United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Census,
Statistics and Postal Personnel
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
1:30 p.m.
Tuesday
September 27, 1994

DECENNIAL CENSUS:

1995 Test Census Presents Opportunities to Evaluate New Census-Taking Methods

Statement of
William M. Hunt, Director
Federal Management Issues
General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-94-136

DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1995 TEST CENSUS PRESENTS OPPORTUNITIES TO EVALUATE NEW CENSUS-TAKING METHODS

SUMMARY STATEMENT
WILLIAM M. HUNT
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION

The 1995 Test Census is crucial in determining how the Bureau of the Census will conduct the 2000 Decennial Census. Evaluation of the new methods should provide the Bureau information about their operational feasibility and potential for achieving the desired results of improving accuracy and containing costs. With regard to the specific methods in the 1995 Test you asked GAO to discuss:

-- The Bureau should gain insight into the accuracy of its address list and maps and how well new methods to cooperate with the Postal Service and local governments may contribute to improvement in quality. The Bureau plans to collect data that should be useful in other planned evaluations of its address list.

-- The Bureau's plans to have the Postal Service identify vacant and nonexistent housing units early in the enumeration process could demonstrate the potential for substantial savings. The Bureau can maximize those savings by ascertaining the earliest point at which housing units are accurately identified as vacant or nonexistent.

-- The Bureau plans to evaluate a statistical method that incorporates sampling to provide an improved count by producing one, rather than two, census counts is encouraging but faces several policy and operational challenges.

-- The Bureau's test of the use of sampling of nonrespondents provides the opportunity to evaluate a method that could significantly reduce the cost of the census; it also may affect the accuracy of the data on nonrespondents. Current Bureau evaluation plans do not provide for measuring the accuracy of: (1) the new sampling methods compared to previous methods, or (2) sampling of remaining nonrespondents after an initial attempt to contact all of them.

-- The Bureau's test is planned to include an evaluation of a new method for enumerating some persons with no usual residence that offers the opportunity to determine if procedural and operational problems of the method it used in the 1990 Decennial Census can be overcome.

It is important that the Bureau identifies the data needed from the test, collects complete and accurate cost information, and completes its evaluations so that the 1995 Test can provide policymakers the information that they need to make major decisions on the fundamental design of the 2000 Decennial Census.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to comment on the Census Bureau's plans for its 1995 Test Census. Specifically, you asked us to discuss the following changes in census methods that the Bureau plans to include in its 1995 Test Census: (1) new data sources and methods to help compile the census address list, (2) the use of the Postal Service to identify addresses on the Bureau's list that are either vacant or nonexistent, (3) two sampling and statistical estimation methods designed to decrease the cost and improve the accuracy of the census, and (4) a new method for counting those persons without a usual residence. In addition, as you requested, we examined the cost implications of the methods being tested.

The 1995 Test Census is crucial to the Bureau for determining what fundamental design changes to incorporate into the 2000 Decennial Census. It should provide the Bureau with information about the operational feasibility of the design changes and their effects on the quality and cost of census data. We are generally in agreement with the changes in methods the Bureau plans to test in 1995 because they are consistent with what we have previously recommended or suggested for reforming the census. However, the Bureau has considerable work to do, including the completion of its evaluation plans for these changes, before it can take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the 1995 Test. Only after the test is evaluated can the Bureau provide policymakers

the information that they need to make major decisions on the fundamental design of the 2000 Decennial Census.

BACKGROUND

The accuracy of the 1990 Decennial Census fell below that of the 1980 Census, while census costs escalated significantly. We reported in 1992 that fundamental changes must be implemented for a successful census in 2000.[1] The Department of Commerce and the Bureau also recognized that the previous methods of census taking needed to be reassessed to achieve the goals of improving the accuracy and containing the cost of future censuses.

