Foreign Assistance
USAID Completed Many Caribbean Disaster Recovery Activities, but Several Challenges Hampered Efforts
Gao ID: GAO-06-645 May 26, 2006
In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne passed through the Caribbean, taking lives and causing widespread damage in several countries. After initial U.S. emergency relief, in October 2004 Congress appropriated $100 million in supplemental funding, primarily for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, which were significantly affected. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), leader of the U.S. recovery programs, agreed, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, to complete the programs by December 31, 2005, giving the agency a 1-year time frame. GAO was asked to (1) review the nature and status of the programs in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that affected the programs' progress; and (3) assess USAID's use of guidance and lessons learned from previous similar programs and efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
As of December 31, 2005, USAID had spent about 77 percent of funds allocated for assistance in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti and completed many disaster recovery activities, such as providing business and agriculture grants. However, the agency significantly reduced its targets for building and repairing houses, in part because of cost increases, and granted contractors extensions to complete some of these projects. Severe weather delayed the progress of recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti--for example, two hurricanes in the summer of 2005 disrupted Jamaican housing repairs. In addition, difficulty coordinating activities with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments hampered housing construction. Further, other construction-related challenges--for example, shortages of cement--delayed projects in Grenada and Jamaica. Finally, frequent security problems in Haiti hindered contractors' progress. USAID has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from previous recovery and reconstruction programs, such as ways to mitigate challenges commonly faced in rebuilding after disasters. USAID staff inexperienced with disaster recovery efforts said that this made it difficult to design and implement the programs. Further, in agreeing to complete the programs within 1 year, USAID faced challenges in designing a broad spectrum of activities that would help rebuild residents' lives and that could be sustained after the programs ended. In addition, the agency did not adopt recommendations from GAO and USAID reviews of past recovery programs that could have helped it more rapidly hire and transfer staff for the Caribbean programs. Although the agency contracted with a management firm to quickly staff its program in Grenada and Jamaica, this led to additional challenges, such as confusion about the management firm's roles and responsibilities in relation to USAID staff and other contractors. USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons learned from the programs in each country.
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GAO-06-645, Foreign Assistance: USAID Completed Many Caribbean Disaster Recovery Activities, but Several Challenges Hampered Efforts
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2006:
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:
USAID Completed Many Caribbean Disaster Recovery Activities, but
Several Challenges Hampered Efforts:
Foreign Assistance:
GAO-06-645:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-645, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne passed
through the Caribbean, taking lives and causing widespread damage in
several countries. After initial U.S. emergency relief, in October 2004
Congress appropriated $100 million in supplemental funding, primarily
for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, which were significantly affected. The
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), leader of the U.S.
recovery programs, agreed, in consultation with the Office of
Management and Budget, to complete the programs by December 31, 2005,
giving the agency a 1-year time frame. GAO was asked to (1) review the
nature and status of the programs in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of
December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that affected the programs‘
progress; and (3) assess USAID‘s use of guidance and lessons learned
from previous similar programs and efforts to draw lessons from the
current programs.
What GAO Found:
As of December 31, 2005, USAID had spent about 77 percent of funds
allocated for assistance in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti and completed
many disaster recovery activities, such as providing business and
agriculture grants. However, the agency significantly reduced its
targets for building and repairing houses, in part because of cost
increases, and granted contractors extensions to complete some of these
projects.
Severe weather delayed the progress of recovery activities in Jamaica
and Haiti”for example, two hurricanes in the summer of 2005 disrupted
Jamaican housing repairs. In addition, difficulty coordinating
activities with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments hampered housing
construction. Further, other construction-related challenges”for
example, shortages of cement”delayed projects in Grenada and Jamaica.
Finally, frequent security problems in Haiti hindered contractors‘
progress.
USAID has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from
previous recovery and reconstruction programs, such as ways to mitigate
challenges commonly faced in rebuilding after disasters. USAID staff
inexperienced with disaster recovery efforts said that this made it
difficult to design and implement the programs. Further, in agreeing to
complete the programs within 1 year, USAID faced challenges in
designing a broad spectrum of activities that would help rebuild
residents‘ lives and that could be sustained after the programs ended.
In addition, the agency did not adopt recommendations from GAO and
USAID reviews of past recovery programs that could have helped it more
rapidly hire and transfer staff for the Caribbean programs. Although
the agency contracted with a management firm to quickly staff its
program in Grenada and Jamaica, this led to additional challenges, such
as confusion about the management firm‘s roles and responsibilities in
relation to USAID staff and other contractors. USAID staff and
contractors are recording lessons learned from the programs in each
country.
Figure: New Housing Construction in Jamaica (left) and Grenada:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator (1) develop disaster
recovery and reconstruction guidance that incorporates lessons learned
from the current and previous programs and (2) revise staffing
procedures to facilitate the rapid reassignment or hiring of needed
personnel for postdisaster recovery and reconstruction programs. USAID
agreed with our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202)
512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
USAID Completed Numerous Recovery Efforts within 1 Year but Granted
Extensions for Many Construction Projects:
Various Factors Slowed USAID's Implementation and Completion of Program
Activities:
Lack of Formal Program Guidance, Time Frame, and Staffing Issues
Contributed to Implementation Problems:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned from USAID Disaster Recovery
and Reconstruction Efforts:
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: USAID Key Nonconstruction-Related Recovery Activities in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
Table 2: USAID Key Construction-Related Recovery Activities in Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
Table 3: Number and Types of Activities at Project Sites GAO Visited in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti:
Figures:
Figure 1: Areas and Extent of Hurricane Damage in Grenada, Jamaica, and
Haiti:
Figure 2: Recovery and Reconstruction Allocations by Country:
Figure 3: USAID Allocation and Expenditure for Disaster Recovery
Assistance for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
Figure 4: USAID-Supported Drainage Canal Cleanup in Haiti:
Figure 5: USAID-Funded School Repair in Grenada:
Abbreviations:
Hurricane Ivan Program: Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation
Program:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
ONR: Office of National Reconstruction, Jamaica:
RIG: Regional Inspector General:
Tropical Storm Program: Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 26, 2006:
The Honorable Jim Kolbe:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan struck several Caribbean islands,
including Grenada and Jamaica, where it killed 59 people and inflicted
damage of about $1.4 billion. In the same month, Tropical Storm Jeanne
struck parts of Haiti with heavy rains, causing flash floods that
killed more than 2,000 people, affected an estimated 300,000 others
through loss of homes, schools, and livelihoods, and caused an
estimated $300 million in damage. The United States and other
donors[Footnote 1] responded initially to these disasters by providing
emergency relief, such as food, water, medical supplies, and temporary
shelter. In October 2004, recognizing the need for longer-term recovery
and reconstruction assistance, Congress passed a supplemental
appropriation allocating $100 million for additional hurricane recovery
efforts in the Caribbean.[Footnote 2] The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), designated to lead the U.S.-funded assistance,
initiated the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation Program
(Hurricane Ivan Program) in Grenada and Jamaica and the Tropical Storm
Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical Storm Program) in Haiti in January
2005.[Footnote 3] Following discussions with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), USAID agreed to complete the programs by December 31,
2005--that is, within 1 year of initiating the programs; this time
frame is shorter than for previous USAID disaster recovery and
reconstruction programs, such as USAID's program in Central America
following Hurricane Mitch. In addition, instead of transferring or
directly hiring staff, as it has done in the past, USAID hired a
management firm, Wingerts Consulting, to quickly staff and establish
the programs in Grenada and Jamaica.
Having previously examined U.S. efforts to provide disaster recovery
assistance,[Footnote 4] we were asked to monitor USAID's delivery of
the assistance in the Caribbean. In this report, we (1) review the
recovery and reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti,
including the status of the activities as of December 31, 2005; (2)
identify factors that affected USAID's ability to implement and
complete the programs within the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess
USAID's use of guidance and application of lessons learned from similar
previous programs and its efforts to draw lessons from the current
programs.
To address these matters, we reviewed USAID's objectives and oversight
strategy for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs. We made
several trips to Grenada and Jamaica and one trip to Haiti.[Footnote 5]
In all three countries, we reviewed program documents and interviewed
USAID staff, private contractors, and host government officials. We
visited 80 project sites, most of them randomly selected, in Jamaica
and Grenada as well as nine project sites in Haiti that were not
randomly selected. We also analyzed program expenditure and activity
data, having assessed the data's reliability and finding it sufficient
for our purposes. We conducted our work from March 2005 through May
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (See app. I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology).
Results in Brief:
USAID completed many of the activities that it implemented in Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti within the 1-year time frame, but the agency
required additional time to finalize many construction-related
projects. Of the $92.4 million allocated for recovery and
reconstruction in the three countries, USAID expended $71.3 million, or
about 77 percent. In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID completed a range of
non-construction-related recovery activities, including providing
business and agriculture recovery grants, technical assistance to
farmers, and grants to fisherfolk or artisans. In Haiti, USAID's
completed nonconstruction activities included restoring irrigated
farmland and hillsides, removing mud from streets and canals, and
issuing household support grants. USAID also initiated construction-
related projects, including repairing houses and public facilities and
building new homes in Grenada and Jamaica and repairing homes, public
facilities, and infrastructure in Haiti. However, in part because of
increases in the cost of materials and labor, USAID lowered initial
targets for many of these projects--for example, reducing new housing
targets in Grenada from 150 to 55, house repair targets in Jamaica from
3,450 to 932, and house repair targets in Haiti from 3,000 to 600.
However, USAID contractors did not achieve the adjusted targets for 11
of the 14 construction activities. In November 2005, USAID granted the
contractors in Grenada and Jamaica a 6-month extension to complete
approximately 240 new houses and finish other construction activities.
