Combating Bioterrorism
Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center Gao ID: GAO-03-847 September 19, 2003Scientists at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center are responsible for protecting the nation against animal diseases that could be accidentally or deliberately introduced into the country. Questions about the security of Plum Island arose after the 2001 terrorist attacks and when employees of the contractor hired to operate and maintain the Plum Island facilities went on strike in August 2002. GAO reviewed (1) the adequacy of security at Plum Island and (2) how well the contractor performed during the strike. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed the administration of Plum Island from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) on June 1, 2003. While DHS is now responsible for Plum Island, USDA is continuing its research and diagnostic programs.
Security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved, but fundamental concerns leave the facility vulnerable to security breaches. First, Plum Island's physical security arrangements are incomplete and limited. Second, Plum Island officials have been assuming unnecessary risks by not adequately controlling access to areas where pathogens are located. Controlling access is particularly important because pathogens are inherently difficult to secure at any facility. Although this risk may always exist, DHS could consult with other laboratories working with pathogens to learn different approaches to mitigate this risk. Third, Plum Island's security response has limitations. For example, the guard force has been armed but has not had the authority from USDA to carry firearms or make arrests. Moreover, Plum Island's incident response plan does not consider the possibility of a terrorist attack. Fourth, the risk that an adversary may try to steal pathogens is, in our opinion, higher at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center than USDA originally determined because of hostilities surrounding the strike. Also, when USDA developed its security plan for Plum Island, it did not review their defined threats with the intelligence community and local law enforcement officials to learn of possible threats--and their associated risks--relevant to the Plum Island vicinity. Although these reviews did not occur, USDA subsequently arranged to receive current intelligence information. Despite a decline in performance from the previous rating period, USDA rated the contractor's performance as superior for the rating period during which the strike occurred.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-847, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center
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Plum Island Animal Disease Center' which was released on October 20,
2003.
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Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry, U.S. Senate:
September 2003:
Combating Bioterrorism:
Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center:
GAO-03-847:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-847, a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Scientists at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center are responsible
for protecting the nation against animal diseases that could be
accidentally or deliberately introduced into the country. Questions
about the security of Plum Island arose after the 2001 terrorist
attacks and when employees of the contractor hired to operate and
maintain the Plum Island facilities went on strike in August 2002. GAO
reviewed (1) the adequacy of security at Plum Island and (2) how well
the contractor performed during the strike. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) assumed the administration of Plum Island from the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) on June 1, 2003. While DHS is now
responsible for Plum Island, USDA is continuing its research and
diagnostic programs.
What GAO Found:
Security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved, but
fundamental concerns leave the facility vulnerable to security
breaches. First, Plum Island‘s physical security arrangements are
incomplete and limited. Second, Plum Island officials have been
assuming unnecessary risks by not adequately controlling access to
areas where pathogens are located. Controlling access is particularly
important because pathogens are inherently difficult to secure at any
facility. Although this risk may always exist, DHS could consult with
other laboratories working with pathogens to learn different
approaches to mitigate this risk. Third, Plum Island‘s security
response has limitations. For example, the guard force has been armed
but has not had the authority from USDA to carry firearms or make
arrests. Moreover, Plum Island‘s incident response plan does not
consider the possibility of a terrorist attack. Fourth, the risk that
an adversary may try to steal pathogens is, in our opinion, higher at
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center than USDA originally determined
because of hostilities surrounding the strike. Also, when USDA
developed its security plan for Plum Island, it did not review their
defined threats with the intelligence community and local law
enforcement officials to learn of possible threats”and their
associated risks”relevant to the Plum Island vicinity. Although these
reviews did not occur, USDA subsequently arranged to receive current
intelligence information.
Despite a decline in performance from the previous rating period, USDA
rated the contractor‘s performance as superior for the rating period
during which the strike occurred.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS consult with USDA to correct physical security
deficiencies; further limit access to pathogens; consult with other
laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the inherent difficulty of
securing pathogens; enhance response capabilities; reconsider risks
and threats; and revise security and incident response plans as
needed.
DHS agreed with the report and has started to implement our
recommendations. USDA stated that the report was very useful.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-847
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Larry Dyckman at
(202) 512-3841 or dyckmanl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
USDA Has Taken Strides To Improve Security at Plum Island, but
Fundamental Concerns Remain:
USDA Concluded Its Contractor's Performance Declined during the Strike
but Operations Continued and Overall Performance Was Superior:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Additional Observations on Plum Island's Security System
by GAO's Office of Special Investigations:
Appendix III: LB&B Associates' Performance, Employee Qualifications,
and Costs:
Performance:
Employee Qualifications:
Costs Attributable to the Strike:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Summary of the Award Fee Determination Board's Rating of LB&B
Associates' Performance from April 2002 to January 2003.:
Figures:
Figure 1: Plum Island, New York:
Figure 2: USDA Award Fee Determination Board's Composite Scores for LB&B
Associates' Performance from October 1999 through January 2003:
Figure 3: Monthly Costs Billed to USDA, October 2001 through May 2003:
Abbreviations:
APHIS: Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service:
ARS: Agriculyural Research Service:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigations:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Letter September 19, 2003:
The Honorable Tom Harkin
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Harkin:
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center--located in Long Island Sound off
the coast of New York--researches contagious animal diseases that have
been identified in other countries. The mission of the facility is to
develop strategies for protecting the nation's animal industries and
exports from these foreign animal diseases, which could be accidentally
or deliberately introduced into the United States. Scientists at Plum
Island--often with the assistance of scientists from other countries--
identify the pathogens and toxins (hereafter called pathogens) that
cause these foreign animal diseases and then work to develop vaccines
against them. Some of the pathogens maintained at the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, such as foot-and-mouth disease, are highly
contagious to livestock and could cause catastrophic economic losses in
the agricultural sector if they were released outside the facility. A
few can also cause illness and death in humans. For this reason,
research on these pathogens is conducted within a sealed biocontainment
area that has special safety features designed to contain the
pathogens.
Until recently, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) administered Plum
Island, but in June 2003, it became the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).[Footnote 1] DHS officials told
us that during a transition period that will last until September 31,
2003, they will review USDA's policies and procedures for Plum Island
and determine how best to administer the facility. USDA will continue
to have access to the facility to perform its research and diagnostic
programs.
Concerns about security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center were
heightened after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, because
of fears that someone might try to steal certain pathogens from the
facility to conduct bioterrorist activities. As a result, USDA
contracted with Sandia National Laboratories--experts involved in a
range of national security areas, including ensuring the safety of
nuclear weapons--to evaluate the effectiveness of, and make
recommendations to improve, Plum Island's security program. USDA worked
with Sandia to develop a risk management approach to improve security
on the island. Some other agencies employ this method for their
security planning, including the Department of Energy; we have also
endorsed a risk management approach for addressing security
risks.[Footnote 2]
Risk management is a deliberate process for determining risk: that is,
how likely it is that a threat will harm an asset and how severe the
consequences would be if the asset were harmed, and then deciding on
and implementing actions to create a certain level of protection or
preparedness. Risk management acknowledges that while risk generally
cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from known or potential
threats can reduce it. A facility adopting this approach should
document in a security plan the assets the facility is protecting as
well as the likely adversaries and their capabilities (the threat), the
probability that an adversary will attempt to threaten those assets and
the consequences of the adversary succeeding (the risk), and the
weaknesses that might allow an adversary to be successful (the
vulnerability). The identified threats, risks, and vulnerabilities are
used to design the physical security system. Because security systems
cannot protect against all threats, the facility should also develop an
incident response plan that clearly lays out the actions to be taken if
an event occurs that exceeds the capability of the security system. The
risk management process is ongoing; as new information develops or
events occur, security is reevaluated and corrective actions are taken.
In August 2002, congressional concerns about the security of pathogens
at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center arose when 71 employees of the
contractor USDA had hired to operate and maintain the facility, LB&B
Associates Inc., went on strike. You asked us to determine (1) the
adequacy of security at Plum Island and (2) how well LB&B Associates
performed from August 2002, the month that its workers went on strike,
through January 2003. To address the first question, we visited Plum
Island several times to gain an understanding of the work performed
there, the operation of the facilities, and to examine the security
measures and plans. We also spoke with officials from DHS, USDA, Sandia
National Laboratories, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USDA's Office of Inspector General, and
government officials of localities near Plum Island. To address the
second question we, among other things, reviewed LB&B Associates'
contract; interviewed pertinent officials; and reviewed USDA's ratings
of LB&B Associates' performance, the qualifications of its employees to
perform certain tasks, and costs that LB&B Associates incurred, but we
did not independently rate the contractor's performance. Before the
administration of Plum Island transferred to DHS, we briefed USDA and
DHS officials on our preliminary findings and made suggestions for
improvement so that they could take immediate corrective measures.
Additional details about our scope and methodology are contained in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved, but
fundamental concerns remain. Before the September 2001 terrorist
attacks, officials at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center were less
conscious of security and focused primarily on the safety of research
activities and operations. Immediately after the attacks, USDA began a
concerted effort to assess security at many of its laboratories,
including Plum Island. Using a risk management approach that Sandia had
suggested, USDA identified certain pathogens as the primary asset
requiring protection, the potential threats to this asset, and the
associated risk. USDA also began steps to upgrade security, some of
which DHS has continued. For example, USDA hired armed guards to patrol
the island and installed fingerprint recognition locks on freezers
containing pathogens. Despite such improvements, we identified
shortcomings in Plum Island's security arrangements.
