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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

**Observations on Proposed
Corporation**

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the administration's proposal to establish a government-owned corporation to operate, maintain, and modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system. Because we are still analyzing the proposal, our observations are preliminary. Our overall comments, however, are being provided in the context of years of work reviewing various aspects of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) activities. (See appendix for a list of relevant reports and testimonies.)

The idea of restructuring the air traffic control function is not new. Since the mid 1980s, various groups have recommended changes ranging from the creation of an independent FAA to the establishment of a private, nonprofit corporation. The current proposal would create a government-owned ATC corporation that is exempt from federal procurement and personnel regulations and appropriations process. This proposal is consistent with the recommendations of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry and the National Performance Review. We believe one underlying reason for the latest proposal is the considerable and legitimate frustration felt by system users, FAA, and others with the slow pace of ATC modernization, exemplified by continued delays in developing the Advanced Automation System (AAS).

We recognize that any decision that would fundamentally change FAA's organizational structure is a highly sensitive and serious matter. The impacts of this change would be far reaching given the critical importance of aviation to the transportation system. To assist the Congress in its deliberations on the merits of the corporation proposal, we will address (1) the proposed exemption of FAA from federal procurement regulations to substantially accelerate the pace of modernization, (2) actions

that FAA is taking to better position itself to meet the ATC system's future needs, and (3) critical financing and safety issues raised by the proposal that require further analysis and discussion.

In summary, our work over the past decade does not support the conclusion that exemption from procurement regulations would necessarily result in ATC equipment being installed more quickly in the field. We found that modernization delays were caused by other factors, such as underestimating the technical complexity of system development. Regarding the issue of FAA's positioning itself for the future, we found inconsistent signals. The corporation proposal paints a picture of a hamstrung FAA struggling to update its air traffic control system. However, FAA's recently issued plans for modernizing the system describe a different FAA--one which has already accomplished a great deal and has a number of new technologies coming on line. Finally, among the financing issues raised by the proposal, revenue and expenditure assumptions deserve a closer look, and close scrutiny of how safety will be ensured is warranted. We will now discuss these points in greater detail.

ACCELERATING THE PACE OF ATC MODERNIZATION

The ATC corporation study, released on May 3, 1994, links problems in ATC system modernization to FAA's required compliance with federal procurement regulations. The study concludes that exemption from such regulations would result in ATC equipment's being installed much more quickly in the field. Our work over the past decade does not support this conclusion. As we discuss later, other factors are the root causes of delays in modernization.

The corporation study is correct in stating that cost and schedule problems affecting AAS and other major acquisitions have

beset the modernization program. As documented in our April 1994 annual status report, these problems have continued.¹ Over the past year, costs rose for 8 of the 12 major projects that we track. Also, implementation was delayed for 9 of the projects. Regarding AAS, FAA announced last year a cost increase of \$1.2 billion, raising the total estimated cost to \$5.9 billion. This compares to the estimate of \$4.3 billion at the time of contract award in 1988.² A task force chartered by the FAA Administrator recently estimated that a scaled-back AAS will likely cost about \$7 billion.

FAA and ATC system users--airlines, general aviation, and the traveling public--have felt the impact of these difficulties. Modernization problems have resulted in the postponement of user benefits, such as more fuel-efficient aircraft routing. Also, AAS schedule delays required FAA to implement interim projects, costing over \$500 million, to sustain and enhance current hardware and software.

As previously stated, our work over the years has identified several technical and managerial factors--not FAA's required compliance with federal procurement rules--as the root causes of cost and schedule problems. One factor is FAA's underestimation of the technical complexity of developing ATC systems--such as AAS and the \$1.4 billion Voice Switching and Control System--given the highly demanding requirements and complex software architectures of these systems. Consequently, FAA established unrealistic development and implementation plans, including overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates for these systems.

¹Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-94-167FS, Apr. 15, 1994).

²These figures represent nominal dollar amounts. As such, they include expected inflation but do not reflect the costs in present value terms.

Other factors include the lack of mission analysis, changing requirements, inadequate operational testing, poor contractor performance, inadequate contractor oversight, and frequent turnover in FAA administrators. In the case of AAS, FAA changed some system requirements after awarding a production contract to International Business Machines (IBM) in 1988 and did not resolve requirements issues that arose during development, such as the definition of electronic flight strips, in a timely manner. Furthermore, FAA did not provide adequate oversight of IBM's performance on the AAS contract. Also, FAA did not have adequate quantitative measures for assessing the progress of software development. Therefore, the agency was surprised when development fell behind schedule.