In September 2005, contractors in Haiti received an 18-month extension
to complete housing and infrastructure repairs but expected to finish
these projects by June 2006.[Footnote 6]
Several factors hampered USAID's ability to implement and complete
program activities within the 1-year time frame. First, periods of
severe weather delayed construction and some agriculture activities in
Jamaica as well as some construction projects in Haiti. Second,
coordination challenges in Grenada and Jamaica negatively affected
USAID's implementation and completion of construction projects. For
example, the Grenadian government lacked a central agency to identify
needs and coordinate hurricane recovery efforts, and Jamaica's Office
of National Reconstruction did not complete certain construction
activities it had agreed to, delaying USAID's completion of new houses.
Third, construction-related challenges, including difficulty in
identifying housing recipients who could demonstrate land ownership,
delayed construction activities in the three countries. Finally,
according to USAID officials, ongoing security challenges disrupted the
work in Haiti, leading, for example, to the temporary evacuation of
some USAID staff during the summer of 2005.
USAID staff reported that a lack of guidance incorporating lessons
learned from previous USAID recovery and reconstruction programs led to
design and implementation challenges; further, the agency did not adopt
prior recommendations regarding time frames and staffing, resulting in
additional problems. Although USAID has managed several recovery and
reconstruction programs since 1999, it has not issued guidance that
incorporates lessons learned from designing and implementing such
programs. For example, if USAID officials had had access to lessons
learned regarding likely increases in postdisaster demand for
construction materials and labor, it might have helped them to
establish more realistic targets for activities to be achieved within a
1-year time frame. Staff who designed the activities told us that they
applied some lessons from prior reconstruction programs--for example,
hiring monitoring firms to assist with technical and financial
oversight of program activities. However, in agreeing to complete
activities by December 31, 2005, USAID did not take into account
lessons learned regarding implementation time frames. It also faced
trade-offs in trying to complete a broad spectrum of activities within
1 year while ensuring that activities had the intended impact of
helping beneficiaries find jobs in the postdisaster environment and
could be sustained by host government staff after the programs were
completed. For instance, to finish activities within the 1-year time
frame, USAID contractors in Grenada designed job skills training to
last 6 weeks, but participants later reported that the training had
been too brief to develop some skills, such as those needed for
construction work. The contractors told us that a longer time frame
would have allowed them to assess and adjust the training to make it
more sustainable. In addition, at the time of our review, the agency
had not adopted prior GAO and USAID recommendations for revising agency
procedures to quickly hire or reassign staff with technical skills to
manage disaster recovery activities. In order to quickly staff its
program in Grenada, which has no USAID mission, the agency hired a
management and oversight firm to manage program activities. However,
USAID staff and contractors told us that the use of this firm led to
several implementation problems, such as confusion about roles and
responsibilities and redundant layers of oversight. USAID staff and
contractors in all three countries are recording lessons learned that
could be valuable in future efforts.
We are recommending that, to better facilitate the design and
implementation of USAID's disaster recovery and reconstruction programs
and address ongoing staffing issues, the USAID Administrator develop
guidance that incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan,
Tropical Storm Jeanne, and other USAID recovery and reconstruction
programs and revise staffing procedures to facilitate the rapid
reassignment or hiring of needed personnel for longer-term recovery
programs. We provided a draft of this report to USAID, the Department
of State, and OMB. We received a formal comment letter from USAID (see
app. III), in which they agreed with our recommendations. USAID and OMB
provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. The
Department of State provided no comments.
Background:
In September 2004, four major hurricanes and storms, including Ivan and
Jeanne, caused extensive damage in the Caribbean, particularly in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti. Figure 1 shows the paths of Hurricane Ivan
and Tropical Storm Jeanne and describes the extent of damage in the
three countries.
Figure 1: Areas and Extent of Hurricane Damage in Grenada, Jamaica, and
Haiti:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Note: Map is not drawn to scale.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Emergency Relief and Immediate Recovery Assistance:
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided emergency
relief, such as food, water and sanitation, and shelter, to address the
urgent needs of those affected by the storms. Following OFDA's relief
efforts in response to Hurricane Ivan, USAID directed existing agency
funding to Grenada and Jamaica--$3.2 million and $7.3 million,
respectively--for immediate recovery activities, including clearing
farmland, cleaning up communities, and repairing houses and schools,
that were carried out through June 30, 2005. Soon after Tropical Storm
Jeanne struck Haiti, the U.S. government provided $11.8 million for
immediate emergency relief and recovery assistance, including emergency
food and water, as well as for cleaning up communities.
U.S. Recovery and Reconstruction Assistance:
Of the $100 million supplemental assistance that Congress approved for
hurricane recovery and reconstruction activities in the Caribbean,
USAID allocated $92.4 million to Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti.[Footnote
7] Figure 2 shows the amount and percentage allocated to each country.
Figure 2: Recovery and Reconstruction Allocations by Country:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Dollar amounts do not add due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Lacking a mission in Grenada, the agency administered the Hurricane
Ivan Program from its Jamaica mission and Barbados satellite office,
and it administered the Tropical Storm Program from its Haiti mission.
Using a new approach to its program staffing, rather than reassign
USAID staff or hire personal services contractors,[Footnote 8] the
agency hired Wingerts Consulting to manage and oversee project
activities in Grenada and Jamaica. Wingerts's responsibilities included
monitoring program activities, reporting progress to the USAID mission
in Jamaica, and coordinating USAID's efforts with the Grenadian and
Jamaican governments and with other donors.
USAID created special objectives for each country that defined the
target areas for the recovery and reconstruction funding. For Grenada
and Jamaica, the supplemental funding expanded the initial emergency,
or a short-term response and aimed to help people quickly rebuild their
communities, enhance and improve their skills, provide limited income
support, and resume their path of sustainable development through
activities that provide immediate income, skills training and
employment opportunities. In Haiti, supplemental funds aimed to meet
the immediate needs of Haitians affected by the tropical storm, help
them regain sources of economic activity, and help them prepare for
future natural disaster threats. According to USAID, recovery and
reconstruction programs are essentially development programs with short
time frames but share the same objectives of sustainable growth and
prosperity.
USAID Completed Numerous Recovery Efforts within 1 Year but Granted
Extensions for Many Construction Projects:
USAID completed many activities it implemented in Grenada, Jamaica, and
Haiti by December 31, 2005. Of the $92.4 million allocated for recovery
and reconstruction across the three countries, the agency expended
$71.3 million. The agency implemented a variety of non-construction-
related activities--for example, providing business rehabilitation
grants in Grenada and Jamaica and implementing community cleanup
activities in Haiti--and met or exceeded its targets for these projects
within the 1-year time frame. In addition, it implemented a number of
construction-related projects, such as repair and building housing and
infrastructure. However, although USAID reduced targets, in part
because of cost increases for these projects in all three countries,
USAID contractors did not complete many of them by December 31, 2005--
in particular, new housing construction--and required extensions to
finish these projects.
USAID Expended Majority of Recovery Funds within 1 Year:
As of December 31, 2005, USAID had expended approximately 77 percent of
the $92.4 million that it allocated for recovery efforts in the three
countries. Figure 3 shows program allocation and expenditure by
country.
Figure 3: USAID Allocation and Expenditure for Disaster Recovery
Assistance for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
USAID Implemented Various Nonconstruction Recovery Activities:
USAID implemented a variety of non-construction-related activities to
help hurricane and storm survivors in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti
recover from the disasters, completing most of them within the 1-year
time frame. USAID generally reached or exceeded its targets for
nonconstruction recovery activities, despite having raised many of
these targets after initiating the activities. We visited a total of 37
non-construction-related sites to observe USAID's progress and
interview beneficiaries. Table 1 shows a selection of USAID's initial
and revised nonconstruction targets and its completed activities, in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of December 31, 2005.
Table 1: USAID Key Nonconstruction-Related Recovery Activities in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: People trained in
tourism, construction, and other skills:
Initial targets (January 2005): 1,600[A];
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 1,800;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 2,402;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: Grants for small and
medium- size enterprises:
Initial targets (January 2005): 200;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 200;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 192;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: Grants and technical
assistance for farmers:
Initial targets (January 2005): 450;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 1,327;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 1,427;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: Grants and technical
assistance for fisherfolk:
Initial targets (January 2005): 35;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 155;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 100;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: Government supported
operations (dollars in millions):
Initial targets (January 2005): $8;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): $8;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): $8;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Grenada: Primary schools
resupplied and re- equipped:
Initial targets (January 2005): 18;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 21;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 24.
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Jamaica: Grants to small and
medium-size enterprises[B];
Initial targets (January 2005): 2,500;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 2,451;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 11,478;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Jamaica: Technical assistance
for farmers;
Initial targets (January 2005): 2,300;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 2,447;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 2,479;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Jamaica: Grants for
fisherfolk;
Initial targets (January 2005): 1,500;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 2,700;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 2,855;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Jamaica: Grants for artisans;
Initial targets (January 2005): 100;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): `00;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 120;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Jamaica: Primary schools and
colleges resupplied and re-equipped;
Initial targets (January 2005): 219;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 52;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 56;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Irrigated land
restored to full production;
Initial targets (January 2005): 5,600 acres;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 6,474 acres;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 19;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Land protected with
conservation methods;
Initial targets (January 2005): 4,960 acres;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 4,960 acres;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 4,975 acres;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Communities trained
in watershed management;
Initial targets (January 2005): 16;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 16;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 5,264 acres;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Water associations
trained in watershed management;
Initial targets (January 2005): 61;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 51;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 0;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Mud removed from
urban streets and canals;
Initial targets (January 2005): 48,000 m[3];
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 48,000 m[3];
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 69,734 m[3];
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Asset restoration
grants;
Initial targets (January 2005): 3,000;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 3,000;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 3,023;
Key nonconstruction recovery activities: Haiti[C]: Communities trained
in disaster preparedness and mitigation;
Initial targets (January 2005): 27;
Revised targets (as of December 2005): 21;
Completed activities (as of December 31, 2005): 21.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Notes: The table shows USAID's primary nonconstruction-related recovery
activities in the three countries; the agency conducted other
nonconstruction-related activities that are not shown.
