Foreign Assistance
Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis Gao ID: GAO-03-644 June 25, 2003The southern Africa food crisis threatened 15.3 million people in six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO was asked to look at (1) factors that contributed to the crisis, (2) how well the populations' needs were met, (3) obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4) challenges to emerging from crisis.
Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather reduced maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural sector caused food supply shortages. Government actions--including the sale of Malawi's grain reserve and Zimbabwe's land reform--further cut available food. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by reducing the labor force. Food aid averted famine, but the overall response did not prevent widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereal gap--the difference between domestic needs and production--was met by the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period. However, food aid deliveries fell short in several countries, and vulnerable households had limited ability to purchase commercial maize. Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns about biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response. Excluding the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, timely donations to the World Food Program. Poor transportation systems and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery. Zambia rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech food; other countries required milling maize for the same reason. This compromised the food aid pipeline given the United States was the region's key donor and its aid may contain biotech food. Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/AIDS epidemic pose challenges to emerging from crisis into sustained recovery. U.N. and U.S. officials cite the need to reverse declining trends in agricultural investments by international financing organizations, national governments, and donors. Without a strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, food crises will recur.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-644, Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate:
June 2003:
Foreign Assistance:
Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food
Crisis:
GAO-03-644:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-644, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Southern Africa has been facing its worst food crisis in more than a
decade, threatening more than 15.3 million people in six countries
(Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with
famine. Because of concerns over the nature and severity of the
emergency, GAO was asked to look at (1) what factors contributed to
the crisis,( 2) how well were affected populations‘ needs met, (3)
obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4) challenges to emerging from
crisis to sustained recovery.
What GAO Found:
* Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather
reduced maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural
sector caused food supply shortages, and government actions--including
the sale of Malawi‘s grain reserve and Zimbabwe‘s land reform--further
cut available food. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity.
Finally, the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by, among
other things, reducing the labor force.
* Food needs were not fully met but famine was averted. Food aid was
sufficient to avert a famine, but the overall response did not prevent
widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereala gap--the
difference between domestic cereal needs and production--was met by
the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period. However, food aid
deliveries fell substantially short in several countries, and
vulnerable households had limited ability to purchase commercial
supplies when available.
Plan for Addressing Cereal Needs in the Six Countries
[See PDF for image]
[a] Cereal includes maize and other grains suitable for food.
[End of figure]
* Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concern about the safety of
biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response. Excluding
the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, timely
donations to the World Food Program (WFP). Poor ports, roads,
railroads, and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery.
One country rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech
food; most others required milling of whole kernel maize for the same
reason. This severely compromised the food aid pipeline because the
United States was the region‘s key donor and most of its aid could
contain biotech food.
* Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/AIDS epidemic pose
challenges to emerging from crisis into sustained recovery. U.N. and
U.S. officials cite the need to reverse declining trends in
agricultural investments by international financing organizations,
national governments, and donors. They note that without a concerted
strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural
development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management,
destabilizing food crises are likely to recur.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and Agriculture and
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID)
* initiate a comprehensive review of the issues associated with
biotech foods in emergency food aid”including environment, health, and
trade concerns”in anticipation of future food crises; and
* work with international donors and national governments on a
recovery strategy integrating, among others, agricultural development,
HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management.
We received comments from the Departments of State and Agriculture,
USAID, and WFP, all of which generally agreed with our conclusions and
recommendations. They also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-644.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick (202) 512-
3149 (gootnickd@gao.gov).
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Multiple Factors Contributed to the Food Crisis:
Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted:
Slow Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with Biotech
Food Were Major Obstacles to an Effective Response:
Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic
Pose Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained Recovery:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
Appendix III: Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment
Methods:
Early Warning Systems:
Assessment Systems:
Appendix IV: U.S. Donations:
Appendix V: Commercial Imports:
Appendix VI: Nonfood Emergency Needs:
Appendix VII: Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
Modern Agricultural Biotechnology:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IX: Comments from Department of Agriculture:
GAO Comments:
Appendix X: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International
Development:
GAO Comments:
Appendix XI: Comment from the World Food Program:
GAO Comments:
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Tables :
Table 1: Cereal Production by Country:
Table 2: Frequency of Household Coping Strategies in Zambia (August
through December 2002):
Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their Timing:
Table 4: U.S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern Africa
Crisis:
Figures:
Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern
African Countries:
Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six Countries
and Plan for Addressing the Deficit (March 2003):
Figure 3: Extent to Which Cereal Food Aid and Commercial
Imports Met the Cereal Gap (April 1, 2002, through March
31, 2003):
Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets
Were Met (July 2002 through March 2003):
Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total Planned Beneficiaries Who
Received at Least Some Food Aid (July through December 2002):
Figure 6: Steps in the Logistics Process:
Figure 7: The Transportation Network for Moving Food in the Region:
Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development–1990 through 2000:
Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans Approved for the
Affected Countries–1990 to 2002:
Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a Percentage of Total
Government Spending– 1996/97 through 2001/02 (in 2003 dollars):
Figure 11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to
Four Countries–1998 to 2003:
Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs Related to Food Security:
Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/AIDS:
Figure 14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
Figure 15: U.N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by
Sector:
Abbreviations :
CFSAM: Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission:
C-SAFE: Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency:
EMOP: Emergency Operations:
EWS: early warning systems:
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization:
FEWS NET: Famine Early Warning Systems Network:
GIEWS: Global Information Early Warning System:
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development:
IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance:
SADC: Southern African Development Community:
UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS:
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture:
VAC: vulnerability assessment committee:
VAM: vulnerability assessment mapping:
WFP: World Food Program:
WHO: World Health Organization:
Letter June 25, 2003:
The Honorable Russell D. Feingold
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on African Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Feingold:
The southern Africa region has been facing its worst food crisis in
more than a decade. Approximately 15.3 million people (26 percent of
the total population) in 6 countries--Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--have experienced severe food shortages
and the threat of famine. Avoiding famine has required substantial
supplies of food from commercial imports[Footnote 1] and a large
international food aid effort. The United Nations began establishing
emergency food aid operations in individual countries as early as
November 2001. In July 2002, the United Nations appealed to
international donors for $507 million to provide 1.2 million metric
tons of emergency food aid as part of a consolidated regional program
for the April 2002-March 2003 crop year. However, food shortages
continue and emergency operations have been extended through June 2003.
Because of concerns over the nature and severity of this food crisis,
you asked us to determine: (1) what factors contributed to the current
crisis in southern Africa, (2) how well were the populations' overall
food needs met during the crisis period, (3) what were the major
obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4) what are the challenges to
emerging from the crisis into sustained recovery.
To address these objectives, we met with and analyzed information from
U.S. government officials at the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Departments of State and Agriculture in
Washington, D.C., and at U.S. missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also met with officials and
reviewed information from the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their headquarters in Rome and in
the southern African countries we visited. In addition, we gathered
information from and met with representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), other U.N. agencies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGO), other donor governments, and host government
ministries in Washington and at the country level in southern Africa.
As part of our fieldwork, we observed WFP and NGO food aid
distributions in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (App. I
provides detailed information on our scope and methodology.):
Results in Brief:
The primary factors that contributed to the food crisis were: (1)
erratic weather, (2) a poorly functioning agricultural sector, (3)
questionable government actions, (4) widespread poverty, and (5) the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Erratic weather patterns contributed to a reduction
in southern Africa's cereal[Footnote 2] production by 29 percent on
average.[Footnote 3] But this decline alone would not have caused a
food crisis absent other conditions. Food stocks were depleted from
previous poor harvests and farmers lacked access to agricultural inputs
such as seeds and fertilizer. Government actions such as the sale of
grain reserves in Malawi and disruptive land reform policies in
Zimbabwe--which spurred a 75 percent drop in that country's commercial
maize (corn) production over the past 2 years--further reduced food
supply. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity in the
region. HIV/AIDS, which has infected 13 percent to 33 percent of the
population in the six countries, exacerbated the crisis by reducing
both productivity and agricultural output and severely limiting the
populations' ability to cope with a bad harvest and high food prices.
By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93
percent of the regional cereal gap[Footnote 4] was met. Commercial
cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million metric tons (MT), while
the food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of
the planned amount). Provision of this food prevented large-scale
famine and death. However, food did not reach the region early enough
to avert widespread hunger, and many people resorted to rationing food,
reducing expenditures on nonfood items, and selling household assets
(such as tools and livestock). Success in filling the total cereal gap
varied widely across the six affected countries. For example, Malawi
more than eliminated its cereal gap, whereas Mozambique cut its gap by
about 50 percent. According to currently available data, rates of acute
malnutrition in the region have not deteriorated significantly.
The major obstacles to the food aid effort were (1) the lack of
sufficient, timely food donations; (2) poor infrastructure in recipient
countries; and (3) concerns associated with biotech food.[Footnote 5]
Although the United States made substantial, early donations, in
aggregate, donor country commitments of food were 18 percent below
operational needs through the end of December. Moreover, given
the lag in time between when food commitments were made and when food
arrived in country, the shortfall in the first 6 months of the crisis
period was much higher. Poor infrastructure--ports, rail, roads, and
storage facilities--in recipient countries hampered efficient delivery
of food aid, limited how quickly food could reach recipients, and
ultimately prevented food from reaching some beneficiaries. Concerns
about the health and environmental safety of food aid that might
contain bioengineered products led Zambia to reject U.S.-donated maize
and most of the other countries to impose costly and time-consuming
processing requirements--which further reduced or delayed the food aid
effort, increased costs, and complicated emergency operations.
The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into
sustained recovery include (1) declining investment in the region's
agricultural sector, (2) the limited scope of existing programs related
to food security,[Footnote 6] and (3) the negative impact of HIV/AIDS.
Recognizing that little progress has been made to address impediments
to the transition from crisis to recovery, the U.N. Secretary-General
and several other key stakeholders have called for a more
comprehensive, integrated approach to break the pattern of recurrent
food crises in Africa. While the food outlook for the next crop year--
April 2003 through March 2004--is better, food security conditions are
still tenuous; and without sustained progress, recurring food crises
may be difficult to avoid in the future.
This report makes recommendations to the Secretaries of State and
Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID, to (1) undertake a
comprehensive review of the issues pertaining to biotech foods in
emergency food aid in anticipation of future food crises, and (2) work
with international organizations, donors, national governments, and key
stakeholders to develop a recovery strategy that integrates
agricultural development, HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management,
among other things.
We received written comments on a draft of our report from the
Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP, which we have
reprinted in appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, respectively. These
agencies generally agreed with our overall conclusions and
recommendations while expressing technical concerns on specific points,
primarily issues related to biotech food. Their technical comments,
along with those received from FAO, IMF, and the World Bank, have been
incorporated into the report as appropriate.
Background:
In 1991/92, drought caused massive crop failure, threatening 18 million
people in 10 southern African countries with famine. Because of a
similar reduced maize crop after the 2001/02 crop cycle,[Footnote 7]
several early warning systems predicted an impending food crisis that
would run through the beginning of the following harvest in April 2003.
(App. II provides a timeline of the crisis period, and app. III
provides information on early warning systems.):
Regional and national assessments of the crisis conducted by WFP, FAO,
and others estimated that 15.3 million people[Footnote 8] in the region
were at risk of starvation. (Fig. 1 shows the population at risk of
famine in each of the six affected countries.):
Figure 1: Population at Risk of Famine in the Affected Southern African
Countries:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In July 2002, WFP initiated the Southern Africa Crisis Response
Emergency Operation (EMOP) for providing food aid to the six countries
on a regional basis. Prior to this consolidation, WFP had been
delivering food to the individual country emergency operating programs.
objectives in the southern Africa food crisis were to prevent
severe food shortages, safeguard the nutritional well-being of
vulnerable segments of the population, preserve human assets, and
prevent migration out of affected areas.
As the major food aid donor in the southern Africa crisis, the U.S.
government has a significant role in the relief effort. Through USAID's
Food for Peace Office and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and
USDA, the U.S. government has worked to support the EMOP and address
the crisis. In February 2002, in an effort to avert famine, the United
States began authorizing food aid shipments to the region. As of March
18, 2003, the U.S. government had provided approximately $275 million
in food aid and $13 million for bilateral nonfood-related assistance
such as agriculture, health, shelter, and sanitation. (See app. IV for
additional information on the U.S. contributions.):
WFP, the United States, and other countries partner with
nongovernmental organizations to distribute food aid at the regional
and village level. In addition, many of these organizations also
provide nonfood emergency assistance and long-term development
aid.[Footnote 9]
Much of the population in each of the affected countries works in the
agricultural sector. The percentage of labor force engaged in
agriculture ranges from 66 percent in Zimbabwe to 86 percent in Lesotho
and Malawi. Many of these farmers rely on maize (corn) as the primary
staple crop. Unlike root crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes--
which are common but less popular staples in the region--maize is
relatively fragile, requiring more fertilizer and differing amounts of
water during the growing season.
Multiple Factors Contributed to the Food Crisis:
The immediate factor contributing to the food crisis was the erratic
weather patterns that disrupted the normal growing cycle, causing maize
production in southern Africa to drop from a 5-year average of about
7.3 million MT to about 5.2 million MT in 2002. The dramatic reduction
in available maize can also be linked to a weak agricultural sector and
government actions, such as Malawi's decision to sell off its strategic
grain reserve and Zimbabwe's fast-tracked land reform. In addition,
much of the region's population had limited access to food because of
widespread poverty. The HIV/AIDS epidemic further exacerbated the
population's access to basic commodities by decreasing household food
production and income and increasing consumption requirements.
Erratic Weather Patterns Played a Key Role in Reducing Maize
Production:
Erratic weather patterns between December 2001 and May 2002 reduced the
harvests in five of the six affected countries, except Mozambique, when
compared with 5-year averages. Drought-like conditions gripped parts of
Malawi, southern Mozambique, Swaziland, southern Zambia, and Zimbabwe
in the middle of the growing season (see app. II for timeline). This
water deficit at a crucial point in the growing season severely
stressed crops and caused many hectares[Footnote 10] to wilt. In
addition, parts of Zambia suffered high rainfall mid-season, flooding
the still-growing crops. Similarly, in Malawi, after the mid-season dry
spells wilted some crops, the country received heavy rains that
hampered the harvesting and drying of what crops remained, and in some
cases, caused them to rot. Lesotho also experienced prolonged rains
late in the season as well as an additional late-season frost that
damaged crops across large parts of the country and drastically reduced
production.
Regional Cereal Production Dropped by 29 Percent:
Regional food supplies have been limited due to poor cereal harvests in
five out of the six affected countries. (See table 1.) Mozambique was
the one exception: Its 2001/02 cereal harvest was actually above
average. However, due to transportation constraints, Mozambique's
production surpluses could not be supplied to the southern part of the
country where cereal harvests were lower.
Table 1: Cereal Production by Country:
In metric tons:
Lesotho; 2001/02 season: 121,500; 5-year average[A]: 171,000[B];
Percentage change: -29%.
Malawi; 2001/02 season: 1,772, 000; 5-year average[A]: 2,081,000;
Percentage change: -15%.
Mozambique; 2001/02 season: 1,767,000; 5-year average[A]: 1,678,000;
Percentage change: 5%.
Swaziland; 2001/02 season: 70,000; 5-year average[A]: 90,000;
Percentage change: -22%.
Zambia; 2001/02 season: 738,000; 5-year average[A]: 1,095,000;
Percentage change: -33%.
Zimbabwe; 2001/02 season: 705,840; 5-year average[A]: 2,164,000;
Percentage change: -67%.
Total; 2001/02 season: 5,174,340; 5-year average[A]: 7,279,000;
Percentage change: -29%.
Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Vulnerability
Assessment Committee (VAC) Reports, September 2002 through January
2003.
[A] Represents average production for the harvests in 1997 through
2001.
[B] Estimated.
[End of table]
Poorly Functioning Agricultural Sector Negatively Affected Food Supply:
In addition to poor weather conditions, weaknesses in the agricultural
sector contributed to a poor harvest. According to IFAD, these
weaknesses included the following:
* Declining soil fertility reduced crop yields. In Lesotho, average
maize and sorghum yields have declined by more than 60 percent since
the mid-1970s. According to FAO, declining soil fertility is a primary
cause of this trend and is leading to a crop production catastrophe in
that country.
* Restricted access to agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer
limited harvests. In Zambia, important inputs such as seeds and
fertilizer were not available until December 2001 or January 2002,
resulting in late plantings. These crops were at a crucial stage of
development when the rains ceased in early 2002, causing crop failure.
