to integrate U.S., international, and host country efforts. For a full description of these characteristics, see GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals*, [GAO-06-788](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).

³⁶See DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006); and GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed*, [GAO-08-837](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008).

necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based on these strategies (see list of related GAO products at end of report).

Although the fiscal year 2010 Jerusalem mission strategic plan identifies performance indicators for U.S. security assistance programs, the targets to measure progress towards achieving these indicators focus on program outputs rather than program outcomes. For example, the plan identified the performance indicator “building Palestinian security capabilities” to assess progress toward achieving State’s broader goal of reforming Palestinian security forces to improve law and order and reduce terrorism.³⁷ However, this indicator is measured based on output targets such as “completing the training and equipping of at least one PG and one NSF battalion” in fiscal year 2008 rather than on outcomes such as reduced terrorism as measured by, for example, changes in the number of terrorist-related incidents or changes in crime rates. Moreover, neither the performance plan nor USSC documents establish measurable outcome targets for assessing progress towards such stated USSC objectives as creating a “right-sized, professional” security force or helping the PA transform its security sector. Nor do these plans and documents contain information on expected time frames or estimated total costs for achieving these goals.³⁸

State and USSC officials acknowledged that it would be useful to describe the impacts of U.S. security assistance on such outcomes as reductions in the number of Israeli security checkpoints in the West Bank. Similarly, they acknowledged it would be useful to tailor some survey questions to establish baselines and assess over time the extent to which polling data suggesting growing Palestinian confidence in their security can be attributed to the conduct and actions of USSC-trained PASF personnel, but noted the difficulty in separating the impact of U.S. security assistance from the impact of such external factors as Israeli political and security actions. In March 2010, State and USSC officials said that they had tasked an officer to clarify how USSC activities achieve State objectives and to improve reporting on USSC performance.

³⁷GAO has highlighted the importance of establishing specific outcome-based performance measures in the development of national and multinational strategies to combat terrorism. See the list of related GAO products at the end of the report.

³⁸While the mission strategic plan for fiscal year 2011 did set as a target that NSF battalions be “fully equipped and housed” in fiscal year 2010, USSC plans as of February 2010 do not reflect this as a goal.

U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and Outpace Development of the Rule of Law

Logistical constraints on personnel movement and access, equipment delivery, and acquisition of land for infrastructure projects challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. In addition, State, USSC, and international officials and documents note that programs to develop the capacity of the civil police and the justice sector are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security sector reform programs.

U.S. Security Assistance Faces Several Logistical Constraints

Logistical constraints—largely outside U.S. control—involving personnel movement and access, equipment approval and delivery, and land acquisition challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance in the West Bank and Gaza.


Constraints on Personnel Movement and Access

State travel restrictions and Israeli Defense Force security checkpoints limit the movement and access of U.S. personnel into and within the West Bank. State restricts U.S. government personnel travel into and within the West Bank and requires that they travel in armored vehicles with security teams when traveling to State designated high threat areas. However, such restrictions do not apply to personnel from other countries supporting the USSC, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, according to State officials. As a result, according to U.S. officials, USSC relies on non-U.S. personnel to visit Palestinian security leaders on a daily basis, gauge local conditions, and conduct training in the West Bank. Israeli security checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank border also limit U.S. government personnel movement and access, according to U.S. officials. For example, on more than one occasion, U.S. government delegations, including staff from USSC and State, were prevented from entering or exiting the West Bank, according to USSC and State officials. PA officials also face movement and access difficulties crossing at Israeli checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank, which hampers the ability of USSC to meet with PA outside of the West Bank.

Delays in Equipment Approval and Delivery

While a process exists for equipment approval and delivery as shown in figure 8, U.S. officials said problems affecting the approval and delivery of equipment have hampered USSC's ability to equip the PASF in a timely manner. USSC officials noted that without a significant effort at a higher political level to streamline this process, delays will frequently occur with little recourse available to USSC.

Figure 8: Process for Equipment Approval and Delivery



Process
 Potential delays
 INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
 Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.

