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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING



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OF THE UNITED STATES

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Rotation Policies And Practices Have Been Changed For The Better-- But Room For Improvement Remains

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense and the services can reduce the amount and cost of overseas movement through improved management of personnel rotation policies and practices.

The Department recently approved changes to policies and practices which formerly contributed to increased and avoidable personnel movements and costs.

It is too early to assess the full economic impact of the policy changes, but some cost reductions should be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 1977 appropriation request now before the Congress. Future appropriation requests should reflect the full economic impact of the changes.

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

The Congress has expressed interest and concern about the cost and amount of military personnel movement resulting from the overseas rotation system. During fiscal years 1973 through 1975, about 1.4 million enlisted personnel rotated to and from overseas at a cost of about \$1.6 billion.

This report contains the results of our analysis of the management of the military rotation system, the progress made by the Department of Defense to improve it, and the expectation that improvements should reduce costs measurably. We point out that achieving the full potential for cost reductions through changes in policies and practices requires the Department to take aggressive management action.

The Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations requested this report in time for use during the review of the Department's fiscal year 1977 budget request. Therefore, we did not obtain formal comments from the Department or the military services. We did, however, informally discuss our overall observations with Department officials and incorporated their comments where applicable.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

James A. Stacks

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

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- BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel
- CONUS continental United States
- DOD Department of Defense
- EPMAC Enlisted Personnel Management Center
- GAO General Accounting Office
- OMB Office of Management and Budget — 27
- PCS permanent change of station

GLOSSARY

- CONUS U.S. territory, including adjacent territorial water, located within the North American continent between Canada and Mexico.
- Enlisted personnel Male and female members of the Armed Forces below the grade of officer or warrant officer.
- Overseas rotation Permanent change of station moves of personnel going to or returning from overseas duty.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

ROTATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES
HAVE BEEN CHANGED FOR THE BETTER--
BUT ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT REMAINS
Department of Defense

D I G E S T

Through improved management of enlisted personnel rotation policies and practices, the Department of Defense and the services can reduce the amount and cost of overseas movement. Neither the Department nor the services had in the past established the management systems needed to identify the underlying policies and practices causing unnecessary rotations and to serve as a basis for corrective action.

Department policy purports to promote personnel stability by limiting permanent change of station moves to those required to support manpower requirements of overseas forces. The policy also attempts to provide an equitable distribution of overseas duty assignments among military personnel.

In keeping with this policy, the Department's objective is for all personnel sent overseas to complete the duty tour prescribed for the location to which they are assigned. According to the Department, this policy is designed to (1) improve combat readiness by controlling personnel turnover, (2) reduce travel costs, and (3) help achieve an all-volunteer force by reducing excessive frequency of moves.

A test made by GAO showed that 24 percent of enlisted personnel returning from overseas had not completed their prescribed tours by an average of 7.7 months. On this basis, GAO estimated that 62,500 enlisted personnel were returned to the continental U.S. during fiscal year 1974 before completing the prescribed duty tour, resulting in additional permanent change of station costs of \$28.9 million. In addition, as a result of the early returns, the military services used about 360 staff-years in travel time at a cost of about \$1.9 million.

GAO says that the services could have reduced fiscal year 1974 permanent change of station costs by about another \$3.8 million by keeping overseas first-term enlisted personnel with 2 to 6 months remaining on their service obligation. The test results applied to fiscal year 1975 would probably yield about the same amounts of unnecessary costs. (See p. 3.)

GAO's test also indicated that:

--Proportionately the Army and Navy returned more personnel with incomplete tours than the Marine Corps and Air Force.

--Enlisted personnel who returned before their tours were completed served an average of 14.8 months overseas--34 percent less time than the 22.5-month average of all policy-prescribed tours.

--The rate of first-term personnel who returned early was more than twice the rate of careerists who did so. (See p. 5.)

Incomplete tours appeared to fall into two broad groups: (1) those resulting from personnel policies and practices and (2) those resulting from requirements changes in numbers of personnel and types of skills needed overseas. The vast majority of incomplete tours resulted from personnel policies and practices. (See p. 6.)

Separation from service was the largest reason--38 percent--for incomplete duty tours resulting from personnel policies. (See p. 6.)

The underlying causes for incomplete tours were varied, and many appeared to offer potential for at least partial control by management. For example:

--Sending personnel overseas without adequate obligated service to serve the prescribed tour. (See p. 8.)

--Returning enlisted personnel for early discharge to attend civilian colleges or vocational schools. (See p. 11.)

--Returning unskilled Navy enlisted personnel to allow 12 months in the continental U.S. before discharge. (See p. 11.)

--Returning enlisted personnel to attend service schools. (See p. 12.)

Rotation costs could be reduced by extending overseas tours of first-term enlisted personnel with 2 to 6 months service remaining rather than returning them to the continental U.S. at the end of the prescribed tour. In many instances, these extensions would delay sending replacements for up to 6 months and thereby further reduce costs. (See p. 13.)

Responding to several management studies, the Department of Defense recently approved changes to policies and practices which formerly contributed to increased and avoidable personnel movements and costs. These changes are designed to reduce personnel rotation by:

--Increasing the manpower pool available for reassignment, thereby increasing the opportunity for selecting personnel with adequate service time to serve a full duty tour.

--Increasing tour lengths by (1) limiting the number of changes in assignments for first-term personnel and (2) establishing a normal 3-year tour overseas for careerists.

--Offering a preferred next assignment as an incentive for personnel to extend for 1 year overseas or at sea.

--Establishing terms-of-service objectives for each military service as a means of increasing average enlistment periods.

--Requiring the services to consider remaining available service time as a basic constraint in making any personnel reassignments. (See p. 19.)

Beginning with March 1976, the services were required to report quarterly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on compliance with the policy and procedure revisions. (See p. 19.)

Achieving the substantial cost reductions possible through the policy changes depends on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services taking aggressive management action to comply fully with the changes. The reporting system should be a useful tool for identifying areas needing additional management action and for assuring the Congress that the Department is better managing the rotation system. (See p. 20.)

GAO believes that the Department should be commended for improving its system and encouraged to continue. It is still too early to assess the full economic impact of the recent policy and practice changes, but some cost reduction should be reflected in the fiscal year 1977 appropriation request.

GAO suggests that the Congress require assurance from the Department that the economic benefits of its current changes have been taken into account in the fiscal year 1977 budget. Further, the Congress should require the Department to identify in future appropriation requests the extent of cost and movement reductions resulting from longer term implementation of the changed policies and practices. (See p. 21.)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Rotating military enlisted personnel, a traditional military practice, is managed through a variety of Department of Defense (DOD) and service policies specifying overseas tour lengths, criteria for eligibility, and frequency of rotations. The number of personnel rotated is determined primarily by the size of the forces stationed abroad and the length of duty tours in overseas areas.

