~~25054~~
121320

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
EXPECTED THURSDAY MORNING
AUGUST 5, 1982

STATEMENT OF

HENRY ESCHWEGE, DIRECTOR

COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION

ON

AVIATION SAFETY HAZARDS

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

WE ARE HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS OUR RECENT FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN OUR FEBRUARY 1980 REPORT ENTITLED, "HOW TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH SAFETY HAZARDS" (CED-80-66). SAFETY HAZARDS INCLUDE PROBLEM AREAS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRES AND POST-CRASH FUEL FIRES.

LET ME SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THE MAJOR AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT WHICH WERE COVERED IN OUR REPORT. FAA DID NOT HAVE: (1) EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS FOR IDENTIFYING SAFETY HAZARDS, (2) A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING PROCESS TO ADDRESS AVIATION SAFETY ISSUES, (3) AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM FOR PREPARING, REVIEWING, AND APPROVING INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM PLANS, (4) AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF CONTROLS TO GOVERN THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF SAFETY PROJECTS, AND (5) SUFFICIENT EVALUATION OF SAFETY PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS.

025522

DURING OUR FOLLOW-UP, WE FOUND THAT FAA HAS TAKEN AND IN SOME CASES IS PLANNING TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT SHOULD HELP THE AGENCY DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH AVIATION HAZARDS. FAA NEEDS TO DO MORE, HOWEVER, TO ADEQUATELY MANAGE ITS EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH SAFETY HAZARDS.

IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY HAZARDS

IN OUR 1980 REPORT, WE STATED THAT BECAUSE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN COLLECTED AND BETTER ANALYSIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE, FAA MIGHT NOT BE IDENTIFYING AND CORRECTING POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARDS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. OUR REPORT MADE SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT IMPROVING FAA'S IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY HAZARDS.

FAA HAS RESPONDED BY INITIATING A DESIGN FOR A COMPUTER-BASED SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE AVIATION SAFETY ANALYSIS SYSTEM, IS INTENDED TO LINK UP MANY OF FAA'S INDIVIDUAL DATA BASES ALONG WITH THOSE AVAILABLE FROM THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA), AND INDUSTRY. ONE OF THE PLANNED MAIN FEATURES OF THIS SYSTEM WILL BE THE ABILITY TO RAPIDLY ANALYZE INFORMATION FROM THE VARIOUS DATA BASES AND TO AUTOMATICALLY FLAG PROBLEM AREAS AND ADVERSE TRENDS.

THE DESIGN SPECIFICATION FOR THE SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY BEING REVIEWED WITHIN FAA. IMPLEMENTATION IS TARGETED FOR DECEMBER 1984. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS COMPLEX SYSTEM BY THE SCHEDULED TARGET DATE DEPENDS UPON THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF A NUMBER OF RELATED ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY UNDER SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT. IF ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES SUFFER A DELAY, THE PROJECT WILL LIKELY BE DELAYED.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE TARGET DATE COULD SLIP IF FAA ENCOUNTERS DELAYS IN DEVELOPING AND INTEGRATING THE VARIOUS SOFTWARE SEGMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH DATA BASES, TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS, AND DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ENTRY SUBSYSTEMS. IN THE PAST, SOFTWARE PROJECTS OF A SIZE AND COMPLEXITY SIMILAR TO THE AVIATION SAFETY ANALYSIS SYSTEM HAS PRESENTED MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROBLEMS TO FAA.

OUR 1980 REPORT ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT FAA EXPLORE ALL MEANS FOR OBTAINING A COMMON FAA/NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD APPROACH TO ACCIDENT INFORMATION. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON DATA BASE WOULD ELIMINATE THE REDUNDANCY IN FAA'S AND THE BOARD'S INDIVIDUAL DATA BASES.

FAA AND THE BOARD HAVE BEEN WORKING TOGETHER ON THE ISSUE OF COLLECTION OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INFORMATION. INDIVIDUAL ACCIDENT/ INCIDENT DATA BASES ARE STILL BEING MAINTAINED. THE BOARD HAS DEVELOPED A NEW DATA COLLECTION FORM WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR USE BY BOTH AGENCIES. THE FAA ADMINISTRATOR RECENTLY ADVISED THE BOARD THAT FAA WILL USE THE NEW FORM, AFTER REVISION TO INCLUDE SOME ADDITIONAL FAA DATA NEEDS, AND THAT HE SUPPORTED THE INTEGRATION OF THE FAA'S AND THE BOARD'S DATA BASES.

WE ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT FAA IMPROVE ITS RESEARCH OF HUMAN FACTORS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND HOW TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS CAUSED BY HUMAN BEHAVIOR. FAA HAS ESTABLISHED A TASK FORCE AND HAS HELD SIX WORKSHOPS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1980 AND JULY 1981 WITH FAA, THE BOARD, NASA, DOD, AND INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATING. FAA IS ANALYZING THE INFORMATION OBTAINED DURING THE WORKSHOPS TO SELECT ITEMS TO BE PURSUED IN FUTURE RESEARCH EFFORTS.