* Incomplete market development impaired farmers' ability to sell
crops. In Malawi, market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s eliminated
price controls and removed government food grain monopolies. While
these liberalizing reforms increased the availability of seeds and
fertilizer, small farmers still lack access to credit.
Recent Government Actions Further Reduced the Food Supply:
The food supply has been constrained further by certain government
actions, the most damaging of which were the sale of grain reserves in
Malawi and fast-tracked land reform in Zimbabwe.
Sale of Malawi's Grain Reserve Hindered Stable Food Supplies:
Between July 2000 and August 2001, the National Food Reserve Agency of
Malawi sold the 167,000 MT of maize it had purchased and stored as food
reserves for the country. Despite several audits, it is still uncertain
where the proceeds of the sale went. While the sold reserves did not
cause the Malawi food crisis, their absence jeopardized the
population's food security. Had the government retained 60,000 MT of
maize in accordance with its own policy to ensure adequate food
supplies or an equivalent amount of currency to purchase new stocks, it
could have been used to help ease food shortages in the early stage of
the crisis, when a considerable number of people are reported to have
died,[Footnote 11] and to fill almost one-quarter of the country's
cereal gap while emergency response operations were ramping up.
An investigation by Malawi's National Audit Office in May 2002
concluded that the National Food Reserve Agency lost money in every
area of handling maize because of poor financial management. Another
investigation, conducted by Malawi's Anti-Corruption Bureau in mid-
2002, found that poor management of the grain reserve allowed companies
and individuals to take advantage of the maize shortage to increase
prices beyond the reach of a large sector of the community. The
mismanagement cost the Malawian government more than K 2.9 billion
(about $40 million).[Footnote 12]
Zimbabwe's Land Reform Decimated Production and Strained Region's
Supply:
After years of trying to redistribute the country's arable land, the
government of Zimbabwe fast-tracked its land reform and resettlement
policy in 2000 with the aim of acquiring all commercial farms no later
than August 8, 2002. The campaign was characterized by the forced
expulsion of landowners and farm laborers. To date, there remain more
than a million internally displaced farm laborers. While the government
did acquire these farms, it did not maintain them to ensure continued
productivity. As a result, the land seizure destabilized the country's
economy, leading to a 75 percent drop in commercial maize production
over the past 2 years and turning Zimbabwe from a net exporter of grain
to a net importer. Because Zimbabwe now cannot grow enough food to feed
its own population, it has strained the cereal supply for the entire
region.
According to the State Department, the country's gross domestic product
fell by more than 20 percent and inflation soared to more than 269
percent between 1998 and 2002, coinciding with fast-tracked land
reform. At the same time, unemployment rose by more than 25 percent as
dismantling of commercial farms left many rural farm workers without a
source of income and, therefore, a way to purchase food when their
subsistence crops failed. In addition, government-imposed price
controls on basic commodities have caused shortages of everything from
bread, milk, sugar, and wheat flour to fuel and electricity.
Widespread Poverty Contributed to Food Insecurity:
The six nations affected by the food crisis are generally low-income
countries. The percentage of population subsisting on less than $1 per
day range from 36 percent in Zimbabwe to 64 percent in Zambia. This
widespread poverty and lack of productive assets (e.g., livestock and
farm machinery) contribute to food insecurity in the region. In
addition, the region is currently facing serious economic problems that
further increase the population's food insecurity. For example, in
recent years, the dramatic collapse in the economy of Zimbabwe and a
decline in the mining industry in South Africa and Zambia have removed
sources of employment for many individuals in the region. The region's
food insecurity is associated with high rates of chronic malnutrition
in the under-5 population--ranging from 30 percent in Swaziland to 59
percent in Zambia.
HIV/AIDS Epidemic Exacerbated Food Shortages:
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has strained already-diminished food supplies by
decreasing affected households' food production and increasing
nutritional requirements. In addition, the epidemic limits households'
access to food by decreasing income and increasing household expenses.
According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS),
adult HIV/AIDS infection rates in 2001 were approximately 31 percent
for Lesotho, 15 percent for Malawi, 13 percent for Mozambique, 33
percent for Swaziland, 22 percent for Zambia, and 34 percent for
Zimbabwe. Infection rates are higher among women, who generally account
for 70 percent of the agricultural labor force and 80 percent of food
production in Africa.
HIV/AIDS Reduces Food Supplies:
HIV/AIDS has decreased household food production by attacking people in
their most productive working years, thus reducing the labor force.
Around three-fourths of HIV/AIDS cases in southern Africa are among
adults between the ages of 20 and 40. The percentage of agricultural
labor force lost due to HIV/AIDS deaths by 2000 was nearly 6 percent
for Malawi and 10 percent for Zimbabwe. Recent studies on specific
rural areas show, for example, that each adult death in Zambia was
associated with a 16 percent reduction in the amount of land planted by
the household, and 72 percent of households affected by chronic illness
in selected rural areas of Malawi experienced an agricultural
production decrease.[Footnote 13] In addition, a person infected with
HIV/AIDS requires up to 50 percent more protein and 15 percent more
calories than a noninfected person. These extra needs put a further
strain on the already limited food supplies.
HIV/AIDS Decreases Access to Food:
HIV/AIDS has lowered household incomes, making it more difficult to
access what food is available. Recent studies estimate that GDP growth
in southern Africa is currently around 1 percent to 2 percent lower due
to HIV/AIDS.[Footnote 14] For the six affected countries, 1 percent of
GDP in 2001 amounted to around $200 million. Recent studies in the
region also show large monetary impacts at the household level. For
example, in Zambia, HIV/AIDS-affected households reported annual income
levels of 30 percent to 35 percent less due to the disease. In
Zimbabwe, households with orphans had 42 percent less income per capita
than households without orphans. In addition, medical care and funeral
expenses are significant: In Zambia, 42 percent of households with
chronically ill members reported unusually high health care expenses
compared with 14 percent of households without chronically ill members,
while in Zimbabwe, funeral costs can be as much as twice the annual per
capita poverty line.
Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted:
By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93
percent of the regional cereal gap appeared to have been met.[Footnote
15] Commercial cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million MT, while
the food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of
the planned food aid amount). The commercial cereal imports and food
aid prevented large-scale famine and death but did not reach parts of
the region early enough throughout most of the crisis period to avert
widespread hunger. Many people resorted to coping mechanisms, such as
rationing their food intake, reducing their expenditures on nonfood
items, and selling household assets to obtain food. The limited data
available on nutritional status generally do not show a significant
impact on acute malnutrition in the countries of the region. In
addition to problems with timely delivery of food, U.N. agencies were
only able to fund about 25 percent of urgent, nonfood emergency
humanitarian needs.
Approximately 93 Percent of the Cereal Gap Met during the Crisis
Period:
The May/June 2002 FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessments (CFSAM) for
each of the six countries estimated the cereal gap for the region at
4.1 million MT or 43 percent of domestic requirements for the April 1,
2002, through March 31, 2003, period. However, by the end of March
2003, the cereal gap had been revised downward substantially---to 2.6
million MT or 31 percent of domestic requirements.[Footnote 16] Based
on the plan that evolved from the CFSAMs, the cereal deficit was to be
offset by a combination of commercial imports and emergency food aid.
The assessments identified an emergency cereals need of 1.2 million MT
for the crop year, and this amount was adopted as a goal in the United
Nations' July 2002 emergency appeal for food aid for the region.
Although later analyses projected more people at risk of famine, the
goal for emergency cereals needs was not increased. As shown in figure
2, if the emergency goal of 1.2 million MT were fully met, the
estimated need for commercial cereal imports would be 1.4 million
MT.[Footnote 17]
Figure 2: Revised Estimate of the Cereal Gap in the Six Countries and
Plan for Addressing the Deficit (March 2003):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3 indicates the extent to which food aid and commercial imports
helped offset the cereal gap in each country and the region over the
April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2003, period. As the figure shows, the
region as a whole met at least 93 percent of its need. In two
countries--Malawi and Zambia--food aid and commercial imports combined
considerably exceeded the cereal gap, while the other four had unmet
gaps ranging from between 9 percent to 50 percent. However, the numbers
reported by the Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VAC), WFP, and
others do not allow us to precisely define total food aid and
commercial import levels. The figures are estimates and should be
interpreted with caution. Food aid figures probably underestimate
actual values because it was difficult for the VACs and WFP to collect
comprehensive food aid data from NGOs. Thus, total NGO contributions
could be considerably higher. Regarding commercial imports, some
countries had experienced a considerable amount of informal trade in
cereals, but the VACs and WFP did not always have access to reliable
figures on informal trade. In the case of Zimbabwe, commercial imports
may be exaggerated, since the VAC expressed skepticism about the data
that were reported. According to some observers, Zimbabwe's price
controls may have encouraged a substantial outflow of cereals to
neighboring countries where controls did not exist. Thus, the gap in
Zimbabwe may have been much greater than shown in the figure.
Figure 3: Extent to Which Cereal Food Aid and Commercial Imports Met
the Cereal Gap (April 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The data in figure 3 do not address the extent to which different parts
of a country were served. Although Zambia appears to have offset its
cereal gap by a large amount, the January VAC assessment reported
serious cereal supply problems at local markets in rural
areas.[Footnote 18] In addition, Malawi, which offset its cereal gap to
an even greater extent, reported maize to be available in most markets,
but vulnerable households had limited ability to pay for the food. (See
app. V for additional information on commercial imports.):
Food Aid Did Not Reach the Region Early Enough to Avert Widespread
Hunger:
The overall commercial cereal imports and food aid averted widespread
famine, according to WFP, USAID, and other observers in the region.
However, because food supplies to the region were less than planned
during the July through December period, far fewer people received food
aid than expected. Many people in vulnerable areas went without meals
and resorted to other coping mechanisms as well. Limited data available
on nutritional status generally do not show a significant impact on
acute malnutrition.
Food Supplies from World Food Program:
Between July and December 2002, WFP distributed only 48 percent of the
cereal it planned to provide to beneficiaries during that period. While
Malawi and Swaziland received 87 percent and 76 percent, respectively,
of their planned deliveries, the other four countries fell below the 40
percent mark.
In addition to cereal, WFP planned to provide several other foods
(principally pulses, vegetable oil, and corn/soya blend) for added
nutrition as well as to meet the special needs of some of its
recipients. WFP realized only 17 percent of its planned distribution of
these foods for July through December 2002. WFP deliveries in three
countries--Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--each represented less
than 10 percent of its plans (1 percent in the case of Zambia). In
Malawi, which had the best performance, WFP achieved 40 percent of its
planned distribution.
Figure 4 shows monthly performance in achieving its plans for
delivery of cereals and noncereal commodities in the region. In
general, performance gradually improved between July and
December. It improved substantially in January, achieving 97 percent
for cereals and 74 percent for noncereals. Deliveries declined during
the next 2 months, to a low in March of 81 percent for cereal and 53
percent for noncereals.
Figure 4: Extent to Which WFP Monthly Food Delivery Targets Were Met
(July 2002 through March 2003):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Food Supplies from Nongovernmental Organizations:
Independent of program, NGOs were to provide about 402,000 MT of
cereals, or one-third of the emergency cereal need for the region. NGOs
obtained or financed food for their efforts from donor countries as
well as other voluntary contributions. The United States funded a World
Vision program that provided 19,710 MT of cereal food aid to Zimbabwe.
In addition, the United States contracted with an NGO consortium,
called C-SAFE (Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security
Emergency), to deliver food into the region. According to U.S.
officials, the program was part of a longer-term strategy that targeted
the most vulnerable populations that the WFP program might miss. USAID,
which began discussions withC-SAFE members (CARE, Catholic Relief
Services, and World Vision) in July 2002, did not approve a program for
the consortium until January 15,
2003.[Footnote 19] However, under a November pre-authorization
agreement, C-SAFE began delivering food into the region in late
December 2002. As of the end of March 2003, the consortium had
delivered about 57,000 MT of cereal food aid to Malawi, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. (See app. IV for additional information on C-SAFE.) Data
provided to us by WFP indicate NGOs provided at least another 16,200 MT
of cereals food aid into the region.
Beneficiaries Fewer than Intended:
Between July and December 2002, WFP averaged only 3.9 million
beneficiaries per month, compared with a planned average of 10.4
million people per month (for both cereal and noncereal food
aid).[Footnote 20] Figure 5 shows how the shortfall in food aid during
the July through December 2002 period affected WFP beneficiary levels
in each country. In four of the six countries, fewer than 45 percent of
planned beneficiaries were served.
Figure 5: Percent of WFP Total Planned Beneficiaries Who Received at
Least Some Food Aid (July through December 2002):
[See PDF for image]
Note: According to USAID officials, Malawi and Swaziland did better
than the other countries, at least in part because they placed fewer or
no restrictions on biotech food aid.
[End of figure]
In addition, many people who did receive food aid did not receive a
full ration.[Footnote 21] For example, WFP officials in Malawi told us
that during November they were only able to provide cereal to many of
their beneficiaries. Beans and vegetable oil were unavailable to
provide a balanced diet.
Reduced Food Intake, Other Coping Strategies:
Studies show that people in vulnerable communities reduced food intake
as their major coping strategy, and this approach has increased since
the crisis began. For example, as of December 2002, more than 60
percent of the population in all regions of Malawi reduced the amount
of food and number of meals they ate, according to the VAC.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) identified other
coping strategies including reducing expenditures on nonfood items,
selling or trading household assets to get food (e.g., sale of
livestock), increasing consumption of wild foods, migrating to find
work or food, stealing, and resorting to prostitution. Table 2 shows
the extent to which surveyed households in Zambia relied on reduced
food consumption and other coping strategies from between August and
December 2002.
Table 2: Frequency of Household Coping Strategies in Zambia (August
through December 2002):
Coping Strategy: Reduced number of meals; Percent of households engaged
in each: 78.
Coping Strategy: Reduced amount at meal times; Percent of households
engaged in each: 72.
Coping Strategy: Skipped food for an entire day; Percent of households
engaged in each: 58.
Coping Strategy: Reduced expenditures on alcohol and tobacco; Percent
of households engaged in each: 57.
Coping Strategy: Increased consumption of wild foods; Percent of
households engaged in each: 38.
Coping Strategy: Reduced expenditures on non-food items; Percent of
households engaged in each: 34.
Coping Strategy: Above-normal livestock sales; Percent of households
engaged in each: 32.
Coping Strategy: Borrowed from friends and relatives; Percent of
households engaged in each: 30.
Coping Strategy: Borrowed from nonfamily members; Percent of households
engaged in each: 27.
Coping Strategy: Borrowed from money lenders; Percent of households
engaged in each: 5.
Source: Zambia National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, Zambia
Emergency Food Security Assessment (Lusaka, Zambia: January 2003).
[End of table]
Nutritional Impacts Mixed:
Between 1999 and 2001, acute malnutrition rates in countries of the
region for children under 5 years of age were between 1.2 percent and
6.4 percent. Some assessments conducted between May and October 2002
found an increase in acute malnutrition rates compared with earlier
studies but did not find rates consistent with a severe food crisis,
which would be 10 percent to 15 percent. However, these studies did not
exclude possible pockets of severe malnutrition or hunger-related
deaths in the region. Also, adult malnutrition and malnutrition in
urban areas were not surveyed.[Footnote 22] More recent assessments
(December 2002 through January 2003) of acute malnutrition for children
under age 5 in select districts of Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and
Zambia found rates generally ranging between 2 percent and 8 percent.
However, the rate was 11.2 percent in one province of Mozambique.
According to a recent internal U.S. government report, anecdotal
evidence from the field in late 2002 indicates that in certain
districts in Zimbabwe, children were being admitted to some health care
facilities in increasing numbers for malnutrition. At one facility,
three to five children were reported to have died of malnutrition
during each month of 2002. More formal nutrition surveys within the
country have demonstrated acute malnutrition rates of 6.4 percent and
7.3 percent in May and August 2002, respectively. Results from a
nutrition survey conducted in early 2003 are still pending.
Nonfood Emergency Needs Severely Underfunded:
In addition to requesting $507 million for emergency food aid for July
2002 through March 2003, U.N. agencies also requested $143.7
million[Footnote 23] to address urgent and related humanitarian needs
that increased people's vulnerability to famine for the July 2002
through June 2003 period. As of April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent of
the total identified requirements had been funded, according to an
April 22 U.N. southern Africa humanitarian crisis update. Principal
objectives of the request were to:
* prevent, contain, and address the outbreak of disease through
enhanced health and nutritional surveillance;
* address the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS and seek to prevent
new infections;
* ensure an adequate and timely provision of agricultural inputs for
the next planting season as well as emergency veterinary inputs;
* maintain the capacity for planning recovery efforts in food self-
sufficiency, education, and health services; and:
* prevent marginal populations from falling into a downward spiral that
could lead to prolonged dependency in the future.