First, Plum Island's physical security is incomplete and limited. For
example, the alarms and door sensors that Sandia recommended for the
biocontainment area are not fully operational. Our Office of Special
Investigations also identified shortcomings such as inadequate lighting
to support the security cameras outside the research complex. Moreover,
USDA did not provide sufficient physical security for certain assets,
including the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank, and assets critical
to the continued operation of the facility. DHS officials agree that
alarms and door sensors for the biocontainment area are important and
anticipate that they will be in place by December 2003. DHS officials
also told us they are in the process of evaluating other physical
security decisions made by USDA. We are recommending actions to correct
Plum Island's physical security deficiencies.
Second, Plum Island officials have not adequately controlled access to
the pathogens. For example, in an effort to continue its mission, USDA
permitted eight scientists from other countries access to the
biocontainment area without being escorted, despite incomplete
background checks. In addition, background checks are not conducted on
students who regularly attend classes within the biocontainment area.
According to the FBI, allowing anyone involved with pathogen-related
activities--and, in particular, scientists from other countries--
access to the biocontainment area without a completed background
investigation represents a significant security risk. Furthermore, not
all individuals entering the biocontainment area for the purpose of
performing nonlaboratory functions, such as cleaning, have been
escorted as required by regulations. DHS officials expressed concerns
about this issue and said they are reviewing USDA policies and
practices. Finally, controlling access to the pathogens is particularly
important because no security device is currently capable of detecting
a microgram of pathogenic material. Therefore, a scientist at Plum
Island, or any other laboratory, could remove a tiny quantity of
pathogen without being detected and potentially develop it into a
weapon. This condition is common to all facilities performing
biological research. Although this risk may always exist, DHS could
consult with other laboratories working with pathogens to learn about
their different approaches for mitigating this risk. For example, at
the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,
background checks are required to be updated regularly to evaluate the
continued suitability and reliability of employees working with
pathogens. DHS officials agree that additional measures could help
safeguard the pathogens at Plum Island and stated that they have taken
responsibility for performing background checks on all scientists prior
to being admitted to the biocontainment area and added escorts. We are
recommending actions to further limit access to pathogens and to
identify ways to mitigate the inherent difficulty of securing
pathogens.
Third, Plum Island's incident response capability has limitations. For
example, the guard force on Plum Island has been operating without
authority from USDA to carry firearms or to make arrests. Until this
authority is provided, local law enforcement officials said they are
reluctant to help address criminal situations on the island. In
addition, Plum Island officials have never specified how long they
believe it should take for local law enforcement to respond to
incidents. Moreover, Plum Island's incident response plan does not
address what to do in the event of an incident that exceeds the
capability of the security system, such as a terrorist attack. Finally,
Plum Island officials have not tested the facility's response
capability to ensure its effectiveness. DHS officials said they have
started to take actions to fully address these incident response issues
and are obtaining assistance from the Federal Protective Service. We
are recommending that DHS officials enhance Plum Island's incident
response capability.
Fourth, the risk that an adversary might try to steal pathogens is, in
our opinion, higher than USDA believed it to be in 2001, when it
defined the same risks for all of its laboratories, including Plum
Island. USDA considered the risk that an adversary would try to steal
pathogens from any of its laboratories to be relatively low compared to
materials found at other laboratories, such as nuclear material or
pathogens of a higher consequence to the human population. Since that
time, however, the level of risk at Plum Island has increased because
of the strike that occurred in August 2002 and the hostility
surrounding it. For example, one striker has been convicted of
tampering with the island's water distribution and treatment system as
he walked off the job the day the strike began. USDA officials suspect
that this individual did not act alone. The intelligence community
considers disgruntled employees to be threats who pose a security risk.
Although USDA did consider the possibility of a disgruntled worker when
planning security for all of its laboratories, it did not reevaluate
the level of risk, the assets requiring protection, or its incident
response plans for Plum Island in light of specific events related to
the strike. Furthermore, Sandia had originally recommended that USDA
review the defined threats with the intelligence community and local
law enforcement officials to ensure that threats particular to Plum
Island and its vicinity were taken into consideration, but this was
never done. FBI and Suffolk County officials told us that they consider
this step to be very important because if there are such threats,
federal and local officials may know of their existence and the risks
they pose to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. DHS officials told
us they recognize the importance of working with local law enforcement
and the intelligence community in order to better identify the threats
relevant for planning security for Plum Island. We are recommending
that DHS reconsider the risks and threats to Plum Island and revise the
security and incident response plans as needed.
Regarding the contractor's performance, despite a decline from the
previous rating period, USDA rated LB&B Associates' performance as
superior for the rating period during which the strike occurred. Also,
as a result of the strike, LB&B Associates exceeded its estimated
budget by about $511,000, or approximately 5 percent, for fiscal year
2002 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2003. USDA was aware of and
approved the cost increases.
We provided DHS and USDA with a draft of this report for their review
and comment. Both agencies provided written and clarifying oral
comments. The agencies also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate. DHS agreed with the report
and stated that it has started to implement our recommendations. USDA
stated that the report was very useful, but raised several concerns.
For example, USDA stated that it appropriately used armed guards on
Plum Island. Our concern is that USDA employed armed guards without
ensuring that they had appropriate authority from USDA to carry
firearms or make arrests. Furthermore, USDA had not developed a policy
for instructing its guards on Plum Island about when and how they could
use force, including the firearms they were carrying. DHS stated that
it is working to resolve these issues.
Background:
Plum Island is a federally owned 840-acre island off the northeastern
tip of Long Island, New York. It is about 1.5 miles from Orient Point,
New York (see fig. 1), and about 12 miles from New London, Connecticut.
Access to Plum Island is by a ferry service operated by a contractor
that transports employees from Orient Point and Old Saybrook,
Connecticut.
Figure 1: Plum Island, New York:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The U.S. Army used Plum Island during World War II as a coastal defense
artillery installation until it was declared surplus property in 1948.
In 1952, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps constructed a biological research
laboratory, but it was never used. Then, in response to a foot-and-
mouth disease outbreak in Canada, the Congress transferred all of Plum
Island to USDA in 1954 for the purpose of researching and diagnosing
animal diseases from other countries, including foot-and-mouth disease,
which has not been seen in the United States since 1929.
Foot-and-mouth disease is the most feared foreign animal disease
because it is highly contagious and can have serious effects on the
economy. Slaughtering susceptible animals and quarantining both animals
and humans in affected areas helps limit the spread of the disease, but
it can, nevertheless, have devastating economic consequences, as
demonstrated during the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. By the
time the disease was eradicated, about 8 months later, the United
Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals and sustained losses of
over $5 billion in the food and agricultural industries, as well as
comparable losses in tourism.[Footnote 3]
Many other types of animal diseases are also studied at the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, such as classical swine fever; rinderpest; and a
variety of pox viruses, including goat, camel, and deer pox. Some of
the diseases are caused by pathogens that are zoonotic--that is, they
can infect, and possibly cause death, in both animals and humans.
Zoonotic pathogens maintained at Plum Island Animal Disease Center
include West Nile virus, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Rift Valley
fever, and vesicular stomatitis. Because of the importance of the
livestock industry to the U.S. agricultural sector and economy,
protecting livestock from these diseases is an important
responsibility.
To prevent pathogens from escaping the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center and infecting livestock, wildlife, or humans, all research is
conducted within a specially designed and sealed biocontainment area
within the research facility that adheres to specific safety
measures.[Footnote 4] For example, the biocontainment area has air
seals on its doors and operates with negative air pressure so that air
passes through a special filter system before leaving the facility. In
addition, employees and visitors must change into protective clothing
before entering the biocontainment area and shower when going between
rooms containing different animal diseases and before leaving the
biocontainment area. USDA's procedures require all people and material
leaving the biocontainment area to be decontaminated.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center's biocontainment area totals
approximately 190,000 square feet, and it is unusual because it houses
a laboratory facility with 40 rooms for large animals. The three-level
laboratory also contains the machinery, such as the air filtration
system, necessary for the biocontainment area to function, and the
pathogen repository. Individuals entering the biocontainment area have
access to all three floors. In contrast, biocontainment areas of other
laboratories usually consist of a series of smaller rooms, housing
smaller laboratory animals, making it easier to control access to the
pathogens.
As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Plum Island
Animal Disease Center is now required to abide by new laws and
regulations that were generated to help reduce the possibility of
bioterrorism. These laws and regulations limit access to pathogens to
only approved individuals--those whom USDA has identified as having a
legitimate need to handle agents or toxins and whose names and
identifying information have been submitted to and approved by the U.S.
Attorney General. Specifically, the USA Patriot Act of 2001[Footnote 5]
prohibits restricted people--such as criminals or those individuals
from countries that the Department of State has declared to be state
sponsors of terrorism--from shipping, receiving, transporting, or
possessing certain dangerous pathogens. In addition, the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002[Footnote 6] requires that USDA
develop an inventory of potentially dangerous pathogens. Furthermore,
individuals who possess or use pathogens must have background checks
and must be registered with the U.S. Attorney General. Implementing
this law are regulations that became effective on February 11,
2003,[Footnote 7] which state that laboratories must be in compliance
with the regulations by November 12, 2003. USDA also requires employees
to have favorably adjudicated background investigations before working
unescorted in the biocontainment area.[Footnote 8]
When USDA contracted with Sandia in October 2001, Sandia evaluated the
effectiveness of security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and
four other USDA laboratories. Using a risk management approach, USDA
first identified generic lists of assets, risks, and threats for all
five laboratories. Sandia then used USDA's generic threat definitions
to assess the security and vulnerabilities at each laboratory. Sandia
officials found that Plum Island's existing security system was
inadequate for protecting against the generic threats that USDA had
selected and that it required significant improvement. Sandia officials
also found that the biocontainment building was not designed to be a
highly secure facility. USDA and Sandia agreed, however, that modifying
the facility to withstand an assault would be cost-prohibitive and
that, because pathogens occur naturally and are available at other
laboratories throughout the world, the risk that a terrorist would try
to steal them from Plum Island was not perceived as significant (and
their perception has not changed). Consequently, Sandia recommended a
limited physical security system designed to deter and detect a
security breach and, with assistance from local law enforcement,
respond to incidents exceeding the capability of the guard force on the
island.