NEED FOR TOP MANAGEMENT'S COMMITMENT TO DEAL WITH SAFETY HAZARDS

THE BASIC WEAKNESSES COVERED IN OUR FEBRUARY 1980 REPORT INVOLVED THE NEED FOR FAA TO HAVE (1) A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING PROCESS FOR ADDRESSING AVIATION SAFETY ISSUES INCLUDING A SYSTEM FOR ASSIGNING PRIORITIES, (2) BETTER PLANS FOR INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS, (3) A SYSTEM FOR MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF SAFETY PROJECTS, AND (4) IMPROVED EVALUATION AND APPRAISALS OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES. THE OVERRIDING NEED WAS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A TOP MANAGEMENT GROUP TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO AVIATION SAFETY HAZARDS.

FAA AGREED WITH THE BASIC THRUST OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, EXCEPT IT SAW NO NEED FOR THE TOP MANAGEMENT GROUP WE SUGGESTED.

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING

AN FAA POLICY OFFICIAL ADVISED THAT THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATOR SUBSCRIBES TO THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE CONCEPT AND THAT ALL PLANNING FLOWS FROM SUCH OBJECTIVES. SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AT FAA, THE ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHED A LIST OF 10 AGENCYWIDE OBJECTIVES FOR FAA. REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATORS WERE DIRECTED TO PREPARE PLANS FOR THEIR ORGANIZATIONS SHOWING HOW THEY WOULD ASSIST FAA IN MEETING EACH OF ITS OBJECTIVES. PLANS PREPARED BY EACH ORGANIZATION ARE TO BE COORDINATED AGENCYWIDE.

THE PLANS COVERING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATORS FOR AVIATION STANDARDS AND FOR ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OFFICES MOST INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH AVIATION SAFETY HAZARDS, ARE BEING DRAFTED. BECAUSE THE DETAILS OF FAA'S

CURRENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING PROCESS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND BECAUSE THE ATTENDANT PLANNING DOCUMENTS ARE STILL BEING DRAFTED, IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF IMPROVEMENT THAT MAY RESULT.

PLANNING FOR INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS

WE REPORTED THAT LOGICAL, SYSTEMATIC PLANNING TO SOLVE SAFETY HAZARDS IN THE MOST TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE MANNER WAS MISSING AT FAA. OUR FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF FAA'S PLANNING ACTIVITIES FOR RECENTLY INSTITUTED INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS INDICATES CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN JULY 1981 FAA INITIATED A SAFETY PROJECT IN THE AREA OF POST CRASH WATER SURVIVAL INVOLVING TRANSPORT AND COMMUTER AIRCRAFT. THE REQUEST TO INITIATE THE PROJECT SPELLED OUT THE BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR THE PROJECT, A STATEMENT OF THE WORK THAT WAS CONTEMPLATED, AND THE PRIORITY TO BE ACCORDED THIS EFFORT. A PRINCIPAL STAFF CONTACT IN THE OFFICE OF AIRWORTHINESS WAS NAMED AND A COMPLETION DATE OF AUGUST 1983 WAS ESTABLISHED.

DURING THE LAST YEAR, A STEERING GROUP COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS FAA OFFICES HAS MET SEVERAL TIMES TO DISCUSS THE PROJECT. A FORMAL PLANNING DOCUMENT TO GUIDE FAA'S EFFORTS AS IT PROCEEDS WITH THE SAFETY PROJECT SHOULD BE ISSUED SOON. THESE PLANNING AND COORDINATING ACTIVITIES ARE RESPONSIVE TO OUR 1980 REPORT.

CONTROL OVER IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS

DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS, QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS ARE HELD WITH THE TECHNICAL CENTER AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF ATTENDING. THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR

FOR ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT RECENTLY STATED THAT HE CONDUCTS BIMONTHLY REVIEWS OF HIS ACTIVITIES WITH THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION STANDARDS. DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL EFFORTS BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS AND THE TECHNICAL CENTER ARE GENERALLY HANDLED THROUGH FREQUENT TELEPHONE CONTACTS.

THE FORMAL SYSTEM WHICH FAA USES IN MONITORING SAFETY PROJECTS CONSISTS OF ONE-PAGE RESUMES OF INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS PREPARED BY AVIATION STANDARDS PROGRAM OFFICES. FOR EXAMPLE, FAA HAS AN INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECT AIMED AT DEVELOPING A FUEL ADDITIVE WHICH WILL REDUCE THE HAZARD OF POST-CRASH FUEL FIRES. THE RESUME FOR THIS ANTIMISTING KEROSENE PROJECT IDENTIFIES THE PRINCIPAL FAA STAFF MEMBERS INVOLVED FROM THE OFFICE OF AIRWORTHINESS, THE TECHNICAL CENTER, AND THE OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY. IT GIVES A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF WHY THE PROJECT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN AND WHAT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DATES DURING THE PROJECT LIFE ARE LISTED.

SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATES FOR VARIOUS MILESTONES ARE LISTED AND SPACE IS PROVIDED FOR REVISIONS TO THE SCHEDULE DATES, AND FOR THE DATE OF ACTUAL COMPLETION. PROGRAM OFFICES ARE CHARGED WITH UPDATING THE RESUMES IN A TIMELY MANNER TO REFLECT APPROPRIATE REVISIONS.

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE RESUMES IS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY PROGRAM STATUS INFORMATION TO THE ASSOCIATE AND DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION STANDARDS. THE RESUMES CAN ALSO BE USED BY AVIATION STANDARDS OFFICE DIRECTORS AND STAFF CHIEFS IN THEIR MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL OPERATIONS.

THE RESUME SYSTEM WAS IMPLEMENTED SUBSEQUENT TO OUR 1980 REPORT. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MANDATORY WRITTEN PROGRESS REPORT SYSTEM. THE USEFULNESS OF THE SYSTEM COULD BE IMPROVED, HOWEVER, IF A REQUIREMENT FOR REGULAR UPDATING WAS ESTABLISHED. THE RESUMES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF AIRWORTHINESS WHICH WE REVIEWED WERE LAST UPDATED AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1981. IT IS QUESTIONABLE AS TO WHETHER INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF A PROJECT OVER SEVEN MONTHS AGO SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT FOR TIMELY INFORMATION.

EVALUATION OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES

OUR 1980 REPORT CONCLUDED THAT LITTLE EVALUATION OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN DONE, SUCH AS MEASURING PERFORMANCE AGAINST OBJECTIVES. WE MADE A NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT IMPROVING FAA'S AND DOT'S EVALUATIONS AND APPRAISALS.

VERY LITTLE HAS CHANGED. AS FAR AS WE COULD DETERMINE NO EVALUATIONS OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED OVER THE MORE THAN 2-YEAR PERIOD SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF OUR REPORT.

TOP MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT

IN 1980 WE REPORTED THAT AN AGENCYWIDE AWARENESS OF THE SAFETY ISSUES AND PROBLEMS WAS MISSING AT FAA, AND AS A RESULT FRAGMENTED, INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTRUCTURED APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION PROCESS DEVELOPED. WE COMMENTED THAT A GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY A TOP MANAGEMENT GROUP WAS NEEDED TO ACT AS A CATALYST TO CREATE AGENCYWIDE AWARENESS AND FACILITATE DECISIONMAKING INVOLVED IN TIMELY AND EFFECTIVELY DEALING WITH SAFETY HAZARDS. WE RECOMMENDED THAT THE SECRETARY DIRECT THE FAA ADMINISTRATOR

TO ESTABLISH A TOP MANAGEMENT GROUP WHICH WOULD (1) IDENTIFY OVERALL SAFETY PRIORITIES, (2) REVIEW AND APPROVE MAJOR INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECT PLANS, AND (3) CONTINUALLY MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF SAFETY PROJECTS. DOT DISAGREED AND HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH A GROUP.

IN THE PERIOD SINCE OUR 1980 REPORT, THE AVIATION MEDIA, MEMBERS OF THE AVIATION COMMUNITY, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE CONTINUED TO BE CRITICAL OF THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF FAA'S EFFORTS IN SOLVING AVIATION HAZARDS. FAA'S EFFORTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRE SAFETY HAVE COME IN FOR PARTICULAR CRITICISM. FOR EXAMPLE, JAMES KING, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, COMMENTED THAT FAA HAS BEEN PROMISING ACTION IN THIS AREA EVER SINCE 1961 WHEN IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT PASSENGERS WERE SURVIVING AIR CRASHES BUT WERE DYING AS A RESULT OF FIRES INVOLVING CABIN MATERIAL. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING.

OUR ANALYSIS OF FAA'S EFFORTS IN ATTEMPTING TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRE SAFETY INDICATES THAT MUCH OF THE CRITICISM IS JUSTIFIED. THE ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATES FOR MANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED AS MUCH AS TWO YEARS, AND EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SOME OF FAA'S RESEARCH RESULTS ARE OF QUESTIONABLE VALUE.