Delays in equipment approval and delivery have occurred throughout this process, for example:

- Delays in approval.** An absence of agreed-upon terms for the approval of equipment requests, such as equipment specifications or a set timeframe to make approval decisions, has resulted in delayed Israeli approval of shipments of USSC and other donor equipment, according to U.S. and

other donor officials.³⁹ For example, State and EU donor officials told us that the Government of Israel has not agreed to specific procedures for pre-approval of equipment orders as it prefers to continue to approve or deny each equipment request on a case-by-case basis. According to an Israeli official, each equipment request must be reviewed on its own merits, as specifications can change. For example, an Israeli official stated that although the Government of Israel had approved procurement of a shipment of raincoats, it did not guarantee the approval of future shipments of raincoats of comparable types and quantities. In addition, because the parties have not agreed on time frames for submitting or approving equipment requests, significant differences between the amounts of time needed to approve various items have constrained USSC's ability to estimate equipment delivery dates. For instance, some vehicles ordered for the Presidential Guard and NSF 2nd Special Battalion in March 2008 were delivered in June 2008 while others were not delivered until January 2009. On the other hand, USSC officials said in March 2010 that the time needed to complete the approval process has declined from approximately 3 months to 2 weeks for items that had been approved in prior shipments by the Israeli government. Nevertheless, these officials note there is no guarantee that previously approved items will continue to be approved by the Government of Israel. For example, they noted that as of November 2009 INL has paid at least \$176,000 to store a \$2.3 million shipment of approximately 1,400 radios and associated gear that the Israeli government approved for delivery, but was then impounded by Israeli customs upon arrival in port in early 2009 after the Government of Israel revoked this approval.⁴⁰

- **Delays in delivery.** Delays have occurred at Israeli customs and during shipment into the West Bank, constraining USSC's mission of properly equipping the NSF and Presidential Guard, according to officials we spoke with. USSC officials stated that shipping items to Israel takes about 1 month by sea and as little as 1 day by air from the United States. However,

³⁹USSC and INL officials noted that other factors have also delayed the approval and delivery of equipment, including the lead times needed to redress shortfalls in manufacturers' stocks, the time needed to identify foreign vendors and obtain waivers for orders placed for items not available in the United States, and the limited availability of ships that meet program requirements that they be U.S.-flagged carriers and in compliance with Israeli port restrictions (e.g., prohibitions on the docking of ships that have visited certain Arab ports 6 months prior to arrival in Israel).

⁴⁰An Israeli government official stated that the radios were impounded to insure their transmission frequencies do not interfere with Israeli or Jordanian frequencies. State noted that the radios remained impounded as of March 2010, even though the radios will be programmed to Government of Israel approved frequencies.

USSC officials also stated that while the time needed for Israeli customs to approve shipments averages about 2 months, approval can take up to a year or more for items that require modification by the Israelis in order to pass Israeli customs inspections. For example, USSC officials noted that vehicles and trailers were held up as Israeli customs required modifications to their lights, brakes, and other specifications before they would release them. According to an Israeli official, the PA also contributes to the equipment delays at customs by not following the shipment instructions in the approved requests. For example, in one case equipment was shipped with other types of goods destined for the West Bank and the quantity of equipment was lower than the approved amount. In another case, the shipper consolidated a shipment of PASF items with items for other customers. The increasing number of equipment deliveries in 2009 has also added to the delays in clearing customs, according to the Israeli government official. Additional unexpected delays in delivery have occurred when Israeli customs inspectors have not released equipment shipments they have approved, according to USSC and INL officials.⁴¹ These officials told us that security inspections required at Israeli border crossings and checkpoints in the West Bank have also delayed delivery. USSC and INL officials noted that they have taken steps to improve their ability to deliver equipment on time, including: developing standardized NSF battalion equipment packages to minimize Israeli opportunities to question equipment specifications; requiring the contracted freight forwarder in Virginia to check every item against shipment manifests prior to shipment; and making greater use of airfreight delivery. In addition, USSC officials said they have shortened the lead times needed to procure and ship equipment over time by pre-ordering items previously approved by the Israelis to be included in later shipments.