An analysis of AAS events illustrates that exempting FAA from federal procurement regulations would not have substantially reduced these delays. FAA issued the request for proposal (RFP) for the AAS development and production contract in August 1987. For about 1 year, FAA reviewed proposals and negotiated with IBM and Hughes--the two bidders on the contract. In July 1988, FAA awarded the contract to IBM. Hughes protested the award; the protest was settled in October and IBM began work on the contract in November 1988. Therefore, the activities performed between issuance of the RFP and contract initiation took about 15 months, with the bid protest accounting for 3 of those months. That period of time is minor compared to the delays experienced since then--delays that are not attributable to procurement regulations. The key Initial Sector Suite System (ISSS) component is 33 months behind schedule; and FAA's AAS Task Force estimated a "most likely" schedule delay of another 20 months. That would put ISSS about 4-1/2 years behind the 1988 contract schedule. Factoring in the estimates of FAA's AAS Task Force, it is likely that ISSS will be implemented at the first ATC facility almost 11 years after the request for proposals was issued.

We believe that FAA's acquisition process can and needs to be improved substantially--and the risk of cost and schedule problems minimized--under its current structure. We have urged FAA to follow the common sense, businesslike principles that are outlined in its acquisition policy. For example, the policy requires mission analysis to justify the need for capital investments and operational testing of a system before production--also known as "fly before you buy." FAA did not adhere to these principles during the early years of modernization.

The administration's desire for less cumbersome procurement regulations is not unique to FAA. Many agencies are placing high expectations on reforms emanating from the National Performance Review and proposed acquisition reform legislation.³ We believe these reforms will reduce the complexity of the procurement system, while also increasing accountability for management results. FAA's modernization program will benefit from these reforms. Finally, additional improvements are likely to result from FAA's ongoing evaluation of its internal process for managing acquisitions, systems development, and new technology.

POSITIONING THE ATC SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

A key issue in assessing the ATC corporation proposal is whether FAA is positioning itself to meet the future needs of the ATC system. We believe that FAA's Capital Investment Plan and Strategic Plan show that the agency is moving in the right direction, albeit slower than anticipated. These plans depict a

³Our comments on proposed legislation S. 1587 are contained in Procurement Reform: Comments on Proposed Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (GAO/T-OGC-94-1, Mar 10, 1994) and Acquisition Reform: Role of Test and Evaluation in System Acquisition Should Not Be Weakened (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-124, Mar. 22, 1994).

dynamic FAA making significant progress in modernizing the system. The ATC corporation study, on the other hand, describes a hamstrung FAA trying to upgrade a technologically backwards ATC system. We find this inconsistency perplexing.

The Capital Investment Plan--known until 1989 as the National Airspace System Plan--has been FAA's blueprint for modernizing the ATC system since 1981. As we reported in April 1994, FAA had completed 54 projects by the end of 1993 and the plan includes 184 active or planned projects. Equipment being acquired includes radars, computers, and communications systems. About \$18 billion has already been appropriated by the Congress for the modernization program. FAA has calculated that \$35 billion in benefits have been or will be realized from projects that have been implemented.⁴

FAA's vision of the 21st century aviation system and its goals for making that vision a reality are embodied in its Strategic Plan. This 5-year plan, released this March, sets goals, objectives, and milestones for seven key areas--such as system safety, system capacity, and FAA's organization. As described in the plan, the future ATC system will make extensive use of automation on the ground and in the cockpit, with controllers and pilots eventually playing monitoring roles. Data-link for communications between the ground and flight deck will be commonplace. Improved weather sensors to detect hazardous conditions and provide comprehensive reliable weather data will help increase safety and efficiency. The Global Positioning System, enhanced by FAA, will provide the principal navigation aid used by civil aircraft and will help to increase airspace safety and capacity. The Strategic Plan underscores how

⁴The \$35 billion in benefits, accruing between 1982 and 2025, are calculated in 1992 constant dollars. Of these benefits, FAA estimates that about \$22 billion will go to system users and \$13 billion to the agency itself.