The plans for the 1995 Test Census are the result of the Bureau's research and development program that began in 1991 to explore changes in methods for collecting, sampling, and estimating data. The 1995 Test was originally scheduled to be done in three urban sites: New Haven, Connecticut; Oakland, California; and Paterson, New Jersey; and one rural site, which includes six parishes in northwestern Louisiana.[2] The Bureau plans to make many of its final design decisions for the 2000 Decennial Census by December 1995.

---

[1]See Decennial Census: 1990 Results Show Need for Fundamental Reform (GAO/GGD-92-94, June 9, 1992).

[2]Because of budget considerations, the Bureau eliminated New Haven, Connecticut, as a test site on September 16, 1994.

Our testimony is based on our review of the changes the Bureau plans to consider as part of the 1995 Test Census, discussions with Bureau officials, visits to the urban test site locations, and our work on prior decennial census activities. (A list of related GAO products is attached to this statement.)

THE BUREAU PLANS TO GATHER DATA TO EVALUATE ADDRESS LIST DEVELOPMENT METHODS

An accurate and complete address list that identifies the mailing address and physical location of each housing unit is the cornerstone of a successful census. In the 1990 Decennial Census, the Bureau, for the first time, developed its own automated system that allowed the Bureau to incorporate changes from its various address list development procedures. The Bureau also asked local governments to check the accuracy of its address list at two stages in the census process. Before mailing the questionnaire, the Bureau gave local governments the opportunity to review the number of housing units contained in each block. At the end of most 1990 census operations, the Bureau asked local governments to again check the accuracy of their housing unit count by block.

We reported that the often redundant, labor-intensive, and costly procedures the Bureau used to develop the address list for the

1990 Decennial Census did not produce a complete and accurate list.[3] The Bureau missed or erroneously included millions of housing units in its final count of 102 million units. The Bureau estimated that about 3.7 million, or 3.6 percent, of all housing units--occupied and vacant--were missed and that another 2.9 million, or 2.8 percent, were erroneously counted.

Since the 1990 Decennial Census, the Postal Service's ability to assist the Bureau has been enhanced because the Postal Service has continued to develop its automated address file that is to include every address to which it delivers mail. For the 1995 Test Census' urban sites, the Bureau collaborated with the Postal Service to create address lists that consisted of the Bureau's address list updated by the Postal Service's address list file.

For the 1995 Test, the Bureau has begun testing the urban local governments' ability to update its address lists and associated geographic maps. In this revised local review program, the Bureau has sent local governments complete lists of housing unit addresses and local area maps for review instead of only block counts. Because of a confidentiality statute,[4] this procedure required swearing in, as temporary Bureau employees, all local government officials who may have access to these data. It is too early in the local governments' review process to tell if

---

[3]See GAO/GGD-92-94.

[4]Title 13, United States Code, Sections 9 and 23(c).

they will be able to effectively work with and improve the Bureau's data.

Although the evaluation of address list development methods is not a formal objective of the 1995 Test, the Bureau plans to collect data on (1) the accuracy of the Bureau's address list compared to the Postal Service's automated address file; (2) local governments' ability to review the Bureau's address list and maps; (3) the sources of local government input, such as administrative records; and (4) other sources of address list additions, deletions, and changes. These data should be useful in the Bureau's planned future evaluations of its address list development methods.

BUREAU PLANS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF VACANT AND NONEXISTENT HOUSING UNITS INCREASE RELIANCE ON POSTAL SERVICE

In 1990, the Bureau sent temporary census employees, called enumerators, to visit those 34.3 million housing units from which a census questionnaire was not returned by mail. However, many of those visits were not necessary because a housing unit either was vacant or did not actually exist. Of the approximately 100 million questionnaires delivered in the 1990 Decennial Census, 8.6 million were delivered to units subsequently found to be vacant; and 4.8 million were delivered to nonexistent units,

according to Bureau records. These 13.4 million addresses represented about 39 percent of the 34.3 million housing units that required repeated visits from census enumerators because a questionnaire was not mailed back.