A longer-term objective was to phase out emergency humanitarian
assistance and move toward a development agenda focused on poverty
reduction, HIV/AIDS prevention and control, and support for food
security by increasing food production and strengthening foreign
exchange earnings. (For additional information on nonfood emergency
needs, see app. VI.):
Slow Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with Biotech
Food Were Major Obstacles to an Effective Response:
Major obstacles to the food aid effort's success were the lack of
sufficient, timely food donations; poor infrastructure in recipient
countries; and concerns associated with biotech food. Although the
United States made substantial, early donations, aggregate commitments
from donor countries were 18 percent below what WFP needed for the July
through December period. The shortfall was actually higher given the
lag in time between when food is committed and when it arrives in-
country. Poor infrastructure in recipient countries and related
logistical constraints impeded efficient delivery of food aid and in
some cases prevented food from reaching beneficiaries. Concerns over
biotech food led Zambia to reject U.S.-donated maize and other
countries to impose costly processing requirements. These actions
reduced or delayed food aid, increased costs, and complicated the
logistics of the emergency operation.
Lack of Sufficient, Timely Donations Contributed to Food Aid
Shortfalls:
By the end of June 2002, the United States had delivered more than
41,000 MT of food aid to ocean ports in the southern African region.
U.S. deliveries to these ports between July and December 2002
represented approximately 50 percent of the food WFP needed to arrive
in-country during that period. (See app. IV for additional information
on U.S. food aid donations.) Nonetheless, in aggregate, donors did not
make sufficient, timely donations to WFP.
WFP needed about 855,000 tons of food (cereals and noncereals) to
arrive in the six countries from July through December 2002 to support
its planned food distributions. During that period, donors advised WFP
that they would contribute about 701,000 tons--a shortfall of 18
percent. However, the shortfall was actually greater because of the
considerable lag time between when WFP was advised in writing that a
contribution would be made and when food arrived in a beneficiary
country. WFP officials estimate that in-kind contributions take 3 to 5
months from the time donors confirm the contribution to the arrival of
food aid at its final distribution
sites.[Footnote 24] However, according to WFP officials, when
contributions are made in cash and procurement is done within the
region, the process can be reduced to 1 to 3 months.
Table 3 shows the countries that gave the most to regional
emergency food aid operation and when they advised WFP of their
intended donations. Some of the major donors, including the United
States and the United Kingdom, gave large amounts early to the crisis.
Others, including the European Union, South Africa, and Japan, waited
several months or longer before confirming what they would contribute.
Table 3: Contributions to WFP and Their Timing:
Food in metric tons:
Cumulative Confirmed Donations[A] to WFP's Southern Africa Regional
EMOP by End of March 2003:
United States:
Jul 2002: 194,350:
Aug 2002: 197,550:
Sep 2002: 248,403:
Oct 2002: 248,403:
Nov 2002: 326,553:
Dec 2002: 326,553:
Mar 2003: 326,553.
European Union: Cumulative Confirmed Donations[A]
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: [Empty]:
Sep 2002: [Empty]:
Oct 2002: 139,854:
Nov 2002: 139,854:
Dec 2002: 139,854:
Mar 2003: 179,531.
South Africa:
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: [Empty]:
Sep 2002: [Empty]:
Oct 2002: [Empty]:
Nov 2002: [Empty]:
Dec 2002: [Empty]:
Mar 2003: 100,000.
United Kingdom: Cumulative Confirmed Donations[A]
Jul 2002: 62,515:
Aug 2002: 65,385:
Sep 2002: 65,385;
Oct 2002: 65,231;
Nov 2002: 65,231;
Dec 2002: 65,231;
Mar 2003: 70,231.
Japan:
Jul 2002: [Empty];
Aug 2002: [Empty];
Sep 2002: [Empty];
Oct 2002: 35,295;
Nov 2002: 35,450;
Dec 2002: 54,386;
Mar 2003: 56,662.
Algeria:
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: [Empty]:
Sep 2002: [Empty]:
Oct 2002: [Empty]:
Nov 2002: [Empty]:
Dec 2002: [Empty]:
Mar 2003: 31,000.
Germany:
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: 6,113:
Sep 2002: 14,539;
Oct 2002: 15,344;
Nov 2002: 15,344;
Dec 2002: 24,256;
Mar 2003: 22,775.
Australia:
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: 6,185:
Sep 2002: 14,335;
Oct 2002: 14,597;
Nov 2002: 14,597;
Dec 2002: 18,098;
Mar 2003: 18,248.
Finland:
Jul 2002: [Empty]:
Aug 2002: 4,075:
Sep 2002: 6,149;
Oct 2002: 8,377;
Nov 2002: 8,377;
Dec 2002: 14,575;
Mar 2003: 14,934.
Canada:
Jul 2002: 1,661;
Aug 2002: 1,661;
Sep 2002: 6,779;
Oct 2002: 6,697;
Nov 2002: 6,697;
Dec 2002: 12,573;
Mar 2003: 12,573.
OPEC:
Jul 2002: [Empty];
Aug 2002: [Empty];
Sep 2002: [Empty];
Oct 2002: [Empty];
Nov 2002: [Empty];
Dec 2002: [Empty];
Mar 2003: 12,411.
Netherlands:
Jul 2002: 1,097:
Aug 2002: 10,797;
Sep 2002: 10,797;
Oct 2002: 10,797;
Nov 2002: 10,797;
Dec 2002: 10,797;
Mar 2003: 10,625.
All others[B]: Cumulative Confirmed Donations[A]
Jul 2002: 7,133:
Aug 2002: 12,961;
Sep 2002: 12,789;
Oct 2002: 14,471;
Nov 2002: 14,471;
Dec 2002: 35,097;
Mar 2003: 36,549.
Total:
Jul 2002: 266,756;
Aug 2002: 304,727;
Sep 2002: 379,176;
Oct 2002: 559,066;
Nov 2002: 637,371;
Dec 2002: 701,420;
Mar 2003: 892,092.
Source: GAO analysis based on WFP data.
[A] A confirmed donation (in kind or in cash) is when a donor has
notified WFP in writing of what it will donate.
[B] There were 29 other donors, some of which were private or
multilateral entities. Together, they accounted for 4.1 percent of all
donations, with an individual range from 0.001 percent to 0.7 percent.
[End of table]
WFP acknowledged that the early months of the regional EMOP would
indeed have benefited from more rapid mobilization of resources. At the
same time, WFP said, as of mid-May 2003, the operation had been 93
percent resourced, by 41 institutional donors--which represented an
unusually supportive response.
Poor Infrastructure Hampered Efficient Food Delivery:
The flow chart shown in figure 6 illustrates logistics process of
delivering food, from the time it is shipped by suppliers to the time
food is actually distributed to the recipients at the village
level.[Footnote 25] Food aid commodities are either purchased by WFP
regionally or shipped to the region through one of five ports of entry:
Beira, Nacala, and Maputo in Mozambique; Durban in South Africa; or Dar
es Salaam in Tanzania. (See fig. 7 for a map of the transportation
network.) From these points of entry, food is transported by truck or
rail to intermediate storage facilities, or transshipment points, which
are strategically located in various districts within the country to
streamline the flow of deliveries. From these strategic locations, food
is then transported to extended delivery points--storage facilities
generally located at the district level--from which the food aid
allocations for each final distribution site are dispatched. WFP
manages this process, including transporting the food to the extended
delivery points. Wherever possible, nongovernmental organizations that
are designated as the implementing partners are responsible for the
secondary transport of food from the extended delivery points to the
final distribution points.
Figure 6: Steps in the Logistics Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: The flow chart does not reflect the additional step of milling.
In addition, the chart does not show monitoring of the flow of food
deliveries throughout the process to ensure proper receipt and
dispatches of food.
Figure 7: The Transportation Network for Moving Food in the Region:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Long-standing weaknesses in transportation infrastructure across the
region hampered timely delivery of food aid where it was needed. Much
of the transportation infrastructure (including ports, railways, and
roads) had deteriorated since the 1991/92 drought. For example, the
port of Maputo, which is ideally situated for moving food commodities
to landlocked countries, such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, cannot be used
optimally because of the lack of adequate port warehouse and storage
facilities. However, even when ports are full, there is a limit to the
amount of food that can be transported over land to landlocked
countries, like Zambia, due to rail and trucking capacity and other
logistical considerations.
According to WFP officials, the port of Nacala was in better condition
than the port of Maputo. But its rail system--the sole transport link
between Malawi and the nearest port in Mozambique and the shortest,
cheapest route into Malawi and eastern Zambia--was in such poor
condition it had to be fixed during the crisis. In late 2002, the
United Kingdom and Canada gave WFP $6.4 million and $256,000,
respectively, to rehabilitate a 48-mile-long track on the Nacala
railway and to lease locomotives and wagons. While these locomotives
and ongoing repairs to the rail corridor represented a major
breakthrough, unexpected setbacks continued to mire operations. For
example, in Malawi, heavy rains in January 2003 completely destroyed
one bridge on the Nacala rail line, thus impeding the movement of
commodities for at least 10 days. In late summer 2002, a donation of
200 trucks from the government of Norway and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies helped ease access
to places that are particularly hard to reach. However, many village
roads in these countries routinely become impassable when the rainy
season (September to March) begins, thus isolating beneficiaries from
food deliveries.
Recipient Country Concerns about Biotech Food Compromised Food
Pipeline:
In the middle of 2002, Zambia and Zimbabwe debated whether to accept
U.S.-donated maize[Footnote 26] based on concerns that it might contain
biotech products that could adversely affect (1) the health of food aid
recipients, (2) the countries' agricultural biodiversity,[Footnote 27]
and (3) their ability to export agricultural commodities.[Footnote 28]
Despite some earlier concerns over U.S. biotech food aid and Zimbabwe's
objections to biotech whole kernel maize dating back to the middle of
2001,[Footnote 29] the United States and international agencies did not
have a ready alternative to biotech food aid in the southern Africa
crisis.[Footnote 30] The United States was only partly successful in
its efforts to persuade southern African country governments to allow
unrestricted import and distribution of food aid, including biotech
products, on an emergency basis for the duration of the crisis. Efforts
included providing information about agricultural biotechnology and the
safety of biotech food aid to Zambia and the other countries.
Nevertheless, Zambia rejected all food aid that could have included
biotech commodities.[Footnote 31] Zimbabwe implemented stringent grain
handling procedures, including milling of whole grain maize, that
significantly slowed distribution of food aid. Malawi, Mozambique, and
Lesotho also debated what to do and eventually imposed milling
requirements on whole grain maize that were enforced with varying
degrees of rigor.[Footnote 32]
Toward the end of August 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a common
statement on biotech food aid, as did the European Union. Both
statements indicated that biotech food aid was unlikely to present a
risk to human health and suggested milling the maize as a way to
overcome environmental and trade concerns. However, U.S. officials from
State, USAID, and USDA believe that, given the severity of the crisis
and existing scientific evidence, U.N. agencies and the European Union
did not speak out early or forcefully enough on the issue.
The United States rejected the option of donating only milled maize,
citing increased costs and limited U.S. milling capacity that would
cause delays in getting food aid to needy people. U.S. officials
estimate that U.S.-based milling would double the costs of its food
aid, thus reducing the amount of aid it could provide. Additionally,
according to U.S. officials, agreeing to mill all of the maize could
have promoted the idea that unprocessed maize was unsafe. (App. VII
provides further discussion of issues related to biotech food.):
Despite the United States' early and large donations, the impasse over
biotech food significantly compromised the food pipeline in several
ways:
* Food aid was reduced and delayed. On September 3, 2002, Zambia's
Agriculture Minister, in a statement to the press, demanded that 19,000
MT of biotech maize that had been delivered to storage facilities
inside the country be sent to a country that was willing to accept it.
(WFP was officially notified on October 29, 2002.) According to U.S.
officials, by early November, Zambia had rejected an additional 57,000
MT of biotech maize intended for its food aid beneficiaries. The
combined 76,000 MT of maize considerably exceeded cereal
shortfall for Zambia for the July through December period and would
have fed 1.5 million Zambians for 3 months.[Footnote 33]In the case of
Zimbabwe, there were delays while the government debated whether to
accept whole grain maize and then negotiated, developed, and put in
place restrictions it deemed suitable. According to a U.S. official, at
one point, more than 80,000 MT of U.S. whole kernel maize imports
destined for Zimbabwe were delayed in South Africa and Mozambique port
warehouses awaiting permits--while the food aid pipeline lacked cereal.
* Costs of food aid operations increased. WFP, national governments,
and other donors have borne the additional costs associated with
requirements to mill some or all of the U.S.-donated maize. These costs
include the milling itself, added charges for transporting whole grain
maize to mills and for shipping milled product, added storage costs
because of limited milling capacity, and grain losses associated with
the milling process.[Footnote 34] WFP estimates that when it has to
mill the product in South Africa, regional distribution costs could
total up to $80 per metric ton more than for unmilled U.S.
maize.[Footnote 35]
* Logistics of the food aid effort were complicated. Logistics became
more complex because of (1) U.S. whole kernel maize piling up in ports
as governments debated whether to accept biotech maize and, if so,
under what conditions, (2) limited milling capacity, (3) added
transportation and storage requirements, and (4) the short shelf life
of maize milled regionally (3 months compared with 12 months for whole
maize). Because food is distributed to households on a monthly basis,
WFP had to ensure that milled maize would not take more than 2 months
to arrive at final distribution sites.
U.S. officials said that recipient countries in southern Africa did not
make timely, informed decisions about whether to accept or reject
biotech food aid. These officials also said the U.S. government does
not have comprehensive data on which recipient countries are likely to
accept or reject biotech food aid, nor does the U.S. government have a
strategy for providing alternatives to biotech food to countries that
may reject it. According to officials from State, USAID, and USDA,
these problems are not confined to the southern Africa region but also
have a global reach.
Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic
Pose Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained Recovery:
The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into
sustained recovery include (1) a decline in agriculture sector
investments; (2) limited scope of existing programs in agricultural
development; and (3) the negative impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Recognizing the need to address numerous challenges to move out of this
crisis into recovery, the U.N. Secretary-General and several other key
stakeholders have called for a comprehensive and targeted approach to
break the pattern of recurrent food crises in Africa. The food outlook
for the next crop year has improved, but without continuing efforts to
respond to the region's problems, recurring food crises may be
difficult to avoid.
Agriculture Sector Investments by Donors and Governments Have Declined:
Since agriculture accounts for 70 percent of the labor force in Africa,
investments that improve productivity in the agricultural sector have
significant implications for food security and overall rural
development. According to the International Food Policy Research
Institute, a 1 percent increase in agricultural productivity would help
6 million more Africans raise their incomes above $1 per day. However,
data show declining investments in the agricultural sector as
agricultural lending by the World Bank, the African Development Bank,
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development has fallen.
Similarly, agricultural spending by national governments and U.S.
bilateral assistance for agricultural programs in the affected
countries have declined.[Footnote 36]
Agricultural Lending by Selected International Financing
Organizations:
Total lending to the agriculture sector by selected international
financing organizations declined during the 1990s. For example,
measured in 2003 dollars, the African Development Bank approved about
$873 million in loans for agriculture in 1990 compared with $236
million in 2000, as shown in figure 8. Similarly, the World Bank
approved $4.7 billion in loans for agriculture in 1990 compared with
$1.4 billion in 2000. Bank officials noted that the World Bank now
approaches the agricultural sector in the context of the Bank's overall
rural development strategy that includes, among other things, lending
for rural infrastructure, rural health, and environment and natural
resource management. For this reason, starting in 2001, the World Bank
began to include agricultural investments as part of its rural
development lending. However, this does not negate the overall
declining trend in agricultural lending between 1990 and 2000.
Figure 8: Agricultural Lending by the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development-1990 through 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Note: IFAD provides strictly agricultural development loans.
[End of figure]
Our review of World Bank agricultural loans to the six affected
countries since 1990 found that 15 had been made--with 9 of them
approved between 1990 and 1993. There were no loans recorded for
Swaziland. As shown in figure 9, in 2002, the downward trend in World
Bank agricultural lending to the affected region reversed with two $50
million emergency drought recovery loans for Zambia and Malawi. These
loans included an agricultural component but also comprised health,
social services, and other emergency programs.
Figure 9: World Bank Agricultural Sector Loans Approved for the
Affected Countries-1990 to 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Agricultural Spending by National Governments:
In general, national governments have been spending a declining share
of their budgets on agriculture, as shown in figure 10. Real spending
on agriculture has declined for two countries--Lesotho and Zambia--
whereas total government spending has increased for all six affected
countries. For the remaining countries, national government spending on
agriculture has been stagnant or has grown at a slower rate than total
government spending.
Figure 10: Agricultural Spending as a Percentage of Total Government
Spending-1996/97 through 2001/02 (in 2003 dollars):
[See PDF for image]
Note: 2001/2002 data for Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe were not
available.We did not calculate the percentage of government spending
for agriculture for Mozambique. The IMF provided us with the percentage
data.
[End of figure]
U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Agricultural Sector:
Although the levels of U.S. bilateral assistance for agriculture by
country have been mixed, overall assistance to the region's
agricultural sector has declined from $27 million in 1998 to $20.6
million in 2003. The largest reductions were for Malawi, which went
from $10.3 million in 1998 to $3.2 million in 2003, while assistance to
Mozambique went from $14.5 million in 1998 to $12.8 million in 2003
(see fig. 11).
Figure 11: USAID Bilateral Assistance in the Agricultural Sector to
Four CountriesA-1998 to 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[A] USAID does not have bilateral programs in Lesotho and Swaziland.
However, these two countries do benefit from some regional assistance
and limited funding support through other U.S. government agencies.
[B] The combined figure includes Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. It does not include Regional Center funding.
[End of figure]
Existing Programs Are Helpful but Limited in Scope:
To promote agricultural development and work toward achieving food
security, FAO, IFAD, and WFP advocate an approach that helps support
small farmers, enhances the ability of the poor to access food, and
aids recovery efforts (fig. 12 describes examples of some of the
current programs). Several U.N. and USAID officials told us that while
many of the programs they have funded have demonstrated promising
results, the programs are limited in scope due to resource constraints
and would need to be implemented on a much wider scale for greater
impact and effectiveness.
Figure 12: Examples of Existing Programs Related to Food Security:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Negative Impact of HIV/AIDS on Food Security Will Grow:
In addition to being a significant factor that contributed to the food
crisis, HIV/AIDS will continue to affect food security in the region by
decreasing food production, lowering household income, and increasing
household expenses, according to numerous experts. These effects will
increase as the HIV/AIDS epidemic worsens. For example, by lowering the
productivity of agricultural labor in its food supply model, USDA
estimated that HIV/AIDS will cause a 3.3 percent reduction in grain
output in sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade relative to the
region's baseline projections. As a result, the projected food deficit
will grow by 13 percent.[Footnote 37]
According to an IMF study, HIV/AIDS will also lower gross domestic
product (GDP). Figure 13 shows the projected decrease in growth rates
of GDP per capita attributable to HIV/AIDS in 10 to 15 years: Estimates
range from minus 4 percent in Mozambique to about minus 7 percent in
Zimbabwe. Projected average per capita GDP growth rates without HIV/
AIDS range from 1.5 percent for Lesotho to 3.9 percent for Mozambique,
indicating that the HIV/AIDS effect will significantly reduce national
income.[Footnote 38] In fact, for a typical sub-Saharan African country
with HIV/AIDS prevalence of 20 percent, national income is estimated to
be 67 percent lower at the end of a 20-year period than without the
disease.
Figure 13: Projected Impact on GDP Due to HIV/AIDS:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Estimates are for an economy open to trade and are for a 10-to
15-year period with 2000 as the base year.
[End of figure]
U.N. Secretary-General and Others Cite Need for Integrated Response:
Although the international response was sufficient to avoid famine in
past food crises in the region--as well as the current one--food
security continues to be a significant development challenge. U.N. and
U.S. officials acknowledge that food aid and humanitarian assistance
alone will not prevent future crises without a comprehensive recovery
strategy that addresses the underlying causes of food insecurity. In
our review, we found no evidence of such a strategy.
In March 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General noted that the devastating
impact of HIV/AIDS requires an integrated response that may include
long-term measures even when addressing short-term emergencies and
called for a more systematic, targeted approach to break the pattern of
recurrent food crises in Africa. Many other authoritative experts and
key stakeholders have echoed the U.N. Secretary-General's call for an
integrated response. For example, in December 2002, SADC--the principal
organization for regional cooperation in food and agriculture and
related economic and social issues--acknowledged the need for political
commitment at all levels within the region and for coordinated support
from SADC, national governments, donors, nongovernmental
organizations, and civil society to ensure food security in the future.
Among those calling for a comprehensive response to address food
security--one that integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS,
natural disaster management, and other appropriate interventions--are
the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the
International Food Policy Research Institute, and the Partnership to
Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa.
In recent years, international donors have announced major initiatives
related to food security. These include plans not only to enhance food
availability by increasing agricultural production but strategies to
increase food accessibility by reducing poverty. For example, the
United Nations' 2001 Millennium Development Goals pledged to help cut
hunger in Africa in half by 2015.[Footnote 39] The World Bank and IMF
have worked with countries eligible for debt relief--Malawi,
Mozambique, and Zambia--to ensure that food security and agriculture
are central themes in these countries' Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers.[Footnote 40] Among other measures, these strategy papers
emphasize promoting small-scale irrigation, reducing land degradation,
and improving access to credit and agricultural inputs. In early 2002,
USAID introduced its Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa,
which is designed to accelerate agricultural growth and reduce
vulnerability to hunger and poverty. However, as of April 2003, of the
six affected countries, only Mozambique was proposed for funding ($3.9
million in 2003) under the initiative.
Regional Food Outlook Remains Tenuous; Sustained Efforts Seen as
Necessary:
Despite improved weather conditions and a better harvest beginning in
April 2003, food security conditions in the region are still tenuous.
As of the end of March 2003, early warning systems were forecasting
that some parts of the region may have better harvests than last year;
however, they also note that food insecurity and the need for emergency
aid persist--and may worsen--in some areas, particularly in Zimbabwe
and parts of southern Mozambique. In February 2003, the U.N. Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that, because the
response to improve agricultural inputs has been inadequate, recovery
by the next agricultural season is unlikely and the need for food aid
prolonged. In fact, the current emergency operations, which were for
the crop year that concluded March 2003, have been extended through
June 2003. Beyond that, according to WFP and USAID officials, the need
for food aid will likely continue, particularly for many of the poorest
and most vulnerable households.
Conclusions:
The current food crisis is complicated by disruptive agricultural and
governance policies in the affected countries and the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. While the WFP, the United States, some donor governments, and
NGOs provided enough food to prevent a famine, overall donor response
was insufficient in terms of food quantities and timeliness to prevent
widespread hunger. In addition, other obstacles--including poor
infrastructure in the affected countries and concerns associated with
biotech food--hampered an effective response. The controversy about
biotech food aid, in particular, significantly complicated logistics,
increased costs, and delayed food aid reaching beneficiaries. Concerns
about agricultural biotechnology may be an obstacle to addressing
future emergency food aid needs around the world, partly because the
United States accounts for about half of global food aid and because
several U.S. food aid commodities are genetically modified.Action is
needed to reduce the likelihood of biotech food aid becoming a serious
problem in future crises. Furthermore, in a region where agricultural
production is critical to national economies and food security, there
is a need for viable agricultural policies and funding by national
governments, as well as adequate agricultural assistance and related
strategies from multilateral organizations and donors, including the
United States. Without a concerted strategy that integrates, among
other things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and
natural disaster management, destabilizing food crises are likely to
recur.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. response to future food
crises in the southern Africa region as well as in other parts of the
world, we recommend that the Secretaries of State and Agriculture and
the Administrator of USAID initiate a comprehensive review of the
issues pertaining to biotech foods in emergency food aid. In
anticipation of future food crises, this review could consider measures
such as (1) encouraging recipient countries to enhance their capacity
to make informed decisions regarding agricultural biotechnology and
offering technical assistance in this endeavor; (2) identifying which
countries are likely to accept, restrict, or reject biotech food aid;
and (3) determining ways that the United States can contribute to
emergency food aid needs in countries that decide to restrict or reject
biotech food aid.
To further food security in the region, we recommend that the
Secretaries of State and Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID
work with international organizations, donors, and national governments
to develop a comprehensive, targeted strategy to ensure sustained
recovery that (1) integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS
awareness and action, natural disaster management, and other
appropriate interventions; (2) estimates costs and resource
requirements; and (3) establishes a plan for mobilizing resources, a
timetable for achieving results, and indicators for measuring
performance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of State, USDA, USAID, and WFP provided written comments
on a draft of our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes
VIII, IX, X, and XI, along with our responses to specific points.
In general, the Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP
agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations. However, they
expressed technical concerns, primarily related to our discussion of
biotech food, which we have addressed in the text as appropriate.
USDA objected to our use of the term "biotech food," saying it prefers
"foods which may contain the products of agricultural biotechnology."
USDA also said that it opposes the use of the term "genetically
modified organisms" and the acronym "GMO" because these terms carry
negative connotations. According to the department, modern agricultural
biotechnology is simply the next step in plant breeding technology.
Notwithstanding USDA's comments, FAO, WHO, and WFP use the terms
genetically modified food, GM food, and biotech food. In fact, after
receiving USDA's comments, we found that USDA was still using the terms
"biotech plants" and "biotech crops" in some of its publicly available
informational materials. USAID objected to our use of the term "biotech
food aid," noting that the United States provides food aid from the
general U.S. food supply, which may contain biotech crops. In certain
places, we now refer to U.S. food aid as aid that may contain biotech
crops.
In commenting on our recommendation to initiate a comprehensive review
of the issues associated with biotech foods in emergency food aid, USDA
said that it agrees that all relevant parts of the U.S. government must
continue to review and engage other countries regarding their biotech
policies, including those related to food aid. USDA said it will
continue to support developing countries' efforts to enhance their
capacity for making science-based and transparent decisions regarding
products of modern agricultural biotechnology. At the same time, USDA
said it is difficult to accurately identify countries that might accept
or reject products of modern agricultural biotechnology because many
developing countries' policies depend upon the specific political,
economic, and social circumstances at the time.
The Department of State said that an interagency review on how to
manage the presence of bioengineered foods in food aid might be useful
for developing a strategy. However, the department said that such a
review should be narrowly focused to ensure better coordination among
food aid, development, trade policy and regulatory agencies. USAID said
it supports further interagency discussion and coordination on the
dimensions of biotechnology in food aid. USAID noted that it is
actively engaged in supporting the development of capacity in a number
of food aid recipient countries to make informed decisions, but said in
practical terms this is a long-term strategy and unlikely to assist in
emergency situations such as we saw in southern Africa. USAID said it
believes that the most practical solution will be to work with
recipient governments and partners involved in the delivery of food aid
to build confidence in the existing safety evaluations of these
products, including evaluations done in the United States and by other
countries, scientists, and international organizations such as FAO and
WHO.
Regarding our recommendation to develop an integrated recovery
strategy, the Department of State, USAID, and WFP fully support the
need for a comprehensive, coordinated approach to help address the
underlying causes of food insecurity. State cited U.S. efforts to work
with major donor countries to create a multilateral framework for
improving long-term food security throughout the world. USAID said
that, along with an interagency working group formed by the sub-policy
planning committee to coordinate the U.S. government response to the
food crisis, it is in the process of drafting a recovery strategy and
action plan, which will guide the development and review of new USAID
country strategies in the region. WFP emphasized the need for the
international community to remain engaged within the region and to help
national governments address medium-to longer-term issues related to
food insecurity. We agree that such efforts must be sustained if
destabilizing food crises are to be avoided.
In addition, we provided FAO, IMF, and the World Bank an opportunity to
review parts of a draft of this report for technical accuracy, and we
incorporated their comments as appropriate.
:
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of State and Agriculture, and the USAID
Administrator. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix XII.
Sincerely yours,
David Gootnick
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by David Gootnick:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what factors contributed to the current crisis in southern
Africa, we met with and analyzed information from government officials
at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and State in Washington, D.C., and
U.S. missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and
South Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed information from
the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
at their headquarters in Rome and in the southern African countries we
visited. In addition, we gathered information from and met with
representatives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), other U.N. agencies, other donor governments, and host
government ministries. We also gathered information and met with
representatives of early warning systems and interagency food security
assessment teams. In addition, we gathered information and met with
representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), including
Africare, Bread for the World, the Coalition for Food Aid, CARE,
Catholic Relief Services, the Coalition for Food Aid, Save the
Children, World Vision, and ACDI/VOCA. We also reviewed studies from
public and private research institutions on the causes of the current
and past food crises in southern Africa.
To determine how well the populations' overall food needs were met
during the crisis period, we met with officials and reviewed
information from WFP, FAO, host governments, the private sector, donor
governments, NGOs, and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). We also met with and gathered information from representatives
of interagency famine early warning and vulnerability assessment teams.
In addition, we analyzed country-specific and regional WFP food aid
data tracking food aid flows from donors (through WFP and NGOs) to the
country level and, for WFP food aid, to the beneficiary level. Because
of southern Africa's infrastructure and technology problems, our
collection and analysis of agricultural supply and demand information
had inherent limitations. We observed food aid distribution at various
stages including at the points of entry and storage facilities at the
extended delivery points and final distribution points. We met with
WFP, NGO, donor, national government, and local government officials
responsible for managing and monitoring the food aid distribution
process. We reviewed real time logistics information system
including its monitoring and loss reports. We also reviewed U.S. and
other donor financial contributions to determine similar information on
nonfood aid-related assistance. We verified the accuracy of data and
reports, to the extent possible, by tracing the flow of information and
obtaining comparable data from multiple government, international
organization, NGO, and private sector sources.
To determine the major obstacles to the food aid effort, we met with
key officials and gathered and examined data from governments and the
private sector in recipient countries, WFP, donor governments, NGOs,
and SADC on the rate and amount of donor contributions, infrastructure,
and biotech food aid and its impact on food aid distribution in the
current crisis. We examined U.S. and other donor funding of EMOP,
reviewing actual country donations against pledges to determine the
sufficiency and timeliness of donations. We reviewed and examined data
on the transportation network for moving food in the region and
identified and confirmed transportation and infrastructure obstacles
during our fieldwork in country. We verified and confirmed the general
accuracy of these data through multiple private sector and governmental
organizations. With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences,
we had seven U.S. scientists provide an independent perspective on the
Zambian Scientists' biotech report.
To determine the challenges to emerging from the crisis into sustained
recovery, we met with numerous NGOs, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID,
and the Departments of Agriculture and State and analyzed information
on the decline in agricultural sector investment, the limited scope of
existing programs in agricultural development, and the negative impact
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition, we reviewed studies from private
and public research institutions, such as the International Food Policy
Research Institute, on the challenges to moving from crisis into
recovery. We also analyzed agricultural funding data of the six
southern African national governments. To analyze World Bank
agricultural lending, we reviewed World Bank annual reports and its Web
site from 1990 to 2002 to determine the amount and nature of loans made
to the six affected southern African countries. After identifying the
loans, we calculated an average deflator for each fiscal year (July to
June) and calculated the 2003 value of each of these loans. To analyze
the percentage of government budgets expended for agriculture, we
gathered fiscal data for each of the six countries from the IMF country
statistical appendices for 1997 through 2002. We then calculated the
current and capital expenditures from agriculture as a share of the
total current and capital expenditures in the government budget. We
also calculated the real growth rate using least square regression
methodology for agricultural and total spending. Finally, to determine
the impact of HIV/AIDS on food security among the six affected
countries, we reviewed USDA and IMF studies that quantified the food
security situation and its economic implications.
The information on foreign laws in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.
We conducted our review from August 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
Figure 14 is a chronology of key events (political actions, alerts, and
emergencies) that occurred in the region and in some of the affected
countries during the 2-year period from July 2001 through April 2003.
Figure 14: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment
Methods:
Two types of data collection systems tracked the food crisis in
southern Africa: (1) early warning systems, which monitor factors that
affect food supply to provide decision makers with notice of potential
crises; and (2) assessment systems, which monitor the nutritional needs
of vulnerable populations in order to design or assess interventions.
Early Warning Systems:
Famine early warning systems are designed to provide decision makers
with information of an impending food crisis or famine. These systems
compile various indicators of food security at a regional, national, or
subnational scale, including information on weather and household
purchasing power. While early warning systems are useful, preventing
food crises depends on timely responses to the information they
disseminate.
For this report, we reviewed two early warning systems:
* FEWS NET: The Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is a specialized
Information Network (NET) based in 17 African countries contending with
chronic food insecurity.[Footnote 41] FEWS NET is a partnership-based
program initiated and funded by USAID. The goal of FEWS NET is to
strengthen the ability of African countries and regional organizations
to manage risk of food insecurity by providing timely and analytical
early warning and vulnerability information. FEWS NET monitors
information from multiple technologies, such as satellites and field
observations, and seeks to facilitate timely access to that
information; identifies specific, acute food security threats; and
provides regular information assessments to decision makers that
reflect the best judgment of the food security community.
* GIEWS: FAO's Global Information Early Warning System on Food and
Agriculture (GIEWS) is an information system based in Rome that
includes 116 governments, 3 regional organizations, and 61
nongovernmental organizations. The goal of GIEWS is to provide the
international community with warning of imminent food crises to ensure
timely interventions in countries or regions affected by natural or
man-made disasters. The system seeks to monitor all aspects of food
supply and demand in all countries on a continuous basis at the global,
regional/subregional, national, and subnational levels. It reports to
the international community through its system of regular and ad hoc
reports.
FEWS NET and GIEWS often contribute to the WFP/FAO Crop and Food Supply
Assessment Missions. Additionally, FEWS NET supplies GIEWS with the
major proportion of its remote-sensing data for monitoring agricultural
production. However, according to USAID, these two early warning
systems differ in three main areas:
* Geographic scope: FEWS NET has a 17-country scope in Africa, whereas
GIEWS has a global mandate.
* Level of detail: FEWS NET reports on the subnational level based on
information gathered by field staff located throughout their scope,
whereas GIEWS reports on the national and global levels from their
headquarters in Rome with few field staff.
* Technical focus on food security: FEWS NET focuses on food
availability, access, and utilization, while GIEWS focuses on food
production and availability.
Early Warning Systems in the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
The famine early warning systems produced relevant information
regarding the southern Africa food crisis. FEWS NET and GIEWS reported
on such food security indicators as adverse weather events, current
food shortages, the status of cereal imports, the status of strategic
grain reserves, the status of grain prices, and forecasts for the 2001/
02 harvest.
In particular, in late 2001 and early 2002 the early warning systems
reported questionable food security in parts of the six countries,
accounting for the poor 2000/01 harvest and anticipating future cereal
gaps based on a poor outlook for the 2001/02 harvest. In November 2001,
FEWS NET reported that the 2000/01 cereal harvest from earlier that
year would likely be insufficient to fill food needs in each country
except Mozambique. After FEWS NET highlighted these potential maize
shortages, the U.S. government began carefully monitoring the situation
in southern Africa, according to a Department of State cable. By mid-
February 2002, GIEWS warned that impending severe food shortages
threatened some 4 million people in the southern African countries,
including parts of each of the six countries. That same month, however,
FEWS NET reported that although there were localized areas of concern
at the national and subnational levels, there was no reason for serious
concern over production prospects from a regional perspective at that
point in the growing season. In April 2002, closer to the harvest
period, GIEWS warned of a looming food crisis in southern Africa, with
conditions in several countries set to worsen. By May 2002, FEWS NET
also warned of the potential for a food security crisis of regional
magnitude if appropriate and timely action were not taken.
Nevertheless, the early warning systems did not anticipate the severity
of the situation in Malawi. Although the systems did report serious
maize (corn) production shortfalls in Malawi during the 2000/01 harvest
caused by mid-season floods and late-season drought, flawed
agricultural statistics provided by the government of Malawi[Footnote
42] indicated that the production shortfall would be covered by other
food crops, especially cassava. According to the IMF, the data error
only became apparent in February 2002 when Malawi began experiencing
severe food shortages.
Assessment Systems:
For this report, we reviewed the following assessments:
* VAM: The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) analyzes,
maps, and reports on populations and geographic areas experiencing food
insecurity to inform WFP food aid operations in 43 countries. VAM uses
state-of-the-art mapping techniques to pinpoint the people most
vulnerable to hunger and target their needs. VAM and FEWS NET work in
close collaboration in the African countries where they are both
present. VAM relies on FEWS NET for early warning analyses in most
African countries. VAM also has a global mandate in supporting internal
WFP operations, whereas FEWS NET attempts to build assessment capacity
within the countries.
* CFSAM: Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) is a rapid
assessment of information generated in an affected country used to fill
in information gaps and to provide an early forecast of production and
the emerging food supply situation of that country. This is done only
at the request of the host country government. A mission may also
collect information on household food security, vulnerability, coping
mechanisms, and social welfare programs. GIEWS/FAO coordinates such
missions in conjunction with WFP and other stakeholders such as host
country ministerial staff, FEWS NET staff, and the Southern African
Development Community's (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU).
CFSAM targets a wider audience than internally focused VAM unit.
The international community uses the CFSAM information to calculate how
much food aid and other relief assistance is needed to assist the most
vulnerable people.
* VAC: SADC and some of its member states established vulnerability
assessment committees (VAC) to better assess and address food security
issues.[Footnote 43] The purpose of VAC assessments is to (1) provide
additional information to help adjust response programs to better meet
the needs of vulnerable populations; (2) rapidly investigate and
characterize or verify suspected crises in local areas; and (3) better
understand the causes of the emergency and their implications for a
return to food security. The committees use a coordinated,
collaborative process that integrates the most influential assessment
and crisis response players into the effort to help gain privileged
access to national data sets and expert technicians and increase the
likelihood of reaching consensus among national governments,
implementing partners, and major donors. Key players include the SADC
Regional Early Warning Unit and national VACs, VAM, FEWS NET, GIEWS,
and several NGOs. The assessment methodology included sample surveys at
the district, community, and household levels and incorporated
household food economy and nutritional surveys.
Use of Assessments in the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
Several of the above assessments have been used to prepare for and
monitor the southern Africa food crisis (see app. II for timeline). FAO
conducted a series of CFSAMs starting in May 2002. The missions
estimated cereal requirements and cereal production for each of the six
countries and the extent to which the gap could be offset by commercial
imports. (See app. V for more on commercial sector imports and their
role in the crisis.) The remaining deficit was identified as requiring
emergency food aid. The regional and national VACs built assessment
capacity in the region and increased the breadth and depth of food
security monitoring during the crisis. To this end, the committees
conducted assessments and prepared reports on their results in
September 2002 and January 2003. A third assessment occurred in May
2003.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Donations:
By early 2002, the United States had recognized the seriousness of the
developing food crisis in southern Africa and initiated actions to
donate substantial quantities of food aid to the region. For example,
in mid-February 2002, USAID arranged a loan of 8,470 metric tons (MT)
of maize to southern Africa from stocks held in Tanzania; the commodity
began arriving in the region in mid-March. On March 15, 2002, USAID
authorized World Vision to provide 14,310 MT of food aid to Zimbabwe
(the amount was later increased to 19,710 MT). On March 21, USAID
authorized the purchase of 35,330 MT of commodities--from existing
stocks in New Orleans--to be shipped to southern African ports; these
stocks arrived by the end of June 2002.
Overall, between late April 2002 and March 31, 2003, the United States
donated and delivered nearly 500,000 MT of food aid to the region
valued at about $275 million. The food represented approximately 68
percent of the total food aid delivered into the region between April
1, 2002, and March 31, 2003.[Footnote 44] U.S. deliveries included:
* 81,950 MT for precursor WFP emergency programs in each of the six
countries--Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe, valued at $43 million;[Footnote 45]
* 19,710 MT for the World Vision program in Zimbabwe, valued at $12.8
million;
* 326,553 MT for the WFP regional operation, valued at $165.4 million;
and:
* 71,600 MT for the C-SAFE operation, valued at $53.5 million.
Table 4 provides a breakout of the U.S. food aid by country and
commodity. As the table shows, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia received
the largest amounts of aid. Maize (corn) and maize meal accounted for
more than 70 percent of the donated commodities. About 84 percent of
all the donated food represented biotech commodities (i.e., maize,
maize meal, oil, and corn soya blend (CSB)/corn soya milk(CSM)).
Table 4: U.S. Government Food Aid Response to the Southern Africa
Crisis:
Country: Lesotho: Corn: 23,500; Corn meal: 2,510: Beans: 800:
Oil: 950; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: [Empty]: Sorghum: [Empty]:
Bulgur: [Empty]: Total: 27,760.
Country: Malawi: Corn: 114,650; Corn meal: 8,500: Beans: 8.720:
Oil: 4,720; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 14,905: Sorghum: [Empty]:
Bulgur: [Empty]: Total: 151,495.
Country: Mozambique: Corn: 13,000; Corn meal: [Empty]: Beans:
2,680: Oil: 2,860; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 1,250: Sorghum:
[Empty]: Bulgur: [Empty]: Total: 19,790.
Country: Swaziland: Corn: 11,500; Corn meal: [Empty]: Beans: 700:
Oil: 725; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 2,617: Sorghum: [Empty]:
Bulgur: [Empty]: Total: 15,542.
Country: Zambia: Corn: 26,500; Corn meal: 9,600: Beans: 7,900:
Oil: 100; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 400: Sorghum: 15,000:
Bulgur: 15,000: Total: 74,500.
Country: Zimbabwe: Corn: 90,800; Corn meal: 56,510: Beans: 17,120;
: Oil: 11,946; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 24,030: Sorghum:
[Empty]: Bulgur: 10,000: Total: 215,406.
Country: Total: Corn: 279,950; Corn meal: 77,120: Beans: 37,920:
Oil: 21,301; Corn soy blend/corn soy milk: 43,202: Sorghum: 15,000:
Bulgur: 25,000: Total: 499,493.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Commercial Imports:
The extent and availability of commercial cereal food supplies during
the food crisis[Footnote 46] are difficult to assess for a number of
reasons. Early concerns about the progress of commercial imports
stemmed from the large amounts of cereal imports needed, the high
regional prices for maize,[Footnote 47] and the lack of sufficient
foreign exchange resources for governments and private sector entities
to purchase the required imports.[Footnote 48] Nonetheless, data
available in mid-May 2003 indicated that 1.72 million MT of commercial
cereal imports had been received in the six countries between April 1,
2002, and March 31, 2003.[Footnote 49] However, the regional
Vulnerability Assessment Committee September 2002, December 2002, and
January 2003 reports indicated some serious problems with food
availability during the year. (See app. III for a detailed description
of the VACs.) Factors contributing to the uncertainty over commercial
cereal food supplies included the lack of time frames indicating when
imports needed to be purchased, data reliability issues, problems
between urban and rural distribution of food supplies, and government
policies that provided disincentives to the private sector to import
food or that, once imports were received in country, discouraged the
efficient supply of those goods to the local market.
In contrast to food aid effort, the CFSAMs did not identify the
monthly rate at which imports needed to occur, making it difficult to
judge the timeliness of commercial imports. The September VAC report
for Zambia indicated concern that it could be difficult for importers
to find maize in regional markets (as several countries in the region
had large deficits and would be competing to buy from the same
suppliers), which in turn could delay purchases. According to the
December VAC report for Lesotho, maize, wheat, and sorghum were
generally not available for purchase at the end of the year in
communities across that country. In Swaziland, maize was reported to be
readily available in retail outlets nationwide even though there had
been no commercial imports between July and November. However, there
were fears that a shortfall in maize imports would occur between
December and March, causing another round of price hikes.
Once data on commercial cereal imports began to be available, data
reliability became an issue in some cases. For example, according to
the December Zimbabwe VAC report, figures on the combination of
commercial imports, food aid imports, and available national production
should have resulted in a surplus of 200,000 MT at the national level.
However, the report indicated there was something seriously wrong with
the numbers, since 41 percent of communities surveyed reported that
cereal grains were not or were rarely available from the government's
grain marketing board and the other 59 percent reported that the grains
were only occasionally available. U.S. government officials noted that
there have been numerous anecdotal reports of the government's
politicizing food aid, which may partly explain some of the
discrepancy.
While commercial cereal imports may have been provided to urban
markets, shortages were reported in many rural areas, indicating
problems with the distribution of commercial cereal supplies. The
December VAC report for Lesotho indicated that maize mealæmaize that
has undergone the milling processæwas said to be available, though very
expensive, in the various urban centers but generally not available in
the rural areas, which were characterized as experiencing a serious
food crisis. The January VAC report for Zambia said there was no
commercial shortfall in urban areas and millers did not expect one
through February and beyond. However, most of the maize that had been
imported (officially or via cross-border trade) was reportedly only
servicing the urban markets, leaving the rural areas with a severe
commercial grain shortfall that drastically pushed up prices. Of 48
villages surveyed, fewer than 10 percent said maize was readily
available and fewer than 30 percent said maize was occasionally
available.
Finally, some national governments implemented subsidies and price
controls that raised concern about private sector imports and whether
imports received would be supplied to local markets efficiently. For
example, in response to the crisis, Malawi implemented a countrywide
subsidy on the consumer price of maize to make it more affordable to
the public. However, this policy, combined with high interest rates
that inhibited the private sector from borrowing to cover its
purchases, meant that the private sector could not profit from
importing maize and selling it at the subsidized price. In Zambia, the
government encouraged a program whereby a private sector group, the
Millers Association, would import 300,000 MT of maize without having to
pay import duties and the government would import 155,000 MT of maize
to begin a strategic reserve. However, the Zambian government
reportedly provided conflicting information about the amount of food it
was to import for relief versus strategic reserves, thus causing
confusion about planned imports, uncertainty over market prices, and
conditions favorable for market speculation. In Zimbabwe, the
government banned all private sector imports and implemented price
controls on maize. This policy reportedly encouraged traders with food
supplies to stockpile them or sell them at a much higher price on black
markets in country or across borders.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Nonfood Emergency Needs:
U.N. agencies requested $143.7 million to address urgent, nonfood
humanitarian needs that increased people's vulnerability to famine for
the July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of April 9, 2003, less than
25 percent of the total identified requirements had been funded. Figure
15 compares the sectors and dollar amounts for which the U.N. agencies
requested funding to actual contributions. As the figure shows, the
largest amounts were requested for health, agriculture, and economic
recovery. Only five of the nine sectors received any funding and four
of these were only partially funded. The four sectors with the highest
rates of funding were: multi-sector, 583 percent of the requested
amount; coordination and support services, 49 percent of the requested
amount; agriculture, 35 percent; and health, 21 percent.
Figure 15: U.N. Nonfood Emergency Appeals and Contributions by Sector:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Funding requests were tied to specific projects. For example, the World
Health Organization (WHO) asked for $2.9 million for projects in Malawi
to enable earlier detection of epidemics, improve response to disease
outbreaks in emergency situations, and strengthen emergency health
coordination. FAO requested funding for an $8.5 million project in
Zimbabwe to (1) increase agricultural production among 400,000
vulnerable households by providing inputs such as seeds and fertilizer,
(2) facilitate tillage, (3) rehabilitate local water sources, and (4)
develop opportunities to market agricultural products.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis:
This appendix provides additional information on crops and foods
produced with modern agricultural biotechnology, how concerns about
agricultural biotechnology developed in southern Africa, and how issues
surrounding agricultural biotechnology affected delivery of U.S. food
aid during the southern Africa food crisis.
Modern Agricultural Biotechnology:
Modern agricultural biotechnology refers to various scientific
techniques used to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by
introducing in their genetic makeup genes for specific desired traits,
including genes from unrelated species. Genetic engineering techniques
allow development of new crop or livestock varieties, since the genes
for a given trait can be introduced into a plant or animal species to
produce a new variety incorporating that specific trait. Additionally,
genetic engineering increases the range of traits that can be
introduced in new varieties by allowing genes from totally unrelated
species to be incorporated into a particular plant or animal
variety.[Footnote 50]
Crops and foods containing or derived from genetically modified (GM)
plants have been characterized by various users as biotech, GM,
genetically modified organisms (GMO), and bioengineered crops and
foods.
Biotech crops currently on the market are mainly aimed at increasing
crop protection by introducing resistance against plant diseases caused
by insects or viruses or by increasing tolerance to herbicides. Biotech
crops have lowered pest management costs and enhanced yields. By the
end of 2000, such crops had been planted on nearly 100 million acres
worldwide. As of 2000, the United States had 76.7 million acres of
biotech crop varieties: 26 percent of all maize planted, 68 percent of
cotton, and 69 percent of soybeans.
The United States and a number of other countries have established
regulatory processes for assessing whether foods derived from
agricultural biotechnology are as safe for humans, animals, other
plants, and the environment as their traditional counterparts. Safety
assessments of GM foods investigate direct health effects (toxicity),
tendencies to provoke allergic reaction, nutritional effects, and any
unintended effects that could:
result from gene insertion.[Footnote 51] Environmental assessments
consider the ability of the GMO to escape and potentially introduce the
engineered genes into wild populations; susceptibility of nontarget
organisms (e.g., insects that are not pests) to the gene product; loss
of biodiversity; and increased use of chemicals in agriculture. The
environmental aspects vary considerably according to local conditions.
GM food such as whole kernel maize seed contains living modified
organisms (LMO) that are capable of transferring or replicating genetic
material. If maize is milled, this is no longer the case. Whole kernel
maize seed can be eaten as a food or planted to grow a new crop.
Challenges to U.S. Agricultural Exports Containing Biotech Commodities:
U.S. agricultural biotech exports have faced several significant
challenges in international markets. First, as the single, major
producer of biotech products, the United States has been relatively
isolated in its efforts to maintain access for these products.[Footnote
52] Second, in many parts of the world, consumer concerns about the
safety of biotech foods have increased, leading key market countries to
implement or consider regulations that may restrict U.S. biotech
exports. Third, in the United States, biotech and conventional
varieties are typically combined in the grain handling system for more
efficient use of crops from multiple sources.[Footnote 53] Thus,
foreign regulations on biotech could affect all U.S. exports of these
commodities as well as food products containing or derived from biotech
crops. Specifically, regulations limiting or banning the importation of
foods containing biotech products present serious challenges to U.S.
exporters of corn and soy products, according to Department of State
and USDA officials.
Several international organizations are involved in developing guidance
on biotech food and its regulation. The Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex)æa joint FAO/WHO body responsible for an international food
code--has been developing principles for the human health risk analysis
of biotech foods. These principles are based on a premarket assessment,
performed on a case-by-case basis, that evaluates both direct effects
(from the inserted gene) and unintended effects that may arise from
inserting the new gene. The principles are in the final stage of an
eight-step international agreement process. Draft language under
consideration includes an option for mandatory labeling based on the
method of production, even if there is no detectable presence of DNA or
protein in the end product resulting from genetic modification. The
United States and several other countries have opposed mandatory
processed-based labeling for foods, which may contain the products of
agricultural biotechnology. They favor mandatory labeling only with
regards to allergic reactions, changes in nutritional content, and
changes in handling requirements. Codex has been deadlocked on the
labeling issue for several years.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental
treaty, regulates transboundary movements of LMOs. Biotech foods are
within the scope of the protocol only if they contain LMOs. The
protocol requires exporters to get consent from importing countries
before the first shipment of LMOs intended for release into the
environment. This requirement does not apply to LMOs intended for
direct use as food, feed, or for processing.[Footnote 54] The protocol
will enter into force 90 days after the 50TH country has ratified it,
which may be in late 2003, according to a USAID official. The United
States is not a signatory to the agreement. However, according to U.S.
officials, as a practical matter U.S. exporters will need to observe
and comply with local regulations implementing the protocol.
U.S. Versus EU Approval Process:
The United States and the European Union (EU) have very different
regulatory frameworks for approving new agricultural biotech products.
The United States generally applies existing food safety and
environmental protection laws and regulations[Footnote 55] to biotech
products and approves them based on their characteristics rather than
on whether they are derived from biotechnology. To evaluate new
products, U.S. regulators require sufficient evidence to determine
their safety or risk. Under this approach, the United States has
approved most new biotech varieties.
The EU follows the "precautionary principle," under which the EU
maintains that approval of new biotechnology products should not
proceed if there is "insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain"
scientific data regarding potential risks. The EU has not approved any
new biotech foods for marketing since 1998.[Footnote 56] This stance
has affected the viability of biotech trade in other parts of the
world. For example, given the importance of the EU market, U.S. soybean
producers have been reluctant to introduce new biotech varieties not
approved for marketing in the EU. Similarly, maize growers in
Argentina, who export to the EU, are deferring planting a biotech
variety known as "Round-up Ready" corn because the EU has not approved
it. They are only planting biotech varieties approved by the EU.
Biotech Issues in Zimbabwe:
According to U S. officials, Zimbabwe raised concerns about the
potential adverse environmental and commercial/trade impacts of
unmilled biotech products as early as the summer of 2001, a year before
the U.N.'s southern Africa appeal. It did not want planting of whole
kernel biotech seeds or feeding of livestock on biotech products. In
December 2001, the United States offered to provide 14,300 MT of maize
to Zimbabwe, but the government refused, since it could not be
certified as GMO-free. In January 2002, the United States agreed to
provide 8,500 MT of fortified corn meal to Zimbabwe as an initial
contribution to a WFP program launched in November 2001. Since this was
a milled product that did not contain any living GMOs, the government
accepted it.
In May 2002, the United States offered an additional shipment of 10,000
MT of whole kernel maize for the WFP program. The government again said
it would only accept contributions that included assurances that the
food was not derived from GMOs. As a result, the maize was reallocated
to Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.
Near the end of July 2002, Zimbabwe proposed to accept a U.S. offer of
17,500 MT of maize that might contain biotech commodity. However, the
maize would be temporarily stored in silos to be milled and
subsequently distributed. In the meantime, the government would use its
own maize for distribution, which would be packed into USAID food bags
and distributed. This proposal became known as "the swap." Near the end
of August, the United States approved the swap arrangement. However, on
September 1, the Agriculture Minister of Zimbabwe was quoted as
emphatically rejecting biotech food assistance.[Footnote 57] Four days
later, though, the President approved accepting biotech maize, subject
to special shipping, milling, and distribution requirements.[Footnote
58]
Biotech Issues in Zambia:
In February and March 2002, WFP and U.S. officials notified Zambia that
U.S. donations to that country would likely include maize containing
biotech varieties. In June 2002, Zambia's Vice President said the
country would gladly accept the U.S. maize Zimbabwe refused. However,
during June and July a public debate on biotech food began and appeared
to be backed strongly by the opposition political party. In August, a
6-hour town meeting on the issue was held, and on August 16, the
government decided to suspend all biotech imports and distributions.
After this announcement, the USAID Administrator invited seven Zambian
scientists to visit the United States on a fact-finding mission
regarding the biotech issue. The scientists came to the United States
in September and subsequently visited South Africa and several European
countries as well. Their report concluded that:
* distributing biotech maize carries a high risk of eroding local maize
varieties;
* the safety aspects of biotech foods are not conclusive;[Footnote 59]
and:
* there is a potential risk of biotech maize, if planted, affecting the
export of baby corn and honey in particular and organic foods in
general to the EU.
They recommended that the government continue its policy of not
accepting biotech foods. On October 29, the Zambian government agreed.
Seven experts in the field of modern agricultural biotechnology
reviewed the Zambian scientists' report for us. With regard to human
health and safety issues, two experts found the report to be fair,
accurate, and fact-based; two experts disagreed with this assessment;
and three did not respond. Concerning environmental issues, three
experts said the report was fair, accurate, and fact-based; two experts
disagreed; one expert was not certain; and one did not respond. The
experts generally agreed that cross-pollination, or gene flow, would
occur between biotech and conventional maize plants, but disagreed
about whether this warrants a ban on biotech maize. Four experts
suggested that milling of biotech maize was a viable option for
maintaining safety while simultaneously feeding the hungry; the other
three did not comment on this issue. Overall, the experts supported the
need for Zambia and other southern African countries to be able to
assess GMOs in their environments.
U.S. Views and Approach:
During June 2002, the United States planned how it would respond to the
biotech issue. It recognized that (1) Zimbabwe's rejection of whole
kernel maize was a problem that had to be addressed, (2) other affected
countries' positions on the import and transport of biotech food needed
to be determined, and (3) it was important to provide information about
biotech food. By early July, the United States was planning to use
private and, if necessary, public diplomacy to get the affected
countries to accept the biotech food aid. It would work with and
through SADC and its members to remove barriers to biotech food aid and
would support WFP in asking for humanitarian exceptions to current and
proposed biotech regulations. When feasible, the United States would
attempt to provide alternative food aid to countries that had bans on
agricultural biotechnology in place. However, if recipient countries
placed special regulations on biotech productsæfor example, milling or
labeling requirementsæthey themselves would have to pay to implement
these requirements. The U.S. government opposed agreeing to provide
only milled biotech food aid because the process added costs and
delayed shipments.
On July 25, 2002, the State Department directed its embassies in the
six affected states and Botswana to stress to host governments the
importance of addressing the region's immediate needs rather than
engaging in protracted debate on the merits or supposed dangers of
biotech food. State warned that recent decisions by some recipient and
transit countries not to accept whole kernel biotech maize risked
endangering the lives of millions of people. State advised U.S.
missions to urge SADC member states to immediately adopt an agreement
allowing unrestricted import and distribution of food aid, including
biotech produce, on an emergency basis for the duration of the crisis.
State's background and guidance to its overseas posts on biotech food
aid included the following:
* Food that is exported from the United States, whether commercially or
through food aid, is the same food eaten by Americans in terms of its
GMO content.
* To date, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that commercially
available biotech commodities and processed foods are any less safe
than their conventional counterparts.
* Commercially produced bioengineered plant varieties in the United
States have been reviewed under the U.S. regulatory process, which sets
rigorous standards for human, animal, and plant health and for
environmental safety. These varieties have received safety approval in
a number of countries.
* Developing countries are concerned that genetically engineered genes
may contaminate other farmers' fields or wild plants in the centers of
origin, but this occurrence would not necessarily be negative or
damaging. Genes naturally flow (through cross-pollination) between
traditionally developed varieties and modern hybrids.
* Some African countries are concerned that if farmers plant whole
grain U.S. food aid, their trade with the EU may be affected. At this
point in time, the only whole grain in food aid that might contain
biotech varieties is maize. If whole maize is planted, it is possible
biotech varieties co-mingled in food aid could cross-pollinate with
local varieties. However, it is unlikely that the biotech grain will
grow well as it is made from hybrid seed and not well-adapted to
conditions in southern Africa.
U.N. Response:
In May 2002, Executive Director raised the issue of biotech food
aid with the U.N. Secretary General and in June briefed him on why
biotech food aid was an impediment for operations in southern Africa.
By early July 2002, the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs had sought guidance from FAO, WHO, and WFP regarding food aid
with biotech components. The FAO Director-General responded with a
letter incorrectly citing the Cartagena Protocol as recommending that
all food aid that might contain biotech products be subject to an
"advanced informed agreement" and be milled before distribution to
avoid the possibility of germination. However, the Cartagena Protocol
expressly states that advanced informed agreement does not apply when
the shipment is for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, nor
does it suggest that grain shipments containing living biotech
components be milled. After the United States raised concerns about
this misinformation, the Director-General issued a correction
letter.[Footnote 60] Nonetheless, the FAO representative in Malawi
repeated the same erroneous recommendations to Malawi's Ministry of
Agriculture. The United States again cited the error, but in August,
the FAO representative in Zimbabwe gave similar inaccurate advice. This
time, when the United States alerted FAO, the problem was quickly
corrected, according to FAO.
On August 23, 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a joint U.N. statement on
the use of biotech foods as food aid in southern Africa.[Footnote 61]
Its key points included the following:
* Although there are no existing international agreements in force
regarding trade in biotech food or food aid, WFP policy is that all
donated food must meet the safety standards of both the donor and
recipient countries and all applicable international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations.
* FAO and WHO are confident that the principal country of origin (i.e.,
the United States) has applied its national food safety risk assessment
procedures to its food aid and has fully certified that these foods are
safe for human consumption. Based on national information from a
variety of sources and current scientific knowledge, FAO, WHO, and WFP
believe the consumption of biotech food now being provided as food aid
in southern Africa is unlikely to present human health risk.
* Any potential risks to biological diversity and sustainable
agriculture from inadvertent introduction of GMOs have to be judged and
managed by countries on a case-by-case basis. In the case of maize,
processing techniques such as milling or heat treatment may be
considered to avoid inadvertent introduction of biotech seed. However,
U.N. policy does not require that biotech grain used for food, feed, or
processing be treated this way.
* Governments must carefully consider the severe and immediate
consequences of limiting the food aid available for millions so
desperately in need.
European Union Statement:
Several of the southern African countries were concerned that if whole
kernel biotech maize were planted and used as feed for their cattle,
their ability to export grain and cattle to the EU would be hampered.
On August 28, 8 days after Zambia announced it would not accept biotech
foods, the delegation of the European Commission in Zambia issued a
press release to clarify its position, which stated the following:
* The United States, the EU, and others have evaluated several biotech
maize varieties, and some have been authorized for use, including
planting. Given the serious food shortages in the region, governments
may want to use these evaluations rather than wait for them to be
repeated locally.
* The fact that a country grows biotech maize has no impact on its
ability to export other agricultural products to the EU.
* The importation and use of biotech maize in a form other than grain
should eliminate concerns about negative biodiversity effects and trade
consequences.[Footnote 62]
* EU scientists have found no evidence that the biotech maize varieties
they have assessed are harmful to human health.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520:
JUN 3
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover
from Food Crisis," GAO-03-644, GAO Job Code 320145.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Lois
Aroian, Bureau of African Affairs, at (202) 647-9849.
Sincerely,
Christopher B. Burnham
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - Wayne Ferris State/OIG - Luther Atkins State/AF - Walter
Kansteiner:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa
Recover from Food Crisis (GAO-03-644, GAO Code 320145):
The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to comment on the
GAO's draft report on Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to
Help Southern Africa Recover from the Food Crisis. The Department
concurs with the report's general thrust, conclusions, and
recommendations. In particular, the report showed that the food crisis
was actually a complex humanitarian emergency of which food was just
one element.
On the recommendations, the U.S. is taking steps to improve long-term
food security throughout the world, not just in southern Africa. Our
Missions overseas, through cooperative efforts between State and USAID
and guided by their Washington agencies, already integrate agricultural
development, HIV-AIDS awareness and action, and disaster management.
Some of our Missions include an HIV-AIDS education component in each
and every aid assistance program.
We have also been working with our partners in the G8 to create a new
multilateral framework for preventing and mitigating the effects of
famines so that communities will not have to sell all they have in a
desperate --and too often unsuccessful --attempt to save their
children's lives. We would like our G8 partners to commit to 1)
increased food assistance to meet current emergency needs, 2) agreement
to use more flexible approaches to addressing food crises (such as
cash-for-work programs) and 3) long-term efforts to increase
agricultural productivity. These efforts are critical because a global
scourge needs a united global response.
The Department suggests that the report note at the outset that the
U.S. anticipated the crisis, prepositioned food in the most vulnerable
countries in order to meet it, and placed food in the pipeline so that
it would arrive in a timely way (p. 4). The report should explain that
the C-SAFE program resulted from a longer-term strategy that targeted
the most vulnerable populations that the WFP program might miss (p.
14).
In 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe initiated a chaotic and often
violent land reform campaign (pp. 6, 8). This campaign was
characterized by mob occupation of commercial farms and the forced
expulsion of landowners and farm laborers. In many instances,
landowners and farm laborers were deprived of all their personal
possessions. The Government of Zimbabwe has actively blocked efforts by
landowners to seek legal protection of their property and redress for
their loss. At the same time, many commercial farms were taken over by
senior Government of Zimbabwe officials and supporters. To date, no
landowner has been compensated for seized land, and more than a million
internally displaced farm laborers remain displaced. The result in
2002-3 was that, once expelled from their lands, farm workers were left
with no way to support or feed themselves, regardless of crop failure.
On the issue of food aid, containing bioengineered food, the Department
works in conjunction with USDA, USAID and other agencies to coordinate
outreach and capacity-building efforts to increase understanding of
agricultural biotechnology and its related regulatory and policy
issues. In this specific instance, the interagency working group on the
southern Africa famine did develop alternative means to address the
crisis once it became apparent that some countries might reject the
food aid. When Zambia opted to reject the biotech corn, for example,
the U.S. sent sorghum and bulgur. Such substitutions are often possible
but are dependent on availability, and substitutes are often more
expensive. Additionally, the U.S. tries to provide the staples usually
consumed in the affected area, to the extent possible. An interagency
review on how to manage the presence of bioengineered foods in food aid
may be useful for developing a strategy; however, such a review should
be narrowly focused to ensure better coordination between food aid,
development, trade policy and regulatory agencies. Language to reflect
this need would be more appropriate.
There are a number of inaccuracies in the report regarding biotech
food.
The report characterized Malawi as a country that rejected biotech food
(p. 22). In fact, Malawi readily accepted whole-grain biotech maize,
asking only that the corn distributed during the planting season, a
relatively short period, be milled. Much of the food aid that others
did not accept ended up in Malawi.
The report referred to food being delayed in the ports because of the
biotech impasse (p. 24), but actual port clogging was also a problem.
Detailing of a port captain to address this problem helped clear the
food aid through the ports.
The report mentioned the public debate and town meeting in Zambia that
addressed the biotech food aid issue. As the report notes, this issue
became politicized.
Proponents of accepting biotech food, scientists who sought to speak on
the issue, were shouted down at the town meeting. The report contains
no information about the active campaign of NGOs in Zambia and
elsewhere to spread misinformation about biotechnology. Moreover, the
U.S. provided extensive materials about agricultural biotechnology and
the safety of biotech food aid to Zambia and the other countries
affected by the food crisis. There is very little mention in the report
of these numerous efforts.
We would urge a review of Appendix VII, "Biotech Foods" because it
provides some inaccurate and incomplete information on bioengineered
foods. The definition of genetically modified organisms (p. 49) is
incorrect and should be re-defined as "organisms in which the genetic
material (DNA) has been altered via introduction of foreign DNA using
in vitro techniques." On the same page, the discussion of safety issues
associated with biotech foods does not make clear that these are the
types of potential issues that regulators and scientists consider
before approving a product for commercial use.
The discussion of international organizations involved in work on
biotechnology issues (pg. 50) confuses work ongoing in various Codex
Alimentarius committees and incorrectly links work on risk assessment
guidelines in the final stage of approval with the issue of labeling
information, whether mandatory or voluntary. The paragraph on the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (p. 50) states that the Protocol will
enter into force in 2004. Forty-eight countries have ratified the
Protocol, leaving only two more for entry-into-force. It is expected
that the final ratifications will be forthcoming by mid-2003, with the
Protocol entering into force no later than December 2003.
As for U.S. compliance with the Protocol, we cannot be a signatory, so
we have no rights or obligations under the Protocol; however, our
exporters will most likely need to observe the requirements. Thus, we
suggest that the report state that "as a practical matter the United
States will need to act in a manner consistent with many of the treaty
requirements.... Footnote number 40 (p.50) inaccurately summarizes and
paraphrases the requirements of the Protocol pertaining to shipments of
LMO's intended for direct use as food, feed, or for processing.
Finally, on page 51, the statement of Europe's use of the
"precautionary principle" is not fully accurate. The definition of the
principle in the report is only one manifestation of the use of this
principle.
Please do contact us if you need further assistance.
The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated
June 3, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We recognize that the United States is taking steps to help improve
long-term food security in the region that include, among others, the
Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which was introduced
early last year. However, as noted in figure 11, overall assistance to
the region's agricultural sector has declined between 1998 and 2003;
and as of April 2003, only one out of the six countries (Mozambique)
was proposed to receive funding under the new initiative. We also
recognize that U.S. bilateral assistance in several of the affected
countries has funded a number of programs related to food security over
the years, including ongoing programs on agricultural development, HIV/
AIDS, and disaster management. While all these programs do help to
promote food security, U.N. and U.S. officials told us that to have
broad impact, these programs need to be implemented on a much larger
scale. Our recommendation that U.S. agencies work with international
organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a
comprehensive, targeted strategy for sustained recovery would, if
implemented, help coordinate efforts, integrate approaches, and
leverage limited resources as necessary to achieve greater
effectiveness.
2. We modified the text on pages 3 and 23 to note that the United
States anticipated the crisis at the outset. Although the United States
acted early so that food would arrive in a timely way, USAID officials
advised us that no food was prepositioned in any of the countries. We
modified the text on page 18 to reflect the point on the C-SAFE
program.
3. We modified the text on pages 10-11 to reflect this information.
4. According to USAID officials, available quantities of sorghum and
bulgur were limited.
5. We noted this view on page 46.
6. We modified our discussion of Malawi's policy on page 31.
7. We modified the text on pages 31 to reflect this point.
8. We replaced the definition, cited from a World Health Organization
publication, with an alternative. See pages 3 and 65. We modified the
discussion of safety issues on pages 64-65.
9. We modified the text on these several issues on page 67.
10. We clarified this footnote, on page 67, to indicate what
information would be required in the initial documentation and what
information would be required in subsequent exchanges of information.
11. On page 68, we changed our reference to the precautionary principle
to clarify that the statements represent the EU's arguments under the
principle.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Comments from Department of Agriculture:
USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services:
Foreign Agricultural Service:
Mr. David B. Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
JUN 3 2003:
1400 Independence Ave, SW Room 5071-S Stop 1001 Washington, DC 20250-
1001:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would like to thank the
General Accounting Office for the opportunity to comment on draft
report #GAO-03-644 entitled "FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: Sustained Efforts
Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis." USDA is
pleased to provide the following three types of comments: (1) a
response to the recommendations; (2) thematic comments regarding the
draft report; and (3) specific comments on the draft report.
Response to Recommendations for Executive Action:
The draft report recommends "the Secretaries of State and Agriculture
and the Administrator of USAID initiate a comprehensive review of the
issues pertaining to biotech foods in emergency food aid." USDA agrees
that all relevant parts of the U.S. Government must continue to review
and engage other countries regarding their biotech policies, including
those related to food aid.
Biotechnology and its acceptance are not new issues. In fact, the
issues discussed in the report are identical to those issues faced by
commercial exports of the same products in many of the same countries.
USDA will continue to work closely with other U.S. Government agencies
to ensure that efforts to address concerns are consistent with overall
U.S. biotech policies. Specifically, USDA will continue to support
developing countries' efforts to enhance their capacity for making
science-based and transparent decisions regarding products of modern
agricultural biotechnology. U.S. Government-wide efforts are
substantial in providing technical assistance to developing countries
that either have or might in the future face food aid needs. These
range from long-term capacity building efforts associated with the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to shorter-term
projects such as USDA's Cochran Fellowship Program. These efforts
remain a priority for providing a better global understanding of the
regulatory issues associated with biotechnology and its acceptance
since it is impossible to predict where the next food security crisis
will develop. The challenge that must be addressed is building
confidence in the existing safety evaluation systems for products of
modern biotechnology, both in the U.S. and in other countries.
It is difficult to accurately identify countries that might accept or
reject products of modern agricultural biotechnology. Given the rapidly
advancing nature of the topic, many developing countries' policies
depend upon the specific political, economic and social circumstances
that might exist at the time. As the draft report accurately indicates,
the policies and their implementation and application evolved over the
course of the food aid crisis in southern Africa in 2002. However, the
U.S. Government is committed to providing food under aid programs that
always meets the health and safety requirements in the U.S. and the
importing country.
USDA has always provided food aid recipients with a wide variety of
products that are available to meet emergency needs. In addition, other
factors are considered, including normal dietary patterns, availability
and costs. All of the products that are provided under these programs
meet all the health and safety requirements necessary for the products
to be consumed in the U.S. There is no difference between those
products provided under food aid programs and the safe and nutritious
food consumed by millions of Americans every day.
Thematic Comments on the Draft Report:
The draft report, as written, attributes the problems that occurred in
providing food aid to southern Africa directly to the food aid itself.
However a more accurate representation would be that the countries in
need of the food aid had non-transparent, non-science based or shifting
regulatory regimes regarding biotechnology. U.S. policy regarding which
commodities to provide as food aid and how to respond to food aid
crises did not change. However, the policies of food aid recipient
countries and their application did change, as is reflected in the
report.
In the U.S., once a product of modern agricultural biotechnology is
determined to be as safe as its conventional counterpart, it is allowed
to circulate freely in the U.S. market. The U.S. Government does not
make or require any distinction between "biotech" or "non-biotech" food
for sale commercially or distribution through food aid channels.
Therefore, the use of these terms in the draft report makes a
distinction that does not exist under U.S. law or policy and is
misleading. All food that is available under U.S. food aid programs,
whether it includes biotech components or not, meets the same high
safety threshold applicable to food available in the U.S. These
decisions are scientifically based and transparent.
In responding to food security needs, the first and highest priority of
the U.S. is to ship enough safe and nutritious food to feed hungry
people. Providing alternatives to our current food aid programs to
address non-science based requirements regarding biotechnology
increases costs and the time required to deliver critical food needs.
As a
result, the amount of food that the U.S. can provide and the number of
people we can help declines.
In addition, specific technical comments on the draft report are
contained in Attachment A for your review and consideration.
In closing, I again want to thank you for allowing us to comment on
this draft report. Please let us know if you would like to discuss our
comments further.
Sincerely,
A. Ellen Terpstra
Administrator:
Signed for A. Ellen Terpstra:
The following are GAO's comments on USDA's letter dated June 3, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We modified the text on page 30 to reflect this point.
2. We modified the text on page 66 to reflect the first point. Our
draft report noted that the biotech and conventional varieties are
typically combined in the U.S. grain handling system. Regarding the use
of the term biotech, see pages 45-46.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
JUN 9 2003:
Mr. David B. Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID's) formal response to the draft GAO report entitled "Foreign
Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover
from Food Crisis" (June 2003). It was reviewed by USAID's Office of
Food for Peace (FFP), the Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and
Trade, the Bureau for Africa, and USAID Missions in southern Africa.
We appreciate your pointing out that the US food aid response in the
early stages of the crisis was both substantial and timely. The United
States Government (USG) recognized early in 2002 that the situation in
southern Africa would require a very large food aid response, and
immediately sought ways to ensure that initial shipments would arrive
in southern Africa early in the crisis. As a result, the first shipment
of food aid from the United States arrived in Durban, South Africa in
May 2002. By December 2002, the United States had delivered over
400,000 metric tons of food aid to the region, representing over 57% of
the total food aid pledges through that period.
We agree with the observation stated in the report that most other
donors were slow to pledge and then slow to deliver on their pledges.
The USG continues to use various
international and in-country fora to urge other donors to respond in a
more timely and robust fashion to food security crises.
USAID agrees with the GAO recommendation to develop a comprehensive,
targeted strategy to ensure sustained recovery
from the southern Africa food crisis. The need for such a recovery
strategy was identified early in the crisis in mid-2002. A Recovery
Strategy/Action Plan that conforms to the GAO recommendation has
already been drafted and is in the process of being reviewed by other
USAID offices, other USG agencies, donors and non-government
development partners. The draft strategy is already serving as a guide
to the development and review of new USAID country strategies in
southern Africa.
USAID supports the recommendation for further interagency discussion
and coordination on the dimensions of biotechnology in food aid. Among
the specific recommendations, USAID is actively engaged in supporting
the development of capacity in a number of food aid recipient countries
to make informed decisions about biotechnology. In practical terms,
however, building such capacity is a long-term strategy and is unlikely
to assist in emergency situations such as we saw in southern Africa. In
almost all instances to date, developing countries have taken a year or
more to conduct biotechnology regulatory reviews before issuing a
decision. Thus, such reviews disrupt emergency food aid responses.
We believe the most practical solutions will be to work with recipient
governments and partners involved in the delivery of food aid to build
confidence in the existing safety:
evaluations of these products. This will include evaluations done in
the U.S. by other countries, scientists, and international
organizations such as WHO and FAO. Additionally, we note that in this
instance, the impact on food aid delivery was not catastrophic because
the impasse only occurred in one country. This allowed the United
States and the WFP to re-route food and find complimentary donor
support with relative success. If concerns with biotechnology occur on
a larger scale, we will need to look at our food aid delivery options
and not just consider biotechnology.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft Report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
John Marshall:
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management:
Signed by John Marshall:
The following are GAO's comments on USAID's letter dated June 9, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. Currently in draft form, the recovery strategy/action plan USAID
outlines in its comments represents a beginning. USAID notes that its
draft strategy has already been useful as a planning tool in developing
USAID's country strategies for the region. As such, the recovery
strategy/action plan will help target U.S. efforts. However, our
recommendation goes beyond U.S. efforts. To ensure sustained recovery
in an environment of constrained resources, we believe there is a need
for a comprehensive strategy that pulls together the efforts of
international organizations, donors, and national governments;
integrates approaches; and leverages limited resources.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Comment from the World Food Program:
World Food Programme:
Programa Mundial de Alimentos:
Programme Alimentaire Mondial:
The Executive Director:
Via Cesare Giulio Viola, 68/70 00148 Rome:
Italy:
Phone: +39-06 5513.3030 Fax: +39-06 6513.2834:
Internet: www.wfp.org:
2 June 2003:
Mr. David B. Gootnick Director:
International Affairs and Trade Attachment U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G. Street:
N.W. Washington D.C. 20548 U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation to the GAO for the
opportunity to review and provide comments on its very important study,
Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food
Crisis.
I was pleased to note that the GAO report reinforces many of the
conclusions of the two interagency missions that I led to the region as
the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian
Needs in Southern Africa. Most notably:
The importance of understanding the linkages among food security, HIV/
AIDS and nutrition. Although this is an area where there has already
been a considerable amount of research and advocacy, the southern
African crisis is the first large-scale emergency where the need to
look at the interface among these issues has been so compelling;
The need for the international community to urgently and radically
alter the way it operates in southern Africa in the short and medium
term. All agencies should review the appropriateness of their
development and emergency operations in southern Africa because
addressing the profound problems of the region will require a broad
effort involving all key actors, including the United Nations,
intergovernmental regional bodies, governments, International
Financial Institutions, donors, large and small civil society
organizations, activists and the private sector.
The report correctly notes that there was a wide range of factors that
contributed to the 2002/2003-food crisis. While the report has captured
most of the main ones, I would like to further highlight a few issues,
which might provide an even more comprehensive understanding to
readers.
1) There are two crucial factors that I would recommend be further
highlighted - extreme poverty and regional economic decline. The report
does touch briefly on
Southern Africa's deep, structural poverty but stresses neither the
role it played in exacerbating the food crisis in 2002-03 nor its
contribution to ongoing food insecurity. The percentage of people
living below the poverty line in all six countries is staggering (from
42% and rising in Zimbabwe to over 60% in the other five affected
countries). Faced by severe food shortages and rapidly escalating
prices, most of the poorest families could not afford to buy what
little food was available at local markets, especially as they had few
- if any - household assets to sell. One of the reasons why the number
of people in need rose during the 2002-03 crisis from an initial
estimate of 12.8 million vulnerable people to 15.3 million was that
rising prices left more and more households in need of food assistance
because they lacked the financial means to purchase maize at market
prices.
The region is battling with a host of serious economic problems, such
as rising unemployment, which have increased people's vulnerability.
Many of the countries have been severely affected by retrenchments in
the South African mining industry, while the region as a whole has
suffered from the dramatic economic collapse in Zimbabwe.
2) In the specific case of Zimbabwe, the report makes several
references to land reform and the impact that it has had on
agricultural production. However, the report could do more to mention
Zimbabwe's economic woes, which have seen the country's Gross Domestic
Product fall by more than 20 percent between 1998 and 2002 and
unemployment rise by more than 25 percent over the same period. In
2003, the economy is projected to decline by a further 14-16 percent.
Meanwhile, inflation has now soared to over 269 percent. All of this
has had a devastating impact on the country's population - both in
rural and urban areas. Furthermore, the Government's lack of foreign
exchange and price controls on basic commodities have caused shortages
of everything from bread, milk, sugar and wheat flour to fuel and
electricity.
On another issue, the GAO report is correct that there is a lag time
between pledges and the arrival of commodities in country. The early
months of EMOP 10200 would indeed have benefited from more rapid
mobilization of resources. However, an important consideration in this
regard is the nature of donor funding. Cash resources are much more
quickly mobilized than in-kind contributions. I would urge that it be
reflected in the report that WFP has purchased nearly 400,000 MTs of
commodities regionally for this EMOP in the period through the end of
April 2003.
We certainly would not wish the report to send out a message that, in
the aggregate, donor response to this operation has been lacking. As of
mid-May, the regional operation is 93 percent resourced and we have had
an extraordinary range of donors in the crisis response. It is
important to note that 41 different institutional donors contributed to
EMOP 10200, including such notable non-traditional donors as South
Africa, Algeria, Cameroon, Andorra, Oman, Malaysia, San Marino,
Thailand, Singapore, the Nelson Mandela Foundation and the Latter Day
Saints. Rather than reflecting poorly on the donor community, I would
suggest that donors have been unusually supportive of EMOP 10200.