FAA can take bold actions whether or not a government corporation is established.

Although the Strategic Plan does not contain as many quantitative goals as we would like, it does provide a good foundation to facilitate managerial and congressional decisions on capital investments. By establishing its mission and program objectives and communicating them both internally to employees and externally to its customers and decisionmakers, FAA is also adhering to the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, which we strongly support.

ASSESSING CRITICAL ISSUES FACING AN ATC CORPORATION

If an ATC corporation is created, the financing and safety oversight of the air traffic control system would change in fundamental ways. We believe this warrants careful analysis of potential implications.

Financing Issues

The proposal projects the ATC corporation as a self-sustaining entity, no longer dependent on government appropriations. This represents a major change from the present method of financing the operations and modernization of the ATC system.⁵ Based on our preliminary analysis of the proposal and its associated financial restructuring plan, we believe issues need to be resolved regarding proposed actions to accelerate investments, assumptions about revenues and expenditures, and the

⁵FAA receives appropriations from both the Airport and Airway Trust Fund and from general revenues. Revenues from the Trust Fund finance the modernization program and revenues from the general fund finance half of the cost of operating and maintaining the ATC system. About 75 percent of FAA's total funding comes from the Trust Fund.

government's potential liability for corporation losses and debt.

Funding Accelerated Investments

The proposal recommends accelerating the investment in 25 selected modernization projects as a way to provide user benefits more quickly. To accomplish this, the corporation would receive the transfer of revenue from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, exemptions from some federal budget laws, and authority to borrow on capital markets. The proposal envisions that a substantial increase in user fees would not be necessary.

The proposal assumes that the corporation would receive the committed amounts in the Trust Fund, that is, funds already set aside to pay for authorized capital projects. The proposal does not clarify whether the transfer of Trust Fund balances would be subject to the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA)⁶ and the Anti-Deficiency Act. We support the deficit reduction goals of the BEA and the financial accountability requirements inherent in the Anti-Deficiency Act. Therefore, we believe decisions to exempt activities from either act should be taken carefully. A related assumption is that the corporation would be allowed to borrow on the private markets. The corporation study estimates that within 10 years the total ATC corporation debt could reach \$6.4 billion under its accelerated investment scenario. While we recognize that the Congress may wish to grant the corporation borrowing

⁶The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), as amended, contains procedures to enforce the deficit reduction agreements achieved by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993. It divides the budget into two mutually exclusive categories: (1) discretionary programs (which includes FAA) and (2) direct spending and receipts (including Airport and Airway Trust Fund Receipts). For 1991 through 1998, BEA, as amended, contains dollar limits on discretionary spending and a "pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement that legislation changing direct spending and receipts must, in total, be at least deficit-neutral.

authority from private markets, there are advantages to borrowing through the Department of the Treasury, such as greater oversight and a lower cost of borrowing.

Sensitivity of Revenue and Expenditure Assumptions


The corporation's viability as a self-sufficient entity depends on whether revenue and expenditure assumptions are realized. Therefore, it is important to assess factors that may influence those assumptions.

The corporation's revenue projections are highly sensitive to the growth in passenger travel and air fares. The corporation study shows that if costs increase as expected but the rate of growth for passenger ticket revenues was 5 percent instead of the 6.4 percent assumed for the corporation to break even, the corporation's revenues would decrease by over \$5 billion during the 10-year period from 1996 through 2005. Viewed from another perspective, a one percentage point drop in the revenue growth rate would result in an average annual drop in revenues of about \$300 million.

Our analysis of passenger ticket revenues for the period from 1983 through 1993 shows a nominal average annual growth rate of 9 percent, which is equivalent to 5.2 percent rate when adjusted for inflation. However, as shown in figure 1, there were wide fluctuations during that period. For example, revenues grew between 1990 and 1991 by 34.8 percent (29.8 percent as adjusted for inflation) but declined between 1991 and 1992 by 7.6 percent (10.2 percent as adjusted for inflation). A factor affecting the large increase between 1990 and 1991 was the 2 percentage point increase in the passenger ticket tax, which became effective December 1, 1990. If growth projections do not materialize or the wide fluctuations continue, the corporation would have a cash flow problem and would face a variety of

choices, such as maintaining large cash reserves, obtaining short-term financing, reducing ATC services, increasing user fees, and seeking congressional appropriations to make up the shortfall.