Moreover, USSC, INL, and PA officials and staff have found it difficult to check on the status of the shipment or to hold parties accountable for delays, according to USSC officials. These officials stated that conflict appears to exist between various Israeli government departments related to the equipping process, which periodically results in unexplained delays in equipment release or approval. According to USSC, it is unclear with whom USSC or PA officials should speak to seek redress for unexplained equipment delays; as a result, delays are often elevated to high level U.S. and Israeli officials, who then negotiate a resolution. These delays have hampered USSC's ability to equip the trained NSF and Presidential Guard

⁴¹State noted in some cases Israeli customs inspectors impounded approved shipments of equipment to verify whether or not some approved items were missing from the shipment.

battalions in a timely manner. While the USSC planned to deliver equipment to these battalions upon their graduation from JIPTC, some of these battalions have operated for several months after graduation without all of their needed equipment. For example, INL ordered equipment for the PG 3rd battalion and NSF 2nd special battalion in December 2007 to be distributed at the time of their May 2008 graduation; however, USSC and INL officials noted that although these two battalions had received all of their vehicles as of March 2010, they had yet to receive 14 percent of their equipment. As of March 2010, the 3rd and 4th NSF special battalions that had completed training in Jordan prior to December 2010 had received over 90 percent of their vehicles but only 44 to 50 percent of their other equipment, according to State officials. These officials said that the 1st NSF special battalion, which graduated in January 2010, had not received any of the purchased vehicles and only 2 percent of its other equipment as of March 2010.⁴²

INL officials stated that these equipment shortfalls had not significantly affected the ability of the NSF special battalions to operate once they were deployed back to the West Bank. However, they acknowledged that these units had been deployed to the field lacking critical items, such as helmets, armored vests, and communications gear, that had been proposed, and in some cases procured, by the USSC and INL but had not been approved for delivery by the government of Israel.


Constraints on Land Acquisition

The completion of U.S.-funded infrastructure projects has been delayed by constraints on acquiring land in the West Bank that are largely outside of U.S. control, according to USSC, INL, and PA officials. Israel must approve the location of all proposed facilities and does not set formal standards by which locations are approved, according to USSC officials. These officials also said the PA is largely limited to building in Oslo Area A, which is solely under PA authority but comprises less than 20 percent of the West Bank's territory. USSC officials also stated that it is difficult to determine whether a proposed installation site includes land solely in Area A. In addition, the Government of Israel requires that the proposed installation

⁴²Efforts by other donors to provide the PG and NSF with light weapons and other lethal equipment have similarly been constrained by the approval process and delivery delays. For example, a USSC official noted a shipment of 1,000 AK-47 rifles approved by the Israeli government had been detained in customs. PA officials said the security forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor efforts to transform the security sector would be significantly hampered if these forces could not be fully armed. An Israeli Ministry of Defense official disputed this assertion, contending that the PASF had sufficient weapons.

sites must not be near Israeli settlements or access routes. After the Government of Israel approves an installation site, USSC officials stated they face a lengthy Palestinian process for establishing ownership rights and obtaining legal title to the land. These officials noted that conflicting land and property claims on the site also create a challenge to acquiring land for PA infrastructure projects. Figure 9 depicts areas where the PA usually can acquire land for security installations in the West Bank (area A) and areas where it cannot (areas B and C).

Figure 9: Division of West Bank Territory by Oslo Area of Control and Israeli Settlements (2009)



Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps).

Because of these restrictions and delays, USSC and INL officials said efforts to develop NSF operations camps beyond the two already under construction remain stalled as of March 2010. Owing to delays in acquiring suitable land for permanent camps and the need to house newly trained battalions, USSC and INL officials said they have built temporary

operations camps. Similarly, because of delays in land acquisition, USSC and INL cancelled renovation plans of an NSF facility in Alami and redirected the funding to the Nuweimah facility, according to an INL official. Originally designed to house 700 trainees, Nuweimah will be expanded to house 2,000 trainees upon completion in fiscal year 2011. To work around restricted property in certain urban areas, the USSC and INL are planning to construct or renovate multistory buildings within urban-based security compounds known as muquata'as. This effort is underway or being planned for compounds in Tulkarm and other urban locations. As a result, some U.S.-funded PASF centers are holding more troops than originally planned and facilities are being built in a way that allows them to be expanded upon if needed, according to USSC and INL officials. These land acquisition problems constrain USSC's goal to provide housing for each of the NSF special battalions upon their completion of training in Jordan.