Hunger and chronic malnutrition cannot be resolved through periodic
emergency appeals during those periods when food insecurity is most
acute. WFP fully supports the conclusion of the GAO that this will
require a sustained effort. Although it is perhaps stating the obvious,
formulating a comprehensive strategy will not make a difference in the
lives of those in southern Africa unless resources are made available
to implement it. We have seen too often, in too many emergencies, that
while there can be an extremely generous outpouring of external
assistance to tackle the immediate manifestations of a crisis, it is
much more difficult to maintain a similar level of engagement to
address the longer-term structural and chronic factors, which
contribute to such high levels of vulnerability.
In all that we do, our actions must concentrate on the needs of women
and children as they are bearing the brunt of this crisis. As noted in
the report of the second Special Envoy mission to the region. "The
untenable burdens of domestic and informal-sector labour on African
women and girls, coupled with their socially constructed vulnerability,
low social and economic status and severely limited autonomy, must be
addressed with full-scale and immediate interventions. The current
willingness to assign additional responsibilities brought on by HIV/
AIDS to already overburdened women and girls threatens to undo the
limited progress made to date towards gender equality. Necessary
interventions range from legislation to uphold women's human rights,
technological advances to reduce the physical and social toll of their
labour, and financial or social compensation for labour assumed in the
absence of social systems to deal with HIV/AIDS - related sickness,
death, hunger and dependency".
In closing, I would like to again express our appreciation to the GAO
for their efforts over the past eight months to better understand not
only the factors contributing to this crisis and how together we have
responded, but also helping to underscore the importance of continuing
collaboration in tackling the longer term issues.
The World Food Programme looks forward to working together with the
United States Government and all of our other partners in defining and
implementing a sustainable recovery strategy.
Sincerely,
James T. Morris
Signed by James T. Morris:
The following are GAO's comments on the letter dated June 2,
2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree with support for further collaboration with the U.S.
government and other partners in defining and implementing a
sustainable recovery strategy.
2. We further highlighted the problems of extreme poverty and regional
economic decline on page 11.
3. We further highlighted Zimbabwe's economic problems on page 11.
4. We reflected these points on page 25.
[End of section]
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Phillip J. Thomas (202) 512-9892 Wayne Ferris (202) 512-5169:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons named above, Joy Labez, Miriam Carroll,
Kendall Schaefer, and Janey Cohen made key contributions to this
report. Nathan Anderson, Nima Edwards, Etana Finkler, Chase Huntley,
Bruce Kutnick, Jeremy Latimer, Barbara Shields, and Eve Weisberg
provided technical support.
(320145):
:
FOOTNOTES
[1] Depending on a country's policies, commercial imports represent the
private sector, the government, or both. In some cases governments
subsidize private sector imports.
[2] As used in this report, cereal refers to plants that yield grain
suitable for food and includes maize, millet, sorghum, rice, and wheat.
[3] This figure reflects total production for these six countries in
the 2001/02 season compared with average production over the previous 5
years.
[4] Total cereal gap is calculated by estimating annual domestic cereal
needs and subtracting the estimated harvest during the year plus cereal
stocks at the beginning of the year.
[5] Modern agricultural biotechnology employs scientific techniques,
such as genetic engineering, to modify plants, animals, or
microorganisms by introducing desired traits in them, including
characteristics from unrelated species. For example, traits may be
introduced to facilitate pest management and improve yield or
nutritional value. In this report, we refer to foods derived from
genetically modified plants as biotech foods. (See app. VII and our
evaluation of agency comments.)
[6] Food security is commonly defined as physical and economic access
by all people at all times to enough food to meet their dietary needs
for an active and healthy life.
[7] The maize crop cycle in southern Africa runs roughly from mid-
November (when crops are planted) through mid-April (when crops are
harvested).
[8] Three assessments of the southern Africa food crisis were conducted
between April 2002 and March 2003. The first round was a series of
national Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) reports
published in May 2002, which estimated that 12.8 million individuals
would be at risk of starvation at the peak of the crisis. The second
round, published in September 2002 as Emergency Food Security
Assessment Reports, increased the at-risk estimate to 14.4 million
people at the peak of the crisis. The third round of assessments,
published in January 2003, increased the estimate to 15.3 million
people.
[9] Nongovernmental organizations are nonprofit, private entities
funded by private, governmental, and international organizations. NGOs
are principal implementing partners in providing emergency food
assistance.
[10] One hectare equals 2.47 acres.
[11] According to a study by the international NGO ActionAid between
January and April 2002, at least 500 to 1,000 people died of hunger and
hunger-related diseases in southern and central Malawi. WFP reported
that more than 70 people died in the village of Gwengwe during that
time--all victims of the district's severe food crisis. The
Commissioner of Malawi's Department of Disaster Preparedness for Relief
and Rehabilitation told us that his agency estimated 1,200 people died
from hunger-related causes between December 2001 and June 2002.
[12] Based on 2001 year-end exchange rate: US$1=Malawi K 72.2.
[13] A 1992 study in Malawi found that a person infected with HIV/AIDS
was estimated to work only 9.7 years out of a potential 25.3 years.
[14] To estimate this reduction, most studies rely on simulations of
projected income growth in a case with HIV/AIDS and in a (hypothetical)
case without HIV/AIDS. The results of these studies vary, primarily due
to assumptions about how HIV/AIDS affects savings and investment rates
and the skill composition of the labor force.
[15] The Vulnerability Assessment Committees, WFP, and others
collected, analyzed, and reported considerable information on the
cereal gap. However, complete data were unavailable because the VACs
found it difficult to gather information on food aid provided by
nongovernmental organizations.
[16] The May/June 2002 FAO/WFP CFSAM initially determined the annual
cereal deficit for each country based on estimates of domestic cereal
consumption and stock requirements and production. Subsequent VAC and
other assessments revised these estimates, resulting in changes to
cereal deficit estimates. A requirement to replenish 473,000 MT of
cereal stocks by the end of the crop year was dropped, estimates of
cereal production and opening stocks were revised upward by 539,000 MT,
and estimates of domestic consumption needs were lowered by 425,000 MT;
the latter revision was partly due to reduced population figures for
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
[17] Given that the U.N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the
original CFSAM emergency food aid targets, we derived the annual
commercial import requirement by subtracting planned emergency food aid
from the March 2003 revised cereal deficit, as provided to us by WFP.
[18] According to WFP, private traders operate primarily in urban
markets. Sales are limited in rural markets due to low purchasing power
among rural populations.
[19] The USAID-approved program authorized 160,000 MT of food aid to be
provided during fiscal year 2003 to three of the six countries. The
program did not establish a target amount of food aid to be distributed
by the end of March 2003.
[20] On average for the 6-month period, WFP planned to assist 8 million
people through large-scale general food and food-for-work
distributions. This aid would go to families living in rural areas
affected by adverse weather and whose coping strategies were depleted
because of stress factors, including the increased burden of caring for
family members affected by HIV/AIDs. WFP also planned to provide
supplementary support to another 2.4 million people during the period,
such as malnourished children, school-age children, and expectant and/
or nursing women who had needs above and beyond the levels needed to
qualify for general food and food-for-work assistance.
[21] According to WFP, the food baskets were incomplete largely because
of when pledged resources arrived as well as donor preferences for in-
kind contributions of certain commodities. Beans, oils, and corn/soya
blend are often under-resourced.
[22] The Malawian VAC's July-August household survey found that adults
were eating less than children and thus might experience a more rapid
decline in nutritional status.
[23] The initial request for nonfood needs was for $104 million.
However, specific requests for some countries and sectors were revised
upward or downward during the year. As of early April 2003, the overall
request was for $143.7 million.
[24] According to USAID officials, depending on the availability of
commodities and shipping, as well as need in an affected country, USAID
in-kind contributions can be provided in as short a time as 6 weeks.
[25] In addition, NGOs that were directly funded by the U.S. government
carried out a similar operation.
[26] Crop varieties developed through the application of biotechnology
to agriculture were first marketed in the United States in 1994.
Because the U.S. grain handling system typically combines biotech and
conventional maize varieties (for efficiency purposes), all U.S. food
aid corn shipments possibly contained biotech maize. In 2002, roughly
35 percent of U.S. food aid could be considered as having varying
degrees of biotech content. See appendix VII for further discussion.
[27] Whole kernel maize, unlike its processed counterpart, has the
possibility, if planted, of introducing engineered genes into
conventional maize plants.
[28] There is no worldwide, harmonized approach to assessing the safety
of biotech foods and regulating their trade. Given the novelty of
agricultural biotech products, many countries especially developing
countries have no approval process for these products at all. The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental treaty,
will regulate transboundary movements of living genetically modified
organisms after it is ratified by 50 countries, which may occur in late
2003. Countries that ratify the protocol may establish their own
national systems for assessing and regulating biotech foods.
[29] In 1999, media in Orissa, India, claimed the United States had
dumped biotech food aid commodities on developing countries because
European and Japanese markets would not buy them. In 2000, Sudanese
politicians accused the NGO community of distributing biotech food aid
and poisoning the Sudanese people. In 2001, the Ugandan government
raised concerns about a program to distribute corn/soya blend rations
to 60,000 people living with HIV/AIDS. In 2001, the Bolivian government
seized biotech food aid following a decree forbidding imports of
products derived from biotech crops. According to USDA, in each of
these instances, USDA and/or USAID addressed the recipient country
government's concerns and ensured that food aid reached those in need.
In December 2001 and May 2002, Zimbabwe rejected U.S. offers to provide
shipments of corn that could not be certified as 100 percent biotech
free. According to ACDI/VOCA, an NGO specializing in development and
food aid issues, through early 2002 most problems relating to biotech
food aid had been resolved relatively quickly and amicably. See ACDI/
VOCA, Genetically Modified Food: Implications for U.S. Food Aid
Programs (Washington, D.C.: Revised February 2002).
[30] According to USAID officials, the United States did not anticipate
the biotech issue, since Mozambique and Zambia had accepted U.S. corn
food aid for years. USDA officials said that it was difficult to
determine with certainty those food aid recipient countries in southern
Africa that would accept or reject food aid containing biotech
commodities because of nontransparent, evolving decision-making
processes.
[31] The United States provided about 280,000 MT of whole kernel maize;
about 77,000 MT of corn meal; about 43,000 MT of corn soy blend and
corn soy milk; and about 21,000 MT of vegetable oil made from either
corn or soybeans. Altogether, about 84 percent of the donated U.S.
tonnage could have contained biotech commodities.
[32] According to USAID, in practice Malawi has preferred that whole
kernel maize be milled prior to distribution but has not allowed its
requirement to slow deliveries of food aid in any way and has only
milled comparatively small quantities.
[33] According to WFP, 1 MT of cereal feeds approximately 60 people per
month.
[34] Milling reduces the volume of the product. As a result, more whole
grain maize must be supplied to meet the food needs of the
beneficiaries.
[35] estimate of $80 per MT represents the rule of thumb for
maximum costs, which include extraction rates during milling,
additional transport, bagging, fumigation, and drying, as well as
additional oversight. Actual total costs for milling, however, could
not be calculated because milling is integrated into the overall
procurement and logistics network.
[36] The private sector is also a source of agricultural investment in
terms of capital (farm machinery and equipment) and technology (seed,
irrigation, and soil conservation). However, little or no data are
available to determine the size, growth, and impact of private sector
investments on agricultural production in these countries.
[37] The projected food deficit is defined as the gap between projected
domestically produced food supplies and projected food needs based on a
basic nutritional requirement and projected population.
[38] GDP projections are from Global Insight's 2000 forecast and
indicate annual growth rates from 2006 to 2020.
[39] One of the key Millennium Development Goals is the eradication of
extreme poverty and hunger and cutting in half between 1990 and 2015
the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day and the
proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
[40] These countries are required to develop Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) as the basis for assistance from the World Bank and IMF
under the Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries, where official
creditors agree to help the most indebted countries obtain debt relief.
In addition to these three countries, Lesotho has prepared an Interim
PRSP and should issue a full PRSP this year.
[41] Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Southern Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[42] Early warning systems often rely on data supplied by the
governments of the countries in question.
[43] The SADC Vulnerability Assessment Committee, established in early
1999, is a committee of national professionals working at the regional
level to enhance food security and livelihood conditions within the
SADC member states. In August 2001, SADC Ministers of Agriculture
encouraged member states to establish cross-sectoral and interagency
vulnerability assessment groups to better understand food security and
livelihood conditions of vulnerable communities and better target
emergency and development interventions. The SADC VAC coordinates and
backstops the national committees.
[44] The U.S. contribution to the southern African region was
consistent with its global food aid performance in recent years. For
example, from1992 through 2001, the United States accounted for an
average 58 percent of global food aid deliveries, ranging between 45.9
percent in 1995 and 68.8 percent in 1999.
[45] Together, the six operations were designed to assist 4.8 million
people.
[46] One factor that reportedly affected the availability of commercial
imports was the drop in maize production in South Africa, a primary
supplier of maize to regional markets. South Africa's average maize
production in 2001 and 2002 was 9 percent lower than the previous 5-
year average (from 1996 to 2000).
[47] Maize prices fluctuated throughout the season and region. In
Malawi, maize prices reached unprecedented levels during the pre-
harvest period. In Zimbabwe, the price of maize on the black market
rose by 167 percent from August to December. In Mozambique, November
2002 prices were generally higher than 2001 prices in four of seven
provinces surveyed, but the same or lower in the other three provinces.
[48] The January 2003 VAC regional report concluded that Zimbabwe faced
the greatest challenge of the six countries for purchasing required
imports. Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic crisis as its
annual inflation rate has reached 180 percent and its gross domestic
product has declined by 12 percent in 2002.
[49] The May 2002 FAO/WFP CFSAM initially estimated the annual cereal
deficit for each country and how much of that could be met by
commercial imports, with the remainder to be offset by emergency food
aid. Subsequent VAC reports updated estimates of the cereal deficit as
well as domestic cereal and stock requirements and production. Given
that the U.N. regional emergency food aid appeal used the original
CFSAM emergency food aid targets, we derived the annual commercial
import requirement by subtracting planned emergency food aid from the
March 2003 revised cereal deficit.
[50] U.S. General Accounting Office, International Trade: Concerns Over
Biotechnology Challenge U.S. Agricultural Exports, GAO-01-727
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001).
[51] In May 2002, GAO reported on biotechnology experts' views on the
adequacy of tests used to evaluate potential health risks associated
with genetically modified foods. Experts we contacted agreed that the
regimen of tests used is adequate in assessing the safety of such
foods. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Genetically Modified Foods:
Experts View Regimen of Safety Tests as Adequate but FDA's Evaluation
Process Could Be Enhanced, GAO-02-566 (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002).
[52] According to USDA officials, more than 17 countries currently
produce biotech agricultural commodities. According to a USAID
official, an estimated 20 percent of the Brazilian soy crop and 20
percent of South Africa's yellow maize are bioengineered.
[53] Once a product of modern agricultural biotechnology is determined
to be as safe as its conventional counterpart, it is allowed to
circulate freely in the U.S. market.
[54] For these products, the protocol establishes procedures for
countries to exchange information. According to the protocol, the
initial documentation should clearly identify that the shipment "may
contain" LMOs that are not intended for intentional introduction into
the environment and contain a point of contact for further information.
Subsequent information that will be placed on an international data
base should contain information such as the characteristics of LMOs;
any national laws, regulation, or guidelines on LMOs; and other related
information.
[55] The U.S. system involves coordination among USDA, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration.
[56] According to a U.S. official, the EU has had a moratorium on new
approvals, which goes a step beyond merely applying precaution to each
regulatory decision.
[57] The swap never took place because the Zimbabwe government did not
fulfill its part of the agreement, according to USAID officials.
[58] According to U.S. officials, as of late February 2003, WFP had
milled more than 41,000 MT of U.S. maize in Zimbabwe and some U.S.
maize destined for Zimbabwe in South Africa. WFP was expecting that all
U.S. corn stored in the region would be milled and transported to end
sites by the end of March or early April.
[59] Issues include concerns related to toxicity, allergenicity, and
antibiotic resistance.
[60] The Director-General advised U.S. officials that it was still
possible that material imported for food, feed, or processing purposes
could be used as seed or that spillage could occur, which might lead to
propagation of the GMO in the country of import or transit. Processes
such as milling, he noted, make germination impossible.
[61] According to WFP officials, Executive Director was tasked to
negotiate drafting of the statement.
[62] Although the EU statement indicated Zambia's acceptance of biotech
maize would not legally undermine its ability to export biotech maize
to the EU, private entities could add restrictions that might affect
such exports..
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