DOD Directive 1315.7, entitled "Rotation and Stabilization of Military Personnel Assignments," establishes uniform rotation policies, including the length of overseas tours, for all services. The services have issued regulations and instructions implementing the directive.

During fiscal years 1973-75, the services rotated 1.4 million 1/ enlisted personnel to and from overseas duty, incurring permanent change of station (PCS) costs of about \$1.6 billion, excluding unit moves, as shown below.

PCS Costs for Overseas Rotations of Enlisted Personnel

| <u>Cost element</u> | <u>Fiscal year</u> | | | <u>Total</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------|
| | <u>1973</u> | <u>1974</u> | <u>1975</u> | | |
| | <u>(note a)</u> | <u>(note b)</u> | <u>(note b)</u> | | |
| | <u>(millions)</u> | | | | |
| Military member | \$154.4 | \$120.1 | \$115.9 | \$ 390.4 | 24.5 |
| Dependents | 50.9 | 54.6 | 52.1 | 157.6 | 9.9 |
| Household goods | 247.7 | 287.3 | 300.3 | 835.3 | 52.5 |
| Dislocation allowance | 19.0 | 21.2 | 18.6 | 58.8 | 3.7 |
| Trailer allowance | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 7.1 | .4 |
| Private vehicles | 24.4 | 21.6 | 30.6 | 76.6 | 4.8 |
| Storage | <u>22.3</u> | <u>25.7</u> | <u>18.5</u> | <u>66.5</u> | <u>4.2</u> |
| Total | <u>\$521.6</u> | <u>\$532.7</u> | <u>\$538.0</u> | <u>\$1,592.3</u> | <u>100.0</u> |

a/Include some costs for final withdrawal from South Vietnam.

b/Move-counting definitions are not uniform from year to year.

1/Due to changes in move-counting criteria, the classification of overseas rotations is not uniform from year to year.

During fiscal year 1974, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps used about 10,900 staff-years in enlisted personnel travel time. We estimate that this travel time cost more than \$65.2 million. (The Navy could not provide data on travel time.) Added to the \$532.7 million for PCS moves, the cost of transporting enlisted personnel, their families, and their household goods to and from overseas amounted to about \$598 million. On the same basis, the cost for fiscal year 1975 amounted to about \$589 million. None of these costs include the costs of the system necessary to administer the movement of so many people.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In our review, we assessed the impact of existing and planned enlisted personnel rotation policies and practices on overseas movement and cost. We reviewed ongoing and planned DOD and service rotation policies, procedures, and management of the supporting systems. For test periods we analyzed the extent and reasons enlisted service members returned to the continental United States (CONUS) before completing prescribed overseas tours, a practice which incurs unnecessary costs and turbulence. We also analyzed the extent to which enlisted personnel were assigned to overseas duty though they did not have sufficient obligated service time to complete the prescribed tour. The test information on personnel returning from and assigned to overseas duty was developed separately for each service.

Our review was performed at the Army Military Personnel Center, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the Air Force Military Personnel Center, San Antonio, Texas; and the U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center and the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri.

CHAPTER 2

OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE OVERSEAS

ROTATION COSTS FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL

DOD policy purports to promote personnel stability by limiting PCS moves to those required to support manpower requirements of overseas forces. The policy also attempts to provide an equitable distribution of overseas duty assignments among military personnel. In keeping with this policy, DOD's objective is for all personnel sent overseas to complete the duty tour prescribed for the location to which they are assigned. According to DOD, this policy is designed to (1) improve combat readiness by controlling personnel turnover, (2) reduce travel costs, and (3) help achieve an all-volunteer force by reducing excessive frequency of moves.

Generally, the longer the duty tour over which rotation costs are distributed, the lower the cost to the Government and the greater stability in operating forces. Conversely, short or interrupted tours generate high costs and personnel instability.

During our test of how the policy was implemented, we found that 24 percent of enlisted personnel returning from overseas had not completed their prescribed tours by an average of 7.7 months. On this basis, we estimate that, during fiscal year 1974, 62,500 enlisted personnel were returned to CONUS before completing the prescribed duty tour, resulting in additional PCS costs of \$28.9 million. We also estimate that the military services used about 360 staff-years in travel time costing about \$1.9 million as a result of the early returns. The services could have reduced fiscal year 1974 PCS costs by about another \$3.8 million by not returning from overseas first-term enlisted personnel with 2 to 6 months remaining in their service obligation. Were our test results applied to fiscal year 1975, the same amounts of unnecessary costs would probably result.

All factors causing unnecessary personnel movement and costs cannot be fully controlled. We believe, however, that with proper monitoring and aggressive management action the personnel policies and implementing practices causing unnecessary rotations could be identified and corrected.

OVERSEAS DUTY POLICIES

DOD Directive 1315.7 establishes a broad policy regarding selecting personnel for overseas duty and determining length of duty tours. Tour lengths are established for each

country, or areas within a country, based on the desirability of the location. (Length of overseas duty tours by country or area are listed in detail in app. I.)


Current policy generally sets the basic overseas duty tour at 24 months or more. Tours as short as 12 months are set for "undesirable" locations. In "desirable" areas, tours of 36 to 48 months are authorized for enlisted personnel accompanied by dependents. This policy, however, permits the services to reduce duty tours in desirable areas to 12 months for those enlisted personnel who have families, but who voluntarily serve unaccompanied tours. These tour lengths apply to duty at land-based stations only. The Navy, however, has decided that duty tours for ships with home ports in foreign countries will generally be identical to the DOD-prescribed tour for the area.

EARLY RETURNS FROM OVERSEAS
ARE EXTENSIVE AND COSTLY


As previously mentioned, by applying our test results to fiscal year 1974, we estimate that 62,500 enlisted personnel were returned to CONUS without completing the prescribed overseas tour in that year, increasing PCS costs by about \$28.9 million.

Shown on the following page, by service, are (1) the percentage of incomplete tours and (2) the average number of months that the incomplete tours fell short of the prescribed tour.

PERCENT OF INCOMPLETE TOURS



AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS INCOMPLETE TOURS FELL SHORT OF PRESCRIBED DUTY TOUR



Viewed from an overall perspective, our test data indicated that:

- Proportionately the Army and Navy returned more personnel with incomplete tours than did the Marine Corps and Air Force.
- Enlisted personnel who returned before their tours were complete served an average of 14.8 months overseas--34 percent less time than the 22.5-month average of all policy-prescribed tours.
- The rate of first-term personnel who returned early was more than twice the rate of careerists who did so.