[A] Initial target reflects tourism and construction skills only; other
skills were added later in the program and are reflected in the revised
target number.
[B] Grants to small and medium-size enterprises included assistance to
business owners and farmers.
[C] Initial targets for Haiti according to USAID's February 2005
Tropical Storm Recovery Program report.
[End of table]
In all three countries, USAID provided assistance to revitalize
businesses and agriculture. In addition, in Haiti, USAID also helped
communities clear:
away flood debris and take steps to prevent similar disasters in the
future. Following are descriptions of several USAID nonconstruction
activities in the three countries:
* In Grenada, USAID provided grants averaging about $6,300 to small
businesses (those with 5 to 24 employees) and grants averaging about
$15,000 to medium-sized businesses (those with 25 to 75 employees) to
reimburse them for hurricane-related repairs. We visited five grant
recipients, each of whom reported using the grants to pay for repairs
or purchase equipment. According to a survey conducted by the
contractors that implemented these grants, about half of the businesses
receiving assistance estimated that they reopened at least 6 months
sooner than if they had had to finance the repairs themselves.
Fisherfolk received grants averaging about $1,900 to replace fishing
gear and equipment and repair boats. Many of the farmers and fisherfolk
also received technical assistance--for example, farmers were taught
techniques for turning backyard yam production into commercial
production.
* In Jamaica, USAID grants to poultry farmers allowed them to buy egg
grading and cold storage equipment, which in turn will enable them to
increase production and incomes. We visited six horticultural farmers
who received grants from USAID consisting of a technology package, such
as seedling nurseries, drip irrigation systems, or integrated pest
management systems. According to USAID staff, they were able to provide
an unexpectedly large number of grants (11,478 versus the revised
target of 2,451) to small and medium-size enterprises because the
implementing team decided to make several grants to individual
beneficiaries as an incentive for beneficiaries to continue to adopt
various new technologies and practices. According to a November 2005
USAID report, agricultural production for farmers who received grant
and technical assistance through the program was estimated to have
increased by 41 percent compared with pre-Hurricane Ivan production
levels. USAID also conducted workshops that taught artisans how to
improve and develop products, procure goods and services, and package
and label their merchandise. In addition, fisherfolk in Jamaica
received grants and disaster preparedness training. For example,
training courses in "Safe Seamanship and Environmental Management" were
delivered to 295 fisherfolk.
* In Haiti, USAID cleared streets of mud and improved urban drainage
that had been damaged from flooding. In addition, USAID implemented a
cash-for-work program that paid local workers about $2 per day for
assisting with various activities throughout the program, including
road and schools repair, mud removal, and clearing of urban drains (see
fig. 4). Further, USAID funded training in disaster preparedness and
response that, according to a report by a USAID contractor, aimed to
"raise disaster awareness, reduce risks, and prepare for contingencies
in vulnerable local communities and municipalities." Among the topics
covered were forming community emergency response teams, designating
first responders to coordinate emergency activities, and developing
risk management and mitigation plans.
Figure 4: USAID-Supported Drainage Canal Cleanup in Haiti:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
USAID Began Many Construction-Related Projects but Did Not Complete
All:
USAID initiated construction-related projects to repair or replace
hurricane and storm-damaged structures in each of the three countries.
However, USAID contractors did not complete a number of these projects,
although USAID reduced its targets for many of the projects. According
to USAID staff and contractors, rising costs in all three countries
were a factor in USAID's decision to reduce construction targets.
According to an April 2006 Regional Inspector General (RIG) audit of
the Hurricane Ivan Program,[Footnote 9] the high cost of housing
construction was due, in part, to the contractor's unfamiliarity with
the local market, which led to the negotiation of unfavorable
subcontracts. The report also indicated that the cost of houses
financed by USAID in Grenada was 37 percent to 49 percent higher than
comparable houses built by the Grenadian Housing Authority; and, in
Jamaica, USAID-funded houses were more than double the cost of houses
built by the Jamaican government. In addition, in Haiti, USAID staff
indicated that a detailed needs survey found that the costs of material
and labor needed to make repairs had more than doubled since the
initial estimates. Table 2 shows a selection of USAID's initial and
revised construction targets and its completed activities, in Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti as of December 31, 2005.
Table 2: USAID Key Construction-Related Recovery Activities in Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: The table shows USAID's primary construction-related recovery
activities in the three countries; the agency conducted other
construction-related activities that are not shown.
[End of table]
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID negotiated 6-month extensions of the
bilateral agreements with the respective host governments in December
2005 and, subsequently, granted contractors extensions of varying
lengths based on the expectation that they could complete activities by
June 30, 2006. In Haiti, USAID granted the contractor an 18-month
extension in September 2005 to complete major infrastructure repair on
a road and bridge; however, USAID officials managing the program said
they expected to complete these activities by June 2006.[Footnote 10]
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID's construction efforts have focused
primarily on repairing and rebuilding houses and building new homes,
and in Haiti, on repairing infrastructure, public facilities, and
houses. Following are descriptions of several of USAID's construction-
related projects.
* In Grenada, USAID is building 55 new houses on the sites of homes
that had been destroyed by the hurricane. The new houses consist of
lumber over a concrete slab and include septic systems and electrical
connections. Of the 55 homes, 36 have an area of 400 square feet and 19
have an area of 650 square feet, with the size of the house depending
on the size of the household. We visited 11 housing construction sites
in August 2005 and revisited five of them in December, at which time,
for the most part, construction was just beginning. In addition, USAID
has initiated repairs of houses, tourist sites, and schools, among
other buildings (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: USAID-Funded School Repair in Grenada:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* In Jamaica, USAID is constructing 220-square-foot concrete-block
houses in two sites provided by the Jamaican government. The Jamaican
Office of National Reconstruction agreed to provide septic systems and
electrical connections for the houses. Most of the beneficiaries are
families whose houses were destroyed by the hurricane because they were
close to the shore; the new housing sites are near the old sites but a
safe distance from the shoreline. We visited the two sites in the early
stages of construction and several months later, after construction had
begun. As of January 2006, construction was well under way in the two
communities, but none of the houses were complete.
* In Haiti, USAID funded the construction of a bridge and the repair of
a national road that runs from Gonaives to Cap-Haitien. According to
USAID's contractor implementing infrastructure activities, repairs to
the road will have a significant impact on the local economy by
restoring farm-to-market transportation and supporting USAID's other
rehabilitation projects in the area. According to USAID staff, as of
December 2005, 60 percent to 70 percent of the road was completed.
Various Factors Slowed USAID's Implementation and Completion of Program
Activities:
USAID's implementation and completion of recovery activities in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti within the 1-year time frame were hampered
by several factors. Severe weather in 2005 delayed the progress of some
activities, in particular the reconstruction of houses in Jamaica and
infrastructure in Haiti. Coordination challenges in Grenada and Jamaica
contributed to delays in the implementation and completion of program
activities. In addition, USAID contractors encountered various
construction-related challenges, such as shortages of materials and
labor, and difficulty in fulfilling USAID requirements. Haiti faced
continued security challenges that limited access to recovery sites,
consequently delaying progress.
Severe Weather Delayed Program Activities in Jamaica and Haiti:
Hurricanes and heavy rains in 2005 affected the progress of USAID
reconstruction and recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti. In
Jamaica, two hurricanes during the summer of 2005, as well as heavy
rain in October and November, contributed to delays in housing
reconstruction and some agriculture activities, including the training
of farmers. In Haiti, a heavier than usual rainy season delayed some
USAID construction activities. Some structures that protected ongoing
work on riverbank repair and irrigation pumps were washed away, and
protective dikes had to be rebuilt. The heavy rain also damaged roads
in many of the project areas, making it difficult to transport
construction materials and field staff.
Coordination Challenges Hindered USAID's Implementation and Completion
of Activities in Grenada and Jamaica:
USAID faced several coordination challenges in Grenada, owing in part
to the agency's lack of a permanent presence in the country, which
affected its ability to implement recovery activities. In Jamaica,
USAID encountered challenges in coordinating with the government, which
negatively affected its ability to complete new housing.
* Coordination challenges in Grenada. Grenada lacked a central
coordinating agency immediately following the hurricane to facilitate
disaster recovery within the country. Because USAID has no mission in
Grenada, staff and contractors had to work with various government
ministries to initiate the recovery process. To address the lack of a
central agency, USAID and other donors provided funds to help Grenada
establish the Agency for Reconstruction and Development to coordinate
donor hurricane recovery efforts; however, establishing the agency took
several months, contributing to delays in certain activities, such as
developing criteria for, and identifying, beneficiaries to receive
housing repairs and reconstruction.
* Coordination challenges in Jamaica. The government of Jamaica did not
complete certain construction activities as agreed with USAID, delaying
USAID's completion of new houses. Jamaica's Office of National
Reconstruction (ONR), established by the government to coordinate
Hurricane Ivan recovery activities, verbally agreed to provide, by
December 31, 2005, concrete bases and install water, roads, and
drainage infrastructure at the two sites selected for new USAID housing
construction. However, USAID did not sign a memorandum of agreement
with the Jamaican government that clearly designated the construction
responsibilities of each party and deadlines for completion.[Footnote
11] According to USAID officials and our observations during site
visits, ONR made slow progress in fulfilling its part of construction
activities and as of January 2006 had not installed electricity and
septic systems, although USAID's construction of many houses was close
to completion. As of March 2006, ONR had not completed the construction
activities that it had agreed with USAID to complete by December 31,
2005.
Construction-Related Challenges Led to Delays in Grenada, Jamaica, and
Haiti:
USAID contractors encountered several challenges that slowed the
agency's implementation and completion of construction projects in all
three countries. These challenges included shortages of materials,
USAID's policies regarding land titles and bank guarantees, and
difficulties working with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and
subcontractors.
* Materials shortages. In Grenada, disruptions following the hurricane,
as well as the island's relatively remote location, led to shortages of
construction materials that periodically delayed housing repairs and
new housing construction. According to USAID, obtaining building
materials in Grenada became more challenging following Hurricane Emily
in 2005. In Jamaica, according to USAID, increased duties on imported
cement, heavy rains that soaked the cement quarries, and a labor strike
that occurred in the country's only cement factory led to shortages
that delayed housing repairs and construction. As of March 2006, USAID
reported that construction in Jamaica continued to be slowed by a
shortage of cement because the production site that supplies the region
shut down after producing low-quality cement.
* Difficulty in establishing land titles. In Grenada, difficulties in
establishing land title or ownership caused construction delays. A
USAID housing contractor in Grenada told us that although it originally
identified 400 to 500 prospective beneficiaries who met selection
criteria established by the Grenadian government, many of these people
lacked the land titles or proof of ownership, which USAID required of
new-housing beneficiaries.[Footnote 12] Because the process of
verifying ownership was so time consuming, the contractor eventually
ran advertisements soliciting respondents who met the selection
criteria and had proof of land ownership.
* Delays in obtaining bank guarantees. In Haiti, delays encountered by
contractors seeking bank guarantees contributed to implementation
delays of some construction projects. USAID staff in Haiti explained
that the agency requires construction contractors to provide a bank
guarantee in order to receive advance disbursements to buy materials
and pay for labor, which USAID officials said is common commercial
practice. However, Haiti's economic situation made it difficult for
local contractors to obtain bank guarantees, even when the contractors
were reputable and had a valid contract with an international
organization. Because contractors could not begin work without the
guarantees, some construction activities were delayed. For example,
according to USAID officials, one highway construction contractor lost
a month and a half of work time and another contractor lost 2 months
while obtaining bank guarantees.
* NGO-related and subcontractor challenges. In Grenada, contractors
encountered challenges in working with local NGOs and subcontractors.
The implementing contractor in Grenada relied on NGOs to help identify
people who met government criteria to receive housing support. However,
according to the contractor, the NGOs had difficulty quickly selecting
beneficiaries and, as a result, housing construction was delayed. In
Jamaica, USAID worked with NGOs to perform housing repairs. According
to USAID staff, it was difficult to attract NGOs that could fulfill the
agency's documentation and reporting requirements in order to receive
grants for the housing repairs. In addition, according to an April 2006
RIG report, the sole subcontractor hired to build houses performed
poorly, which also contributed to construction delays.
Security Problems Disrupted Program Activities in Haiti:
In Haiti, kidnappings and continued violence in areas affected by the
tropical storm presented security challenges that disrupted USAID's
recovery work. According to USAID officials, most security issues that
delayed program activities occurred in Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince,
where frequent kidnappings and violence made the port zone extremely
dangerous. In addition, attacks on port officials prompted them to
strike for better security, and sometimes delayed distribution of
materials. USAID officials told us that the lack of security required
USAID's contractors to take precautionary measures, such as daily
monitoring of the security situation, and invest additional resources
to protect staff and activity sites before undertaking activities. In
addition, security concerns led to the temporary evacuation of most
direct-hire USAID staff from Haiti during the summer of 2005. Security
concerns also limited USAID staff's and contractors' access to project
sites and ability to provide assistance in certain areas. For example,
U.S. embassy security policies required special approval for travel to
Gonaives--one of the areas most affected by the tropical storm and a
target for USAID assistance--because of continued violence there.
Lack of Formal Program Guidance, Time Frame, and Staffing Issues
Contributed to Implementation Problems:
USAID has not issued recovery and reconstruction program guidance that
incorporates lessons learned from previous programs; as a result, USAID
staff were challenged to find information to guide the design and
implementation of the Hurricane Ivan Program, leading to an ad hoc
design process and implementation delays. In addition, although it
applied some lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch and other past
programs, USAID did not apply lessons and recommendations regarding
time frames and staffing, and as a result, USAID staff tasked with
managing the Caribbean disaster recovery programs faced challenges
similar to those encountered in prior programs. USAID staff and
contractors stated that they are currently recording lessons learned
from the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs.
Lack of Guidance That Includes Lessons Learned Contributed to Program
Design and Implementation Challenges:
Although USAID has managed several large disaster recovery and
reconstruction programs since 1999,[Footnote 13] USAID has not provided
guidance specific to these programs that includes lessons learned from
previous programs. USAID has issued guidance for OFDA emergency
assistance[Footnote 14] that serves as a reference both for OFDA staff
and for the private and public organizations that work with OFDA in
providing emergency assistance. However, this guidance does not address
the design and implementation of the recovery and reconstruction
activities that USAID provides following OFDA's emergency response. In
addition, the agency has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons
learned from designing and implementing its prior recovery and
reconstruction programs. For example, for our 2002 report on USAID's
assistance after Hurricanes Mitch and Georges,[Footnote 15] USAID staff
and other federal agencies involved in the recovery efforts in Latin
America provided us with some lessons learned and ideas for improving
the delivery of future disaster recovery assistance, such as the need
to establish accountability mechanisms as part of program design, hire
firms to provide technical oversight, and develop fixed-amount
reimbursable contracts. Although USAID recorded some lessons learned
from its Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery program, this document,
unlike its OFDA guidance, has remained in draft form since 2002, has
not been formally issued or approved by the agency, and may not be
readily available to all staff.[Footnote 16]
USAID staff assigned to manage the Hurricane Ivan Program, who did not
have prior experience in managing recovery and reconstruction
activities, reported that the lack of guidance and access to lessons
learned created challenges in planning and managing a wide range of
activities. According to USAID staff designing the Hurricane Ivan
Program, the lack of ready access to lessons learned from previous
recovery and reconstruction programs resulted in an ad hoc approach to
planning recovery activities. USAID headquarters officials told us that
no formal agency guidance was available to assist them in planning the
recovery effort; consequently, they had to search for documents and
contact staff involved in previous USAID disaster recovery efforts to
understand how previous programs were implemented.
Officials at USAID headquarters told us that some program planning
during disaster recovery situations is by necessity country specific
and based on the political, economic, and disaster situation in the
affected country. However, a USAID official stated that operational
guidance would have facilitated the design process and that ready
access to lessons learned could have prevented some mistakes. For
example, if USAID officials had had access to lessons learned regarding
likely increases in postdisaster demand for construction materials and
labor, it might have helped them to establish more realistic targets
for activities to be achieved within a 1-year time frame. With regard
to construction and repair, important lessons from prior USAID disaster
recovery programs include the need to account for the difficulties
involved with hiring and supervising contractors unfamiliar with USAID
requirements, selecting beneficiaries and verifying land titles.
USAID Applied Some Lessons from Previous Disaster Programs but Did Not
Follow Prior Recommendations on Time Frame and Staffing:
In designing and implementing recovery efforts in Grenada, Jamaica, and
Haiti, USAID applied some lessons from previous disaster recovery
programs. However, the agency did not apply lessons and recommendations
regarding time frames and staffing for recovery programs. As a result,
USAID staff tasked with managing the Caribbean disaster recovery
programs faced challenges that could have been avoided if they had had
access to lessons learned from prior programs; in addition, staffing
issues remain unaddressed.
USAID Applied Some Lessons Learned from Previous Programs:
Despite lacking ready access to lessons learned, USAID headquarters
officials that designed the recovery programs gained access to draft
documents that they said allowed them to apply some lessons learned
from USAID's Hurricane Mitch recovery program. For instance, referring
to lessons regarding accountability and sustainability, officials
involved the Regional Inspector General to ensure that appropriate
accountability mechanisms were in place and incorporated the concept of
"build back better," such as rebuilding hurricane-affected
infrastructure to better withstand future natural disasters. According
to USAID, the team implementing business, agriculture, and training
activities in Jamaica followed lessons learned from Hurricane Mitch
regarding hiring contractors with proven track records. USAID staff in
Haiti also reported that some lessons learned from the Hurricane
Georges recovery program, which included projects in Haiti, had been
incorporated into their program's design, including:
* simplifying the task order approval process for hiring contractors,
* working with community-based organizations to implement recovery
activities, and:
* hiring monitoring firms to assist with technical and financial
oversight of program activities.
One-Year Time Frame May Have Limited Impact and Sustainability of Some
Activities and Conflicted with Prior Lessons Learned:
In agreeing to a 1-year time frame for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical
Storm Programs, USAID may have limited the impact and sustainability of
some activities and did not take into account lessons learned from the
Hurricanes Mitch and Georges effort. According to OMB officials
responsible for foreign affairs programs, the 1-year time frame was
developed to speed its completion of recovery activities relative to
previous USAID disaster recovery efforts and, in response to concerns
expressed by members of Congress that these emergency supplemental
resources be expended in a timely manner, to assist with recovery
efforts and not divert funds to regular long term development
programs.[Footnote 17] However, our recent interviews with USAID staff
and contractors, as well as previous GAO work, suggests that in
agreeing to the December 31, 2005, deadline, USAID faced a trade-off in
trying to complete a broad spectrum of activities within the 1-year
time frame and ensure that activities supported through these programs
have the intended impact in helping beneficiaries recover, rebuild, and
find jobs in the postdisaster environment and can be sustained by host
government staff after the programs end.
