Foot and Mouth Disease
To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues Gao ID: GAO-02-808 July 26, 2002The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered more than 4 million animals and sustained losses of $5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years. Following the outbreak, the country was generally barred from participating in the international trade of live animals and animal products that could transmit the virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and others with this information, but it lacks adequate processes for sharing this information with the Customs Service. The United States receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed abroad, international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign governments. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and regions in which they are stationed, which ensures that the United States has timely access to information on foreign FMD outbreaks. However, USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S. livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face several challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, although USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease response plans.
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Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate:
July 2002:
Foot and Mouth Disease:
To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve
Outstanding Issues:
GAO-02-808:
Letter:
Executive Summary:
Purpose:
Background:
Results in Brief:
Principal Findings:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Chapter 1:
FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease:
Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive:
International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate FMD:
An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars:
Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant:
USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other
Animal Diseases:
U.S. Customs Service Supports USDA‘s Efforts at Ports of Entry:
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Chapter 2:
USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from Multiple
Sources:
USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of FMD Information
to Customs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Chapter 3:
USDA‘s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries Help
Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock:
Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to
FMD Remains:
U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other
Countries:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Chapter 4:
The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and Tested
Emergency Response Plans:
Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be
Resolved:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD-Free by the United States
Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into
Canada
Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into
Mexico
Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
Tables:
Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
Products:
Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the
2001
Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom:
Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the
United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products,
Fiscal Year 2001:
Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised U.S.
Declaration Forms:
Figures:
Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002:
Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002:
Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:
Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:
Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom:
Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United
Kingdom:
Abbreviations:
APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service:
BSE: bovine spongiform encephalopathy:
CCRA: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency:
CFIA: Canadian Food Inspection Agency:
DEFRA: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs:
FAS: Foreign Agricultural Service:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FMD: foot and mouth disease:
FSIS : Food Safety and Inspection Service:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
NAHEMS: National Animal Health Emergency Management System:
OIE: Office International des Epizooties:
pH: potential of hydrogen:
SAGARPA: Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca
y Alimentaction:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
WTO: World Trade Organization:
Letter July 26, 2002:
The Honorable Tom Daschle
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Daschle:
As requested, we are reporting on the United States‘ ability to prevent
the introduction of foot and mouth disease. This report contains
recommendations to the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the need to
develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on foreign
disease outbreaks to the Customs Service, improve some of the
preventive measures used in the United States, and develop plans and
timetables to address any outstanding issues that could impede a U.S.
response.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to other
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; the
Commissioner of Customs; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Lawrence J. Dyckman
Director, Natural Resources
and Environment:
Signed by Lawrence J. Dyckman
[End of section]
Executive Summary:
Purpose:
The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom
decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious
animal disease can cause to a nation‘s livestock industry and other
sectors of the economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8
months later, the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals
to control the disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the
food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its
tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for
almost 34 years; following the outbreak, the country was, until
recently, generally restricted from participating in the international
trade of live animals, and animal and other products that could
transmit the FMD virus.
The United States is an FMD-free nation and has not had an outbreak of
the disease since 1929. In 2001, the U.S. livestock and poultry sector
was valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock
industry to the U.S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U.S.
livestock from FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United
States (foreign animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to
determine whether (1) U.S. processes to obtain and disseminate
information on foreign FMD outbreaks are adequate, (2) U.S. measures
for preventing FMD from entering the United States are effective and
comparable with those of other selected countries, and (3) the United
States could respond quickly and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if
it were to occur.
To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports,
airports, and international mail-processing facilities in New Jersey,
Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection
stations on the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders to observe
inspection procedures for livestock imports and met with government
officials in these countries who are responsible for protecting their
nation‘s livestock from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians
in six states that are major producers of U.S. livestock, and
international passengers and U.S. veterinarians who were in the United
Kingdom during the outbreak. In addition, GAO reviewed and summarized
legislation, regulations, and publicly available documents on the
measures used by the European Union and the United Kingdom to prevent
the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 1 for a detailed description of
GAO‘s scope and methodology.)::
Background:
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals such
as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever and
blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals
recover from an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated
and causes severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have
human health implications.
Animals, people, or any materials that bring the virus into contact
with susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy virus, and in
the right environmental conditions can persist in contaminated items,
such as soil and manure, for weeks or months. Only about 40 percent of
countries worldwide are considered FMD-free, but all three North
American countries are FMD-free.
USDA‘s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is
responsible for protecting U.S. livestock from the introduction of
foreign animal diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its
responsibilities, APHIS conducts activities to exclude animal disease,
detect and eradicate it, and educate the public about it. APHIS
inspectors are present at 144 U.S. ports of entry, as well as in some
foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of international cargo,
passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this includes all major U.S.
ports.
In an effort to keep U.S. animals free of foreign animal diseases, the
U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is an important federal partner,
supporting USDA‘s activities at each of the 301 ports of entry into the
United States. Customs is the first line of defense at U.S. ports
against the entry of prohibited and illegal items, particularly when
the port does not have APHIS personnel.
Results in Brief:
The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on
foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA agencies and others with this
information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing this
information with Customs. The United States receives information on FMD
outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in foreign countries,
international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign
governments directly. In particular, USDA has animal health experts
stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade officials stationed in
129 countries. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and
animal health information about the countries and regions in which they
are stationed, which allows the United States to have access to
information on foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However,
USDA‘s processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks
are uneven. For example, after receiving official notification from the
United Kingdom on February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that
country, USDA immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington,
D.C., and their field locations, and during the month of March provided
the public, industry, state and local governments, and private
veterinarians with information and guidance about FMD prevention. But
USDA has no formal process for providing Customs with information. As a
result, Customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry did not receive
uniform information or guidance on FMD prevention activities after the
U.K. outbreak. Customs received this information only after formally
requesting it from the Administrator of APHIS--over a month after the
United Kingdom‘s notification. During this interval, many Customs
inspectors said they felt ill equipped to adequately process
international cargo and passengers at U.S. ports of entry. While USDA
has taken an interim step to improve notification to Customs about
foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is recommending further improvements to
establish a more permanent solution and ensure that Customs has clear
procedures for handling passengers and cargo from countries affected by
FMD.
U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to
those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of
the disease for almost 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of
the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of
international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to
the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from
reaching U.S. livestock.
* USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by
helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example,
USDA supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD-free
buffer zone between North and Central America, which are FMD-free, and
South America, which is not.
* USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at
ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers,
and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. For example,
in response to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately
prohibited imports of susceptible animal products from the United
Kingdom, including those shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official
notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until
USDA reassessed the United Kingdom‘s animal disease status and
determined the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly,
at airports, USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to
ensure that international passengers do not inadvertently bring items
into the country that could carry the FMD virus.
However, these and other efforts cannot completely eliminate the
vulnerability of U.S. livestock because (1) some level of risk is
inherent in international travel and trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus
that may remain viable for days or even weeks on shoes and in hay or
certain meat and dairy products, and (3) the volume of legal and
illegal international trade and passengers entering the United States
makes it impossible for U.S. inspectors to inspect and ensure the
safety of every shipment, baggage, or person entering the country.
Furthermore, although the preventive measures the United States,
Canada, and Mexico have implemented are similar, these other countries‘
implementation measures suggest opportunities for USDA to improve its
preventive measures. For example, all three countries use signs at
airports to alert passengers about FMD and the need to keep it out of
the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican signs are much more
noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more colorful. GAO is
recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their effectiveness.
In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face a number
of challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, even though
USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease
response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation, coordination,
and communication between state and federal agencies and between
federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA is
making improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between
the states. Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate
infrastructure, including a massive commitment of manpower and
laboratory resources. USDA has developed agreements with other federal
agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, to leverage additional resources. However, gaps
remain. For example, it is unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200
additional veterinarians trained in responding to foreign animal
diseases that it estimates the nation will need to respond to an FMD
outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating to animal
identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been
addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to
identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it
is unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner.
USDA currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues.
However, the effectiveness and speed of a U.S. response may be
compromised if these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before
an FMD outbreak occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans
with interim and final milestones to ensure that these issues are
addressed in a timely fashion.
Principal Findings:
USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks but Can Improve Dissemination to Customs:
USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal
diseases, including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include
USDA‘s network of staff stationed in foreign countries, international
animal health and trade organizations, and the governments of affected
nations. However, the usefulness of the information on foreign FMD
outbreaks depends on a foreign country‘s willingness to provide
accurate information in a timely fashion. For example, in 2001,
Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some regions of their
country had been affected with FMD, although unconfirmed reports
indicated that the disease had been present for several months,
according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take official action to
prohibit FMD-susceptible products from Argentina until it received an
official notification of the outbreak or obtained verifiable scientific
evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.
APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all
need current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all
play an important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak.
While APHIS immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no
formal process or defined procedures to distribute information on
foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. For example, after the U.K. outbreak,
APHIS did not inform Customs about its decisions to prohibit or
restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers arriving
at U.S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Until the Acting
Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing
from the Administrator of APHIS, Customs did not receive any official
guidance on general inspection measures for passengers and products.
According to a Customs memorandum and officials we spoke to, many
Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped to adequately process
international cargo and passengers at ports of entry during the initial
stages of the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, according to Customs officials,
these inspectors are not animal disease specialists, and therefore need
clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process international
passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports where there is
no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although Customs had
not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the past, a
Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive future
alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step,
however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for
formal and well-defined communication procedures and protocols between
APHIS and Customs.
U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those of Other Countries,
but Providing Complete Protection May Be Infeasible:
The United States seeks to prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting
various programs to control and eradicate the disease overseas and by
screening livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the
nation‘s ports of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control
FMD outbreaks, USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U.S.
borders. For example, in North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and
control FMD have largely focused on Mexico because of the shared border
and the possible threat that the FMD virus could move overland from
South America, where the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA
helped Mexico eradicate FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that
Mexico remains disease free. Similarly, USDA programs have helped
create FMD-free zones in Colombia and Panama. These zones will help
alert countries in both Central and North America about the potential
incursion of FMD from the south. Also, when other countries have an
outbreak, USDA may provide support by sending U.S. veterinarians to
help control and eradicate the disease. For example, a total of about
327 U.S. animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians,
helped eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom.
USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could
enter the United States and has implemented measures to prevent
potentially infected animals or products from entering the country. For
example, USDA allows imported livestock only from countries that are
free of FMD and other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by
appropriate import permits and health certificates and may subject
these animals to quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD
outbreak, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible products
shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA has reassessed
the disease status of the affected country and determined the level of
trade that can resume. Moreover, USDA restricts imports of animal
products from FMD-affected countries to those that have been processed
in such a manner that they inactivate the virus and do not present a
risk to U.S. livestock. In contrast, other products, such as hay used
for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy products, are
completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive measures for
international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international
ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment returning
from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus into the
country.
USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United
States‘ almost 75-year disease-free status is a measure of the success
of the department‘s efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same
time, these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of
risk inherent in international trade and travel, no set of measures can
ever completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the
United States. Moreover, these experts believe that U.S. vulnerability
to an outbreak remains because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter
the country on a variety of animate and inanimate products and (2) the
magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for
USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only
one contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U.S.
animal to start a nationwide outbreak.
Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock
from FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures
that are comparable to U.S. measures to ensure that imports of
livestock and animal products, international mail, and garbage from
international carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the
countries have implemented measures differently for international
passengers. For example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats
at ports of entry, the United States does not. According to USDA
officials, the United States does not use disinfectant mats because
research indicates that their use may cause the virus to spread. Also,
while all three countries use signs at international airports to alert
and inform passengers about the risks of FMD, the U.S. signs are not as
noticeable as the signs used in Canada and Mexico. While GAO recognizes
that there is a cost to developing new signs, more effective signs may
help improve U.S. preventive measures for international passengers.
Despite Preparation Efforts, Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S.
Response Are Yet to Be Resolved:
If FMD enters the United States despite USDA‘s preventive measures, the
nation‘s ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the
disease quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the
importance of an effective response, USDA and many states have
developed emergency response plans that establish a framework for the
key elements necessary for a rapid and successful U.S. response and
eradication program. These plans have been tested, to some extent, by
federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. Planning
and testing exercises have also identified the following challenges,
which could ultimately impede an effective and timely U.S. response if
they are not resolved before an FMD outbreak occurs:
* Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. A
timely response depends on having livestock producers and private
veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state
and federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control
before the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several
federal and state animal health officials expressed concern about how
quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in
the United States. According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak
helped raise general awareness among state officials, private
veterinarians, and livestock producers about the risks and potential of
an FMD outbreak in the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and
the states increased their efforts to inform the livestock industry
about the risks and symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to
maintain this heightened awareness about FMD, now that the immediate
risk from the United Kingdom has subsided.
* Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between
federal, state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the
industry. Recent planning efforts and testing exercises have started
the process of establishing greater coordination and improving the
level of cooperation and communication between all levels. However,
these efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according
to state officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and
communication between state officials and their federal counterparts
vary across states. To help address these gaps, USDA is working with
other organizations, such as the National Emergency Management
Association, and is providing funds to help states improve their
planning for animal emergencies.
* Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of animal
disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on an
adequate infrastructure, which should include a national emergency
management control and command center, technical and other personnel,
transportation and disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and
testing capacity. While details for some of these components have been
developed, others are not yet fully resolved. For example, USDA, in
partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has set up a
mechanism that will enable it to leverage resources for many of the
general logistical support activities needed to respond to an outbreak.
Similarly, USDA‘s memorandum of understanding with the Department of
Defense will help provide needed military personnel and equipment to
support a response effort. However, it is not yet clear how the United
States will fill the shortage of at least 1,200 specially trained
veterinarians or the laboratory testing and diagnostic capacity that
USDA estimates is needed to respond to an animal health emergency.
* Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and
indemnify livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U.S. response to
an FMD outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking
system that will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and
slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal
disposal and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an
animal identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it
in 1999. However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted
the concept because of the costs involved and the potential for the
unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA
officials. Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration,
and rendering are the preferred methods for disposing of animal
carcasses. However, according to federal and state officials, each of
these disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges
that have not yet been fully considered, such as the potential to
spread the disease if on-farm disposal is not feasible, the potential
to cause groundwater contamination or air pollution, high cost, and
concerns about public perception. Finally, delays could occur during an
FMD eradication effort, because producers--fearing that they might not
be adequately compensated for the fair market value of destroyed
animals, products, and materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting
costs--may not cooperate with responders. To address this concern, USDA
published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD-related
regulations that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be
handled during an outbreak.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to develop (1) a
formal process to disseminate updated information on foreign FMD
outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical
procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers
from FMD-affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider
better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international
passengers do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States.
Finally, GAO recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones
to address the outstanding issues that could compromise an effective
and rapid U.S. response.
Agency Comments:
We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report for review and
comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated that the
report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of
meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided
an accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of
federal, state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the
health of U.S. agriculture. USDA agreed with the report‘s conclusion
that because of the enormous volume of international travel and trade,
there is no way to ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However,
USDA also believes that the short-and long-term measures that it is
taking to enhance prevention, surveillance, emergency preparedness, and
coordination with other federal, state, and industry organizations is
providing a much-needed boost to the United States‘ overall
safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, USDA agreed that it
would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of its efforts
and make whatever changes are warranted.
USDA‘s and Customs‘ written comments are presented in appendix V and
VI, respectively. USDA‘s comments include additional information on the
department‘s recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United
States‘ ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas
of (1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control
measures, and (3) communications and outreach. We have included this
information and the additional technical comments that USDA provided us
with throughout the report as appropriate.
[End of section]
Chapter 1: Introduction:
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating viral
animal diseases affecting cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle and
swine, and has occurred in most countries of the world at some point
during the last century. Although the disease has no human-health
implications, it can have enormous economic and social consequences, as
recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated.