At the urging of Congress, the Bureau used the Postal Service during the 1990 Census to help identify the occupancy status of some of the last, most difficult follow-up cases. A Bureau study found that although additional testing was needed, this method appeared to be a very inexpensive and useful way to help complete these final cases. In our 1992 report, we encouraged the Bureau to use the Postal Service to identify vacant and nonexistent units before any census forms were mailed because we believed such an approach could yield substantial savings.[5] However, we noted that testing the use of the Postal Service in this capacity would be necessary because the Bureau had no data from the 1990 Census on how accurately the Postal Service identified units as nonexistent. Also, the Bureau did not ask the Postal Service to identify vacant units during its 1990 Census address list development operations.

In the 1995 Test Census, the Bureau plans to test the use of Postal Service letter carriers to identify vacant and nonexistent units when it mails census questionnaires. The Bureau's plan is to use undeliverable, First-Class Mail that the Postal Service

[5]See GAO/GGD-92-94.

returns to the Bureau to identify vacant and nonexistent housing units. The Postal Service is to have three separate opportunities to identify an address as undeliverable: (1) during a manual check before the questionnaires are mailed out, (2) during the delivery of a "prenotice" letter alerting households to the arrival of a census questionnaire within 10 days, and (3) during the delivery of the questionnaire package. After the Postal Service classifies units as vacant or nonexistent, the Bureau would begin its visits to those households that did not return a questionnaire by mail to verify the accuracy of the Postal Service's classifications.

As part of the test, the Bureau plans to evaluate by December 1995 the following issues: (1) the completeness and accuracy of the Postal Service's identification of units as either vacant or nonexistent; (2) the rates at which various operations misclassify vacant and nonexistent housing units; (3) the potential for the Bureau to use sampling methods to recheck the Postal Service's classifications of the occupancy status and existence of housing units; (4) whether a Bureau mailing of a prenotice letter or a mailing of the questionnaire itself is the best method for letter carriers to identify vacant or nonexistent units; and (5) the potential cost impact of these methods.

The basic procedures the Bureau outlined for using the Postal Service to identify vacant and nonexistent units early in the

census process appear to be sound. The Bureau's evaluation plans seem well-focused on the important issues. If the evaluations prove the value of this new census method, the identification of vacant and nonexistent housing units early in the census operation will reduce the cost of following up on nonrespondents.

THE BUREAU'S USE OF THE SAMPLING METHODOLOGY DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF THE CENSUS COUNTS PRESENTS CHALLENGES

Each decennial census has produced an undercounting of the population, which has been most pronounced for minority populations. For the 1990 Decennial Census, on the basis of the Bureau's demographic analysis, the net undercount was estimated to be 1.8 percent of the population, or approximately 4.7 million persons. The net undercount rate was higher than the estimated 1.2 percent net undercount for the 1980 Census, which was based on similar demographic analysis methods.

The estimated 4.4 percentage point difference in the 1990 net undercount rate between blacks (5.7 percent) and non-blacks (1.3 percent) was the highest such difference since the Bureau began estimating the accuracy of census coverage with the 1940 census. Because of the undercounting in the 1990 Decennial Census, the Secretary of Commerce considered an adjustment to the 1990 Census

results to correct the undercount.[6] On the basis of the data available at that time, the Secretary decided against the adjustment.

Integrated coverage measurement (ICM)--a statistical method that the Bureau plans to test in 1995--is designed to improve the accuracy of the census count by reconciling the results of the original census counts with data obtained from a sample of households. The ICM method presents the Bureau with several operational challenges. For example, completing this statistical method by the end of December 1995 will be difficult. For the 1995 Test Census, the Bureau plans to move up Census Day by about 4 weeks, from April 1 to March 4, to allow more time to complete its tabulation of the data by December 31, 1995.[7]

The Bureau developed the ICM method not only to improve the census counts but also to reduce the time required by the 1990 Census method it used to check the accuracy of the original counts and to produce adjusted numbers--the Post Enumeration Survey. By using the ICM method in the 1995 Test, the Bureau plans to obtain a one-number census, rather than the two population numbers it developed for the 1990 Census--the

---

[6]The issue of adjusting the 1990 census counts is currently in litigation.