FAA'S ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PLAN FOR AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRE SAFETY WAS ISSUED IN JUNE 1980. FEDERAL RESEARCH IN THIS AREA HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR MANY YEARS PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF THIS FORMAL PLAN. THE PLAN IDENTIFIED 16 PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES

WHICH WERE TO BE PERFORMED BY FAA'S TECHNICAL CENTER AT ATLANTIC CITY AND FAA'S CIVIL AEROMEDICAL INSTITUTE AT OKLAHOMA CITY. THE PLAN EMPHASIZES THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEST METHODS AND CRITERIA FOR CABIN INTERIOR MATERIALS THAT RELATE TO FLAMMABILITY, SMOKE, AND TOXICITY UNDER POST CRASH FIRE CONDITIONS. THE PLAN ALSO INCLUDES DEVELOPMENT OR EVALUATION OF CABIN FIRE EVACUATION AIDS, INCLUDING HEAT RESISTANT SLIDES, EMERGENCY LIGHTING FOR SMOKE-FILLED CABINS, PROTECTIVE BREATHING DEVICES, AND FIRE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS. THE PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES WERE ESTIMATED TO BE COMPLETED ON VARIOUS DATES WITH THE LAST DATE BEING JANUARY 1983.

AS OF MAY 1982 FOUR OF THE PROJECTS HAD BEEN COMPLETED, FIVE HAD BEEN ELIMINATED, THREE OTHERS HAD BEEN ADDED, AND THE ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATES FOR THE OTHER SEVEN HAD BEEN EXTENDED ANYWHERE FROM SEVEN MONTHS TO TWO YEARS. THE LAST SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE IS JUNE 1984.

ONE OF THE INCOMPLETE PROJECTS CONCERNED THE RECOMMENDATION OF A MATERIAL TO BE USED AS A BLOCKING LAYER TO INHIBIT OR PREVENT THE BURNING OF SEAT CUSHION MATERIAL IN A POST CRASH FIRE. FAA TESTED VARIOUS MATERIALS AND IN LATE 1980 FAA'S TECHNICAL CENTER RECOMMENDED A MATERIAL (VONAR PE) WHICH, IF USED ON SEAT CUSHIONS, HAD THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASING THE SURVIVAL TIME IN THE CABIN BY 60 SECONDS. FAA DECIDED THAT THE WEIGHT PENALTY OF THE MATERIAL WAS EXCESSIVE SINCE IT WOULD ADD ABOUT 3 POUNDS TO EACH SEAT AND RESULT IN AN ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF AN ADDITIONAL 60 GALLONS OF FUEL PER SEAT PER YEAR. THE TECHNICAL CENTER ALSO EVALUATED SOME ALUMINIZED MATERIAL, HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED

TO BE TOO COSTLY. MUCH OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT WAS APPARENTLY WASTED AND VALUABLE TIME IN COMING UP WITH ACCEPTABLE MATERIAL WAS LOST, BECAUSE FAA DID NOT SPECIFY AT THE OUTSET THE LIMITATIONS ON WEIGHT AND COST. IN APRIL 1981, FAA REQUESTED NASA TO ASSIST IN THE SOLUTION OF LOW-WEIGHT FIRE BLOCKING LAYERS FOR AIRCRAFT SEAT CUSHIONS. THIS EFFORT WAS STILL UNDERWAY IN JUNE 1982.

IN REJECTING THE NEED FOR A TOP MANAGEMENT GROUP TO FACILITATE FAA'S DEALING WITH SAFETY HAZARDS IN A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE MANNER, DOT POINTED TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AND WERE TO BE MADE AT FAA. WHILE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE, THE CRITICISM LEVELED AT FAA'S EFFORTS IN GENERAL, AND OUR ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT CABIN FIRE SAFETY IN PARTICULAR, INDICATES TO US THAT FURTHER MANAGEMENT CONTROL IS NEEDED.

AS WE POINTED OUT IN OUR FEBRUARY 1980 REPORT, FAA IN RESPONDING TO A SIMILAR NEED IN ANOTHER AREA OF AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY ESTABLISHED AN AGENCYWIDE FORMALIZED SYSTEM TO CONTROL ITS MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATOR VERY RECENTLY STRENGTHENED THE CONTROL OVER THIS PROCESS. THE FOCAL POINT HAS BEEN ELEVATED TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE AGENCY AND HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS THE FAA SYSTEM ACQUISITION REVIEW COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS CHAIRED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR AND INCLUDES ALL OF THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATORS. IT HAS CENTRAL DECISIONMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAJOR ACQUISITIONS. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE THE TYPE OF MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL ESTABLISHED BY FAA'S MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS.

WHILE THE IMPROVEMENTS NOTED IN THE RECENT PLANS FOR INDIVIDUAL SAFETY PROJECTS AND IN THE MONITORING ACTIVITIES FOR INDIVIDUAL

SAFETY PROJECTS WILL HELP, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS NEEDED MOST IS FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR TO ESTABLISH AN AGENCYWIDE SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH MAJOR SAFETY HAZARDS LIKE THE ONE ESTABLISHED FOR MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS. HERE TOO, THE ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD BE A PART OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS.

- - - - -

MISTER CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES MY STATEMENT. WE WILL BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS.