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[Pricing of a Fixed-Price Incentive Contract Awarded to RCA Corporation bi the Goddard space Flight Center]. PSAD-78-49; $\mathrm{B}-118720$. Deceaber S , 1977. 5 pp .

Roport to Robert A. Frosch, ldministrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; by Richard $\boldsymbol{A}$. Gutmann. Director, Procurement ard Systems Acguisition Diy.

Issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and Services (1900); Federal Procurement of Goods and Services: Reasonableness of Prices Under Negotiated Contracts and Subcontracts (1904).
Contact: Procurement and Systems Acquisition Div.
budget Function: General science, space, and Technology: Supporting space Activities (255).
Onganizaticr Concernea: Natioual Aerunautics and Space Açministration: Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; RCA Corf.: Astro Electronics. Frinceton, NJ.
Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Science and Technology; Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpcrtation.

A fixed-price incentive contract awarded to RCA Corporation. Astro Electronics, by the Godaard space Flight Conter provides for furnishing eight Television Infacired Observation Satellite spacecraft buses, associated documents, spares comporents, and ground suppcrt equipment. The value of the contract through modificatiun 16 was $\$ 61,938,241$ at the target price and $\$ 65,078,437$ at the ceiling price. Findings/Conclusions: There are areas of pctential overpriciny pertaining to the contractor"s decision to manufacture reaction control equi pment instead of buying it as originally contemplated in modification 1 to the contract. Review of RCA's material cost estimates totaling $\$ 8.6$ million, which were included in its proposal for modification 1 , showed that estimates used in negotiations were based on current data. With respert to modification $1 \epsilon$, an RCA estjmate to make reaction control equipment may have been orerstated by as much as $\$ 723.000$ at target cost and $\$ 850,0 C 0$ at ceiling price. RCA, in its proposal, di not use lower sufplier quotations which it hai obtained and did not provide the National aeronautics and space Alministration (NASA) with adequate information to Jetermine the selated effect on pricing. Also, at the time RCA subaitted its estimate for regotiating a change in the contract scope, it did not inform NASA of additional lower price quotations which were available or that the price to the $A \dot{\text { a }}$ force had been reducid. Recommendations: The contracting officer should consider the tindings of this review and determine whether the government is entitled to a price adjustment under the contract. (SC)

# United States General Accounting Office <br> WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548 

# The Honorable Robert A. Frosch <br> Administrator, National Aeronautics <br> and Space Administration 

Dear Dr. Frosch:
We have reviewed the oricing of fixed-price incentive contract NAS5-22330 awarded to RCA Corporation (RCA), Astrn Electronics, Princeton, New Jersey, by the Goddard Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The contract provides for furnishing eigit Teievision Infra-red ohservation Satellite (TIROS) spacecraft busses, associated documents, spares components, and ground support equipment. The value of the contract through modification 16 was $\$ 61,938,241$ at the target price and $\$ 65,078,437$ at the ceiling price. The Air Force also bought sateliites from RCA. The NASA and Air Force requirements were consolidated during negotiations to obtain savings resulting from the purchase of larger quantities.

This review wes part of a nationwide review of the pricing of negotiated noncompetitive prime contracts. Individual contract reviews represent part of our efforts to monitor agencies' adherence to prescribed laws, regulations, and procedures in neyotiating noncompetitive contract prices.

We idencified areas of potential overpricing pertaining to the contractor's decision to manufacture reaction control equipment instead of buying it as original $y$ contemplated in modification 1 to the contract. In addi'ion to reviewing material costs pertaining to modification 1 , we reviewed the cost proposal ard negotiations supforting the execution of modification 16 to the contract which pertained ro reaction control equipment.

Our review of RCA's material cost estimates totalin' $\$ 8.6$ million, which were included in its proposal fcr modification l, showed that estimates used in negotiations were based on current data. with respect to modification 16 , we found that an RCA estimate to make reaction control equipment may have been overstated by as much as $\$ 723,000$ at tarjet cost
and $\$ 850,000$ at ceiling price. RCA, in its p:oposal, did not use lower supplier quotations, which it had obtained, and did not provide NASA with adequate information to determine the related effect on pricing. Also, at the time RCA submitted its estimate for negotiating a change in contract scope, it did not inform NASA of additional lower price quotations, which were available, and thac the price to the Air Force had been reduced. All of these factors could have had an impact on the contracting officer's actions in negotiating a final price.

## BACKGROUND

Contract NAS5-22330 was awarded to RCA on Apr... 1, 1975, to fabricate anj/or furnish nine sets of long-lead items (major subcontracts and materials) for TIROS spacecrafts. The total firm Sixed price was $\$ 16,600,000$.

Modification 1, dated June 30 , 1975, increased the scope of the basic contract to add the requirement for furnishing eight TIROS series spacecraft busses, associated documents, spares components, and ground support equipment. The type of contract was changed to fixed-price incentive and the target price was increased by $\$ 45,792,000$ to $\$ 62,392,000$. Included in the target price were additional items valued at $\$ 6,390,700$ which were to be negotiated later.

Modification l6, dated Dectmber 17, 1976, finalized these additional items at a target prict of $\$ 5,849,000$. It also incorporated into the contract a number of changes in scope of work at a net increase in target price of $\$ 75,100$. Anong the changes in scope was a $\$ 40,000$ reduction in target price for the fabxication of the reaction control equipment in-house.