Capacity Development of PA Civil Police and Justice Sector Is Limited

U.S. and international officials noted that PA civil police and justice sector reforms are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security sector reforms.

- **Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) capacity is limited.** According to EUPOL COPPS advisors, the PCP lags behind all other Palestinian security forces in funding for infrastructure and equipment. Although infrastructure exists, such as joint operation centers and prison facilities, about 60 new police stations need to be rebuilt or constructed and existing facilities need to be refurbished, according to a USSC document. The PCP also have difficulties obtaining certain types of equipment, such as finger printing equipment, radios, and personal protective equipment, according to EUPOL COPPS. Also, the judicial police—charged with serving court orders, protecting judges and judicial facilities, and transporting prisoners—lack vehicles and operating capabilities outside of Ramallah, according to a USSC report. According to a U.S. official, a decision was made in 2008 to increase the size of the NSF in the West Bank from 5 to 10 NSF special battalions in part to compensate for the lack of PCP capacity.

According to State and international officials, the NSF and the PCP do not coordinate programs to a large extent. Although the NSF receives training on operating with the PCP at JIPTC and PCP are trained on operating with NSF at many different levels, including at USSC-sponsored courses, the NSF and PCP coordination needs to be strengthened, according to U.S. and other officials. While an INL official said the PA is taking efforts to increase coordination between these two security forces through the

Interior Ministry's Strategic Planning Directorate, the PCP's lack of communication equipment, such as radios, limits coordination. A EUPOL COPPS official told us that it is difficult for the PCP to obtain radios and frequencies and such a lack of communication equipment constrains the building of a sophisticated and well-equipped civil police force.

- **Justice sector capacity is limited.** The PA justice sector still lacks sufficient infrastructure, organization, and updated laws, according to PA, U.S., and international documents and officials.⁴³ Justice-sector infrastructure, such as facilities and courts in each governorate, require upgrades and improvements by 2011, according to USSC. U.S. and foreign officials told us that to improve justice-sector organization, the PA needs to more clearly define the roles of its government agencies. According to a USSC report, cooperation between the elements of the criminal justice system—the courts, police, and prosecutors—is poor. In addition, USSC reported that the physical separation of government agencies within and between governorates results in poor coordination.⁴⁴ USSC further reported that the lack of clarity and consistency in PA laws and the lack of a working legislature also undermine PA civil police and justice-sector capacity. USSC reported that the PASF, including the civil police, are constrained in their ability to conduct security operations and to detain persons who present a security threat and the justice sector is constrained in convicting such persons because Palestinian laws on some related issues are vague and sometimes contradictory. However, such laws cannot be reviewed and updated until after a new Palestinian Legislative Council is installed.⁴⁵

Moreover, a State document noted that the civil police and justice-sector capacity limitations have become a matter of greater concern as it has become apparent that other donors are not providing the necessary civil

⁴³The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan of 2008 - 2010 created a justice-sector program, "Justice Now," which focuses on elements such as justice-sector infrastructure and capacity development.

⁴⁴For example, according to a USSC report, the physical separation between the elements of the criminal justice sector in Jenin may form an obstacle to personal and professional cooperation, and impedes the ability of external actors to effectively monitor or assist criminal justice-sector reform.

⁴⁵The Palestinian Legislative Council's term expired in January 2010 and no elections have yet been held to replace it. According to State officials, elections for both the President of the PA and the Legislative Council await resolution of issues concerning the scope and conduct of the elections and the eligibility of voters in Hamas-controlled Gaza to participate.

policing, justice-sector, and other pledged assistance necessary to keep pace with the progress the U.S. security assistance programs are achieving. According to U.S. and PA officials and documents, sustaining the progress they have made with U.S. assistance in the security sector may be difficult unless the lack of capacity in the civil police and the justice sectors with which the USSC-supported security forces must operate are addressed. To help address some of these gaps, State officials said State had recently reinforced its role for facilitating coordination among U.S. agencies and international donors for justice-sector issues. Examples of U.S. and international justice-sector reform programs include: the INL's Justice Sector Assistance Project, USAID's Rule of Law and Justice Enforcement Program, EUPOL COPPS' civil police and rule of law program, and the Canadian International Development Agency's "Sharaka" Program, as shown in table 3.