Figure 1: Growth Rate in Passenger Ticket Tax Revenue



Source: GAO's analysis of FAA data.

As for expenditures, the proposal provides few details. For example, it does not discuss the financial implications of (1) any potential increase in personnel compensation and benefit costs that may result from higher salaries for ATC personnel and (2) its recommendation that the corporation permit current employees to retain federal retirement, health, and life insurance benefits. One perceived benefit of moving to a corporation is the ability to attract and reward qualified personnel. Since the ATC corporation would now negotiate salaries and benefits with its highly skilled work force, it is likely that significant upward pressures will be exerted on personnel costs. The FAA Administrator, questioned about why unions that represent FAA employees are strong supporters of the

corporation idea, was quoted as saying, "they think they'd have the opportunity to get more compensation." If the ATC corporation pays higher salaries and benefits than FAA currently pays, it would have to increase revenues or decrease other expenses.

Potential Liability for Corporation Losses and Debt

The potential for the corporation to operate at a deficit raises concern about the risk of financial liability to the government. We believe that it would be prudent for the Congress and others to consider what the expectation will be if revenue projections do not materialize and if the taxpayer is forced to "bail out" the corporation as it did with savings and loan institutions and the Farm Credit System. Experiences of government corporations such as Amtrak and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) are instructive.

- Amtrak, a "for profit" mixed ownership government corporation, has lost money each year. From 1990 to 1994, federal subsidies have averaged \$835 million annually. As we recently reported, Amtrak's current financial condition has deteriorated in recent years because Amtrak's revenues have been lower than projected while its expenses have been higher than expected.⁷ Federal support will be necessary to sustain Amtrak operations.
- TVA, a wholly owned government corporation, is responsible for providing electricity and other services to the seven-state Tennessee valley area. TVA's current debt ceiling is \$30 billion, and its outstanding debt is over \$25 billion. The amount of debt outstanding and the cost of debt servicing has caused congressional concern; interest expenses currently account for about 30 percent of TVA's

⁷Amtrak: Financial Condition Has Deteriorated and Future Costs Make Recovery Difficult (GAO-T-RCED-94-155, Mar. 17, 1994) and Amtrak: Key Decisions Need to Be Made in the Face of Deteriorating Financial Condition (GAO-T-RCED-94-186, Apr. 13, 1994).

revenues. Although TVA's debt is not an obligation of the U.S. government and is not backed by its full faith and credit, the importance of TVA operations in the Tennessee valley makes it unlikely that it would be allowed to default on its obligations.

Given the importance of aviation to the transportation system, the nation's economy, and the national defense, it is likely that the federal government would accept financial liability if the ATC corporation is unable to meet its obligations.

Safety Issues

The U.S. ATC system is widely recognized as the safest in the world. The proposal, by establishing a separate ATC corporation, would require the remaining FAA to be responsible for safety oversight--a fundamental change in how safety is ensured. We recognize that if an ATC corporation were created, all parties involved would have an important interest in preserving safety. The key issue is whether the division of responsibility between the corporation and the new FAA create risks that could affect the margin of safety for which our current system is so highly regarded. The proposal implies that the corporation's emphasis might not always side with enhanced safety. To prevent this, FAA would exercise oversight of the corporation's activities and have the final word on safety issues. Our work suggests that building an effective oversight function is an extremely formidable task, so we urge caution in this area.

Four oversight areas would deserve FAA's attention under the corporation concept. They are: (1) requiring the performance of safety-related activities regardless of financial conditions, (2) establishing safety standards for judging compliance, (3) addressing weaknesses in the proposed model for oversight, and (4) completing controller and maintenance work force staffing

standards.

Performance of Safety-Related Activities

An effective oversight function in FAA will be essential to ensure that the ATC corporation does not reduce the margin of safety. For example, if the corporation were under pressure to cut costs to hold user fees constant, effective oversight would guard against the corporation's deferring maintenance on ATC equipment. Our recent studies of Amtrak, a government corporation having many of the attributes proposed for the ATC corporation, showed this to be a genuine concern. Because of financial constraints, Amtrak is having a "40's crisis": major and needed overhauls have been deferred for 40 percent of its fleet; and 25 percent of its fleet is at least 40 years old.

