Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight Gao ID: GAO-07-801SP May 24, 2007Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. In February 2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from devolving into a narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the United States, and several multilateral organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S. and international efforts, the overall security situation in this poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and, moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The lack of security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic opportunities. Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--one on food and agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national security forces, and one on drug control programs. We identified programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that limited success and should be taken into consideration in program design and implementation. A key improvement we identified in most of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some additional needed improvements we identified include better coordination among the United States and other donor nations, more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles, especially deteriorating security and the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements varied. Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on, including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security reform agenda established by the United States and several coalition partners. The United States has been involved to some degree with each of the five pillars and initially was charged with taking the lead in establishing the Afghan army, but has since allocated significant resources to reconstituting the police and countering the illicit drug trade. Although some army and police units have been trained and equipped, Defense reports that none are capable of independent operations, Afghanistan still has no formal national judicial system for the police to rely upon, opium poppy cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan police often find themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and militias. In the absence of national security forces capable of independently providing security for the country, the International Security Assistance Force is helping to provide security for Afghanistan. Though reconstruction assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of refugees, Afghanistan continues to face reconstruction challenges, which are exacerbated by the security-related concerns. Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces to operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a total of $7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined. The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.
GAO-07-801SP, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, And Reconstructing Afghanistan:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight:
GAO-07-801SP:
Contents:
Letter:
Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures:
Demographics and Development Indicators:
Natural Resources:
Economy:
Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National
Security Forces Face Several Challenges:
Prior Recommendations:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several
Factors:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan:
Prior Recommendation:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags
behind the Other Security Pillars:
Prior Recommendation:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and
Are Constrained by Security Concerns:
Prior Recommendations:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan:
Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005:
Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008:
Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan:
Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army:
Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan:
Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy:
Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project:
Abbreviations:
AEF: Afghan Eradication Force:
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces:
CERP: Commanders' Emergency Response Program:
Defense: Department of Defense:
GDP: gross domestic product:
IG: Inspectors General:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
ODA: official development assistance:
PEP: Poppy Elimination Program:
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team:
State: Department of State:
UN: United Nations:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 24, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
As the United States reviews plans to accelerate its efforts to secure,
stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan, I have enclosed a series of issue
papers for your consideration. These papers are based on the continuing
and prior work of GAO on Afghanistan, which we have provided to the
Congress since June 2003.
Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help
secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] In February
2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding
to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden
nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from
devolving into a narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the
United States, and several multilateral organizations are engaged in
securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has
been made in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development,
and training of the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years
of U.S. and international efforts, the overall security situation in
this poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and,
moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The lack of
security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and rebuild
Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a resurgence of
the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces,
inadequate infrastructure, limited government capacity, corruption, a
largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a dramatic increase in
drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic opportunities.
Furthermore, these efforts are complicated by regional influences, and
the recent transfer of the security mission to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan-
-one on food and agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction
assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national security
forces, and one on drug control programs.[Footnote 2] We identified
programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles
that limited success and should be taken into consideration in program
design and implementation (see table 1). A key improvement we
identified in most of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved
planning, including the development of strategic plans with elements
such as measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and
identification of external factors that could significantly affect
efforts. Some additional needed improvements we identified include
better coordination among the United States and other donor nations,
more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project
implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles, especially
deteriorating security and the limited institutional capacity of the
Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan:
Areas of focus: Emergency food assistance;
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop joint U.S.-Afghan
Interagency strategic focus and plan; (2) Consider more flexible
procurement and distribution options; (3) Improve coordination;
Obstacles: (1) Unstable security situation; (2) Control by warlords of
much of the country; (3) Growth of opium production; (4) Inadequate
international resources.
Areas of focus: Afghanistan reconstruction;
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop comprehensive
operational strategy/ strategic plan; (2) Improve financial data; (3)
Improve coordination; (4) Develop performance management plan for USAID
in Afghanistan; (5) Require performance management plans from
contractors; (6) Communicate performance information;
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Growth of opium production;
(3) Inadequate resources; (4) Delayed funding; (5) Poor contractor
performance and limited capacity.
Areas of focus: Afghan army and police;
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop detailed plans for
completing the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police;
(2) Help ensure congruent progress in all security pillars;
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Limited Afghan capacity; (3)
Lack of an effective judiciary; (4) Growth of opium production; (5)
Continued presence of armed militias.
Areas of focus: Drug control;
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Minimize project delays;
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Limited Afghan capacity; (3)
Lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental
institutions.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements
varied. For example, officials from the Departments of Defense
(Defense) and State (State) generally concurred with the recommendation
in our 2005 report on efforts to establish an Afghan army and police
that detailed plans would facilitate more effective management of
resources and promote better long-term planning. As of May 2007,
however, the departments had not provided us with such plans. On the
other hand, in response to recommendations in our 2004 and 2005
Afghanistan reconstruction reports, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) developed a strategic plan and performance
management plans and the agency's planning and performance management
for Afghanistan are now more thorough.
Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on,
including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that
progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security
reform agenda established by the United States and several coalition
partners. These pillars included: creating a national army,
reconstituting the police, establishing a working judiciary, combating
illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. The United
States has been involved to some degree with each of the five pillars
and initially was charged with taking the lead in establishing the
Afghan army, but has since allocated significant resources to
reconstituting the police and countering the illicit drug trade. While
some progress has been made in each pillar, the United States and its
coalition partners continue to face challenges. Although some army and
police units have been trained and equipped, Defense reports that none
are capable of independent operations, Afghanistan still has no formal
national judicial system for the police to rely upon, opium poppy
cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan police often find
themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and militias.
In the absence of national security forces capable of independently
providing security for the country, ISAF is helping to provide security
for Afghanistan. However, ISAF's ability to do so is limited by a
number of factors, such as national restrictions on its component
forces and shortages in troops and equipment. Lastly, though
reconstruction assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president,
return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of
refugees, Afghanistan continues to face reconstruction challenges,
which are exacerbated by the security-related concerns described above.
Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing,
stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade
and require continuing international assistance. If the recent
administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the
United States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier
estimates. Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping
the Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan
would decline and the overall security situation would improve.
However, Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating
security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to
operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a
total of $7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold
increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of
the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006
combined. The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult
trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing
demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in
the years ahead.
Significant oversight will be needed to help ensure the Congress has
visibility over the cost and progress of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
The enclosures that follow provide background information on
Afghanistan and discuss suggested areas for additional oversight on the
following topics:
* efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces,
* international security forces,
* counternarcotics,
* Afghanistan's judicial system, and:
* reconstruction.
These enclosures are based on our completed Afghanistan related work
and incorporate updated information from current budget and program
documents. We also discussed these topics with cognizant Defense,
State, and USAID officials involved in securing, stabilizing, and
reconstructing Afghanistan. Additionally, we met with U.S. Central
Command officials, who provided the current status of (1) their efforts
to train and equip the ANSF and (2) the recent transition of the
security mission from U.S. to ISAF control. Moreover, we met with
experts from various academic and research institutions and reviewed
their reports related to Afghanistan. Finally, we provided a draft of
this report to the relevant agencies for advanced review. Each agency
informed us that they were not providing formal comments. However, each
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. We
conducted our review from January through May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress and
cognizant congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-3031 or
willliamsbridgersj@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
enclosure VII.
Signed by:
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard D. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures:
Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited
natural resources. It is bordered by Pakistan to the east and south;
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran
to the west (see fig. 1). Afghanistan's land area is about 647,500
square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than the state of Texas.
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Map Resources.
[End of figure]
Conflict has ravaged Afghanistan for nearly three decades. The Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a
prolonged war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted
civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of the
fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a
haven for terrorists. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the
United States, several allies, and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance
forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a
safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists. In late 2001, a conference in Bonn,
Germany established a process for political reconstruction that
included the adoption of a new constitution and called for democratic
elections. On December 7, 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first
democratically elected president of Afghanistan. The National Assembly
was inaugurated on December 19, 2005.
Demographics and Development Indicators:
Afghanistan's population, estimated at over 31 million, is ethnically
and linguistically diverse. Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups include
the Pashtun (42 percent), Tajik (27), Hazara (9), Uzbek (8), Aimak (4),
and Turkmen (3). Although some ethnic groups are predominant in
specific regions, such as the Pashtun along much of the border with
Pakistan, many regions are populated by multiple ethnic groups. Over 30
languages are spoken in Afghanistan, but most of the population speaks
either Dari/Persian (46 percent) or Pashtu (42). The population is
largely rural and mostly uneducated. Almost half of the population is
under the age of 15. Islam is the predominant religion--80 percent of
the population is Sunni and 19 percent is Shi'a.
Development indicators published by the World Bank and the United
Nations (UN) rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every
category. Life expectancy at birth is 43 years of age. More than 20
percent of all Afghan children die before the age of 5, of which a
third die soon after birth. The per capita income for Afghanistan is
estimated to be about $200 per year, excluding income from illicit drug
production and trafficking, and over 70 percent of Afghan adults are
illiterate. According to the World Bank, limited available data suggest
that more than a third of rural households face chronic or temporary
shortages of food.
Natural Resources:
Resource limitations pose constraints on development in Afghanistan.
Only 12 percent of the land in Afghanistan is arable, the country has
limited access to fresh water, and potable water supplies are
inadequate. Unlike some other countries in the region, Afghanistan does
not produce oil or have substantial oil reserves. Instead, much of the
population relies on wood for fuel, which has led to rapid
deforestation and soil degradation. In addition, much of the country is
prone to damaging natural hazards, including earthquakes in the Hindu
Kush mountains, flooding, and droughts.
Economy:
After the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, the Afghan
economy grew rapidly as a new government was established and
international aid flowed into the country. While limited economic
statistics are available, the World Bank estimates that the Afghan
economy grew approximately 16 percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, and
14 percent in 2005 (see table 2). Inflation has fluctuated, from around
10 percent in 2004 and 2005 to as low as 4 percent in December 2006 due
to a decline in international energy prices, according to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).[Footnote 3] According to IMF and
private economic consulting firms, while the economy is expected to
grow rapidly over the next few years, Afghanistan is still a very poor
country attempting to recover from decades of warfare and economic
neglect.
Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005:
Indicator: Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of constant 2000 U.S.
dollars);
2000: N/A;
2001: 2.7;
2002: 4.4;
2003: 4.9;
2004: 6.1;
2005: 7.3.
Indicator: GDP growth (annual percent);
2000: N/A;
2001: N/A;
2002: 29;
2003: 16;
2004: 8;
2005: 14.
Indicator: Official development assistance (ODA) (billions of constant
2000 U.S. dollars);
2000: 0.2;
2001: 0.4;
2002: 1.4;
2003: 1.7;
2004: 2.3;
2005: 2.8.
Indicator: Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent);
2000: N/A;
2001: 17;
2002: 32;
2003: 35;
2004: 37;
2005: 38.
N/A = data unavailable:
Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the
World Bank.
Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on
constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S.
dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants.
[End of table]
Since 2001, the Afghan economy has received large amounts of foreign
assistance. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available,
official development assistance (foreign grants and concessional loans)
from international donors was $2.8 billion, or over a third the size of
the national economy. In addition, about 60 countries attended a
January 2006 conference in London on the Afghanistan Compact, which
maps out how the international community will contribute to
Afghanistan's future development. Afghanistan has also received
substantial reduction in its external debt, which had totaled over $11
billion. However, according to IMF, Afghanistan's ability to assume
additional debt for development purposes is limited due to
Afghanistan's remaining debt and limited export revenues.
In terms of international trade, Afghanistan's exports are dominated by
illicit narcotics (opium and its products, morphine and heroin), which
have an estimated total value of $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion per year,
according to the World Bank.[Footnote 4] By contrast, officially
recorded exports are estimated at several hundred million dollars. The
country is highly import dependent for basic goods like petroleum
products; construction materials; machinery and equipment; medicines;
textiles; and, in bad harvest years, food, with imports financed
largely by aid and (to a considerable extent) illicit drug proceeds.
According to the World Bank, growth and diversification of legal
exports will be critical for the country's longer-term development
success.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National
Security Forces Face Several Challenges:
In the wake of decades of war that left Afghanistan without an army or
a functioning police force, the United States, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and other coalition nations have been
working to develop the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National
Police--referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--to
provide security for Afghanistan. After several years of relative calm
since the ousting of the Taliban, security deteriorated significantly
in 2006. The use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings
increased fourfold, with approximately 130 suicide attacks launched by
militants. This deterioration in security has been blamed in part on
the weakness of the ANSF.
The United States has provided over $6 billion through fiscal year 2006
to train and equip the Afghan army and police. Citing deteriorating
security in Afghanistan and the need to rapidly establish independent
security forces, the administration has requested $7.6 billion and $2.9
billion for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, respectively, to accelerate
efforts to train and equip the ANSF (see table 3).
Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008:
Dollars in millions.
Assistance program: Afghan army[B];
Fiscal years: 2002: $76.9;
Fiscal years: 2003: $372.6;
Fiscal years: 2004: $723.7;
Fiscal years: 2005: $1,736.6;
Fiscal years: 2006: $768.0;
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: $4,883.2;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $1,903.7;
Total: $10,464.7.
Assistance program: Afghan police;
Fiscal years: 2002: 25.5;
Fiscal years: 2003: 5.0;
Fiscal years: 2004: 223.9;
Fiscal years: 2005: 813.9;
Fiscal years: 2006: 1,293.7;
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: 2,730.6;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 948.9;
Total: 6,041.5.
Total;
Fiscal years: 2002: $102.4;
Fiscal years: 2003: $377.6;
Fiscal years: 2004: $947.6;
Fiscal years: 2005: $2,550.5;
Fiscal years: 2006: $2,061.7;
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: $7,613.8;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $2,852.6;
Total: $16,506.2.
Sources: Departments of Defense and State.
[A] Fiscal year 2007 includes approximately $1.6 billion that has been
appropriated and approximately $6 billion as requested by Defense in
the 2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.
[B] Afghan army includes detainee operations.
[End of table]
According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials,
the 2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of
sufficient mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State[Footnote
5] to complete the training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008-
-almost a year ahead of previous plans--at which time the United States
would transition its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to
Defense progress reports from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops[Footnote
6] and 62,500[Footnote 7] police officers and patrolmen and women have
been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore, over the next 2 years,
* Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000 army
personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops (for a
total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an Afghan Ministry
of Defense and military sustaining institutions;[Footnote 8] and:
* Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of
82,000 police personnel--an increase of 20,000 over previous plans--
including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the reform of
Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police.
These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of
efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial improvements in
the current forces' capabilities to operate independently. According to
Defense progress reports from March 2007, no army combat units are
fully capable of operating independently and less than 20 percent are
fully capable of leading operations with coalition support. Defense
reports that no Afghan police units are fully capable of operating
independently and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to
lead operations with coalition support.[Footnote 9] Moreover, according
to Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of
forces on hand is less than those trained. For example, although 20,400
combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007,
Defense officials stated that approximately 15,000 were actually
present for duty.[Footnote 10]
Furthermore, efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have faced
problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense planned to
equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet weapons and
armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn
out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, Defense
began providing the forces with U.S. equipment--an effort that faces
challenges.[Footnote 11] As security has deteriorated, equipment needs
have changed, and their associated costs have increased. For example,
the Afghan army was initially provided with pickup trucks, such as
those in figure 2, and 9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has
begun providing more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more
lethal weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients receive,
retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged. For example,
the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG) reported that when the
United States first began training the police, State's contractor
provided trainees with a one-time issue of uniforms and nonlethal
equipment upon graduation. However, many students sold their equipment
before they reached their duty stations, and the program was
terminated. The IGs reported that most equipment is now distributed
from Kabul to police units' provincial headquarters, but hoarding
equipment is reportedly a large problem, maintenance is insufficient,
and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is
limited.[Footnote 12]
Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for
managing the country's national police force, faces a number of
problems that have required reform or restructuring. According to
officials from State and its police training contractor, these problems
include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure overburdened
with senior-level officers; lack of communication and control between
central command and the regions, provinces, and districts; pay
disparity between the army and police; and a lack of professional
standards and internal discipline. According to State, the Ministry of
Interior is in the process of implementing pay and rank reforms.
Reforms to date include removal of over 2,000 high-ranking officers
(colonel and above) and steps to make pay for rank-and-file police
officers more equitable. Additional planned reforms include
establishing parity between the salaries of police and military and
selecting police officers based on merit rather than loyalty and local
influence.
Prior Recommendations:
In our 2005 report on the Afghan security forces, we recommended that,
because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial
resources, the Secretaries of Defense and State develop detailed plans
for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. We
proposed the plans include clearly defined objectives and performance
measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future funding
requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved,
including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. We
suggested that the Secretaries provide this information to the Congress
when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan army or
police forces.
In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security
sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and
trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating
militia fighters--is critical to the success of the army and police
programs, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State work
with the other nations to help ensure that progress in the other
pillars is congruent with the progress made in the army and police
programs. We suggested that the Secretaries regularly report to the
Congress--no less than annually--on the progress made in addressing
these other security pillars.
Though Defense and State generally concurred with our recommendations,
both suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need
to report their plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and
police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State reporting to the
Congress, however, indicated that the departments did not have the
detailed plans as we recommended. In recent months, we again asked
Defense and State for plans that are responsive to the recommendation.
Though both Defense and State officials asserted that detailed plans
for fielding fully functioning Afghan army and police forces by a
stated end date have been done, they have not provided them to us. We
continue to believe that developing and following such plans and
ensuring concurrent progress in the other security pillars is essential
to the overall future success of the Afghan security effort.
Oversight Questions:
* What is the overall strategic plan for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan?
What is the operational concept for the ANSF? How are U.S. plans to
train and equip the ANSF incorporated into the strategic plan for
Afghanistan?
* How much funding has the United States provided to train and equip
the ANSF? How do Defense and State track funding for the ANSF,
including obligations and expenditures? What equipment, training, and
services has the United States provided through drawdowns and as excess
defense articles?
* How much funding, training, equipment, or other services have the
other coalition partners provided to train and equip the ANSF?
* What is the anticipated total cost to fully train and equip the ANSF?
What is the estimated annual cost to sustain these forces, and who will
pay for it? What are the plans for Afghanistan to take program and
financial responsibility for its army and police?
* What have been the results to date of efforts to train and equip the
ANSF? What and how much equipment has been provided? How does the
United States track where it is and how it is used? How many troops
have been trained and equipped? Of those, how many are available for
duty? What are the capabilities of these troops to operate
independently of coalition troops?
* What performance measures are used to assess progress in developing
Afghan army sustaining institutions? What progress has been made? What
is the desired end state, and what is the anticipated time frame for
completion?
* What performance measures are used to assess progress in reforming
the Afghan Ministry of Interior? What progress has been made? What is
the desired end state, and what is the anticipated time frame for
completion?
[End of section]
Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several
Factors:
Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), with approximately 35,000 troops from 37
nations,[Footnote 13] was formed to assist the government of
Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment to enable
reconstruction. ISAF was formed in December 2001 under a United Nations
(UN) mandate to provide security in Kabul and its surrounding area, and
to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment. In
2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to (1)
assume command and control for the ISAF mission and (2) assume
responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in northern
and western Afghanistan. Although NATO had difficulty persuading
nations to provide the resources needed for these teams, as of November
2006, it oversees 25 PRTs throughout Afghanistan, which are structured
around five regional commands, as shown in figure 3. Twelve PRTs are
led by the United States. The PRTs' mission is to assist the government
of Afghanistan to extend its authority; to facilitate the development
of a stable and secure environment; and, through military presence,
enable security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT has
a lead country assigned, but PRTs are joint military-civilian
organizations and often include representatives from other ISAF member
states. For example, the United States has officials from the
Departments of State and Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) at many of the PRTs to observe and
assist in reconstruction efforts.
Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: ISAF and Defense (data); Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
ISAF's responsibilities and efforts in Afghanistan are increasing.
However, its ability to provide security for the country is limited by
a number of factors. Although NATO has command over ISAF troops,
control is ultimately exercised by each nation. ISAF's rules of
engagement are heavily influenced by limitations imposed by national
governments (referred to as national caveats) that, for example,
prevent troops from some countries from performing certain tasks or
missions, or moving between geographic areas of operation. As a result,
the burden of combat, when it arises, falls disproportionately on the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania,
Australia, and Estonia, which have forces in or lead PRTs in the more
hostile regions of Afghanistan. Furthermore, some ISAF troops are
limited by shortages of certain types of critical equipment, and most
do not have strategic capacity, such as airlift.
Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated into the ISAF chain
of command. Therefore, each lead nation can have its own concept,
priorities, and, in some cases, national caveats that guide specific
PRT operations. For some PRTs, particularly in the more volatile south
and east, providing security is the priority, but for others in more
secure areas, reconstruction is the highest priority. Overall, PRTs aim
to contribute to stability and facilitate reconstruction via activities
such as patrolling, monitoring, influence, and mediation. Many have
also participated to some extent in specific reconstruction projects by
providing funding or other assistance, particularly in areas where
nongovernmental organizations have been unable to operate.
The U.S.-led PRTs facilitate reconstruction by providing security but
also devote substantial resources to reconstruction projects that are
designed to advance U.S. security objectives. U.S. commanders,
including those leading PRTs, have access to funds provided under
Defense's Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). According to
Defense officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, CERP funds for
Afghanistan totaled $391 million, and the requests for fiscal years
2007 and 2008 are $231 million and $210 million, respectively.
According to the U.S. Central Command, CERP-funded projects are
intended to gain the confidence of local residents and leaders and
discourage them from cooperating with insurgents. U.S. CERP funds have
been used by PRT commanders for rapid implementation of small-scale
projects, such as providing latrines for a school or a generator for a
hospital, and do not require prior approval or coordination at the
federal level.
Oversight Questions:
* How do the national caveats placed on the various ISAF forces affect
ISAF's ability to provide security for Afghanistan and the operations
of the PRTs? What equipment shortages and capability limitations exist
among the ISAF-member nations and how are they being addressed?
* What reconstruction programs and projects do the various PRTs engage
in? How do PRT lead nations manage their programs to ensure
accountability?
* How much funding has Defense provided for CERP-funded projects in
Afghanistan? How are CERP funds being used in Afghanistan? How does
Defense track CERP projects and ensure accountability for the use of
these funds?
* How does the United States coordinate its PRTs with those run by
other coalition partners? How does the United States coordinate its
CERP-funded PRT reconstruction projects with USAID and other donors
(including nongovernmental organizations) who may be providing
reconstruction assistance in the area?
[End of section]
Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan:
Combating illicit narcotics in Afghanistan is one of the five security
pillars. Since 2002, the United States has provided over $1.5 billion
to stem the production and trafficking of illicit drugs--primarily
opiates--in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. and international efforts in
these areas, the UN estimated that the number of hectares of opium
poppy under cultivation grew by 50 percent in 2006, and a record 6,100
metric tons of opium was produced. The UN estimated that the export
value of opium and its derivatives--morphine and heroin--equaled about
a third of Afghanistan's licit economy, with drug profits reportedly
funding terrorists and other antigovernment entities. Initial estimates
for 2007 indicate that the amount of opium poppy under cultivation will
remain the same or possibly increase. The continued prevalence of opium
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking throughout Afghanistan imperils
efforts to secure and stabilize the country.
To combat opium poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and their negative
effects on Afghan institutions and society, the United States, working
with allied governments, in 2005 developed a five-pillared
counternarcotics strategy addressing (1) alternative livelihoods, (2)
elimination and eradication, (3) interdiction, (4) law enforcement and
justice reform, and (5) public information. USAID and State initiated a
number of projects under each of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy's
five pillars, but delays in implementation--due to the security
situation, poor infrastructure, and other factors--limited progress.
Many projects have not been in place long enough to fully assess
progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy
cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking.
Alternative livelihoods. USAID implemented projects to provide economic
alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the amount of
Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug industry.
Results varied in the three principal alternative livelihoods regions,
in part because of the differing security risks and access to
infrastructure.
Elimination and eradication. State supported the Afghan government's
efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops if
prevention failed. State provided support for central and provincial
eradication efforts (see fig. 4). Central government eradication
efforts improved with the reorganization of the Afghan Eradication
Force (AEF) into smaller, more mobile units and the addition of
purchased and leased transport and logistical-support aircraft.
However, in 2006, AEF's fielding was delayed because of coordination
problems, reducing the amount of eradication possible. In addition, not
all Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams, which were designed to help
governors discourage farmers from growing poppy, were fully fielded.
Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
Interdiction. State and Defense assisted Drug Enforcement
Administration-led efforts to help build Afghan capacity to destroy
drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major
traffickers. State and Defense also provided support for border
security enhancements in neighboring countries and the counternarcotics
police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan, State began border security projects.
Law enforcement and justice reform. State supported the Afghan
government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and
punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State provided support for
Department of Justice prosecutors, who helped develop and implement a
new counternarcotics law; corrections reform, including training guards
and refurbishing courthouses; and a planned justice center.
Public information. State led a public information campaign intended to
convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy cultivation and trade.
However, because of delays with the PEP team implementation, the
campaign was not able to rely on planned support from the teams.
Prior Recommendation:
In our 2005 report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police,
we concluded that progress in the other security pillars was critical
to eventually sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the army
and police.[Footnote 14] As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State
have not specifically reported on progress in the counternarcotics or
other security pillars, as we recommended.
Oversight Questions:
* What is the current status of U.S. funding provided for
counternarcotics in Afghanistan, and how much has been expended? What
has this funding supported?
* What is the status of the State-and USAID-funded counternarcotics
programs? What has been accomplished in each of the five
counternarcotics pillars?
* What counternarcotics assistance have the Departments of Defense and
Justice, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, provided?
* How will the Afghan counternarcotics strategy be adjusted if, as is
expected, the 2007 poppy cultivation figures show no decrease?
[End of section]
Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags
behind the Other Security Pillars:
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of
law is a prerequisite for effective policing. It is one of the five
security pillars. However, according to donor officials, few linkages
exist in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the
police have little ability to enforce judicial rulings. In addition,
judges and prosecutors are not being exposed to police training and
practices.
Supported by the United States, other donors, and international
organizations, Italy--initially the lead nation for reforming the
judiciary--followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and
drafting legal codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3)
renovating the country's physical legal infrastructure. However,
according to Italian and U.S. government officials, the reform program
was underfunded and understaffed.
Nevertheless, Italy and the other donors made some progress in
promoting reform. This included drafting a new criminal procedure code,
training several hundred judges, and renovating courthouses. USAID
officials indicated that they continue to have projects to develop a
judicial code of conduct and to train both sitting and new judges. They
also have projects to develop and implement uniform procedures and
rules for courts and to establish a common curriculum for law courses.
Also, as noted in enclosure IV, the United States has supported the
Afghan government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest,
prosecute, and punish illicit drug traffickers and corrupt officials.
However, these accomplishments and current efforts address only a
portion of Afghanistan's overall need for judicial reform.
Afghanistan's judicial sector is characterized by a conflicting mix of
civil, religious, and customary laws, with too few trained judges,
prosecutors, or other justice personnel. Furthermore, its penal system
is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, official records, and essential
office equipment and furniture have been damaged extensively. U.S. and
other donor officials informed us that progress in rebuilding the
judicial sector lags behind the other security pillars and that the
reform effort is being undermined by systemic corruption at key
national and provincial justice institutions.
Prior Recommendation:
Although we did not specifically examine U.S. assistance efforts to
help establish a working judiciary in Afghanistan, in our 2005 report
on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police, we concluded that
progress in the other security pillars is critical to eventually
sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the army and
police.[Footnote 15] As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State have
not specifically reported on progress in the judicial or other security
pillars, as we recommended.
Oversight Questions:
* What is the status of efforts to develop a working judicial system in
Afghanistan?
* How much funding has the United States provided for Afghanistan's
judicial system, and how much of that has been expended? What has this
funding been used for?
* What are the key obstacles to judicial reform, and how will they be
addressed?
* To what extent have the United States, its coalition partners, and
the government of Afghanistan developed a strategy, clear objectives,
and an estimate of the time and resources needed to complete justice
sector reforms?
[End of section]
Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and
Are Constrained by Security Concerns:
To date, the United States has provided about $4.4 billion for
reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the administration has requested an
additional $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Reconstruction
assistance to Afghanistan, largely led by USAID with support from
international donors and other U.S. government entities, helped
Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions of children to
school, and repatriate millions of refugees. However, the
reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are immense, and reconstruction
efforts face a number of challenges. Afghanistan is one of the world's
poorest countries and ranks near the bottom of virtually every
development indicator category, such as life expectancy; literacy;
nutrition; and infant, child, and maternal mortality (see encl. I).
Nearly three decades of war and extended drought have destroyed
Afghanistan's infrastructure, economy, and government.
U.S. reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan has taken place in three
stages since the ouster of the Taliban. In 2002 and 2003, USAID
initially focused on humanitarian and short-term assistance, such as
assistance to displaced persons and food assistance, which helped avert
widespread famine. Although USAID continues to provide some
humanitarian assistance, this assistance is now a much smaller part of
its program.
In 2004, USAID expanded assistance to include quick impact projects,
such as infrastructure projects. At that time, due to a variety of
obstacles, especially security and limited Afghan capacity, USAID had
not met all of its reconstruction targets in areas such as health,
education, and infrastructure. The largest component of these
reconstruction efforts was the construction of roads, which, after
decades of neglect, were in disrepair or lacking altogether. The United
States, Afghanistan, and international donors deemed road construction
critical to economic growth and security.
In recent years, USAID expanded Afghan reconstruction assistance to a
comprehensive development package that focuses more on increasing
Afghan capacity and aims to address a wide range of needs, such as
agriculture, education, health, road construction, power generation,
and others. As shown in table 4, USAID has allocated reconstruction
assistance to 12 primary program categories, with more than $1.8
billion, or about 27 percent of U.S. reconstruction assistance, to
roads.
Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category:
Dollars in millions.
Program category: Roads;
Fiscal years: 2002: $51;
Fiscal years: 2003: $142;
Fiscal years: 2004: $354;
Fiscal years: 2005: $276;
Fiscal years: 2006: $255;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: $446;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $338;
Total[A]: $1,862;
Percent of total[A]: 27.
Program category: Power generation;
Fiscal years: 2002: 3;
Fiscal years: 2003: 0;
Fiscal years: 2004: 77;
Fiscal years: 2005: 286;
Fiscal years: 2006: 61;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 135;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 203;
Total[A]: 765;
Percent of total[A]: 11.
Program category: Alternative livelihoods;
Fiscal years: 2002: 3;
Fiscal years: 2003: 1;
Fiscal years: 2004: 5;
Fiscal years: 2005: 185;
Fiscal years: 2006: 121;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 211;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 121;
Total[A]: 647;
Percent of total[A]: 9.
Program category: Elections, governance, rule of law, Office of
Transition Initiatives;
Fiscal years: 2002: 25;
Fiscal years: 2003: 42;
Fiscal years: 2004: 153;
Fiscal years: 2005: 103;
Fiscal years: 2006: 23;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 124;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 56;
Total[A]: 526;
Percent of total[A]: 8.
Program category: Support to government of Afghanistan;
Fiscal years: 2002: 41;
Fiscal years: 2003: 40;
Fiscal years: 2004: 103;
Fiscal years: 2005: 117;
Fiscal years: 2006: 60;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 47;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 62;
Total[A]: 470;
Percent of total[A]: 7.
Program category: Health and clinics;
Fiscal years: 2002: 8;
Fiscal years: 2003: 56;
Fiscal years: 2004: 83;
Fiscal years: 2005: 111;
Fiscal years: 2006: 51;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 72;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 66;
Total[A]: 447;
Percent of total[A]: 7.
Program category: Education and schools;
Fiscal years: 2002: 19;
Fiscal years: 2003: 21;
Fiscal years: 2004: 104;
Fiscal years: 2005: 86;
Fiscal years: 2006: 49;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 62;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 54;
Total[A]: 395;
Percent of total[A]: 6.
Program category: Food assistance;
Fiscal years: 2002: 159;
Fiscal years: 2003: 51;
Fiscal years: 2004: 49;
Fiscal years: 2005: 57;
Fiscal years: 2006: 60;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 22;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 10;
Total[A]: 408;
Percent of total[A]: 6.
Program category: Economic growth;
Fiscal years: 2002: 21;
Fiscal years: 2003: 12;
Fiscal years: 2004: 84;
Fiscal years: 2005: 91;
Fiscal years: 2006: 46;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 68;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 61;
Total[A]: 382;
Percent of total[A]: 6.
Program category: Agriculture;
Fiscal years: 2002: 27;
Fiscal years: 2003: 56;
Fiscal years: 2004: 50;
Fiscal years: 2005: 77;
Fiscal years: 2006: 27;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 55;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 31;
Total[A]: 324;
Percent of total[A]: 5.
Program category: Provincial Reconstruction Teams;
Fiscal years: 2002: 0;
Fiscal years: 2003: 11;
Fiscal years: 2004: 56;
Fiscal years: 2005: 85;
Fiscal years: 2006: 20;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 117;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 30;
Total[A]: 319;
Percent of total[A]: 5.
Program category: Internally displaced persons;
Fiscal years: 2002: 108;
Fiscal years: 2003: 23;
Fiscal years: 2004: 10;
Fiscal years: 2005: 0;
Fiscal years: 2006: 0;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 0;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 0 ;
Total[A]: 141;
Percent of total[A]: 2.
Program category: Other[B];
Fiscal years: 2002: 7;
Fiscal years: 2003: 7;
Fiscal years: 2004: 45;
Fiscal years: 2005: 37;
Fiscal years: 2006: 5;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 15;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 16;
Total[A]: 131;
Percent of total[A]: 2.
Total;
Fiscal years: 2002: $471;
Fiscal years: 2003: $462;
Fiscal years: 2004: $1,173;
Fiscal years: 2005: $1,511;
Fiscal years: 2006: $778;
Fiscal years: 2007 request: $1,374;
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $1,048;
Total[A]: $6,817;
Percent of total[A]: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[A] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[B] Includes water, information technology, and program support.
[End of table]
USAID's road construction efforts include primary roads, including
parts of Afghanistan's ring road, and secondary and urban roads, some
of which connect to the ring road, as depicted in figure 5.
Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Road reconstruction and construction has attracted considerable donor
assistance. As of January 2007, about $5.2 billion for transportation
infrastructure projects had been provided or promised by the United
States and more than 10 other donors. Nearly $4 billion of this was for
366 completed projects, including most of the ring road. The ring road
connects Kabul to Kandahar in the south, Herat in the east, and Mazar-e-
Sharif in the north, completing a circle or ring. The portion of the
ring road from Kabul to Kandahar was a signature project for USAID--
opening in December 2003 to much fanfare. The Kabul-Kandahar road
reduced travel time between the two cities from several days to 6
hours. However, the U.S. Embassy has restricted official U.S. travel on
the road because of heightened security risks.
Because most reconstruction project evaluation has not yet taken place,
it is not clear whether the broad range of USAID's reconstruction
programs in Afghanistan has led to improved results in many sectors or
whether, given the obstacles USAID faces, the breadth of its efforts
limits USAID's ability to achieve significant results in a smaller set
of priority areas.
In addition, many of USAID's reconstruction programs target specific
geographic areas. In 2005, we reported that two-thirds of obligated
fiscal year 2004 funds supported local projects in Afghanistan's 34
provinces, but Kabul and Kandahar provinces received approximately 70
percent of these funds, mainly for roads. More recently, alternative
livelihood programs have focused on providing economic alternatives in
opium poppy-growing areas. Further, the administration's proposed
budget for fiscal year 2008 specifies that some of the funding be
provided for roads in areas targeted by insurgents and for rural
development in poppy-producing regions. Focusing assistance on such
targeted geographic regions has resulted in some complaints that
regions only receive assistance if they have problems such as opium
poppy cultivation or heightened security concerns.
Prior Recommendations:
In 2004, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID revise USAID's
strategy for its assistance program to Afghanistan.[Footnote 16]
Specifically, we suggested that, among other things, the strategy
should contain measurable goals, specific time frames, and resource
levels. We also recommended that the Secretary of State produce an
annual consolidated budget report and semiannual obligation and
expenditure reports. In response, USAID agreed and has revised its
operational strategy for Afghanistan much as we suggested. State, on
the other hand, disagreed and noted that it already keeps the Congress
informed through briefings, hearings, and mandated reports. We
disagreed at the time and continue to believe that regular reporting of
both obligations and expenditures for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan
would provide the Congress with a more complete picture of what funds
actually have been spent.
In 2005, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) establish a
performance management plan that complies with USAID directives, (2)
clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that
contractors are to develop performance management plans specific to the
work they are conducting, and (3) more completely communicate the
performance information from the plans to executive decision makers in
Kabul and Washington, D.C.[Footnote 17] Overall, USAID concurred and
has developed the performance management plans we suggested. However,
USAID's plans are ambitious and assume that security in Afghanistan
will improve, which has not happened.
Oversight Questions:
* How much funding has the United States provided for Afghanistan's
reconstruction, and how much of that has been expended? What has been
achieved to date? What obstacles have been encountered? How has USAID
taken these obstacles, such as the worsening security situation, into
account in planning for future reconstruction efforts?
* What are USAID's reconstruction priorities? How have USAID funds been
allocated? How are USAID's programs prioritized and sequenced? What is
the current geographic distribution of obligated funds for local
programs? How do USAID's reconstruction priorities align with the
overall U.S. strategy for securing and stabilizing Afghanistan?
[End of section]
Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3031 or
willliamsbridgersj@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report include Al Huntington (Assistant
Director), David Bruno, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa,
Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, David Gootnick,
Elizabeth Guran, Laura Holliday, John Hutton, Ernie Jackson, Hynek
Kalkus, Reid Lowe, Elizabeth Repko, George Taylor, Phil Thomas, Pierre
Toureille, Adam Vodraska, Tim Wedding, Eve Weisberg, Christina Werth,
and Loren Yager.
FOOTNOTES
[1] This does not include the cost of U.S. military operations.
[2] GAO, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, GAO-03-607
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); Afghanistan Reconstruction:
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress;
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 2004); Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress,
Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten
Achievement of U.S. Goals, GAO-05-742 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005); Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have
Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005); Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite
Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S.
Goals, GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006).
[3] In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue
to affect Afghanistan's national accounts, balance of payments,
monetary, and social sector data. Given the security environment in
Afghanistan and the ongoing development of the statistical system's
capacity, statistics presented here for context and background should
not be considered completely reliable.
[4] The World Bank reports that data are limited on the extent of
production and export of opium, given its illicit nature.
[5] Defense is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan army.
Defense and State share responsibility for police training.
[6] We note that in early 2005, Defense reported that it had provided
basic training for 18,300 combat troops and projected that it could
train an additional 27,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007, for a
total of 46,000 combat troops (see GAO-05-575).
[7] Defense officials indicated that Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior
reports the number of police assigned and that these numbers may not be
reliable. The Ministry of Interior Forces include, among others:
uniformed police, border police, counternarcotics police, and personnel
for sustaining purposes, such as training, education, and procurement.
[8] Sustaining institutions include medical, logistics, intelligence,
and recruiting units.
[9] Although Defense reports that no army or police units are fully
capable of operating independently of coalition forces, Defense
officials stated that some units of the Afghan army have conducted
successful operations and State officials provided examples of
successful police operations.
[10] Defense officials state that approximately 40 percent of the
absences were authorized and 60 percent were unauthorized.
[11] These efforts began in 2005; however, the equipment did not arrive
until 2006.
[12] U.S. Departments of Defense and State Inspectors General,
Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness
(Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2006).
[13] These include about 14,000 U.S. troops and 21,000 troops from the
36 other coalition member countries. In January 2007, several NATO
countries pledged to send additional troops.
[14] GAO-05-575.
[15] GAO-05-575.
[16] GAO-04-403.
[17] GAO-05-742.
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