Our estimates of the cost, by military services, for the incomplete tours are shown in the following table.

| <u>Service</u> | <u>PCS</u> | <u>Travel time</u> <u>(note a)</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| | (000 omitted) | | |
| Army | \$15,287 | \$1,407 | \$16,694 |
| Navy | 5,878 | (b) | 5,878 |
| Marine Corps | 1,281 | 343 | 1,624 |
| Air Force | <u>6,414</u> | <u>162</u> | <u>6,576</u> |
| Total | <u>\$28,860</u> | <u>\$1,912</u> | <u>\$30,772</u> |

a/Based on the average number of days in travel status, prorated over the prescribed overseas tour.

b/Data not available.

Nothing in our review indicated a management policy or practice change which could cause us to believe that the situation described above had changed radically for fiscal year 1975.

REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE TOURS

DOD and service management officials said they did not routinely monitor either the number or the causes of incomplete tours. In our view, such monitoring is an essential management tool for controlling the extent and number of incomplete tours. We believe that, if properly used, such information would allow management to identify the policies or practices related to early return situations and to take corrective action.

Incomplete tours in our tests fell into two broad groups: (1) those resulting from personnel policies and practices and (2) those resulting from requirements changes in numbers of personnel and types of skills needed overseas. Incomplete tours attributable to requirements changes accounted for only 7 percent of total incomplete tours for which reasons were available.

As shown in the following table, separation from service was the most common reason for incomplete duty tours.

| <u>Reason</u> | <u>Percent of sample</u> | <u>Estimated number in 1974 (note a)</u> |
|--|--------------------------|--|
| Service separation | 38 | 23,900 |
| Personnel phasing (Navy) (note b) | 7 | 4,100 |
| Medical | 6 | 3,800 |
| Skill not required | 5 | 3,300 |
| Service school attendance | 5 | 3,300 |
| Movement of unskilled personnel (Navy) | 5 | 3,000 |
| Other | 24 | 15,000 |
| Undetermined | <u>10</u> | <u>6,200</u> |
| Total | <u>100</u> | <u>c/62,500</u> |

a/Sample results applied to the number of uncompleted tours.

b/Unique to Navy--staggering personnel rotation to and from ships.

c/Does not add due to rounding.

The category "other" includes such reasons as early return as an incentive for reenlistment, humanitarian or hardship cases, and disciplinary problem cases. Although significant in aggregate, the many individual reasons were relatively small in number. The category "undetermined," amounting to 10 percent of the sample, resulted from incomplete service records from which we were not able to identify the causes of the incomplete tours.

Service separation

Enlisted personnel who returned to CONUS for separation from the service before they completed the prescribed over-seas tours included those separated for the following reasons.

| <u>Reason</u> | <u>Percent of incomplete tours for separation</u> | <u>Estimated number in 1974</u> |
|--|---|---------------------------------|
| End of term of service | 47 | 11,200 |
| Administrative discharge--unsuitable for continued service | 21 | 5,000 |
| Discharge for retirement, attendance at civilian schools, or other reasons | <u>32</u> | <u>7,600</u> |
| Total | <u>100</u> | <u>a/23,900</u> |

a/Does not add due to rounding.

End of term of service

Enlisted personnel returning early for separation because their enlistment was ending were initially sent overseas without sufficient time to serve the prescribed tour. Although DOD's objective is for all service personnel to serve the prescribed overseas tour, it does not stop the services from sending personnel overseas who do not have adequate time remaining in their service commitment to serve the entire overseas tour.

Generally, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force require enlisted personnel to have adequate active service time to serve the prescribed overseas tour. The Army requires only 12 months active service remaining. Almost half the enlisted personnel who returned early from overseas for separation in CONUS had fulfilled their active service commitment. This group, of which 94 percent were first enlistees, returned an average of 6.1 months before completing the prescribed DOD duty tour. Army and Navy personnel accounted for most of these incomplete tours.

Army officials said the high rate of incomplete tours by first-term personnel was primarily a result of (1) large overseas personnel requirements and (2) short enlistment periods and several options necessary to meet personnel recruiting goals. They explained that overseas units, particularly those in Europe, generally have higher manning priorities than CONUS units. The European units are therefore largely made up of first-term personnel. In the past, the Army had relied heavily on the 2-year enlistment to meet personnel needs. During fiscal year 1974, for example, 24 percent of the first-term enlistments were for 2 years. Allowing for 5 months for training, travel, and leave, the 2-year enlistees had, at most, 19 months to serve overseas even though many overseas tours were for 24 months or more.

Army enlistment option programs, now generally for 3 years, could also reduce time available for overseas duty. For example, the unit-of-choice and special unit option guarantee enlisted personnel at least 16 months in a unit of their choice after basic training, and station-of-choice option guarantees enlistees 12 months at a station of their choice. If enlistees choose a CONUS unit or station under those options, the time remaining for longer overseas duty tours prescribed by DOD may be less than needed to complete such tours.

We did not quantify the number of Army personnel with incomplete tours caused by the 2-year enlistment and the option programs. However, fiscal year 1974 enlistment data

indicates that the potential exists for future incomplete tours resulting from these programs, since 24 percent of enlisted personnel who entered the Army during fiscal year 1974 were on 2-year contracts and another 45 percent entered under the previously discussed options.

Army officials were aware of the problem caused by enlistment periods and options. Consequently, the 2-year enlistment was suspended on July 1, 1975, and a study of the need for numerous enlistment options, including the effect on personnel movement, is underway.

Navy officials attributed incomplete tours to administrative errors in assigning personnel and exceptions to Navy policy. They said that exceptions were granted when personnel with critical skills were needed and longer service commitment enlisted personnel were not available.

At the time of our review, the services were continuing to send enlisted personnel overseas who did not have enough remaining obligated service to complete the prescribed tour. As shown in the following table, when these enlisted personnel reported overseas, their obligated service averaged 6.6 months less than the prescribed tour.

| <u>Service</u> | <u>Percent of sample without enough obligated service</u> | <u>Average number of months short</u> |
|----------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Army | 15.2 | 8.9 |
| Navy | 8.5 | 6.4 |
| Marine Corps | 5.9 | 4.6 |
| Air Force | 2.9 | 4.1 |
| DOD average | 5.9 | 6.6 |

The problem seemed most severe in the Army and Navy. According to officials of those services, they were aware of this problem but enlisted personnel with enough time remaining and with the needed skills were not available when assignments were made.

Service unsuitability

Administrative separations for service unsuitability accounted for 21 percent of the early returns for discharge. As shown below, the most frequent reason was unsuitability for continued duty.

| <u>Reason</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Unsuitable for continued duty | 44 |
| Unfit | 18 |
| Lack of progress | 14 |
| Expeditious discharge | 15 |
| Good of the service | <u>9</u> |
| Total | <u>100</u> |

The Army and Navy accounted for most of the early returns included in our sample. We do not know whether those services' high rates can be attributed to the (1) type of service member recruited, (2) selection of service members for overseas duty, or (3) the type and location of duty. The data indicates, however, that the Air Force and Marine Corps were better able to control the rate of early return for administrative discharge and infers that the Army and Navy could decrease the number of returns for this reason.

A review of records for Army enlisted personnel that returned from Europe during calendar year 1974 seems to substantiate these findings. As shown below, more than 7,700 Army enlisted personnel were returned from Europe to CONUS before completing their prescribed duty tour and released for administrative reasons. This apparently occurred because the service members could not cope with military life.

| <u>Reason</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|--|---------------|
| Unfit | 2,170 |
| Unsuitable | 1,183 |
| Inability to adapt for various reasons | 3,078 |
| Discharged for the good of the service | <u>1,273</u> |
| Total | <u>7,704</u> |

We have previously described the problem as it relates to the Army situation in our April 23, 1975, report to the Secretary of Defense, entitled "Urgent Need for a Department of Defense Marginal Performer Discharge Program."

Retirement, schooling, and other reasons

About 32 percent of the enlisted personnel returned for separation for a variety of reasons, including retirement and attendance at civilian schools. Eighty-two percent of all enlisted personnel who returned to retire were in the Navy, compared to a total of 18 percent in all the other services.

Navy policy generally requires enlisted personnel to have enough obligated time remaining to serve the prescribed duty tour. Navy officials said that they could not adhere to this policy with higher graded enlisted personnel because of the difficulty in staffing overseas positions. As a result, such enlisted personnel were assigned without regard to remaining obligated service. Further, according to a Navy official, unaccompanied enlisted personnel eligible for retirement often retire after meeting the DOD 12-month minimum overseas duty requirement, but not the prescribed duty tour for the area, thereby resulting in incomplete duty tours. He said the Navy was considering ways to reduce such incomplete tours. Again, as indicated by the fewer incomplete tours for retirement by Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force service members, this reason for early return appears controllable.

Early separation to attend civilian college or vocational/technical school accounted for 4 percent of the early returns for separation, all of which were in the Army and Navy. Army officials said early return to attend civilian schools was no longer allowed, and Navy officials said they were assessing the need to continue the practice. Obviously, this cause for early returns can be controlled.

The remaining reasons for early return for separation, including unit deactivation, convenience of the Government, and marriage, represented only a small proportion of the total.

Personnel phasing and movement of unskilled enlisted personnel

Personnel phasing and movement of unskilled enlisted personnel apply only to the Navy. Together, they accounted for 12 percent of the Navy's incomplete tours (an estimated 7,100 during fiscal year 1974).

Personnel phasing is the practice of staggering the rotation of personnel to and from ships changing home ports from CONUS to overseas. It is intended to avoid rotating a large portion of the crew at one time, which the Navy believes would reduce combat readiness. Phasing accounted for 7 percent of total incomplete tours. The average tour curtailment was 6 months. To the extent that this practice is essential for readiness, it is not controllable.

Responsibility for assigning Navy enlisted personnel is shared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) and the Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC). BUPERS assigns enlisted personnel having designated skills, and EPMAC assigns unskilled personnel, generally seamen, firemen, and

airmen (about 13 percent of Navy enlisted personnel). The same general rotation policies apply to both categories of enlisted personnel. The EPMAC assignment process is not as refined as that of BUPERS since enlisted personnel assigned by EPMAC do not possess the higher levels of skills or training held by BUPERS assignees.

An official told us that EPMAC's practice was to return from overseas unskilled enlisted personnel not planning to reenlist so that they would have 12 months in CONUS before discharge--even if an early return resulted. According to the official, this practice gave the individual enough time in the CONUS unit to become productive before leaving the service. During fiscal year 1974, an estimated 3,000 enlisted personnel returned to CONUS an average of 7 months early for this reason.

This practice caused three staffing disruptions--first, when enlisted personnel left overseas units; second, when they reported to CONUS units; and third, when they left CONUS units. These disruptions, as well as rotation costs, could have been reduced by extending overseas duty to allow sufficient time in CONUS only for processing out of the Navy. The potential for controlling such early returns is obvious.

Medical

Enlisted personnel returned to CONUS due to medical problems accounted for 6.1 percent of the incomplete tours (an estimated 3,800 for fiscal year 1974). The average tour shortfall was 8.5 months. We recognize that not all medical problems can be anticipated. Therefore, the potential for reducing early returns caused by this factor seems limited.

Skill not required

About 3,300 enlisted personnel (representing 5 percent of the incomplete tours) were returned to CONUS because their skills were no longer needed at the assigned location. The average tour curtailment was 4.9 months. These curtailments result from changes in forces' requirements rather than enlisted personnel rotation policies.

Service school

Return to CONUS to attend service technical schools accounted for 5 percent (an estimated 3,300 enlisted personnel in fiscal year 1974) of the incomplete tours. The Navy had the highest occurrence rate, while the Air Force returned no personnel for this reason. This practice of returning enlisted personnel to meet school quotas, especially

since many schools begin classes several times a year, is questionable. For example, certain Navy schools, those most frequently attended by returning enlisted personnel, begin classes quarterly and some begin monthly. Yet Navy enlisted personnel returned an average of 10 months before the end of the prescribed overseas tours to attend school.

BUPERS officials explained that many of those returning early were unskilled enlisted personnel returning to acquire basic skills. According to the officials, the Navy used these unskilled personnel as a reservoir to fill school quotas that could not be filled through recruiting. Navy officials said that 11 to 12 percent of the annual school quotas were filled in this manner.

Obviously, filling school quotas is needed to keep training costs down. However, the cost effectiveness of cutting overseas tours short for this reason is questionable. This factor is certainly controllable and offers potential for reducing personnel rotation costs.

RETURNING SERVICE MEMBERS HAVING
A SHORT TIME REMAINING IN SERVICE

By extending the overseas tours of first-term enlisted personnel with 2 to 6 months remaining until the end of their enlistment period, we estimate that the services could have reduced fiscal year 1974 PCS costs by \$3.8 million. During our test period, 12 percent of the personnel who returned to CONUS had 2 to 6 months of service time left when they returned. The average service time remaining was 4 months. As shown in the following table, 74 percent of these personnel were completing their first enlistment.

| <u>Service</u> | <u>Percent of sample with 2 to 6 months obligated service</u> | <u>Percent of sample that were on first enlistment</u> |
|----------------|---|--|
| Army | 11.5 | 78 |
| Navy | 8.6 | 42 |
| Air Force | 11.7 | 64 |
| Marine Corps | 12.1 | 77 |
| DOD | 11.7 | 74 |

We believe that a reasonable justification exists for returning career enlisted personnel without regard to the end of their enlistment, since they will probably reenlist. We also believe, however, that enlisted personnel within 6 months of completing their first enlistment who have not stated an intention to reenlist should remain overseas until the end of their obligated service.

DOD Directive 1315.7 authorizes the services to extend the tours of enlisted personnel who are serving in overseas countries with 36-month tours, whose families are allowed, and who are within 11 months of separation. This directive does not require extension but only authorizes it. The provisions of the directive are incorporated into the policies of each service.

For example, Army policy is to (1) extend, in varying amounts, the tours of enlisted personnel who have 91 to 120 days of service obligation remaining so that when they return to CONUS they will have 90 days or less obligated service and (2) extend the tours of enlisted personnel in long-tour (36 or more months) areas with 6 months or less obligated service so they will have only sufficient time remaining to process out. These Army policies apply to enlisted personnel approaching the end of their terms of service who do not plan to reenlist.

Navy policy provides that noncareer enlisted personnel serving in areas for which accompanied tour lengths are 36 months or longer may have their tour involuntarily extended if they are within 11 months of separation. Before the extension is imposed, however, enlisted personnel are given the opportunity to extend their enlistments to provide 12 months of obligated service beyond the prescribed tour.

The Congress has shown interest in having the services manage their overseas personnel in a manner which will return such personnel to CONUS with only enough enlistment time remaining for processing out. In its report on the 1975 DOD appropriations bill, the House Committee on Appropriations instructed the Army not to return service members with a short time remaining on their obligation for early release. The Committee further instructed the Army to manage its overseas forces in a manner that will insure that service members arrive in CONUS in time for processing out but not weeks or months before the enlistment expires.

CONCLUSIONS

The number of personnel rotated overseas is controlled by the size of the approved overseas forces and the length of duty tours. The services have management flexibility in selecting personnel for overseas duty and determining the length of time they must serve. Therefore, the number of personnel rotated overseas can be reasonably controlled through management action to (1) assign personnel who can serve the prescribed duty tour and (2) insure that early returns for administratively controllable reasons are held to a minimum.

Through improved management of enlisted personnel rotation policies and practices, DOD and the services have an opportunity to reduce the amount and cost of overseas movement. Neither DOD nor the services have in the past established the management systems needed to identify the underlying policies and practices causing unnecessary rotation and to serve as a basis for corrective action.

Generally, the longer the duty tour over which rotation costs are distributed, the lower the cost to the Government and the greater the stability in operating forces. DOD has established uniform overseas tours applicable to all services, but 24 percent of the service members in our test failed to complete the prescribed tour. Although DOD and service policy provides for exceptions to the prescribed duty tours, the exceptions have seemingly almost become the rule.

The underlying causes for incomplete tours were varied, and many appeared to offer potential for being at least partially controlled by management, with resulting cost reductions. For example,

- Sending enlisted personnel overseas without adequate obligated service to serve the prescribed tour.
- Returning enlisted personnel for administrative discharge.
- Returning enlisted personnel to retire.
- Returning enlisted personnel for early discharge to attend civilian colleges or vocational schools.
- Returning unskilled Navy enlisted personnel to allow 12 months in CONUS before discharge.
- Returning enlisted personnel to attend service schools.

Rotation costs could have been even further reduced by extending overseas tours of first-term enlisted personnel with 2 to 6 months of service remaining rather than returning them to CONUS at the end of the prescribed tour. In many instances, these extensions would delay the sending of replacements for as long as 6 months and thereby further reduce PCS costs.

CHAPTER 3

ROTATION STUDIES--THEIR RESULTS

AND OUR EVALUATION

Three major studies on various aspects of military rotation and turbulence have recently been completed:

--Office of Management and Budget (OMB) study of the military travel management system.

--DOD Turbulence Ad Hoc Study Group.

--Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) interservice audit of PCS of military personnel.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AUDIT OF PCS MOVEMENTS

The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued a report on DOD PCS movements on September 10, 1975. Although the report focused on planning and budgeting for PCS movements, it also discussed incomplete overseas duty tours. The report stated:

"Improvements in the Services' selection procedures for assignment of enlisted personnel to duty overseas and better visibility of the reasons for personnel not completing their prescribed overseas tour periods were needed to reduce personnel turbulence and to increase the rate of tour completions. Our tests showed that, with the exception of the Marine Corps, a significant percentage of enlisted personnel in each Service did not complete their prescribed tour period overseas. These 'short-tour' percentages were as follows: Army - 77 percent; Navy - 20 percent; Air Force 17 percent; and Marine Corps - 4 percent. Among the major reasons for the early returns were (1) separation from Service due to completion of service commitment period which occurred prior to completion of prescribed tour length, and (2) early reassignment to CONUS duty stations due to various Service or member needs. As a result of these 'short-tour' vacancies, up to 38,200 additional rotational moves may be required at an estimated cost of \$59 million in FY 1976."

The report recommended that the services (1) discontinue selecting personnel for overseas assignments when the unexpired term of service is less than the prescribed duty tour and (2) report the number of and reasons that overseas tours were curtailed and their percent of total reassignments from the area. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy) concurred in the recommendations.

OMB STUDY

In March 1975, OMB initiated a study of the military travel management system principally to:

- Identify the major policies, administrative procedures, and the management system for determining, implementing, and controlling the military move program for each military service.
- Evaluate the impact of policies and procedures on the number of required moves.
- Evaluate the number of moves and the allocated resources in each service's move program and determine their consistency with current service policies and procedures.

In a September 1975 draft report, OMB concluded that several basic policies and procedures generate more military moves per year than are needed to maintain worldwide military deployments at desired levels under existing prescribed tour lengths. OMB also concluded that better management and control of military personnel move costs was needed. It estimated that \$363 million could be saved in fiscal year 1977 if the average overseas tour length were equal to the prescribed tour length.

OMB's recommended changes in DOD and service personnel rotation policies and practices designed to reduce personnel turbulence and improve the effectiveness of the military travel management system included:

- Eliminating the "all-other" tour length differential in overseas areas except for isolated areas where dependents cannot accompany service members.
- Including Alaska and Hawaii in the CONUS sustaining base.
- Requiring the services to plan to meet the prescribed overseas tour lengths.

- Eliminating maximum tour length constraints for specific geographical areas.
- Including cost considerations as an explicit criterion in generating personnel reassignments.
- Changing assignment procedures to provide simultaneous rather than sequential assignment selection.
- Including remaining available service time as a basic constraint in making personnel reassignments.

As of February 1976, OMB had not issued a final report. According to an OMB official, a final report may not be issued since, in his judgment, the draft had already achieved much of the desired effect.