These consequences occur because the international community values
products from countries that are FMD-free and generally restricts
international trade in FMD-susceptible products from countries affected
by an outbreak. Most FMD-affected countries, therefore, take whatever
measures necessary to regain their FMD-free status as quickly as
possible. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has primary responsibility for protecting domestic livestock
from animal diseases such as FMD. The U.S. Customs Service supports
USDA in these efforts.
FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease:
FMD--a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily cloven-
hoofed animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats--has 7 types
and over 80 subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of the
virus does not protect animals against infection from the other types.
FMD-infected animals usually develop blister-like lesions in the mouth,
on the tongue and lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which
causes them to salivate excessively or become lame. Other symptoms
include fever, reduced feed consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs
are very sensitive to the virus and show symptoms of the disease after
a short incubation period of 3 to 5 days. The incubation period in
sheep is considerably longer, about 10 to 14 days, and the clinical
signs of the disease are usually mild and may be masked by other
conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to go unnoticed.
The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD varies and
depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast, adult
animals usually recover once the disease has run its course. However,
because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-producing
animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many months, and
dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease
therefore can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.
The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and
during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the
virus into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood,
saliva, and feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if
pigs become infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete
large amounts of the virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials
that are exposed to the virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into
contact with susceptible animals. For example, the virus can spread
when susceptible animals come in contact with contaminated:
* animals;
* animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;
* transport vehicles and equipment;
* clothes or shoes worn by people; and:
* hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics.[Footnote 1]
The FMD virus has a remarkable capability for remaining viable for long
periods of time in a variety of animate and inanimate objects. For
example, the virus can persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36
hours, manure for 1 to 24 weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9
to 14 weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and
other products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen
(pH) conditions.[Footnote 2] Generally, the virus can survive freezing
but cannot survive at temperatures above 50× Celsius (122× Farenheit)
and at pH levels of less than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the
various lengths of time that the FMD virus can survive in some selected
products.
Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
Products:
Product or by-product: Bacon; Processing or storage conditions: Salted;
Virus survival time: 183 days.
Product or by-product: Bedding (straw and wood shavings); Processing or
storage conditions: N/A; Virus survival time: 4 weeks.
Product or by-product: Buttermilk; Processing or storage conditions: N/
A; Virus survival time: 14 days.
Product or by-product: Ham; Processing or storage conditions: N/A;
Virus survival time: 16 weeks.
Product or by-product: Hay; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient
temperature; Virus survival time: Greater than 200 days.
Product or by-product: Hides or skins; Processing or storage
conditions: Air dried at 20× C; Virus survival time: 6 weeks.
Product or by-product: Manure; Processing or storage conditions:
Summer/winter; Virus survival time: 1 week/24 weeks.
Product or by-product: Shoes; Processing or storage conditions: Summer/
winter; Virus survival time: 9 weeks/14 weeks.
Product or by-product: Soil; Processing or storage conditions: Summer/
winter; Virus survival time: 3-7 days/21 weeks.
Product or by-product: Water; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient
temperature; Virus survival time: 14 weeks.
Product or by-product: Wool; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient
temperature; Virus survival time: 20 days.
Legend: N/A=not applicable:
Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.
[End of table]
FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal
diseases that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such
as vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two
foreign swine diseases are also clinically identical to FMD--swine
vesicular disease and vesicular exanthema of swine. The only way to
distinguish between FMD and these other diseases is through laboratory
analyses of fluid or tissue samples. FMD is also sometimes confused
with mad cow disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE).[Footnote 3] BSE is a fatal, neuro-degenerative disease found in
cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract the disease
through animal feed that contains protein derived from the remains of
diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally fatal
disease in humans--known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease--is
linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow
disease, FMD has no known human health implications.
Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive:
FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in the world and
endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South
America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of FMD
include North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the
Caribbean. Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period
1992 through 2002.
Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
Epizooties.
[End of figure]
In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and
during the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks.
The spread of certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how
quickly it is spreading throughout the world. For example, the FMD
virus serotype O, known as the Pan-Asia strain, was first identified in
northern India in 1990 and was subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It
then spread westward into Saudi Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently,
throughout the Near East and into Europe (Thrace region of Turkey,
Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The Pan-Asia strain was also found in
Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 1999 it was reported in
mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By late 1999 and in 2000,
it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently, the Pan-Asia
strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Primorsky
Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free from FMD
since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan-Asia strain is
also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom
that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide,
including the type O Pan-Asia strain.
Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
Epizooties.
[End of figure]
In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States,
Canada, and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The
United States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to
eradicate FMD from North America.
International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate FMD:
The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)--an intergovernmental
organization created in January 1924 by an international agreement
signed by 28 countries--was established to guarantee the transparency
of information on the animal disease status of member countries. In
addition, OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information
and disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and
promotes international solidarity for the control of animal diseases,
and guarantees the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules
for international trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001,
OIE had 158 member countries.
OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these
countries) as being FMD-free with or without vaccination if they meet
certain criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code.
For example, to obtain FMD-free status without vaccination, a member
country should
(1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a
declaration that it has been FMD-free and has not used vaccination for
1 year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of
surveillance;
(4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of
FMD; and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been
imported into the country, since such animals can become the source of
future infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD-free-with-vaccination
status, a country should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease
reporting, (2) send a declaration that there have been no outbreaks of
FMD for 2 years,
(3) provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance
systems and has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent
and control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are
carried out and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5)
have an intensive and frequent system to detect any viral activity.
When FMD occurs in an FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is not
practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to
regain its FMD-free-without-vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards
require a country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case
of FMD when a ’stamping out approach“ (immediate slaughter of diseased
and exposed animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the
disease before the country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD-free
status. As part of this process, surveillance results of laboratory-
screening tests (serological surveillance results) must be provided to
OIE to prove that the disease has been eradicated. If vaccination was
used to control the outbreak, then the country must wait until 3 months
after the last vaccinated animal is slaughtered and serological
surveillance results prove that the disease has been eradicated before
reapplying for FMD-free status.
The international community generally places a high value on products
from countries that are FMD-free without vaccination. Such countries
can export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD-
free countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD-free-with-
vaccination status are restricted to trading animal products that can
be treated to ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most
countries that are FMD-free without vaccination resort to a stamping
out process to eradicate the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United
Kingdom and Taiwan followed this process in 2001 and 1997,
respectively. Similarly, if an outbreak were to occur in the United
States, the current U.S. policy requires all infected and exposed
animals to be immediately slaughtered and disposed of by incineration,
burial, or rendering.[Footnote 4]
In recent years, the international community has been encouraging the
acceptance of regionalization policies for international trade.
Regionalization involves declaring one or more areas of a country FMD-
free while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a
regionalization policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United
States, even if one state or area was infected, the nation as a whole
might not lose its FMD-free status, and trade restrictions might not be
enforced on all of our FMD-susceptible products.
An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars:
An FMD outbreak could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars in both
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the government would include
the costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance
of animal movement controls, control areas, and intensified border
inspections; the destruction and disposal of infected animals;
vaccines; and compensation to producers for the costs of disease
containment. However, government compensation programs may not cover
100 percent of producers‘ costs. As a result, direct costs would also
occur for disinfection and for the value of any slaughtered animals not
subject to government compensation. According to recent U.K. government
estimates, the direct costs for control and eradication of the 2001
outbreak was about $4 billion. According to several estimates, the
direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U.S. outbreak of FMD
could range up to $24 billion in current dollars, depending, among
other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the control strategy
employed.[Footnote 5]
The value of lost export sales in the event of an FMD outbreak would
represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U.S.
economy. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the
United States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. exports
of live animals and animal products. This ban could result in losses of
between $6 billion and $10 billion a year while the United States
eradicated the disease and until it regained disease-free status. These
losses may be mitigated to some extent by increased domestic sales of
meat from disease-free portions of the United States that may otherwise
have been exported. However, USDA officials believe that many people in
the United States would refuse to eat meat during an FMD outbreak, thus
the offset probably would be minimal.
Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs affecting
consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors of the
economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as part
of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such as
meat-processing facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose
revenue. Furthermore, an FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects
such as unemployment, loss of income (to the extent that government
compensation does not fully reimburse producers), and decreased
economic activity, which could ripple through other sectors of the
economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could
result in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom,
according to government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses
to the tourism industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the
losses sustained by the food and agriculture sector.
In addition, not only may consumers have to pay higher prices for the
remaining supply of animal products affected by an FMD outbreak, but
the price of substitutes is likely to rise, as well. For example, as
the price of FMD-free meat increases, some consumers are likely to buy
poultry or other meat substitutes, thus causing the prices of these
substitute products to rise. However, the higher prices that consumers
pay for substitutes do not result in a net cost to the economy because
these higher prices result in increased revenues for poultry producers
and others.
Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant:
An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts, such as enormous
psychological damage, especially on families and localities directly
affected by the outbreak, as the U.K. experience in 2001 illustrates.
For example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found
that individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of
symptoms, including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite,
increased anger, irritability, and general depression. An increase in
marital discord was also noted. One general practioner reported that 50
percent of his patients affected by the FMD outbreak required
antidepressant drugs. Some farming families even sent their children
away from home during the outbreak rather than have them witness the
slaughter and disposal of the family‘s livestock.
Consumer confidence in the safety of the U.K. food supply was also
adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdom‘s
Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD
and mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now
consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these
consumers have changed their grocery-buying habits.
An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy
livestock producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their
animals had been destroyed and their properties were quarantined.
According to one study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the
Cumbria area of the United Kingdom, most farming households had to curb
their usual daily activities, and only the most essential movements on
and off the farms were permitted. Lost income caused stress to families
because they had to cut back on their household expenditures and some
had to renegotiate loans. The study notes that the enforced isolation
caused by the quarantines added to the tensions and stresses already
being experienced by both adults and children.
USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other
Animal Diseases:
Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has
the lead responsibility for protecting the nation‘s livestock from
foreign animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United
States as well as those thought to have been eradicated. Assisting
APHIS in this endeavor are USDA‘s Foreign Agricultural Service, the
Food Safety and Inspection Service, and the Homeland Security Council.
Within APHIS, several groups share responsibility for protecting U.S.
livestock from the incursion of foreign animal diseases such as FMD:
* International Services. Working with its counterpart organizations in
foreign countries, this group seeks to reduce the international spread
of animal and poultry diseases. Its goal is to protect U.S. livestock
and poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease-management
strategies provided to exporting countries before they send their
animals and products to the United States.
* Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and
marketability of our nation‘s animals, animal products, and veterinary
biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/or eliminate
animal diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and
productivity. This group administers laws and regulations on importing
animals and animal products, including embryos and semen, to ensure
that imports are free from certain disease agents. In addition,
Veterinary Services provides training for state and private
veterinarians on foreign animal diseases of concern and provides animal
disease diagnostic and surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has
primary responsibility for inspecting and ensuring the safety of live
animal and animal product imports to the United States. Within
Veterinary Services, the Emergency Programs unit coordinates efforts to
prepare for and respond to animal disease outbreaks, including FMD, and
in the fall of 2001, published a draft plan for responding to an FMD
outbreak. It employs veterinarians trained to detect and respond to an
FMD outbreak. Emergency Programs also provides federal and state
veterinarians and others with training on foreign animal diseases.
* Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDA‘s
primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States,
as well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present
at all major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments
and supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X-rays, and hand-
held remote-sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically
inspect animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land,
as well as international passengers and their luggage arriving via air,
sea, or land border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant
Protection and Quarantine‘s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers‘ luggage for
prohibited fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and
animal pests and diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year,
it will have increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double
the level available 2 years ago.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that by the end of
this year, APHIS will also have increased the number of its
safeguarding personnel to approximately 3,870--an increase of 50
percent over its fiscal year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA told
us that it has hired 18 additional veterinarians who are conducting
port-of-entry reviews, working with state counterparts, and providing
technical guidance and training on working with and handling animal
products and byproducts and international garbage that could pose a
threat of foreign animal diseases.
In addition, USDA‘s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates
programs designed to build new markets and improve the competitive
position of U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is
responsible for USDA‘s overseas activities, such as market development,
international trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and
analysis of statistics and market information. FAS supports U.S.
agricultural interests through its network of agricultural counselors,
attachés, and trade officers stationed in many foreign countries. FAS
officials primarily deal with agricultural trade issues and meet with
host government and industry officials to discuss and facilitate
agricultural trade.
USDA‘s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat
and meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors
at ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on
imported meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving
countries that are eligible to export meat products to the United
States. In fulfilling this responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic
reviews of eligible countries. According to USDA, FSIS‘s inspection of
livestock before slaughter is an important surveillance tool for
detecting the presence of FMD in the United States.
Finally, USDA‘s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading
and coordinating USDA‘s activities to plan for and manage agriculture-
related crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as
USDA‘s primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and private-sector organizations.
U.S. Customs Service Supports USDA‘s Efforts at Ports of Entry:
The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation‘s primary enforcement
agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially harmful
products into the United States, including FMD-contaminated products.
In addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper
duties or tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors
work to enforce the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as
those of USDA. Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests
and bills of lading, and physically inspect cargo and international
passengers and their luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all
301 ports of entry throughout the United States, including
international airports and seaports and land border crossings along the
Canadian and Mexican borders. Customs also has inspectors at some
foreign locations, such as the international airport in Toronto,
Canada, where they perform preclearance inspections of passengers and
their luggage prior to entry into the United States. Customs inspectors
also examine international mail and packages arriving in the United
States at the 14 facilities handling mail of foreign origin.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U.S. processes to
obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks are
adequate and timely, (2) U.S. measures for preventing FMD from entering
the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected
countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and
effectively to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur.
To address the first question, we obtained and reviewed relevant
documents, and we interviewed USDA and Customs officials. In
particular, we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information
obtained and disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the
United Kingdom.
For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations,
and other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state
officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo,
we visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for
international mail, we visited international mail-processing
facilities in New Jersey and Virginia and one international express
package carrier in Kentucky. To observe the preventive measures for
live animals imported through
U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the
Sarnia, Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe
the preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles
International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance
procedures used to process international passengers entering the United
States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We
also gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is
handled at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby
county and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how
USDA‘s guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of
disease at U.S. livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.
As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after
September 11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after
the U.K. outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of
the review as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to
survey passengers who were returning to the United States from the
United Kingdom, during the outbreak, at the airport after they left the
passenger-processing area. Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60
passengers who visited the United Kingdom during the time of the
outbreak (Mar. through Sept. 2001). We asked them to recall various
aspects of their return trip and the processing they underwent at U.S.
airports. These results cannot be generalized and represent only the
experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In addition, because we
asked people to recall events after the passage of
4 to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes
might not have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon
arrival.
Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the
preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom with
those used by the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for our
review because the ability of the United States to protect its
livestock from FMD also depends on the ability of our neighbors to
prevent the disease; according to USDA officials, if any of the three
countries has an FMD outbreak, the other two are also likely to have an
outbreak. We included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is
a major U.S. trading partner and because of its recent experience with
FMD. To obtain information on the preventive measures used by Canada
and Mexico, we visited these two countries, met with federal officials,
and obtained and reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and
Mexico, we visited airports, seaports, international mail-processing
facilities, and border crossings to observe the preventive measures
used by these countries. To obtain information on the United Kingdom‘s
preventive measures, we reviewed and summarized legislation and
regulations for the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as
other publicly available documents. To ensure the accuracy and
completeness of our information, we shared the summaries that we
prepared on the preventive measures used by the three countries with
officials in these countries and asked for their review and comments.
The information on these foreign countries‘ preventive measures does
not reflect our independent legal analysis.
Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state
emergency response plans as well as other key documents and federal
legislation and regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry
representatives, and state officials. We also interviewed a group of
selected veterinarians and animal health technicians who were part of
the U.S. contingent that supported the United Kingdom‘s response
efforts in 2001 to obtain their perspectives on U.S. preparedness and
observations on lessons learned from the U.K. outbreak. We interviewed
the state veterinarian in six states that are major U.S. livestock
producers to obtain their perspective on their state‘s preparedness
efforts as well as the overall U.S. ability to respond to an outbreak
if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session and a
conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health Association
that included information on U.S. preparedness and response to an FMD
outbreak.
We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this report for review and
comment. The written comments we received from USDA are presented in
appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in appendix VI. In
addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we have
incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.
We conducted our work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Chapter 2: USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign
FMD Outbreaks, but Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved:
USDA relies on a wide variety of sources to obtain information on
outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources include APHIS and FAS staff
stationed abroad, official notifications from international trade or
animal health organizations, and notifications from affected countries.
But USDA‘s dissemination of this information is more problematic
because it has no formal process--detailed procedures and protocols--
for sharing information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs, which
provides the first line of defense against potentially contaminated
products entering U.S. ports. USDA does, however, share the information
it develops with agencies within the department, states, public and
private veterinarians, industry groups, and the public through various
methods, including E-mails, postings to USDA‘s Internet site, telephone
calls, and media alerts.
USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from Multiple
Sources:
USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal
diseases, including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA
staff stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such
as OIE and the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of
affected nations.
USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a range
of information on agricultural issues, including the disease status of
foreign countries. For example, APHIS‘s International Services group
employs over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in
27 countries around the world. According to APHIS officials, these
foreign service staff collect agricultural information for the
countries they are stationed in as well as other countries in the
region. Their primary sources of information include (1) official
notifications from foreign governments about changes in their country‘s
animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host government, local
industry, and private-sector officials; (3) local radio and television
reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may provide early
information about potential animal or crop disease problems; and (4)
informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted by the
foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather
references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to
APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal
sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the
United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting
imports.
Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63
agricultural counselor, attaché, and affiliate foreign national
offices; 17 agricultural trade offices; and a number of agricultural
advisers covering 129 countries around the world. According to the FAS
officials we spoke with, staff stationed overseas have no functional
responsibility for tracking foreign animal diseases, such as FMD.
However, during their routine activities, they may become aware of a
possible outbreak, in which case they would likely relay this
information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D.C. FAS staff obtain
agricultural information from several of the same sources accessed by
APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry reports,
meetings with host government officials, and official government
notifications and documents.
In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease
conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its
evaluation of a country‘s eligibility to export meat and meat products
to the United States. FSIS‘s technical staff review the documents
provided by the foreign country as well as conduct in-country visits
before deeming a country eligible to export meat and meat products to
the United States for human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in
each eligible exporting country, at least annually, and shares any
information obtained on diseases of concern with APHIS, according to
USDA.
USDA also receives information from international organizations, such
as OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to
follow during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both
OIE and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an
official notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These
organizations then provide other member nations with official
notification of the outbreak.
In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries
affected by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading
partners. For example, major U.S. trading partners often notify USDA
officials directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom
did in early 2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom
notified USDA on the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD--
February 21, 2001. In North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United
States have an informal understanding that in the event of an FMD
outbreak, the affected country will immediately report to the other two
countries.
The usefulness of information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a
foreign country‘s willingness to provide accurate information in a
timely fashion. There are instances, however, when a country may fail
to notify OIE, WTO, or its major trading partners of a disease outbreak
in a timely manner.[Footnote 6] For example, Argentine officials did
not acknowledge that some regions of their country had been affected
with FMD, although unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had
been present for several months, according to USDA officials. Argentina
officially notified OIE on March 13, 2001, and USDA then took action to
prohibit imports of affected Argentine products. In commenting on a
draft of this report, USDA stated that if it had verifiable scientific
evidence that FMD existed in Argentina, it could have prohibited
imports before the country notified OIE.
USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of FMD Information
to Customs:
APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all
need information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an
important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process,
including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information
on foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no
assurance that Customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry, and in
particular at the ports where APHIS does not have a presence, are
adequately informed of the need to implement controls for potentially
contaminated cargo, and international passengers and their luggage
entering the United States.
APHIS Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Inform USDA Agencies and Others in
the United States About Foreign FMD Outbreaks:
APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field staff located in the
United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state governments,
industry groups, the public, and the media about foreign FMD outbreaks.
These methods include:
* E-mails and electronic alerts,
* memos and letters,
* telephone calls,
* meetings,
* press releases,
* printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),
* public education and outreach,
* toll free information hotline, and:
* postings to the Internet (USDA‘s Web page).
After the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that
APHIS used each of these methods to distribute information about (1)
the disease, (2) the outbreak in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing
the introduction and spread of the disease in the United States. For
example, APHIS field locations began receiving electronic alerts and E-
mails from APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same
day that the United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak.
Similarly, by the second week of March 2001, USDA had issued several
press releases, placed information on its Web site about FMD
precautions, initiated an international travelers‘ education campaign,
and established a toll-free number for public inquiries about the
disease. Also, shortly after the U.K. outbreak began, APHIS distributed
several types of printed media to its field offices nationwide.
According to the Veterinary Services staff in the field offices we
contacted, they distributed these materials to state governments,
industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed posters in
public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table 2 shows
selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak in
the United Kingdom.
Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the
2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom:
Date: Feb. 21, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS Alert
to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port Offices prohibiting the
importation of all meat products from the United Kingdom (including
England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of Man)..
Date: Feb. 26, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS
Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors
to closely monitor international passengers, in particular those
arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those who had been on
a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if necessary..
Date: Mar. 1, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS
Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors
providing guidance on inspecting farm equipment and tractors as well as
other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of
Ireland..
Date: Mar. 6, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: First team
of U.S. veterinarians deployed to the United Kingdom to help respond to
the outbreak..
Date: Mar. 12, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Beginning
the week of March 12, 2001, a high-ranking APHIS official began a tour
of major eastern U.S. ports, meeting with U.S. Customs and other
federal inspection agencies to emphasize the need for aggressive
exclusion activities..
Date: Mar. 13, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS
Electronic Alerts and USDA news release announcing the prohibition of
imported live swine and ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat
(chilled or frozen), and other products of swine and ruminant from all
European Union nations (does not include cooked pork products)..
Date: Mar. 13, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA Media
Advisory announcing kick off of traveler‘s education campaign starting
March 14, 2001..
Date: Mar. 14, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA memo
to its field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding
guidelines for importing pets from areas affected with FMD..
Date: Mar. 16, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA news
release announcing the establishment of toll-free FMD call lines--
domestic and international..
Date: Mar. 20, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS
begins regularly scheduled conference calls with the National
Association of State Departments of Agriculture to discuss APHIS‘s FMD
exclusion efforts..
Date: Mar. 22, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Specific
guidance provided to the U.S. Customs Service on FMD-related inspection
procedures for cargo and passengers at U.S. ports of entry..
Date: Mar. 23, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Industry
Alert to livestock owners and private-practice veterinarians posted to
the APHIS Web site, reminding them to report unusual animal health
symptoms..
Date: Mar. 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Other
information issued during the month of March includes; * meetings about
FMD with industry, state, and local governments;; * FMD-prevention
information developed for airlines;; * warning signs posted at
airports;; * public service announcements on radio and television; and;
* FMD information for USDA extension agents..
Date: Apr. 9, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Secretary of
Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection
personnel..
Date: Apr. 26, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Secretary
of Agriculture assures the Congress that compensation would be
available to producers in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United
States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and doubling the size of
the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200 current inspectors to
critical ports of entry..
Date: May 11, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA and the
Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to
ensure that FMD is kept out of the United States..
Date: May 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA issues FMD-
prevention guidelines for livestock shows agricultural fairs, and other
agricultural events..
[End of table]
However, the effectiveness of USDA‘s efforts is uncertain. For example,
in March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting
that they could assist USDA‘s preventive activities by making in-flight
announcements on international flights to raise passengers‘ awareness
about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the
airlines to use when making these announcements. However, the
passengers returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom
we contacted told us that not all the airlines made such announcements.
Similarly in May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for
livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs.
According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are ’suggestions“ for
fair organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation
are left to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed
that the implementation of APHIS‘s guidelines varied dramatically at
the two county fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example,
USDA‘s guidelines indicate that food should not be allowed in areas
where show animals are housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed
that no restrictions of this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the
livestock owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs
generally did not know about the risks associated with FMD or the need
to take precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread.
For example, one livestock producer told us that FMD was a ’European
problem“ and that the United States did not have to worry about it.
APHIS Does Not Have a Formal Process to Provide Customs with
Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks:
While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing interested
parties about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform
Customs--the first deterrent to the importation of potentially FMD-
affected products--about these outbreaks. As Table 2 shows, after the
U.K. outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its
decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly
screen passengers arriving at U.S. ports of entry from the United
Kingdom. Customs did not receive any consistent national guidance from
APHIS until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally requested this
information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16,
2001. As a result, Customs‘ field staff did not receive uniform
official guidance on general inspection measures for passengers and
products until March 27, 2001, and specific information on at-risk
products to be detained at the ports until April 4, 2001--37 and 45
days, respectively, after APHIS received the United Kingdom‘s official
notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs memorandum and
officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped to adequately
process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry during the
initial stages of the U.K. outbreak. For example, one Customs
supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her
port of entry and that she had no information on how to clean
passengers‘ shoes and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to
this Customs supervisor, the lack of official guidance forced her staff
to rely on informal and inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS
officials located at another port of entry. She added that because
Customs inspectors are not animal disease specialists, they need
nontechnical, clear procedures to help them process international
cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports where
there is no APHIS presence. The Customs‘ Assistant Director for Field
Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance is needed for
all Customs field inspectors.
APHIS officials acknowledged that they did not notify Customs of the
U.K. outbreak. According to these officials, because Customs had not
sought specific guidance from APHIS about prior FMD outbreaks in other
countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo,
passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the
outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them.
As a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U.K. outbreak,
the APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that
in May 2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field
Operations to the list of people to whom she sends E-mail notifications
of foreign FMD outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field
Operations told us that this action will help his office better inform
Customs‘ field inspectors about future foreign FMD outbreaks.
Conclusions:
Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U.S. livestock
from FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this responsibility.
Customs is especially critical to keeping FMD-contaminated products out
of the United States at those ports of entry where APHIS is not
present. However, Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted,
coordinated, and comprehensive defense against FMD at the nation‘s
border only if they receive current information on the countries that
are affected by FMD and have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to
process at-risk products and passengers. APHIS has taken the first
interim step to notify Customs of future foreign FMD outbreaks, by
including a Customs official on one of its electronic mailing lists.
However, we believe that this does not provide a permanent solution to
the lack of clear communication protocols and procedures between APHIS
and Customs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U.S. ports of entry are
fully informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we recommend that
the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to
develop (1) a formal written agreement with the Commissioner of the
Customs Service that will clearly delineate the process by which future
information on foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs
and (2) uniform, nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can
use to process international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD-
affected countries.
[End of section]
Chapter 3: U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to
Other Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible:
U.S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak--control and eradication
overseas and the port of entry screening of livestock, animal products,
and passengers--have been successful since 1929. Nevertheless, the
United States remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak because of the
nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it can come into the
country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both legal and illegal
passengers and cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar
challenges in protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive
measures that are comparable to those the United States uses. However,
the United States could also build on the experiences of other
countries to improve its preventive measures.
USDA‘s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries Help
Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock:
As a first line of defense to safeguarding U.S. animal resources
against the introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps prevent,
control, and eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate
outside the United States. By helping other nations eradicate or
control these outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural pests
and diseases reaching U.S. borders.
In North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have
largely focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the
possible threat of the FMD virus‘s moving overland from South America,
where the disease is endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located
in Mexico working with the Mexico-United States Commission for the
Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases.
The commission, formed in 1947 as a combined U.S.-Mexican effort to
eradicate FMD from Mexico,[Footnote 7] built Mexico‘s animal health
infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954.
Today, USDA and Mexican veterinarians work together, through the
activities of the commission, to provide disease surveillance,
diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico to ensure that the country
remains FMD-free. According to USDA officials in Mexico, the United
States initially covered about 80 percent of the costs for the joint
program; however, as the Mexican government assumed greater
responsibility for the program, the U.S. share has decreased to about
20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in
funding for the commission‘s activities. According to USDA officials,
this funding supports the commission‘s high-security laboratory in
Mexico City by providing training, supplies, and equipment.
In addition, for over 30 years, the United States has held regular
meetings on animal health issues with the governments of Canada and
Mexico to harmonize North America‘s import requirements and, more
recently, to coordinate preventive actions and emergency response
activities in the event of an FMD outbreak. For example, in 2000, the
three countries held joint exercises--known as the Tripartite Exercise
2000--to test their FMD communication and response plans, and to assess
their response systems. As a result of this exercise, the three
governments signed a memorandum of understanding to formally establish
the North American Animal Health Committee. This committee represents
animal health issues for the North American Free Trade Agreement and
seeks to harmonize live animal and animal product import requirements
for North America. The committee will also plan emergency response
activities and perform joint test exercises to ensure that all three
countries remain prepared to respond to an FMD outbreak.
The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD-control zones
in Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in
Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from
South America, USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama
and Colombia. In Panama, USDA supports the U.S.-Panama Cooperative
Program for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains
the Darien Gap area of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal
diseases. This program conducts field surveillance at high-risk border
points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the
infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative
Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio-containment,
diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign
animal diseases in Central America.
Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD-free barrier
along the Colombia-Panama border.[Footnote 8] This barrier serves as
the ’first line of defense“ for preventing the spread of FMD northward
into Central America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD-
free. Until FMD is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that
maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease‘s northward spread.
USDA provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the
program.
As part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also
has cooperative agreements with all the other Central American
countries to support joint monitoring and surveillance activities,
including field investigations and the collection of laboratory samples
for FMD and other foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements,
USDA helps transfer surveillance and detection technologies to these
countries.
When FMD strikes other nations--as it did recently, for example, in
Argentina and the United Kingdom--the United States may assist in
controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327
U.S. animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians,
helped eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans
came from USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments.
Beginning in March 2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally
in groups that averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the
response for about a month. At the peak of the outbreak during March
and April, about 100 U.S. animal health professionals were assisting in
the U.K. response. The U.S. responders with whom we spoke participated
in surveillance activities, such as collecting blood samples, and
epidemiology tasks, such as tracking and predicting the path of new
disease outbreaks. They also issued permits and licenses to move
animals and products such as silage. By providing such assistance, the
United States not only helps ensure that the disease is eradicated
quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-infected products
to arrive at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 9]
Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to
FMD Remains:
Preventive measures at U.S. borders provide the second line of defense
against the incursion of FMD into the United States. USDA has
identified several key pathways by which the FMD-virus could enter the
United States. To respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA
implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products,
passengers, and equipment arriving at U.S. borders are free of the
virus and do not pose a risk to U.S. livestock. However, some level of
risk is inherent in international trade and travel, and no set of
measures can ever completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will
enter the country. Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level
of inspection resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and
magnitude of cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that
continue to enter the country, the United States remains vulnerable to
an outbreak.
The United States Has Implemented Preventive Measures for Key Pathways:
The FMD virus could enter the United States through a number of key
pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal and other products,
international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international
carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment
returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed
and implemented specific preventive measures described below.
Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such
as swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA
judges to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern.[Footnote 10]
For example, in April 2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or
geographical regions as free of FMD. (See app. I.) Generally, live
animals can be imported only through designated ports of entry, the
majority of which are located along U.S. borders shared with Canada and
Mexico, and three others located on the east and west coasts.[Footnote
11] Most live cattle imports into the United States originate from
Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live lamb
imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the
United States must be accompanied by a U.S. import permit and a health
certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of
origin. The health certificate states that the animals have been in the
exporting country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free
of other diseases of concern.[Footnote 12] Generally, animals arriving
from countries other than Canada and Mexico may be
quarantined.[Footnote 13] Zoological ruminants and swine from FMD-
affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be
processed through USDA‘s New York Animal Import Center.
Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other
products that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could
potentially enter the United States during the course of normal
international trade. These products include animal products meant for
human consumption, such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal
products, such as hides, skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well
as nonanimal products, such as farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA
regulates the importation of this diverse range of products to help
minimize the risk of introducing FMD into the United States.
USDA implements different import rules for FMD-free and FMD-affected
countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of
concern,[Footnote 14] USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product
imports. For FMD-affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of
all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official
notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until
USDA reassesses the disease status of the affected country and
determines the level of trade that can resume. USDA allows imports of
animal and other products from FMD-affected countries only if they meet
certain requirements. These requirements vary for different kinds of
products, as follows:
* Animal products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk
are prohibited from FMD-affected countries. However, processed meat and
dairy products are allowed from FMD-affected countries if they meet
certain requirements. For example, meat products can be imported from
FMD-affected countries only if (1) the country and meat processing
plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to the United
States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet APHIS‘s meat-
processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that meat products
from these countries are not contaminated with the FMD virus, and
require that the products be processed in a manner that will inactivate
the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured, or canned
and shelf-stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U.S. import
permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the country
of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, most dairy
products from FMD-affected countries must meet APHIS‘s requirements to
ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD‘s introduction. For example,
milk products that are in a concentrated liquid form and are shelf-
stable without refrigeration are allowed from FMD-affected countries.
Some dairy products, such as condensed milk require a U.S. import
permit, while others, such as yogurt and butter are unrestricted and do
not require a permit.[Footnote 15]
* Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products are
allowed from FMD-affected countries if they have been properly treated
to inactivate the virus; however, a U.S. import permit may be required.
For example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal
trophies can be imported into the United States from FMD-affected
countries.
* Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw
used for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD-affected
countries. However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate
from the exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam
cleaned. APHIS officials inspect farm equipment at U.S. ports of entry
to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are
found, then inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately
washed with detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before
granting approval for entry into the United States.
All animal and other products arriving at U.S. ports of entry, whether
from FMD-free or FMD-affected countries, are subject to inspection by
U.S. federal inspectors. Customs officials, who review the documents
accompanying the shipments, either electronically or on paper, provide
the first level of inspection for these shipments. On the basis of this
review, Customs is authorized to either release the shipments into
commerce or hold them for USDA inspection. USDA provides Customs with a
list of products to be flagged for inspection by APHIS. APHIS
inspectors ensure that all the necessary documents accompanying the
shipment, such as import permits and official health certificates, are
complete and ensure that the shipments match their manifest. In some
instances, APHIS inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to
check their contents. After APHIS completes its inspection, the
shipment may proceed to FSIS and/or the Food and Drug Administration
for further inspection, depending on which agency regulates the safety
of these products for human health issues, or may proceed to Customs
for release into commerce.[Footnote 16] According to USDA, FSIS
inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments of products
under FSIS‘s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more in-depth
examination.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary
inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those
ports staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments
continue to be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said
that it is working with Customs and other federal agencies to develop
an automated targeting system, which will serve as an electronic
interface among federal agencies to identify and automatically
segregate high-risk plant cargo and track imported animals and animal
products.
International passengers. International passengers who may have been in
contact with the FMD virus, either through contact with infected
animals or materials such as soil and manure, or who bring potentially
contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to
the United States. USDA provides the following FMD-prevention
information and types of scrutiny for international passengers in an
effort to reduce the risk associated with this pathway:
* USDA requests airlines to make in-flight announcements on
international flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and
it plays prerecorded announcements about how international passengers
can assist in keeping FMD out of the United States.
* International passengers must fill out a U.S. Customs declaration
form that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into
the country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were
in contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these
questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at
the port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x-ray and
inspect the contents of the passengers‘ baggage; ask them additional
questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy
products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.
* USDA‘s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim
areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their
luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors
look not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and
leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to
determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission.
If the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these
passengers are referred to the USDA inspection area for further
processing.
After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the
international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not
consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the
airlines they traveled on did not make any in-flight announcements
about FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs
declaration form indicated that they had been in contact with animals
or visited a farm while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred
by officials to the USDA inspection area at the airport for further
processing or they had to request USDA personnel at the airports to
examine and disinfect the shoes that they wore while they were in FMD-
affected areas in the United Kingdom.
Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international
carriers, such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus
into the United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated
with the virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that
garbage from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of
so that it does not present a risk to U.S. livestock. For example, USDA
inspectors supervise the removal of all international garbage from
airplanes and ships. This garbage must be transported in leak-proof
containers and must be disposed of properly, such as by incineration or
sterilization, and subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance
agreements with catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper
handling and approved disposal methods for international garbage.
Before a compliance agreement is signed, APHIS officials will, among
other things, review the application; visit the handling, processing,
or disposal facilities; observe the operation of any equipment to
determine its adequacy for handling garbage; and certify and approve
the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be used to process international
garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating under these compliance
agreements to ensure that they abide by the conditions stated in the
agreement.
International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the
FMD virus may also be sent through international mail and courier
services to U.S. residents. As a result, international mail packages
entering the United States are subject to inspection by Customs and
USDA officials. Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the
packages and either visually inspects or x-rays them as part of its
responsibility to screen international mail for illegal and prohibited
items, such as contraband and drugs. At USDA‘s request, Customs can
also screen international packages for prohibited animal products, such
as meat and dairy products from FMD-affected countries. Customs sets
aside packages that appear to contain such items for USDA‘s inspection.
USDA officials will review the declaration forms and may x-ray or open
these packages for physical inspection. If the item in the package is a
permissible product, the officials will reseal the package and release
it for delivery; otherwise it will be confiscated and
destroyed.[Footnote 17] In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA
noted that mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized
on the basis of pathway analysis.
Military personnel and equipment. Because U.S. military forces are
deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning
to the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the
country. As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps
oversee the reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and
personal property to reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the
United States. For example, military personnel must declare all
agricultural items they are bringing back to the United States and
identify whether they have been on farms or in contact with animals
while abroad. Their clothing and gear should also be cleaned and washed
before reentering the country. Similarly, all military rolling stock,
such as humvees, trucks, weapons systems, and tanks, as well as other
used military gear, such as canvas tents, must be thoroughly cleaned
before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates, and other military equipment
must be free of soil, manure, and debris. Military equipment used to
eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as FMD, is not allowed
reentry. For small-scale operations, the military must notify USDA at
least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U.S. port of entry. USDA will
determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are available at the first
port of entry, and all items will be held at this port for inspection.
If approved cleaning facilities are not available or if the equipment
is contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA will refuse
to allow reentry. Large-scale operations require a 30-day notification.
United States Remains Vulnerable to FMD:
The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, and some
USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy
condition of U.S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of
U.S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these
and other experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD
outbreak for the following reasons:
* FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that remains viable for
long periods of time.
* FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and
inanimate items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose
varying levels of risk to U.S. livestock, according to USDA, it could
take only one contaminated product to come into contact with one
susceptible U.S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.
* The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and
products entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for
USDA and other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most
inspections at ports of entry are restricted to paper reviews of
manifests supported by a limited number of judgmentally selected
samples for physical inspection. For example, in fiscal year 2001, over
470 million international passengers and pedestrians arrived at U.S.
ports of entry; of these, USDA inspected about 102 million. According
to APHIS officials, about 30 percent of the items seized from
passengers at airports were prohibited animal products or by-products.
Table 3 provides information on the volume/numbers of passengers,
vehicles, and cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS‘s
inspections for fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of
international mail entering the United States makes it difficult for
APHIS and Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD-
susceptible products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the
international mail facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that
about 30,000 international parcels pass through their check point every
day. This volume of mail provides the inspectors approximately 3
seconds per parcel to judge whether the package might contain FMD-
susceptible products. Moreover, mail is processed at the facility
during the day and night to keep up with the volume of international
mail arriving daily. However, APHIS inspectors are present only during
the day shifts and detector dogs are available for only 1 to 2 days per
week. Although Customs‘ inspectors screen packages for FMD-susceptible
products during the time when APHIS inspectors are not available, both
APHIS and Customs inspectors told us that the process is less effective
than having an APHIS inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to
APHIS‘s Assistant Director for Port Operations, even doubling or
tripling the agency‘s inspection resources would not significantly
reduce the FMD risk from overseas entries because the percentage of
passengers, vehicles, and cargo receiving a physical inspection is
likely to continue to be relatively low.
Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the
United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products,
Fiscal Year 2001:
Commodity/mode: Passengers; (all modes of transport); Volume/
number[A]: 472,000,000; Inspected by APHIS[B]: 101,513,792; Percentage
inspected: 21.5.
Commodity/mode: Ships; Volume/number[A]: 215,328; Inspected by
APHIS[B]: 52,016; Percentage inspected: 24.2.
Commodity/mode: Aircraft; Volume/number[A]: 1,064,923; Inspected by
APHIS[B]: 541,109; Percentage inspected: 49.0.
Commodity/mode: Cargo; * Rail; * Trucks; * Ship; Volume/number[A]:
14,538,271[C]; 1,534,566; 7,878,000
5,125,705; Inspected by APHIS[B]: 2,181,904[D]; Percentage inspected:
N/A[E].
Commodity/mode: Mail packages; Volume/number[A]: N/A[ F]; Inspected by
APHIS[B]: 434,216; Percentage inspected: N/A.
Legend: N/A=not applicable:
[A] Source: U.S. Customs Service.
[B] Source: USDA.
[C] The number of full containers. :
[D] The number of bills of lading inspected. A single bill of lading
may include multiple containers. :
[E] The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs
report their data in differing units of measure.
[F] The total amount of international mail that entered the United
States during fiscal year 2001was not available; however, APHIS
officials at the Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that
approximately 30,000 parcels go past their check point every day.
[End of table]
* Moreover, most U.S. preventive measures are not designed to intercept
illegal entries of products or passengers that may harbor the FMD
virus. According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products
entering the United States is growing, and contraband meat products
entering the country is the single most important risk for the
introduction of FMD. In addition, illegal shipments of products from
countries other than the stated point of origin and illegal immigrants
also pose significant risks. USDA and Customs annually confiscate
thousands of contraband and prohibited products at U.S. ports of entry.
For example, in fiscal year 2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of
prohibited meat/poultry and animal by-products. According to USDA
officials, these seizures are only a small portion of the contraband
entering the United States. To respond to the growing threat from
illegal entries, USDA recently created the Smuggling Interdiction and
Trade Compliance program. Program officials collaborate with several
federal, state, and private organizations to ensure compliance with
U.S. agriculture import laws at ports of entry.
U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other
Countries:
U.S. preventive measures for FMD are comparable to the measures used by
Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways included
in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports,
international mail, and garbage from international carriers. The
pathway that presented the most significant area of difference
concerned the measures used to process international passengers
entering these countries. (Detailed information on the preventive
measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom are provided in
appendixes II through IV of this report.):
Generally, U.S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the
other three countries for the following four pathways:
* Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock
only from approved countries that are FMD-free. Generally, these live
animals must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that
have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if
necessary. In addition, the countries require import permits and health
certificates to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals
are imported directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico
requires an official government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals
imported from countries other than the United States in their country
of origin before they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2)
accompany the shipment and monitor the health status of the animals
while they are in transit.
* Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal
product imports only from countries that they consider FMD-free and
that meet their specific animal health and food safety standards. The
countries also allow certain animal product imports from FMD-affected
countries if they originate from a preapproved establishment and are
processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example,
meat products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf-stable can
be imported from FMD-affected countries, but unprocessed products, such
as fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not allowed.
In addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject to
review and may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive at
the port of entry in each of the countries.[Footnote 18]
* International mail. The countries handle international mail in a
similar manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing
the sender, country of origin, and contents of the package. Only
packages considered suspect, for example, because they do not include
required information, are from high-risk countries, or have been sent
by repeat offenders, are selected and opened for further inspection.
Canada uses x-ray technology to help identify packages containing
prohibited items, and Mexican officials told us that all international
packages arriving from FMD-affected countries are opened and inspected
for prohibited items.
* Garbage from international carriers. The countries‘ federal agencies
responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment,
transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers.
They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or
under certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For
example, in Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved
sites located at least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock
and/or poultry and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx.
5.5 feet) of local refuse and/or other standard covering material. At
the time of our review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals
to be fed international garbage from airlines or ships.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United
Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a
member of the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade
among, countries that are FMD-free as well as some that are not.
The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used
to prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers.
Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:
* Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United
States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert
international passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U.S. signs were
smaller and less visible in comparison with the signs used by the other
two countries. For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall
and warned passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French
about FMD. Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall,
included pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast,
the first U.S. signs were 1-by-1 foot and included relatively small-
sized text on a white background that was difficult to read and did not
easily convey the importance of the message. According to USDA
officials, these signs were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3-
by-3 feet) that included a colored graphic and larger-sized text. While
larger, we observed at one U.S. international airport that the new
signs were placed at a considerable distance from arriving passengers.
These signs were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and
therefore were several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed
that the signs in Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible
locations that were in greater proximity to the passengers. According
to agriculture officials in all three countries, they are limited in
their ability to place signs at ports of entry because they have to
negotiate the size and placement with the port authorities. As a
result, they are not always able to use the most effective signs or
locations. Figures 3 and 4 show the signs that were used in the United
States and Canada and Mexico.
Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made
changes to the declaration forms they use to process international
passengers upon arrival. For example, after the U.K. outbreak in 2001,
Canada reworded its declaration form to provide examples of food
products of concern, such as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico
developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD-affected
countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture-
related questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any
changes to its declaration form in 2001, and some of the international
passengers we contacted considered the agriculture-related question on
the form ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that
USDA was aware that the question on the form was confusing and
ambiguous to travelers. This official said that most of the confusion
arises because the question on the form consolidates three questions
into one.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has
recently worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the
Customs declaration form. The form now includes two agriculture-related
questions that USDA believes will be more easily understood by
travelers and will yield better information to the department to help
focus its inspection efforts. The new form is currently being
distributed throughout the country. Because USDA‘s actions address our
concerns, we have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this
report. (See table 4 for a comparison of the agriculture-related
questions on the prior and revised U.S. declaration forms.):
Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised U.S.
Declaration Forms:
Language on prior Customs declaration form[A]: Q.11 I am (We are)
bringing fruits, plants, meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live
animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, have been on a farm or
ranch outside the U.S.; [Empty]; Language on revised Customs
declaration form[A]: Q.11 I am (We are) bringing; (a) fruits, plants,
food, insects:
(b) meats, animals, animal/wildlife products:
(c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails:
(d) soil or have been on a farm/ranch/pasture:; Q.12 I have (We have)
been in close proximity of
(such as touching or handling) livestock:
Note: ABoth forms require the questions to be answered with either a
’yes“ or ’no“ response.
[End of table]
* Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico
developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at
airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the
country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose
not to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the
disinfectant in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number
of uses and may begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes
that were otherwise clean.
Conclusions:
The United States has had significant success in keeping the nation‘s
livestock FMD-free since 1929. To some extent, the success of this
effort is directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. preventive
measures both abroad and at the nation‘s borders. However, because of
the extensive presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and
volume of international cargo and travel continue to expand, the
nation‘s vulnerability to an introduction of FMD remains high. The
steps that other nations have taken to reduce the risk of FMD--such as
signs to alert international passengers--could help improve USDA‘s
efforts to protect U.S. livestock. While we recognize that there is an
additional cost to preparing new, larger, and more noticeable signs, we
believe that, given the significant economic costs of an FMD outbreak
to the nation, these costs are justified if they can help improve our
preventive measures.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help improve the effectiveness of U.S. measures to prevent the
introduction of FMD by international passengers, we recommend that the
Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop
more effective signage about FMD for ports of entry.