DHS assumed formal administration of Plum Island from USDA on June 1,
2003, as provided by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. During a
transition period that will last until October 1, 2003, DHS will review
USDA's policies and procedures and determine how best to administer the
functions of Plum Island. Until the transition is complete, DHS will
administer the facility under the same policies and regulations
established by USDA. Ultimately, the two agencies will work together to
address national biodefense issues and carry out the mission of the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center. While DHS is now formally
responsible for security, scientists and support staff of two USDA
agencies, the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), will continue to implement the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center's research and diagnostic mission.
ARS scientists at Plum Island are responsible for research on foreign
livestock diseases, while APHIS scientists are responsible for
diagnosing livestock diseases. APHIS conducts diagnostic training
sessions several times a year to give veterinary health professionals
the opportunity to study the clinical signs of animal diseases found in
other countries, such as foot-and-mouth disease. According to USDA,
scientists from other countries are an integral part of the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center's workforce because they are well qualified and
well situated to study the diseases researched there, many of which are
endemic to their own countries. These scientists are sponsored by USDA
and obtain visas that permit them to work for the department.
DHS currently uses USDA's independent contractor to carry out
operations and maintenance functions for Plum Island. The services
under the contract include, among other activities, operating the
ferries, providing security and emergency fire and medical services,
providing buildings and grounds services, meeting utility requirements,
and performing custodial functions. On August 13, 2002, 71 of these
employees went on strike. The contractor at that time, LB&B Associates,
was responsible for handling the strike. On January 6, 2003, LB&B
Associates' contract expired. USDA had initially awarded that contract
under a small business program when LB&B Associates still qualified as
one. Since that initial award, LB&B Associates had grown so that it no
longer was eligible to compete for contracts set aside for small
businesses. As a result, USDA awarded the new contract to North Fork
Services, a joint venture between LB&B Associates and Olgoonik
Logistics LLC, a small minority company of Anchorage, Alaska. Under
this arrangement, the more experienced LB&B Associates serves as a
mentor to North Fork Services, and most of the employees who worked for
LB&B Associates continue to work for North Fork Services. DHS officials
told us that they would not renew the contract with North Fork
Services. DHS stated that the current terms and scope of the contract
are insufficient to operate the facility in accordance with its view of
the standards and mission of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
USDA Has Taken Strides To Improve Security at Plum Island, but
Fundamental Concerns Remain:
Before the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, like many other federal laboratories, was less
conscious of security and focused primarily on the safety of its
programs and operations. Since then, USDA intensified its focus on
security and has taken strides in developing and installing a security
system. However, Plum Island remains vulnerable to security breaches
because its security arrangements are incomplete and limited.
USDA Has Taken Strides To Improve Security at Plum Island:
Security at Plum Island has improved since the fall of 2001. USDA hired
a physical security specialist to oversee its efforts to improve
security, including the implementation of Sandia's recommendations, and
to provide direction for the security measures being taken for Plum
Island.[Footnote 9] As of July 2003, completed security upgrades
include the following:
* taking measures to prevent unauthorized access to Plum Island by
allowing only sponsored visitors on the ferry and island; identifying
those sponsored individuals, and allocating passes, when they board the
ferry; and staffing Orient Point, New York, with a security guard as
well as installing an access gate that can be opened only with an
identification card assigned to Plum Island federal personnel;
* hiring armed guards to patrol the island and observe personnel and
visitors entering and leaving the facility. When the nation is on high
terrorist alert (code orange) armed guards are added to monitor access
to the biocontainment area and to better secure the island's perimeter.
This also allows armed guards to remain in the building while the other
armed guards go to the harbor to inspect vehicles unloaded from the
ferry and ensure that individuals departing the ferry onto Plum Island
have permission to be there;
* conducting a background check for government staff and contractors
working on the island and performing more rigorous checks for
individuals with access to the pathogens;
* installing some video cameras to (1) increase the probability of
timely detection of an intruder and (2) monitor the activities of those
inside the biocontainment area when they remove pathogens from the
storage area--or the repository;
* installing intrusion detection alarms in the administrative building
and the biocontainment area;
* limiting access to pathogens by installing certain access control
devices; and:
* improving pathogen control and accountability by completing and
maintaining an inventory of pathogens at the facility, submitting names
of those with access to pathogens to the U.S. Attorney General, and
creating security and incident response plans, as required by law.
Despite Improvements, Security Arrangements at Plum Island Are
Incomplete and Have Serious Limitations:
Although security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved
over the past few years, fundamental concerns remain.
Plum Island's Physical Security Is Incomplete and Limited:
Plum Island's physical security system is not yet fully operational.
For example, the facility does not yet have in place all the equipment
necessary to detect intruders in various places. DHS officials agree
that these physical security measures are important and anticipate they
will be in place by December 2003.
In addition, our Office of Special Investigations identified physical
security limitations. For example, we found that lighting is inadequate
to support the cameras outside of the research complex and vehicles are
not properly screened. (See app. II for other limitations identified by
our Office of Special Investigations and observations on how they could
be addressed.):
Moreover, the physical security measures that USDA chose to implement
on Plum Island are largely limited to the biocontainment area, where
pathogens are located. Consequently, other important assets remain
vulnerable. For example, the continued operation of the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center is dependent on its infrastructure, which has
limited protection. Protecting the infrastructure is particularly
important because the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is the only
facility in the United States capable of responding to an outbreak and
researching foot-and-mouth disease. Therefore, if the infrastructure
was damaged, no other facility could step in and continue this foot-
and-mouth disease work.[Footnote 10] Furthermore, Plum Island is the
only facility in North America that has a foot-and-mouth disease
vaccine bank. This bank represents years of cooperative research
performed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, yet the room
containing it has a window opening covered with only plywood. USDA
officials said they intend to improve the physical security of the
vaccine bank but have not yet decided on the approach to take. In
addition, DHS officials agree that the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center is vital to combating bioterrorism, and they are evaluating the
physical security on Plum Island.
Access to Pathogens Is Not Adequately Controlled:
Access to pathogens at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is not
adequately controlled. For example, as of July 2003, eight scientists
from other countries were working in the biocontainment area without
completed background investigations.[Footnote 11] According to FBI
officials, allowing anyone who does not have a completed background
investigation access to the biocontainment area--in particular, a
scientist from another country--represents a significant security risk.
USDA officials told us these scientists were allowed into the
biocontainment area to enable research to continue. Furthermore, they
stated that background investigations had been initiated for these
individuals, and it was assumed that these scientists were being
escorted, which USDA policy permits for those with pending background
investigations. However, Plum Island officials told us that due to
resource constraints, it has not been possible to continually escort
and monitor scientists while they are in the biocontainment area. When
we brought this concern to the attention of DHS officials, they told us
they are developing a more restrictive policy for allowing scientists
from other countries to have access to pathogens.
In addition, USDA policy does not require background checks on students
who attend the foot-and-mouth disease classes that are regularly held
in the biocontainment area. In 2002, USDA held six classes with an
average of 32 students per class and anticipates continuing these
classes in the future. According to USDA's policy, individuals may
enter the biocontainment area without background checks if an approved
individual escorts them.[Footnote 12] We believe this policy warrants
reconsideration for several reasons.
* Allowing students who do not have background checks into
biocontainment for purposes of attending foot-and-mouth disease
classes, with or without an approved escort, may not be consistent with
the regulations[Footnote 13] implementing the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.
* These same regulations do not provide an exception for unapproved
students or other visitors who may be handling or have access to
pathogens.
* USDA officials told us that maintaining constant visual contact with
even one escorted individual is very difficult because of the size and
floor plan of the biocontainment area.
USDA officials told us that they believe escorting students is
sufficient to meet the intent of the regulations. However, DHS
officials said that all students should have completed background
checks before entering the biocontainment area and told us they will
develop a policy that will ensure that this occurs once the transition
period is complete.
Although USDA's regulations specifically allow unapproved individuals
into the biocontainment area with an approved escort, we found
unescorted maintenance workers in the biocontainment area. The
regulations provide for unapproved individuals to conduct routine
cleaning, maintenance, repair, and other nonlaboratory functions in the
biocontainment area if they are escorted and continually monitored by
an approved individual.[Footnote 14] However, early in our
investigation we found that as many as five such individuals were
working in the biocontainment area without escorts. When we brought
this to the attention of USDA officials, they provided an escort for
these individuals. DHS officials added that the operating contractor
would soon provide security escorts.
Controlling access to pathogens is important because no security device
can currently ensure that an insider, such as a scientist, will not
steal pathogens from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center or other
laboratories. According to the director of the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center--while under USDA's administration--and officials from
Sandia, the National Institutes of Health, and the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, pathogens are more difficult
to secure than other materials that could be used as weapons, such as
nuclear material. This is because there is no existing mechanism
capable of detecting the theft of a microgram of pathogenic material
and a tiny quantity can be multiplied. Thus, a scientist could covertly
generate or divert a pathogen during the normal course of work, remove
it from the laboratory undetected, and potentially develop it into a
weapon for spreading disease. This inherent problem leaves all
facilities with pathogens vulnerable to serious security breaches.
Also, the existence of the foot-and-mouth disease pathogen at the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center is a particular concern because an
undetected theft, followed by the spread of the disease, would have
serious economic consequences for the nation. In addition, the presence
of zoonotic diseases at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is
worrisome because of the potential for adverse health affects on
humans, and two such pathogens are of particular concern. First, U.S.
government research has shown that Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
can be developed into a human biowarfare agent. Second, USDA believes
that because of the genetic similarities of two pox strains, it may be
possible to manipulate camel pox into an agent as threatening as
smallpox.[Footnote 15] Although USDA created an inventory list of the
pathogens at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, as required by law,
such a list cannot provide an accurate count of pathogens because
quantities of pathogens change as they replicate.
Thus far, Plum Island officials have secured pathogens by restricting
access to the island itself and to the biocontainment area where the
pathogens are located and by locking the freezers containing the
pathogens. But DHS officials have not yet had the opportunity to fully
consider actions other laboratories are taking to mitigate the
likelihood that pathogens could be stolen. Officials at the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick,
Maryland, told us they are taking several steps, in addition to
physical security measures and inventory control, to better safeguard
pathogens against theft. For example, they plan to use trained
personnel as roving monitors to ensure that unauthorized laboratory
work is not being performed, and they will randomly inspect all
personnel exiting laboratories. Moreover, they are interviewing
scientists periodically and requiring that background checks be updated
every 5 years in order to evaluate the continued suitability and
reliability of those employees working with pathogens. Although USDA
told us background checks were updated every 5 years, according to Plum
Island records as of July 2003, 12 current Plum Island employees, some
of whom have access to pathogens, had not had their background checks
updated in more than 10 years. According to Sandia, other potentially
helpful safeguards include creating, implementing, and enforcing strict
policies, including those that prohibit researchers from continuing
work in the biocontainment area if they do not follow security
procedures. DHS officials stated that they have started to work with
other laboratories and that measures such as these, while not
necessarily a panacea, could help improve the security of pathogens at
Plum Island.
Incident Response Capability Is Limited:
Plum Island's incident response capability is limited in four ways.
First, the security guards on each shift carry firearms, although Plum
Island does not have statutory authority for an armed guard
force.[Footnote 16] USDA operated the guard force on Plum Island
without authority for the guards to carry firearms or make arrests.
Furthermore, Plum Island officials have not approved a policy that
addresses the use of weapons, and, as a result, the guards do not know
specifically how they are expected to deal with intruders on the island
and when or if they should use their weapons.[Footnote 17]
When we informed DHS officials of these problems, they agreed to
resolve them as soon as possible and raised the possibility that the
Federal Protective Service[Footnote 18] could be assigned to guard Plum
Island. The Federal Protective Service, now under DHS, has the
authority to carry weapons and make arrests.[Footnote 19] Since DHS has
taken responsibility for the island, the Federal Protective Service has
visited Plum Island to assess its security requirements.
Second, according to the observations of our Office of Special
Investigations, Plum Island has too few guards to ensure safety and
effectiveness.[Footnote 20] DHS officials agree with this observation
and said that they have requested funds to hire additional guards.
Third, arrangements for local law enforcement support are also limited.
According to Sandia's recommended security plan, in the event an
incident exceeds the response capability of the Plum Island guards,
they would first contact Southold town police, the closest and primary
responding law enforcement agency.[Footnote 21] If still more resources
were needed, Southold town police would contact Suffolk County police,
the secondary responder. Because of liability issues, however,
arrangements with local law enforcement have not been finalized even
though there have been continuing discussions with local law
enforcement. The result is that Plum Island officials cannot predict
the extent to which the Southold town police will provide backup during
an incident. On the other hand, officials of Suffolk County, which
includes both Plum Island and Southold, told us that although it takes
longer for them to respond than Southold police, they could respond
with an adequate number of officers, if necessary.[Footnote 22] In
addition, they have requested a map of the island and a tour of the
biocontainment area to become more knowledgeable about the facility and
its surrounding terrain. Suffolk County officials pointed out, however,
that, for geographical reasons, Southold remains the primary responder.
In this vein, Plum Island officials have never defined an adequate
response time, nor have they conducted exercises with local law
enforcement officials to determine how effectively Plum Island and
local officials can address an incident on the island. DHS officials
agree that the arrangements for local law enforcement support are
limited, and they are trying to overcome this problem as quickly as
possible by first resolving the issue surrounding the authority to make
arrests and carry weapons. In addition, these officials concur that it
is important to develop a better understanding of the response times
and capabilities of local law enforcement assistance and to conduct
exercises to test the adequacy of arrangements once they are completed.
Fourth, according to Sandia officials, the incident response plan for
Plum Island is not sufficiently comprehensive. Plum Island's incident
response plan contains certain elements required under law, such as how
to respond to an inventory violation or a bomb threat.[Footnote 23]
However, because USDA selected a risk management approach to security,
Plum Island officials need an incident response plan that clearly lays
out the actions to be taken if events occur that exceed the capability
of the facility's security system. For example, Plum Island officials
do not have a road map for actions to be taken in the event of a
terrorist attack--who gets notified, in what order, and the
responsibilities of staff for responding. This is a critical
shortcoming because, according to DHS, the nation faces a significant
risk of a terrorist attack. Sandia officials also said that the
incident response plan for Plum Island requires significant additional
development to properly prepare for the complete range of threats.
Moreover, the incident response plan does not identify the security
steps that should be taken in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease or take into consideration any increased risks to the
facility, which could severely impede the nation's capability to
contain an outbreak.
Finally, according to the FBI and local law enforcement officials, the
island's incident response plan may need to be coordinated with the
incident response plans of such nearby facilities as the Millstone
nuclear power plant, the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and the
laboratories at the State University of New York at Stony Brook because
a terrorist attack on any of these facilities could also involve Plum
Island.[Footnote 24] This type of coordination has not yet taken place.
DHS officials agree that the incident response plan needs to be more
comprehensive and coordinated with national and local law enforcement
agencies.
Plum Island's Security Plan Does Not Address All Risks and Threats:
The risk that an adversary might try to steal pathogens is, in our
opinion, higher than USDA believed it to be in 2001, when it defined
the same risks for all of its laboratories, including Plum Island. USDA
considered the risk that an adversary would try to steal pathogens from
any of its laboratories to be relatively low compared to materials
found at other laboratories, such as nuclear material or pathogens of a
higher consequence to the human population. Since its evaluation in
2001, however, the level of risk at Plum Island has increased because
of the strike that occurred in August 2002 and the hostility
surrounding it. For example, one striker has been convicted of
tampering with the island's water distribution and treatment system as
he walked off the job the day the strike began.[Footnote 25] USDA
officials suspect that this individual did not act alone. In addition
to this incident, USDA asked the FBI and USDA's Office of Inspector
General to investigate the possibility that a boat engine had been
tampered with. USDA also asked the FBI to investigate why backup
generators failed to come on when Plum Island lost power for more than
3 hours in December 2002.
After the backup generators failed to provide power, New York's ABC
news station broadcast an interview with a disguised worker, at that
time employed at Plum Island, who discussed his unhappiness with USDA
and the contractor and blamed replacement workers for the power
outage.[Footnote 26] In addition, several of the striking workers
returned to work for LB&B Associates and are still employed on the
island under the new contractor, North Fork Services. In response to
the strike, USDA prevented striking workers from accessing Plum Island
and it added guards at Orient Point to assure the security of employees
as they were arriving and departing near the union picket line.
However, USDA did not reevaluate the level of risk, the assets
requiring protection, or its incident response plans in light of the
strike and accompanying sabotage. USDA believed that this was not
necessary because its security plan anticipated a disgruntled worker at
any of its laboratories. We disagree because there is a difference
between addressing security problems caused by one employee and
addressing the hostilities resulting from the strike, which could
include several employees working together. We believe that the
implications of a disgruntled work force should be taken into account
when reevaluating the extent of risks, threats, and assets requiring
increased security.
Furthermore, Sandia had originally recommended that USDA review the
defined threats with the intelligence community and local law
enforcement officials to ensure that threats particular to Plum Island
and its vicinity were taken into consideration, but this was never
done.[Footnote 27] FBI and Suffolk County officials told us that they
consider this step to be very important because if there were such
threats, federal and local officials may be aware of them and the risks
they pose to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. In addition, if
local law enforcement entities were involved in planning Plum Island's
security, they would be in a better position to respond to incidents on
the island.
DHS officials agree that rehiring workers who walked off the job could
be problematic but told us they are under pressure from the local
chapter of the union and the community to rehire those who lost their
jobs as a result of the strike. DHS officials also said they recognize
the importance of working with local law enforcement and the
intelligence community to better define the threats and associated
risks for Plum Island.