Upon compietion of the contract, the final price is to be established by (l) adतing to the total target profit 25 percent of the difference by which the total final negotiated cost is iese, than the total target cost or 2) deducting from the total teiget profit 25 percent of the aifference by which the total :inal nesotiated cost is greater tian the total target cost. The total final negotiated price shall not exceed the ceiling price.

The contractor executed Certificates of Current Cost or Pricing Data. A defective pricing clause was aiso incorporated into the contract.

## OVERPRICING OF REACTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT--MÖDIFICATION 16

Reaction control equipment is a component used in the TIROS. Its function is to place the satellite into final, precise orbit. The rocket engine assembly (thruster) is a major component of the reaction control equipment.

In its initial proposal dated Narch 26 , 1975, to NASA for modification 1, RCA included the reaction control equipment as a subcontracted item. On June 13, 1975, NASA and the contractor concluded negotiations for modification ? on this basis.

During a program-review meeting in August 1975, NASA was advised that RCA had decided to manufacture the reaction control equipment rather than to subcontract for it. NASA accepted the contractor's decisior with the intention of making appropriate price adjustments later. On October 30, 1975, the contractor transmitted its proposal to NASA. The proposil, prepared as of June 12, 1975, included a unit price of $\$ 30,555$ for thrusters. The basis for the unit price was a quote from a prospective supplier, dated February 3, 1975, of $\$ 29,100$ plus a 5 persent economic adjustment factor.

The con'ractor separately provided NASA with vendor nrice quotations, which included 5 received in Febri:ary 1975 for thrusters. Four quoted prices for thrusters were lower than the one used by RCA in its proposai--the lowest being $\$ 14,539$ a unit. RCA did not explain to NASA that the proposal for the reaction control equirment included an estimated unit price of $\$ 30,555$ for thrusters, which was $\$ 16,016$ higher than the lowest quote of $\$ 14,539$, nor did RCA offer any explanation as to why the source with the lowest quote was not being used.

As of October 30, 1.975, the date of the contractor's letter to NASA submitting its proposed costs to make the reaction control equipment, the following events had taken place:
--During the period of October 17 to October 30, 1975, RCA had received four additional quotations for thrusters from two potential suppliers, one of which was the evertual supplier, ranging from $\$ 13,542$ to $\$ 17,899$. We found no evidence that this information was disclosed to NASA. The difference between the $\$ 30,555$ price used in the proposal and the lowest quote of $\$ 13,542$ was \$17,013 a unit.
--While negc:iating with the Air Force, the contractor, on October 23, 1975, verbally advised the Air Force that the price for each thruster would be reduced to a range from $\$ 13,000$ to $\$ 20,000$ based on revised vencur costs. The contractor then revised its target price to the Air Force bared on an estimated cost of $\$ 20,000$ per thruster instead of the $\$ 30,555$ initially proposed. However, when submitting its proposal to NASA, the contractor quoted a unit price of $\$ 30,555$ per chruster and did not reveal that the unit price to the Air Force had been reduced to $\$ 20,000$. The Air Force considers its total negotiated price to be based, in part, on a thruster urit price ranging from $\$ 13,000$ to $\$ 20,000$.

On November 2.5, 1975, the contractor purchased the thrusters at a unit price of $\$ 17,536$.

NASA did not consider it necessary to have the contractor's proposal audited. Instead, it relied on RCA's proposal when negotiating a reduction or $\$ 40,000$ which essentially represented the difference between the contractor's total estimate to buy the reaction control equipment and the total estimate to make it.

RCA executed a Certificate of current Cost or Fxicing Data on November 10, 1976, for modification 16 which included the proposal to manufacture the reaction control equipment. Jata shown thereon was certified to be accurate, current, and complete as of Očober 20, 1976, the date negotiations were concluded. Modification 16 specified that the reaction control equipment fabrication in-house adjustment constituted a change in the scope of work.

The contracting officer informed us that he was not aware of the (1) impact of the February 1975 price quotations for thrusters, (2) existence of the four October ig75 quotations, and (3) revised proposal on thrusters to the Air Folce from $\$ 30,555$ to $\$ 20,000$ a unit. The contracting officer also informed us that, had he been made fully aware of this information, he might have acted differently in negotiating a final price.

On the basis of our computation sho in below, we believe that the price for the thrusters has been overstated by $\$ 722,937$ at target cost and $\$ 849,884$ at ceiling price.
Difference between high and low quotes ..... \$ 17,013
Number of units33.5
Total ..... \$569,935
Add - Overhead ..... 153,00,2
Overpricing at target cost ..... \$722,937
Overpricing at ceiling price

Contractor officials generally agreed with our findings and also informed us that an overstatement in the price could have ocsurred.

## RECOMMENDATICN

We recomend that the contracting officer consider the above finding and determine whether the Government is entitled to a price ecjustraent under contract NAS5-22330.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Goddard Space Flight Center; the Office of Management and Budget; the Office of Federal Procurement Policy; and RCA. We are also sending copies of this report to the senaie and House Committees on Appropriations, the House Committee on Government Operations, and the Senate Commitree on Covernmental Affairs.

As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, not later than 60 days after the date of the report, and to the House and senate committees on Appropriations with the agency's first. request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the report. We would appreciate receiving a copy of these statements.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. Gutmann

Director