Establishment of Safety Standards

Oversight of an ATC corporation would require FAA to establish safety standards by which to judge the corporation's performance. Experience with Amtrak raises some concerns about the effectiveness of Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) oversight of that corporation. In our work, we found that FRA has not established standards for passenger car components because FRA officials believed they could work informally with Amtrak.⁸ Applying Amtrak's experience to the ATC corporation proposal would tend to support the establishment of safety standards, before any organizational change, against which the new FAA will judge the corporation's performance.

⁸Amtrak Safety: Amtrak Should Implement Minimum Safety Standards for Passenger Cars (GAO/RCED-93-196, Sept. 22, 1993).

Application of Airline Oversight Model

The ATC corporation study proposes that oversight be modeled after FAA's regulation of the airline industry. More must be known about how this will be accomplished. As documented in our studies over the past 5 years, as well as in reviews by the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General, FAA's oversight of the airline industry has encountered major difficulties. (See appendix for a list of GAO products related to safety oversight.) We found FAA had problems

- targeting its inspector resources;
- determining when airlines are not complying with safety rules;
- carrying out enforcement actions in a timely manner;
- developing an early-warning system of safety performance indicators; and
- delegating responsibility for self-certifications without rendering its oversight function ineffective.

It should be noted that FAA has been addressing many of these concerns for a number of years. The complexity of these problems is such that FAA's corrective actions are not yet complete. The issue for the ATC corporation proposal is whether FAA will expeditiously develop the tools and techniques needed to perform effective oversight.

Completion of Staffing Standards

To detect staffing reductions that might unduly compromise safety, FAA's oversight unit will need good baseline staffing standards for controllers and maintenance technicians by which to judge the corporation's staffing levels. We recently testified that despite long-standing congressional requirements for

development of these standards, FAA has yet to complete them.⁹ The possible creation of the ATC corporation makes this task even more critical.

CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

As the debate over whether to shift FAA's ATC functions to a government corporation unfolds, we believe it is important to recognize that changing to a corporate structure in the transport sector does not necessarily correlate with success or serve as a panacea for the problems of the predecessor organization. A case in point is Amtrak, also a government corporation, which has responded to its financial problems by deferring maintenance and not upgrading its equipment. Also, we believe the details associated with financing the corporation need to be scrutinized. Questions exist about the corporation's ability to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency.

Finally, any fundamental change to existing ATC operations would need to keep safety as its primary consideration. Notwithstanding assurances that safety will remain a preeminent concern, we believe debate over the corporation proposal warrants close scrutiny of how safety will be ensured given the division of responsibility between the corporation and the new FAA.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We will be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

⁹FAA Budget: Agency Faces Key Management Challenges on Major Issues (GAO/T-RCED-94-191, Apr. 19, 1994).

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Air Traffic Control: Management Attention Needed for Future Investment Decisions (GAO/T-94-195, April 24, 1994).

Air Traffic Control: Agency Faces Key Management Challenges on Major Issues (GAO/T-RCED-94-191, April 19, 1994).

Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-94-167FS, Apr. 15, 1994).

Advanced Automation System: Implications of Problems and Recent Changes (GAO/T-RCED-94-188, Apr. 13, 1994).

Aviation Safety: FAA and the State Department Can Better Manage Foreign Enforcement Cases (GAO/RCED-94-87, Mar. 17, 1994).

Amtrak: Financial Condition Has Deteriorated and Future Costs Make Recovery Difficult (GAO/T-RCED-94-155, Mar. 17, 1994).

Transportation Safety: Opportunities for Enhancing Safety Across Modes (GAO/T-RCED-94-120, Feb. 10, 1994).

Airport Improvement Program: Better Management Needed for Funds Provided Under Letters of Intent (GAO/RCED-94-100, Feb. 2, 1994).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Aviation Safety: FAA Can Better Prepare General Aviation Pilots for Mountain Flying Risks (GAO/RCED-94-15, Dec. 9, 1993).

Aircraft Certification: FAA Can Better Meet Challenges Posed by Advances in Aircraft Technologies (GAO/T-RCED-94-53, Oct. 20, 1993).

Airport Improvement Program: Allocation of Funds from 1982 to 1992 (GAO/RCED-94-14FS, Oct. 19, 1993).