[7]A change in Census Day for the 2000 Decennial Census would require an amendment to Title 13, United States Code, which sets April 1 as Census Day.

headcount and the one based on the Post Enumeration Survey. For the new method, the Bureau plans to (1) create an independent address list for a sample of blocks, (2) interview all households on that list, and (3) then immediately match the results of those interviews to the results from its previous census procedures. This matching is to be done by the enumerator during the interview itself in order to expedite that procedure and improve the accuracy of the matching.

From this matching, the Bureau plans to determine what it deems to be the "true population" based on the sampled households on Census Day. The Bureau is to develop a ratio between the original population count and the "true population" count and apply that ratio by demographic groups, such as race, to the total population. To expedite and improve this matching activity, the Bureau plans to test the use of notebook computers and sophisticated software to gather the sample interview data and then compare the sample data to the data gathered by the regular census procedures.

As part of the ICM method, the Bureau will use procedures similar to the ones used in the 1990 Post Enumeration Survey to help it evaluate the results obtained by the new method. This will add about 2 months to the completion of the ICM. The Bureau's present schedule also shows that it will complete population

estimates for each test site by December 1995, and it will complete block-level estimates by April 1996.

The Bureau faces many operational challenges that need close examination in the 1995 test. For example, obtaining information about the occupants of a household if they have moved between Census Day and the day of the sample interview may be difficult for the Bureau. Bureau statisticians estimate that about 7 percent of the households in the test areas will move during that time. Also, the Bureau may encounter a lack of cooperation from households chosen for the sample interview procedure because they may have already been personally interviewed during regular census procedures or because they may resent the more lengthy list of questions the Bureau plans to ask during the sample interview. Using the required computer technology may be difficult for Bureau enumerators. Also, the interview process may introduce bias into the results of the process by having enumerators attempt to match the results of their own interview with the data gathered in earlier census procedures.

The Bureau is developing its evaluation methodology for the integrated coverage measurement. It expects to complete this methodology by December 1994. Bureau statistical specialists told us that the most important planned evaluations should be completed by December 1995. Without being able to review the Bureau's evaluation methodology, we are unable to render an

opinion as to its appropriateness and the feasibility of the evaluations being completed by that date.

OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO EXPAND THE EVALUATION OF SAMPLING OF NONRESPONDENTS

In past censuses, the Bureau mailed questionnaires to virtually all households in the country and requested that they mail back completed questionnaires. For those who did not mail back completed questionnaires, the Bureau sent enumerators to attempt to retrieve missing questionnaires. Enumerators were required to make up to six contacts--three of which were personal contacts--with the households before resorting to other methods to obtain the data. For the 1990 Census, the Bureau's workload for following up on nonrespondents depended on the census mail return rate. In that census, the Bureau's mail return rate was considerably lower than it was in the 1980 Census--63 percent, 12 percentage points lower than in 1980. As a result, the Bureau had to follow up on 34.3 million housing units.

Before the 1990 Census, we recommended that the Bureau consider using statistical methods to develop census information on nonrespondents.[8] In our 1992 report, we again encouraged the

[8]A $4 Billion Census in 1990? Timely Decisions on Alternatives to the 1980 Procedures Can Save Millions (GAO/GGD-82-13, Feb. 22, 1982).

Bureau to evaluate using the statistical methods of sampling for some or all of the nonrespondent workload to reduce the time and labor-intensive fieldwork and speed the census process.[9]

To reduce the nonrespondent workload, the Bureau plans to follow up on a 33-percent sample of nonrespondents in the 1995 test. The Bureau plans to use two different methods to draw these samples. One sampling method--the block sample--is to preselect a sample of 33 percent of the blocks in portions of the test sites and follow up on all households in those blocks that do not return a questionnaire. In other portions of the test site, the Bureau plans to use another sampling method--the housing unit sample, which is to draw a sample of 33 percent of the housing units that do not return a questionnaire, regardless of the blocks in which they are located.