* In Grenada, USAID provided training in various trades and also paid
participants a stipend while they attended 6-week courses. However, in
a later evaluation of this program component, the contractors
conducting the training reported that participants had commented that 6
weeks was too short to fully develop some skills, such as those needed
for construction; however, because the contractor did not assess the
training until the end of the 1-year time frame, they were unable to
modify the training design. The contractor reported that a longer
program time frame, such as 18 months, would have allowed them to
assess the training's results--for instance, by tracking the number of
people that found jobs after being trained--and adjust the design to
increase its impact. The contractors also found that the time frame
limited their ability to assess the results of training in hotel
services, because many of the islands' hotels were still closed for
repair during the year that training was provided. We interviewed 19
persons who participated in USAID's skills training in Grenada and
found that fewer than half were employed 3 to 6 months after completing
it.[Footnote 18]
* In Haiti, USAID officials said that although they tried to select
projects that fit the needs of affected areas, the 1-year time frame
had implications for the sustainability of some program activities. For
example, the officials explained that their activities included
hillside stabilization and the development of an early warning system
to be transferred to the government of Haiti at the program's
conclusion. However, the USAID officials said that 1 year was not
enough time to implement and test some activities, and train government
staff to take them over. USAID officials said that 2 years would have
been a more reasonable time frame.
Our prior assessments of the agency's Hurricane Mitch recovery program
highlighted some of the trade-offs in trying to design activities that
are sustainable and can be completed within a short time frame. In our
2002 assessment of USAID's administration of disaster recovery
assistance after Hurricanes Mitch and Georges,[Footnote 19] we
reported, based on responses from USAID staff and other agencies
involved in providing the assistance, that "the December 31, 2001,
deadline was a major factor in how they planned, designed, and
implemented their disaster recovery activities, and it also affected
the extent to which sustainability could be built into the program."
For example, one agency involved in the Mitch recovery reported that
the deadline limited project sustainability because it did not allow
enough time to complete training for local entities. Another agency
said future projects should have follow-on activities to assess the
implementation of technical guidance and training provided. USAID
officials in the Dominican Republic acknowledged that they selected
some activities because they knew they could complete them by the
program deadline, despite recognizing that other activities might have
achieved greater sustainability.
USAID Did Not Implement Some Prior Staffing Recommendations and
Encountered Challenges Related to Use of Management Firm:
USAID did not adopt several prior recommendations that could have
helped it to more rapidly hire and transfer staff in response to
recovery and reconstruction needs, and as a result of hiring Wingerts
Consulting to quickly staff the Hurricane Ivan Program in Grenada and
Jamaica, the agency encountered additional challenges. In our 2002
report,[Footnote 20] we observed that USAID did not have the "surge
capacity" to quickly design and initiate a large-scale infrastructure
and development program with relatively short-range deadlines (2.5
years) while providing emergency relief and initial reconstruction
assistance and managing its regular development program. Based on these
findings, we recommended that USAID develop and implement procedures
that would (1) allow it to quickly reassign key personnel in
postemergency and postcrisis situations and (2) allow missions to hire
personal services contractors to augment staff on an expedited
basis.[Footnote 21] In addition, USAID's draft document outlining
lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch program indicates that a
shortage of qualified engineering and technical staff constrained the
implementation of the program; the document recommends designating an
official to identify staffing needs quickly and take action to address
them.[Footnote 22] USAID agreed with the recommendations in our 2002
report but as of April 2006 had not taken steps to respond to them; it
also had not implemented the recommendations in its 2002 draft lessons-
learned report. In addition, we recently reported that USAID had not
staffed several positions that it considered critical to essential
technical oversight of its tsunami reconstruction programs in Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, indicating that staffing these types of programs remains
a challenge.[Footnote 23]
USAID decided to hire Wingerts Consulting to manage and oversee the
program in Grenada, where USAID has no permanent presence, and assist
with oversight in Jamaica. According to USAID's Mission Director in
Jamaica and other staff, factors influencing the decision included the
following:
* The mission needed assistance in initiating recovery activities and
personnel with technical skills to oversee disaster recovery
activities, particularly construction.
* The agency's process for hiring personal services contractors can
take up to 6 months, and given the 1-year time frame, staff were needed
quickly.
* Hiring a consulting firm provided the agency the flexibility to
acquire short-term staff with skills needed for specific program
activities as well as to replace staff when their skills were no longer
needed.
According to USAID's Regional Inspector General, USAID staff, and
contractors, the agency's decision to hire Wingerts Consulting to
oversee the program in Grenada and Jamaica led to additional
challenges.
* In its April 2005 report, USAID's RIG found that Wingerts's roles and
responsibilities in monitoring the program's implementation had not
been clearly defined, making it difficult for contractors to implement
the program, and for USAID staff to manage program activities. USAID
subsequently refocused Wingerts's responsibilities primarily on
providing technical oversight and supporting the USAID permanent staff
responsible for various program components in Grenada and Jamaica. It
took two months after the Wingerts contract was signed to more clearly
define each party's roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 24]
* USAID staff and contractors told us that they were uncertain about
Wingerts's role in managing the program. In addition, according to
USAID contractors, the added layer of oversight that Wingerts provided
sometimes created tension and confusion because contractors were still
required to report to USAID staff overseeing their program activities
in Jamaica and Barbados. In its April 2006 follow-up audit, the RIG
noted that the Wingerts oversight model was problematic in that USAID's
other contractors were not accustomed to having Wingerts perform
functions that USAID staff would normally perform, and as a result,
working relationships were uncomfortable.[Footnote 25]
Although USAID staff and contractors reported some challenges in
working with Wingerts, USAID officials in Jamaica noted that the
mission has benefited by engaging a contracting firm to fulfill
specific functions, rather than hiring staff. According to USAID, by
using a contractor to provide a range of management and oversight
support, the mission created a structure that was highly flexible and
allowed for quick responses to changing needs throughout the program.
USAID also noted that in Grenada, where USAID has no presence, the
contracting firm served an essential function of handling day-to-day
interaction with the government in addition to managing the $8 million
allocated for direct government support. While the use of Wingerts
provided USAID with flexibility, USAID staff and the U.S. embassy in
Grenada said that temporarily relocating USAID permanent staff or
personal services contractors to manage recovery efforts in the country
would have been more efficient than using the management firm.
USAID Staff and Contractors Are Recording Lessons Learned:
As part of its internal evaluation of the Hurricane Ivan
reconstruction, USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons
learned, including an assessment of the program's economic impact and
whether the program helped the countries to "build back better" and
prepare for future disasters. The staff and contractors told us in
December 2005 that they would incorporate this information into their
final program summary, which they expected to complete in May 2006.
Staff at the Haiti mission told us that they were recording lessons
learned from the Tropical Storm Program disaster mitigation activities
and that overall lessons learned will be included in the final program
report. However, we have not yet learned whether USAID headquarters
intends to incorporate lessons learned from the Caribbean programs into
guidance that would be available to staff implementing future recovery
and reconstruction programs. (See app. II for our summary of lessons
learned reported by U.S. officials and contractors involved in the
Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs as well as for lessons
culled from our and USAID's reviews of its previous disaster recovery
programs.)
Conclusions:
Disaster recovery and reconstruction assistance is an important
component of USAID's development assistance portfolio, providing a
bridge between its emergency relief efforts and its long-term
development assistance. In responding to the Caribbean disasters, USAID
provided a wide range of recovery and reconstruction support. However,
despite having administered several large-scale disaster recovery
programs in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia since 1999, USAID
has not issued guidance for recovery and reconstruction programs that
incorporates lessons learned from its prior efforts, leading to
challenges in designing and implementing the recovery and
reconstruction activities discussed in this report. In addition,
although USAID and GAO have previously documented USAID's difficulties
in quickly staffing its recovery and reconstruction programs and have
made recommendations to assist USAID in correcting these problems,
these issues remain unaddressed. As a result, the agency is likely to
be unprepared to rapidly recruit and mobilize technically skilled staff
for its next disaster recovery program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better facilitate USAID's ability to design and implement future
disaster recovery programs and address its previously documented
recurring staffing challenges, we recommend that the USAID
Administrator take the following two actions:
* Develop disaster recovery and reconstruction program guidance that
incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and
Reconstruction Program and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program as
well as previous disaster recovery programs.
* Revise staffing procedures to allow the agency to more quickly
reassign or hire key personnel, either to augment staff responsible for
disaster recovery efforts in countries with a USAID mission or to
manage efforts in countries where USAID does not maintain a permanent
presence.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to USAID, the Department of State
and OMB. We received a formal comment letter from USAID (see app. III),
in which they agreed with our recommendations. USAID and OMB provided
technical comments that we incorporated into the report, as
appropriate. The Department of State had no comments.
USAID agreed with our first recommendation and indicated it has
established an agency task force for complex emergency and
stabilization responses to allow it and other U.S. government agencies
to undertake a structural approach based on past experience to provide
an integrated and effective response to future disasters. Further, as
part of its technical comments, USAID indicated that the Jamaica
Mission has taken steps to document a draft list of lessons learned
that will be included in the final report at the conclusion of the
Hurricane Ivan program. USAID said these reports will be shared with
USAID officials in Washington for developing guidelines for future
disaster recovery programs and for inclusion in USAID's Center for
Development and Evaluation databases.