Airport Improvement Program: Program Funding by State Relative to Enplanements for Selected Years (GAO/RCED-94-7FS, Oct. 12, 1993).

FAA Reauthorization: Opportunity Exists to Address Safety, Capacity, and Efficiency Issues (GAO/T-RCED-93-75, Sept. 28, 1993).

Amtrak Safety: Amtrak Should Implement Minimum Safety Standards for Passenger Cars (GAO/RECD-93-196, Sept. 22, 1993).

Aircraft Certification: New FAA Approach Needed to Meet Challenges of Advanced Technology (GAO/RCED-93-155, Sept. 16, 1993).

Aviation Research: Issues Related to FAA's Research Activities (GAO/T-RCED-93-68, July 29, 1993).

FAA Work Forces: Important Decisions Affecting Staff Use and Management (GAO/T-RCED-93-59, June 30, 1993).

Airport Improvement Program: Opportunity to Consider FAA's Role in Meeting Airport System Needs (GAO/T-RCED-93-43, May 26, 1993).

Aviation Research: Actions to Enhance the Effectiveness of FAA's Research Activities (GAO/T-RCED-93-40, May 20, 1993).

Air Traffic Control: Improvements Needed in FAA's Management of Acquisitions (GAO/T-RCED-93-36, May 5, 1993).

FAA Budget: Important Challenges Affecting Aviation Safety, Capacity, and Efficiency (GAO/T-RCED-93-33, Apr. 26, 1993).

Air Traffic Control: Uncertainties and Challenges Face FAA's Advanced Automation System (GAO/T-RCED-93-20, Apr. 19, 1993).

Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-93-121FS, Apr. 16, 1993).

Air Traffic Control: Advanced Automation System Problems Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED-93-15, Mar. 10, 1993).

Air Traffic Control: Justifications for Capital Investments Need Strengthening (GAO/RCED-93-55, Jan. 14, 1993).

Aviation Safety: Increased Oversight of Foreign Carriers Needed (GAO/RCED-93-42, Nov. 20, 1992).

Airspace System: Emerging Technologies May Offer Alternatives to the Instrument Landing System (GAO/RCED-93-33, Nov. 13, 1992).

Air Traffic Control: Advanced Automation System Still Vulnerable to Cost and Schedule Problems (GAO/RCED-92-264, Sept. 18, 1992).

FAA Budget: Key Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED-92-51, Apr. 6, 1992).

Aviation Safety: Commuter Airline Safety Would Be Enhanced With Better FAA Oversight (GAO/T-RCED-92-40, Mar. 17, 1992).

Aviation Research: Progress Has Been Made but Several Factors Will Affect Program Success (GAO/T-RCED-92-39, Mar. 10, 1992).

Air Traffic Control: Challenges Facing FAA's Modernization Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-34, Mar. 3, 1992).

Aviation Safety: Better Oversight Would Reduce the Risk of Air Taxi Accidents (GAO/T-RCED-92-27, Feb. 25, 1992).

Airport Development: Improvement Needed in Federal Planning (GAO/T-RCED-92-30, Feb. 19, 1992).

Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to More Aggressively Manage Its Inspection Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-25, Feb. 6, 1992).

Aviation Safety: Air Taxis--The Most Accident-Prone Airlines--Need Better Oversight (GAO/RCED-92-60, Jan. 21, 1992).

Aviation Safety: Problems Persist in FAA's Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-92-14, Nov. 20, 1991).

FAA Staffing: Better Strategy Needed to Ensure Facilities Are Properly Staffed (GAO/T-RCED-92-8, Oct. 16, 1991).

Air Traffic Control: FAA Can Better Forecast and Prevent Equipment Failures (GAO/RCED-91-179, Aug. 2, 1991).

Aviation Acquisition: Further Changes Needed in FAA's Management and Budgeting Practices (GAO/RCED-91-159, July 29, 1991).

Air Traffic Control: The Interim Support Plan Does Not Meet FAA's Needs (GAO/RCED-90-213, Sept. 11, 1990).

Air Traffic Control: Continuing Delays Anticipated for the Advanced Automation System (GAO/IMTEC-90-63, July 18, 1990).

Privatization of Federal Aviation Administration Functions (GAO/T-RCED-88-11, Dec. 11, 1987).

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