DOD TURBULENCE AD HOC STUDY GROUP

In April 1974, a DOD study group was formed to investigate opportunities for cost savings through better management of personnel resources. The study group identified a series of items potentially capable of reducing (1) personnel turnover in units and (2) PCS costs. As of January 1976, the items which had been adopted as DOD-wide policy:

- Eliminated the 2-year initial enlistment.
- Established a goal of 36 months for overall average tour lengths.
- Made prescribed overseas tour length flexible within a 90-day "window."
- Eliminated preferentially short overseas tours for women.
- Extended the policy permitting involuntary extensions of overseas tours.
- Established the policy that retirement dates must normally allow completion of overseas tours for accompanied servicemen and at least 12 months on station if unaccompanied or in CONUS.

As a result of the OMB study previously discussed, the DOD Turbulence Ad Hoc Study Group reportedly changed its focus from internal consideration to the recommendations contained in that study. As of January 1976, the Group had not issued a final report.

RECENT DOD POLICY CHANGES

As a result of the above studies, a number of DOD personnel policies and administrative procedures were changed effective January 1, 1976. They include:

- Increasing the manpower pool available for reassignment, thereby increasing the opportunity for selecting personnel with adequate service time to serve a full duty tour by (1) using secondary skill identifiers, (2) using simultaneous rather than sequential assignment selection, and (3) integrating the assignments of initial entry personnel with the assignments of careerists, thus eliminating separate initial assignment allocation for first-term personnel.
- Increasing tour lengths by (1) limiting the number of changes in assignments for first-term personnel and (2) establishing a normal 3-year tour for careerists.
- Offering a preferred next assignment as an incentive for personnel to extend for 1 year overseas or at sea.
- Establishing terms-of-service objectives for each military service as a means of increasing average enlistment periods.
- Requiring the services to consider remaining available service time as a basic constraint in making any personnel reassignments.
- Including Hawaii in the CONUS sustaining base.

A more complete list of the approved policy and administrative procedure changes is included as appendix II. According to a DOD official, these changes are being incorporated into DOD Directive 1315.7.

Beginning with March 1976, the services were required to report quarterly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on compliance with the above changes. Examples of the required reports include:

- The number of personnel that did not complete the prescribed duty tour, amount of shortfall, and cause.
- The reasons for and number of personnel who are given more than two permanent duty station assignments.

CONCLUSIONS

In our opinion, the previously discussed studies and reviews indicate serious concern by DOD over the amount and cost of personnel rotation. Although the recent policy changes are long overdue, they appear capable of reducing the rate of incomplete overseas duty tours. However, it is too early to precisely assess the impact of these new policies on reducing personnel turbulence and costs. Nevertheless, DOD should be able to reasonably estimate cost reductions and demonstrate their impact on appropriation requests for fiscal year 1977 now before the Congress.

Achieving the substantial cost reductions possible through the policy changes is dependent on aggressive management action by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services to assure complete implementation. The reporting system should be a useful tool for identifying areas needing additional management action to control unnecessary personnel turbulence and costs. It should also serve as a means of assuring the Congress that the rotation system is being better managed.

CHAPTER 4

REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

BY THE CONGRESS

This report has dealt with past policies and practices, and planned and implemented changes, in the management of overseas rotation of enlisted personnel. We believe that DOD management has made progress in identifying and changing policies and practices that formerly contributed to costly and avoidable movement of personnel overseas.

DOD should be encouraged by the Congress to continue its pursuit of additional policy and practice changes to reduce unnecessary costs and movement of personnel. The Department should also be commended for its efforts thus far to improve the management of a complex and sensitive system without abrupt and costly disruptions.

Although it is too early to assess the full economic impact of DOD's recent policy and practice changes, some cost reduction should nevertheless be reflected in the fiscal year 1977 appropriation request. The Congress may want to pursue this issue and be assured by DOD that the economic benefits of these changes have been taken into account in the fiscal year 1977 budget. Further, the Congress may want to require DOD to identify in future appropriation requests the extent of cost and movement reductions resulting from longer term implementation of the changed policies and practices.

Finally, if DOD does not act to improve the system as fully, quickly, and practically as this report indicates is possible, then the Congress may wish to act to reduce future budget requests to provide the necessary motivation.

OVERSEAS DUTY TOURS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL
(OTHER THAN THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM)

| Primary Respon- sibility | Country or Area | Tours in Months | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | Accompanied by Dependents | All * Others |
| Air Force | ALASKA | | |
| | Anchorage Area including Elmendorf AFB and Fort Richardson..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Fairbanks Area including Eielson AFB and Fort Wainwright..... | 30 | 18 |
| | Big Delta Area including Fort Greely, Juneau and Kenai-Whittier Area including Wildwood Station..... | 24 | 18 |
| | Bethel, Kodiak Island and Nome.. | 24 | 12 |
| | Aleutian Peninsula, Islands west of 162nd meridian including Adak, Attu, Dutch Harbor and Point Barrow Area..... | 18 | 12 |
| | Clear, Fire Island and Murphy Dome..... | NA | 12 |
| Marine Corps | AMERICAN SAMOA | NA | 12 |
| Navy | ANTARCTIC REGION | NA | Indef |
| Army | **ARGENTINA | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | ARUBA..... | 24 | 18 |
| Air Force | ASCENSION ISLAND | NA | 12 |
| Navy | **AUSTRALIA (Except as indicated).. | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Alice Springs, Woomera and North West Cape..... | 24 | 15 |
| Army | **AUSTRIA..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | AZORES..... | 24 | 15 |
| Navy | BAHAMAS | | |
| | Eleuthera..... | 24 | 18 |
| | Andros Island | 24 | 12 |
| | Grand Bahama Island, San Salvador and Turks and Caicos..... | NA | 12 |

| <u>Primary Responsi- bility</u> | <u>Country or Area</u> | <u>Tours in Months</u> | |
|---|--|--|-------------------------|
| | | <u>Accompanied by Dependents</u> | <u>All * Others</u> |
| Navy | BAHRAIN ISLAND..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | **BELGIUM..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | BERMUDA..... | 36-48 | 18 |
| Army | BOLIVIA..... | 24 | 18 |
| Navy | **BRAZIL (Except as indicated)..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Recife, Salvador and Santa Cruz.... | 24 | 18 |
| | Fortaleza..... | NA | 18 |
| Navy | BURMA (Except Rangoon)..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Rangoon..... | 24 | 14 |
| Navy | CAMBODIA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | CANADA | | |
| | ** Metropolitan Areas | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Labrador..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Senneterre, Quebec, St. Margarets, New Brunswick..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Newfoundland | | |
| | St. Johns..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Argentia..... | 24 | 18 |
| | Stephenville..... | NA | 12 |
| | Other Areas | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | **CHILE..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Army | COLOMBIA..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | CORSICA..... | NA | 18 |
| Army | COSTA RICA | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | CUBA | | |
| | Guantanamo | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | CYPRUS..... | 24 | 18 |
| Army | DAHOMY..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | **DENMARK..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | DIEGO GARCIA..... | NA | 12 |
| Army | DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | ECUADOR..... | 36 | 18 |
| Navy | EGYPT..... | 24 | 18 |
| Army | **EL SALVADOR | 36-48 | 24 |
| Army | ETHIOPIA-ERITREA (Except as indicated)..... | 24 | 18 |