USDA Concluded Its Contractor's Performance Declined during the Strike
but Operations Continued and Overall Performance Was Superior:
Regarding the contractor's performance, despite a decline from the
previous rating period, USDA rated LB&B Associates' performance as
superior for the rating period during which the strike occurred. When
the strike occurred, LB&B Associates, with the assistance of USDA
employees, maintained operations at Plum Island. For example, LB&B
Associates implemented a strike contingency plan, brought in qualified
individuals from its other work sites, and hired subcontractors with
the required licenses and certifications to operate certain Plum Island
facilities and its boats. Also, as a result of the strike, LB&B
Associates exceeded its estimated budget by about $511,000, or
approximately 5 percent, for fiscal year 2002 and the first quarter of
fiscal year 2003. USDA was aware of and approved the cost increases.
Further information about LB&B Associates' performance, employee
qualifications, and costs is contained in appendix III.
Conclusions:
Despite improvements, security arrangements at Plum Island are not yet
sufficient. Further actions are needed to provide reasonable assurance
that pathogens cannot be removed from the facility and exploited for
use in bioterrorism. Until DHS fully implements the physical security
measures and addresses those vulnerabilities identified by our Office
of Special Investigations, Plum Island's security system will not
provide physical security commensurate with the importance of the
facility. Additionally, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center will
remain more vulnerable than it needs to be if the physical
infrastructure that supports it is not afforded better protection.
Similarly, it is important to better secure the foot-and-mouth disease
vaccine bank to ensure its availability for combating an outbreak.
Also, the lack of comprehensive policies and procedures for limiting
access to pathogens unnecessarily elevates the risk of pathogen theft.
Moreover, because physical security measures alone are not adequate to
secure pathogens, all laboratories containing these materials face the
challenge of developing other approaches to mitigate the risk of theft.
By consulting with other laboratories to discover methods they are
using to mitigate the risk to pathogens, Plum Island officials can
learn more about safeguards being employed elsewhere. Furthermore, Plum
Island officials cannot effectively respond to security breaches until
DHS resolves issues that impede Plum Island's response capability, such
as the authority of the guard force to make arrests, which makes it
difficult for the guards and local law enforcement agencies to address
criminal situations on the island. Finally, because we believe the
level of risk at Plum Island is higher than USDA originally determined,
and because USDA did not validate threats with intelligence agencies or
local law enforcement officials, DHS cannot be assured that Plum
Island's security, including its physical security system and response
plans, is sufficient to address the full range of events that could
occur on the island.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To complete and enhance Plum Island's security arrangements, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of Agriculture, do the following:
* Correct physical security deficiencies by (1) fully implementing the
physical security measures, (2) addressing the specific security
shortcomings identified by our Office of Special Investigations, (3)
better securing certain features of the physical infrastructure that
supports the continued operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, and (4) better securing the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine
bank.
* Limit access to pathogens by further developing and enforcing
specific procedures, including internal control checks, to ensure (1)
that all individuals involved in laboratory activities in the
biocontainment area--including students and regardless of citizenship-
-have been approved, in accordance with the law; (2) that background
checks of these individuals are updated regularly; and (3) that
cleaning, maintenance, and repair staff entering the biocontainment
area are escorted at all times by individuals with completed background
checks.
* Consult with other laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the
inherent difficulty of securing pathogens.
* Enhance incident response capability by (1) resolving the issue of
the guards' authority to carry firearms and make arrests; (2)
developing and implementing a policy on how guards should deal with
intruders and use weapons; (3) increasing the size of the guard force;
(4) completing an agreement with local law enforcement agencies to
ensure backup assistance when needed; (5) defining an adequate response
time for law enforcement to respond to incidents; (6) developing an
incident response plan that includes precise detail about what to do in
the event an incident occurs that exceeds the capability of the
security system, such as a terrorist attack; and (7) conducting
exercises with local law enforcement to test the efficiency and
effectiveness of Plum Island's response capability.
* Reconsider the security risks at Plum Island, taking into account
recent acts of disgruntled employees.
* Consult with appropriate state and local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to revisit the threats specific to the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center.
* Revise, as necessary, security and incident response plans to reflect
any redefined, risks, threats, and assets.
Agency Comments:
We provided DHS and USDA with a draft of this report for their review
and comment. Both agencies provided written and clarifying oral
comments. The agencies also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate. Overall, DHS agreed with
the report and stated that it has started to implement our
recommendations, and USDA stated that the report was very useful but
also raised several concerns.
In its written comments (see app. IV), DHS agreed that fundamental
concerns leave the facility vulnerable to security breaches and stated
that the report is factually accurate. DHS also commented that it
accepts and supports our recommendations. In addition, DHS stated that
since it assumed administrative responsibility for Plum Island on June
1, 2003, it has taken the following actions, among others, to address
the recommendations in this report:
* DHS is working with USDA to develop corrective actions to address the
physical security deficiencies identified in our report.
* DHS is working with USDA to develop an access control policy for all
personnel who are required to enter the biocontainment area.
* DHS is working with other federal agencies to develop security
policies and procedures to limit access to pathogens.
* DHS is working with the Federal Protective Service to enhance
security at the facility and bring arrest and detention authority to
the island. In addition, DHS stated that funds have been requested to
increase the guard force.
* DHS is working with local law enforcement agencies to coordinate
incident response plans, mutual aid agreement requirements, and joint
exercises to test security response capabilities.
* DHS is reviewing the island's entire security plan and will revise
the threat assessment as necessary. DHS stated that it expects to
complete this assessment in early 2004.
In its written comments (see app. V), USDA addressed several aspects of
our report. These specific comments and our responses follow.
* USDA suggested that the report should make judgments about the need
for enhanced security against a risk assessment-based approach that
considers both the probability and the consequences of specific types
of attacks. However, as we report, DHS is now responsible for
performing such an assessment, and DHS stated that it has undertaken a
review of USDA's threat statement, which it will complete early in
2004. Our objective was to evaluate the status of security on Plum
Island. That evaluation included, among other steps, a review of USDA's
risk-based security plan for Plum Island and its implementation. Our
report details substantive flaws in both the planning and the execution
of that plan.
* USDA also commented that the report did not recognize that USDA had a
contract to improve security at Plum Island prior to September 11,
2001. We added to the report that USDA contracted with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers in 2000 to improve security at Plum Island, but
noted that few of the Corps' recommendations had been implemented.
Also, USDA officials told us that in light of September 11, 2001, and
the subsequent dissemination of anthrax through the postal system, they
made a concerted effort to improve security at USDA's laboratories. The
officials added that Sandia was hired to provide USDA with a consistent
approach to evaluating security at the department's major laboratories.
Sandia officials told us that they did not agree with the approach
taken by the Corps, and they concluded that Plum Island's existing
security system was substantially inadequate for protecting against the
threats that USDA defined as relevant.
* USDA indicated that it took various actions to safeguard pathogens in
response to the strike. USDA stated that it increased and armed the
guards on Plum Island; added guards at Orient Point, Long Island, where
the strikers were picketing; and excluded the strikers from Plum Island
facilities. We agree that USDA responded with immediate measures and
have revised the report to reflect these steps. However, we believe
that USDA's responses to the strike were insufficient. Although USDA
increased the number of guards at Orient Point, this was a temporary
measure primarily put in place to ensure the safety of the employees as
they passed the union picket line. Also, Plum Island officials told us
that the number of guards on Plum Island itself did not change as a
result of the strike and that these guards had been armed since 2001.
More importantly, USDA's comments do not recognize that there is a
difference between addressing security problems caused by one employee
and addressing the security problems resulting from the strike, which
could include several employees collaborating to cause problems. We
believe that the implications of having a disgruntled work force should
be taken into account when reevaluating the extent of risks, threats
and assets requiring increased security.
* USDA stated that it appropriately used armed guards on Plum Island
and were in communication with local law enforcement. While we agree
that armed guards are necessary for security on Plum Island, our
concern is that the guard force did not have authority from USDA to
carry firearms and make arrests. Furthermore, USDA never developed a
policy instructing its guards when and how they could use force,
including the firearms they were carrying. Plum Island officials said
they were unable to resolve these important matters with USDA
headquarters officials, including the Office of General Counsel.
Finally, we noted in the report that while Plum Island officials have
communicated with local law enforcement, no agreement was reached to
assist Plum Island guards in the event a criminal act occurred on the
island. DHS stated that it is working to resolve these issues.
* USDA stated that it is an accepted practice for a person with an
appropriate background investigation to escort those who do not yet
have a clearance. USDA also acknowledged that it had problems
implementing its escort procedures at Plum Island but now believes its
escort procedures are reliable. We agree that the practice of escorting
is used in other laboratories that contain pathogens. However, Plum
Island officials and scientists repeatedly told us that this procedure
is not practical at Plum Island because of staffing considerations. For
example, they explained that the escorts were Plum Island employees who
had other duties, which compelled them to leave those they were
escorting for periods of time. Furthermore, we believe that internal
control checks should be established to ensure implementation of escort
procedures, and we have added this to our recommendations. DHS
commented that more will be done to address this issue--it is planning
to develop, in concert with USDA, a limited use policy to identify
access control requirements for all personnel who are required to enter
the biocontainment area.
* USDA said that several of the employees we identified had not had
their background checks updated in the last 5 years, but that some of
those we identified had. We reported based on the actual records of
background checks maintained at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
We also recognize that there may be differences between the records
maintained on the island and other USDA records, and that the
background checks of several of these individuals may have been updated
since the time of our review.
