Dairy Industry
Information on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy Options Gao ID: GAO-05-50 December 29, 2004In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw milk, one-third of which were used in fluid milk products. Farmers, cooperatives, processors, and retailers receive a portion of the retail price of milk for their part in providing milk to consumers. During 2002 and 2003, farm prices fell while retail prices did not similarly decline. This pattern raised concerns about a growing spread between farm and retail prices. Farm prices have since increased, reaching record highs in April 2004. As requested, GAO examined (1) the portion of retail milk prices received by farmers, cooperatives, processors, and retailers, how this changed over time, and the relationship between price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors influence prices and affect the transmission of price changes among levels; and (3) how federal dairy program changes and alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income and federal costs, among other considerations.
Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received about 46 percent, cooperatives 6 percent, wholesale processors 36 percent, and retailers over 12 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 2 percent milk (the most common type of milk purchased) in the 15 U.S. markets GAO reviewed. During this period, in 12 of the 15 markets, the spread between farm and retail prices increased. However in some markets, the price spread between these levels increased and then moderated. Price changes at one level were most closely reflected in changes at adjacent levels of the marketing chain. Farm, cooperative, wholesale, and retail milk prices are determined by the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are affected by the supply of raw milk and the demand for milk products such as fluid milk, cheese, and butter, as well as by federal and state dairy programs. At the cooperative level, prices are influenced by the cost of services that cooperatives provide, and the relative bargaining power of cooperatives and milk processors. At the wholesale and retail levels, input costs such as labor and energy, and the continued consolidation of firms influence milk prices. Recent changes in federal dairy programs have affected farm income, federal costs, and other considerations. For example, the Milk Income Loss Contract program has supported some farm incomes but has exceeded initial cost estimates because of low farm prices. A number of options have been suggested to change federal dairy policies such as amending federal milk marketing orders and raising or eliminating the support price. In general, these options would have mixed effects depending upon whether milk prices were high or low over the short or long term. For example, options that increase farm income over the short term tend to increase milk production and lower farm prices over the long term. These options also tend to be costly for the federal government during periods of low prices.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2004:
Dairy Industry:
Information on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy
Options:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-50]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-50, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw
milk, one-third of which were used in fluid milk products. Farmers,
cooperatives, processors, and retailers receive a portion of the retail
price of milk for their part in providing milk to consumers. During
2002 and 2003, farm prices fell while retail prices did not similarly
decline. This pattern raised concerns about a growing spread between
farm and retail prices. Farm prices have since increased, reaching
record highs in April 2004. As requested, GAO examined (1) the portion
of retail milk prices received by farmers, cooperatives, processors,
and retailers, how this changed over time, and the relationship between
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors influence prices
and affect the transmission of price changes among levels; and (3) how
federal dairy program changes and alternative policy options have
affected or might affect farm income and federal costs, among other
considerations.
What GAO Found:
Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received about
46 percent, cooperatives 6 percent, wholesale processors 36 percent,
and retailers over 12 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 2
percent milk (the most common type of milk purchased) in the 15 U.S.
markets GAO reviewed. During this period, in 12 of the 15 markets, the
spread between farm and retail prices increased. However in some
markets, the price spread between these levels increased and then
moderated. Price changes at one level were most closely reflected in
changes at adjacent levels of the marketing chain.
Farm, cooperative, wholesale, and retail milk prices are determined by
the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are
affected by the supply of raw milk and the demand for milk products
such as fluid milk, cheese, and butter, as well as by federal and state
dairy programs. At the cooperative level, prices are influenced by the
cost of services that cooperatives provide, and the relative bargaining
power of cooperatives and milk processors. At the wholesale and retail
levels, input costs such as labor and energy, and the continued
consolidation of firms influence milk prices.
Recent changes in federal dairy programs have affected farm income,
federal costs, and other considerations. For example, the Milk Income
Loss Contract program has supported some farm incomes but has exceeded
initial cost estimates because of low farm prices. A number of options
have been suggested to change federal dairy policies such as amending
federal milk marketing orders and raising or eliminating the support
price. In general, these options would have mixed effects depending
upon whether milk prices were high or low over the short or long term.
For example, options that increase farm income over the short term tend
to increase milk production and lower farm prices over the long term.
These options also tend to be costly for the federal government during
periods of low prices.
Farm and Retail 2 Percent Milk Prices, October 2000 to May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To continue informed decision-making, the Secretary of Agriculture
should build on GAO‘s analysis of the potential effects of various
policy options as USDA proposes future changes or provides information
to the Congress. USDA expressed concern about the practicality of some
of the dairy policy options discussed. USDA did not comment on the
report‘s recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-50.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Lawrence J. Dyckman,
(202) 512-3841, dyckmanl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Analysis of Prices at Four Marketing Levels for 2 Percent
Milk in Selected Markets:
Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Milk Processors
and Retailers:
Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread:
Correlation between Price Changes at the Four Marketing Levels:
Comparison of Average Annual and Monthly Prices for 2 Percent Milk:
Appendix III: Retail Prices for Four Kinds of Milk in Selected Markets:
Appendix IV: Average Monthly and Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale
and Retail Milk Prices in Selected Markets:
Appendix V: Factors That Influence the Price of Milk as It Moves from
the Farm to the Consumer:
Market Forces, in Addition to Federal and State Policies, Influence
Milk Prices at the Farm Level:
Services Provided by Cooperatives, Market Structure, and Collective
Action Can Influence the Price of Milk at the Cooperative Level:
Input Costs, Service Levels, Innovations, and Market Structure
Influence Wholesale Fluid Milk Prices:
Retailing Costs, Consumer Demand, and Market Structure Changes Affect
Retail Prices for Fluid Milk:
Appendix VI: Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. Fluid
Milk Market:
Summary of Recent Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S.
Fluid Milk Market:
Results on the Extent of Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission and Price
Transmission Asymmetry:
Results on Farm-to-Retail Speed of Adjustment and Price Transmission
Asymmetry:
Results for Retail-to-Farm Price Transmission and Price Transmission
Asymmetry:
Possible Causes of Asymmetry in the Extent and Speed of Price
Transmission:
Appendix VII: Effects of Recent Federal Dairy Program Changes and
Alternative Policy Options:
Recent Changes in Federal Dairy Programs Vary in Their Effects on
Policy Considerations We Identified:
Effects of Alternative Dairy Policies Differ under Various Scenarios:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contacts:
Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Portion of the Retail Price of a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk
Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Processors, and Retailers
for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 2: Changes in the Farm-to-Retail Price Spread for a Gallon of 2
Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 3: Correlation between Farm Price Changes and Changes in
Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent
Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 4: Correlation between Cooperative Price Changes and Changes in
Wholesale and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15
Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 5: Correlation between Wholesale and Retail Price Changes for a
Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 6: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2000:
Table 7: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2001:
Table 8: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2002:
Table 9: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2003:
Table 10: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail
Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2004:
Table 11: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 12: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Boston, Massachusetts, October
2000 through May 2004:
Table 13: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Charlotte, North Carolina,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 14: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 15: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Dallas, Texas, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 16: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Denver, Colorado, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 17: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Miami, Florida, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 18: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October
2000 through May 2004:
Table 19: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 20: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in New Orleans, Louisiana,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Table 21: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 22: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Salt Lake City, Utah, October
2000 through May 2004:
Table 23: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in San Diego, California, October
2000 through May 2004:
Table 24: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Seattle, Washington, October
2000 through May 2004:
Table 25: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Washington, D.C., October 2000
through May 2004:
Table 26: Average Ownership and Operating Costs by Region and Herd
Size, 2000:
Table 27: USDA's Milk Classes Used for Setting Milk Prices:
Table 28: Change in Costs for Fluid Milk Processing Plants in Maine,
1993 through 2000:
Table 29: Supermarket Operating Costs as a Percentage of Sales and
Gross Margin, 2003:
Table 30: Growth of Supermarket Sales and Expenses during the Last
Decade, 1993 through 2003:
Table 31: Market Share of the Top Four Food Retailers in Selected
Markets, 2003:
Table 32: Overview of Fluid Milk Price Transmission Studies and Results
on Price Transmission Asymmetry/Symmetry:
Table 33: Recent Price Transmission Studies of the Fluid Milk Market:
Figures:
Figure 1: Selected Milk Markets, Corresponding Defense Commissaries
Used for Our Analysis, and Federal Milk Marketing Order Areas Prior to
April 2004:
Figure 2: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 3: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Boston, Massachusetts, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 4: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Charlotte, North Carolina, October 2000 through
May 2004:
Figure 5: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 6: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Dallas, Texas, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 7: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Denver, Colorado, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 8: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Miami, Florida, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 9: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 10: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 11: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for New Orleans, Louisiana, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 12: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 13: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Salt Lake City, Utah, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 14: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for San Diego, California, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 15: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Seattle, Washington, October 2000 through May
2004:
Figure 16: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Washington, D.C., October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 17: Retail Prices in Atlanta, Georgia, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 18: Retail Prices in Boston, Massachusetts, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 19: Retail Prices in Charlotte, North Carolina, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 20: Retail Prices in Cincinnati, Ohio, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 21: Retail Prices in Dallas, Texas, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 22: Retail Prices in Denver, Colorado, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 23: Retail Prices in Miami, Florida, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 24: Retail Prices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 25: Retail Prices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 26: Retail Prices in New Orleans, Louisiana, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 27: Retail Prices in Phoenix, Arizona, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 28: Retail Prices in Salt Lake City, Utah, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 29: Retail Prices in San Diego, California, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 30: Retail Prices in Seattle, Washington, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 31: Retail Prices in Washington, D.C., for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
Figure 32: Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders:
Figure 33: Number of Fluid Milk Processing Plants and Volume of Milk
Processed per Plant, 1980 through 2002:
Figure 34: Percentage of Retail Food Sales by Market Segment, 1993 and
2003:
Figure 35: Marketing Chain and Price Transmission for the U.S. Fluid
Milk Industry:
Figure 36: Potential Effects of Options to Change FMMOs on Various
Policy Considerations:
Figure 37: Potential Effects of Options to Change the Price Support
Program on Various Policy Considerations:
Figure 38: Potential Effects of Options to Extend MILC on Various
Policy Considerations:
Figure 39: Potential Effects of Adopting the NDEA on Various Policy
Considerations:
Figure 40: Potential Effects of Changing Trade Restrictions and Export
Incentives on Various Policy Considerations:
Figure 41: Potential Effects of Options to Facilitate Risk Management
on Various Policy Considerations:
Figure 42: Potential Effects of Options to Manage Raw Milk Supplies on
Various Policy Considerations:
AMS: Agricultural Marketing Service:
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation:
DEIP: Dairy Export Incentive Program:
FMMO: federal milk marketing order:
FSA: Farm Service Agency:
MILC: Milk Income Loss Contract:
NDEA: National Dairy Equity Act:
NEDC: Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact:
NYC: New York City:
UNY: Upstate New York:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
WTO: World Trade Organization:
Letter December 29, 2004:
Congressional Requesters:
In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw
milk for which they received approximately $21.2 billion. Roughly one-
third of these 19.7 billion gallons were ultimately sold to consumers
as fluid milk (milk) products. The milk marketing chain that moves milk
from the dairy farm to the consumer is composed of farmers, dairy
cooperatives,[Footnote 1] wholesale milk processors,[Footnote 2] and
retailers, and entities at each level receive a portion of the retail
price of a gallon of milk for the functions they perform. These
functions include producing, processing, distributing, and selling
milk. During 2002 and 2003, farm prices were the lowest since 1979,
while retail milk prices generally did not experience a similar
decline.[Footnote 3] This disparity raised concerns about a growing
price spread between farm and retail milk prices. However, in 2004,
farm price trends have reversed, with farm prices reaching record
highs.
Since the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and some
states have operated programs designed to support dairy farmers by
ensuring that farm prices do not fall below minimum levels. These
programs include, among others, federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs),
which use formulas to establish minimum farm prices in different
marketing areas of the country; a price support program to sustain farm
prices through a standing offer to purchase certain milk products at
set prices; and trade restrictions or export subsidies to protect the
U.S. milk industry from competition from foreign milk products or
reduce supplies.
Low farm prices have generated interest in new federal policies to
provide assistance to dairy farmers; however, the cost of these
programs during periods of low prices has raised concerns. For example,
in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm
Bill), Congress authorized USDA to establish the Milk Income Loss
Contract (MILC) program, which provides supplemental payments to
farmers during periods of low prices.[Footnote 4] Depressed farm prices
triggered $1.8 billion in MILC payments to dairy farmers in fiscal year
2003. Additionally, USDA spent over $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2001
through 2003 attempting to maintain minimum farm prices at a
legislatively set level through the price support program.
Recent changes in milk prices have illustrated the volatility of milk
price cycles. For example, as of April 2004, farm prices reached record
highs as USDA announced a minimum price for raw milk used in
manufacturing cheese that was approximately 36 percent higher, at
$19.66 per hundredweight, than the March price of $14.49 per
hundredweight, an increase of nearly $0.45 per gallon of milk.[Footnote
5] This increase reflected a number of changed market conditions that
decreased the amount of raw milk production, while also increasing the
demand for some manufactured dairy products.[Footnote 6] However, high
farm prices create incentives for farmers to produce more milk, which
then tends to depress milk prices over the long term, thereby
increasing concerns about farm viability in the future.
At your request, this report examines (1) what portion of the retail
price of fluid milk is received by dairy farmers, dairy cooperatives,
wholesale milk processors, and retailers in selected markets throughout
the United States, how this distribution has changed over the period of
our review (October 2000 through May 2004), and the relationships among
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors, such as costs,
influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer,
as well as how these and other factors affect the extent to which
changes in price are transmitted among levels as milk moves from the
farm to the consumer; and (3) how changes in dairy policies and
alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income,
federal costs, economic efficiency,[Footnote 7] and consumer prices,
among other policy considerations. It also updates other information on
milk prices included in our June 2001 report.[Footnote 8]
To update our information on the pricing distribution among the various
levels of the milk marketing chain, we analyzed milk prices in 15
selected markets nationwide, ensuring that (1) these markets provided
national geographic coverage; (2) at least one market was located in
each of the federal milk marketing order areas, as they existed during
the majority of the period from October 2000 through May 2004; (3) the
selected markets included both state and federally regulated markets;
and (4) these areas represented similar marketing areas for which we
reported information in our June 2001 report.[Footnote 9] For these 15
markets, we obtained data from USDA, the cognizant state milk control
agency, the Department of Defense's Commissary Agency, and a private
data collection company on the prices received by farmers,
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers.[Footnote 10] We
limited our data collection efforts to whole, skim, 2 percent, and 1
percent milk as sales of these milk types constitute over 93 percent of
fluid milk sales annually. We also confined our analysis to the prices
of these milk types sold in gallon containers as milk sold in gallon
containers accounts for about 65 percent of fluid milk products sold
under FMMOs.[Footnote 11] We focused our detailed data analysis on 2
percent milk sold in gallon containers, the largest volume of reduced-
fat milk sold nationwide. As a result, our analysis may not reflect
pricing trends for all types of milk and package sizes.
To update our information on factors influencing milk prices, explore
price transmission within the milk marketing chain, and examine the
effects of federal dairy policy changes and alternative policy options,
we contacted a number of national dairy experts in academia or
representing federal and state agencies, cooperatives, processors,
retailers, or industry groups. We also reviewed relevant legislation,
studies, and other publications. We qualitatively analyzed the effects
of recent changes in federal dairy programs, as well as alternative
policy options, on various policy considerations as identified in
previous GAO reports, relevant studies, and legislation, as well as
through our conversations with dairy policy experts. These policy
considerations included farm income, milk production, federal costs,
price volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. Different
stakeholders in the dairy policy arena may have alternative views on
the relative importance of these policy considerations, as well as
other considerations that we did not include, which could lead to
differing perspectives on these options. We conducted our review from
September 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. We did not independently verify
the data we received from various sources. However, we discussed with
these sources the measures they take to ensure the accuracy of data,
and these measures seemed reasonable. Appendix I provides additional
information on the scope and methodology of our review.
In summary, we found the following:
* Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received 45.9
percent, cooperatives 6.1 percent, wholesale milk processors 35.6
percent, and retailers 12.5 percent of the retail price of a gallon of
2 percent milk in the 15 markets we reviewed. However, these
percentages varied widely depending on the specific market. For
example, the farmers' portion ranged from 36.0 percent to about 58.6
percent.
* Furthermore, during this time period, the price spread between farm
and retail prices increased in 12 of the 15 markets we examined.
However, in some of the 12 markets, the spread between farm and retail
milk prices increased dramatically, and then moderated. In 9 of the 15
markets, retail prices showed a statistically significant increase. In
4 of the remaining markets, retail prices decreased over time, while in
the other 2 markets, retail prices showed no statistically significant
change. At the same time, farm prices decreased in 12 of the 15 markets
and increased in the remaining 3 markets during the 44-month period.
However, declines in farm prices, in most cases, began to reverse
during the latter months of our period of analysis. Price changes
generally correlated across levels in the marketing chain, with the
strongest correlations occurring between adjacent levels. For example,
in most of the markets we analyzed, changes in cooperative prices
correlated strongly with changes in wholesale prices. However, changes
in cooperative prices correlated less strongly with changes in retail
prices.
* Prices at all levels of the milk marketing chain are determined by
the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are
determined primarily by factors affecting the supply of raw milk, such
as costs of production; the demand for milk products, such as fluid
milk, cheese and butter; and the effects of federal and state dairy
programs. At the cooperative level, the difference between what
cooperatives pay farmers for raw milk and the prices at which they sell
raw milk to wholesale fluid milk processors is influenced by the types
of services the cooperatives provide, the relative bargaining power of
cooperatives and milk processors, as well as collective action taken by
dairy cooperatives. Factors that affect the difference between what
processors pay for this raw milk and the prices at which they sell
fluid milk products to retailers include input costs, such as labor,
energy, transportation and packaging; the level of services they
provide to retailers; innovations in processing technology; and changes
in the structure of the fluid milk processing industry, such as
increases in the consolidation and market share of some firms. At the
retail level, costs such as labor and energy, along with other factors
such as consumer demand and the structure of the market, help determine
the difference between what retailers pay for fluid milk products and
the prices they charge consumers for those products.
* While price changes at one level of the milk marketing chain are
generally reflected in price changes at other levels, several factors
can influence the extent or speed at which these changes are reflected
and whether price increases and decreases are reflected differently.
For example, increasing concentration, resulting in greater market
power at successive levels of the milk marketing chain, may provide
entities an opportunity to influence how changes in prices are
transmitted among the different levels. In addition, other factors,
such as federal and state dairy policies, can affect prices in ways
that can cause market participants to alter the way they transmit price
changes between marketing levels. Some recent economic studies of the
U.S. fluid milk market have found that these and other factors may
cause retail milk prices to react more completely and quickly to farm
price increases than to decreases.
* Recent changes in the FMMO program, adjustments to the prices of
products purchased under the price support program, and the
establishment of the MILC program have had various impacts on policy
considerations such as dairy farm income, federal costs, and price
volatility. Reforms to the FMMO system had mixed effects on farm income
depending on the geographic location of the farmer, while the overall
effects on all farmers are less clear. Further, recent adjustments to
the prices of products purchased under the price support program have
generally decreased federal costs but also decreased farm income during
periods of low prices. Finally, government payments introduced through
the MILC program have kept some small dairy farms in business, but the
program has exceeded initial federal cost estimates because farm prices
during 2002 and 2003 were lower than anticipated.
* A number of options that would modify existing policies or introduce
alternative policies have been proposed or discussed. While we examined
the potential impacts of these options on a range of policy
considerations related to the dairy sector, we did not assess their
overall economic or budgetary impacts or their consistency with U.S.
international trade commitments or positions in ongoing negotiations.
As a result, the purpose of this analysis is not to take a position for
or against any of these options, but simply to discuss their likely
effects on the policy considerations we identified. Various policy
options could affect dairy policy considerations in different ways
under different scenarios, such as periods of high or low prices. Also,
short-term effects may differ from long-term effects. In general,
options that increase farm income over the short term also tend to
increase milk production and thus the potential for oversupply and
lower average farm prices over the long term. For example, the dairy
support price could be raised, which would limit the fall of farm
prices and increase farm income in the short term. However, it would
spur additional production and therefore reduce average farm prices
over the long term. Such options also tend to be costly for the federal
government during periods of low prices. Thus, extending the MILC
program, which is scheduled to expire at the end of September 2005,
would allow the federal government to continue to support farm income
but could also increase federal costs if farm prices trend downward in
the future. In some cases, options that increase the economic
efficiency of federal dairy programs also increase price volatility
because they allow clearer transmission of market price signals. For
example, eliminating the price support program would increase
volatility by removing the price floor on manufactured dairy products,
but it would also increase economic efficiency by reducing incentives
to allocate resources to surplus production. Also, to the extent that
price changes at the wholesale level are passed through to the retail
level, a number of options would likely have mixed effects on consumer
prices depending upon the particular product under consideration (e.g.,
butter, cheese, or fluid milk).
As a result of recent farm bills, such as those in 1996 and 2002, USDA
has studied different aspects of dairy policy, either to implement
program changes mandated by the Congress or to provide information to
the Congress on the effects of various dairy programs. For example, the
2002 farm bill required USDA to conduct studies of dairy policy issues,
including an economic evaluation of the effects of various elements of
the national dairy policy and of terminating federal dairy programs
relating to milk price support and supply management. One study
required by this legislation, which addressed the subject of changing
standards for fluid milk, was issued in August 2003.[Footnote 12] A
second study, which included both an evaluation of the effects of
various elements of the national dairy policy and the termination of
federal milk price support and supply management programs, was provided
to the Congress in September 2004.[Footnote 13]
This report is divided into nine appendixes. Appendix I describes in
detail our objectives, scope, and methodology. Appendix II provides
information on average milk prices at the farm, cooperative, wholesale,
and retail levels; changes in farm and retail milk prices and how they
affect the farm-to-retail price spread; and the extent to which price
changes at one level of the milk marketing chain correlate with price
changes at other levels. Appendix III compares retail prices of whole,
2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk. Appendix IV provides the average
monthly prices and annual prices of the four types of milk at each
level of the milk marketing chain. Appendix V describes the factors
that influence prices as milk moves from the farmer to the consumer.
Appendix VI provides a technical review of recent research examining
price transmission within the milk marketing chain. Appendix VII
provides a qualitative analysis of the effects of recent changes in
federal dairy programs and alternative dairy policy options that have
been proposed or discussed. Appendix VIII presents USDA's comments and
our evaluation of them. Appendix IX lists GAO contacts and contributors
to this report.
Conclusions:
The difference in price between what farmers receive for their raw milk
and what consumers pay for fluid milk products has increased in recent
years. This growing spread between farm and retail prices may be
attributable to a number of factors at each level of the milk marketing
chain, including supply and demand forces, changes in input costs to
processing and retailing, and the continued concentration of
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers. A variety of
federal policies exist to influence the prices that farmers receive.
However, the effects of these policies may not be uniform; they can
affect different sizes of farms or regions of the country in different
ways. Moreover, policies that benefit farm income may adversely affect
other policy considerations such as economic efficiency and federal
costs. Given the complexity of federal dairy policy, the decision to
change existing policies or introduce new policies requires
consideration of a variety of these potential effects. Examining the
effects of policy alternatives on a variety of different policy
considerations will help the Congress formulate federal dairy policy
based on comprehensive analyses that consider these alternatives in
relation to their effects on different considerations, farm sizes, and
regions of the country. In addition, although recent USDA studies have
examined some policy options, there are other potential policy options
to consider, as discussed in this report.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To continue the facilitation of informed decision making by USDA and
the Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture build on
GAO's analysis of the potential effects of various dairy policy options
as USDA proposes future changes to current dairy laws or regulations or
provides information to the Congress in response to congressional
proposals.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to USDA and DOD for their review and
comment. We received written comments from USDA's Under Secretary for
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services and Under Secretary for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, which are presented in appendix
VIII. USDA also provided suggested technical corrections, which we have
incorporated into this report, as appropriate. These technical
corrections were offered by several USDA agencies, including the
Agricultural Marketing Service, Economic Research Service, Farm Service
Agency, and Office of the Chief Economist. DOD had no comments on the
draft report.
In its written comments, USDA said the information provided in the
report on milk prices at the farm, cooperative, and retail levels is
valid. However, USDA said it has reservations regarding our use of
prices paid for fluid milk at commissaries as an indicator of the
wholesale price of fluid milk and that we should make clear the
weaknesses of using commissary price data. USDA acknowledged, however,
that there seems to be no viable alternative. During the course of our
work, we were unable to obtain wholesale price data because these data
are considered proprietary by industry officials. After consulting with
USDA officials and other dairy experts, we determined that commissary
price data were the best surrogate because commissaries generally sell
milk at a standard 5 percent markup from cost. Based on USDA's
comments, we expanded the discussion in the report of the potential
limitations of using commissary data.
USDA said it largely agrees with the report's discussion of the factors
that influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the
consumer and the report's characterization of economic studies of price
transmission in the U.S. fluid milk market. However, USDA expressed
some concerns regarding the report's discussion of recent federal dairy
program changes and alternative policy options. First, USDA said that
this discussion appears to be a compilation of policy recommendations
that are examined independently and qualitatively within the existing
program structure. Our discussion of dairy policy options are not
policy recommendations. As stated in the report, to identify these
policy options and their potential impacts we relied heavily on a
synthesis of the views of leading dairy experts and the results of an
extensive literature search, including our review of more than 50
studies and other publications. Time and resource constraints for
completing our work precluded us from developing or contracting for the
use of an economic model that would have provided quantitative
estimates of these potential impacts. In addition, some of the policy
options would have been difficult to model and quantify, such as the
potential impacts of accelerating USDA's hearing and rulemaking process
for amending FMMOs. The report also notes that we compared the policy
options identified against a baseline scenario of policies in place as
of August 2004. This baseline scenario existed at the start of our work
and was needed to provide a consistent context for our analysis.
Second, USDA suggested that we make clear the caveats of this type of
analysis. As noted in the report, we examined the impact of federal
dairy program changes and policy options on six policy considerations:
farm income, milk production, federal costs, price volatility, economic
efficiency, and consumer prices. We acknowledge that other stakeholders
may have different views on the importance of these policy
considerations, or other considerations that we did not include in our
analysis. The report also states that the potential effects of policy
options on these considerations could vary depending upon economic
conditions and other policy decisions. In this regard, we did not
assess the options' overall economic or budgetary impacts, or their
consistency with U.S. international trade commitments or positions in
ongoing negotiations. In addition, the report does not identify a
preferred option or combination of options. As indicated in the report,
each option has varying potential impacts on the policy considerations
used in our analysis. Despite these caveats, we believe this analysis
is informative and helpful to congressional decision makers who must
weigh competing interests in determining dairy policy.
USDA also said that in some cases the report mischaracterizes the
operation of current programs and the effects that changes to current
programs or the introduction of new programs would have on program
outlays, producers, and consumers. For example, USDA noted that the
report offers several options for improving the operation of the Dairy
Export Incentive Program (DEIP), including expanding the use of this
program. However, USDA indicated that expanding the use of DEIP is not
a legitimate option because, under World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules, DEIP is bound by quantitative and monetary caps and product-
specific restrictions that limit its use to the current range of
eligible dairy commodities. We do not agree that we mischaracterized
the operation of this program. The report clearly states that USDA has
announced and awarded subsidies under DEIP to the limits allowed by WTO
rules for nonfat dry milk and various cheeses. Regarding expansion, the
report discusses options suggested by dairy experts for the additional
use of this program as an effective marketing tool, and does not call
for expanding its use to exceed relevant WTO caps or restrictions.
However, we have adjusted the language in the report to make this
distinction clearer.
USDA also offered several comments regarding the FMMO program. Among
these, USDA said that the report is incorrect in stating that the
objective of this program is "to ensure an adequate level of milk
production." According to USDA, this objective is associated with the
Dairy Price Support Program. We have revised the report to reflect this
clarification and added language suggested by USDA to better describe
the FMMO program's objectives.
In addition, USDA raised concerns about the practicality of
implementing some of the options discussed in the report, particularly
(1) adopting a competitive pay price to establish class prices under
the FMMO program and (2) combining Class III and Class IV into a single
manufacturing class.[Footnote 14] Regarding the first, USDA said that
it and a committee of academicians spent considerable time several
years ago trying to devise a competitive price series that could be
used to establish minimum class prices. However, this effort was
unsuccessful. USDA said that our report does not identify or indicate
how to create such a price series. Similarly, regarding combining Class
III and Class IV, USDA notes that no specifics are offered in the
report as to how milk in such a class would be priced. We acknowledge
that the report does not explain how a competitive price series could
be created or how milk would be priced if the classes were merged.
However, these options were identified by stakeholders during the
course of our work. Other options discussed in the report also may
present challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report
discusses those issues.
Finally, USDA said that it does not believe the hearing and rulemaking
process it uses to modify FMMOs inhibits its ability to respond to
changing market conditions or the marketing of new dairy products.
However, as discussed in the report, some stakeholders cited the
slowness of this process as a concern. In addition, the report
discusses USDA's efforts to improve this process to more quickly
respond to problems or needed changes while ensuring the promulgation
of economically sound regulation.
USDA did not comment on the report's recommendation.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of the report to
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; the House
Committee on Agriculture; other appropriate congressional committees;
interested Members of Congress; the Secretary of Agriculture; the
Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget; and other interested parties. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Lawrence J. Dyckman:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe:
Chair:
Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James M. Jeffords:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Arlen Specter:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In March 2003, Senator Snowe, Chair, Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, joined by Senators Clinton, Collins, Dodd, Jeffords,
Kennedy, Kerry, Leahy, Mikulski, Rockefeller IV, Sarbanes, Schumer, and
Specter requested that GAO examine a number of issues concerning the
pricing and marketing of milk in the United States. Specifically, they
asked us to update the information contained in our 2001 report,
entitled Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market
Structure ([Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-561],
June 15, 2001), and to address other issues. This report examines (1)
what portion of the retail price of fluid milk is received by dairy
farmers, dairy cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers
in selected markets throughout the United States, how this distribution
has changed over the period of our review, and the relationships among
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors, such as costs,
influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer,
as well as how these and other factors affect the extent to which
changes in price are transmitted among levels as milk moves from the
farm to the consumer; and (3) how changes in dairy policies and
alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income,
federal costs, economic efficiency, and consumer prices, among other
policy considerations.[Footnote 15] It also updates other information
on milk prices included in our June 2001 report.
To update our information on the price distribution among the various
levels of the milk marketing chain, we analyzed milk prices in 15
selected markets nationwide: Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts;
Charlotte, North Carolina; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Denver,
Colorado; Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Minneapolis,
Minnesota; New Orleans, Louisiana; Phoenix, Arizona; Salt Lake City,
Utah; San Diego, California; Seattle, Washington; and Washington,
D.C.[Footnote 16] In selecting these markets, we ensured that (1) they
provided national geographic coverage; (2) at least one market was
located in each of the federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) as they
existed during most of the period from October 2000 through May 2004;
(3) the selected markets included both state and federally regulated
markets; and (4) these areas represented similar marketing areas for
which we reported information in our June 2001 report. For the 15
markets, we collected data on the prices received by farmers,
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers for October 2000
through May 2004. We limited our data collection efforts to the prices
of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk because sales of these
milk types constitute over 93 percent of fluid milk sales annually. We
also confined our analysis to the prices of these milk types sold in
gallon containers because milk sold in gallon containers accounts for
about 65 percent of fluid milk products sold under FMMOs.[Footnote 17]
There is no precise method for calculating the price that farmers
receive for raw milk that is ultimately processed and sold in fluid
milk products because dairy farmers receive a blend price for their
milk, which is the average price for milk used for fluid and
manufactured products. Therefore, any calculation of the value received
by farmers for raw milk that is to be used for fluid milk products is
necessarily only approximate. To estimate a farm price for raw milk
used in fluid milk products, we used data provided by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS). AMS developed an adjustment, which accounts for various charges
such as hauling and marketing fees, that we subtracted from the
announced cooperative Class I price to obtain the estimated farm price
for raw milk used in fluid milk products for each of the selected
markets in our review except San Diego, which is not part of the FMMO
system.[Footnote 18] AMS's adjustment accounts for farm-to-plant
hauling costs, cooperative dues and capital assessment, mandatory
advertising and promotion costs, competitive and receiving credits, and
a representative estimate of the value of reimbursements to
cooperatives for the services performed for handlers and for
transportation costs not covered by the order minimum price.[Footnote
19] Most of the items that make up the adjustment are not available for
the specific fluid milk market that we selected, but rather are based
on information collected for milk used over wider geographical areas.
Therefore, an order-wide value used for any of these items provides an
estimate rather than the actual value for this item. Also, the values
for two of the adjustment items--reimbursements to cooperatives for
services performed for handlers and for transportation costs not
covered by the order minimum price--were not readily available so they
were estimated indirectly based on other reported data and, in some
cases, on anecdotal information provided by industry members. However,
despite these limitations, AMS believes that the estimated farm price
is a good representation of the price that dairy farmers receive for
raw milk used in fluid milk products. For the farm price for San Diego-
-a state-regulated market--we used mailbox price data collected by the
California Department of Food and Agriculture. The mailbox price is the
weighted average of the prices received by dairy farmers in the market
for all of their raw milk sold and therefore is computed as the total
net dollars received for milk divided by the total pounds of milk
marketed.[Footnote 20] This price is likely to be lower than the price
received for milk used for fluid purposes because the prices for milk
used for manufacturing purposes are generally lower. However, it is the
best measure we could obtain.
To determine cooperative prices, we used AMS data on announced
cooperative prices to represent prices that wholesale milk processors
paid to cooperatives. Wholesale milk processors in federally regulated
markets generally purchase milk from cooperatives and pay the federal
minimum price for milk plus premiums that are negotiated between
cooperatives and wholesale milk processors. The announced cooperative
price is the Class I milk price announced by the major cooperative in
each of the markets. This price does not apply to all Class I sales in
federally regulated markets and is not necessarily the price actually
received for all of the milk sold by the major cooperative; the
announced cooperative prices have not been verified by USDA as actually
having been paid by processors. For San Diego, we used the minimum
fluid prices established by the state of California. Data on the
premiums paid in excess of these minimums were not available for this
market. (See app. V for a detailed discussion of over-order premiums.)
To determine wholesale prices, we used the prices paid at Department of
Defense Commissary Agency locations. The Defense Commissary Agency
purchases milk under competitive and noncompetitive contracts with
wholesalers. We used commissary prices as surrogates for privately
established wholesale prices because (1) defense commissaries sell
groceries at a standard 5 percent markup from cost to active and
retired military personnel and (2) wholesale price data are considered
proprietary by industry officials and were not available to us. The
commissary network of stores ranks twelfth in the United States in
sales volume for supermarket chains. We selected 39 different
commissary locations near the 15 markets we reviewed, and the Defense
Commissary Agency provided us with weekly prices paid by consumers at
these locations for gallons of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim
milk.[Footnote 21] We averaged these weekly prices to obtain monthly
prices. We then adjusted these monthly prices to account for the 5
percent markup. Where we had multiple commissary locations for a
market, we averaged the adjusted monthly prices to obtain a wholesale
price for the market. We recognize that these locations may not provide
an ideal match with other price data analyzed for a given location; for
example, in some markets the available commissary locations were not in
close proximity to the selected marketing areas. Also, wholesale
processors may provide these commissary locations with different levels
of service than they do for retailers in these markets.[Footnote 22] In
such cases, the prices paid by these commissaries for fluid milk may
have been different than the prices that retailers in the selected
markets paid to their wholesale suppliers. However, these were the best
wholesale data that we could obtain. In those locations where
commissaries sold more than one brand of milk, we used the price for
the brand that had the highest sales volume for a particular period.
For retail prices, we contracted with Information Resources, Inc., a
private data collection and analysis company, to obtain average weekly
retail prices for whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk sold in
gallon containers. These data represented a weighted average of prices
at supermarkets with yearly sales exceeding $2 million for the markets
included in our analysis. We then averaged these weekly prices to
obtain monthly prices. We were unable to obtain data from some types of
nonsupermarket retailers such as mass merchandisers, thus the retail
pricing data that we present may not be representative of fluid milk
prices at those locations. Figure 1 shows the locations of the 15
selected markets, the corresponding commissaries, and the federal milk
marketing order areas.
Figure 1: Selected Milk Markets, Corresponding Defense Commissaries
Used for Our Analysis, and Federal Milk Marketing Order Areas Prior to
April 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The Western Order was terminated as of April 1, 2004. However,
because the order existed during the majority of our period of analysis
we chose to include the data in this report. Farm and cooperative level
prices for this order for April and May 2004 were provided by USDA
based on what they would have been had the order still existed.
[End of figure]
To determine (1) the portion of the retail price of a gallon of milk
received by farmers, cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and
retailers; (2) how changes in retail and farm prices affect the farm-
to-retail price spread; and (3) how price changes at any level of the
marketing chain correlate to changes in prices at other levels, we
limited our analysis to 2 percent milk, which currently represents the
largest volume of reduced-fat milk sold nationwide. Therefore, our
analysis of 2 percent prices may not necessarily reflect pricing
patterns and trends for the other three kinds of milk. Appendix II
includes graphs that show the relationships among the farm,
cooperative, wholesale, and retail prices for a gallon of 2 percent
milk for each of the 15 markets. Because farm and cooperative prices
reflect a higher milkfat content than that in 2 percent milk, we
adjusted these prices to reflect the value of removing milkfat and
replacing it with skim milk.[Footnote 23] This adjustment allowed us to
use farm and cooperative prices that were comparable to the wholesale
and retail prices for our analysis.
To determine the degree that farm and retail prices had changed and the
effect these changes had on the farm-to-retail price spread from
October 2000 through May 2004 for each of the 15 markets, we used a
statistical procedure to estimate farm-level and retail prices at the
beginning and end of the period.[Footnote 24] We relied on estimated
rather than actual prices to reduce the influence of the starting and
ending months and years selected for our analysis in markets in which
milk prices varied from month to month. We used the differences between
the estimated initial and final prices to represent the changes during
the period. When our statistical procedure did not find a consistent
association between prices and time, we treated the difference in the
estimated initial and final prices as zero. We calculated the change in
the farm-to-retail price spread as the estimated retail price
difference minus the estimated farm price difference.
To describe the relationship between price changes at any given level
in the milk marketing chain and price changes at the other levels, we
tested for correlations between price changes at the various levels for
each of the 15 markets included in our analysis. Specifically, we
calculated coefficients describing the degree of correlation between
changes in farm prices and price changes at the cooperative, wholesale,
and retail levels; price changes at the cooperative level and price
changes at the wholesale and retail levels; and price changes at the
wholesale and retail levels. In appendix II, we report those
correlation coefficients and indicate which are statistically different
from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.
To update information provided in our June 2001 report on the retail
prices for four kinds of milk, we analyzed the retail price data that
we obtained from Information Resources, Inc. We array these data in
appendix III for each of the selected 15 markets for October 2000
through May 2004.
To update information provided in our June 2001 report on average
monthly and annual farm and cooperative prices, and wholesale and
retail prices for different kinds of milk, we analyzed data obtained
from USDA, the California Department of Food and Agriculture, the
Department of Defense Commissary Agency, and Information Resources,
Inc. We report these data in appendix IV for each of the selected 15
markets for October 2000 through May 2004.
To update our information on the major factors influencing milk prices
and explore price transmission within the milk marketing chain, we
conducted more than 50 interviews with national dairy experts working
with the federal and state governments,[Footnote 25] cooperatives,
[Footnote 26] processors,[Footnote 27] retailers,[Footnote 28] or
industry groups,[Footnote 29] or in academia.[Footnote 30] We also
reviewed a number of relevant studies and publications from USDA and
other sources. Where possible, we obtained data on production costs,
services provided by cooperatives, as well as inputs to processing and
retailing. We also obtained information on concentration and market
power at each level of the milk marketing chain. We present information
on the factors influencing the price of milk in appendix V.
To compare the results and methodologies of various studies looking at
the issue of price transmission in fluid milk marketing from the farm
to the retail level, we performed a technical review of 14 academic
studies conducted over the past 10 years, looking at model
descriptions, assumptions, and results. We also spoke with the
economists involved in these studies concerning their model results and
the causes of differences in fluid milk price transmission across
markets. The scope of these studies encompassed national, regional, and
city-level models of fluid milk price transmission. Appendix VI
provides a summary of our review of price transmission and the various
price transmission studies.
To identify and examine the effects of federal dairy program changes
and alternative policy options, we contacted many of the same dairy
experts previously mentioned. We also conducted an extensive literature
search and reviewed more than 50 relevant studies and other
publications we identified. We qualitatively analyzed the effects of
federal dairy program changes and policy options we identified on six
main policy considerations: farm income, milk production, federal
costs, price volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. We
evaluated impacts on these policy considerations under both high-and
low-price scenarios, over the short and long terms. We identified these
policy considerations by reviewing previous GAO reports, relevant
studies, and legislation, as well as through our conversations with
dairy policy experts. Different stakeholders in the dairy policy arena
may have alternative views on the relative importance of these policy
considerations, as well as other considerations that we did not
include, which could lead to differing perspectives on these options.
In addition, the potential effects of policy options on these
considerations could vary depending upon economic conditions and other
policy decisions. We compared the dairy policy options we identified
against a baseline scenario of the policies in place as of August 2004:
FMMO regulations, a Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program that is
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005, a price support
program at $9.90 per hundredweight, a Dairy Export Incentive Program
(DEIP), trade restrictions, and milk regulatory policies in some
states. We include a discussion of the effects of recent federal dairy
program changes and alternative policy options in appendix VII.
We conducted our review from September 2003 through October 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We
did not independently verify the data we received from various sources.
However, we discussed with these sources the measures they take to
ensure the accuracy of the data, and these measures seemed reasonable.
Additionally, we consulted with the following dairy experts concerning
the results of our analysis of price transmission within the milk
marketing chain and the effects of changes in federal dairy programs
and alternative policy options:
* Ed Jesse, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison;
* Daniel Lass, Ph.D., Professor, College of Natural Resources and the
Environment, University of Massachusetts, Amherst;
* Richard Sexton, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, University of California-Davis; and:
* Mark Stephenson, Ph.D., Senior Extension Associate, Department of
Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Analysis of Prices at Four Marketing Levels for 2 Percent
Milk in Selected Markets:
This appendix reports on our analysis of prices at four marketing
levels for a gallon of 2 percent milk in 15 selected markets for
October 2000 through May 2004. Our analysis includes information on (1)
the portion of the retail price of a gallon of milk received by
farmers, cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers; (2)
how changes in farm and retail milk prices affect the farm-to-retail
milk price spread; and (3) how price changes at any level of the
marketing chain correlate with changes in prices at other levels.
We limited our analysis to gallons of 2 percent milk because sales of
milk with reduced fat content account for nearly 52 percent of all
sales of fluid milk and sales of 2 percent milk account for about 62
percent of these reduced-fat sales. The farm and cooperative prices
used in our analysis and presented in this appendix have been adjusted
to reflect 2 percent milkfat. This analysis may not reflect pricing
patterns and trends for other kinds of milk. We present complete data
for prices for all four types of milk--whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and
skim--in appendix III.
Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Milk Processors
and Retailers:
Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, our data suggest that
farmers received 45.9 percent, cooperatives 6.1 percent, wholesale
processors 35.6 percent, and retailers 12.5 percent of the retail price
of a gallon of 2 percent milk in the 15 markets we reviewed.[Footnote
31] However, these percentages varied depending on the specific market.
For example, the farmers' portion ranged from 36.0 percent to 58.6
percent, while retailers in 12 markets received anywhere from 3.5
percent to 44.1 percent.[Footnote 32] In comparison, the average
percentages we reported in 2001 for the period March 1998 through
September 2000 were 43 percent, 5 percent, 33 percent, and 19 percent,
respectively, for farmers, cooperatives, wholesale processors, and
retailers. Table 1 summarizes the price breakdown for each market.
Table 1: Portion of the Retail Price of a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk
Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Processors, and Retailers
for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Percent received by farmers: 42.7%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.4%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 34.8%;
Percent received by retailers: 15.1%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 49.9%.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Percent received by farmers: 51.2%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 4.5%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 24.0%;
Percent received by retailers: 20.4%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 44.4%.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Percent received by farmers: 41.1%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.5%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 46.6%;
Percent received by retailers: 4.8%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 51.4%.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Percent received by farmers: 45.8%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.6%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 39.0%;
Percent received by retailers: 7.7%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 46.7%.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Percent received by farmers: 55.9%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 5.3%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 49.5%;
Percent received by retailers: (10.7%)[A];
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 38.8%.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Percent received by farmers: 39.4%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 4.5%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 25.7%;
Percent received by retailers: 30.3%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 56.0%.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Percent received by farmers: 50.8%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 9.5%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 45.0%;
Percent received by retailers: (5.3%)[A];
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 39.7%.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Percent received by farmers: 52.1%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.9%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 36.5%;
Percent received by retailers: 3.5%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 40.0%.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Percent received by farmers: 58.6%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.8%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 64.1%;
Percent received by retailers: (30.5%)[A];
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 33.6%.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Percent received by farmers: 36.8%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 9.5%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 36.6%;
Percent received by retailers: 17.1%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 53.7%.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Percent received by farmers: 42.5%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.3%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 34.8%;
Percent received by retailers: 19.4%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 54.2%.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Percent received by farmers: 44.8%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.6%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 43.0%;
Percent received by retailers: 8.6%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 51.6%.
Selected market: San Diego, California[B];
Percent received by farmers: 36.0%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 6.8%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 28.1%;
Percent received by retailers: 29.1%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 57.2%.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Percent received by farmers: 36.7%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.2%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 16.0%;
Percent received by retailers: 44.1%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 60.1%.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Percent received by farmers: 53.4%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.3%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 10.2%;
Percent received by retailers: 33.1%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 43.3%.
Selected market: Average for the 15 markets;
Percent received by farmers: 45.9%;
Percent received by cooperatives: 6.1%;
Percent received by wholesale processors: 35.6%;
Percent received by retailers: 12.5%;
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 48.0%.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
[A] Our analysis found that retailers in the Dallas, Miami, and
Minneapolis markets received a negative return on a gallon of 2 percent
milk for the 44-month period. Officials with one major retailer in the
Dallas market indicated that a price war was occurring in Dallas during
this time period. We were unable to obtain explanations for the
negative returns in Miami and Minneapolis. These negative returns may
be the result of problems with comparability between commissary and
supermarket data.
[B] Figures for the San Diego market may understate the percent
received by cooperatives and overstate the percent received by
wholesale processors because the cooperative price data for this market
did not include estimates of over-order premiums paid to cooperatives.
On the other hand, figures for this market may overstate the percent
received by cooperatives and understate the percent received by farmers
because unlike the farm price data for other markets, the farm price
data for San Diego represent a weighted average of milk sold for all
uses. See appendix I.
[End of table]
Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread:
From October 2000 through May 2004, the spread between farm and retail
milk prices increased in 12 of the 15 markets.[Footnote 33] However, in
some of the 12 markets, the spread between farm and retail milk prices
increased dramatically and then moderated. In 9 of the 15 markets,
retail prices showed a statistically significant increase. In 4 of the
remaining markets, retail prices decreased over time; in the other 2
markets, retail prices showed no statistically significant change. At
the same time, farm prices decreased in 12 of the 15 markets and
increased in the remaining 3 markets over the 44-month period. However,
these declining farm prices began to moderate, or, in most cases, began
to rise during the latter months of our period of analysis. Table 2
provides these data for selected markets.[Footnote 34]
Table 2: Changes in the Farm-to-Retail Price Spread for a Gallon of 2
Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Change in farm prices: $0.03;
Change in retail prices: ($0.21);
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.24).
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Change in farm prices: ($0.06);
Change in retail prices: $0.12;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.18.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Change in farm prices: ($0.05);
Change in retail prices: $0.20;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.25.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Change in farm prices: ($0.07);
Change in retail prices: ($0.12);
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.05).
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Change in farm prices: $0.02;
Change in retail prices: $0.24;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.22.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Change in farm prices: ($0.06);
Change in retail prices: $0.16;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.22.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Change in farm prices: ($0.01);
Change in retail prices: $0.25;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.26.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Change in farm prices: ($0.03);
Change in retail prices: $0.05;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.08.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Change in farm prices: ($0.02);
Change in retail prices: [A];
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.02.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Change in farm prices: ($0.10);
Change in retail prices: $0.16;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.27.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Change in farm prices: ($0.07);
Change in retail prices: ($0.01);
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.06.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Change in farm prices: ($0.04);
Change in retail prices: [A];
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.04.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Change in farm prices: $0.03;
Change in retail prices: ($0.16);
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.19).
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Change in farm prices: ($0.08);
Change in retail prices: $0.10;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.18.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Change in farm prices: ($0.03);
Change in retail prices: $0.28;
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.32.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: Differences between changes in farm and retail prices may not add
to the change in the farm-to-retail price spread due to rounding.
[A] No statistically significant change was observed in the price
spread over the 44-month period.
[End of table]
Correlation between Price Changes at the Four Marketing Levels:
We found that price changes generally correlated across levels in the
marketing chain, with the strongest correlations occurring between
adjacent levels. The values of correlation coefficients presented are
estimates of the degree that price changes at one level in the milk
marketing chain are associated with price changes at other levels. The
higher the coefficient, the closer the association between changes in
prices at different levels. Changes in cooperative prices, in general,
were strongly correlated with changes in wholesale prices.[Footnote 35]
However, changes in cooperative prices correlated less strongly with
changes in retail prices. As discussed in appendix V, many factors
other than farm or wholesale prices influence the retail price of fluid
milk.
Correlation coefficients between prices at different marketing levels
varied across markets. For example, correlations between cooperative
and wholesale prices in individual markets range from a high of 0.982
to a low of -0.031. We ranked the 15 markets by the extent of
correlation between cooperative and wholesale prices. The correlation
coefficient for the market that fell in the middle of this ranking was
0.788. In comparison, the market in the middle of a similar ranking for
the time period analyzed in our 2001 report had a lower correlation
coefficient between these prices, 0.716. Similarly, correlations
between cooperative and retail prices in individual markets range from
a high of 0.879 to a low of 0.214. We did a comparable ranking of the
15 markets by the extent of correlation between cooperative and retail
prices. The correlation coefficient for the market that fell in the
middle of this ranking was 0.588. In comparison, the market in the
middle of a similar ranking for the time period presented in our 2001
report again had a lower correlation coefficient between these prices,
0.483. Tables 3 through 5 present data from our correlation analysis of
price changes across marketing levels.
Table 3: Correlation between Farm Price Changes and Changes in
Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent
Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.525*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.537*.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.691*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.780*.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.995*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.693*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.983*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.589*.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.998*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.813*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.713*.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.932*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.428*.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: (0.024);
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.826*.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.683*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.881*.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.220;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.503*.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.993*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.784*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.863*.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.542*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.217.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.829*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.360*.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.407*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.432*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.341*.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.249.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.962*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.810*.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we
omitted the months for which data were missing.
*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5
percent).
[End of table]
Table 4: Correlation between Cooperative Price Changes and Changes in
Wholesale and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15
Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.546*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.543*.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.694*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.775*.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.697*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.982*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.588*.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.818*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.725*.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.436*.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: (0.031);
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.823*.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.682*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.879*.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.228;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.499*.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.788*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.861*.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.540*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.214.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.830*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.360*.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.969*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.480*.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.250.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.962*;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.809*.
Source: GAO's analysis of cooperative price data provided by USDA (for
the San Diego market, the Southern California Class I price data were
provided by the California Department of Food and Agriculture),
wholesale price data provided by the Defense Commissary Agency, and
retail price data provided by Information Resources, Inc.
Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we
omitted the months for which data were missing.
*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5
percent).
[End of table]
Table 5: Correlation between Wholesale and Retail Price Changes for a
Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.319*.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.348*.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.746*.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.544*.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.802*.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.429*.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: (0.003).
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.744*.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.205.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.734*.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.419*.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.270.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.497*.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.183.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.
Source: GAO's analysis of wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we
omitted the months for which data were missing.
*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5
percent).
[End of table]
Comparison of Average Annual and Monthly Prices for 2 Percent Milk:
Tables 6 through 10 show the average annual price for a gallon of 2
percent milk in the 15 markets for each of the four marketing levels
during part of 2000, all of 2001, 2002, and 2003, and part of 2004.
Figures 2 through 16 present average monthly data for the period
October 2000 through May 2004 on farm, cooperative, wholesale, and
retail prices for gallons of 2 percent milk in each of the 15 markets.
Gaps in any of the lines shown in the figures indicate that data were
unavailable for those months.
Table 6: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2000:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Farm price: $1.05;
Cooperative price: $1.25;
Wholesale price: $2.04;
Retail price: $2.67.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Farm price: $1.25;
Cooperative price: $1.35;
Wholesale price: $1.96;
Retail price: $2.23.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Farm price: $1.09;
Cooperative price: $1.25;
Wholesale price: $2.06;
Retail price: $2.58.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Farm price: $1.03;
Cooperative price: $1.21;
Wholesale price: $[A];
Retail price: $2.24.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Farm price: $1.08;
Cooperative price: $1.20;
Wholesale price: $2.05;
Retail price: $1.74.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Farm price: $0.99;
Cooperative price: $1.11;
Wholesale price: $1.73;
Retail price: $2.45.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Farm price: $1.22;
Cooperative price: $1.44;
Wholesale price: $2.50;
Retail price: $2.33.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Farm price: $1.05;
Cooperative price: $1.18;
Wholesale price: $1.79;
Retail price: $1.94.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Farm price: $1.01;
Cooperative price: $1.12;
Wholesale price: $2.05;
Retail price: $1.77.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Farm price: $1.02;
Cooperative price: $1.22;
Wholesale price: $2.25;
Retail price: $2.61.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Farm price: $1.01;
Cooperative price: $1.09;
Wholesale price: $1.83;
Retail price: $2.09.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Farm price: $0.98;
Cooperative price: $1.06;
Wholesale price: $1.97;
Retail price: $2.25.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Farm price: $0.92;
Cooperative price: $1.16;
Wholesale price: $1.90;
Retail price: $2.54.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Farm price: $1.02;
Cooperative price: $1.10;
Wholesale price: $1.47;
Retail price: $2.56.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Farm price: $1.21;
Cooperative price: $1.28;
Wholesale price: $1.51;
Retail price: $2.11.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: Averages for 2000 were calculated using data from October through
December, the portion of 2000 included in our analysis.
[A] We were unable to obtain data from the Defense Commissary Agency to
represent wholesale prices for 2 percent milk in the Cincinnati market
during 2000.
[End of table]
Table 7: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2001:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Farm price: $1.14;
Cooperative price: $1.34;
Wholesale price: $2.50;
Retail price: $2.68.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Farm price: $1.29;
Cooperative price: $1.39;
Wholesale price: $1.95;
Retail price: $2.32.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Farm price: $1.18;
Cooperative price: $1.34;
Wholesale price: $2.32;
Retail price: $2.62.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Farm price: $1.15;
Cooperative price: $1.32;
Wholesale price: $2.24;
Retail price: $2.28.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Farm price: $1.17;
Cooperative price: $1.28;
Wholesale price: $2.15;
Retail price: $1.98.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Farm price: $1.12;
Cooperative price: $1.23;
Wholesale price: $1.93;
Retail price: $2.54.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Farm price: $1.31;
Cooperative price: $1.53;
Wholesale price: $2.56;
Retail price: $2.40.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Farm price: $1.17;
Cooperative price: $1.32;
Wholesale price: $2.17;
Retail price: $2.07.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Farm price: $1.14;
Cooperative price: $1.27;
Wholesale price: $2.21;
Retail price: $1.73.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Farm price: $1.11;
Cooperative price: $1.31;
Wholesale price: $2.32;
Retail price: $2.68.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Farm price: $1.14;
Cooperative price: $1.21;
Wholesale price: $1.91;
Retail price: $2.42.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Farm price: $1.10;
Cooperative price: $1.18;
Wholesale price: $2.11;
Retail price: $2.24.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Farm price: $1.05;
Cooperative price: $1.25;
Wholesale price: $2.04;
Retail price: $2.84.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Farm price: $1.11;
Cooperative price: $1.20;
Wholesale price: $1.66;
Retail price: $2.73.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Farm price: $1.34;
Cooperative price: $1.42;
Wholesale price: $1.71;
Retail price: $2.30.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
[End of table]
Table 8: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2002:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Farm price: $1.04;
Cooperative price: $1.22;
Wholesale price: $2.01;
Retail price: $2.47.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Farm price: $1.11;
Cooperative price: $1.21;
Wholesale price: $1.77;
Retail price: $2.33.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Farm price: $1.01;
Cooperative price: $1.22;
Wholesale price: $2.55;
Retail price: $2.59.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Farm price: $0.95;
Cooperative price: $1.11;
Wholesale price: $1.98;
Retail price: $2.34.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Farm price: $1.08;
Cooperative price: $1.17;
Wholesale price: $2.19;
Retail price: $2.03.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Farm price: $0.93;
Cooperative price: $1.05;
Wholesale price: $1.66;
Retail price: $2.56.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Farm price: $1.17;
Cooperative price: $1.41;
Wholesale price: $2.56;
Retail price: $2.36.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Farm price: $0.98;
Cooperative price: $1.14;
Wholesale price: $1.81;
Retail price: $2.01.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Farm price: $0.95;
Cooperative price: $1.10;
Wholesale price: $2.38;
Retail price: $1.95.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Farm price: $0.92;
Cooperative price: $1.19;
Wholesale price: $2.22;
Retail price: $2.70.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Farm price: $0.94;
Cooperative price: $1.02;
Wholesale price: $1.88;
Retail price: $2.59.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Farm price: $0.91;
Cooperative price: $0.99;
Wholesale price: $1.92;
Retail price: $2.29.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Farm price: $0.88;
Cooperative price: $1.06;
Wholesale price: $1.84;
Retail price: $2.66.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Farm price: $0.93;
Cooperative price: $1.01;
Wholesale price: $1.39;
Retail price: $2.74.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Farm price: $1.16;
Cooperative price: $1.23;
Wholesale price: $1.44;
Retail price: $2.28.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
[End of table]
Table 9: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2003:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Farm price: $1.07;
Cooperative price: $1.25;
Wholesale price: $2.02;
Retail price: $2.49.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Farm price: $1.14;
Cooperative price: $1.25;
Wholesale price: $1.79;
Retail price: $2.33.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Farm price: $1.05;
Cooperative price: $1.27;
Wholesale price: $2.65;
Retail price: $2.63.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Farm price: $0.98;
Cooperative price: $1.16;
Wholesale price: $2.00;
Retail price: $2.34.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Farm price: $1.09;
Cooperative price: $1.19;
Wholesale price: $2.26;
Retail price: $2.02.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Farm price: $0.97;
Cooperative price: $1.08;
Wholesale price: $1.68;
Retail price: $2.55.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Farm price: $1.20;
Cooperative price: $1.43;
Wholesale price: $2.56;
Retail price: $2.47.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Farm price: $1.01;
Cooperative price: $1.19;
Wholesale price: $1.87;
Retail price: $2.00.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Farm price: $0.99;
Cooperative price: $1.13;
Wholesale price: $2.36;
Retail price: $1.62.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Farm price: $0.94;
Cooperative price: $1.24;
Wholesale price: $2.22;
Retail price: $2.68.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Farm price: $0.97;
Cooperative price: $1.05;
Wholesale price: $1.97;
Retail price: $2.45.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Farm price: $0.95;
Cooperative price: $1.03;
Wholesale price: $1.99;
Retail price: $2.14.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Farm price: $0.93;
Cooperative price: $1.12;
Wholesale price: $1.84;
Retail price: $2.69.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Farm price: $0.95;
Cooperative price: $1.04;
Wholesale price: $1.46;
Retail price: $2.88.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Farm price: $1.19;
Cooperative price: $1.27;
Wholesale price: $1.46;
Retail price: $2.33.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
[End of table]
Table 10: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail
Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2004:
Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia;
Farm price: $1.18;
Cooperative price: $1.35;
Wholesale price: $2.21;
Retail price: $2.54.
Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts;
Farm price: $1.27;
Cooperative price: $1.38;
Wholesale price: $1.90;
Retail price: $2.43.
Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Farm price: $1.13;
Cooperative price: $1.35;
Wholesale price: $2.84;
Retail price: $2.87.
Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Farm price: $1.09;
Cooperative price: $1.27;
Wholesale price: $2.21;
Retail price: $1.95.
Selected market: Dallas, Texas;
Farm price: $1.20;
Cooperative price: $1.30;
Wholesale price: $2.47;
Retail price: $2.13.
Selected market: Denver, Colorado;
Farm price: $1.06;
Cooperative price: $1.20;
Wholesale price: $2.04;
Retail price: $2.72.
Selected market: Miami, Florida;
Farm price: $1.30;
Cooperative price: $1.52;
Wholesale price: $2.56;
Retail price: $2.63.
Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Farm price: $1.15;
Cooperative price: $1.31;
Wholesale price: $2.13;
Retail price: $2.13.
Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Farm price: $1.14;
Cooperative price: $1.29;
Wholesale price: $2.43;
Retail price: $1.93.
Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Farm price: $1.03;
Cooperative price: $1.33;
Wholesale price: $2.15;
Retail price: $2.87.
Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona;
Farm price: $1.08;
Cooperative price: $1.17;
Wholesale price: $2.17;
Retail price: $2.25.
Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Farm price: $1.07;
Cooperative price: $1.14;
Wholesale price: $2.16;
Retail price: $2.19.
Selected market: San Diego, California;
Farm price: $1.12;
Cooperative price: $1.22;
Wholesale price: $1.92;
Retail price: $2.50.
Selected market: Seattle, Washington;
Farm price: $1.06;
Cooperative price: $1.15;
Wholesale price: $1.74;
Retail price: $2.59.
Selected market: Washington, D.C;
Farm price: $1.31;
Cooperative price: $1.39;
Wholesale price: $1.66;
Retail price: $2.56.
Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information
Resources, Inc.
Note: The 2004 averages were calculated using data from January through
May of that year, the portion of 2004 included in our analysis.
[End of table]
Figure 2: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Atlanta, Georgia, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Atlanta adjusted
to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the
prices paid by the commissaries at Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson,
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Boston, Massachusetts, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Boston, Massachusetts, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the effective cooperative Class I price for Boston
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content during the period that the
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was effective (July 1997 through
September 2001); the cooperative price after September 2001 is the
announced cooperative Class I price for Boston adjusted to 2 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
commissary at Hanscom Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup;
and the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Boston market.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Charlotte, North Carolina, October 2000 through
May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Charlotte, North Carolina, the farm price is the USDA
estimated farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for
Charlotte adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the price paid by the Fort Bragg North Post Store, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Charlotte market.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Cincinnati, Ohio, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Cincinnati
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price
paid by the commissary at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, adjusted for
a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Cincinnati market. We were unable
to obtain data from the Defense Commissary Agency to represent
wholesale prices for 2 percent milk in the Cincinnati market during
2000 and for January and February 2001.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Dallas, Texas, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Dallas, Texas, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Dallas adjusted to
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the
prices paid by the two commissaries at Fort Hood, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Dallas market.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Denver, Colorado, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Denver, Colorado, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Denver adjusted to
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the
prices paid by the commissaries at Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force
Base, Buckley Air Force Base, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, adjusted
for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Denver market.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Miami, Florida, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Miami, Florida, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Miami adjusted to
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
commissary at the Naval Air Station, Key West, adjusted for a 5 percent
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information
Resources, Inc., for the Miami market.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for
Milwaukee adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the price paid by the commissary at the Naval Station Great Lakes,
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Milwaukee market.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Minneapolis, Minnesota, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for
Minneapolis adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price
is the price paid by the commissary at Fort McCoy, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Minneapolis market.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for New Orleans, Louisiana, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For New Orleans, Louisiana, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for New
Orleans adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the average of the prices paid by the Naval Support Activities, New
Orleans; the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport; and Keesler
Air Force Base commissaries, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for
the New Orleans market.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Phoenix, Arizona, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Phoenix adjusted
to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the
prices paid by the commissaries at Luke Air Force Base and Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail
price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the
Phoenix market.
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Salt Lake City, Utah, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Salt Lake City, Utah, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Salt
Lake City adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the price paid by the commissary at Hill Air Force Base, adjusted for a
5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Salt Lake City market.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for San Diego, California, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For San Diego, California, the farm price is the California
Department of Food and Agriculture mailbox price adjusted to 2 percent
milkfat content; the cooperative price is the Southern California Class
I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at the Naval Base,
San Diego; Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton; Naval Outlying Landing
Field, Imperial Beach; Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar; Naval Air
Station, North Island; and by the San Onofre Commissary, Camp
Pendleton, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the San Diego
market.
[End of figure]
Figure 15: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Seattle, Washington, October 2000 through May
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Seattle, Washington, the farm price is the USDA estimated
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for
Seattle adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is
the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at the Naval Station
Everett, Smokey Point Support Center; Fort Lewis; and McChord Air Force
Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Seattle market.
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon
of 2 Percent Milk for Washington, D.C., October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For Washington, D.C., the farm price is the USDA estimated farm
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Washington, D.C.,
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the
average of the prices paid by the commissaries at Bolling Air Force
Base; Walter Reed Army Medical Center; Fort Myer; Fort Belvoir; the
Marine Corps Base, Quantico; Andrews Air Force Base; Aberdeen Proving
Ground; the Naval Station, Annapolis; Fort Meade; and Fort Detrick,
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Washington, D.C.,
market.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Retail Prices for Four Kinds of Milk in Selected Markets:
This appendix updates information provided in our June 2001 report on
the average retail prices for whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim
milk in 15 selected markets for October 2000 through May 2004. We found
that retail pricing patterns varied significantly across markets. For
example, in the Boston market from October 2000 through May 2004, the
average price for 2 percent milk was generally the same as the average
price for 1 percent milk; however, whole and skim milk prices were
generally lower. On the other hand, for this period in the San Diego
market, the average price of 2 percent milk was generally lower than
the prices of whole and 1 percent milk, but higher than skim milk
prices. Figures 17 through 31 provide information on the average retail
price for the four kinds of milk in the 15 selected markets for October
2000 through May 2004.
Figure 17: Retail Prices in Atlanta, Georgia, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information
Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market.
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Retail Prices in Boston, Massachusetts, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Boston market.
[End of figure]
Figure 19: Retail Prices in Charlotte, North Carolina, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Charlotte market.
[End of figure]
Figure 20: Retail Prices in Cincinnati, Ohio, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Cincinnati market.
[End of figure]
Figure 21: Retail Prices in Dallas, Texas, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Dallas market.
[End of figure]
Figure 22: Retail Prices in Denver, Colorado, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Denver market.
[End of figure]
Figure 23: Retail Prices in Miami, Florida, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Miami market.
[End of figure]
Figure 24: Retail Prices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Milwaukee market.
[End of figure]
Figure 25: Retail Prices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Minneapolis market.
[End of figure]
Figure 26: Retail Prices in New Orleans, Louisiana, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the New Orleans market.
[End of figure]
Figure 27: Retail Prices in Phoenix, Arizona, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Phoenix market.
[End of figure]
Figure 28: Retail Prices in Salt Lake City, Utah, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Salt Lake City market.
[End of figure]
Figure 29: Retail Prices in San Diego, California, for Whole, 2
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the San Diego market.
Figure 30: Retail Prices in Seattle, Washington, for Whole, 2 Percent,
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Seattle market.
[End of figure]
Figure 31: Retail Prices in Washington, D.C., for Whole, 2 Percent, 1
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Washington, D.C., market.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Average Monthly and Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale
and Retail Milk Prices in Selected Markets:
This appendix updates information provided in our June 2001 report on
average monthly and annual farm and cooperative prices of raw milk and
on the average monthly and annual wholesale and retail prices for a
gallon of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk. Tables 11 through
25 provide these data for 15 selected markets over the period October
2000 through May 2004.
Table 11: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.87;
Retail: Skim: $2.75.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.76;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Average;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.66;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.86;
Retail: Skim: $2.74.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.65;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.81;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.53;
Retail: 2%: $2.69;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.76;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.45;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.52;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.54;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.63.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.68;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.71;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.81;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.69;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.66.
Average;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.55;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.26;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.47.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.21;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.92;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $2.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.51;
Retail: Skim: $2.48.
Average;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.01;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.21;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.45.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.43.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.41;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.44;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.44;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.44;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.66;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.51;
Retail: Skim: $2.46.
Average;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.92;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.46.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.39;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.87;
Cooperative: $2.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.64;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.50;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.45;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.85;
Retail: Skim: $2.78.
Average;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11;
Retail: Whole: $2.35;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.45.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Atlanta market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Atlanta for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid
by the commissaries at Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market. Prices may not
average due to rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.