USAID also agreed with our second recommendation. The agency
acknowledged that recent large-scale natural disaster and complex
emergencies, including the Asian tsunami and conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, have revealed glaring gaps in the U.S. capacity to respond
effectively, particularly for stabilization and reconstruction
programs. In technical comments, USAID's Jamaica mission noted that its
use of a management and oversight firm provided a highly flexible
structure to respond quickly to changes in staffing needs throughout
the program; however, USAID further recommended that any adjustment to
the agency's policy address ongoing urgent needs to change staffing
under projects with a short time horizon. To respond to staffing
challenges, USAID has proposed the development of a "civilian surge
capacity," which, if approved and funded, would give USAID over a 3-
year time period to develop short-to long-term staff on an as-needed
basis, focusing on skill sets that USAID has identified as lacking
sufficient capacity.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees as well as the Administrator, USAID; Acting Director, OMB;
and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
David Gootnick:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
We were asked to periodically monitor the delivery of assistance under
USAID's Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Reconstruction Program (Hurricane
Ivan Program) and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical
Storm Program). In this report, we (1) review the recovery and
reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the
status of activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that
affected USAID's ability to implement and complete the programs within
the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID's use of guidance and
application of lessons learned from similar previous programs as well
as its efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
To determine the status of the programs, we initially reviewed the
supplemental appropriation language passed in 2004 and USAID documents
that outline special objectives for each country and interviewed
program officials regarding program goals. We also made three
monitoring trips to Grenada, two trips to Jamaica, and one trip to
Haiti.[Footnote 26] The information on foreign law in this report does
not reflect our independent legal analysis but is based on interviews
and secondary sources. After our initial monitoring trip to Haiti, our
ability to travel there was curtailed when, because of security
concerns, the U.S. Department of State restricted country access to
emergency personnel only. Therefore, after the initial trip, we
reviewed monthly reports and held periodic conference calls with USAID
staff and contractors to discuss the status of the recovery program in
that country. During our monitoring trips to Grenada and Jamaica, we
conducted document reviews and held interviews with USAID staff as well
as contractors to discuss program progress, determine compliance with
established requirements set by audit entities, and learn how funding
allocation decisions were made and tracked. We also met with private
contractors and subcontractors, and host government officials involved
in the recovery efforts to discuss program implementation and progress.
In Grenada, we interviewed 19 attendees of the skills training program
to get a sense for the skills that were taught and the extent to which
the training provided employment opportunities for the attendees. In
addition, we conducted field visits to various project sites to observe
the progress of activities and verify the extent to which objectives
and timelines were being met. We visited a random selection of 80
project sites in Jamaica and Grenada, and 9 project sites in Haiti that
were not randomly selected due to security restrictions and our
inability to visit following our initial information gathering trip.
(See table 3.)
Table 3: Number and Types of Activities at Project Sites GAO Visited in
Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti:
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: Housing repairs;
Number: 8 recipients;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: New housing construction;
Number: 11[A] recipients;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: Community centers;
Number: 2 projects;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: Water and sanitation;
Number: 1 project.
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: School repairs;
Number: 10 schools.
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Agriculture grants;
Number: 4 recipients;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Fishery grants;
Number: 2 recipients;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Small to medium-size business grants;
Number: 5 recipients;
Country: Grenada: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Skills training;
Number: 4 centers.
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: Housing repairs;
Number: 10[B] recipients;
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: Community
rehabilitation: New housing construction;
Number: 2 sites with total of 186 houses.
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: School repairs;
Number: 7 schools.
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Agriculture grants;
Number: 10[C] recipients;
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Fishery grants;
Number: 1 community;
Country: Jamaica: Type of activity at project site: Business recovery:
Craft grants;
Number: 3 recipients.
Country: Haiti: Type of activity at project site: Community
revitalization[D]: School repairs;
Number: 1 school;
Country: Haiti: Type of activity at project site: Community
revitalization[D]: Disaster preparedness training;
Number: 1 community;
Country: Haiti: Type of activity at project site: Community
revitalization[D]: Asset restoration grants;
Number: 5 recipients;
Country: Haiti: Type of activity at project site: Community
revitalization[D]: River-widening project;
Number: 1 project;
Country: Haiti: Type of activity at project site: Community
revitalization[D]: Canal cleanup;
Number: 1 project.
Country: Total;
Number: 89.
Source: GAO.
[A] We visited 11 sites in August 2005 and revisited 5 of these sites
during December 2005 to assess progress.
[ B] We randomly selected housing repair sites, which then were used by
USAID to coordinate visits based on their proximity to Kingston.
[C] Two of these sites were not randomly selected.
[D] Site visits in Haiti were not randomly selected.
[End of table]
We assessed factors affecting the implementation and completion of
program activities by reviewing USAID monthly reports and interviewing
USAID staff, contractors, and host government officials overseeing the
various program activities during our monitoring trips to Grenada and
Jamaica. For Haiti, during our periodic conference calls, we discussed
implementation and completion challenges with USAID staff and
contractors with oversight responsibility for the various program
components.
To assess USAID's application of lessons learned from previous disaster
recovery programs, we reviewed reports from prior USAID recovery
efforts and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti as well as contractors. We reviewed documentation on
lessons learned that USAID officials had compiled following the
Hurricane Mitch recovery program in Central America. We further
reviewed reports on disaster relief from various international
organizations, such as the World Bank, that detailed lessons learned
from other disaster recovery efforts. Two members of our audit team
also attended a Caribbean Basin conference that highlighted disaster
preparedness and mitigation strategies, including strategies for
funding reconstruction, whether building codes should be regionally or
nationally applied, and how the private sector can contribute to
effective disaster preparedness and mitigation strategies. Finally, we
collated lessons learned in a separate appendix (see app. II) based on
interviews with staff and contractors administering the Hurricane Ivan
and Tropical Storm Jeanne Programs and lessons documented in previous
GAO and USAID assessments of disaster recovery programs in Latin
America, the Caribbean, and Asia.
To ensure that appropriate internal controls were established to
account for program funds, we interviewed USAID financial management
staff in Jamaica and reviewed program documents that described USAID's
mechanisms for ensuring accountability. We also coordinated with
USAID's Regional Inspector General to determine the Inspector General's
involvement with establishing internal controls and monitoring how well
USAID maintained controls throughout the program.
For this report, we relied primarily on USAID's data reported to date
in the agency's monthly reports on expenditures and progress in each
country. We assessed the reliability of this data by (1) interviewing
USAID program staff and its contractors to determine how data were
collected and reported and what quality assurance mechanisms were in
place, (2) reviewing a sample of USAID's program files as well as its
contractors' files in Grenada and Jamaica, and (3) collaborating with
USAID's Regional Inspector General on the reliability of expenditure
data. During our trip to Grenada in August 2005, we found errors and a
misrepresentation of data in USAID's monthly reports, which we reported
to USAID staff and contractors responsible for the collating the data.
USAID corrected the data errors and made changes to certain indicators
that we had found to be misleading. Overall, we found that USAID's data
as corrected were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing
our reporting objectives. We conducted our work from March 2005 through
May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned from USAID Disaster Recovery
and Reconstruction Efforts:
We reviewed USAID's recovery efforts following the 1998 hurricanes in
Latin America and 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, as well as its
ongoing efforts in response to the 2004 tsunami in Asia. Following is a
compilation of lessons reported by U.S. officials and contractors
involved in USAID's Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation Program
and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program as well as lessons from GAO
and USAID reviews of previous disaster recovery programs. Although this
list is by no means exhaustive, it summarizes some common lessons and
examples of USAID's efforts to address disaster recovery challenges and
is intended as a tool for future disaster recovery programs.
Lessons Learned for Program Planning and Implementation:
* Set appropriate time frames. Disaster recovery program time frames
should be based on a needs assessment of the activities that best aid
recovery and should be undertaken in phases, if necessary. In our 2002
report on USAID's Hurricane Mitch and Georges recovery program, various
agency officials said the program's time frame influenced how planning,
design, and implementation of recovery activities affected program
sustainability. For example, the Dominican Republic mission reported
that it selected some activities it knew could be completed by the
expenditure deadline despite recognizing that other activities may have
achieved greater sustainability, especially those with more cost
sharing with the host government and other implementing organizations.
Other agency officials involved in the recovery suggested that future
efforts include time for follow-on activities, such as training, to
ensure better sustainability. USAID staff and contractors implementing
the Caribbean programs' activities discussed in this report stated that
the 1-year time frame influenced the types of activities they selected
and may have limited the sustainability of some projects. One
contractor explained that in a previous program, activities were
divided into different phases (e.g., immediate recovery activities were
implemented in less than 1 year, while road construction was given a
1.5-year time frame and railroad reconstruction was planned for 2 years
but completed in 3). In the Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID was able to
identify beneficiaries for business and agriculture recovery grants and
expend the majority of program funds allocated to these activities
within a 1-year time frame, while reconstruction of houses in Jamaica
and Grenada required an extension several months beyond December 31,
2005. Based on their experience in the Hurricane Mitch and Georges
recovery program, USAID officials designing and implementing the
Tropical Storm Program in Haiti said that program staff should not
attempt to complete activities in an arbitrarily short time frame.
USAID staff and contractors we interviewed stated that 15 to 18 months
is a more reasonable time frame for reconstruction activities.
* Conduct thorough cost assessments. USAID should ensure that initial
cost estimates are based on specific information about site conditions.
Due to inadequate estimates in the Caribbean programs regarding the
cost of labor and materials for reconstruction activities, USAID
originally targeted an unrealistically high number of activities that
later had to be reduced. Part of this lesson includes anticipating
increases in construction materials and labor due to increases in
demand for construction after a disaster. For example, in Indonesia,
USAID's initial cost estimates for a road to be rebuilt after the
tsunami were based on limited information about site conditions.
Because of the uncertainty about the site conditions, the Army Corps of
Engineers included a 20 percent contingency in its cost estimate.
However, actual costs may still exceed this estimate because plans for
the road have changed.
* Look beyond restoration of the status quo and aim to improve
infrastructure and livelihood opportunities. In the planning of
Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery efforts, the U.S. and its
international partners agreed on an approach that would not simply
replace what was destroyed, but would "build back better" with a
lasting impact. This approach was adopted in the Caribbean programs.
For example, in the rehabilitation of schools, USAID repaired schools
to their pre-Ivan condition or better in compliance with the building
codes and hurricane resistance standards. In Haiti, USAID also provided
household restoration grants as well as created a cash-for-work program
to help those affected by the storm to rebuild their livelihoods and
decrease their vulnerability to future floods.