:
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this report. We will then send copies of
this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture,
appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. We
will also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please call me or Charles
M. Adams at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Lawrence J. Dyckman
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which USDA has addressed security for Plum
Island, we visited the facility several times to examine current
physical security measures and to review plans for further security
actions. In addition, two security experts from our Office of Special
Investigations toured the facility to identify possible vulnerabilities
and actions that could be taken to reduce them. We also reviewed
numerous security documents, such as Sandia's assessment of Plum Island
security; Plum Island's draft security and response plans; draft
memorandums of understanding with local entities; physical security
implementation plans; and policies and procedures for guards,
employees, visitors, students, and others with access to pathogens. In
addition, we worked closely with Sandia officials to understand how
they applied a risk management security approach to Plum Island. We
also interviewed numerous officials from Plum Island, including the
physical security specialist, scientists, the center director, and
others responsible for security changes under both the Agricultural
Research Service and the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service;
officials of USDA's Offices of Homeland Security, Procurement and
Property Management, and General Counsel; and officials of the
Department of Homeland Security, which assumed the administration of
Plum Island. To gain a better understanding of possible threats to Plum
Island, we spoke with officials from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence
Agency, Suffolk County police and fire departments, and USDA's Office
of Inspector General. To understand the cooperation between local
governments and Plum Island that might be needed if an incident were to
occur on the island, we interviewed government and law enforcement
officials from Suffolk County, the town of Southold, and the village of
Greenport. Finally, we toured the laboratories at and interviewed
officials from the National Institutes of Health and the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases to understand how
they are handling security challenges since the terrorist attacks of
2001. To determine Plum Island's compliance with new laws and
regulations, we reviewed the USA Patriot Act[Footnote 28] of 2001, the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002[Footnote 29] and its
regulations that went into effect as a final interim rule on February
11, 2003,[Footnote 30] as well as USDA's policies and procedures for
security at biosafety level 3 facilities. We also considered the Office
of Management and Budget's Circular A-123, Management Accountability
and Control,[Footnote 31] and the standards in our Internal Control:
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. [Footnote 32]
To determine how well LB&B Associates performed from the time the
strike began on August 13, 2002, to January 5, 2003, we (1) reviewed
LB&B Associates' contract with USDA and identified LB&B Associates'
performance requirements; (2) interviewed officials of USDA, LB&B
Associates, and the International Union of Operating Engineers to get
their perspective on LB&B Associates' performance; (3) reviewed USDA's
ratings of LB&B Associates' performance since 1999 and, in particular,
the Award Fee Determination Board's report on LB&B Associates'
performance during the period the strike took place; (4) reviewed the
qualifications of LB&B Associates employees, such as the boat operators
and water distribution and treatment system operators, all of whom are
required to meet certain qualifications for performing their duties;
(5) analyzed 3 years of contract cost data provided by LB&B Associates
to learn which items increased as a result of the strike; and (6)
validated the contract cost data by spot-checking it against the bills
LB&B Associates submitted to USDA. While we took these steps to
determine how well LB&B Associates performed, we did not independently
rate LB&B Associates' performance. In addition, we interviewed
officials involved in investigating strike-related incidents,
including officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and USDA's
Office of Inspector General.
Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards from January through August 2003.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Additional Observations on Plum Island's Security System
by GAO's Office of Special Investigations:
* The security force reports directly to the Administrative Contract
Officer and not to the Security Director--it is important for the
security force to report directly to the Security Director of Plum
Island to ensure that security-related issues are handled promptly.
* There are no name checks or record checks given to contractors and
visitors going into the biocontainment area. Contractors and visitors
entering the biocontainment area could be checked for criminal charges
(through the National Criminal Information Center) before they are
granted access.
* The area outside of the biocontainment and administrative building is
surveilled by stationary closed-circuit television cameras, which are
insufficient. Installing pan, tilt, and zoom closed-circuit television
cameras in certain areas would enhance surveillance capabilities.
* The island is easily accessible to the general public by boat, and
there are limited "no trespassing" signs present on the island to
advise the public that it is a government facility--more "no
trespassing" signs in those areas of the island that are easily
accessible to the public by boat would address this condition.
* In the event of a fire, Plum Island is not always able to respond
appropriately because the fire brigade has limited hours of operation.
The security force could be cross-trained for fire rescues and
therefore provide 24-hour coverage.
* The building used for overnight accommodations lacks panic alarms for
emergency response. Panic alarms could be installed in the building
and, when visitors are present, security guards could drive by on a
regular basis.
* Control for keys and master keys of the facility is deficient. The
security department could be assigned the responsibility for all keys
and master keys. A key log could be created to better track possession
of keys.
[End of section]
Appendix III: LB&B Associates' Performance, Employee Qualifications,
and Costs:
USDA concluded, in an evaluation of LB&B Associates' performance, which
included the time period involving the strike, that LB&B Associates'
overall performance was superior, although its performance had declined
compared to prior rating periods. When the strike occurred, LB&B
Associates, with the assistance of USDA employees, continued to perform
and maintained operations at Plum Island. LB&B Associates implemented a
strike contingency plan, brought in qualified individuals from its
other work sites, and hired subcontractors with the required licenses
and certifications to operate certain Plum Island facilities and its
boats. Also, as a result of the strike, LB&B Associates exceeded its
estimated budget by about $511,000, or approximately 5 percent, for
fiscal year 2002 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2003. USDA was
aware of and approved the cost increases.
Performance:
Although LB&B Associates' performance declined during the strike
relative to previous rating periods, overall, LB&B Associates performed
at a superior level during the evaluation period that included several
months when workers were on strike, maintaining--and in some cases even
improving--operations critical to the functioning of the island,
according to Plum Island officials. Plum Island's Award Fee
Determination Board regularly rated LB&B Associates' performance using
a system described in its contract to calculate a composite performance
score.[Footnote 33] According to the board, LB&B Associates'
performance was outstanding--the highest level--for more than 2 years,
until the rating period in which the strike began. The board faulted
LB&B Associates in several rating categories resulting in a decline in
its performance rating. For example, according to the board, LB&B
Associates' strike contingency plan, which describes how essential
operations would be continued in the event of a strike, was outdated.
As a result, implementation of the plan was slowed because it took up
to 48 hours before all of its temporary workers arrived on the island.
Moreover, some subcontracts cost more than anticipated.
According to the board, LB&B Associates overcame initial problems in
implementing its contingency plan and, overall, performed at the
superior level. For example, temporary workers and subcontractors hired
by LB&B Associates quickly repaired the water system that had been
sabotaged on the first day of the strike. Furthermore, according to the
board, some activities improved after the onset of the strike,
including the maintenance of steam pipes, an important component of the
process used to decontaminate laboratory waste contaminated with
pathogens. Also, boat maintenance and cafeteria services--both of
which, according to the Board, had been problematic before the strike-
-improved after replacement workers were hired. Figure 2 shows the
composite scores the board gave LB&B Associates from fiscal year 2000
through the first quarter of fiscal year 2003, which includes the time
during which the strike occurred.
Figure 2: USDA Award Fee Determination Board's Composite Scores for
LB&B Associates' Performance from October 1999 through January 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: GAO presentation of USDA data.
[A] USDA rated LB&B Associates quarterly through fiscal year 2000; USDA
changed to a 6-month rating schedule beginning with fiscal year 2001.
[B] The strike began in August of this rating period, April 1, 2002,
through January 5, 2003, which would have ended on September 30, 2002;
however, because the contract was extended through January 2003, the
rating period was extended also.
[End of figure]
More details about how the board evaluated LB&B Associates' performance
are contained in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Award Fee Determination Board's Rating of LB&B
Associates' Performance from April 2002 to January 2003.
Performance categories: Utilities; Types of activities: * Heating, A/C,
and ventilation; * Refrigeration; * Plumbing and pipefitting; * Power
plant operations; * Wastewater operations; * Electronics; Score and
level of performance: 77 Superior.
Performance categories: Safety, health and environmental compliance;
Types of activities: * Security; * Emergency health services; *
Environmental compliance; * Biological safety; * Fire alarm support;
Score and level of performance: 70 Satisfactory.
Performance categories: Program and cost management; Types of
activities: * Contract and cost management; * Special task management;
* Resource utilization; * Quality control; * Subcontract management; *
Scheduling and coordination; * Communications and reporting; Score and
level of performance: 80 Superior.
Performance categories: Facilities; Types of activities: * Painting and
carpentry; * Equipment maintenance; * Janitorial functions; * General
building and grounds maintenance; Score and level of performance: 76
Superior.
Performance categories: Administrative support; Types of activities: *
Photography services; * Mail; * Laundry; * Glassware; * Food services;
Score and level of performance: 82 Superior.
Performance categories: Transportation; Types of activities: * All
marine and vehicle transportation services; * Boat and vehicle
maintenance; Score and level of performance: 71 Superior.
Source: GAO.
Note: GAO presentation of USDA data.
[End of table]
Employee Qualifications:
To maintain operations at Plum Island after the strike began, LB&B
Associates brought in temporary replacements from some of its other
contract sites, hired subcontractors, and subsequently hired permanent
replacement workers, as described in the strike contingency plan. We
confirmed that workers in certain positions, including boat operators
and operators for the wastewater treatment system, were licensed as
prescribed by LB&B Associates' contract with USDA. In addition, many of
the replacement workers appear to have significant and relevant work
experience for the positions for which they were hired.
Although LB&B Associates and USDA staff worked together to maintain
vital functions, operations were affected at times by the strike
because of the reduced workforce and the loss of some workers with
specific skills and/or qualifications. For example, the ferries that
take workers to and from the island operated on a reduced schedule
until all three boat masters who had walked out were replaced by
individuals with the necessary Coast Guard license. Also, some USDA
officials stepped in to fulfill duties that were normally performed by
qualified contract staff, such as monitoring the air filters in the
laboratory, until qualified replacements were hired. By July 2003, most
positions left vacant by the strike were filled, most of them by
permanent replacement workers and 16 by striking workers who returned
to work on the island.