[End of table]
Table 12: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Boston, Massachusetts, October
2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.03.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.26;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Average;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.21;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.25;
Retail: Skim: $2.03.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.25;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.08.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.12.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.12.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.45;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.65;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.59;
Cooperative: $1.68;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.65;
Cooperative: $1.75;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.66;
Cooperative: $1.76;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.69;
Cooperative: $1.79;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.68;
Cooperative: $1.78;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.93;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.20.
Average;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.20.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.82;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.56;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Average;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.56;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.65;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.51;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.26;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.79;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.54;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89;
Retail: Whole: $2.33;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.33;
Retail: 2%: $2.39;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Average;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $2.35;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $2.01;
Cooperative: $2.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Average;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $ $2.12;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Boston market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the effective cooperative Class I price for Boston for 3.5 percent
milkfat content during the period that the Northeast Interstate Dairy
Compact was effective (July 1997 through September 2001); the
cooperative price after September 2001 is the announced cooperative
Class I price for Boston for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale
price is the price paid by the commissary at Hanscom Air Force Base,
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Boston market. Prices
may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 13: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Charlotte, North Carolina,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Average;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.54.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.57;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.44;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.52;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.68;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.57;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.32;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.54;
Cooperative: $1.71;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.57;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.39;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.33;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.69;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.46;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.63.
Average;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.59.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.63;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.57;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.56;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.54;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.65;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.58;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Average;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.61;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.53;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.65;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.58;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.52;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.64;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.57;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.56;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.54;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.57;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.54.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.69;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.83;
Retail: Skim: $2.73.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.91;
Retail: Whole: $2.78;
Retail: 2%: $2.80;
Retail: 1%: $2.88;
Retail: Skim: $2.80.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.91;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.82;
Retail: 1%: $2.90;
Retail: Skim: $2.81.
Average;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.72;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.65;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.61.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.78;
Retail: 2%: $2.79;
Retail: 1%: $2.87;
Retail: Skim: $2.78.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.82;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.80;
Retail: Whole: $2.76;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.84;
Retail: Skim: $2.77.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.78;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.69;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.83;
Retail: Skim: $2.73.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.70;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.69;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.83;
Retail: 1%: $2.92;
Retail: Skim: $2.81.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.83;
Cooperative: $2.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $3.10;
Wholesale: 2%: $3.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.84;
Retail: Whole: $3.19;
Retail: 2%: $3.21;
Retail: 1%: $3.24;
Retail: Skim: $3.21.
Average;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.77;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.74;
Retail: Whole: $2.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.87;
Retail: 1%: $2.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.86.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Charlotte market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Charlotte for 3.5
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
Fort Bragg North Post Store, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for
the Charlotte market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 14: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.94;
Retail: 2%: $2.18;
Retail: 1%: $2.25;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.93;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Average;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.92;
Retail: 2%: $2.24;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: N/A;
Wholesale: 2%: N/A;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.20;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.91;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $2.04.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $1.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $1.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $1.93;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $1.98;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $1.98;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $1.94;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.41.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.69;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.54;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.72;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $1.95;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.70;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.36;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.96;
Retail: Whole: $2.02;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Average;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $1.94;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $1.96;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.44;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $1.91;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00;
Retail: Whole: $1.93;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.95;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.79;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: N/A;
Retail: Whole: $1.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $1.85;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Average;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89;
Retail: Whole: $1.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $1.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $1.84;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $1.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49;
Retail: Whole: $1.84;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49;
Retail: Whole: $1.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.69;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $1.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $1.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $1.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.45;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87;
Retail: Whole: $1.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.20;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.15;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.08.
Average;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $1.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.08;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $1.63;
Retail: 2%: $1.89;
Retail: 1%: $1.88;
Retail: Skim: $1.82.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $1.63;
Retail: 2%: $1.87;
Retail: 1%: $1.85;
Retail: Skim: $1.80.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $1.46;
Retail: 2%: $1.70;
Retail: 1%: $1.60;
Retail: Skim: $1.56.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.85;
Cooperative: $2.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.68;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.50;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.19;
Retail: 1%: $2.14;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Average;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $ 2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $1.66;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Cincinnati market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Cincinnati for 3.5
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
commissary at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information
Resources, Inc., for the Cincinnati market. Prices may not average due
to rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.
[End of table]
Table 15: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Dallas, Texas, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95;
Retail: Whole: $1.79;
Retail: 2%: $1.64;
Retail: 1%: $1.75;
Retail: Skim: $1.67.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $1.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.80.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $1.82;
Retail: 1%: $2.02;
Retail: Skim: $1.81.
Average;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95;
Retail: Whole: $1.89;
Retail: 2%: $1.74;
Retail: 1%: $1.93;
Retail: Skim: $1.76.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95;
Retail: Whole: $2.01;
Retail: 2%: $1.89;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.87.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.02;
Retail: 2%: $1.91;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $1.96;
Retail: 2%: $1.85;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.84.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $1.92;
Retail: 1%: $2.06;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $1.94;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.05;
Retail: Skim: $1.98.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.02;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.54;
Cooperative: $1.64;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.04;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.19;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.14;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Average;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.13;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.06;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.03;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.01.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.15;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.02;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.11;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.14;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.02;
Retail: 1%: $2.17;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.07.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $1.99;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.02;
Retail: 2%: $1.97;
Retail: 1%: $2.05;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Average;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.16;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.02;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.01;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.93.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $1.97;
Retail: 1%: $2.04;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.96;
Retail: 1%: $2.05;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $2.18;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.14;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.43;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.17;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.11;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.42;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.44;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.37;
Retail: Whole: $2.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.06;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Average;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17;
Retail: Whole: $2.11;
Retail: 2%: $2.02;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.37;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.28;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26;
Retail: Whole: $2.15;
Retail: 2%: $1.96;
Retail: 1%: $1.98;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $1.97;
Retail: 1%: $1.96;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.42;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.89;
Cooperative: $2.00;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.74;
Retail: Whole: $2.79;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.77;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Average;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.50;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.37;
2.37: [Empty];
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.13;
Retail: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.06.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Dallas market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Dallas for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid
by the two commissaries at Fort Hood, adjusted for a 5 percent markup;
and the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources,
Inc., for the Dallas market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 16: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Denver, Colorado, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Average;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.54;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.48;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.70;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.65;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.65;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.65;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.49;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.65;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.64;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87;
Retail: Whole: $2.65;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Average;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.67;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.66;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.68;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.80;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.59;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.52;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.43;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Average;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.69;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.61;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.52;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.58;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.40;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.54;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.44;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.36;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.37;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.37;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.64;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.46;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.47;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.69;
Retail: 1%: $2.97;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.99;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.42;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.93;
Retail: Skim: $2.45.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Average;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.68;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.75;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.20.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.69;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.47;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.78;
Retail: Whole: $2.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.79;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.85;
Cooperative: $1.99;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.66;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.48;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23;
Retail: Whole: $3.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.90;
Retail: 1%: $2.87;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Average;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.48;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.42.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Denver market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Denver for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid
by the commissaries at Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force Base, Buckley
Air Force Base, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Denver market. Prices may not
average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 17: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Miami, Florida, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.46;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.46;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.47;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Average;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.50;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.50;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.78;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.74;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.57;
Cooperative: $1.79;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.60;
Cooperative: $1.83;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.65;
Cooperative: $1.87;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.65;
Cooperative: $1.88;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.67;
Cooperative: $1.89;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.70;
Cooperative: $1.92;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.68;
Cooperative: $1.91;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.44;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Average;
Farm: $1.57;
Cooperative: $1.79;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.53;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.41;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.53;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.39;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.37;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.24.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: N/A;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.26;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.45;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Average;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.36;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.48;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.54;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.40;
Retail: 1%: $2.41;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.48;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.77;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.79;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.79;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.78;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Average;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.67;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.41.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.77;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $2.02;
Cooperative: $2.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.66;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $3.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.97;
Retail: 1%: $2.92;
Retail: Skim: $2.86.
Average;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.78;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.53.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Miami market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Miami for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
commissary at the Naval Air Station, Key West, adjusted for a 5 percent
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information
Resources, Inc., for the Miami market. Prices may not average due to
rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.
[End of table]
Table 18: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October
2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $1.97;
Retail: 2%: $1.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.87.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $1.98;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $1.99;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $2.00;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Average;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $1.98;
Retail: 2%: $1.94;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.15;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.11;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.64;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.65;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.17;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11;
Retail: Whole: $2.15;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.13;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.31;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.13;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.70;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $2.18;
Retail: 2%: $2.12;
Retail: 1%: $2.16;
Retail: Skim: $1.99.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.55;
Cooperative: $1.69;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.13;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.01.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.11;
Retail: 2%: $2.04;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Average;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.13;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $2.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.04;
Retail: 1%: $2.04;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.02;
Retail: 1%: $2.02;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.06;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.02;
Retail: 1%: $2.05;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.04;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.02;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $1.99;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.04;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.02;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.99;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.99;
Retail: 1%: $2.02;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Average;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.87.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.86.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.87.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.00;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.00;
Retail: Skim: $1.87.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.05;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $1.97;
Retail: Skim: $1.85.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.03;
Retail: 2%: $1.93;
Retail: 1%: $1.96;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.04;
Retail: 2%: $1.94;
Retail: 1%: $1.98;
Retail: Skim: $1.84.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.15;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $2.11;
Retail: Skim: $1.96.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.40;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $1.98.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.17;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.11;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Average;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.07;
Retail: 1%: $2.04;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.85.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05;
Retail: Whole: $2.17;
Retail: 2%: $2.08;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $2.01;
Cooperative: $2.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.41;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Average;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.54;
1.54: [Empty];
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.08;
2.08: [Empty];
Retail: Whole: $2.22;
Retail: 2%: $2.13;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.94.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Milwaukee market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Milwaukee for 3.5
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the
commissary at the Naval Station Great Lakes, adjusted for a 5 percent
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information
Resources, Inc., for the Milwaukee market. Prices may not average due
to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 19: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01;
Retail: Whole: $1.84;
Retail: 2%: $1.74;
Retail: 1%: $1.86;
Retail: Skim: $1.68.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $1.79;
Retail: 1%: $1.89;
Retail: Skim: $1.71.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01;
Retail: Whole: $1.79;
Retail: 2%: $1.79;
Retail: 1%: $1.92;
Retail: Skim: $1.74.
Average;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01;
Retail: Whole: $1.82;
Retail: 2%: $1.77;
Retail: 1%: $1.89;
Retail: Skim: $1.71.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.47;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $1.78;
Retail: 2%: $1.73;
Retail: 1%: $1.85;
Retail: Skim: $1.68.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $1.68;
Retail: 2%: $1.67;
Retail: 1%: $1.80;
Retail: Skim: $1.64.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $1.66;
Retail: 2%: $1.69;
Retail: 1%: $1.85;
Retail: Skim: $1.70.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $1.67;
Retail: 2%: $1.72;
Retail: 1%: $1.86;
Retail: Skim: $1.76.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.48;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $1.65;
Retail: 2%: $1.70;
Retail: 1%: $1.88;
Retail: Skim: $1.75.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $1.68;
Retail: 2%: $1.71;
Retail: 1%: $1.91;
Retail: Skim: $1.78.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $1.68;
Retail: 2%: $1.73;
Retail: 1%: $1.94;
Retail: Skim: $1.80.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.59;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11;
Retail: Whole: $1.69;
Retail: 2%: $1.75;
Retail: 1%: $1.96;
Retail: Skim: $1.82.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18;
Retail: Whole: $1.69;
Retail: 2%: $1.76;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.64;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $1.69;
Retail: 2%: $1.74;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.82.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.64;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.74;
Retail: 2%: $1.80;
Retail: 1%: $2.05;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29;
Retail: Whole: $1.66;
Retail: 2%: $1.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.00;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Average;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.17;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.12;
Retail: Whole: $1.69;
Retail: 2%: $1.73;
Retail: 1%: $1.92;
Retail: Skim: $1.77.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29;
Retail: Whole: $1.68;
Retail: 2%: $1.74;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.81.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29;
Retail: Whole: $1.76;
Retail: 2%: $1.87;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.86.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.86;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.85;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.19;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.84;
Retail: 2%: $1.97;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $2.04;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $2.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $2.04;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.97;
Retail: 2%: $1.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.78;
Retail: 2%: $1.85;
Retail: 1%: $2.14;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.72;
Retail: 2%: $1.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.00;
Retail: Skim: $1.78.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.83;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $2.17;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Average;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $1.95;
Retail: 1%: $2.19;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.87;
Retail: 2%: $1.96;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $1.92.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30;
Retail: Whole: $1.75;
Retail: 2%: $1.79;
Retail: 1%: $2.00;
Retail: Skim: $1.78.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $1.57;
Retail: 2%: $1.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $1.54.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.97;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.52;
Retail: 2%: $1.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $1.46.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.44;
Retail: 2%: $1.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.75;
Retail: Skim: $1.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.43;
Retail: 2%: $1.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $1.31.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.45;
Retail: 2%: $1.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $1.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.52;
Retail: 2%: $1.46;
Retail: 1%: $2.84;
Retail: Skim: $1.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24;
Retail: Whole: $1.51;
Retail: 2%: $1.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.98;
Retail: Skim: $1.39.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $1.53;
Retail: 2%: $1.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.81;
Retail: Skim: $1.48.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.66;
Retail: 2%: $1.88;
Retail: 1%: $2.55;
Retail: Skim: $1.86.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.48;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.57;
Retail: 2%: $1.88;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Average;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.36;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27;
Retail: Whole: $1.57;
Retail: 2%: $1.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $1.56.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.30;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.65;
Retail: 2%: $1.94;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.64;
Retail: 2%: $1.91;
Retail: 1%: $2.55;
Retail: Skim: $1.93.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.60;
Retail: 2%: $1.80;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $1.81.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.52;
Retail: 2%: $1.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $1.63.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.99;
Cooperative: $2.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2004;
Average;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31;
Retail: Whole: $1.70;
Retail: 2%: $1.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Minneapolis market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Minneapolis for
3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by
the commissary at Fort McCoy, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for
the Minneapolis market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 20: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in New Orleans, Louisiana,
October 2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Average;
Farm: $1.22;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.33;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.56;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.38;
Cooperative: $1.58;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.58.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22;
Retail: Whole: $2.67;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.67.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.67;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.48;
Cooperative: $1.69;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.72;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.71;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.31;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.79;
Retail: Skim: $2.74.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.74.
Average;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.59;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21;
Retail: Whole: $2.66;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.66.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.79;
Retail: Skim: $2.73.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $2.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.77;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.76;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.63.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.35;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.61;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Average;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.61;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.61.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.64.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.67.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.59;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.80;
Retail: 1%: $2.89;
Retail: Skim: $2.80.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.37;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.81;
Retail: 1%: $2.86;
Retail: Skim: $2.80.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10;
Retail: Whole: $2.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.79;
Retail: 1%: $2.83;
Retail: Skim: $2.79.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.14;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97;
Retail: Whole: $2.76;
Retail: 2%: $2.81;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $2.78.
Average;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.79;
Retail: Skim: $2.75.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.70.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.75;
Retail: Skim: $2.70.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.85;
Retail: 1%: $2.88;
Retail: Skim: $2.80.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.78;
Cooperative: $2.08;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.33;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $3.18;
Retail: 2%: $3.25;
Retail: 1%: $3.28;
Retail: Skim: $3.18.
Average;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.87;
Retail: 1%: $2.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.83.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the New Orleans market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for New Orleans for
3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the
prices paid by the Naval Support Activities, New Orleans; the Naval
Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport; and Keesler Air Force Base
commissaries, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is
the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the New Orleans
market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 21: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.73;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.44;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.17;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $1.82;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Average;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.23;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $2.46.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.26.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.49;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.05;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.20.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.48;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.38;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.59;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61;
Retail: Whole: $2.41;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.53;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.50;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.08;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76;
Retail: Whole: $2.47;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Average;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.41;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.66;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.52;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.53;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.78;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.75;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.36;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.00;
Cooperative: $1.09;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.48;
Retail: 2%: $2.57;
Retail: 1%: $2.60;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.52;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.60.
Average;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.57;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.64;
Retail: Skim: $2.54.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.13;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.49;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.61;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.06;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.43;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $2.48.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.97;
Cooperative: $1.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.44;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.97;
Cooperative: $1.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.43;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.51;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.06;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.97;
Cooperative: $1.06;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.32;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.79;
Retail: Whole: $2.44;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.45.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97;
Retail: Whole: $2.67;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.85;
Retail: Skim: $2.67.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.33;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.16;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Average;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $2.39;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $2.41.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $1.97;
Retail: 2%: $2.11;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98;
Retail: Whole: $2.14;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.18;
Retail: Skim: $2.03.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.83;
Cooperative: $1.91;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.33;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.14;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.65;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Average;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Phoenix market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Phoenix for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid
by the commissaries at Luke Air Force Base and Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Phoenix market.
Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 22: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Salt Lake City, Utah, October
2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $2.60;
Retail: 2%: $2.18;
Retail: 1%: $2.17;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.39;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.18;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Average;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.17;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.21;
Retail: 1%: $2.19;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.34;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.09.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $2.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.39;
Cooperative: $1.48;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.93;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.18;
Retail: 1%: $2.16;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.42;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.39;
Retail: 2%: $2.19;
Retail: 1%: $2.12;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.51;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.39;
Retail: 2%: $2.13;
Retail: 1%: $2.13;
Retail: Skim: $2.00.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.44;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.37;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.20;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.48;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.39;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.21.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91;
Retail: Whole: $2.41;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.33;
Retail: Skim: $2.22.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.14;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Average;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84;
Retail: Whole: $2.42;
Retail: 2%: $2.24;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.24;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.41;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $2.41;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.02;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.39;
Retail: 2%: $2.38;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.26;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.09;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.37;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.09;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.01;
Retail: 1%: $1.94;
Retail: Skim: $1.91.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.06;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.46;
Retail: 2%: $2.42;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.44;
Retail: 1%: $2.41;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $1.97;
Retail: 1%: $1.99;
Retail: Skim: $1.84.
Average;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.07;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.96;
Cooperative: $1.04;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.03;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.94;
Cooperative: $1.02;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.09;
Retail: 1%: $2.07;
Retail: Skim: $1.85.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.11;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.89.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $1.96;
Retail: 2%: $2.00;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.83.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.04;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.01;
Retail: Skim: $1.86.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.77;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.11.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.10;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.92;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.51;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.22;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.28;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.05;
Retail: 1%: $2.06;
Retail: Skim: $1.88.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07;
Retail: Whole: $2.03;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Average;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82;
Retail: Whole: $2.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.14;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99;
Retail: Whole: $2.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.08;
Retail: Skim: $1.93.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.12;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86;
Retail: Whole: $1.96;
Retail: 2%: $2.03;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.90.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80;
Retail: Whole: $1.99;
Retail: 2%: $2.06;
Retail: 1%: $2.13;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.10;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.78;
Retail: Whole: $2.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.02.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.81;
Cooperative: $1.88;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.52;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.38.
Average;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89;
Retail: Whole: $2.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.19;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Salt Lake City market, the farm price is the USDA-
estimated farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Salt
Lake City for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the
price paid by the commissary at Hill Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Salt Lake City market. Prices may
not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 23: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in San Diego, California, October
2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.51;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.79;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Average;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.95;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.93;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.57;
Retail: 1%: $2.77;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.05;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.01;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.84;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.85;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.81;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.46;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.91;
Retail: 2%: $2.85;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $3.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.94;
Retail: 1%: $2.99;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $3.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.99;
Retail: 1%: $3.04;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $3.22;
Retail: 2%: $2.95;
Retail: 1%: $3.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.55;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $3.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.95;
Retail: 1%: $3.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.61.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $3.18;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.81;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.06;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $3.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.94;
Retail: 1%: $3.08;
Retail: Skim: $2.52.
Average;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.97;
Retail: 2%: $2.84;
Retail: 1%: $2.94;
Retail: Skim: $2.47.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $3.05;
Retail: 2%: $2.91;
Retail: 1%: $2.94;
Retail: Skim: $2.46.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.01;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.95;
Retail: 2%: $2.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $2.85;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.98;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61;
Retail: Whole: $2.76;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.94;
Cooperative: $1.14;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.88;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.90;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.85;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.87;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.85;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.77;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $0.89;
Cooperative: $1.08;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $0.91;
Cooperative: $1.08;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.64;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $0.94;
Cooperative: $1.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $0.92;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $0.92;
Cooperative: $1.08;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.71;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Average;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.66;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $0.92;
Cooperative: $1.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.68;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.84;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $0.89;
Cooperative: $1.06;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.74;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50;
Retail: Whole: $2.74;
Retail: 2%: $2.63;
Retail: 1%: $2.94;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.87;
Cooperative: $1.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.72;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.69;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.70;
Retail: 2%: $2.58;
Retail: 1%: $2.78;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.88;
Cooperative: $1.02;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.70;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.60;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.27.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.87;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.87;
Cooperative: $1.04;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.68;
Retail: 1%: $2.78;
Retail: Skim: $2.30.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.70;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.82;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.84;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $3.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.98;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73;
Retail: Whole: $3.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $3.07;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.16;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76;
Retail: Whole: $3.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.86;
Retail: 1%: $3.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.43.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75;
Retail: Whole: $3.12;
Retail: 2%: $2.80;
Retail: 1%: $3.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.93;
Retail: Skim: $2.23.
Average;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56;
Retail: Whole: $2.87;
Retail: 2%: $2.69;
Retail: 1%: $2.94;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.04;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55;
Retail: Whole: $2.64;
Retail: 2%: $2.45;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.43;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.26;
Cooperative: $1.21;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.80;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.40;
Retail: Whole: $2.55;
Retail: 2%: $2.34;
Retail: 1%: $2.76;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.48;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.76;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.63;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.85;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.34;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83;
Retail: Whole: $3.03;
Retail: 2%: $2.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.93;
Retail: Skim: $2.40.
Average;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.37;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53;
Retail: Whole: $2.72;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.77;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by the California
Department of Food and Agriculture, the Defense Commissary Agency, and
Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the San Diego market, the farm price is the California
mailbox price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the Southern California Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content;
the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid by the
commissaries at the Naval Base, San Diego; Marine Corps Base, Camp
Pendleton; Naval Outlying Landing Field, Imperial Beach; Marine Corps
Air Station, Miramar; Naval Air Station, North Island; and by the San
Onofre Commissary, Camp Pendleton, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and
the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc.,
for the San Diego market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 24: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Seattle, Washington, October
2000 through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.59;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31;
Retail: Whole: $2.71;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.14;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.30;
Retail: Whole: $2.83;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.58;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.27;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.40;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.33;
Retail: Whole: $2.73;
Retail: 2%: $2.57;
Retail: 1%: $2.57;
Retail: Skim: $2.45.
Average;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.59;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31;
Retail: Whole: $2.76;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.55;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.63;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48;
Retail: Whole: $2.62;
Retail: 2%: $2.39;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Month: February;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.33;
Retail: Whole: $2.98;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Month: March;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.29;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.64;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.43;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.36;
Retail: Whole: $2.77;
Retail: 2%: $2.52;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $2.29.
Month: April;
Farm: $1.27;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.71;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.59;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.95;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.54.
Month: May;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.78;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51;
Retail: Whole: $2.95;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.44.
Month: June;
Farm: $1.41;
Cooperative: $1.49;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57;
Retail: Whole: $2.80;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.70;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Month: July;
Farm: $1.44;
Cooperative: $1.52;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $3.14;
Retail: 2%: $3.01;
Retail: 1%: $2.85;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Month: August;
Farm: $1.44;
Cooperative: $1.53;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61;
Retail: Whole: $3.15;
Retail: 2%: $2.99;
Retail: 1%: $2.85;
Retail: Skim: $2.71.
Month: September;
Farm: $1.46;
Cooperative: $1.54;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62;
Retail: Whole: $2.84;
Retail: 2%: $2.65;
Retail: 1%: $2.62;
Retail: Skim: $2.43.
Month: October;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.92;
Retail: 2%: $2.72;
Retail: 1%: $2.69;
Retail: Skim: $2.46.
Month: November;
Farm: $1.47;
Cooperative: $1.56;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.70;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63;
Retail: Whole: $3.01;
Retail: 2%: $2.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Month: December;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32;
Retail: Whole: $2.93;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.47.
Average;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.78;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51;
Retail: Whole: $2.92;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.67;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.15;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32;
Retail: Whole: $3.18;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $2.67.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.33;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32;
Retail: Whole: $3.13;
Retail: 2%: $2.86;
Retail: 1%: $2.74;
Retail: Skim: $2.62.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.12;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.29;
Retail: Whole: $3.16;
Retail: 2%: $2.91;
Retail: 1%: $2.78;
Retail: Skim: $2.68.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.11;
Cooperative: $1.19;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.35;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.28;
Retail: Whole: $2.99;
Retail: 2%: $2.66;
Retail: 1%: $2.59;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.17;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.54;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.33;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.26;
Retail: Whole: $3.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.48.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.07;
Cooperative: $1.15;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.52;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.24;
Retail: Whole: $3.08;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.54;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.12;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.48;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.36;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.27;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.21;
Retail: Whole: $3.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.67;
Retail: 1%: $2.69;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.43.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.10;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20;
Retail: Whole: $3.01;
Retail: 2%: $2.70;
Retail: 1%: $2.71;
Retail: Skim: $2.47.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $0.99;
Cooperative: $1.07;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.45;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17;
Retail: Whole: $3.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.77;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.56.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.34;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.19;
Retail: Whole: $2.98;
Retail: 2%: $2.73;
Retail: 1%: $2.69;
Retail: Skim: $2.41.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.02;
Cooperative: $1.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20;
Retail: Whole: $2.98;
Retail: 2%: $2.76;
Retail: 1%: $2.75;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Average;
Farm: $1.08;
Cooperative: $1.16;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.52;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.39;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.31;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.24;
Retail: Whole: $3.05;
Retail: 2%: $2.74;
Retail: 1%: $2.68;
Retail: Skim: $2.50.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.03;
Cooperative: $1.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.19;
Retail: Whole: $3.12;
Retail: 2%: $3.04;
Retail: 1%: $2.91;
Retail: Skim: $2.78.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.00;
Cooperative: $1.08;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17;
Retail: Whole: $3.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.92;
Retail: 1%: $2.73;
Retail: Skim: $2.53.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $0.96;
Cooperative: $1.05;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.42;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.29;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.21;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.14;
Retail: Whole: $2.97;
Retail: 2%: $2.75;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.42.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.03;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.40;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.27;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.19;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.12;
Retail: Whole: $3.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.49.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.04;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.23;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.16;
Retail: Whole: $2.94;
Retail: 2%: $2.81;
Retail: 1%: $2.66;
Retail: Skim: $2.45.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $0.96;
Cooperative: $1.04;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17;
Retail: Whole: $3.00;
Retail: 2%: $2.82;
Retail: 1%: $2.76;
Retail: Skim: $2.54.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $0.95;
Cooperative: $1.04;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.45;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.18;
Retail: Whole: $3.07;
Retail: 2%: $2.86;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $2.55.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.05;
Cooperative: $1.15;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.55;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.28;
Retail: Whole: $3.11;
Retail: 2%: $2.93;
Retail: 1%: $2.90;
Retail: Skim: $2.65.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.81;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54;
Retail: Whole: $3.22;
Retail: 2%: $3.00;
Retail: 1%: $3.01;
Retail: Skim: $2.72.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.43;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $3.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.98;
Retail: 1%: $2.97;
Retail: Skim: $2.69.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.35;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $3.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.89;
Retail: 1%: $2.93;
Retail: Skim: $2.63.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.30;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55;
Retail: Whole: $2.75;
Retail: 2%: $2.62;
Retail: 1%: $2.49;
Retail: Skim: $2.39.
Average;
Farm: $1.09;
Cooperative: $1.18;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.44;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31;
Retail: Whole: $3.03;
Retail: 2%: $2.88;
Retail: 1%: $2.80;
Retail: Skim: $2.57.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.22;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.69;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.56;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.92;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.47;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.10;
Cooperative: $1.20;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.65;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.81;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.13;
Cooperative: $1.23;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.60;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.44;
Retail: 2%: $2.46;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.28;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.46;
Retail: Skim: $2.32.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.80;
Cooperative: $1.89;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13;
Retail: Whole: $3.06;
Retail: 2%: $2.88;
Retail: 1%: $2.82;
Retail: Skim: $2.61.
Average;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.69;
Retail: 2%: $2.59;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Seattle market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is
the announced cooperative Class I price for Seattle for 3.5 percent
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid
by the commissaries at the Naval Station Everett, Smokey Point Support
Center; Fort Lewis; and McChord Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by
Information Resources, Inc., for the Seattle market. Prices may not
average due to rounding.
[End of table]
Table 25: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Washington, D.C., October 2000
through May 2004:
Year: 2000;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2000;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.09;
Retail: 2%: $2.10;
Retail: 1%: $2.09;
Retail: Skim: $1.94.
Year: 2000;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.51;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.11;
Retail: 2%: $2.12;
Retail: 1%: $2.11;
Retail: Skim: $1.97.
Average;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.67;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42;
Retail: Whole: $2.10;
Retail: 2%: $2.11;
Retail: 1%: $2.10;
Retail: Skim: $1.95.
Year: 2001;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.54;
Cooperative: $1.62;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54;
Retail: Whole: $2.21;
Retail: 2%: $2.24;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2001;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.67;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.52;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.22;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.23;
Retail: Skim: $2.04.
Year: 2001;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.43;
Cooperative: $1.50;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.57;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48;
Retail: Whole: $2.21;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.05.
Year: 2001;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.49;
Cooperative: $1.57;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.64;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2001;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2001;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.63;
Cooperative: $1.70;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.93;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2001;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.63;
Cooperative: $1.71;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.25;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2001;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.64;
Cooperative: $1.71;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.26;
Retail: Skim: $2.10.
Year: 2001;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.65;
Cooperative: $1.72;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2001;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.68;
Cooperative: $1.76;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.37;
Retail: 2%: $2.35;
Retail: 1%: $2.34;
Retail: Skim: $2.17.
Year: 2001;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.69;
Cooperative: $1.77;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74;
Retail: Whole: $2.38;
Retail: 2%: $2.39;
Retail: 1%: $2.40;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2001;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.57;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60;
Retail: Whole: $2.35;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.19.
Average;
Farm: $1.56;
Cooperative: $1.63;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.12.
Year: 2002;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.71;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.54;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55;
Retail: Whole: $2.36;
Retail: 2%: $2.36;
Retail: 1%: $2.35;
Retail: Skim: $2.18.
Year: 2002;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.52;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52;
Retail: Whole: $2.33;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2002;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.41;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.65;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.49;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50;
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.15.
Year: 2002;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.33;
Cooperative: $1.40;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.64;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.43;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49;
Retail: Whole: $2.30;
Retail: 2%: $2.30;
Retail: 1%: $2.30;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2002;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.31;
Cooperative: $1.38;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.63;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.42;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48;
Retail: Whole: $2.32;
Retail: 2%: $2.31;
Retail: 1%: $2.32;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2002;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.40;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.46;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.12.
Year: 2002;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.31;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2002;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.28;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2002;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.31;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.27;
Retail: 2%: $2.27;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2002;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.21;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.54;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.34;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.12.
Year: 2002;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.25;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44;
Retail: Whole: $2.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.20;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.08.
Year: 2002;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.24;
Retail: 2%: $2.25;
Retail: 1%: $2.24;
Retail: Skim: $2.09.
Average;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.41;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.47;
Retail: Whole: $2.29;
Retail: 2%: $2.28;
Retail: 1%: $2.29;
Retail: Skim: $2.13.
Year: 2003;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.24;
Cooperative: $1.32;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43;
Retail: Whole: $2.20;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2003;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.20;
Cooperative: $1.28;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.53;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.37;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.33;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41;
Retail: Whole: $2.19;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.08.
Year: 2003;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.50;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.18;
Retail: 2%: $2.19;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2003;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.24;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.48;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.29;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.22;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.21;
Retail: Skim: $2.07.
Year: 2003;
Month: May;
Farm: $1.17;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.23;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.22;
Retail: Skim: $2.07.
Year: 2003;
Month: June;
Farm: $1.18;
Cooperative: $1.25;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.49;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38;
Retail: Whole: $2.25;
Retail: 2%: $2.22;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.06.
Year: 2003;
Month: July;
Farm: $1.19;
Cooperative: $1.26;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.50;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.34;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.39;
Retail: Whole: $2.28;
Retail: 2%: $2.23;
Retail: 1%: $2.20;
Retail: Skim: $2.07.
Year: 2003;
Month: August;
Farm: $1.29;
Cooperative: $1.36;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.45;
Retail: Whole: $2.34;
Retail: 2%: $2.29;
Retail: 1%: $2.27;
Retail: Skim: $2.14.
Year: 2003;
Month: September;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.74;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.61;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59;
Retail: Whole: $2.50;
Retail: 2%: $2.47;
Retail: 1%: $2.42;
Retail: Skim: $2.28.
Year: 2003;
Month: October;
Farm: $1.57;
Cooperative: $1.65;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.51;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
Year: 2003;
Month: November;
Farm: $1.58;
Cooperative: $1.66;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.53;
Retail: 1%: $2.50;
Retail: Skim: $2.34.
Year: 2003;
Month: December;
Farm: $1.53;
Cooperative: $1.61;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.55;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $2.37.
Average;
Farm: $1.32;
Cooperative: $1.39;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.62;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.42;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49;
Retail: Whole: $2.35;
Retail: 2%: $2.33;
Retail: 1%: $2.31;
Retail: Skim: $2.16.
Year: 2004;
Month: January;
Farm: $1.36;
Cooperative: $1.44;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.69;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58;
Retail: Whole: $2.59;
Retail: 2%: $2.54;
Retail: 1%: $2.51;
Retail: Skim: $2.36.
Year: 2004;
Month: February;
Farm: $1.34;
Cooperative: $1.42;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55;
Retail: Whole: $2.56;
Retail: 2%: $2.50;
Retail: 1%: $2.48;
Retail: Skim: $2.33.
Year: 2004;
Month: March;
Farm: $1.37;
Cooperative: $1.45;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54;
Retail: Whole: $2.53;
Retail: 2%: $2.48;
Retail: 1%: $2.45;
Retail: Skim: $2.31.
Year: 2004;
Month: April;
Farm: $1.51;
Cooperative: $1.59;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66;
Retail: Whole: $2.58;
Retail: 2%: $2.49;
Retail: 1%: $2.43;
Retail: Skim: $2.25.
Year: 2004;
Month: May;
Farm: $2.03;
Cooperative: $2.11;
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28;
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12;
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05;
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04;
Retail: Whole: $2.90;
Retail: 2%: $2.78;
Retail: 1%: $2.72;
Retail: Skim: $2.51.
Average;
Farm: $1.52;
Cooperative: $1.60;
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82;
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66;
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61;
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67;
Retail: Whole: $2.63;
Retail: 2%: $2.56;
Retail: 1%: $2.52;
Retail: Skim: $2.35.
[End of table]
Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.
Note: For the Washington, D.C., market, the farm price is the USDA-
estimated farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for
Washington, D.C., for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price
is the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at Bolling Air
Force Base; Walter Reed Army Medical Center; Fort Myer; Fort Belvoir;
the Marine Corps Base, Quantico; Andrews Air Force Base; Aberdeen
Proving Ground; the Naval Station, Annapolis; Fort Meade; and Fort
Detrick, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Washington,
D.C., market. Prices may not average due to rounding.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Factors That Influence the Price of Milk as It Moves from
the Farm to the Consumer:
The prices that farmers, cooperatives, wholesale processors, and
retailers receive are determined by the interaction of many factors,
such as forces affecting the supply of raw milk and manufactured and
fluid milk products, consumer demand for manufactured and fluid milk
products, federal and state dairy programs, the level of services
provided by dairy cooperatives, market structure at various levels of
the marketing chain, and other input costs of processing and retailing.
Dairy farmers receive a price for raw milk, and each entity involved in
the processing and marketing of fluid milk adds value to the product
and retains a portion of the difference between the farm and retail
prices. (This difference is known as the price spread.) This appendix
examines the key factors that influence milk prices at the different
levels of the marketing chain.
Market Forces, in Addition to Federal and State Policies, Influence
Milk Prices at the Farm Level:
Supply and demand forces, which in turn are influenced by federal and
state dairy programs, determine farm prices for the raw milk that is
sold for use in fluid milk and other dairy products.[Footnote 36] For
example, in recent months, a variety of supply and demand forces have
come together to significantly increase farm milk prices. On the supply
side, the available supply of raw milk has been reduced by farmers
cutting back production due to a previous period of low prices and by
the closing of the Canadian border to replacement cows as a result of
concerns about mad cow disease.[Footnote 37] On the demand side,
consumer demand for nonfluid dairy products has increased as consumers
resumed eating out following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and as
dietary trends, such as the rising popularity of low-carbohydrate
diets, have changed. While these forces have been driving recent price
trends, federal and state dairy programs continue to influence milk
prices. For example, major domestic programs such as federal milk
marketing orders (FMMOs) and price supports help individual farmers who
lack market power compared to other entities such as wholesale
processors and retailers and help to ensure that farm prices do not
fall below a minimum level. At the same time, U.S. import restrictions
maintain domestic dairy prices at levels higher than average
international market prices by limiting the quantities of milk products
that are imported into the country.
Supply and Demand Forces Affect Farm Milk Prices:
The quantity of raw milk that dairy farmers supply (production) is
determined by the operating costs of producing that milk, such as feed
and fuel,[Footnote 38] ownership costs for dairying equipment,[Footnote
39] land costs, and labor costs, as well as the price that farmers
expect to receive for milk (as based on demand). Of these costs, the
2002 annual report on the costs of milk production in California, the
largest milk producing state, showed that the highest cost is feed, at
44 percent of milk production costs. Other major costs include
replacement cows (14 percent), other operating expenses (13 percent),
and labor (11 percent).[Footnote 40] Milk production can also vary
seasonally, according to weather, and is affected by farmers'
management practices.
In February 2004, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) published a
report on the characteristics and costs of milk production in the
United States, which found that dairy farmers in the West had a cost
advantage over farmers in other regions because western operations were
appreciably larger.[Footnote 41] Farms with 500 or more milk cows had
substantially lower total operating and ownership costs, averaging
$11.60 per hundredweight of milk sold. This cost advantage arises
because as herd size increases, associated increases in fixed costs,
such as capital investments, are spread proportionally over a larger
amount of production, thereby lowering the fixed costs per
hundredweight of milk produced. USDA found that the average herd size
of low-cost operations was more than three times the size of high-cost
operations.[Footnote 42] Table 26 shows the average ownership and
operating costs by region and herd size in 2000.
Table 26: Average Ownership and Operating Costs by Region and Herd
Size, 2000:
Region: Arizona/Las Vegas, Pacific Northwest, California[A];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $11.58.
Region: Upper Midwest[B];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $14.40.
Region: Northeast[C];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $14.44.
Region: Central[D];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $18.09.
Region: Mideast/Southeast[E];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $18.23.
Herd size: Small (500);
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $11.60.
Source: USDA.
[A] States in this survey region included parts of Arizona, California,
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.
[B] States in this survey region included Michigan and Wisconsin and
part of Minnesota.
[C] States in this survey region included Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont and parts of Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
[D] States in this survey region included Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa
and parts of Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South
Dakota.
[E] States in this survey region included West Virginia and parts of
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.
[End of table]
The USDA study also reported that while milk is produced in all 50
states, the top 5 milk-producing states in 2000--California, Wisconsin,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota--accounted for 53 percent of
total milk produced. Growth in the importance of western regions as
major sources of milk over the past 25 years is a significant feature
of the United States dairy industry. For example, in 1975, midwestern
states such as Iowa, Ohio, and Missouri were prominent among the top 10
dairy producing states. By 2000, production in Idaho, New Mexico, and
Washington State surpassed production in these traditional dairy
states. Milk production is consolidating so that farms with larger
numbers of cows account for a growing share of production. In 1993,
farms with 100 or more cows accounted for 14 percent of all U.S. dairy
farms, over half of all cows, and over 55 percent of the milk produced.
As of 2000, these numbers had grown to 20 percent of all dairy farms,
66 percent of all cows, and more than 70 percent of milk produced.
Significantly, farms with 500 or more cows accounted for 3 percent of
all dairy farms, but 35 percent of cows and 31 percent of milk produced
in 2000.
The production of milk has unique characteristics that distinguish it
from other agricultural products and that cause relatively small
changes in supply or demand to result in relatively large changes in
price, particularly at the farm level. Farmers employ specialized
assets or equipment to produce milk, and they have limited ability to
use their farms, cows, and equipment for other purposes during periods
of low prices. This limited flexibility creates a relatively inelastic
supply of milk with respect to price.[Footnote 43]
Demand for raw milk is mainly derived from consumer demand for fluid
milk and manufactured milk products.[Footnote 44] Consumer demand for
different fluid or manufactured milk products affects the price of raw
milk used for other products because increased consumer demand for one
particular product-causing more of that product to be produced--reduces
the supply of raw milk available for other products, thus increasing
the price that manufacturers of other products must pay to acquire raw
milk. Over the long term, per capita demand for fluid milk products has
been steadily declining, in large part because consumers have
substituted carbonated soft drinks and other beverages for fluid milk.
On the other hand, consumer demand for milk products has varied based
on dietary considerations, such as the rising popularity of low-
carbohydrate diets and changes in food consumption patterns, such as an
increase in the amount of food consumed away from the home. Despite
some evidence that consumer demand for fluid milk has become more
price elastic, it remains relatively price inelastic compared to the
demand for many other products.[Footnote 45]
Given the relative inelasticities of milk supply and demand with
respect to price, a number of sources indicated that recent changes in
the amount of raw milk produced, when combined with changes in demand,
have affected farm prices. After late 1999, farm prices began falling
in response to the production surplus that existed at that time. In
addition, a number of dairy experts indicated that following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prices began to fall even
further as people stopped eating out as much, thereby reducing the
demand for manufactured milk products such as cheese.[Footnote 46] This
reduced consumption compounded the long-term decline in demand for
fluid milk products. USDA reported that the combination of these supply
and demand factors was responsible for the low farm prices that
occurred during 2002 and 2003.
More recently, however, supply and demand conditions have changed to
produce record high farm prices in 2004. For example, in response to
low prices during 2002 and 2003, some farmers began to cut back on
production by reducing the sizes of their herds. However, with the
relative price inelasticity of milk supplies, one academic expert noted
that it can take 12 to 18 months to achieve a supply response to low
prices. During this time, the identification of a cow infected with mad
cow disease in Alberta, Canada, in May 2003, led to a temporary U.S.
ban on imports of Canadian beef and cattle. This ban included live
animals, some of which would have been used as replacement cows in U.S.
dairy herds. While some beef imports have resumed, USDA has not lifted
restrictions on imports of live cattle.[Footnote 47] Consequently, in
June 2004, a report by USDA's Economic Research Service noted that with
relatively few expansions in late 2003 and the tight supplies of
replacement cows, few dairy farmers could increase production in
response to rising milk prices, a response that usually limits price
increases.[Footnote 48]
Another factor in reducing milk production has been the lower amount of
bST--a hormone used in milk production--available to U.S.
farmers.[Footnote 49] USDA reported that about 2 percent of the U.S.
milk supply can be attributed to the use of bST.[Footnote 50] However,
in January 2004, Monsanto, the maker of the hormone, announced that its
customers would receive only half their normal supply. This reduced
availability began March 1 and is expected to continue through the end
of 2004. Additionally, drought conditions in recent years have led to
higher feed costs and have negatively affected the quality of the
feed.[Footnote 51] Finally, some sources identified the National Milk
Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working Together program as another
factor leading to reduced raw milk supplies.[Footnote 52] Since the
program began in July 2003, cooperatives have tried to reduce raw milk
supplies by eliminating some dairy herds, decreasing production, and
increasing exports. USDA estimates indicate that from January through
June 2004, milk production in the top 20 dairy producing states
averaged about 1 percent below production levels during the same period
in 2003.
While these factors combined to reduce the available supply of raw
milk, dairy experts indicated that demand for manufactured milk
products has recovered during 2004. In part, they cited a general
economic recovery as contributing to this increased demand. They also
indicated that people have returned to consuming more food away from
home, as they did prior to September 11, 2001. This recovery in demand,
coming at a time of reduced milk supplies, pushed farm prices to record
high levels in April and May of 2004. For example, USDA's market-based
announced minimum price for milk to be used in manufactured products,
such as cheese, was $19.66 and $20.58 per hundredweight in April and
May of 2004, respectively. These prices compare with $9.41 and $9.71
per hundredweight for April and May of 2003. More recently, these high
prices have started to moderate; the comparable announced minimum price
for June 2004 was $17.68. However, USDA has estimated that average 2004
farm-level prices will be more than $3 per hundredweight higher than
they were in 2003.
Federal and State Dairy Programs and Policies Influence Farm Prices:
A complex system of programs and policies influences the price of raw
milk used to produce fluid milk and manufactured products. USDA's milk
marketing orders, as well as some states' dairy programs, attempt to
stabilize milk marketing conditions by establishing minimum raw milk
prices and other marketing rules, thus, these programs assist
individual farmers and dairy cooperatives, which lack the market power
of other entities such as wholesale milk processors.[Footnote 53]
USDA's price support program attempts to ensure that farm prices do not
fall below a minimum level, and, together with the Milk Income Loss
Contract (MILC) program, provides a safety net for individual farmers
during periods of low prices. These programs and other federal dairy
policies operate in a broader context of trade restrictions, which can
limit competition from imported dairy products and maintain U.S. prices
above average international market prices.
Federal and State Milk Marketing Orders:
In 2003, the price of about 67 percent of the fluid grade milk marketed
by dairy farmers in the United States was regulated under the FMMO
program, created in 1933 and administered by USDA.[Footnote 54] Under
this program, USDA uses national dairy market price information to set
the minimum prices that must be paid by processors for raw fluid grade
milk in specified marketing areas, or orders.[Footnote 55] Figure 32
shows a map of the current 10 FMMOs.
Figure 32: Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Under the FMMO program, USDA has a classified pricing system for
setting minimum prices for milk on a monthly basis, based upon the
intended use of the milk, as shown in table 27. While there is some
variation among the methods used for setting prices in different
orders, in general, FMMO class prices are determined by formulas with
milk component values derived from wholesale dairy product prices. For
example, Class III formulas use weekly average butter, cheese, and dry
whey prices to determine values on a monthly basis for butterfat,
protein, and nonfat solids. The Class IV formulas use weekly average
butter and nonfat dry milk prices to determine values on a monthly
basis for butterfat and nonfat solids, respectively. The Class II price
is determined by adding a fixed amount--a Class II differential of
$0.70 per hundredweight--to the advanced Class IV skim milk value,
while the Class I price is determined by adding a Class I differential
to the higher of the advanced Class III or IV skim milk
values.[Footnote 56] The Class I differentials vary by order. These
differentials were, and to some extent remain, designed to represent
the cost of transporting milk from areas with a surplus--traditionally
the Upper Midwest region--to areas with a deficit, when necessary to
meet the demands for fluid milk products. Because these differentials
vary among orders, Class I prices differ from one marketing order to
another.
Table 27: USDA's Milk Classes Used for Setting Milk Prices:
Class: I;
Usage (examples): Fluid milk for drinking purposes.
Class: II;
Usage (examples): Soft manufactured products, such as cream products,
cottage cheese, ice cream, and yogurt.
Class: III;
Usage (examples): Cream cheese, other spreadable cheeses, and hard
cheese.
Class: IV;
Usage (examples): Butter and dried milk products, such as nonfat dry
milk.
Source: GAO presentation of USDA data.
[End of table]
Dairy farmers selling raw milk to manufactured or fluid milk processors
regulated by an FMMO receive an average, or "blend," price that is the
weighted average of the prices of Class I through IV milk. The weights
are determined by the amount of milk sold in each class in the
marketing order. The average price farmers receive, therefore, depends
in part on the extent to which the total raw milk supply in a specific
order is used to make fluid milk, as opposed to the three classes of
manufactured products. Dairy farmers located in a milk marketing order
sometimes ship their milk to another order to obtain a higher
price.[Footnote 57] If the farmer meets the receiving milk marketing
order's shipping requirements, all of that farmer's milk, not only the
shipped milk, can qualify for that order's blend price.[Footnote 58]
However, farmers must consider whether the benefit of receiving a
higher blend price outweighs the cost of transporting a sufficient
amount of milk to qualify for the receiving order's blend price.
To generate the money paid to farmers, processors pay into, or draw
from, a federal order "pool" based on the value of the use for which
they are buying the raw milk.[Footnote 59] Fluid milk processors are
required to participate in the federal order pool if they are covered
by one of the federal milk marketing orders. Processors of manufactured
products are not required to participate in the pool. Under the
classified pricing system, raw milk used in fluid products is valued
more highly. Therefore, the fluid milk processors typically pay money
to the pool, while those producing other products typically draw money
from the pool. This draw represents a benefit to processors of
manufactured milk products for serving as a reserve supply plant for
that order's Class I market. In part, a processor's payment or draw
depends on the producer price differential, a measure of the difference
between the value of that processor's use of raw milk as determined by
the market and the value if all of that processor's raw milk were used
in Class III products. In times of significant price volatility, it is
possible for the producer price differential to be negative, so that
some processors of manufactured products would have to pay into the
pool. In such cases, some of these processors choose not to participate
in the pool, or de-pool their milk, because they would be required to
pay into the pool instead of receiving a draw.
Some states, such as California, Maine, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia, have established their own minimum farm-level milk
pricing programs that cover all or portions of their states. These
states have established commissions or boards to perform functions
similar to those of USDA. For example, Virginia's milk commission,
created in 1934, establishes monthly farm prices to ensure dairy
farmers an adequate return on their investment and to preserve market
stability. Similarly, Nevada's dairy commission, established in 1955,
sets minimum prices for raw milk sold to processing facilities located
within that state.
Dairy Price Support Program:
The dairy price support program, established in 1949, supports farm
prices by providing a standing offer from USDA's Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) to purchase butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk at
specified prices.[Footnote 60] The prices offered for these dairy
products are intended to provide sufficient revenue so that processors
of these products can pay farmers, on average, a legislatively set
support price for raw milk. Since 1999, the support price has been set
at $9.90 per hundredweight.[Footnote 61]
By offering to purchase as much butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk as
processors offer to sell at specified prices, the price support program
sets a floor on the price of these commodities and, thus, indirectly on
the raw milk used to produce them. Because processors are not required
to sell to the CCC and milk processing costs vary, farmers may receive
prices that are either above or below the support price. However,
manufactured product prices generally will not fall below the floor for
very long. Also, because the price for raw milk used for fluid purposes
under the FMMO program is based in part on the price of raw milk used
for manufacturing purposes, the price support program indirectly
influences the price that farmers receive for raw milk used for fluid
purposes as well.
The Secretary of Agriculture can adjust--or tilt--the related CCC
purchase prices for butter and nonfat dry milk and still achieve the
target support price for raw milk used in manufactured products. These
products are considered joint products manufactured from the same 100
pounds of milk.[Footnote 62] Therefore, by increasing the support price
of butter while lowering the support price of nonfat dry milk, or vice
versa, USDA is able to adjust the CCC purchase prices, while
maintaining the overall support price. The ability to adjust the
relative purchase prices of these products is important for correcting
imbalances in the CCC's purchases of milkfat (butter) and nonfat solids
(nonfat dry milk). Failure to correct for such imbalances can create an
incentive for farmers to expand production and may alter the flow of
milk to alternative uses. The 1990 Farm Bill authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to adjust the tilt twice annually to limit the
accumulation of significant government stocks of certain
commodities.[Footnote 63]
As market prices rise, the support program allows the CCC to release
its commodity stocks if the market price for a particular commodity
exceeds that commodity's purchase price. In this respect, the program
helps to decrease volatility in milk prices with regard to high-price
periods as well as low-price periods.
Milk Income Loss Contract Program:
In 2002, the MILC program began to provide countercyclical payments
directly to farmers during periods of low prices.[Footnote 64] The MILC
program provides support to farmers when the price of Class I milk in
Boston falls below $16.94.[Footnote 65] MILC payments are equal to 45
percent of the difference between $16.94 and the lower Boston Class I
price. Farmers in all regions of the country have access to payments
under this program, but only 2.4 million pounds of milk per farm are
eligible for payments during each federal fiscal year. Farmers may
choose the month that they begin accepting their payments.[Footnote 66]
This discretion may enable farmers producing more than 2.4 million
pounds of milk per year to target their MILC payments during the
lowest-price periods of the year to maximize the MILC payments they
receive before reaching the cap on eligible production.
Trade Restrictions and Export Incentives for Dairy Products:
According to some government and academic experts, trade restrictions
have the greatest effect of any federal policy on farm milk prices.
Trade restrictions maintain U.S. prices above average international
market prices by restricting the amount of imports, particularly of
manufactured dairy products, that enter the country.[Footnote 67] In
other countries, costs of production may be lower, or exports may be
more heavily subsidized, possibly allowing these countries to export
products to the United States at competitive prices. Thus, without
trade restrictions, manufactured products from these other countries
might enter the United States in greater quantities. This increased
supply of manufactured products would be expected to decrease the
demand for domestic raw milk and lead to lower farm prices. Without
these trade restrictions, other dairy programs, such as the price
support program, might not be feasible because lower manufactured
product prices resulting from international competition could trigger
an increase in purchases by the CCC, which could render the program
prohibitively expensive.
The primary U.S. international trade restriction is the tariff-rate
quota, which is the primary international trade restriction allowed
under current international agreements. USDA's Foreign Agricultural
Service uses licensing to administer a tariff-rate quota system for
most dairy products. Under tariff-rate quotas, a low tariff rate
applies to imports up to a specified quantity, and a higher tariff rate
applies to any imports exceeding that amount. These higher over-quota
tariff rates generally limit trade to within quota levels. Quota rates
and quantities vary by product.
Another aspect of U.S. trade policy that affects farm prices is the
Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), an initiative that aims to help
exporters of certain U.S. dairy products-specifically, nonfat dry milk,
butterfat, and various cheeses-meet prevailing world prices for
targeted dairy products and destinations.[Footnote 68] A major
objective of the program is to develop export markets for dairy
products where U.S. products are not currently competitive. Under the
program, the Foreign Agricultural Service pays cash to exporters as
bonuses, allowing them to buy dairy products at U.S. prices and then
sell them abroad at lower international prices. DEIP could affect farm
prices primarily by increasing demand for dairy products through export
subsidies.[Footnote 69] According to a 2002 report by the Congressional
Research Service, past studies have indicated that DEIP subsidies have
at times enhanced farm prices; for example, these studies indicated
that DEIP subsidies enhanced farm prices by $0.30 to $0.50 per
hundredweight in 1992.[Footnote 70] Additionally, in May 2003, the
National Milk Producers Federation testified that the subsidies for
5,000 metric tons of butterfat provided by DEIP in March 2003 increased
wholesale butter prices by an estimated $0.06 per pound.[Footnote 71]
This price increase boosted farm income by between $20 million and $30
million. DEIP can also help lower government costs by reducing the
amount of product purchased under the price support program to the
extent that savings in the price support program exceed the costs of
subsidies. Given recent market conditions, DEIP has primarily been used
to encourage exports of nonfat dry milk and cheese,[Footnote 72] and
for the most part, from 1998 through 2002 the program supported exports
of these products to the maximum extent allowable under international
trade commitment limits.[Footnote 73]
Services Provided by Cooperatives, Market Structure, and Collective
Action Can Influence the Price of Milk at the Cooperative Level:
Milk reaches the consumer through a variety of pathways; however, most
milk produced by dairy farmers in the United States is marketed through
dairy cooperatives.[Footnote 74] Dairy cooperatives can either sell, or
arrange the sale of, raw milk purchased from farmers to wholesale milk
processors, or they can process it into fluid and manufactured milk
products and distribute them to retail outlets.[Footnote 75] As part of
sales to wholesale milk processors, cooperatives negotiate with the
processors for over-order premiums, which represent the difference
between the prices charged to the wholesalers and regulated minimum
prices, in areas with federal or state marketing orders or regulations.
The difference between the price at which cooperatives sell raw milk to
wholesale fluid milk processors and the farm price for fluid milk is
influenced by the costs of services that cooperatives provide to their
members and to their buyers, the relative market power of cooperatives
and fluid milk processors, and the effects of collective action taken
by dairy cooperatives in marketing their members' milk.
Costs of Services Provided by Cooperatives Influence Milk Prices:
Over-order premiums, in part, compensate cooperatives for the services
they provide to their members and on behalf of their members to
wholesalers. Some distinctive features of cooperatives include member
ownership and control, at-cost services for members, and distribution
of income to members on the basis of patronage. Farmers join dairy
cooperatives to guarantee a market outlet for their milk, to gain
bargaining power to obtain the best price in the market, to have their
milk marketed efficiently, with the assurance that their milk will be
accurately weighed and tested, and to be effectively represented in
legislative, regulatory, and public relations matters. Most dairy
cooperatives require farmers to sign a 1-year membership agreement that
commits them to market all their milk through the cooperative.[Footnote
76]
Cooperatives operate like corporate businesses to perform services for
their members. For example, Dairy Farmers of America, the largest dairy
cooperative in the country, serves almost 23,000 members, producing
about 21 percent and marketing about 33 percent of the milk in the
United States. According to the cooperative's Web site, the cooperative
provides a variety of services to its members, including the following:
* insurance--medical programs, dental/vision plans, and life insurance
available to members via a milk check deduction;
* direct deposit--direct deposit of members' milk checks, ensuring that
farmers' pay checks will be available within 24 hours of the pay date;
* forward contracting--a marketing service that allows members to
protect themselves against price volatility by locking in the future
sale price of their milk several months before it is produced; and:
* financing services--loan packages for cattle, equipment, and
operating expenses.
In some cases, dairy farmers pay on a per-use basis for the services
they receive. However, cooperatives may also try to offset the costs of
their services through negotiations with wholesale milk processors for
over-order premiums.
Over-order premiums also compensate dairy cooperatives for a number of
services that they provide to fluid milk processors on behalf of their
members. Generally, these services include (1) transporting milk from
different milk-producing areas, (2) scheduling--or balancing--milk
deliveries to coincide with demand, and (3) standardizing the component
content of milk deliveries. Different cooperatives also provide
additional services for fluid milk processors. For example, one
cooperative we contacted noted the rigorous quality control procedures
it performs on its members' milk. According to the cooperative
official, these efforts allow the cooperative to market its members'
milk as better quality, potentially helping the cooperative negotiate
higher over-order premiums. Officials from another cooperative said
that a major component of the costs of services provided by
cooperatives is balancing the delivery of raw milk supplies to
processors' plants. At certain times processors' plants have surging
demand for raw milk, while at other times the plants are empty. In
addition, supply disruptions, such as labor strikes, create significant
balancing disruptions. In this environment, few, if any, fluid milk
processing firms have the capital (plants to make cheese and other
products during periods of low fluid demand) to assume the risks
inherent in balancing, and so in most cases this responsibility is met
by the cooperatives.
Relative Market Power of Cooperatives and Processors Influences Milk
Prices:
Historically, farmers produced and distributed fluid milk as well as
some manufactured products. Milk is a highly perishable product that is
bulky to transport. Traditionally, this left farmers dependent on local
markets for the sale of their milk. The role of dairy cooperatives
developed as farmers faced greater demand for fluid milk and dairy
products and the number of farmers who processed and distributed their
own milk products declined. Instead, specialized firms began taking on
the role of processing fluid and manufactured milk products and
marketing them for sale to consumers. However, in this environment,
there were many more farmers than processors, so processors had the
opportunity to bargain with different farmers to obtain a lower price
for their raw milk supplies. In this situation, farmers were at a
disadvantage. Consequently, cooperatives took on the role of collecting
raw milk from farmers and distributing it to processors. By doing so,
cooperatives helped to balance the bargaining power between farmers and
processors. The 1922 Capper-Volstead Act provides limited antitrust
immunity to cooperatives that meet certain requirements under certain
conditions and gives farmers an opportunity to work together in setting
raw milk prices, including bargaining for market premiums. Thus, over-
order premiums, in part, reflect market power acquired by cooperatives
relative to processors.
Since our June 2001 report, the concentration of dairy cooperatives has
increased, with the potential effect of enhancing their market power in
negotiations with processors. In 2001, we reported that 83 percent of
the milk produced in the United States was marketed by cooperatives.
However, USDA recently reported that in 2002, the share of milk sold to
processors and other distributors by cooperatives reached 86 percent of
all the milk produced in the United States.[Footnote 77] Cooperatives
attained this market share despite a 13 percent decrease in the number
of dairy cooperatives between 1997 and 2002. During this time the
amount of member-produced milk marketed by the eight largest dairy
cooperatives grew from 52 to 63 percent of the total volume of milk
marketed by cooperatives. This translated into an increase from 42 to
52 percent of the total volume of milk produced in the United States.
A number of dairy experts cited the need to offset gains in market
power made by increasingly concentrated firms at the wholesale
processor and retail levels of the milk marketing chain as a key factor
in the continued concentration of cooperatives. The greater the
percentage of the milk supply that a cooperative markets, the greater
its ability might be to obtain higher over-order premiums in
negotiations with wholesale processors. On the other hand, one academic
source questioned the extent to which increased concentration is
enhancing the market power of dairy cooperatives, particularly over the
long term. He noted that although Dairy Farmers of America has been
consolidating its control over milk supplies in some regions, farmers
and cooperatives have been able to command larger over-order premiums
in the East and Upper Midwest regions--where the cooperative's presence
is not as strong--than in the West, where milk supplies have been
increasing. Other sources noted that competition still exists among
cooperatives and independent dairy farmers and that this competition
prevents even larger cooperatives from obtaining excessively high over-
order premiums.
Collective Action by Cooperatives Influences Milk Prices:
Another factor in determining the over-order premiums received by
cooperatives for raw milk is collective action taken by cooperatives.
Cooperatives work together to try to set prices by coordination allowed
under the protection afforded by the Capper-Volstead Act. For example,
officials with Dairy Farmers of America said that a major factor in the
price of milk at the cooperative level is the action of marketing
agencies composed of cooperatives. Marketing agencies behave like
cartels and announce prices for their cooperative members. In most
cases these agencies set prices for raw milk used in fluid milk and
other products. Most of the prices announced by the marketing agencies
represent the minimum federal order prices; additional charges may be
added representing the costs of services provided by the cooperatives
to the processors.
Representatives of Dairy Farmers of America said that there are
marketing agency agreements in most major markets except in the Pacific
Northwest and that for the most part, cooperatives participate in
marketing agencies. They further stated that the use of marketing
agencies has become more common in recent years. The marketing agencies
may also market milk for independent farmers. The officials noted that
while cooperatives and independent farmers can choose not to
participate in the marketing agencies, experience has shown that as
more producers choose to market milk outside the system, the marketing
agencies face significant competition and prices fall. Eventually, if
the prices get low enough, the producers have an incentive to work
together again.
In an alternative type of collective action, three cooperatives--the
Dairylea Cooperative, Dairy Farmers of America, and St. Albans
Cooperative Creamery--established a milk marketing organization called
Dairy Marketing Services. According to a Dairy Marketing Services
official, the organization was formed because the cooperatives realized
that they needed more market power to compete with increasingly
concentrated processors and retailers. Cooperatives such as Dairylea,
or individual farmers, establish contracts with Dairy Marketing
Services to market their milk. Dairy Marketing Services markets about
16 billion pounds of milk annually for farmers in the Northeast area
that extends from Maine to Maryland, and includes a small area in Ohio.
The official estimated that this quantity represents about 45 percent
of the milk marketed in the Northeast and is produced by some 10,000 to
11,000 farmers.
The Dairy Marketing Services official stated that the organization has
been able to carve a niche for itself in the milk marketing chain by
convincing processors that it is more efficient for them to have Dairy
Marketing Services arrange to have raw milk transported from the farm
to the plant and allow the processors to focus on processing milk. As a
result, Dairy Marketing Services has been able to obtain contracts from
a number of major processors in the Northeast, including Dean Foods,
Crowley Foods, and Kraft, to ensure an adequate supply of milk for
their plants. Additionally, Dairy Marketing Services provides
specialized services for farmers such as health insurance and workmen's
compensation, a livestock purchasing service, and risk management
operations for farmers engaged in forward contracting. Although we were
unable to confirm the effects that Dairy Marketing Services' efforts
have had, the official stated that the organization has provided higher
over-order premiums and lower transportation charges for its
participating cooperatives and farmers than would have otherwise been
the case.
Input Costs, Service Levels, Innovations, and Market Structure
Influence Wholesale Fluid Milk Prices:
The difference between the price at which wholesale fluid milk
processors sell fluid milk products to retail firms and the price they
pay for raw milk is influenced by changes in input costs, such as fuel,
labor, packaging, transportation, and capital expenses. These costs, in
turn, are affected by recent innovations that have increased efficiency
and lowered costs of fluid milk processing, as well as by the level of
service that fluid milk processors provide to retailers. For example,
in addition to shipping the products to retailers, some wholesalers
provide in-store services, including unloading the milk on the store
dock, restocking the dairy case, and removing outdated or leaking
containers. The difference between what fluid milk processors pay for
raw milk and the wholesale price they charge their retail customers is
also influenced by continued structural change in the fluid milk
processing industry, including a steady increase in firm consolidation
and the market share of some firms. While there have been many reasons
for these trends, the effects on the market and fluid milk prices at
this level are unclear.
Input Costs, Service Levels, and Innovations Influence Wholesale Fluid
Milk Prices:
Several fluid milk processors stated that the cost of raw milk, and, in
particular, the federal order minimum price, was the single most
important influence on wholesale milk prices. We estimate that the
price of raw milk ranges from about 60 to 70 percent of the wholesale
price of 2 percent milk. As such, the wholesale price that processors
charge would be directly linked to the Class I federal order price on a
year-to-year basis, with adjustments for over-order premiums and other
inputs. However, a variety of other input costs can also affect the
price at which fluid milk processors sell fluid milk products to
retailers. Some sources indicated that costs of inputs other than raw
milk have been increasing in recent years.[Footnote 78] As one
executive of a milk-processing firm explained, the primary input costs,
apart from raw milk, include labor and energy. A 2002 study examining
changes in fluid milk processing plants located in the state of Maine
found that total processing costs rose at an annual rate of about 2.4
percent (adjusted for inflation) from 1993 through 2000.[Footnote 79]
The study indicated that economywide wage inflation plus a dramatic
increase in health care premiums paid by employers drove labor costs
above the costs of other inputs, such as land and building expenses and
plant supplies. Equipment costs increased 10.9 percent per year with
investments in plant automation and greater reliance on information
technologies. Also, fuel costs increased by 4.6 percent per year,
reflecting economywide trends in energy costs. Moreover, while the cost
of operating capital constituted only 1.0 percent of processing costs,
it increased substantially during this period due to an increase in the
short-term lending rate. Table 28 displays the percentage change in
fluid milk processing costs in Maine reported in this study for each
cost category from 1993 through 2000.
Table 28: Change in Costs for Fluid Milk Processing Plants in Maine,
1993 through 2000:
Cost category: Electricity;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 5.0%;
Annual rate of change: 1.6%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 12.0%.
Cost category: Equipment;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 20.0%;
Annual rate of change: 10.9%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 106.0%.
Cost category: Fuel oil;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%;
Annual rate of change: 4.6%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 37.0%.
Cost category: Labor;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 31.0%;
Annual rate of change: 3.7%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 29.0%.
Cost category: Land and building;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 13.0%;
Annual rate of change: 3.8%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 30.0%.
Cost category: Operating capital;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%;
Annual rate of change: 15.5%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 175.0%.
Cost category: Product loss;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%;
Annual rate of change: 0.4%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 3.0%.
Cost category: Supplies;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 27.0%;
Annual rate of change: (3.0%);
Total change from 1993 through 2000: (19.0%).
Cost category: Water and sewer;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%;
Annual rate of change: (0.3%);
Total change from 1993 through 2000: (2.0%).
Cost category: Total;
Percent of total cost in 2000: 100%;
Annual rate of change: 2.4%;
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 18.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of data from Dalton et al. (2002).
Note: Percentages calculated based on 2000 dollars. Percent of total
cost in 2000 was calculated by GAO and is rounded to the nearest
percent. Annual rates of change and total change from 1993 through 2000
are from Dalton et al. (2002).