* Establish a host government agency to coordinate the international
response to the disaster. USAID worked with the governments of Grenada
and Jamaica to establish independent coordination entities separate
from those countries' ministries to facilitate the recovery process and
streamline working with the government. A central agency to coordinate
disaster recovery between donors is important for ensuring that
activities are not duplicated; however, USAID and other donors should
take into account the time needed to establish these agencies when
developing implementation schedules and setting program completion time
frames. For example, USAID reported that the Agency for Reconstruction
in Development in Grenada, funded by USAID and other donors, did not
take over coordination responsibilities until March 2005, about 3
months into USAID's program. In Jamaica, USAID coordinated with the
Office for National Reconstruction to identify recipients for recovery
assistance as well as to build new housing communities. The Indonesian
government established the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency to
coordinate the international response to the tsunami. The entity has
produced a master plan for reconstruction that it has used to attempt
to control and track organizations involved in reconstruction.
* Channel assistance through organizations and contractors with proven
track records and a history of working in the affected country. USAID
officials administering Haiti's Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program
reported that they selected contractors that had a history of working
there as a means of strengthening coordination and ensuring
implementation of program activities. This was particularly critical
given Haiti's security challenges and USAID's inability to travel to
many of the project sites regularly. In El Salvador, USAID contracted
with at least five private voluntary organizations that it had
previously worked with to implement earthquake recovery projects.
According to USAID officials, using organizations that have proven to
be capable and reliable reduces the likelihood of misuse of funds and
corruption.
* Involve community-based organizations in program implementation.
Noting that this was a successful approach in Hurricane Georges, USAID
officials in Haiti worked with community-based organizations in
implementing the Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program. For example,
one contractor worked with local management committees it had worked
with during a previous program in Gonaives several years before. These
groups were one of the few functioning civil society organizations in
Gonaives immediately after the flooding and served as program partners
and liaisons on community issues, security, and sustainable maintenance
efforts. Another contractor worked with already existing water user
groups organized around irrigated parcels in the Plaine des Gonaives
and Trois Rivieres areas. The use of community-based organizations also
allowed the contractor to mobilize the local population rapidly to
execute short-term employment generation activities, such as tertiary
roads and ravine protection structures. In addition, school
rehabilitation frequently was organized around parent and teacher
groups that supported the school in preflood periods.
* Avoid overlap between host governments and community-based
organizations to avoid inefficiencies. To avert potential future
overlap with nongovernmental organizations in Sri Lanka during tsunami
reconstruction, USAID participated in weekly meetings with the
government coordinating entity and NGOs, among others, to designate
responsibility for different geographic areas.
Lessons Learned for Staffing:
* Identify staffing needs quickly and designate someone to manage the
staffing process. USAID officials involved in Hurricane Mitch recovery
activities drafted lessons learned recommending that, when responding
to disaster recovery, USAID mission and Washington officials need to
quickly identify staffing needs and that an appropriate official should
be charged with tracking staff issues to facilitate the response. For
example, in our 2002 report of Hurricane Mitch and Georges, we reported
that the number of USAID direct-hire staff in general, and contracts
officers in particular, has declined and USAID had difficulty finding
qualified personnel to manage the large-scale emergency program on an
expedited basis. In the same report, USAID's Honduran mission reported
serious constraints due to the absence of a contracts and grants
officer needed to negotiate and sign agreements and ensure that
implementation and acquisition mechanisms are in place. The mission in
the Dominican Republic reported that the majority of staff hired for
its reconstruction effort had no prior USAID experience and that
implementation slowed as new staff learned the agency's management
system. As stated earlier in this report, the lack of experienced staff
was also a challenge in the Hurricane Ivan program.
* Create a mechanism to quickly hire staff for recovery and
reconstruction programs. In addition, a draft document in which
contractors assessed USAID's Hurricane Mitch program reported that
lengthy personal service contract hiring practices added to staffing
bottlenecks, and some USAID staff recommended that waiver authorities
should be made available to hire staff quickly on a noncompetitive
basis. In addition, the Honduras Mission stated that USAID needs to do
a better job of immediately identifying staff with the skills needed
for reconstruction activities rather than relying on staff within the
mission or region. In the tsunami program, to establish technical
oversight, USAID reassigned and hired experienced staff, such as
engineers, and acquired additional technical expertise through
interagency agreements but had difficulty filling some positions it
considered critical to technical oversight.
Lessons Learned for Recovery Activities:
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation:
* Provide disaster preparedness and mitigation training to communities.
In Haiti, 222 participants in seven communities were trained in
disaster preparedness and mitigation, including the designation of
emergency responders and the development of local action plans focused
on risk assessment, disaster mitigation, and preparedness. In Jamaica,
fisherfolk received training in "Safe Seamanship and Environmental
Management." USAID also developed training to ensure sustainability and
provide local capacity building through a course on "General Safety and
Survival at Sea," which was taught to 60 participants from three local
NGOs, in coordination with the Caribbean Maritime Institute.
Participants received safety equipment and an emergency response guide
developed for the fisheries sector, including specific measures to
reduce vulnerability with regard to small boat safety, search and
rescue, sinking vessels, fires, bad weather, and survival at sea under
different distress situations.
Construction:
* Ensure quality control of construction and follow building codes
appropriate to type of disaster sustained. USAID has difficulty
ensuring that contractors build houses correctly and completely. For
example, in our review of the El Salvador earthquake program, we
reported problems such as roof supports that were improperly connected
to walls, and metal windows and doors that were not functioning
properly. Following the GAO visit, USAID issued detailed procedures
that Army Corps of Engineers Officials and contractors were required to
complete following their work. USAID also conducted additional quality
control training that contractors, NGOs, and other entities involved in
implementing the program were required to attend. USAID officials
stated that the training was useful in reinforcing the principle of
"building back better" and that, following the training, the quality of
construction improved. Contractors in the Hurricane Ivan program
followed local building and hurricane resistance codes, including the
use of hurricane straps and Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Standards for
wood and concrete houses.
* Understand the local land tenure system. In El Salvador, many
Salvadorans whose houses were destroyed had no legal proof that they
owned the property on which their house had stood. Housing starts were
delayed because contractors had to wait weeks for approvals to begin
construction. The USAID contractor responsible for housing in Grenada
also encountered challenges due to land title issues. The contractor
told us that although it originally identified 400 to 500 prospective
beneficiaries who met selection criteria established by the Grenadian
government, many of these people lacked the land titles or proof of
ownership that USAID required of new-housing beneficiaries. Because the
process of verifying ownership was so time consuming, the contractor
eventually ran advertisements soliciting respondents who met the
selection criteria and had proof of land ownership.
* Establish memorandums of understanding or formal agreements if
reconstruction efforts are shared with the host government. In Haiti,
USAID officials established a memorandum of understanding with the
government for road and bridge construction activities. Conversely, in
Jamaica, USAID did not establish a memorandum of understanding with the
government in its coordination for new-housing construction. According
to USAID, when the Jamaican government did not fulfill its obligation
to install electricity and septic systems and to provide other
infrastructure for the housing communities, USAID had to grant
extensions to complete activities that were impacted by the delays and,
as a result, delayed the delivery of new housing to beneficiaries.
* Address warranties and liabilities for construction projects before
building. Warranty and liability responsibilities should be detailed in
the contract agreements and determined prior to construction. In the
Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID did not determine who would fulfill
warranty and defects liability responsibility early on in the program,
and such issues were still being resolved, in some cases, after
construction of schools and other buildings were already completed and
the contractor considered the project closed.
Nonconstruction:
* Coordinate with local industry boards and organizations to identify
recipients and community leaders. USAID contractors in Grenada worked
to improve tourism services after Hurricane Ivan left 50 percent of the
persons previously working in this sector unemployed and another 40
percent underemployed. The contractor formed partnerships with several
local tourism associations, including hotel, airport, taxi, and small-
business organizations. The contractors developed skills training
courses to improve hospitality and tourist services. For example, after
some participants were trained in craft making, the contractors
organized a "Buy Grenada" fair to showcase the participants' work. In
addition, the contractors partnered with several community-based
organizations to deliver training in small business management, food
vending, ecotourism, and professional tour guiding.
* Coordinate with government for education or skills training. USAID's
skills training program in Grenada provided needed income support and
skills development, but was not designed in consultation with the
government's Ministry of Education. Moreover, the government does not
recognize the training certificates issued to participants. Also,
contractors and participants recognized that the 6-week training period
was not long enough to develop certain skills, such as construction,
and that it would have made more sense to develop fewer, but longer,
courses to adequately train participants.
Lessons Learned for Ensuring Accountability:
* Establish accountability mechanisms. Concerns over public and private
corruption due to the wide dispersion of activities following Hurricane
Mitch influenced USAID to take extra precautions to safeguard program
funds. USAID's Regional Inspector General (RIG) and GAO monitored the
Hurricane Mitch and El Salvador earthquake reconstruction programs and
briefed USAID staff as well as Congress on a regular basis on key
issues that USAID needed to correct. In the Caribbean program, USAID
involved RIG officials early in the design to ensure proper
accountability mechanisms were established and audits were performed
early in the program.
* Hire third-party monitoring firms. USAID officials in Haiti
contracted with an engineering firm to monitor construction activities
and with a financial management firm to validate performance reports,
report on the quality of activities executed by the contractor, and
identify problem areas, and ensure flexibility in implementation. USAID
officials reported that the oversight and recommendations from the two
firms have proven to be invaluable. Specifically, the engineering firm
was instrumental in providing several good recommendations on urgent
needs that had not been identified in the damage survey; additionally,
the firm provided early warning on a number of occasions where work
needed immediate correction and collaborated closely with the
implementing firms and quickly gained their confidence for sound
recommendations. It served as a capable arbiter on several disputes
between implementers and their subcontractors. Both the engineering and
financial firms served a critical function at a time when USAID direct
hires were unable to travel freely in Haiti to monitor progress due to
poor security. In its El Salvador earthquake recovery program, USAID
required that a private accounting firm conduct a concurrent audit of a
USAID-funded health clinic being implemented by AmeriCares, a U.S.-
based private voluntary organization that provides medical supplies
overseas. This was done because AmeriCares had no experience
implementing a USAID-funded program and was working through a
Salvadoran nongovernmental organization to carry out the construction.