Table 3: Select PA Justice-Sector Reform Programs

Donor/program	Description
U.S. INL Justice Sector Assistance Project	Improve the capacity of the Jenin justice sector, primarily the police and public prosecution, to investigate and prosecute cases to reduce the current case backlog through technical assistance, training, and modest amounts of equipment. Plans to expand program to strengthen cooperation between criminal investigators and prosecutors.
USAID Rule of Law and Justice Enforcement Program	Build the management capacity and case management system of the courts and increase public confidence in the justice sector through outreach programs.
EUPOL COPPS	Advise and monitor the functioning of the PA justice sector through the Civil Police, the Ministry of Justice, the prosecutor's offices, and courts.
Canadian International Development Agency "Sharaka" Program	Provide training, equipment, infrastructure, information technology systems, and support to the Office of Attorney General and the Public Prosecution Service. Also provide support to forensics and courthouses.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. and international program documents.

Conclusion

In fiscal years 2007 through 2010, State allocated approximately \$392 million in USSC assistance to support U.S. strategic goals and Roadmap objectives in the Middle East, and has requested \$150 million more for fiscal year 2011. Most of this assistance has supported training and equipping new PASF battalions deployed in the West Bank. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has helped the

PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West Bank and is progressing faster than PA civil police and justice sector reforms, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess and report on the progress of their security assistance. As such, it is difficult for State and the USSC to gauge whether or not their security assistance programs are helping the PA achieve its Roadmap obligations to undertake security sector transformation and create a right-sized, professional security force. Establishing and tracking outcome-based performance measures in the proposed USSC campaign plan would help inform decisions about the costs, progress, and impact of U.S. security assistance to the PA particularly given that this assistance is progressing faster than the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms.

Recommendations

As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors.

Agency Comments

State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State commented that they recognize the need for such indicators and have tried to develop ones that are meaningful at this stage of the program's development. For example, State mentioned that they have included broad performance measures in the Mission Strategic Plan. INL has also factored performance measures into all of its funding obligating documents. State, however, accepts our point that these measures should be more performance-based. Now that trained and equipped security force units are in place, State anticipates developing meaningful security-related baseline data for measuring the progress of U.S. sponsored trained units. State further commented that they have already started to do this with the Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the cases they prosecute. In addition, State commented that INL is in the process of crafting a new Letter of Agreement with the Palestinian Authority. This letter is to contain project goals, objectives,

and milestones that reflect the program's recent and anticipated future growth in size and complexity.

State cautioned that, as we reported, several factors outside of State's control influence progress toward the most meaningful performance-based indicators. State noted that while security assistance provided by the United States can strengthen the capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate increasingly in certain areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, State added, such an agreement depends on a range of political, economic, and social factors that encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and security capabilities U.S. assistance gives the PA security forces. State also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contribution to this report are listed in appendix V.



David Gootnick
Director, International Affairs and Trade.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., in the West Bank, at the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Amman, Jordan. We also met with PA, Israeli, and Jordanian government and security officials as well as recognized experts in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. We reviewed State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget justifications for fiscal years 2008 through 2010 to determine the levels of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding allocated to USSC and INL security assistance programs in the West Bank. We determined that the INCLE funding allocation data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To describe the nature and extent of the training programs, we reviewed INL, USSC, and contractor status report documentation and conducted site visits to observe U.S.-sponsored training at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. We reviewed examples of training reports, student surveys, and after action reports used by USSC contractors to review the performance of their trainees during and after every National Security Forces (NSF) training session. To describe the status of USSC programs to equip the NSF, we reviewed equipment delivery lists, contractor statements of work, equipment delivery work orders, and summaries of equipment end use monitoring reports. We interviewed INL, USSC, Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), and Jordanian officials about the status of equipment deliveries. To describe the status of the construction of PASF installations, we reviewed the August 2007 "Framework Agreement" signed between the Secretary of State and the PA Prime Minister as well as INL contract summary data and progress reports; visited construction projects in and around the city of Jericho; and interviewed PA and INL contract staff about project objectives, plans, and funding issues. We assessed the reliability of the data on the battalions trained and equipped by the USSC, and on the infrastructure construction data provided by INL. We did not assess the reliability of the data on the current size and structure of the PASF because we are presenting them for background purposes only.

To assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance programs, we examined whether its approach identified and applied measurable performance indicators necessary to gauge results—as called for in a number of GAO products listed at the end of this report. These reports state that developing and applying outcome-based performance indicators are (1) a management best practice; (2) one of the

key characteristics of effective national security strategy planning, particularly when developing counterterrorism strategies; and (3) a necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based on these strategies. We also reviewed other GAO reports assessing the extent to which other U.S. assistance projects develop and apply results-based performance indicators. We reviewed the strategic plans for State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the mission performance and the mission strategic plans for the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, as well as the four monthly activity reports the USSC has produced between November 2009 and March 2010. We examined United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data and an Israeli Ministry of Defense report for changes in the number of Israeli roadblocks within the West Bank from 2007 to 2009.

To determine factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority, we analyzed reports, conference presentations, and U.S. government sponsored studies to identify issues that affect U.S. programs. We conducted interviews with State, INL, and USSC officials in Washington, D.C., and in the field. We also met with Israeli, PA, Jordanian, and other international officials during our fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Jordan. To assess logistical constraints, we reviewed relevant UN and State documents on access and movement; INL and USSC documents on the logistics of providing equipment to the PA; and met with USSC officials to discuss challenges in acquiring land for U.S.-funded infrastructure in the West Bank. To illustrate the U.S.-funded equipment approval and delivery process, we developed a schematic representation and identified points during which the process may experience problems based on discussions with U.S., Israeli, and PA officials. We consulted with INL and USSC officials and incorporated their comments into our representation of the equipment approval and delivery process. To assess the capacity of the PA police and justice sector and its impact on U.S. security assistance, we reviewed documents from and met with USSC, Israeli, PA, and international officials. To examine the pace of U.S. and international assistance to the PA civil police and justice sector, we also reviewed State documents and met with current PA police and justice sector donors, including USAID, INL, and EUPOL COPPS.

We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: List of USSC Courses Provided to the PASF in the West Bank, July 2008 to March 2010

Table 4 shows the 24 different specialized courses the USSC has conducted or supported for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and the two additional courses it planned to offer as of March 2010.

Table 4: USSC-Sponsored Training Courses in the West Bank, July 2008 – March 2010

Course title	Approximate course length	Start date	Approximate number trained
PASF Senior Leaders Course	60 days	Oct. 2008	6 courses held with selected PASF personnel
PASF Intermediate Leaders Course	30 days	Feb. 2010	2 courses held with selected PASF personnel
Human Rights/Use of Force	35 hours	Mar. 2010	40 PASF students
HQ Staff Training	30 days	July 2008	Selected staff from 4 NSF battalions
Advanced Staff Training	30 days	Oct. 2008	Selected staff from 3 NSF battalions
Intermediate English Language Training	10 weeks	Sept. 2008	86 students
Advanced English Language Training	10 weeks (or 5 weeks intensive)	Nov. 2008	108 students
Map Reading and Symbols	30 days	July 2009	40 NSF students
Media Awareness Training	30 days	March 2010	20 PASF students
Medical Refresher Training	30 days	Feb. 2009	Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions
Basic Lifesaver First Aid	5 days	Nov. 2009	80 students
First Responder	6-8 weeks	Dec. 2009	80 students
Tactical Logistics	30 days	June 2009	Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions
Basic Driver Training	30 days	Oct. 2008	Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions, 120 NSF students, 120 PASF students
Vehicle Maintenance	30 days	March 2009	Selected personnel from 3 battalions
15 Ton Drivers Training	15 weeks	Nov. 2009	30 NSF students
Recovery Vehicle Training	3-4 months	May 2009	Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions
Fleet Management	30 days	Dec. 2008	Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions
Equipment Maintenance	30 days	Nov. 2009	Selected personnel from 1 NSF battalion
Warehouse Management	30 days	Feb. 2009	Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions
Training/Training Management	N/A	Planned	N/A
Communications Training	30 days	March 2010	150 NSF students
Communications Maintenance	4 months	March 2010	None complete as of March 31, 2010
Computer Skills Training	30 days	Dec. 2009	20 students
Food Service Operations	4 months	Feb. 2010	None complete as of March 31, 2010
Nutrition Training	3 months	Planned	None complete as of March 31, 2010

Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.

Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3rd and 4th Battalions

Table 5 shows the type and quantity of equipment approved for the NSF 3rd and 4th battalions. USSC procures an initial issuance of equipment for battalions trained with U.S. funds at the Jordanian International Police Training Center adjusting the issuance slightly for each battalion. An average battalion consists of 500 troops.

Table 5: Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3rd and 4th Battalions

Description	Quantity
Vehicles	
Ambulances	3
4-Door Sedan (Surveillance vehicle)	8
Isuzu D-MAX 4x4 Supercrew Truck	64
Benches, rack systems and tarps for Isuzu D-MAX	64
3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4	15
3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4	15
Prisoner transport van (Paddy Wagon)	2
Tow Truck	2
Generator trailer	4
Water trailer, 500 gallon	5
Tool Box, truck mounted	2
Organizational (Recon Platoon)	
Video camera/Camcorder (No tape)	4
4GB Memory stick for cameras, camcorders	8
Camera	4
10 X 50 Binoculars	16
Speciality Equipment	
Extendable mirror	12
Rappelling gloves	68
Grenadier gloves	15
Rappelling harness system	68
Police Entry Equipment	
Dual Handled Entry Sledge/Door Ram	6
Climbing Rope	10
Climbing Ladders	10
Brean-N-Rake Entry Bar for windows	6
Dynamic Entry Back Kit (cutters, sledge, bar)	6
Close Quarter Dynamic Entry Sledge	6
Hydraulic Spreaderbar (doorway)	6

**Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment
Approved for Provision to the NSF 3PrdP and
4PthP Battalions**

Description	Quantity
Gorilla Entry Bar (doorway)	6
Ballistic Entry Shield (Level IIIA)	6
Fence Climbing Kit	6
Dynamic Entry Sledge (Regular)	6
Ladder, Telescopic	6
General Equipment	
Mobile Light Trailer	10
Handheld Spot Lights (rechargeable)	100
Road Cones	100
Metal Bars for checkpoints	50
Spike Strips	30
Metal Detectors	24
Steel Handcuffs	500
Head Flashlights (rechargeable)	550
Bullhorns	10
Camera, Snake	6
Handheld Monitor	6
Spotting Scope with camera adapter	4
Rubber training mat	1
Printer	5
Scanner/Fax	4
Copier Machine	2
Projectors	4
Wallboards	14
Paper Shredder	3
DVD Player/VCR	6
Laminator	2
Laptops	6
Desktops	6
Water Coolers	30
Television	6
Road Emergency Kit (triangle, fire ext., reflective vest)	64
Rain Tarp	15
Washer and Dryer	1
Medical Equipment	
Tactical Trauma Kit	15
First Responder Kit	120

**Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment
Approved for Provision to the NSF 3PrdP and
4PthP Battalions**

Description	Quantity
Resuscitation Mannequin	2
Litter, Non-Rigid Poleless	20
Litter, Folding Rigid Aluminum Nylon	8
Litter, Stand	8
Litter, Straps	6
First Aid Kits, small, individual, with case	550
Riot Gear	
Riot Shield	300
Riot Helmet	300
Riot Gloves	300
Knee Pads	300
Elbow Pads	300
Riot Control Gas Mask	300
Gas Mask Cartridges (2 per person)	600
Riot Baton	300
Individual Equipment	
Helmets, Level I	550
Body Armor, Level II	550
Uniforms	
PT Gear (shorts, shirt, track suit, shoes, socks)	550
Field Jacket	550
Rain Suit	550
Patch, Palestinian flag	1,100
Patch, NSF	1,100
Patch, Battalion	1,100
Patch, eagle logo, on beret	550
Boots	1,100
Beret	550
Ball cap, BDU	550
Military sweater	550
Coveralls	20
Cold Weather Suit	550
Undershirt, Cotton, Green (3 per person)	1,650
Undershirt, CW Green, POLYPRO	550
Trousers, Green, 70% cotton (2 per person)	1,100
Shirt, Green with pockets, 70% cotton (2 per person)	1,100
Socks, black, 100% cotton (3 pairs per person)	1,650

**Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment
Approved for Provision to the NSF 3PrdP and
4PthP Battalions**

Description	Quantity
Scarf, wool, knit	550
Drawers, Olive drab, 100% cotton (3 per person)	1,650
Drawers, CW POLYPRO	550
Cap, watch, black, fleece	550
Standard Issue	
Sleeping bag	550
Tactical Vest	550
Canteens, with case	550
Mission bag	550
Tent, GP Medium	20
Web belts	1,050
Foam sleeping pad	550
Poncho liner	550
Bag, Duffle	550
Bag, barracks (laundry)	550
Cup, canteen	550
Towels	1,050
Bag, waterproof	550
Sheets	1,000

Source: USSC.

Appendix IV: State Comments on Draft Report



United States Department of State

Chief Financial Officer

Washington, D.C. 20520

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers
Managing Director
International Affairs and Trade
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

APR 26 2010

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints," GAO Job Code 320683.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Steve Peterson, Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 736-4376.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James L. Millette".

James L. Millette

cc: GAO – David B. Gootnick
INL – David Johnson
State/OIG – Tracy Burnett

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY:
U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping Security Forces but the Program
Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints
(GAO-10-505, GAO Code 320683)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled “PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints.” Supporting the Palestinian development of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) Security Forces in accordance with the goals and objectives of the Roadmap for Peace supports the U.S. Government’s foreign policy and national security priorities. It is a component in our overall effort to promote a two state solution where the Palestinian State lives side by side in peace and security with Israel. For this reason and in light of the foreign assistance funding Congress has appropriated for the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, we welcome the GAO’s review of our programs and the opportunity to improve upon our efforts.

The Department of State partially concurs with the recommendation of the GAO report that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. More specifically, that State should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors. State includes performance measures and indicators for its programs, but would agree that they could be further refined. We appreciate the fact that the report acknowledges several challenges, including the still early stage of the program’s development, its fluidity, and the complex political and security environment.

State recognizes the need for such indicators and has tried to develop ones that are meaningful at this stage of the program’s development. For instance, every year since this program became operational in August 2007, we have included broad performance measures in the Mission Strategic Plan. INL also factors performance measures into all of its funding obligating documents: contracts with DynCorp International and DPK, amended letters of agreement with the Government of Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, and implementation letters with the Palestinian Authority. We accept GAO’s point, however, that these measures should be more performance-based and now that trained and

equipped security force units are in place, we anticipate developing meaningful security-related baseline data for measuring the progress of these units. We have already started to do this with our Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the cases they prosecute. In addition, INL is in the process of crafting a new Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the Palestinian Authority that will contain project goals, objectives, and milestones that reflect the program's recent and anticipated future growth in size and complexity. This LOA will replace the existing one that has been in effect since 2005, including several amendments.

We would like to caution, however, that as the report notes, there are several factors we cannot control that influence progress toward the most meaningful performance-based indicators. According to the Roadmap, "comprehensive security performance" will be measured over time by the redeployment of Palestinian security forces to areas vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces. While security assistance provided by the United States – and other donors – can strengthen the capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate increasingly in these areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, such an agreement depends on a range of political, economic, and social factors that encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and security capabilities our assistance gives the PA security forces.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov.

Staff Acknowledgments

Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Michael Maslowski; Jillena Roberts; Martin De Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Reid L. Lowe; and Joseph P. Carney made key contributions to this report. Etana Finkler provided technical support.

Related GAO Products

The following GAO reports discuss how outcome-based performance indicators can be developed and applied as a management best practice:

Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements. [GAO-07-1034](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007).

Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals. [GAO-06-437](#) (Washington, D.C.: April 2006).

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [GAO-06-15](#) (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. [GAO-04-38](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

The following GAO reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as one of the characteristics of effective national security strategy planning:

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals. [GAO-06-788](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).

Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. [GAO-04-408T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

The following reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as a necessary component of campaign planning and execution:

Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [GAO-08-622](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008).

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [GAO-08-837](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008).

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