[End of table]
Changes in the level of service that some fluid milk processors provide
their retail customers have increased the efficiency of the dairy
supply chain, thus potentially influencing wholesale milk prices. For
example, some fluid milk processors have begun to undertake supply-
chain management for their retail customers.[Footnote 80] According to
a number of retailers and processors, supply-chain management commonly
involves shared computer systems, which, in the vertical marketing
chain, allow processors to more efficiently manage the processing and
transporting of fluid milk products. One processor indicated that it
uses an electronic data transfer system to manage supplies for certain
retailers. In particular, this system allows the processor to contract
for a certain number of loads of milk per day. Further, according to a
recent presentation given by company officials, Dean Foods' national,
refrigerated, direct-store-delivery system allows it to deliver fluid
milk to its customers with increased route network efficiency and
without customer disruption.[Footnote 81] Dean Foods operates 129 fluid
processing plants in 39 states, servicing more than 150,000 customers
coast to coast via its direct-store-delivery system of more than 6,000
routes.[Footnote 82]
By allowing fluid milk products to move more efficiently from the
processor to the retailer, these kinds of services help to ensure
quality and reduce waste and costs along the supply chain. To the
extent that processors benefit from the reduced costs of supplying
retailers with fluid milk products, the provision of these services
could have a downward effect on wholesale prices. On the other hand,
these services could provide value to retailers for which they might be
willing to pay a higher price when acquiring fluid milk products.
Therefore, the net effect on wholesale prices of the level of service
that processors provide to retailers is uncertain.
Additionally, innovations in technology can affect prices at the
wholesale milk processing level. For example, changes in processing
technology, such as more automated equipment, can improve the
efficiency of processing operations and, to the extent that processing
firms are successful at reducing their costs through innovative
practices, they may be able to reduce their prices. A representative of
one fluid milk processor explained that improvements in processing and
packaging technology have doubled and tripled output. Also, a
representative of one firm that processes milk for sale in its own
retail stores stated that the firm has dedicated a large contingent of
people toward the goal of reducing milk losses at its processing plants
and has been successful at cutting these losses in half. He noted that
a driving force behind these efforts is to try to alleviate increases
in other input costs, such as labor.
With innovations in technology, the fluid milk processing industry has
also invested in innovative new products. By developing products with
extended shelf lives, processors can potentially save shipping costs,
leading to lower wholesale prices. For instance, the dairy processing
industry's collective investment in extended shelf life, ultra high
temperature, and aseptic packaging technology allows fluid milk
products to reach the end user more efficiently while maintaining
quality.[Footnote 83] The benefits to processors and their retailers
include the ability to ship these products longer distances because
they are able to endure more stress than traditionally processed milk.
Market Structure in the Fluid Milk Processing Industry Can Influence
Wholesale Prices:
Since the 1960s, there has been long-term structural change in the
wholesale fluid milk processing industry as a continuously declining
number of firms have processed an increasing average volume of
milk.[Footnote 84] Structural change in the processing industry has
been driven by economies of size, technological changes, high
concentration at other levels of the milk marketing chain, and rapid
consolidation into fewer and fewer firms.[Footnote 85] While structural
change can lead to lower prices due to cost reduction from greater
efficiency in production, it can also lead to higher market
concentration, particularly in individual markets. In general, high and
increasing market concentration can result in greater market power,
potentially allowing firms to increase prices above competitive levels.
Accordingly, the net impact of increased market concentration on
wholesale prices can be either positive or negative.
In recent years, through aggressive acquisitions of independent dairy
processing plants, a handful of fluid milk processing firms have
changed the market structure of the dairy industry at the wholesale
level. These companies have generally pursued the business strategy of
acquiring strong regional dairy processing plants so that they can
strengthen their presence in existing markets, while expanding their
geographic coverage to a national level. The acquisition and
consolidation trend at the wholesale level has affected market
structure by leading to higher market concentration for fluid milk
processors in some markets. One common measure of market concentration
is the four-firm concentration ratio-the percentage of sales by the top
four firms in a market. According to the 1997 Census of Manufacturers,
the market share for the top four fluid milk processors in the nation
was about 21 percent. However, the market share for top fluid milk
processors at the local level was significantly higher. For example, in
our June 2001 report, we found that in Boston, Massachusetts, the
market share of the top four fluid milk processors increased from 66
percent in December 1997 to 88 percent in December 1999.[Footnote 86]
Since our last report in 2001 on fluid milk prices, this trend has
continued, and there have been several significant mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures that have further consolidated the
industry. For example, in late 2001, Dean Foods merged with Suiza,
Inc., bringing together the number one and two firms in terms of market
share in the processing industry. Then, in July 2002, the Land O' Lakes
dairy cooperative sold its fluid milk operations to Dean Foods. We
estimate that these acquisitions and mergers gave Dean Foods about a 27
percent market share nationally in fluid milk products in 2002. Others
have estimated that Dean Foods' market share is about 35 percent
nationally and approximately 70 percent in New England.[Footnote 87] As
of 2002, we estimate that the market share of the top four fluid milk
processors has increased to approximately 47 percent.[Footnote 88] As
seen in figure 33, with increased concentration, the number of fluid
milk processing plants has gone from 1,066 plants producing an average
of 50.1 million pounds of milk per year in 1980 to 385 plants producing
an average of 154.2 million pounds per year in 2002.
Figure 33: Number of Fluid Milk Processing Plants and Volume of Milk
Processed per Plant, 1980 through 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Such increased concentration of fluid milk processing firms,
particularly in individual markets, can increase the price at which
fluid milk is sold to retailers because market concentration can
provide these firms greater market power. Thus, some analysts viewed
the trend toward greater concentration in the wholesale market as a
means toward greater dominance and market power in selling fluid milk
to retailers. Further, they noted that increased market power can also
benefit processors in their negotiations for raw milk supplies from
cooperatives and independent farmers. For example, the exercise of
market power could allow processors to negotiate more favorable supply
contracts, which could drive down input prices and increase the spread
between wholesale and retail prices. Other economists who study the
causes of market concentration described a phenomenon called the
"replication hypothesis"--as concentration grows at one marketing
level, it is likely to be replicated at other marketing levels. For
instance, high market concentration at the retail level can lead to
greater concentration at the fluid milk processor level, and higher
concentration in fluid milk processing can, in turn, lead to higher
concentration at the cooperative level. One fluid milk processor that
we spoke with stated that retail concentration has resulted in
retailers preferring only one supplier, requiring a processor to have
multiple plants in order to supply a retailer who serves many markets.
On the other hand, increasing concentration can lead to cost savings
through efficiency gains, which may be passed on to retailers in the
form of lower wholesale prices. For example, some economists viewed
consolidation of processing firms as a result of increasing economies
of scale and excess plant capacity. That is, processors decrease their
costs per gallon for items like packaging or processing costs, as they
increase the amount of milk they process.[Footnote 89] One dairy
analyst reported that in plants ranging from a monthly volume of 90,000
pounds per month to 30 million pounds per month processing costs
decreased from about $1 per gallon to about $0.50 per gallon. In the
end, the impact of market concentration on wholesale prices, either
positive or negative, depends on whether market power or efficiency
dominates.[Footnote 90]
Retailing Costs, Consumer Demand, and Market Structure Changes Affect
Retail Prices for Fluid Milk:
Three key factors that influence fluid milk prices at the retail level
are retailing costs, consumer demand, and market structure. Recent
increases in input costs such as labor and energy have been
substantial. In an effort to hold down their retailing costs and remain
competitive, some retailers are implementing supply-chain management
and other innovations that increase efficiency. At the same time,
consumers are purchasing a declining amount of traditional fluid milk
and are increasing consumption of other beverages, such as soft drinks
and bottled water. Market structure changes include continued
consolidation in recent years through mergers and acquisitions among
large food retailers at the national level and in many local markets,
along with an increasing number of outlets that are competing with
traditional supermarkets to sell fluid milk.
Costs of Retailing Influence the Price of Fluid Milk:
Representatives of the Food Marketing Institute stated that after the
wholesale costs of the milk, the primary costs that influence the
retail price of fluid milk are related to labor and energy.[Footnote
91] They added that all of these costs have been rising recently.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average hourly
earnings for nonsupervisory food store employees went from $7.56 per
hour in 1992 to $10.20 per hour in 2002. These payroll costs are the
largest percentage of retail operating costs, followed by the second
largest single category, employee benefits such as health
insurance.[Footnote 92] Table 29 shows the breakdown of supermarket
operating costs in 2003 as a percentage of total sales and gross
margin.[Footnote 93]
Table 29: Supermarket Operating Costs as a Percentage of Sales and
Gross Margin, 2003:
Expenses: Depreciation and amortization;
Percentage of sales: 1.3%;
Percentage of gross margin: 4.7%.
Expenses: Employee benefits;
Percentage of sales: 3.5%;
Percentage of gross margin: 12.7%.
Expenses: Insurance;
Percentage of sales: 0.3%;
Percentage of gross margin: 1.1%.
Expenses: Maintenance and repairs;
Percentage of sales: 0.7%;
Percentage of gross margin: 2.5%.
Expenses: Other operating costs;
Percentage of sales: 3.8%;
Percentage of gross margin: 13.8%.
Expenses: Payroll;
Percentage of sales: 11.4%;
Percentage of gross margin: 41.3%.
Expenses: Property rentals;
Percentage of sales: 1.8%;
Percentage of gross margin: 6.5%.
Expenses: Supplies;
Percentage of sales: 1.1%;
Percentage of gross margin: 4.0%.
Expenses: Taxes and licenses;
Percentage of sales: 0.4%;
Percentage of gross margin: 1.4%.
Expenses: Utilities;
Percentage of sales: 1.3%;
Percentage of gross margin: 4.7%.
Expenses: Total expenses;
Percentage of sales: 25.7%;
Percentage of gross margin: 93.1%.
Source: GAO analysis of Food Marketing Institute data.
[End of table]
Table 30 displays the sales and expense growth as a percentage of sales
for the supermarket industry during the last decade, from 1993 through
2003. During this time, total employment costs increased by 12.0
percent, including a 10.7 percent increase in payroll expenses; the
cost of supplies also increased by 10.0 percent.
Table 30: Growth of Supermarket Sales and Expenses during the Last
Decade, 1993 through 2003:
Supermarket sales (dollars in billions): Sales from supermarkets with
more than $2 million in annual sales;
1993: $292.0;
2003: $432.8;
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 48.2%.
Retailing costs as a percentage of sales: Payroll expenses;
1993: 10.3%;
2003: 11.4%;
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 10.7%.
Total employment cost;
1993: 13.3%;
2003: 14.9%;
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 12.0%.
Supplies;
1993: 1.0%;
2003: 1.1%;
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 10.0%.
Utilities;
1993: 1.2%;
2003: 1.3%;
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 8.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of Food Marketing Institute data.
[End of table]
A 2003 study that was more specific to retailer costs related to fluid
milk sales noted that these costs include both direct and indirect
costs.[Footnote 94] Direct costs are those for electricity, labor,
store equipment, and fluid milk. Indirect costs include corporate,
division, and store overhead. While the study found variation in the
indirect costs, such as store overhead, there was less variation across
retail stores in direct costs.
Increasing per unit costs have led some retailers to try to improve
efficiency and reduce total costs. As mentioned in the discussion of
factors influencing fluid milk prices at the wholesale level, some
retailers are reducing costs by working with their wholesale suppliers
to achieve supply-chain management. For example, officials with Wal-
Mart noted that the firm has tried to reduce its costs and maintain its
everyday-low-pricing strategy for consumers through:
* a computerized system called Collaborative Planning Forecast
Replenishment that allows processors to track stock levels at Wal-Mart
locations and schedule deliveries to specific locations;
* direct-store-delivery of the majority of its fluid milk products to
increase the efficiency of its supply chain;[Footnote 95] and:
* changes to its shipping practices, such as not putting labels on its
cases, that have allowed Wal-Mart to save time and money.
Another retailer indicated that it is trying to improve the way it
stocks its shelves to cut costs. A representative indicated that the
retailer has invested in retrofitting its stores to use a device called
a "bossy cart," which allows store employees to move 80 gallons of milk
into the milk case in one shelf-stocking.
Consumer Demand Influences Retail Fluid Milk Pricing:
Consumer demand, driven by factors such as taste, convenience, and
health, influences the retail price of milk. Moreover, since fluid milk
represents approximately 3 percent of total supermarket sales, it is an
important category for store performance, and retailers have an
incentive to price their products competitively. However, over time,
fluid milk consumption has gradually declined, with per capita demand
for milk trending downward at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per year. This
downward trend stems from several key factors including increasing
consumption of substitute drinks such as carbonated soft drinks, juice
drinks, coffee, teas, soy products, and bottled water. Also, there has
been an increasing trend toward more eating outside the home, reducing
the demand for fluid milk sold in food stores. Within the fluid milk
category, whole milk has gone from being 92 percent of fluid milk
consumed in 1960 to about 35 percent in 2001. Private labels represent
the largest portion of the market, about 60 percent.[Footnote 96] More
recently, however, there has been growth in the development of
innovative value-added dairy products. These new innovations include
dairy products for medicine/health (such as low-carbohydrate products),
multipack drinks such as single-serve and vending drinks, and organic
dairy products.
In response to trends in consumer demand for fluid milk products,
retailers from high-end supermarkets to mass merchandisers use diverse
pricing strategies, and no single approach applies to any group.
However, according to some retail executives, one method that retailers
are currently using is category management. Using this strategy, a
retailer would not focus on how much 1 percent, 2 percent, or whole
milk it sells, but rather on how much is sold from the entire dairy
case.[Footnote 97] Accordingly, category managers would view product
assortment strategically, evaluating the performance of entire groups
of related dairy products. The goal is to maximize the sales for the
entire category, which requires continual adjustment to match consumer
demand. To accomplish this goal, managers may feed scanner data and
other market information into computer models that make product
assortment decisions.
A related issue influencing the retail price of fluid milk is the price
elasticity of demand, that is, the sensitivity of fluid milk
consumption to changes in price. For many years, empirical studies have
indicated that milk prices were very price inelastic, meaning that
there was little change in demand in response to a change in price.
Most studies suggest that overall, the demand for milk is still price
inelastic. However, some recent studies suggest that the demand for
milk is not as price inelastic as it was previously.
Moreover, some researchers have found that for many fluid milk
products, demand is elastic, or that there is a greater change in
demand relative to a change in price for certain types of milk. One
study reported that price elasticities varied considerably by container
size, type (such as white or flavored), and fat content of the
milk.[Footnote 98] For instance, the study found that the demand for
whole milk, skim milk, and low fat milk in half-gallon containers was
price elastic. This research also suggested that carbonated soft drinks
are the chief substitute or competitor for fluid milk products, while
water is a complement in consumption.[Footnote 99] In another study,
researchers found that the elasticities of demand for skim/low fat and
whole milk brands are different.[Footnote 100] Demand for skim/low fat
milk was found to be more price elastic than demand for whole milk,
suggesting that retailers could increase overall fluid milk sales by
lowering the prices of skim/low fat milk relative to prices for whole
milk.
Retail Market Structure Can Influence Fluid Milk Prices:
As with the fluid milk processing industry, there have been trends of
increasing consolidation and concentration at the retail level during
recent years, especially among retail firms in some individual markets.
Structural change and increased consolidation at the retail level of
the milk marketing chain could lead to lower retail prices as
individual retailers experience increased efficiencies in their
operations. On the other hand, high levels of concentration can result
in greater market power, potentially allowing firms to increase market
prices above competitive levels.[Footnote 101] Also, greater market
concentration at this level could increase a retailer's buying power
with fluid milk processors, potentially lowering costs. Depending upon
whether these lower costs are passed on to consumers, this can either
lower retail milk prices or increase the spread between wholesale and
retail prices.
According to USDA, since 1996, almost 4,700 supermarkets, representing
$75.5 billion in sales, were acquired by other firms. Major mergers and
acquisitions that have occurred in the retail food market in recent
years include the following:
* In 1998, Kroger, the nation's largest supermarket chain, acquired
Fred Meyer, and Albertsons acquired American Stores, the second-largest
at that time.
* In 2000, Delhaize America, operator of the Food Lion chain of stores,
purchased Hannaford Brother's Shop 'n Save supermarkets in New England
to become the eighth-largest food retailer at that time.
* In 2001, Kroger purchased supermarkets in Oklahoma and Texas from
Winn-Dixie.
* In 2001, Safeway made several acquisitions including Genuardi's
Family Market stores (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware),
Randall's food markets (Houston, Texas), and Dominick's supermarkets
(Chicago metropolitan area).
* In 2004, Albertsons, the third-largest U.S. food retailer, purchased
Shaw's, the eleventh-largest at the time.
In June 2001, we reported that, for the 100 largest U.S. cities, the
combined average market share of the top four firms increased from 69
percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 1998, with some variation depending
upon the particular market area.[Footnote 102] An official of one large
supermarket chain noted that because of Wal-Mart's large presence in
the market, other companies' slices of the "demand pie" got thinner,
providing an incentive to expand and buy out other companies. According
to USDA data, the top four firms among all food retailers in 2003 were
Kroger, Wal-Mart, Albertsons, and Safeway.[Footnote 103]
Consolidation in food retail chains has led to high levels of
concentration in individual metropolitan markets. Table 31 displays
market concentration, as measured by the four-firm concentration ratio,
in the 15 markets that we used in this report to analyze the spread
between retail and farm milk prices.[Footnote 104] While this threshold
varies, some economists have characterized a market with a four-firm
concentration ratio of 60 percent or greater as a "tight oligopoly" or
highly concentrated.[Footnote 105] In 2003, the levels of concentration
varied by metropolitan market, with the percentage of the market held
by the four largest firms ranging from 62.8 percent in the Minneapolis/
St. Paul area to 84.9 percent in Denver, with an overall unweighted
average of 73.9 percent. Moreover, for the 15 markets that we analyzed,
the overall average four-firm concentration ratio for 1998 that we
reported in 2001--74 percent--is comparable to the 2003 average.
[Footnote 106]
Table 31: Market Share of the Top Four Food Retailers in Selected
Markets, 2003:
Retail markets: Atlanta, Georgia;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 78.2%.
Retail markets: Boston, Massachusetts;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 70.1%.
Retail markets: Charlotte, North Carolina;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 82.0%.
Retail markets: Cincinnati, Ohio;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 79.4%.
Retail markets: Dallas, Texas;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 67.3%.
Retail markets: Denver, Colorado;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 84.9%.
Retail markets: Miami, Florida;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 81.6%.
Retail markets: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 63.2%.
Retail markets: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 62.8%.
Retail markets: New Orleans, Louisiana;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 74.7%.
Retail markets: Phoenix, Arizona;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 80.2%.
Retail markets: Salt Lake City, Utah;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 67.6%.
Retail markets: San Diego, California;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 68.8%.
Retail markets: Seattle, Washington;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 71.8%.
Retail markets: Washington, D.C;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 76.5%.
Retail markets: Average;
Four-firm market share, 2003: 73.9%.
Source: GAO presentation of USDA/ERS data.
Note: Four-firm market shares are for supermarkets and super centers
only. Smaller grocery stores and convenience stores are excluded.
[End of table]
At the same time, the traditional dominance of supermarkets in food
sales has been challenged by competition from new mass merchandisers
and super centers such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target. These retailers
tend to offer lower prices and often purchase their inventories in
large quantities to pass on low prices to consumers. According to a
recent USDA report, even the larger conventional food stores do not
have the same buying power as these large general merchandisers. They
also tend to grow by new investment in stores rather than through
mergers and acquisitions, in contrast to traditional supermarkets.
Figure 34 displays the change in food sales by market segment of food
retailers between 1993 and 2003. Sales from supermarkets decreased from
63 percent to 58.3 percent during this time period. However, sales from
warehouse clubs and super centers increased from 3.6 percent to 9
percent, while those of convenience stores and drug stores also
increased--from 11.9 percent to 13.6 percent. Overall, sales from
nontraditional food retailers--warehouse clubs and super centers, mass
merchandisers, and convenience and drugstores--went from 17.2 percent
in 1993 to 24.4 percent in 2003.
Figure 34: Percentage of Retail Food Sales by Market Segment, 1993 and
2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Within the fastest-growing segment, warehouse clubs and super centers,
the largest food retailer is Wal-Mart, followed by Target and Meijer's,
while the second fastest growing segment includes the major drug
chains, such as Walgreen's and CVS. As of 2003, Wal-Mart super center
sales reached $103.2 billion, with estimated grocery sales of $41.3
billion.[Footnote 107] According to a recent ACNielsen study, while all
U.S. households still shop in traditional grocery stores, the annual
number of trips to such stores continues to decline.[Footnote 108] In
contrast, super centers have shown strong gains in household
penetration as well as gains in the number of trips per year. In dairy,
however, conventional food stores still offer a larger selection of
milk products. A recent study by researchers at Cornell and Oklahoma
State Universities on dairy case management found that the number of
milk products offered was highest in supermarkets (74) and lowest in
drug stores (16).[Footnote 109] While the volume of milk products was
highest for mass merchandisers, the number of products (24) was similar
to convenience stores (22). The authors explained that historically,
mass merchandisers concentrated on moving a large volume of product
with a limited variety.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. Fluid
Milk Market:
This appendix summarizes the findings of 14 economic studies of price
transmission in U.S. fluid milk markets. These studies estimated the
extent to which price changes at one level, such as the farm level, are
transmitted to other levels, such as the retail level, and the time in
which these price changes are transmitted. Many of the studies found a
difference, or asymmetry, in either the extent or speed of price
transmission, depending on whether the initial price change was an
increase or a decrease (see table 32).[Footnote 110] Some of the
studies analyzed possible causes for price asymmetry and often
identified the presence of noncompetitive markets as a contributing
factor.[Footnote 111] Although most studies estimated how prices are
transmitted from the farm to the retail level, a few also estimated how
price changes are transmitted from the retail level back to the farm
level.
Table 32: Overview of Fluid Milk Price Transmission Studies and Results
on Price Transmission Asymmetry/Symmetry:
Author: Carman and Sexton;
Year: Forth-coming 2005;
Model: Econometric model based on Houck (1977);
Period of study: 1999-2003;
Geographic area: Nine western U.S. cities[B];
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry in certain milk types and markets;
Additional results: Asymmetry in timing in CA markets.
Author: Sexton, Xia, and Carman;
Year: 2004;
Model: Hotelling framework;
Econometric model;
Period of study: 1999-2003;
Geographic area: Nine western U.S. cities[C];
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry;
Additional results: Asymmetry in timing.
Author: Capps, Jr;
Year: 2004;
Model: Houck econometric model and error correction model;
Period of study: 1994-2002;
Geographic area: Seven U.S. cities[D];
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry in majority of cities.
Author: Linkow, Gould and Stiegert;
Year: 2004;
Model: Asymmetric friction model;
Period of study: 1997-2004;
Geographic area: Ten U.S. cities[E];
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry.
Author: Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill;
Year: 2004;
Model: New Empirical Industrial Organization model;
Period of study: 1996-2000;
Geographic area: Boston;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: N/A.
Author: Lass;
Year: 2004;
Model: Econometric model based on Kinnucan and Forker (1987);
Period of study: 1982-2002;
Geographic area: New England;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Post-compact asymmetry[F];
Additional results: Pre-compact same as 2001.
Author: Wang;
Year: 2003;
Model: Structural econometric model based on Emerick (1994);
Period of study: 1971-1997;
Geographic area: National;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry;
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run; Symmetry retail to farm.
Author: Romain, Doyon, and Frigon;
Year: 2002;
Model: Marketing margin, econometric model;
Period of study: 1980-1997;
Geographic area: Upstate New York (UNY) and New York City (NYC);
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry UNY and NYC prior to price-gouging law;
only NYC after the law[G];
Additional results: Same results in short run.