Costs Attributable to the Strike:
With USDA's approval, LB&B Associates exceeded its estimated budget by
about $511,000, or approximately 5 percent, during the 15-month period
covering fiscal year 2002 and the first quarter of fiscal year
2003,[Footnote 34] the period during which the strike began.[Footnote
35] USDA allowed the additional expenditures, which occurred in the
last 2 months of fiscal year 2002 and the first 3 months of 2003,
because it recognized that the strike would result in higher expenses
and it found LB&B Associates' estimate for exceeding the budget to be
acceptable, under the circumstances. As required by Federal Acquisition
Regulations, LB&B Associates notified USDA that it expected to exceed
its budget as a result of the strike.[Footnote 36] Figure 3 shows the
total costs LB&B Associates charged to USDA from October 1, 2001
through January 5 2003; the graph also incorporates costs billed to
USDA by North Fork Services from January 6 through May 31, 2003,
illustrating the continued fluctuation in contract costs.
Figure 3: Monthly Costs Billed to USDA, October 2001 through May 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: GAO presentation of USDA data.
[End of figure]
According to LB&B Associates' data,[Footnote 37] there were
fluctuations in Plum Island's costs, as shown in figure 3. Also, as a
result of the strike, additional costs were incurred in the following
areas from August 1, 2002, through January 5, 2003,[Footnote 38] unless
otherwise noted: labor (salary and benefits), subcontracts, cafeteria,
and travel (including lodging and transportation).
Labor: The cost of labor peaked at $428,161 in August 2002, a 16
percent increase over the average monthly cost of $370,118 for the
previous 10 months. Monthly labor costs then gradually decreased until
November, when the cost of labor was about 1.6 percent more than the
average monthly cost. Labor costs increased because most of the
temporary replacements were management-level employees from other LB&B
Associates contract sites, who earned more than the employees they
replaced. According to its documents, LB&B Associates used management-
level employees because union members from other localities usually
honor a picket line and would not temporarily replace union strikers.
As new permanent employees were hired, the cost of labor gradually
decreased.
Subcontracts: Subcontracts related to the strike, such as for providing
security guards at the picket line, added about $523,000,[Footnote 39]
or 77 percent of the total subcontract costs billed to USDA by LB&B
Associates.
Cafeteria: Cafeteria expenses increased by about $12,000, or 51 percent
of the total cafeteria expenses because the cafeteria provided two
meals per day for the temporary replacements, who spent more time on
the island to ensure continued operations than employees had before the
strike began.
Travel: Travel expenses attributed to the strike, such as transporting
and housing the temporary replacement workers, totaled more than
$125,000, constituting 98 percent of the total travel costs billed to
USDA during that time period.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
August 19, 2003:
Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dyckman:
Thank you for providing us with a copy of your draft report entitled
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island
Animal Disease Center (GAO-03-847).
We agree with the General Accounting Office's overall observation that
the security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has improved,
but still has fundamental problems that leave the facility vulnerable
to security breaches. Since assuming administrative responsibility for
PIADC operations on June l, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
has made significant strides toward addressing the recommendations
contained in the body of the report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Marc
S. Hollander, Acting Center Director, PIADC on 631-323-3207.
Sincerely,
Dr. Charles E. McQueary:
Under Secretary for Science and Technology:
Signed by Dr. Charles E. McQueary:
Department of Homeland Security Comments on GAO Draft Report:
General Comment:
While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) accepts and supports
the seven separate recommendations made as part of this report, we
would like to note that significant progress had been made by the USDA
prior to June l, 2003 when island operations was transferred to the
DHS. Since assuming that responsibility, DHS has continued to identify
and manage the existing improvements and complete an assessment
baseline of the entire island posture followed by development of a
detailed corrective action plan with implementing timelines.
Responses to Recommendations for Executive Action:
Recommendation #1:
Correct physical security deficiencies by (1) fully implementing the
physical security measures, (2) addressing the specific security
shortcomings identified by our Office of Special Investigations, (3)
better securing the physical infrastructure that supports the continued
operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and (4) better
securing the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank.
Corrective Action:
DHS agrees, in principle, with the assumptions and assertions made in
the report as modified by the suggested text to demonstrate the
progress made since assuming administrative responsibility for the
island on June 1, 2003. During the first 60-days since assuming
administrative responsibility for the island, DHS conducted a detailed
assessment and baseline of the current state of island operations and
infrastructure. Results from that assessment have been briefed to
senior leadership in the DHS as well as the USDA and the next steps are
to develop a step-by-step corrective action report with timelines and
actionable items.
Recommendation #2:
Limit access to pathogens by further developing and enforcing specific
procedures to ensure (1) that all individuals involved in laboratory
activities in the biocontainment area, including students, regardless
of citizenship, have been approved, in accordance with the law, (2)
that background checks of these individuals are regularly updated; and
(3) that cleaning, maintenance and repair staff entering biocontainment
are escorted at all times by individuals with completed background
checks.
Corrective Actions:
DHS has undertaken a detailed study of all existing security-related
policies and procedures; specifically those that relate to the
restriction of access to the biocontainment areas at the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center. The DHS plans to develop, in concert with the
USDA as
appropriate, a limited use policy to identify access control
requirements for all personnel required to enter the biocontainment
facility.
Recommendation #3:
Consult with other laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the
inherent difficulty of securing pathogens.
Corrective Action:
DHS has been working closely with National Nuclear Security
Administration National Laboratories to identify applicable security
policies and procedures. Specifically, DHS has been working very
closely with US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,
the National Institutes of Health, and Health and Human Services in
developing consistent and complete security policies and procedures to
limit access to pathogens.
Recommendation #4:
Enhance incident response capability by (1) resolving the issue of the
guards' authority to carry firearms and make arrests; (2) increasing
the size of the guard force; (3) completing an agreement with local law
enforcement agencies to ensure backup assistance when needed; (4)
defining and adequate response time for law enforcement to respond to
incidents; (5) developing an incident response plan that include
precise detail about what to do in the event an incident occurs that
exceeds the capability of the security system, such as a terrorist
attack; and (6) conducting exercises with local law enforcement to test
the efficiency and effectiveness of Plum Island's response capability.
Corrective Action:
DHS has been working closely with the FPS to develop a task for
specific assistance to the island. FPS spent several weeks on the
island integrated with the existing guard force to determine the scope
and requirements for the developing task assignment. DHS expects to
proceed with tasking the FPS to the island in the near future. That
tasking will bring arrest and detention authority to the island.
Funds have been requested to increase the guard force beginning in FY
2004 allowing for better coverage of the island. Adding these
additional security professionals will also enable the island to enter
into mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement professionals.
The DHS assessment also identified the lack of an incident response
plan. The associated corrective action plan will identify in detail the
path forward in developing this plan and integrating it with local law
enforcement capabilities and requirements.
During the site visits with the local law enforcement as well as local
firefighters, we began discussing mutual aid agreement requirements and
joint exercise development and execution.
Expectation is that over the upcoming year DHS and the local community
will be in a position to define the mutual aid requirement and develop
a robust exercise plan and schedule.
Recommendation #5:
Reconsider the security risks at Plum Island, taking into account
recent acts of disgruntled employees.
Corrective Action:
As part of the baseline assessment, the DHS has undertaken a review of
the USDA threat statement with the guidance to review the entire
security posture of the island again like facilities. This review will
result in a revise threat statement more appropriately reflecting the
existing and possible threats. The revised threat statement will be
issued by early next year.
Recommendation #6:
Consult with appropriate state and local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to revisit the threats specific to the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center.
Corrective Action:
Consistent with the above responses, the DHS will continue to work with
the local and national law enforcement agencies in developing a
complete set of possible threats for the island.
Recommendation #7:
Revise, as necessary, security and incident response plans to reflect
any redefined risks, threats, and assets.
Corrective Action:
As part of the assessment baseline, the DHS has been reviewing existing
policies, procedures, and incident response plans to ensure that they
remain appropriate while the threat statement and mutual aid agreements
are being developed and/or revised. DHS will continue to work with
other research facilities in developing the islands' threat statement
and the security posture required.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Research, Education, and Economics Agricultural Research Service:
August 29, 2003:
Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman Director:
United States General Accounting Office Natural Resources and
Environment Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Dyckman:
This letter is in response to your request for comments on your
proposed report entitled Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to
Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, (GAO-03-847).
Enclosed please find comments from the Department of Agriculture (USDA)
from both the Agricultural Research Service and the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service.
These comments were shared with your team during a meeting in my office
on August 20, 2003. USDA appreciated the opportunity to have that
meeting to go over the report with you. This e-mail is provided to
document and clarify our comments made at the time of that meeting.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report.
Sincerely,
CAIRD E. REXROAD, JR.
Acting Associate Administrator:
Signed by CAIRD E. REXROAD, JR.:
Enclosure:
USDA Response to the Draft GAO report, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions
Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center (GAO -
03-847).
General Comments:
USDA wishes to emphasize that security at Plum Island has been an
ongoing concern and that a risk-assessment based approach was used post
9-11 to define the measures that we subsequently put in place to
protect our assets, specifically our pathogen holding. We believe that
this report, to be useful, must make judgments about needs for enhanced
security against a specific risk assessment based approach considering
both probability and consequences of specific types of attacks. We
acknowledge that security was not focused on a "terrorist attack" as
little evidence or rationale suggest a significant probability of such
an attack as a preferred way to gain access to pathogens.