Agency Comments:
In its comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in
the process of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be
larger and more mobile than the ones that we observed during the course
of our work.
[End of section]
Chapter 4: Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak:
If FMD enters the United States despite USDA‘s preventive measures, the
nation‘s ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the
disease quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the
importance of an effective response and the necessity to prepare before
an outbreak occurs, USDA and most states have developed emergency
response plans that establish a framework for the key elements
necessary for a rapid and successful U.S. response and eradication
program. Many of these plans have, to some extent, been tested by
federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. However,
planning and testing exercises have also identified several challenges
that could ultimately impede an effective and timely U.S. response if
they are not resolved before an FMD outbreak occurs.
The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and Tested
Emergency Response Plans:
Planning for a coordinated response to emergencies, including outbreaks
of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels.
Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested
and revised their plans in response to the results of these tests.
Federal and State Governments Have Developed Emergency Response Plans:
At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross
signed the federal response plan in April 1999, which is intended to
guide the federal response to national emergencies and augment state
response efforts. Under this plan, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is designated as the coordinating agency and is
responsible for providing expertise in emergency communications,
command and control, and public affairs. In the event of an FMD
outbreak, FEMA would designate USDA as the lead agency and work closely
with the department to coordinate the support of other federal agencies
to respond to the outbreak. For example, under the plan, Customs would
’lock down“ ports of entry; the Department of Defense would provide
personnel, equipment, and transport; the Environmental Protection
Agency would provide technical support on the disposal of animal
carcasses; the National Park Service would guide the response if
wildlife become infected; and other agencies would provide additional
support.
To supplement the federal response plan and provide specific guidelines
for an animal disease emergency, such as implementing quarantines of
infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA‘s
Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a
federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly
contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the
involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities,
policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and
federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an
integrated local, state, and federal response.
At the state level, many states have developed an animal disease
component for their state‘s emergency management plans. According to
the National Animal Health Emergency Management System
(NAHEMS),[Footnote 19] in January 2000, only about half the states and
U.S. territories had developed animal health emergency response plans.
At that time, NAHEMS recommended that each state develop a plan for
responding to animal health emergencies that links to their state‘s
emergency management plan and includes information on the following key
elements:
* Animal health surveillance and detection systems.
* Control and eradication procedures.
* Communication between key partners.
* Involvement of emergency management officials.
* Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.
* Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in
responding to natural disasters.
According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the
number of states and U.S. territories with animal disease emergency
plans had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of
their state‘s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their
plan included all of the elements listed above.
Federal and State Agencies Have Tested Their Emergency Response Plans:
To ensure the efficacy and completeness of their plans, the federal
government and many of the states have conducted ’tabletop“ and
functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision
makers in a relatively stress-free setting to:
* discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease
outbreak;
* evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and:
* resolve questions of coordination and responsibility.
The setting is relatively stress-free because there is no time limit to
resolve the hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises
simulate an emergency in the most realistic way possible, without
moving people or equipment. It is a stressful, real-time exercise in
which people apply emergency response functions to a hypothetical
scenario. According to one APHIS official, functional exercises are
best described as ’dress rehearsals“ for actual emergencies.
The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises,
as described below:
* To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is
comprehensive and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop exercise
in 2001. In this exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving a
modest, limited FMD outbreak in the United States and obtained the
views of 21 federal agencies and the American Red Cross on how they
could support the federal response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used this
information to revise its draft national FMD response plan.
* The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000--the
Tripartite Exercise 2000--to test the plans, policies, and procedures
that would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in
North America. The test focused on communication between the various
entities involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. The test resulted in many
recommendations to improve the three countries‘ abilities to
(1) communicate effectively, (2) provide program support, and (3) use
vaccines. According to the final report, the recommendations, if
implemented, will improve North America‘s overall response capacity.
The three countries have established working groups tasked with
responding to these recommendations.
Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted
various kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other
animal disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June
2001, the Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas
Division of Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public
Safety, conducted a 4-day modified functional exercise of the state‘s
draft FMD response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and
private entities in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test
participants‘ abilities to control the simulated outbreak, find and
deliver indemnity funds, and streamline the decision-making processes.
Overall, the exercise determined that better communication and
coordination could improve the speed and effectiveness of the state‘s
response. It also identified areas of ambiguity in the plan that left
participants without clear directions at crucial times during the
exercise. According to state officials, the plan was revised as a
result of the exercise, and according to the Executive Director of the
Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises are necessary to
continuously improve the plan. However, the state veterinarian also
said that he does not believe that adequate resources are available
either at the federal or state level for such activities.
Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be
Resolved:
As the U.K. experience has demonstrated, responding to an FMD outbreak
can tax a nation‘s fiscal, scientific, and human resources. If a
similar outbreak were to occur in the United States, the nation would
face a wide spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and
rapid response: (1) the need for rapid disease identification and
reporting; (2) effective communication, coordination, and cooperation
between federal, state, and local responders; (3) an adequate response
infrastructure, including equipment, personnel, and laboratory
capacity; and (4) clear animal identification, indemnification, and
disposal policies. While USDA has made some progress in addressing some
of these issues, significant work remains.
Rapid Disease Identification and Reporting:
The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to
mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends on
livestock producers‘ and private veterinarians‘ quickly identifying and
reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they
do not do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and
state governments could initiate any action. For example, within the
first few days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first
reports of FMD reached British officials, infected animals were criss-
crossing the country in hundreds of separate movements, putting other
livestock at risk. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred
before any suspicion that the disease was present in the country. In
contrast, in France, county officials quickly identified diseased
animals from the United Kingdom, and were able to slaughter them
quickly and avoid a large-scale outbreak. As a result, France sustained
minimal animal losses and was declared FMD-free within months, while it
took the United Kingdom almost a year to eradicate the disease and
regain its FMD-free status.
Several federal and state animal health officials with whom we spoke
were concerned about how quickly disease identification and reporting
would actually occur in the United States. They told us that livestock
producers or veterinarians may not readily identify FMD because (1) the
disease presents symptoms that are similar to other less-serious
diseases, (2) FMD and other foreign animal diseases are not usually
included in veterinary school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may
never have seen FMD-infected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers
and veterinarians may not report the disease because they are not aware
of the reporting process or may not realize the criticality of prompt
reporting.
According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak helped raise general
awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock
producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the
United States. An indication of this increased awareness is the
doubling of foreign animal disease investigations from about 400 in
2000 to more than 800 in 2001. In addition, federal and state officials
told us that the U.K. outbreak led to greater awareness of the need to
have trained diagnosticians for foreign animal diseases in the field.
In recent years, more field veterinarians have attended foreign animal
disease training at USDA‘s Plum Island facility.[Footnote 20]
Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA intensified its efforts
to increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U.K.
outbreak in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed
industry and animal health associations, and sponsored workshops,
conferences, and informational telecasts for federal, state, and local
officials, and others. In addition, the state governments also
supported and supplemented USDA‘s informational efforts. Despite USDA
and state efforts to flood the livestock industry with information
about the risks of FMD during 2001, the challenge to USDA will be to
maintain this heightened awareness about FMD, now that the immediate
risk from the U.K. outbreak has subsided.
Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication:
Cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal, state,
and local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock producers are
essential for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and
test exercises have helped start the process of establishing greater
coordination and improving the level of cooperation and communication
between all levels. According to a USDA official, for example, USDA‘s
recent planning efforts to develop a national FMD response plan brought
together officials from a variety of federal agencies to consider the
implications of an FMD outbreak to their areas of responsibility and
helped them develop ways in which they could support a federal
response.
Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and
coordination are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26
U.S. states/territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a
group of states that had agreed to support each other in preparing for
and responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to
Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional
coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern
states met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated
response plan for the region.
While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of
communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified
areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the
Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and
cooperation between government and industry participants, it also
identified the need for the following actions:
* Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of
information.
* Develop written agreements between national animal health and
industry officials to ensure a continued high level of communication
even when players change.
* Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop
collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an
actual outbreak.
We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and
state officials varied by state. For example, while some state
officials indicated that they had excellent working relationships with
their federal counterpart located in the state, others told us that
cooperation and communication were limited. According to one APHIS
field veterinarian, the level of cooperation and communication depends
to a large extent on the personalities of the people involved and
therefore such variance is to be expected. While the development of
written agreements as suggested by the Tripartite exercise report and
NAHEMS could help alleviate this problem, as of 2001, only about 32
U.S. states/territories had such agreements or other documents that
detailed the respective roles of federal and state officials.
To help improve cooperation, coordination, and communication, USDA
officials told us that they are working with organizations such as the
National Emergency Management Association to help states with their
animal-emergency-planning efforts. In addition, USDA awarded 38 grants
totaling $1.8 million in 2001 to state agencies, tribal nations, and
emergency management organizations. According to USDA, this funding was
to be used for training, equipment, and emergency-preparedness
exercises.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May
2002, it announced that it would be making more than $43 million
available as grants to the states for strengthening homeland security
preparedness. Of this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet
the national standards of emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS.
Moreover, USDA stated that it is working with FEMA to develop a
framework for a comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign
animal disease outbreak. The plan will help better ensure the timely
dissemination of information to critical audiences, including federal
agencies, states, and industries.
Adequate Response Infrastructure:
An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an effective
infrastructure, including a national emergency management control and
command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and
disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.
To ensure that a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly
coordinated and adequately controlled, USDA has established an
Emergency Management Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland,
location. In the event of an outbreak, USDA will activate this center
to coordinate day-to-day activities during an FMD response and notify
U.S. trading partners of the status of the outbreak. According to
USDA‘s draft FMD response plan, APHIS will set up the Joint Information
Center--collocated with the Emergency Management Operations Center--to
serve as the primary source of public information about the response
and will coordinate with other federal and state information centers.
In addition, as the U.K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD
outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons
who can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and
diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal;
(2) biohazard response support for controlling animals‘ movement and
decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and
personnel; and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding
responders; the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment
and supplies; and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak,
the U.K. government had to request specialized animal disease support
from several countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide
slaughter and decontamination support; and use military personnel to
provide general logistical support. According to a U.K. government
working paper issued in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak,
more than 7,000 civil servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed
forces personnel were involved in the response--making it a bigger and
more complex logistical exercise than the United Kingdom‘s involvement
in the Gulf War.
A recent test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel
requirements to respond to an FMD outbreak in the United States would
also be enormous--approaching 50,000 people to support a response. More
specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be
at least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000
specially trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health
emergency. APHIS officials told us that while state and private
veterinarians could help make up some of this difference, without
appropriate training, their help would be of limited use.
To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has
undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency
management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies‘
resources to help provide many of the general logistical support
activities. Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of
understanding with the Department of Defense to provide military
personnel and equipment to support a response effort. In addition,
APHIS has implemented an Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to
increase the number of veterinarians available to assist in an animal
health emergency. The program trains federal, state, and private
veterinarians to handle emergency situations. As of December 2001,
APHIS had trained 276 emergency veterinarian officers, 145 of whom
participated in responding to the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, USDA has
trained 520 veterinarians across the country as foreign animal disease
diagnosticians, and they may be called upon to provide specialized
animal health support in the event of an outbreak. Finally, according
to APHIS officials, USDA has informal arrangements with the United
Kingdom and other countries to provide the United States with
veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United States, and the United Kingdom are currently drafting a
memorandum of understanding that would allow the five countries to
share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health emergency.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it
has created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private
veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist
APHIS veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign
animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275
private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department
is continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will
supplement the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies
and organizations.
A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic laboratory system
that is capable of handling the volume of testing and analysis
necessary in the event of an outbreak. For example, from February
through December 2001, the United Kingdom‘s Pirbright Laboratory, that
country‘s primary reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the
presence of the FMD virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to
ensure that the disease had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of
2.75 million samples were tested as part of the response to the
outbreak. Despite this level of testing, according to U.S.
veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom had
unmet needs for laboratory assistance.
In the United States, USDA‘s Plum Island facility--the primary
laboratory in the United States that is authorized to test suspected
FMD samples--would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD
outbreak, according to many federal and state officials with whom we
spoke. Recognizing this potential problem, the National Association of
State Departments of Agriculture recently recommended that the United
States develop a national strategy for animal health diagnostic
laboratory services that would include USDA‘s Plum Island facility and
its National Veterinary Services Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as
state and university laboratories. Currently, state diagnostic
laboratories have no formal role in a foreign animal disease response.
In addition, the Director of the Plum Island facility stated that the
nation needs to look beyond Plum Island for laboratory support in the
event of a large-scale FMD outbreak. He suggested that off-site
noncentralized testing, using noninfectious material (tests that do not
use the live virus), should be considered with backup testing support
provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us that while the idea of
a regional laboratory structure has merit, several issues would have to
be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For example,
laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training and
certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and maintained
to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a
significant commitment of resources.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of
its efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is
providing state and university cooperators with $20.6 million to
establish a network of diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically
throughout the country. This network will permit the rapid and accurate
diagnosis of animal disease threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier
this year it allocated $177 million to make improvements at key
locations, including its diagnostic and research facilities in Ames,
Iowa, and Plum Island, and that $15.3 million was allocated to USDA‘s
Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid detection technology for
FMD as well as other animal diseases.
Animal Identification, Disposal, and Indemnification Policies:
The effectiveness of a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak will require an
animal identification and tracking system to allow responders to
identify, control, and slaughter infected and exposed animals as well
as clear animal disposal and indemnification policies. The 2002 farm
bill,[Footnote 21] addresses animal disposal and indemnification issues
by providing the Secretary of Agriculture with broad authority to hold,
seize, treat, or destroy any animal, as well as to limit interstate
livestock movement as part of USDA‘s efforts to prevent the spread of
any livestock disease or pest. The Secretary may also take measures to
detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of livestock, as
needed. In addition, the farm bill requires the Secretary to compensate
owners on the basis of the fair market value of destroyed animals and
related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop specific
guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.
Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak,
successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is
essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United
States generally does not require animal identification, nor does it
have a system for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to
a USDA official, in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely
have to rely on sales records to track animal movements, which could
take days, or weeks, depending on the accuracy of record-keeping and
producer/seller cooperation.
The longer it takes to identify animals and track their movements from
premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to contain the
outbreak. USDA officials told us that, depending on where the outbreak
is first identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely difficult
to trace. For example, if only one farm were infected and animals had
not recently been moved on or off the premises, no tracing of live
animals would be necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared in
a major market or feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on
almost a daily basis, tracing would be very difficult and time-
consuming.
Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking
system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the
Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the
industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the
potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information.
The Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as
technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry
opposition to a national animal identification system. For example,
this official told us that the National Cattlemen‘s Beef Association
recently indicated some support for such a system. However, the
following issues will need to be resolved before a national system can
be developed and implemented:
* The responsibility for funding the system.
* The type of technology that should be employed--strictly visual,
electronic, or some combination.
* The amount of information that should be included on each animal‘s
identification tag or electronic-tracking device.
* The persons able to access this information.
* The information that should be shared with other federal departments
and agencies.
* At what point on the farm-to-table continuum should identification
end?
In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the disposal
of carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the
potential number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For
example, during the U.K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily
sheep, were slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA
estimates, if the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude
(affecting about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13
million animals would be affected, and most of them would be cattle and
hogs. Generally, disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or
rendering. In the United States, according to USDA‘s draft FMD response
plan, burial would be the preferred method of disposal when conditions
make it practical. The plan states that burial is the fastest, easiest,
and most economical method of disposal. When burial is not feasible,
the plan recommends incineration as the alternative means of disposal
even though USDA recognizes that incineration is both difficult and
expensive. According to a USDA veterinarian who helped during the U.K.
outbreak, a 200-meter funeral pyre was used to incinerate 400 cows or
1,200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a pyre required 1,000 railway ties, 8
tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4 tons of straw, 200 tons of
coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In addition, heavy equipment,
such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20 people, was needed to
construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits and incineration
pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of slaughtered animals.
Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom:
[See PDF for image]
Source: USDA.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United
Kingdom:
[See PDF for image]
Source: USDA.
[End of figure]
According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of
these disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges
that have not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such
challenges as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to
identify burial sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits
and clearances in advance, and the potential to spread the disease if
animals have to be transported to an off-farm burial site. For
incineration, the incineration site has to be accessible to large
equipment, and yet has to be sufficiently away from public view to
minimize negative public reaction to the sight of large burning pyres.
In addition, incineration could not only affect air quality but also
may be ineffective because if not constructed properly, the pyres may
not generate sufficient temperatures to completely incinerate the
carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United Kingdom the
pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the
carcasses were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges
because transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk
of spreading the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting
procedures would be needed at the rendering facility. Some U.S.
veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom told us that during the
outbreak, the United Kingdom faced many of these disposal challenges
and they were concerned that the United States might not have devoted
enough attention to deciding how it would address these or similar
disposal issues. According to APHIS officials, USDA is currently
creating digital maps of the whole country to help identify appropriate
burial and incineration locations. In addition, USDA is trying to
determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely converting the
meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number of animals
slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.
Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to
ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and
exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U.K. outbreak, the
government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak
experienced delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers‘
resistance and legal challenges. According to state and livestock
association officials, indemnification would be a significant issue--
one that could hamper a rapid response in the United States.
USDA published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending the indemnity
provisions for its FMD-related regulations. This proposed rule
clarifies how USDA will determine the value of animals and materials
affected by an FMD outbreak and how indemnity payments will be made to
claimants. USDA developed this proposed rule because it was concerned
that potential delays to an FMD eradication program in the United
States might occur because of producers‘ perceptions that they might
not be adequately compensated for the fair market value of destroyed
animals, products, and materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting
costs. Under the proposed rule, the federal government would pay 100
percent of the costs for the purchase, destruction, and disposition of
animals if they become infected with FMD, as well as for materials
contaminated with FMD and the cleaning and disinfection of affected
premises, according to USDA.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal
identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely
vital areas that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of
disease. In this regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with
the agricultural industries to provide forums for a national dialogue
on the issue of a national identification plan for American livestock.
The ultimate objective is to establish a national identification plan
that provides the essential elements to improve emergency response and
meet future needs. USDA further stated that it is investing in other
options for disposing of carcasses on a large scale. Finally, USDA
stated that it has extended the comment period from July 1 to July 31,
2002, for its proposed regulations that address how decisions regarding
indemnity payments will be made in the event of an FMD outbreak.
Conclusions:
If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of control, it
could ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the destruction
of millions of animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the
disease must be stamped out quickly. Although the federal government
and state governments have made significant progress in developing and
testing emergency response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such
as FMD, significant issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues
could present major impediments to an effective and timely response if
not addressed before an outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has
several ongoing efforts to resolve many of these issues, the department
has not established specific time frames for the completion of these
efforts. We believe it is critical that adequate management attention
and resources be made available to ensure that these issues are
resolved expeditiously.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure that the United States is well positioned to respond
effectively to an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend
that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to
develop a plan, which should include interim milestones and completion
dates, for addressing the various unresolved issues that could
challenge an effective U.S. response.
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD-Free by the United States:
As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following countries/areas
free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest (cattle plague):
Australia
Austria [Footnote 22]
Bahama Islands [Footnote 22]
Barbados
Belgium [Footnote 22]
Belize (British Honduras)
Bermuda
Canada
Channel Islands [Footnote 22]
Chile [Footnote 22]
Costa Rica
Czech Republic [Footnote 22]
Denmark [Footnote 22]
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland [Footnote 22]
France [Footnote 22]
Germany [Footnote 22]
Greenland
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary [Footnote 22]
Iceland
Italy [Footnote 22]
Jamaica
Japan [Footnote 22]
Luxemborg [Footnote 22]
Mexico
Netherlands [Footnote 22]
New Caledonia [Footnote 22]
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Northern Ireland [Footnote 22]
Norway [Footnote 22]
Panama
Panama Canal Zone
Papua New Guinea [Footnote 22]
Poland [Footnote 22]
Portugal [Footnote 22]
Republic of Ireland [Footnote 22]
Spain [Footnote 22]
Sweden [Footnote 22]
Switzerland[Footnote [Footnote 22]]
Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon
Tobago
Trinidad
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands:
[End of section]
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into
Canada:
This appendix provides summary information on Canada‘s preventive
measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five key
pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals;
(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal
of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships;
(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through
international mail.
Background:
The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in April
1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and plant
health inspection programs, which were previously provided by four
federal agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA
delivers food, plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions
across Canada. CFIA has 180 field offices, including border ports of
entry, and 408 offices in nongovernment establishments, such as
processing facilities. CFIA also has 13 biosecurity level-III
laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD and large animals.[Footnote
23] These laboratories provide scientific advice, develop new
technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.
The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction
of diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the
importation of animals and animal products from foreign countries to
reduce the risk of introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD.
The last outbreak of FMD in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection
programs for animals, food, and plants produced in Canada and
commodities and live animals imported into Canada. One of these
programs is the Animal Health and Production program, which is applied
at Canadian ports of entry. This program covers the issuing of import
permits, quarantining of live animal imports, negotiating export health
requirements with other nations‘ government, and establishing and
ensuring compliance with Canadian import health standards. In addition,
the program is responsible for implementing domestic disease control
programs, foreign animal disease preparedness, and emergency response.
Controls for Live Animal Imports:
Canada allows live animal imports only from countries that are FMD-free
and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals imported
into Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of
entry. For example, live animals imported into Canada by air from
countries other than the United States are required to enter at
airports, such as Vancouver, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary.
CFIA generally requires that an import permit application be filed in
advance of the importation of live animals from countries other than
the United States. The import permit contains information on the (1)
importer, who must be a Canadian resident; (2) exporter; (3)
destination of the animal(s); (4) producer; (5) port of entry; (6)
preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be quarantined; and
(7) description of animals to be imported including the number,
species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and
registration numbers or numbers from the official seal on the
transporting vehicle. If quarantine periods are required for the
animals, CFIA preapproves the quarantine premises.
The inspection of shipments of live animals at Canadian ports of entry
includes a document review and verification by Canadian Customs and
CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-load the animals for
inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part of the physical
inspection, inspectors may verify the animal identification numbers.
CFIA usually requires the importer to have a license to move the
imported animals to their final destination. Additionally, once animals
have entered Canada, CFIA can impose post-import requirements, which
may include the possible quarantine and testing or additional treatment
of the animals.
All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet
these general import requirements. However, once these requirements are
met, Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the
United States and those from other countries.
Live Animals Imported from the United States:
Generally, live animals entering Canada from the United States must
conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for
animals from other countries. Depending on an animal‘s state of origin
and the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal
diseases that Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as
brucellosis, tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be
required. Some states have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain
kinds of animals on the basis of the state‘s disease status. For
example, as of April 2002, the following seven U.S. states were
qualified to export restricted feeder cattle to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.
CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals
imported from the United States. For example, an import permit is not
required for U.S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for
fattening. These animals are required only to have an Official
Zoosanitary Export Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian.
The certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of the
consignor; (2) consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals
to be exported; (4) animal‘s origin; (5) results of the veterinary
examination of the animals; and (6) animal‘s residency in the United
States, which must be for a minimum of 60 days. Additionally, while
some animals, such as bob calves and restricted feeder cattle, are not
required to be tested for diseases that Canada does not have such as,
tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis, others, such
as breeding cattle, must be tested.
Similarly, a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not
required for animals imported from the United States for direct
slaughter. U.S. livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter
are placed in sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to
the Canadian slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals
imported for direct slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered
within 4 days of importation.
CFIA encourages U.S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of
time to ease the border review process.[Footnote 24] Once a truckload
of U.S. livestock arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a
preclearance document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the
CFIA inspection area, where inspectors review the documentation to
ensure that the information provided is correct. When required, CFIA
unloads cattle for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections
on the trailers if the load is small and it is safe to do so. U.S.
livestock imported for direct slaughter requires only a visual
inspection; however, imported breeding cattle are checked for health
status, and their ear tags and tattoos are verified against the
documentation provided. Every transporter is required to clean and
disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping vessels that
have been used to transport livestock immediately after they have been
unloaded.
A U.S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-authorized
veterinarian must accompany swine imports from the United States. The
certificate contains the name and address of both the consignor and
consignee and complete identification of the animals to be exported,
including certification that the (1) United States is free of hog
cholera; (2) herd of origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo
rabies for the past 12 months, and that the animals exported have been
tested for these two diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from
other animals for at least 30 days prior to export; (4) animals have
been transported in cleaned and disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals
have not been fed any garbage at any time. Additionally, all swine
imported from the United States must be quarantined in Canada for at
least 30 days in a CFIA-approved quarantine station. Swine shipments
imported directly for slaughter are required to have an import permit.
CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United
States to be accompanied by a U.S. origin health certificate and an
import permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1)
registered name and identification number of the parents, (2) species
and breed,
(3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection
premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting
vehicle, and (6) name and address of the consignee.
Live Animals Imported from Other Countries:
To prevent the introduction of disease and control the importation of
animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture designates countries
or parts of countries free from specific diseases. Canada designates
countries to be FMD-free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease
in the country or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak
of the disease,
(3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to prevent the
introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the
spread of the disease, and (6) the zoo-sanitary infrastructure.
Importing countries must also be free of other Office of International
des Epizooties (OIE) List A diseases in addition to FMD, such as
rinderpest and classical swine fever. Importing countries that have OIE
List B diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known
as mad cow disease; tuberculosis; and brucellosis must provide
additional documentation proving that the herds being exported to
Canada are free of these diseases. At the time of our review, in
addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle imports only
from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted only from the
United States.
If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and other diseases of
concern, the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals.
CFIA generally requires that all live animals imported into the country
have a unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions
for animals imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle
must be tested for tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and
anaplasmosis, unless the exporting country is considered free of these
diseases and certifies that it is free of other diseases of concern.
CFIA has established additional requirements for importing horses into
Canada from FMD-affected countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses from
FMD-affected countries must be quarantined and washed with a
disinfectant. In addition, their hooves and all equipment, such as
saddles and tack, and all transportation vehicles must be cleaned and
disinfected. Bedding and manure must be placed in bags and incinerated.
Controls for Imported Animal Products:
Canada allows only imports of FMD-susceptible animal products, such as
fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some
animal products may be imported from FMD-affected countries if they
meet certain requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue
Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to
ensure that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing
the products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United
States are generally required only to present proof of the country of
origin at the port of entry.
Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-free by CFIA
can generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with
live animal imports, to designate a country as FMD-free, CFIA reviews
information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2)
time since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect;
(4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the
disease; (5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6)
zoo-sanitary infrastructure.
For all countries, Canada also has a country-by-country meat inspection
and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the
country‘s overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments
operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat
products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews
relevant legislation and related technical information, including the
country‘s residue-monitoring program. If the requesting country has
legislation equivalent to Canada‘s, a visit is made to the country to
study the actual implementation of the legislation in establishments.
On the basis of satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments
wishing to export meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains
a list of the countries and establishments that have been approved to
export certain types of meat products into Canada. For those countries
where the meat inspection system as a whole has not been approved,
importation may be limited to specific meat products.
Importations from countries that are not considered free from FMD are
normally limited, to include the following: (1) commercially sterile
canned cooked meat products; (2) pasteurized, canned, cured, and
boneless meat products; and (3) cooked, frozen, tubed and boneless beef
from specified establishments in certain countries. Milk products are
allowed entry if they have been treated properly and are certified
accordingly. Establishments approved for meat and meat product exports
to Canada are periodically reviewed.
All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to
monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a
shipment is identified as containing meat products, it must be held
until the CFIA inspector reviews the information, such as the Official
Meat Inspection Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the
exporting country. The Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains
information on the (1) name and address of the exporter and importer;
(2) certificate number, country code, and exporting establishment
number; (3) establishment number and name, and country where the
animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the carrier; (5) port of loading
and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number and description of the meat
products; and (8) numbers from the official seal on the container and
the container numbers. Depending on the exporting country, additional
certifications may be required. Some animal product shipments are
exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit through Canada to
another country. CFIA does not review these shipments, provided they
remain under a Customs bond and originate in a country and are of a
type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into Canada. Animal
product imports from the United States are generally required only to
present proof of country of origin. However, some U.S. products, such
as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import permit.
CFIA‘s sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes
require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all
containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to
identify any evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer
labels. For shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory
containers, a full inspection of affected containers is conducted. For
canned meat products, random inspections are carried out by the
inspector on a minimum of 40 cases, which are to be representative of
the inspection lot and not include more than 5 containers from each of
the cases. When there are fewer than 40 cases in an inspection lot,
inspectors select the appropriate number of containers out of each case
to make up the required sample. For inspection lots having fewer than
200 containers, the entire inspection lot must be examined, and the
total number of containers must be recorded on the report form.
When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the inspector must
immediately hold the animal products and notify the area office by
telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must
officially notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or
partially refused and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or
remove it from Canada or it will be destroyed under direct supervision
of a CFIA inspector.
Controls for International Garbage:
Garbage from international airlines and ships must be disposed of and
treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector. Garbage from
carriers of U.S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar
to those for Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to
be disposed of by incineration, heat treatment at 100× Celsius for 30
minutes, or burial at a CFIA-approved site. In addition, the
transportation routes for international garbage are approved in advance
along with alternative routes in case of an emergency. Transporters are
responsible for maintaining their trucks in good condition and checking
to ensure that there are no possible leaks.
Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that
garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage
can be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate
incineration or burial sites. The ships‘ destinations are also recorded
at the first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal
galleys to ensure that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto
Canadian land. At subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the
galley seals. Seals may be broken under CFIA presence but must be
resealed prior to departure if the ship is going to additional Canadian
ports. All foodstuffs and pet animals are to remain on the ship and are
allowed off only with the written permission of CFIA. If ships do not
comply with these requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from
entering Canadian waters.
Controls for International Passengers:
CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained
detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of prohibited
plants and animal products. International passengers are required to
declare all animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain
animal products can result in fines. International passengers, except
those arriving from the United States, are not allowed to bring meat
and meat products into Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of
cheese. Passengers not declaring prohibited items are subject to
monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. At the main Canadian
international airports, CFIA has approximately nine dogs trained to
sniff baggage accompanying international passengers before they proceed
through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog program is part
of CFIA‘s front line of defense against pests and diseases. The dogs
are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits, plants, and
meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk through the
baggage claim area looking for anything that might be considered
suspicious.
CFIA made a number of changes to the international passenger controls
as a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts
of Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the
airports, (2) x-ray passengers‘ baggage, and (3) mount a public
awareness campaign. As a part of the public awareness campaign, large
signs were placed around the airport terminals informing the public
about FMD and precautions that should be taken to prevent its
introduction into Canada. Brochures were also printed conveying similar
information and handed to international passengers arriving from FMD-
infected countries. In addition, CCRA officials asked specific
questions about whether the passengers had been around farm animals or
visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in Canada--even if the
relevant question was not marked on the declaration card. This
additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was declared
FMD-free. Moreover, all international passengers entering Canada were
required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who indicated that
they might present an FMD risk were asked additional questions about
their activities and--as deemed necessary--their shoes were sent out
for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to Canada from
countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at the
teams‘ expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European
outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they
are planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the
messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases.
Controls for International Mail:
CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving into Canada
by mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to
open mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection
by agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a
seal with a code indicating which agency should perform a further
inspection. Generally, each package is then x-rayed. Problem importers/
exporters are identified through a computer system, and these packages
are given additional scrutiny.
Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the recipient
responsible for items sent through the mail, rather than the sender. As
a result, recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they receive
inappropriate items through the mail. For example, if personal
shipments of prohibited agricultural products are sent through the
mail, the recipient can be subject to monetary penalties of up to Can.
$400. For commercial shipments, however, penalties for prohibited
agricultural products can currently be as much as Can. $6,000. In
addition, criminal penalties can also be imposed, depending on the
nature of the offense.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into
Mexico:
This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures
that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five
key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live
animals;
(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal
of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships;
(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through
international mail.
Background:
The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth
Disease, formed in 1947, combined U.S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate
FMD from Mexico.[Footnote 25] The commission built Mexico‘s animal
health infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in
1954. Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number
of activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2)
responding to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on
emergency plans and programs, (4) promoting public information
programs, and
(5) preparing and updating Mexico‘s emergency foreign animal disease
response plans.
Mexico‘s Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca
y Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish,
and food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other
things, (1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo-
sanitary rules used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of
entry, and (3) the animal health measures used in response to a foreign
animal disease emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of
which are at international ports of entry, such as border crossings,
airports, and seaports. For 2001, SAGARPA‘s budget for borders, ports,
and airports was about Mex. $11 million (approximately U.S. $1.1
million). All imports of live animals and agricultural products must be
processed through one of SAGARPA‘s offices. In addition, SAGARPA
officials enforce compliance with Mexico‘s official zoo-sanitary rules
(1) at Customs offices, (2) at quarantine stations, (3) at inspection
points, and (4) in other countries where treaties and accords have been
approved.
SAGARPA divides Mexico into eight regions and assigns a veterinarian
coordinator to each region for animal disease surveillance and for
activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal
disease outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico
established 29 animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout
Mexico, these groups include over 900 government and private
veterinarians trained in identifying and responding to foreign animal
diseases, including FMD. Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity
level-III laboratory capable of testing for foreign animal
diseases.[Footnote 26] In 2001, Mexico reported performing 220
investigations into suspicious cases that might have been FMD. All
investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus.
Controls for Live Animal Imports:
SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries.
Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that have
the FMD virus. SAGARPA‘s general requirements for all live animal
imports include advance notification to SAGARPA‘s official
veterinarians at the ports of entry. The amount of time required for
official advance notification depends on the animals‘ country of
origin. Before live animals can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends
official veterinarians to the exporting country to ensure that the live
animals to be exported are free of disease.
Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of entry,
official veterinarians review all the documents and physically inspect
the animals. Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican sanitary
import permit; (2) a country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip
certificate, if applicable; (4) a registration certificate, if
applicable; and (5) a commercial license. The sanitary import permit
certifies that the exporting country has met Mexican importation
requirements. The health certificate contains information on the:
* name and address of the importer,
* place of origin and destination of the animals,
* animal health production standards of the exporting country,
* place where the certificate was issued, and:
* time period for which the certificate is effective.
All animals imported into Mexico must have individual identification
marks or numbers unless they are imported for immediate slaughter. If
animals are imported for direct slaughter, the only information that
needs to be recorded is the number of animals and their origin.
Additionally, all live animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and
depending on how tame the animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt,
and the entire animal is hosed down with disinfectant. Additionally,
the trucks and containers that transported the animals are disinfected,
and any bedding or waste from the animals is incinerated at the port of
entry.
Generally, all live animals, regardless of their country of origin,
must meet these import requirements. However once these requirements
are met, Mexico has separate procedures for live animals imported from
the United States and those imported from other countries.
Live Animal Imports from the United States:
Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are
allowed to conform to less-stringent entry requirements than animals
imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United
States frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis
of a U.S. veterinary inspection. U.S. animals that arrive in Mexico via
air or sea are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit
when facilities for inspection are available at the port of entry
within Mexico.
Before crossing the border, U.S. animals must remain on the U.S. side
of the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When
Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U.S.
counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the
animals, (2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3)
require animals to be disinfected and/or immunized, or (4) apply other
animal health safety measures.
Live Animal Imports from Other Countries:
In addition to the general requirements listed above, all live animals
entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other import
requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than the
United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment.
As a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two
official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals
before they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are
responsible for developing an animal health report for the animals
being exported, which will document information on the health of the
animals from the time the veterinarians arrive in the exporting country
until the shipment of animals arrives in Mexico. As a result, before
the animals are loaded onto the ship for transport to Mexico, the
Mexican veterinarians will examine the paperwork and inspect each
animal. One of the veterinarians will then accompany the shipment and
monitor the animals for clinical signs of disease while in transit to
Mexico. According to Mexican officials, because the majority of live
animal imports into Mexico come from Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in transit is usually considered an
adequate quarantine period for the animals. For example, the voyage
from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days and serves as an
adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live animal
imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also transported
to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports, they too
are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board the
ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to
Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the
shipment can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting
country.
Controls for Imported Animal Products:
SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services at
Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products comply with
all Mexican import requirements before they are released into commerce.
Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that
SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which
countries are FMD-free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or
restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico
does allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as
long as SAGARPA has approved the animal-product-processing plants and
the products are shipped with the required health and sanitary
certificates. Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are
allowed into Mexico only if they have been properly heat-treated or
subjected to maturation processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other
products, such as machinery, vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must
undergo disinfection procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being
allowed into the country. Products denied entry into Mexico must be
immediately reexported or destroyed.
All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPA‘s
inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports.
Some imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports
of entry that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA
officials review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in
Mexico to ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country
without inspection.
The broker initiates the importation and inspection process for animal
products at the port of entry by presenting the required paperwork,
including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection
services from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will
review the paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the
shipment. The health certificate contains information on the (1) name
and address of the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the
specific destination of the animal products, (3) animal health
production standards used by the exporting country, (4) place where the
certificate was issued, and (5) time period for which the certificate
is effective. If the import documents are in order and the products are
from permissible countries, the container is unloaded from the vessel
and transported to the official warehouse for further inspection.
SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products
or farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico
has deemed as high-risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on
the outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm
machinery and other equipment from high-risk countries must be
completely disinfected. Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are
physically inspected by SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the
refrigerated section of the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists
of (1) a paperwork review, including a review of the Mexican sanitary
import permit and health certificate signed by an official veterinarian
of the exporting country, and (2) a visual inspection of the meat
packages for the meat-processing plant‘s seal, lot number, and factory
number to ensure that the product came from an approved plant in the
country of origin. In addition, SAGARPA officials may collect product
samples for laboratory analysis.[Footnote 27] Once all the reviews and
inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors complete the inspection
report and make a final recommendation on whether the shipment should
be released. Cargo cannot leave the warehouse at the port of entry
without forms from SAGARPA stating that the cargo has been inspected
and deemed safe to enter the country. After the main SAGARPA office
issues the final certificate of importation and releases the shipment,
the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs‘ inspection. Mexican
Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or restricted products are
not entering the country.
Controls for International Garbage:
SAGARPA officials supervise the off-loading and disposal of organic
waste and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from FMD-affected
countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated. Incinerators in
two locations accept international garbage--one in Mexico City and one
in Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are allowed to
dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other Mexican
ports must take their garbage with them.
Controls for International Passengers:
In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that all
international passengers have to complete upon entry into Mexico, all
passengers from FMD-affected countries must fill out a special,
detailed questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help
prevent the introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products
that they may be carrying and (2) providing information about their
contact with animals in the country from which they are arriving. In
addition, the form asks passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico
where they could come into contact with live animals.
At airports and marine ports of entry, international passengers from
high-risk countries must walk over special mats soaked with
disinfectant to disinfect their shoes. According to Mexican officials,
the disinfectant mats are changed every month, and before the arrival
of a high-risk flight at the airport, SAGARPA officials apply fresh
disinfectant to the mat. In addition, until January 2002, the outside
surface of baggage arriving from high-risk countries was sprayed with
disinfectant as it was loaded onto the conveyor belt and before it
entered the baggage claim area of the airport. Baggage from high-risk
flights is also x-rayed and inspected for illegal products by official
inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products are incinerated.
Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport
in English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent
the introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican
requirements described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning
travelers about the dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports.
Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships
arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal
and use of food in the ship‘s galley that is intended for the crew. As
part of this inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list
of all the seaports that the ship has stopped at before arriving in
Mexico to determine whether it docked in ports that pose a risk for
FMD, (2) review the list of all food products on board the ship, (3)
visually inspect the food in the galley,
(4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are
from high-risk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main
entrances of the ship. Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port
for more than 3 or 4 days are allowed to consume some of the products
in the galley while they are docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go
ashore must go through the same procedures as other international
passengers arriving at any port of entry--complete immigration and
customs forms, declare any products of animal or plant origin that they
may be carrying, and walk over disinfectant mats.
Controls for International Mail:
SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all international
mail deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail.
According to Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100
percent of all the international packages arriving from FMD-affected
countries but only randomly sample packages arriving from the United
States and Canada. According to these officials, the post office
facility in Mexico City receives about 500 packages per international
mail delivery. Inspectors do not leave the postal facility until all of
the packages that arrived on a particular day have been inspected,
according to officials. Any prohibited products sent through
international mail that are confiscated are incinerated.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom:
This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures
used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does not enter the
country via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the
importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products;
(3) the handling and disposal of garbage from international carriers,
such as airplanes and ships; (4) international passengers; and (5)
packages sent through international mail. Because the United Kingdom is
subject to the directives of the European Union Economic Community, for
each pathway, this appendix summarizes (1) the preventive measures
established by the European Union for trade between member states and
nonmember countries and
(2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom.
Background:
The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic
Community[Footnote 28] and is subject to the European Union‘s
directives. One E.U. goal was to develop a common market without
borders among the member states. The European Union established
directives that approximated member states‘ laws and developed rules
applicable to all member states. These directives harmonized the
European Union‘s laws so that member states could consistently follow
and apply the same rules uniformly in a common market. For example,
each member state must follow guidelines governing the import of live
animals and animal products to prevent the introduction of foreign
animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European Union. In addition,
each member state is allowed to have national provisions as needed. As
a result, the United Kingdom has its own legislation governing the
imports of live animals and animal products that implements the
European Union‘s directives and covers areas that are not harmonized by
these directives.
When the European Union becomes aware of an outbreak of disease in
another member state or in a nonmember country that may constitute a
serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a
declaration making it an offense for any member state to import
specific animals or animal products from the affected country or
region. In the event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take
emergency safeguard measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of
particular species of animals or animal products from affected member
states to other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal
products from affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain
circumstances, member states may invoke additional safeguarding
procedures and take ’interim safeguard and protective measures.“ Member
states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of
the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them.
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the
federal agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related
issues. DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in
the United Kingdom.
E.U. and U.K. Controls for Live Animal Imports:
The European Union has established separate preventive measures for
imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember
states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to
ensure that live animal imports are disease free.
E.U. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Member States:
Live animal trade between member states requires an official
veterinarian from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior to
their movement and certify them as disease-free. This certification
ensures that the (1) animals have originated from an FMD-free country
or have been tested for diseases of concern, (2) animals have been
isolated for a specified period of time, (3) country has an official
disease surveillance program, and (4) animal production standards have
been met. Member states must also ensure that the animals to be
exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo routine
veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as
required by E.U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the
original transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of
live animals traded between member states are generally performed in
the country of origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the
destination member state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the
destination member state are responsible for performing these checks.
E.U. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Nonmember Countries:
Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or
areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has approved the
country as being FMD-free. This approval is granted on a country-by-
country basis after the following factors have been considered for the
nonmember country:
* The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
environmental health situations that may exist.
* The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of
infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading
partners.
* The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
imports.
* The structure and authority of veterinary services, including
laboratory services.
* Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
hormones.
In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union
when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or
are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to
travel. Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported
out of the country or slaughtered.
Live animal shipments from nonmember countries must enter the European
Union through approved member states‘ border inspection posts. A health
certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the exporting
country must accompany all shipments. E.U. directives have harmonized
the inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to ensure the
quality and equality at all member states‘ ports of entry. At border
inspection posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, identity,
and physical checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment is
allowed to enter into free circulation within the European Union. The
border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show
no clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and
brucellosis are allowed into the European Union. Border inspection
posts are required to inform other member states‘ border inspection
posts of any live animal shipments denied entry and the reasons for the
denial.
U.K. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Member States:
Animals can be imported from member states to go directly to slaughter
facilities, move through approved holding centers to slaughter
facilities, or go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export
health certificate and a license for animal movement must accompany
animals arriving from member states. Veterinary inspectors have the
authority to inspect animals imported into the United Kingdom from
member states at their point of destination to ensure that E.U.
requirements have been met. Inspectors can stop a shipment of animals
while in transit if the transporter does not have the appropriate
documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are required to be
slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved facility.
Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member state for 6
months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter animals,
3 months.
DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to transport live
animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain the following
information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date
of pick-ups, including the name of the producer or business and the
address of the animal-holding center; (2) species, origin, and number
of animals transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4)
individual animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD
outbreak, as a temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required
to have, at all times while in the United Kingdom, proof of
disinfection.
In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and
maintain information on the owner‘s name, the registration number of
the transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For
cattle, they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into
the United Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and
proposed destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine,
operators are required to record only the registration number of the
holding center or the herd of origin and the proposed destination.
Owners and operators of slaughter facilities are generally not required
to maintain this information.
U.K. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Nonmember Countries:
The United Kingdom has adopted the European Union‘s directives for
importing live animals and has spelled out the details for implementing
these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through
another member state‘s border inspection post are required to have both
a border certificate of examination and the original health certificate
when they arrive at the U.K. destination. The United Kingdom also has
procedures for post-import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary
inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a
member state‘s border inspection post. These post-import checks can
occur at the imported animals‘ destination or while they are in
transit. As a result of these checks, if disease is suspected, animals
may be quarantined, slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live
animals from nonmember countries are required to enter the United
Kingdom through certain ports of entry such as, Heathrow, Luton,
Stansted, and Prestwick.
E.U. and U.K. Controls for Imported Animal Products:
The European Union has established separate preventive measures for
imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The United
Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product imports
are disease free.
E.U. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Member States:
Animal products imported by a member state from other member states
must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the
European Union‘s animal health requirements and are under the control
of an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for
ensuring that its animal products are safe and disease free.
Intracommunity shipments of animal products must be accompanied by an
official health certificate or commercial document that contains
information on the origin and destination of the products. As a result
of the European Union‘s common market rules, there are no routine
public health checks at member states‘ ports of entry for shipments
originating in another member state. However, E.U. rules permit random
spot checks of shipments at the place of destination.
E.U. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Nonmember Countries:
Member states can import animal products only from nonmember countries
or parts of a nonmember country approved by the European Union. As with
live animal imports, approval is considered on a country-by-country
basis after the following factors have been considered:
* The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
environmental health situations that may exist.
* The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or
contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.
* The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
imports.
* The structure and authority of veterinary services, including
laboratory services.
* Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
hormones.
Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member
states through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a
health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting
country. Official veterinarians at the member states‘ border inspection
post are responsible for ensuring that the following three types of
checks on shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the
information provided is verified:
* A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation
accompanying the shipment, the importer‘s advance written notice
specifying the number and nature of the shipment, and the estimated
time of arrival at the port of entry.
* An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment are the
same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not
arrive in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps,
official marks, and health marks identifying the country and
establishment of origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in
officially sealed containers are not opened unless there is doubt about
the authenticity of the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such
cases, the containers will be opened and inspected to ensure that the
stamps, health marks, and other marks identifying the country and
establishment of origin are present on the shipment and conform to
those on the certificate or document accompanying the shipment.
* A physical check of the shipment involves inspecting the contents to
ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During
a physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory
analysis. Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage
of imported shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. The
percentage varies according to the product and the country of origin.
For example, veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish
products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50
percent of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed animal
protein shipments.
In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not
meet requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is
reexported if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For
shipments where reexportation is not possible, the product is
destroyed.
E.U. rules allow for the importation of some types of animal products,
such as canned meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries
that have FMD, as long as specific food-processing procedures are
followed to inactivate the virus. For example, milk products imported
from FMD countries must be properly heat-treated.
Imports of semen and embryos from nonmember countries are accepted by
the European Union if the shipment (1) comes from an FMD-free country;
(2) is accompanied by a signed health certificate attesting to the
disease-free status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or
embryos are derived; and (3) comes through an approved collection
center. The information in the accompanying documents is checked at the
member states‘ border inspection post to determine if the shipment
meets the European Union‘s requirements before it is released. The
European Union has additional requirements for imported germplasm;
however, these are currently being updated.
U.K. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Member States:
Animal products from other member states must be accompanied by all the
documents required by E.U. rules and are deliverable only to the
address in the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents.
Official U.K. veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary
checks for products imported from other member states, which may
include the sampling of the product at the U.K. destination.
U.K. Measures for Imports of Animal Products from Nonmember Countries:
In order to ensure that animal diseases are not imported into the
United Kingdom via animal products from nonmember countries, DEFRA
enforces a system of controls that relies primarily on the health
certification accompanying the shipment and post-import official
veterinary inspections of the shipment. Imports from nonmember
countries are permitted only through about 26 approved border
inspection posts in the United Kingdom.
E.U. and U.K. Controls for International Garbage:
E.U. rules require that garbage from international carriers, such as
airplanes and ships, be removed under official control for destruction.
In the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as ’catering
waste“ and, according to U.K. regulations, represents the most likely
route by which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter
the country. As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of
all catering waste from international carriers that arrive in the
United Kingdom. To ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues
licenses, which delineate how the catering waste is to be transported,
including the transportation route for the waste from the port of entry
to the disposal site and how it is to be disposed of, which could
either be at an approved landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the
United Kingdom cannot be fed any imported catering waste.
E.U. and U.K. Controls for International Passengers:
E.U. rules set limits on what products international passengers can
bring from nonmember countries into member states. For example,
personal imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are illegal.
However, passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from
nonmember countries if (1) the products are meant for human
consumption, (2) the products come from an E.U.-approved country, and
(3) the quantity imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) per
person. Passengers traveling within the European Union are allowed to
import meat, animal, and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as
long as the product originates from another member state.
The United Kingdom follows the E.U. rules for personal imports of
animal products by international passengers. The United Kingdom can
impose penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for
passengers found smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat.
Additional restrictions on personal imports of international travelers
may be imposed as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in
various parts of the world.
As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products, such
as meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at
various ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about
prohibited items and warn them about potential penalties for illegal
imports.
U.K. Controls for International Mail:
We are not aware of any specific E.U. requirements for international
mail. However, U.K. Customs‘ inspectors examine all international mail
packages for prohibited and restricted items. For example, packages
containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened
and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember
countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does
not exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in
hermetically sealed containers, and it is intended for personal
consumption only. Packages found in contravention of these regulations
are liable to be seized without compensation. Meat or meat products
sent to the United Kingdom via international mail from other member
states are allowed if they are for personal consumption and do not
exceed 10 kilograms. Additional evidence may be required to support
claims that imports in excess of
10 kilograms are for personal use. Further restrictions on imported
items sent through international mail may be imposed as needed, owing
to outbreaks of animal disease in other countries.
[End of section]
Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C. 20250:
JUL 2 2002:
Dr. Lawrence J. Dyckman Director:
Natural Resources and Environment United States General Accounting
Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Dr. Dyckman:
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has reviewed the General
Accounting Office‘s (GAO) Draft Report, ’To Protect U.S. Livestock,
USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues“ (GAO-02-808).
We found the report to be generally accurate and insightful, providing
a number of meritorious recommendations. We appreciate this opportunity
to comment on your findings.
Resources and Infrastructure:
Since last year‘s foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United
Kingdom and the events of September 11, USDA has significantly
heightened efforts to prevent foreign agricultural pests and diseases
from entering the United States either intentionally or accidentally.
In late May, USDA announced that more than $43 million would be made
available in grants to States from the $328 million approved by
President Bush and the Congress earlier this year to strengthen USDA‘s
homeland security preparedness. These grants are an important component
of the Administration‘s continued efforts to strengthen the Federal-
State-industry infrastructure available to quickly detect and
effectively respond to a potentially devastating introduction of FMD or
another foreign animal disease.
Of the $43 million announced in May, $20.6 million is being provided to
State and university cooperators to be used to establish a network of
diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the Nation
to permit rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal disease threats;
$4.5 million will be used to strengthen State-level surveillance for
animal disease; and $4.3 million will be used to assist States to
improve
their capability to detect plant pests and diseases. In addition, $14
million is being used to help States meet the national standards of
emergency preparedness established by the National Animal Health
Emergency
Management System (NAHEMS). [Last year USDA provided the States $2
million to work toward meeting NAHEMS standards; these funds were drawn
from fiscal year (FY) 2001 supplemental appropriations bill, which
provided USDA with $5 million out of a requested $35 million;
the balance of the $5 million was used for other emergency preparedness
needs.]
We are also working in closely with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to develop a comprehensive operational plan under which
FEMA would coordinate Federal assets and resources to assist USDA in
the event of an outbreak. Additionally, we are working within the
Department to ensure that the Forest Service and other agencies could
provide logistical and operational support in the event of an outbreak.
This latest infusion of resources follows other allocations announced
earlier this year, including $177 million to make improvements at key
USDA locations, including diagnostic and research facilities in Ames,
Iowa, and Plum Island, New York. We also devoted an additional $35
million to strengthen the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection program by
expediting work with the U.S. Customs Service on an automated
inspection targeting system, purchasing 100 rapid pathogen
identification devices, and hiring additional inspection personnel.
USDA also provided $16.5 million for the Food Safety and Inspection
Service to increase monitoring, provide training to inspectors, expand
technical capabilities, and hire additional inspectors for imported
meat and poultry. Finally, $15.3 million was provided for the
Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid detection technologies
for FMD as well as other animal diseases.
This year, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has
established two new Senior Executive Service positions to head
Emergency Programs (animal health) and Port Operations, and both of
these positions will be filled by the end of the year. In addition, by
the end of the year, APHIS will have increased its safeguarding
personnel to approximately 3,870, a 50 percent increase over FY 2000
staffing levels, and we will have doubled the number of dog teams to
123 from the level of 2 years ago. We have also hired 18 additional
veterinarians who are conducting port reviews, working closely with
State counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on
working with and handling animal products, animal by-products, and
international garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal
diseases. The President‘s FY 2003 budget requests about $150 million in
additional funding for USDA for additional homeland security
protections. If this request is granted by Congress, it would bring the
resources dedicated to protecting agricultural health to the highest
levels ever.
With regard to concerns about the availability of sufficient personnel
to work on a massive eradication effort if one were required, we wish
to point out that we have created a National Animal Health Reserve
Corps, composed of private veterinarians from around the United States
who would be willing to assist APHIS veterinarians in field and
laboratory operations during a foreign animal disease situation. To
date, more than 275 private veterinarians have signed on to this Corps,
and we are continuing to recruit more members. This Corps supplements
the force of personnel drawn from the States, the Department of
Defense,
FEMA, and other organizations in the event of an animal disease
catastrophe. We are also working with Canada, New Zealand, Australia,
and the United Kingdom on the creation of an international veterinary
reserve, which could supplement resources available domestically in the
event of a major emergency.
Prevention and Control Measures:
We wish to note that, although the report seems to characterize the
United States‘ regulatory processes as similar to those of the United
Kingdom, belonging to European Union (EU) presents the United Kingdom
with greater risk than that faced by the United States, because the EU
includes, and provides for trade among, countries that are FMD-free and
some that are not.
APHIS is continually assessing emerging animal health conditions around
the world and ensuring that our requirements effectively address the
risks associated not only with FMD but also bovine spongiform
encephalopathy and a host of other diseases of concern.
We wish to note that the report understated the number of ports at
which USDA has a presence. In fact, USDA has a presence at all major
U.S. ports, with staffing based on risk assessments and supplemented
with tools ranging from detector dogs to x-rays to hand-held remote
sensing/diagnostic equipment. In those ports staffed by USDA, we have
the primary inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and
manifests. To ensure that these shipments continue to be referred to
USDA for inspection, we are working with Customs and other Federal
agencies:
on the aforementioned automated targeting system, which will serve as
an electronic interface among several Federal agencies to identify and
automatically segregate high-risk plant cargo and track imported
animals and animal products.
In addition, Customs and APHIS inspectors work together at
international mail facilities, examining package declaration forms,
visually inspecting or x-raying package contents to determine those
items requiring closer inspection, which may include opening such mail.
Mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized, and this
is based upon pathway analyses, which can help determine the potential
for the introduction of a foreign animal disease.
With regard to the concerns cited about work needed in the areas of
animal identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity, we would agree
that these are all absolutely vital areas to have addressed prior to
any major outbreak of disease. In this regard, we are working closely
with the agricultural industries to provide forums for national
dialogue on the issue of a national identification plan for American
livestock. The ultimate objective is to establish a national
identification plan that provides the essential elements to improve
emergency response and meet future needs. We are also investing other
options available for disposing of carcasses on a large scale. Further,
on May l, 2002, we published in the Federal Register proposed
regulations to address the payment of indemnity in the event of an FMD
outbreak. Under this rule, the Federal Government would pay 100 percent
of the costs for purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals
should they become infected with FMD as well as for materials
contaminated with FMD and cleaning and disinfection of affected
premises. We recently extended the comment period on this proposal to
July 31, 2002.
Communications and Outreach:
Immediately upon the detection of FMD in the United Kingdom, USDA
implemented an aggressive educational campaign to increase awareness of
FMD on the part of international travelers, farmers, and the general
public. Among other things, additional advisory signs were posted in
airports, public service announcements were broadcast, an information
hotline and comprehensive Web site were established, and a suggested
in-flight announcement was provided to international carriers. Our
outreach effort continues, and APHIS is in the process of developing
new signage at ports of entry that will be larger and more mobile than
the ones observed by the GAO auditors. In addition, we are very pleased
to note that we have worked with Customs to modify the Customs
declaration form so that its questions will be understood more easily
by travelers and yield better information to help us focus our efforts.
The new forms are now being distributed around the country.
We are also working in conjunction with FEMA to develop a framework for
a comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign animal disease
outbreak. The plan will help better ensure timely dissemination of
accurate information to critical audiences, including Customs and other
Federal agencies, States, and industry.
Conclusion:
In short, we appreciate the opportunity to review GAO‘s report and
believe the final product is overall an accurate portrayal of the
challenges facing the continuum of Federal, State, and industry
resources dedicated to safeguarding U.S. agricultural health. As the
report acknowledges, with the enormous volume of international travel
and trade, there is no way to ensure zero risk of disease introduction.
However, we believe that the short-and long-term measures we are taking
to enhance prevention, surveillance, emergency preparedness, and
coordination with other Federal, State, and industry organizations are
providing a much-needed boost to our overall safeguarding
infrastructure. We will continue to look critically at the
effectiveness of our efforts and to make whatever changes are warranted
to ensure that the American food supply continues to be the safest,
most abundant, and most affordable food supply in the world.
Sincerely,
Ann M. Veneman Secretary:
Signed by Ann M. Veneman:
[End of figure]
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service:
U.S. Customs Service Memorandum:
DATE: July 2, 2002:
FILE: AUD-1-OP CN:
MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE J. DYCKMAN GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE:
FROM: Director, Office of Planning:
SUBJECT:Comments on Draft Audit Report Entitled Foot and Mouth Disease:
To Protect U.S. Agriculture, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve
Outstanding Issues:
Thank you for providing us with a copy of your draft report entitled
’Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Agriculture, USDA Must Remain
Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues“ and the chance to discuss the
issues in this report.
We have reviewed this report and have no comments to make at this time
on the substance of the report.
We did not identify any information that would warrant protection under
the Freedom of Information Act.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. If you have
any questions regarding this report, please contact Ms. Cecelia Neglia
at (202) 927-9369.
Signed by Willam F. Riley:
[End of figure]
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Lawrence Dyckman (202) 512-3841
Anu Mittal (202) 512-9846:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl,
and Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important
contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood,
Judy Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.
FOOTNOTES
[1] A veterinary biologic is a product used for diagnosing, preventing,
and treating an animal disease. These products include vaccines and
kits for diagnosing specific animal diseases.
[2] The pH condition of a product is the measure of its degree of
acidity or alkalinity; a value of 7 is considered neutral while values
greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 7 are
considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain
viruses, such as FMD.
[3] In January 2002, we issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow
Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas
Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 25, 2002).
[4] Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or
chemicals to separate the fat from the protein and mineral components.
[5] Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U.K. outbreak to
control the disease. According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a
comparable outbreak in the United States could require the destruction
of about 13 million animals.
[6] While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with its
reporting requirements, WTO can.
[7] The commission was originally called the Mexican American
Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.
[8] This barrier is one of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is
maintained by the European Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.
[9] According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U.K. outbreak
in 2001, another benefit of sending U.S. personnel to assist with
foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable training they receive by
handling diseased animals and responding to various aspects of a ’real
life“ response.
[10] USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a country‘s FMD-free
status using the OIE criteria described in chapter 1, and independently
validates the country‘s disease status reports sent to the OIE. In
addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the country
and conducts verification visits to the country.
[11] Twenty-six other U.S. ports of entry accept live animals on a
limited basis.
[12] Because the incubation period for FMD is significantly less than
60 days, the 60-day requirement helps ensure that if animals have been
exposed to the FMD virus or other serious animal health diseases, they
would become symptomatic within this period of time.
[13] The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals
imported and the kinds of diseases present in the country of origin.
[14] Unrestricted trade is generally dependent on a country‘s being
free of other diseases of concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest),
and others. FMD is only one of the diseases of concern.
[15] The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing
conditions for the product and determine whether the stated process
will inactivate the FMD virus.
[16] Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by
FSIS, while others, such as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration to ensure that they are safe for human
consumption before they are released into U.S. commerce.
[17] Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are
routinely notified.
[18] All imported animal product shipments receive a documentary
review, which usually involves a review of the accompanying paperwork,
such as import permits and health certifications. A percentage of
animal product shipments is judgmentally selected for physical
inspection to ensure that the products do not present any animal or
public health risk. Samples may be taken for laboratory analyses as
part of this inspection.
[19] NAHEMS is a joint federal-state-industry group whose objectives
include improving the U.S. ability to respond to animal health
emergencies.
[20] Plum Island is USDA‘s high-security laboratory (with a biosafety
level-III status) located on an island off of Long Island, New York,
and is the only U.S. laboratory authorized to conduct diagnostic
testing of FMD-suspected samples using live FMD virus.
[21] The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002 (the 2002 farm bill) on May 13, 2002.
[22] These countries are included in special categories for FMD and
rinderpest because even though they have been determined to be free of
these diseases, one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) they
supplement their national meat supply through the importation of fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/areas that
are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common
land border with countries/areas that are not designated as free of
rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from
countries/areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD
under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for
importation into the United States.
[23] Canada‘s biosecurity level-IV laboratory conducts tests on animals
infected with dangerous zoonotic agents.
[24] Live animals in transit by air are off-loaded only to change
planes and, if destined for the United States, are placed in sealed
trucks before leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow animals to transit
Canada that would normally not be allowed into the country.
[25] The commission is currently called the Mexico-United States
Commission for the Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth and other Exotic Animal
Diseases.
[26] A biosecurity level-III laboratory is one that maintains a high
security level and employs extreme control measures in the handling of
samples. Such laboratories install special control measures to reduce
the risk of pathogens escaping into the surrounding environment by
using air filters and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant
showers prior to leaving the facility.
[27] Mexico has a meat-product-sampling scheme, which is detailed in
the country‘s meat inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are
taken from a shipment of 25 tons of meat. The system is based on a
judgmental sampling process; however, importers who have had problems
in the past are sampled more often.
[28] Member states include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of
Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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