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

| Primary Respon- sibility | Country or Area | Tours in Months | |
|--------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | Accompanied by Dependents | All * Others |
| | Asmara, Harrar, Missaua, and Isolated Areas..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | **FRANCE..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Army | **GERMANY (Except as indicated) .. Todendorf..... | 36-48 24 | 24 18 |
| Navy | GIBRALTER BCC | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | **GREECE (Except as indicated).... Athens, Ekali, Elevisis, Erithraia, Katsimidhi, Keretea, Kifisia, Koropi, Marathon, Parnis, Pateras, Pendelikon and Piraeus..... | 36-48 30 | 24 18 |
| | Crete (Except Soudha Bay) | 24 | 18 |
| | Soudha Bay..... | NA | 12 |
| | Other Locations..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | GREENLAND..... | NA | 12 |
| Navy | GUAM..... | 24 | 15 |
| Army | **GUATEMALA..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | **HAWAII..... Kauai and KMC Kilauea..... | 36-48 30 | 24 18 |
| Air Force | HONDURAS..... | 24 | 18 |
| Navy | HONG KONG..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | ICELAND..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | INDIA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | INDONESIA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | IRAN (Except as indicated) | 24 | 12 |
| | Shahroki Station..... | NA | 12 |
| | Teheran (including Mehrabad Airport and Doshran Tappeh AB) | 24 | 18 |
| Air Force | ISRAEL..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | **ITALY (Except as indicated)..... San Vito and Brindisi..... | 36-48 30 | 24 18 |
| | Gheddi, Gioia del Colle, Marina Franca, Mt. Corna, Piacenza, Rimini, Sigonella and Mt. Venda. | 24 | 18 |

| <u>Primary Respon- sibility</u> | | <u>Tours in Months</u> | |
|---|---|--|-------------------------|
| | | <u>Accompanied by Dependents</u> | <u>All * Others</u> |
| | Piano di Corsi, Mt. Finale Ligure... | NA | 18 |
| | Mt. Virgine..... | 24 | 15 |
| | Mt. Calverina, Mt. Pizzoz and Zello.. | 36 | 24 |
| | Mt. Grappa, Mt. Torara and Naz Sciaves..... | NA | 15 |
| | Cima Gallina, Gambarie, Mt. Cimona, Mt. Limbara, Mt. Paganella and Reggio..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | **JAPAN (Except as indicated)..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Misawa and Iwakuni..... | 30 | 18 |
| | Wakkanai..... | 24# | 15 |
| | Akashi, Kobe and Osaka..... | 24 | 15 |
| | Akizuki Kure..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Isolated Areas including Abashiri, Asoiwayama, Chitose AB, Fuji Maneuver Area, Itazuke, Kashiwa Kokura (including Yamado), Mineokayama, Mito, Namaike, Nemuro, Ominato, Seburiyama, Shingu Wells, Takayama and Wajima..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | JOHNSTON ISLAND..... | NA | 12 |
| Army | KOREA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | KUWAIT..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | KWAJALEIN..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | LAOS..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | LIBERIA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | LIBYA..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | MAHE ISLAND, SEYCHELLES..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | MALAYSIA..... | NA | 12 |
| Navy | MALTA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | **MEXICO..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | MIDWAY ISLAND..... | 24 | 15 |
| Navy | MOROCCO Kenitra (formerly Port Lyautey Area)..... | 24 | 15 |

| Primary Respon- sibility | Country or Area | Tours in Months | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | Accompanied by Dependents | All * Others |
| Air Force | **NETHERLANDS..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | NEW ZEALAND..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Army | NICARAGUA..... | 36 | 18 |
| Air Force | **NORWAY..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | PAKISTAN | 24 | 18 |
| Army | **PANAMA (including Canal Zone)... | 36-48 | 18 |
| | Galeta Island..... | 24 | 18 |
| Army | PARAGUAY..... | 24 | 18 |
| Air Force | **PERU..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (Except as indicated)..... | 24 | 15 |
| | Balanga Area (Bataan); Laoag; Lubang; Mactan Island; Mindanao; Paracale, (Luzon); and Wallace Air Station..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | **PORTUGAL..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Navy | **PUERTO RICO (Except as indicated) | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Roosevelt Roads..... | 36-48 | 18 |
| | Ponce (Ft. Allen) and Isabela | 24 | 12 |
| | Vieques Island..... | NA | 12 |
| Marine Corps | RYUKYU ISLANDS (Except as indicated)..... | 30 | 18 |
| | Isolated Areas..... | NA | 12 |
| Navy | SAIPAN..... | 24 | 18 |
| Air Force | SARDINIA (Except as indicated).... | 24 | 12 |
| | La Maddalena..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Decimomannu AB..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | SAUDI ARABIA..... | 18 | 12 |
| Navy | SENEGAL..... | 24 | 12 |
| Navy | SINGAPORE..... | 36 | 24 |
| Air Force | **SPAIN (except as indicated).... | 36-48 | 24 |
| | Alcoy, Constantina, Elizondo, Rosas, and Villatobas..... | 30 | 18 |
| | Cartegena, El Ferrol, Guardamar del Segura and Sonseca..... | 24 | 18 |
| | Santiago..... | NA | 18 |
| | Balearic Islands and Gorremandi .. | NA | 15 |

| Primary Responsi- bility | | Tours in Months | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | Accompanied by Dependents | All * Others |
| | Adamuz, Ciudad Real and Estaca DeVares..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | TAIWAN (Except as indicated)..... | 24 | 15 |
| | Ching Chuan Kan ABJ..... | 24 | 12 |
| | Isolated Areas..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | ##THAILAND (Except Bangkok/Don Muang. Bangkok/Don Muang..... | NA 24 | 12 18 |
| Army | TUNISIA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Air Force | TURKEY Adana, Golcuk, and Sile..... | 24 | 18 |
| | Ankara, Incirlik CDI, Izmir and Samsun..... | 24 | 15 |
| | Karamousel..... | 30 | 18 |
| | Trabzon..... | NA | 15 |
| | Other Areas..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | UNITED KINGDOM (Except as indicated) St. Mawgans (England); Londonderry (Ireland); Holy Loch, Machrihanish, RAF Mormond Hill, Thurso (Scotland) and Brawdy (Wales)..... | 36-48 24 | 24 18 |
| Air Force | UPPER VOLTA..... | 24 | 12 |
| Army | **URUGUAY..... | 36 | 24 |
| Army | **VENEZUELA..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Army | VIETNAM..... | NA | 12 |
| Navy | **VIRGIN ISLANDS..... | 36-48 | 24 |
| Air Force | WAKE ISLAND..... | 18 | 12 |
| | WEST INDIES Anguilla, Antigua and Barbados | 24 | 18 |
| | St. Lucia..... | NA | 12 |
| Air Force | YUGOSLAVIA..... | 24 | 18 |
| Army | ZAIRE (Formerly Congo) Bukava, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi ... | 24 | 12 |



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

December 24, 1975

MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments (M&RA)

SUBJECT: Reduction of Personnel Turbulence

This policy decision paper is forwarded for implementation, with the first quarterly reports due on 31 March 1976.