Sampling nonrespondents can reduce cost and could improve the overall accuracy of census counts in both positive and negative ways. Sampling nonrespondents could improve the accuracy of the data on nonrespondents. As we have previously reported, the number of errors found in the census data--including the accuracy of the basic count--increases in proportion to the time it takes to complete the census.[10] By concentrating its attention on a smaller sample of nonrespondents, the Bureau may be able to

---

[9]See GAO/GGD-92-94.

[10]See GAO/GGD-92-94.

obtain more accurate data on the number and characteristics of nonrespondents.

On the other hand, the nature of sampling itself increases the statistical uncertainty of the data on nonrespondents--particularly at lower geographic levels, such as blocks and aggregations of blocks. The magnitude of this uncertainty can be statistically calculated on the basis of such variables as the size of the sample, the method used to draw the sample, and the size of the universe being sampled.

The effects of sampling nonrespondents on the accuracy of the data must be weighed against the potential cost savings. The Bureau's 1995 Test Census should provide data on the trade-off between accuracy and cost. Thus, in making its major design decisions in December 1995, the Bureau will need data from sampling nonrespondents showing the statistical uncertainty of the data at various geographic levels. Although the Bureau is concentrating on maximizing savings, policymakers will need data that compare the accuracy and costs of the Bureau's two methods for sampling nonrespondents with the accuracy of the data and costs obtained by the past method of attempting to contact all such households. Policymakers will also need data on the costs and what the level of uncertainty and accuracy might be if the sampling of nonrespondents is done after an initial attempt to contact all nonrespondents.

Currently, the Bureau's evaluation focuses solely on comparing the accuracy of the counts produced by the two different methods of sampling nonrespondents--the block sample and the housing unit sample. It plans to compare the census counts obtained by each of those methods by such factors as the average population per household, which might indicate which is the more accurate method. However, the Bureau does not plan to evaluate these new methods in comparison to the past method of attempting to contact all nonrespondents or to evaluate the benefits and costs of an initial attempt to contact all nonrespondents.

THE BUREAU'S PLAN FOR THE 1995 TEST ARE INTENDED TO MORE ACCURATELY INCLUDE THOSE PERSONS WITH NO USUAL RESIDENCE IN THE CENSUS

The 1990 Decennial Census marked the first time that the Bureau included a nationwide effort to gather information on the number and characteristics of selected components of the homeless population. Referred to as the Street and Shelter Night, or "S-Night," the effort counted persons at homeless shelters and selected street and other locations during nighttime hours.

In 1989 the Bureau had tested a daytime count at facilities that serve homeless persons and found that a daytime count may produce a more accurate count, but the Bureau determined that it was too

late to change its plans for S-Night. S-Night was hampered by methodological and other problems. When the Bureau decided to do a nighttime count at sites where homeless people were known to congregate, it acknowledged that it would miss a portion of the homeless population at sites considered too dangerous for census enumerators to enter. Also, the Bureau had no procedures for ensuring that persons counted during S-Night would not also be counted during other census operations, resulting in possible double-counting. Further, the Bureau depended on the local governments to identify the locations where homeless people might be found. Although most of the large cities responded to the Bureau's request to identify such street locations, overall, only 36 percent of all local governments responded.

Our 1991 evaluation of S-Night showed that the nighttime method of counting homeless people at selected street locations resulted in an unknown number of the hidden homeless being missed and no assurance that those counted were homeless and would not also be counted during other census procedures.[11]

For its 1995 test, the Bureau plans to change its approach for counting the street portion of the program to a daytime one. It plans to test the feasibility of a daytime approach at facilities where persons with no usual residence receive services, such as

---

[11]See 1990 Census: Limitations in Methods and Procedures to Include the Homeless (GAO/GGD-92-1, Dec. 30, 1991).

food kitchens and social service centers. The Bureau plans to collect information such as the name, date of birth, age, where the respondents usually live, or if they have a usual place of residence.