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID also contracted engineering expertise to
monitor the completion and quality of implementing contractors'
construction activities. The USAID Mission in Jamaica obtained these
services by augmenting the engineering staff of Wingerts Consulting.
The work of the engineers engaged through Wingerts was similar to that
typically performed by a USAID staff engineer, including monitoring and
reviewing the processes utilized by the implementing contractor to
assure reasonable costs, quality control, and delivery of a final
product that is consistent with the expected results specified in the
contract. According to USAID, the Wingerts staff served as an extension
of the mission, given that the mission needed to move swiftly to
implement construction and renovation activities and the mission did
not have internal staff with sufficient expertise to effectively
implement the activities under a short time frame. The engineers
engaged by the Jamaica Mission through Wingerts worked collaboratively
with USAID's technical staff and the implementing contractors to
provide technical approval of contract award processes and
certifications and to perform site visits and environmental monitoring
during execution of construction contracts and grants.
Lessons Learned for Monitoring and Evaluation:
* Conduct monthly progress reviews and provide interim reports. In its
April 2005 report, the Regional Inspector General recommended that
USAID staff responsible for the Hurricane Ivan Program monitor the
program by maintaining a spreadsheet of target due dates for each
activity and verify that all activities are completed on time. USAID
provided monthly reports of its Caribbean recovery efforts that
summarized the progress of program activities, challenges in
implementing and completing activities, and the programs' expenditures
to date. According to USAID officials responsible for the Hurricane
Ivan Program, the contractor hired to assist with oversight, Wingerts
Consulting, played a role in ensuring regular and timely progress
reporting and program analysis, including capturing cross-country and
cross-program implementation issues, and providing program-level
financial analyses. USAID also reported that Wingerts conducted various
site visits and served as a liaison between USAID's technical staff and
implementing contractors to better assess the status of activities "on
the ground" and report back to the mission, the bureau, and other
stakeholders. USAID officials acknowledged that these reports might
have been prepared by mission staff rather than Wingerts if USAID had a
mission in Grenada or had sufficient staff in Jamaica to compile and
produce the reports.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
May 18, 2006:
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID's) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled "USAID
Completed Many Caribbean Disaster Recovery Activities, but Several
Challenges Hampered Efforts (GAO-06-645)." USAID acknowledges the
validity of the GAO report and its recommendations.
Recommendation: Develop disaster recovery and reconstruction program
guidance that incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan
Recovery and Reconstruction Program and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery
Program as well as previous disaster recovery programs.
USAID Response: In light of its experience, the Agency has developed a
crisis management model that utilizes task forces composed of USAID and
other key USG department and agency personnel to provide an effective,
integrated platform for complex emergency and stabilization responses.
The task force, to be activated by the Administrator and with the
Deputy Administrator serving as Chair, is responsible for the
following:
a. Serve as a coordination point for information sharing and joint
planning among Agency bureaus;
b. Coordinate externally with State Department regional bureau and
other USG counterparts, and respond to requests from the National
Security Council and other USG agencies;
c. Identify and track specific policy and operational roadblocks within
the Agency and the USG and work to remove them expeditiously; d.
Develop appropriate waiver authority with respect to proposed Agency
work in response to the complex emergency;
e. Develop bilateral country planning, as appropriate, and program
design for relief and reconstruction efforts;
f. Determine workforce planning and staffing for Agency activities in
response to the complex emergency;
g. Have responsibility for review and approval of resource allocations
for Agency activities;
h. Develop appropriate internal technical support for the task force;
and i. Prepare, as appropriate, Congressional testimony and responses
to Congressional inquiries.
The Agency has taken lessons learned and published them on the Agency
intranet site for Agency employees.
Recommendation: Revise staffing procedures to allow the Agency to more
quickly reassign or hire key personnel, either to augment staff
responsible for disaster recovery efforts in countries with a USAID
mission or to manage efforts in countries where USAID does not maintain
a permanent presence.
USAID Response: Recent large scale natural disasters and complex
emergencies (e.g., conflict), including the Asia Tsunami, Afghanistan,
and Iraq, have revealed glaring gaps in U.S. capacity to respond
effectively, particularly for stabilization and reconstruction
programs. USAID acknowledges that it has, at times, limited capacity to
respond to certain crises. We also lack sufficient quantities of
particular skill sets, such as engineers. For nearly a dozen years the
Agency did not have a budget that allowed us to replace attrition. As a
consequence the Agency has been reduced in size by over 40%. Although
we have had limited funding to hire additional staff over the past two
years, we have been able to build our capacity in critical skill sets
by hiring additional contracting officers and health officers. However,
these limited numbers are not enough to meet the full range of
competencies and numbers of staff we require, leading to staffing
shortfalls in USAID missions throughout the world. Therefore, USAID has
proposed the development of a "civilian surge capacity" which, if
approved and funded, would give USAID over a three-year time period the
ability to grow short-to-long-term staff on an as needed basis. The
surge capacity program would not add permanent staff, but would augment
current staff levels on a temporary basis. The USAID surge package
focuses on particular skill sets where we have identified a lack of
sufficient capacity.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Cynthia Pruett:
Acting Chief Financial Officer:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Phillip Herr (Assistant
Director), Francisco Enriquez, Adrienne Spahr, Reid Lowe, Shana
Wallace, and Mark Dowling made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule
Estimates. GAO-06-488. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006.
Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address
Current and Future Challenges. GAO-03-946. Washington, D.C., August 22,
2003.
Foreign Assistance: USAID's Earthquake Recovery Program in El Salvador
Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are behind Schedule. GAO-03-656.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended
Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response
Capability. GAO-02-787. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and Continued Management
Improvements Needed. GAO/NSIAD-93-106. Washington: D.C.: June 11, 1993.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Other donors' pledges for recovery assistance amounted to about
$177 million in Grenada and about $23 million in Jamaica. In Haiti,
pledges amounted to about $16 million.
[2] Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L.
108-324, Div. B, Chapter 5 (Oct. 13, 2004).
[3] USAID allocated most of the appropriated funds to Grenada, Jamaica,
and Haiti, which sustained the heaviest damage in the storms; this
report focuses on the agency's work in these countries.
[4] For example, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program
Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to
Improve Its Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2002); and Foreign Assistance: USAID's Earthquake Recovery Program in
El Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are Behind Schedule,
GAO-03-656 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003). See Related GAO Products.
[5] After our initial trip to Haiti in March-April 2005, the Department
of State restricted access to emergency personnel because of security
concerns.
[6] The extensions that USAID granted to contractors in Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti entailed no additional cost to the agency.
[7] USAID also allocated about $5.6 million to OFDA as reimbursement
for relief efforts and $2 million to the Bahamas, Tobago, and the
Caribbean Community islands, which sustained some damage from Hurricane
Ivan.
[8] USAID defines its workforce as comprising individuals with whom it
has an employer-employee relationship. The Federal Acquisition
Regulations define a personal services contract as one that makes the
contractor appear as a government employee by the nature of the
relationship that is established. USAID is authorized by section
636(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to
contract with individuals for personal services abroad. USAID's
personal services contractors may be U.S. citizens, host country
nationals, or third country nationals.
[9] USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica's
Hurricane Recovery and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-
532-06-004-P (San Salvador, El Salvador, April 2006).
[10] USAID reported that the extensions in all three countries imposed
no additional program costs.
[11] In responding to a draft of this report in May 2006, USAID
commented that, in response to issues raised by GAO and USAID's RIG,
the Jamaica Mission was in the process of developing a memorandum of
understanding for negotiation and signature with the government of
Jamaica's Office of National Reconstruction.
[12] According to USAID officials, agency policy does not prohibit
beneficiaries without land titles from receiving recovery assistance;
however, USAID staff managing the Caribbean programs determined that to
avoid land disputes, land titles were necessary for beneficiaries of
new-housing construction.
[13] In addition to administering the $100 million that Congress
appropriated for Caribbean disaster recovery in 2004, USAID
administered about $525 million for disaster recovery assistance
following Hurricanes Mitch and Georges in 1999 and $159 million for
recovery assistance in El Salvador following the 2001 earthquakes.
USAID's efforts to assist with reconstruction in Asia following the
2004 tsunami, which are ongoing, received $908 million in funding.
[14] USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Reduction: A
Practitioner's Guide (Washington, D.C., November 2002).
[15] GAO-02-787.
[16] USAID, Lessons Learned from Planning and Implementation of the
Hurricane Mitch Supplemental Reconstruction Program (draft report)
(Washington, D.C., June 27, 2000).
[17] OMB staff indicated that they encourage USAID to consult with OMB
on any difficulties the 1-year time frame may have posed on program
implementation, but USAID did not seek additional consultation.
[18] This was partially owing to limited employment opportunities for
women who took construction courses but had difficulty obtaining jobs
in this field.
[19] USAID had agreed to expend all of the appropriated funds by
December 31, 2001, about 30 months from enactment of the supplemental
appropriation. See GAO-02-787.
[20] GAO-02-787.
[21] GAO-02-787.
[22] Lessons Learned from Planning and Implementation of the Hurricane
Mitch Supplemental Reconstruction Program.
[23] GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and
Schedule Estimates, GAO-06-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2006).
[24] USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica's
Hurricane Recovery and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-
532-05-008-P (San Salvador, El Salvador, April 2005).
[25] USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica's
Hurricane Recovery and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-
532-06-004-P (San Salvador, El Salvador, April 2006).
[26] GAO did not visit the Caribbean islands of Bahamas, Tobago, and
Caribbean Community islands, which received a total of $2 million for
small-scale hurricane recovery efforts.
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