I. First-Term Personnel -- Terms of Service and Tour Policy

The minimum term of service for officer and enlisted personnel will be 36 months. Terms of service objectives for non-prior service enlisted accessions are as follows:

| <u>Length of Enlistment</u> | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Marine Corps</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 3 years | 75% | 15% ^{a/} | - | 35% |
| 4 years or more | 25% | 85% | 100% | 65% |

^{a/} Navy 3x6 program (3 years active duty, followed by 3 years Selected Reserve duty)

II. First-Term Enlisted Personnel -- Early Separations

First-term maximum cumulative attrition goals for enlisted personnel prior to expiration of terms of service are as follows: (Goals for the first year exclude training attrition; however training attrition will be reported as a separate item.)

| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Marine Corps</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|---------------------|
| First year | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
| Second year | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% |
| Third year | 15% | 15% | 15% | 15% |



III. First-Term Personnel -- Tour Policy

First-term personnel serving for three or four years will be given no more than one assignment following initial training unless required to serve a short tour (e. g. , Korea), in which case they will be given no more than two assignments in different locations. First-term personnel serving for more than four years will be given no more than two assignments in different locations, regardless of tour length.

IV. Career Personnel -- Tour Policy

Tour lengths for career personnel normally will be of three years duration or more. Exceptions will be granted for unaccompanied tours and hardship locations, in accordance with DoD directives.

Career officers will be selected for service schools and graduate education annually, but will be assigned as students only after completing current tours of duty.

All Services will adopt a "homebasing" policy (similar to Navy's sea/shore program) wherein individuals assigned to unaccompanied hardship overseas (short) tours will be returned to the location of their previous U.S. assignments, wherever feasible. For those personnel not participating in the limited homebasing program, the Services will provide advanced assignments to the next long-tour station. In conjunction, the Services will examine the feasibility of authorizing the dependents of military personnel selected for short tours to remain in present quarters if the military member is to return to the same installation; or, if the military member is not returning to the same installation, to remain in present quarters until quarters at the next accompanied duty station become available, and then to move directly to the new quarters.

Flag/general officer assignments will be normally for a minimum of two years. It is recognized that the special nature of some of their assignments will require occasional deviations which will be reported quarterly.


V. Administrative and Procedural Improvements

A. The Services will include personnel in Hawaii (except for isolated areas) in the "sustaining base" for replacement of

personnel deployed overseas who are returning for a CONUS assignment.

- B. The Services will incorporate cost criteria in planning and programming personnel reassignments.
- C. The Services will establish explicit no-cost move objectives and provide these objectives to the monitors, detailers, assignment officers or resource managers implementing the move program.
- D. The Services will utilize secondary skill identifiers in making reassignments for those individuals currently possessing multiple skills.
- E. The Services will utilize simultaneous rather than sequential assignment selections in programming personnel reassignments.
- F. The Services will consider remaining available service time as a basic constraint in making personnel reassignments.
- G. The Services will integrate the assignments of initial entry training personnel with the assignments of careerists, thus eliminating separate initial assignment allocations for first-term personnel.
- H. The Services will not allow an enlisted member stationed overseas or on sea duty to be reassigned as a result of reenlistment unless the member is within 90 days of ETS/EOS.
- I. The Services will establish Inspector General type monitoring procedures for investigating assignment and transient practices.
- J. As an incentive for a member to extend for one year overseas (or, in the case of the Navy and Marine Corps, at sea), the Services will give priority for such member's preferred next assignment.

Services will provide quarterly reports to this office as described in the joint plan for reporting deviations from DoD policies concerning the Reduction of Personnel Turbulence. Implementation of these policies should commence 1 January 1976 and be phased in an orderly manner.



William K. Brehm

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

| | Tenure of office | |
|--|------------------|------------|
| | From | To |
| <u>DOD</u> | | |
| SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: | | |
| Donald H. Rumsfeld | Nov. 1975 | Present |
| James R. Schlesinger | July 1973 | Nov. 1975 |
| William P. Clements (acting) | May 1973 | July 1973 |
| DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: | | |
| William P. Clements | Jan. 1973 | Present |
| ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): | | |
| William K. Brehm | Sept. 1973 | Present |
| Carl W. Clewlow (acting) | June 1973 | Aug. 1973 |
| <u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u> | | |
| SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: | | |
| Martin R. Hoffmann | Aug. 1975 | Present |
| Norman R. Augustine (acting) | July 1975 | Aug. 1975 |
| Howard H. Callaway | May 1973 | July 1975 |
| ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): | | |
| Donald G. Brotzman | Mar. 1975 | Present |
| M. David Lowe | Feb. 1974 | Jan. 1975 |
| Carl S. Wallace | Mar. 1973 | Jan. 1974 |
| CHIEF OF STAFF: | | |
| Gen. Fred C. Weyand | Sept. 1974 | Present |
| Gen. Creighton W. Abrams | Oct. 1972 | Sept. 1974 |

| | <u>Tenure of office</u> | |
|--|-------------------------|------------|
| | <u>From</u> | <u>To</u> |
| <u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u> | | |
| SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: | | |
| J. William Middendorf II | Apr. 1974 | Present |
| John W. Warner | May 1972 | Apr. 1974 |
| ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): | | |
| Joseph T. McCullen, Jr. | Sept. 1973 | Present |
| James E. Johnson | June 1971 | Sept. 1973 |
| CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: | | |
| Adm. James L. Holloway III | July 1974 | Present |
| Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. | July 1970 | July 1974 |
| COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS: | | |
| Gen. Louis H. Wilson | July 1975 | Present |
| Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr. | Jan. 1972 | June 1975 |

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

| | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|
| SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE: | | |
| Thomas C. Reed | Dec. 1975 | Present |
| John L. McLucas | May 1973 | Dec. 1975 |
| ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): | | |
| David P. Taylor | June 1974 | Present |
| James P. Goode (acting) | June 1973 | June 1974 |
| CHIEF OF STAFF: | | |
| Gen. David Jones | Aug. 1974 | Present |
| Gen. George S. Brown | Aug. 1973 | July 1974 |
| Gen. John D. Ryan | Aug. 1969 | Aug. 1973 |

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