During the 1995 test, the Bureau plans to evaluate (1) the effectiveness of the process used to develop a list of facilities, (2) the number of people counted at the various facilities, (3) the extent to which people were double-counted, (4) the reliability of the responses to questions about usual residence and where a respondent stayed the previous night, (5) strengths and weaknesses of the service-based enumeration procedures, (6) the feasibility of follow-up enumerations, and (7) the costs of the operation.

The procedures the Bureau plans to test to more accurately count those persons with no usual residence seem properly designed. The Bureau's evaluation plan appears to identify the data it needs for proper evaluation.

THE 1995 TEST CENSUS HAS COST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 2000 DECENNIAL CENSUS

In 1990, the Bureau estimated that if the census-taking approach did not change, the 2000 Decennial Census could cost about $4.8

billion. Decennial census costs have increased dramatically over the past few decades. The 1970 Decennial Census cost $221 million, and the 1980 Decennial Census cost $1.1 billion. Even when inflation and increased workload are taken into account, the costs of the 1980 Census doubled from the prior one. Despite the Bureau's early goal of containing cost in the planning of the 1990 Census, the 1990 Decennial Census continued this upward spiral, costing about $2.6 billion. Adjusting for inflation and workload growth, the cost of the 1990 Census was still 25 percent higher than that of the 1980 Census.

Responding to congressional concerns about the escalating costs, the Bureau committed to exploring more cost-efficient ways to take the 2000 Census by again making cost containment one of its goals for the 2000 Census. In its plans for the 1995 Test, the Bureau incorporated a number of new methods we discuss in this testimony that could achieve cost efficiencies.

In address list development, the results of the revised procedures used in the 1995 Test may show ways the Bureau could reduce the a costly element of the process--field canvassing to develop and check the list and maps. To develop its address list and maps for the 1990 Census, the Bureau employed a series of procedures, including field canvassing of almost every block in the country, to create or check the list. The procedures cost about $182 million. An automated geographic system that

supported the list by generating maps and helping to geographically locate addresses cost an additional $328 million to develop during the 1980s and was first used in the 1990 Decennial Census. In the 1995 TEST, the Bureau will be able to evaluate the extent to which its address list and maps, updated by the Postal Service's automated file and revised local review procedures, may reduce field canvassing and cost in future censuses.

Another example of an opportunity to reduce costs which we discuss is the early identification of housing units that are vacant or nonexistent. The Bureau's plan to have the Postal Service identify vacant and nonexistent housing units early in the enumeration process has the potential for significantly reducing the $317 million the Bureau spent in 1990 for such identification. The Bureau could maximize those savings by ascertaining the earliest point at which housing units are accurately classified as vacant or nonexistent. The Bureau estimated that it could have saved from $121 million to $165 million by using letter carriers to identify vacant and nonexistent units in the 1990 Census. The range is based on the extent of the Bureau's field canvassing to verify the Postal Service's classifications.

Sampling of nonrespondents also offers the opportunity for substantial savings. The Bureau estimated that under various

response rate and sampling configurations it could have saved between $429 and $457 million of the $560 million it spent on follow-up by sampling 30 percent of nonrespondents.

On the other hand, the ICM method could partially offset some of the potential savings that could be achieved by using other new methods discussed earlier. The amount of follow-up interviewing and clerical matching required by the Bureau's proposed methodology is unknown, but these procedures will have a major bearing on the cost of ICM and ultimately the cost of the 2000 Decennial Census. Because the Bureau currently plans to develop ICM estimates for each state, it anticipates that the sample size for its independent survey of census respondents will be several times the size of the sample used for the 1990 Post Enumeration Survey, which was 12,000 blocks. A statistical expert at the Bureau estimated that the sample size for ICM will have to be about 22,000 to 68,000 blocks, depending on the desired level of precision for the population estimate. Cost implications for this increase in sample size will depend on the degree of precision desired and the procedures used.