Although the report suggests that security concerns at Plum Island
Animal Disease Center were triggered by the events of September 11,
2001, we would like to call to your attention that the original
contract with the Army Corps of Engineers for security upgrades was
issued in August 2000, and amended twice to expand the scope of the
work in May 2001. USDA engaged Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to
provide guidance on facility security immediately after September 11,
2001. Sandia's experience with other Government and university labs
aided USDA in framing its security approach. A security specialist was
hired at PIADC in June 2002 in response to the SNL assessment. A
contract for major security upgrades was issued in June 2002 with
completion scheduled for December 2003.
The draft report suggested in multiple places that the threat to PIADC
and probability of the theft of pathogens increased markedly with the
advent of the strike by LB&B employees who had been involved in the
maintenance operations of the facility. Furthermore, the report
suggests that USDA failed to take proper steps to reevaluate or
mitigate the increased threat. The threat of a disgruntled insider was
one of the three primary risks identified by the original SNL security
assessment made in October 2001. USDA took several steps to enhance
security in response to the strike. The guard force on the island and
at Orient Point was increased. The guards on the island were armed. The
strikers were excluded from the island and from the parking and boat
access at Point Orient.
The draft report indicates that under USDA, the security guards did not
have the authority to carry firearms and make arrests. USDA believes
that we appropriately used armed guards at PIADC. Furthermore, GAO
stresses the importance of working with local law enforcement. Although
verbal agreements were made between State and local law enforcement and
ARS for cooperation at PIADC, a formal signed agreement underwent a
series of legal reviews and was never finalized because of the arrest
and detention authority issue. Nonetheless, there were communications
between PIADC and local law enforcement. During the strike or during
heightened alert they were provided regular briefings.
The draft report questions the "escorting" of persons who lack
appropriate background investigations into the restricted area
containing pathogens. USDA maintains, and SNL concurs, that the
practice of persons with appropriate background investigations
providing continuous escort of persons who do not, is widely accepted
as an appropriate practice. This policy has been well documented at
PIADC. We acknowledge problems with implementation of this policy that
GAO brought to our attention and believe that the current escort
practices are reliable.
You provided specific information during our meeting that certain
background investigations should be renewed. We appreciate receiving
the list and have evaluated it. We found that 5 of 11 contractor/
employees had not expired, 3 had already been sent to Office of
Personnel Management for renewal, and 3 had expired but no action had
been taken for renewal. A system has been established to alert
management 6 months prior to expiration of a background investigation.
Background investigations for all eight of the non-citizens on your
list are already in process.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles M. Adams, (202) 512-8010:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Aldo Benejam, Nancy
Crothers, Mary Denigan-Macauley, Jonathan Gill, Thomas Farrell, Wyatt
R. Hundrup, and Ramon Rodriguez made key contributions to this report.
(360295):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, § 310) authorized
the transfer of Plum Island to DHS.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
[3] An outbreak directly impacts the trade sector because countries
constrain trade with those markets whose products may be tainted with
foot-and-mouth disease. Other sectors, such as tourism are affected
because tourist activities are restricted, especially in quarantined
areas. Production from infected or quarantined herds is zero because
production is stopped when animals are slaughtered and products from
infected animals are not permitted into the food chain.
[4] Laboratories adhere to specific biosafety guidelines according to
their designated biosafety level, which can range from 1 to 4.
Biosafety level 1 is acceptable for low-risk organisms that may be
found, for example, in high school laboratories. Biosafety level 4 is
reserved for a number of exotic and highly lethal pathogens, such as
ebola. There are only five facilities in the United States with
biosafety level 4 laboratories, including the Department of the
Defense's U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
and the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of
Health. Plum Island operates a biosafety level 3 agriculture
laboratory with some additional special agricultural safety features to
prevent the release of animal disease pathogens into the environment.
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 817.
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 211-213.
[7] 7 CFR part 331.
[8] USDA Security Policies and Procedures for Biosafety Level-3
Facilities, Agricultural Research Service, DM 9610-1.
[9] Also, USDA had engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in August
2000 to make some physical security improvements at Plum Island, but
this work was not based on an assessment of threats and risks. Few of
the measures suggested by the Corps were implemented. In addition,
Sandia officials told us that they did not agree with the approach
taken by the Corps and that their physical security recommendations
differed significantly. USDA has relied on Sandia's security
recommendations.
[10] Foot-and-mouth disease cannot be studied on the mainland of the
United States unless the Secretary of Agriculture determines that it is
necessary to do so (see 21 U.S.C. § 113a).
[11] USDA officials told us that they considered these scientists to be
"grandfathered"--that is, USDA did not require background checks to
gain unescorted access because these scientists were employed before
enactment of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act in June 2002. In
addition, we found that three of these scientists arrived after this
date--December 2002 and February and May 2003.
[12] USDA Security Policies and Procedures for Biosafety Level 3-
Facilities, Agricultural Research Service, DM 9610-1.
[13] 7 CFR §§ 331.10 and 331.11.
[14] 7 CFR § 331.10(a)(2)(iv)(B).
[15] Out of concern that Iraqi scientists were trying to manipulate
camel pox for possible warfare use, USDA conducted work for the
Department of Defense to determine if camel pox could be manipulated
into an agent similar to smallpox.
[16] USDA's Office of General Counsel was aware of this issue for over
1 year but had not resolved it as of June 2003 when DHS became
responsible for Plum Island.
[17] A draft policy on the use of force was written for the guard force
on Plum Island but never put into use.
[18] The Federal Protective Service's goal is to provide a safe
environment in which federal agencies can conduct their business by
reducing threats posed against federal facilities, which range from
terrorism to workplace violence to larcenies.
[19] Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS has authority for its
officers to carry firearms and make arrests.
[20] Additional observations of our Office of Special Investigations
are included in appendix II.
[21] Southold town police are located on Long Island in Suffolk County,
approximately 5 miles from Plum Island.
[22] In a life-and-death situation, the Suffolk County Police
Department could respond with a helicopter, significantly reducing
response time.
[23] See 7 CFR, § 331.11 (a) (3).
[24] Officials of the FBI's New York office and of the Suffolk County's
Police Department and Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Service
told us that they would welcome the opportunity to review Plum Island's
security assessment and response plans and would assist with this
coordination.
[25] Water pressure is a vital component of the process used to
decontaminate materials in the biocontainment area in order to prevent
the spread of animal diseases. Convicted of malicious mischief for
tampering with the water system, the employee was sentenced to 5 years'
probation and ordered to pay restitution.
[26] USDA officials said that although it was never proven that
replacement workers were to blame for the outage, this illustrates the
discontent on the island. Information on the qualifications of
replacement workers can be found in appendix III.
[27] While intelligence officials did not contribute to the assessment
of threats to Plum Island, USDA has established links that provide
current information about terrorist threats.
[28] Pub. L. No. 107-56.
[29] Pub. L. No. 107-188 § § 211-213.
[30] 7 CFR § 331.
[31] Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-123 Management
Accountability and Control (Washington, D.C.: 1995). This document
provides the specific requirements for assessing and reporting on
controls within the executive branch.
[32] U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control: Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). The Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA) requires us to issue standards for
internal control in government. Among other things, the standards
provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal
control.
[33] The Award Fee Determination Board consisted of six officials who
worked on Plum Island: center director, assistant center director,
administrative contract officer, safety officer, APHIS laboratory
chief, and ARS foot-and-mouth disease unit scientist. The composite
score could have placed LB&B at one of five levels: 0-34, unacceptable;
35-49, unsatisfactory; 50-70, satisfactory; 71-84, superior; and 85-
100, outstanding.
[34] LB&B Associates exceeded its fiscal year 2002 estimated budget of
$8,027,011 by approximately $151,000, or about 1.9 percent. In the
first quarter of fiscal year 2003, which covered October 1, 2002,
through January 5, 2003, the contractor exceeded the estimated budget
of $2,250,524 by about $360,000, or about 16 percent.
[35] Prior to the strike, LB&B Associates billed to USDA over $107,000
in legal fees associated with renewing the collective bargaining
agreement through May 31, 2002, after which time LB&B Associates itself
paid about $136,000 in legal fees through April 2003.
[36] Under a cost-reimbursable contract, Federal Acquisition
Regulations require that the contractor notify the agency in writing
whenever it has reason to believe that its costs will exceed 75 percent
of the estimated budget, or if the total cost will be greater or
significantly less than the estimated budget. Also, as part of the
notification process, the contractor is required to provide the agency
with a revised estimate of the total cost of performing its contract.
In this case, if USDA had not accepted the cost increases, USDA
officials said that USDA and LB&B Associates officials would have had
to agree on which services to discontinue in order to stay on budget.
[37] An independent auditor found that LB&B Associates' statements of
income, changes in equity, and cash flows fairly represent the
financial position of the company for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2002.
[38] Costs rose sharply in December 2002 because costs related to
subcontracts that were incurred in October and November were not billed
to USDA until December, due to the billing cycles of LB&B Associates
and the subcontractors. These subcontract-related costs were for tasks
unrelated to the strike, such as security guards on the island, and
related to the strike, such as security guards at the picket line.
[39] North Fork Services incurred an additional $36,000 in subcontract
costs related to the strike from January 6 through May 31, 2003. These
subcontracts were for delivering supplies and materials to Orient Point
and for security at the picket line on Orient Point while striking
workers were picketing.
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