Decisions the Bureau makes on the basis of the results of the 1995 Test Census should significantly affect the overall cost of the 2000 Decennial Census. The Bureau plans to design an automated cost and progress system for the 1995 Test Census to capture measures of the actual cost of different census field and

processing operations. According to Bureau officials, the system will collect cost information on the effects the new methods, as well as other aspects of the 1995 Test Census such as printing and equipment.

In the past, the Bureau has had difficulties obtaining reliable cost information from its census operations. The Bureau's past cost accounting deficiencies could present similar difficulties for the 1995 Test. In our evaluation of prior Bureau planning activities, we said that the Bureau needed to place more emphasis on getting complete and accurate cost and productivity data for evaluation of its tests.[12] In our review of the 1990 Census, we found that even generally reliable information on the costs and benefits of important activities was extremely difficult to obtain. In many cases, because the Bureau's accounting structure allowed for commingling costs of dissimilar activities and because it lacked quality controls over the recording of those costs, the Bureau could not determine the cost of various activities.

CONCLUSION

In our testimony before this Subcommittee last October we said that the Bureau's changes in the methods it planned to test in

[12]See GAO/GGD-92-94.

the 1995 Test Census contained promising proposals. We are generally encouraged by the progress the Bureau has made in developing the specific methods to test for the five areas we examined for this testimony. It is important that the Bureau identifies the data needed from the test, collects complete and accurate cost information, and completes its evaluation so that the 1995 Test can provide policymakers the information that they need to make major decisions on the fundamental design of the 2000 Decennial Census.

- - - -

This concludes my prepared statement. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Related GAO Products

Bureau of the Census: Legislative Proposal to Share Address List Data Has Benefits and Risks (GAO/T-GGD-94-184, July 21, 1994).

Decennial Census: Promising Proposals, Some Progress, But Challenges Remain (GAO/GGD/T-94-80, Jan. 26, 1994).

Decennial Census: Test Design Proposals Are Promising, But Fundamental Reform Is Still at Risk (GAO/T-GGD-94-12, Oct. 7, 1993).

Decennial Census: Focused Action Needed Soon to Achieve Fundamental Breakthroughs (GAO/T-GGD-93-32, May 27, 1993).

Decennial Census: Fundamental Reform Jeopardized by Lack of Progress (GAO/T-GGD-93-6, Mar. 2, 1993).

Decennial Census: Opportunities for Fundamental Reform (GAO/T-GGD-92-51, June 10, 1992).

Decennial Census: 1990 Results Show Need for Fundamental Reform (GAO/GGD-92-94, June 9, 1992).

1990 Census: Limitations in Methods and Procedures to Include the Homeless (GAO/GGD-92-1, Dec. 30, 1991).

Expanding the Role of Local Governments: An Important Element of Census Reform (GAO/T-GGD-91-46, June 15, 1991.

Programs of the 1990 Decennial Census: Some Causes for Concern (GAO/T-GGD-90-44, May 21, 1990).

Critical Issues for Census Adjustment: Completing Post Enumeration Survey on Time While Protecting Data Quality (GAO/T-GGD-90-15, Jan. 30, 1990).

1990 Census: Comparison of Coverage Improvement Programs for 1980-1990 (GAO/GGD-90-8, Nov. 28, 1989).

Status of Census Bureau Plans and Preparations for the 1990 Census (GAO/T-GGD-87-6, Mar. 12, 1987).

The Census Bureau's 1984 Address List Compilation Test (Mar. 13, 1986).

A $4 Billion Census in 1990? Timely Decisions on Alternatives to the 1980 Procedures Can Save Millions (GAO/GGD-82-13, Feb. 22, 1982)

(243057)