Author: Dhar and Cotterill;
Year: 2002;
Model: Two-stage market channel model;
Period of study: 1996-1998;
Geographic area: Boston;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: N/A.
Author: Lass, Adanu, and Allen;
Year: 2001;
Model: Econometric model based on Kinnucan and Forker;
Period of study: 1982-1997;
Geographic area: New England;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Symmetry;
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run.
Author: Frigon, Doyon, and Romain;
Year: 1999;
Model: Marketing margin, econometric model;
Period of study: 1980-1997;
Geographic area: Northeast U.S; UNY and NYC;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Symmetry in all markets except asymmetry in NYC after law[G];
Additional results: Asymmetry in all markets in short run.
Author: Carman;
Year: 1998;
Model: Econometric model based on Houck;
Period of study: 1985-1997;
Geographic area: Three California cities[H];
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Symmetry;
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run.
Author: Emerick;
Year: 1994;
Model: Structural econometric model based on Houck;
Period of study: 1971-1991;
Geographic area: National;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry;
Additional results: Symmetry in short run.
Author: Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar;
Year: 1994;
Model: Econometric model;
Period of study: 1983-1990;
Geographic area: National;
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]:
Asymmetry.
Source: GAO analysis using various sources (see table 33).
[A] These results indicate farm-to-retail price asymmetry or symmetry.
[B] These cities include the four California markets of Sacramento, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego and the five non-California
markets of Seattle, Portland, Salt Lake City, Denver, and Phoenix.
[C] The cities are the same as in Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005).
[D] These metropolitan markets include Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,
Dallas, Hartford, St. Louis, and Seattle.
[E] These metropolitan markets could not be disclosed.
[F] The Compact refers to the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact.
[G] This law refers to the New York milk price-gouging law of 1991
(codified at NY Gen. Bus. §396-rr).
[H] These three California cities include Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Sacramento.
[End of table]
How prices are transmitted within the milk marketing chain is important
to policy makers because it affects both farmers and consumers. Farmers
may be concerned with price transmission because they may believe
increases in retail prices are not fully passed back to the farm level,
while decreases are passed on. Consumers and farmers may believe that
decreases in farm prices are not fully passed along to the retail
level, while increases are passed on. Figure 35 illustrates price
transmission through the vertical milk marketing chain; the arrows show
how price signals are transmitted in both directions between marketing
levels.
Figure 35: Marketing Chain and Price Transmission for the U.S. Fluid
Milk Industry:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The first section of this appendix is a detailed table summarizing the
models, data, and key assumptions used in each study, and each study's
results. The second and third sections discuss the farm-to-retail
results, including evidence of price asymmetry, with respect to the
extent of price transmission and the speed of price transmission. The
fourth section discusses the retail-to-farm results on price
transmission. The last section discusses the studies' findings
regarding factors that might cause price asymmetry.
Summary of Recent Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S.
Fluid Milk Market:
While most of the studies summarized in table 33 use, as a basis for
their models, the standard Houck (1977)[Footnote 112] and Kinnucan and
Forker (1987) models to identify price asymmetry,[Footnote 113] others
use newer methods such as the error correction model, which some
researchers believe provides a more appropriate specification for
examining asymmetric price transmission.[Footnote 114] Most of the
studies estimated only "forward" price transmission, or price
transmission from the farm to the retail level, but we also report on
one study that estimated "backward" price transmission, from the retail
level to the farm. The studies also differed in whether they estimated
short-run or long-run price transmission asymmetry or both.[Footnote
115] We take all of these differences into account in interpreting the
studies' overall conclusions and discussing their results.
Table 33: Recent Price Transmission Studies of the Fluid Milk Market:
Author/Study/Year: Carman and Sexton, "Supermarket Fluid Milk Pricing
Practices in the Western United States," Agribusiness, forthcoming
2005;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Econometric model based on
the farm-to-retail price transmission model of Houck (1977) for whole,
skim, 1 percent, and 2 percent milk. Estimated time lags using an Almon
distributed lag model;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Average monthly prices for nine California and non-California metro
markets, 1999-2003;
Farm prices: California: Class I California milk prices;
Other states: FMMO Class I prices;
Retail prices: ACNielsen average monthly retail prices;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Market
power based on hypothesis tests of parameter size, parameter tests for
asymmetry, and a departure from cost differences of fluid milk products
due to different fat contents;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: California and non-California:
Contemporaneous to 3-month period;
California markets: Some evidence of price symmetry and some of price
asymmetry, depending on market and product;
Non-California markets: Price transmission in almost all markets was
asymmetric;
Degree of price transmission:
California: Sacramento: Increases: 72%-122%; Decreases: 52%-97%;
Los Angeles: Increases: 60%-115%; Decreases: 75%-106%;
San Francisco: Increases: 65%-115%; Decreases: 49%-94%;
San Diego: Increases: 56%-109%; Decreases: 58%-110%;
Non-California: Seattle: Increases: 57%-72%; Decreases: 39%-64%;
Portland: Increases: 3%-25%; Decreases: 4%-30%;
Phoenix: Increases: 5%-59%; Decreases: 6%-63%;
Salt Lake City: Increases: 39%-56%; Decreases: 54%-83%;
Denver; Increases: 43%-56%; Decreases: 40%-55%;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Analysis revealed
evidence of market power in fluid milk pricing in each of the nine
metro markets analyzed;
In Portland, estimated retail price coefficients did not respond to
farm prices;
In non-California markets, only 3 of 40 estimated coefficients were
consistent with perfect competition in pricing;
Addition of retail skim milk, 1 percent, and 2 percent led to different
results than previous analysis of only whole milk.
[End of Carman and Sexton]
Author/Study/Year: Sexton, Xia, and Carman, "Horizontal Differentiation
with Differential Input Costs: Retail Prices for Milk by Fat Content."
Paper presented at the annual AAEA meetings, Denver, Colorado, 2004.
[B];
Model Description: Type of economic model: Theoretical model based on
Hotelling framework of horizontally differentiated products with
differential costs. Econometric estimation -seemingly unrelated
regression-of a differentiated product, market competition model using
metropolitan retail markets for whole and skim milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Average monthly prices for nine California and non-California cities.
California data, 1999-2003;
Non-California data, 2000-2003;
Farm prices: Class I prices from California Dairy Information Bulletin
and FMMO Class I component prices;
Retail prices: California Dairy Information Bulletin;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Three
competition scenarios examined for retail fluid milk markets: perfect
competition, monopoly, and oligopoly;
Skim milk (low-cost) and whole milk (high-cost) represent products with
differential costs transmitted differently in different competition
scenarios;
Farm prices do not contain over-order premiums;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry:
California: Los Angeles and San Diego have longer transmission periods
than Sacramento and San Francisco;
Non-California: Prices are transmitted gradually for Denver, Salt Lake
City, Portland, and Phoenix, while prices in Seattle are transmitted
quickly, within 1 month;
Degree of price transmission: N/A;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Competition results:
California: Results suggest oligopoly scenario for Sacramento, San
Francisco, and Los Angeles markets. Some evidence of oligopoly scenario
for San Diego market;
Non-California: Results suggest oligopoly scenario for Phoenix, Salt
Lake City, and Seattle markets. Model also suggests Denver market is
closer to oligopoly, while Portland is closer to monopoly scenario.
[End of Sexton, Xia, and Carman]
Author/Study/Year: Capps, Jr., "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price
Transmission Associated with Whole Milk and Two Percent Milk in
Selected U.S. Cities: A Comparison of the Conventional Houck Approach
and the Error Correction Model Approach." Working paper, Department of
Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, 2004;
Model Description: Type of economic model: The standard Houck
econometric price transmission approach is compared to the error
correction model using co-integration procedures. Model estimates
results for whole milk and 2 percent milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Monthly data from January 1994 to October 2002 for seven U.S. cities:
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Hartford, St. Louis, and Seattle;
Farm prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service;
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations:
Elasticities of price transmission are calculated for each product and
market;
The model does not include any other marketing input costs;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Houck method: Price asymmetry:
Whole Milk: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Dallas, and
Hartford;
Whole Milk: Symmetric: St. Louis and Seattle;
2 percent: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Hartford;
2 percent: Symmetric: Dallas, St. Louis, and Seattle;
Houck method: Elasticity of price transmission (ranges):
Whole milk: Increases: (+0.23)-(+0.58);
Whole milk: Decreases: (-0.02)-(+0.12);
2 percent: Increases: (+0.11)-(+0.46);
2 percent: Decreases: (-0.06)-(+0.25);
Error correction model: Price asymmetry:
Whole Milk: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas;
Whole Milk: Symmetric: St. Louis;
2 percent: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Chicago, and Seattle;
2 percent: Symmetric: St. Louis and Dallas.
Error correction model: Elasticity of price transmission (ranges):
Whole milk: Increases: (+0.24)-(+0.35);
Whole milk: Decreases: (-0.03)-(+0.06);
2 percent: Increases: (+0.05)-(+0.29);
2 percent: Decreases: (-0.006)-(+0.12);
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Author notes that
results suggest there is a possible market failure due to a highly
concentrated retail sector, with the exception of St. Louis and
Seattle.
[End of Capps, Jr.]
Author/Study/Year: Linkow, Gould, and Stiegert, "Retail Consolidation,
Market Concentration, and Farm-Retail Price Asymmetry in the U.S. Fluid
Milk Market." Working paper, Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Authors use an asymmetric
friction model that accounts for the existence of menu costs (the costs
of repricing products). Estimated model uses the price of private label
whole milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Weekly panel data from 1997--2004 for 10 metropolitan fluid milk
markets;
Farm prices: FMMO Class I announced cooperative price;
Retail prices: IRI retail price data;
private label (store brand) whole milk.[C];
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Price
asymmetry and menu costs are allowed to vary by city;
Includes a marketing cost index variable based on a paper by Romain et
al., (2002);
Includes a measure of market concentration and a measure of spatial
market concentration;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry: Asymmetric-Farm price decreases are passed on
less completely than increases;
Responses to price increases do not differ considerably across cities.
Responses to price decreases do differ across cities;
Degree of price transmission: N/A.
[End of Linkow, Gould, and Stiegert]
Author/Study/Year: Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill, "Dairy Compact, Market
Power, and Milk Prices in Boston." Working paper, Department of
Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Connecticut, 2004;
Model Description: Type of economic model: The New Empirical Industrial
Organization structural model of Appelbaum (1982) that includes
measures of market power and price transmission. The model tests for
values of these variables with and without the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact (NEDC).[D];
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Weekly data from 1996-2000 for Boston metropolitan fluid milk market;
Farm prices: The higher of the FMMO Class I prices or Compact Class I
prices, plus over-order premiums;
Retail prices: Computed from IRI retail data by dividing total sales by
total volume.[C];
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations:
Assesses retail prices under four scenarios: NEDC, no NEDC, with
perfect competition, and oligopoly;
estimates market power and market conduct variables;
Assumes cost-plus pricing between processors and retailers in the
Boston area;
Model does not estimate the timing of price transmission;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry: N/A;
Degree of price transmission: Increases: 68%;
Transmission elasticities were estimated at 0.331 pre-Compact and
0.2911 post-Compact;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Retail price increases
due to market power outweighed impact of NEDC by nearly 7 times;
Both the pre-and post-NEDC retail price markup over marginal cost (the
competitive benchmark) is about 25% of the retail fluid milk price;
Market conduct-supermarkets do not ignore each other's actions;
MILC program provides benefits to farmers, consumers, and retailers at
the expense of taxpayers.[E].
[End of Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill]
Author/Study/Year: Lass, "Impacts of the Northeast Dairy Compact on New
England Prices Revisited: New Data, New Lessons." Working paper,
Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
2004.[D];
Model Description: Type of economic model: Update of the previous 2001
econometric mark-up model of Kinnucan and Forker (1987) allowing for
rising and falling farm prices and different speeds of adjustment;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Monthly time-series price data for New England (Boston and Hartford),
1982 to 2002;
Farm prices: FMMO Class I price for the New England market;
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service retail price series
for Boston and Hartford;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Longer
data series than 2001 paper with time periods split into pre and post-
Compact;
a pre-1997 period and a 1997-2002 period;
Parameters of the pre-and post-Compact periods were tested to determine
changes in price transmission;
Assumes constant returns to scale and a competitive market beyond the
farm gate;
Included variable to measure changes in processing costs using USDA's
Food Marketing Cost Index;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: Pre-Compact period: Results
were consistent with original findings (Lass et al., 2001); price
asymmetry in the short run and symmetry in the long run;
Post-Compact period:
Short run: Price asymmetry;
Long run: Price asymmetry;
Degree of price transmission: N/A;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Boston: There was
greater variation in farm prices without the Compact, leading to higher
retail prices;
Hartford: There was greater variation in farm prices without the
Compact, with greater increases in retail prices.
[End of Lass]
Author/Study/Year: Wang, Price Transmission and the Role of Federal
Dairy Policy in U.S. Dairy Markets. Master's thesis, Cornell
University, 2003;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Structural econometric model
using a simultaneous system of equations of national dairy prices,
including farm and retail fluid milk. Models both farm-to-retail and
retail-to-farm price transmission. Model based on a previous one by
Emerick (1994);
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
National in scope; uses national monthly average data from 1971-1997;
Farm prices: Announced cooperative Class I price;
Retail prices: U.S. retail price from Bureau of Labor Statistics-USDA;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations:
Competitive fluid milk market and constant returns to scale;
Policy variable for changes in price support in 1980s;
Price lags chosen from dairy market literature;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry: Short run:
(1 month): Asymmetric;
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry: Long run: (3
months): Asymmetric;
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Short
run: Increases: 94%;
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Short
run: Decreases: 31%;
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Long
run: Increases: 83%;
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Long
run: Decreases: 64%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Timing/price asymmetry: Short run: (1
month): Asymmetric;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Timing/price asymmetry: Long run: (3
months): Symmetric;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Short
run: Increases: 94%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Short
run: Decreases: 2%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Long
run: Increases: 40%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Long
run: Decreases: 34%;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Decreases in dairy
price supports in the mid-1980s led to greater asymmetric price
transmission and more volatility in the post-1988 period than in the
pre-1988 period for fluid milk and nonfat dry milk.
[End of Wang]
Author/Study/Year: Romain, Doyon, and Frigon, "Effects of State
Regulations on Marketing Margins and Price Transmission Asymmetry:
Evidence from the New York City and Upstate New York Fluid Milk
Markets," Agribusiness, 2002;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Marketing margin model that
includes quantity of commodity marketed and marketing costs combined
with the Houck (1977) model. It includes variables measuring cumulative
increases and decreases in farm-level prices. The Akaike Information
Criterion was used to determine the appropriate lag structure;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Monthly data from 1980 -1997 for Upstate New York (UNY) and New York
City (NYC) markets;
Farm prices: UNY and NYC prices are the FMMO Class I prices;
Retail prices: UNY and NYC prices are from the New York State
Department of Agriculture;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Model
allows for testing of constant returns to scale;
Model allows for asymmetry of other marketing costs;
Model includes state policy variables-such as deregulation of milk
distribution in NYC and the NYC price-gouging law.[F];
Model does not account for over-order premiums in farm prices;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry:
Short run: Asymmetric-NYC and UNY before price-gouging law;
Asymmetric-NYC after price-gouging law;
Long run: Asymmetric-UNY and NYC, before price-gouging law;
Asymmetric-NYC after price-gouging law;
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: Before the price-gouging law:
Increasing elasticities: 0.70;
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: Before the price-gouging law:
Decreasing elasticities: 0.30;
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: After the price-gouging law:
Increasing elasticities: 0.52;
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: After the price-gouging law:
Decreasing elasticities: 0.43;
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: Before the price-gouging law:
Increasing elasticities: 0.62;
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: Before the price-gouging law:
Decreasing elasticities: 0.49;
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: After the price-gouging law:
Increasing elasticities: 0.52;
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: After the price-gouging law:
Decreasing elasticities: 0.51;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Model results indicate
constant returns to scale;
NYC experienced price asymmetry in the long run prior to 1991, before
the price-gouging law came into effect, but much less thereafter;
The deregulation of milk distribution to NYC in 1987 allowed Farmland
Dairies' entry into the NYC market and significantly reduced marketing
margins.
[End of Romain, Doyon, and Frigon]
Author/Study/Year: Dhar and Cotterill, "Price Transmission in
Differentiated Product Market Channels: A Study of the Boston Fluid
Milk Market and the Northeast Dairy Compact," Food Marketing Policy
Center, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University
of Connecticut, 2002;
Model Description: Type of economic model: A two-stage structural
market channel model of the Boston milk market using a nonlinear model
of costs and demand. The model looks at the Boston fluid milk processor
and retailer market channels;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Monthly average data for Boston market from March 1996 to July 1998;
Farm prices: Boston FMMO Class I fluid milk price;
Retail prices: IRI data for aggregate retail and top 4 supermarket
chains in the Boston market.[C];
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Model
allows for both vertical and horizontal market channel effects;
Model allows for the identification of cross-firm pass-through rates;
Authors specify three different oligopoly games;
Study does not test for the timing of price transmission or price
transmission asymmetry;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and: degree of price
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: N/A;
Degree of price transmission (ranges):
Processor-to-wholesale: 55%-65%;
Wholesale-to-retail: 54%-62%;
Firm-specific transmission: 32%-47%;
Industrywide transmission: 88%-100%;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Competition between
retailers was lessened due to focal point pricing and the Compact;
Industrywide and firm-specific cost shocks were not identical, nor did
the latter aggregate to the former.
[End of Dhar and Cotterill]
Author/Study/Year: Lass, Adanu, and Allen "Impacts of the Northeast
Dairy Compact on Retail Prices," Agricultural and Resource Economics
Review, 2001;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Econometric model based on
the basic markup model of Kinnucan and Forker (1987) allowing for
rising and falling farm prices and different speeds of adjustment;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Monthly time-series price data for New England (Boston and Hartford),
1982 to 1997;
Farm prices: Class I FMMO price for the New England market;
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service retail price series
for Boston and Hartford;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Uses
national data to determine the lag structure for fluid milk-uses lags
of 1 and 2 months;
Model uses impacts of price transmission to determine the impact of the
Compact;
Assumes constant returns to scale and a competitive market beyond the
farm gate;
Includes variable to measure changes in processing costs using USDA's
Food Marketing Cost Index;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: Boston: Retail prices
increased most rapidly in the current period; for declines, the
greatest decreases occurred after a one-period lag;
Hartford: Current period effects of rising farm prices were greater
than current period falling farm prices;
Boston and Hartford:
Short run: Price asymmetry;
Long run: Price symmetry;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Boston: Degree of price transmission: 58% average;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Boston: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: SR: 0.46:
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Boston: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: LR: 0.35;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Boston: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: SR: 0.14;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Boston: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: LR: 0.35;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Hartford: Degree of price transmission: 48% average;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Hartford: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: SR: 0.30;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Hartford: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: LR: 0.33;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Hartford: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: SR: 0.15;
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission:
Hartford: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: LR: 0.25;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: In the long run,
increases in margins were primarily accounted for by other factors,
such as processing costs, rather than the Compact;
Impact of the Compact on retail prices was less than the over-order
premium, suggesting that less than the full amount of the premium was
passed on to consumers.
[End of Lass, Adanu, and Allen]
Author/Study/Year: Frigon, Doyon, and Romain, "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail
Transmission in the Northeastern Fluid Milk Market," Food Marketing
Policy Center, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of Connecticut, 1999;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Hybrid of the marketing cost
model, which includes the quantity of commodity marketed and costs,
with the Houck model, which includes variables of cumulative increases
and decreases in farm-level prices;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Northeast United States, Upstate New York (UNY), and New York City
(NYC) markets using monthly data, 1980-1997;
Farm prices: UNY and NYC prices are the Class I FMMO prices;
for Northeast United States-FMMO Class I average prices of the four
FMMO regions at that time;
Retail prices: UNY and NYC prices from New York State Department of
Agriculture; Northeast United States prices from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations:
Competitive market and constant returns to scale assumptions are
relaxed;
A variable for market concentration, the four-firm concentration ratio,
included for UNY and NYC;
Model allows for marketing costs;
Model includes policy variables such as the NYC price-gouging law;
Model does not account for over-order premiums in farm prices;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and: degree of price
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry:
Short run: Asymmetry existed for UNY after 2 months, and still existed
in NYC and the Northeast United States after 3 months;
Long run: After 4 months, the Northeast United States, UNY, and NYC
(postgouging law) fully adjusted. Only NYC (pregouging law) had not
adjusted;
Symmetry existed in all regions in the long run except NYC prior to
1991;
Degree of price transmission: N/A;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: NYC experienced price
asymmetry in the long run prior to 1991, before the price-gouging law
came into effect;
Variable for market concentration was found insignificant for both UNY
and NYC. Authors believed that the problem of consumer information was
the predominant cause of asymmetric price transmission.
[End of Frigon, Doyon, and Romain]
Author/Study/Year: Carman, "California Milk Marketing Margins," Journal
of Food Distribution Research, 1998;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Response of retail-level
milk prices to changes in farm prices using Houck's (1977) model for
estimating nonreversible functions. The model is estimated using prices
for whole milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
Three California market areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Sacramento. Monthly data, January 1985 to March 1997;
Farm prices: Class I prices for Northern and Southern California from
California Dairy Information Bulletin;
Retail prices: California Dairy Information Bulletin;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Uses
lags of 1 month for price increases and 2 months for price deceases;
Uses an index of marketing costs from the USDA/Economic Research
Service marketing cost index;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry: Short run: Asymmetric-Unlike price increases,
there was a significant 1-month lag between farm price decreases and
total retail price decreases for each city;
Long run: Symmetric-Retail milk price changes were not significantly
different for increases and decreases of farm prices;
Degree of price transmission:
Sacramento: Increases: (111%-112%); Decreases: (110%-117%);
San Francisco: Increases: (117%-118%); Decreases: (94%-103%);
Los Angeles: Increases: (76%-88%); Decreases: (62%-94%);
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: For five of the six
equations, the one-for-one price transmission process is consistent
with constant dollar markup pricing;
For Los Angeles, tests showed that retailers were maintaining prices
by absorbing some cost increases, and reducing prices less than farm
prices decreased.
[End of Carman]
Author/Study/Year: Emerick, An Econometric Analysis of Dairy Market
Price Transmission Processes. Master's thesis, Cornell University,
1994;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Structural econometric model
based on Houck's method (1977) using a simultaneous system of 32
equations and a distributed lag formulation. The model estimates price
transmission for five dairy products, including fluid milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
National scope-national monthly average data series, 1971-1991;
Farm prices: Announced cooperative Class I price;
Retail prices: U.S. average city retail fluid milk price from Consumer
Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Price
lags chosen from knowledge of the dairy market-lag length 2 months for
farm price increases and decreases;
Models both farm-to-retail and retail-to-farm price transmission
results;
Model uses slope and intercept dummy variables used to separate time
periods into 1977-1988 and 1988-1991 to account for government support
price decreases and greater price volatility;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry;
Short run (Immediate): Symmetric;
Long run (2 months): Asymmetric;
Degree of price transmission;
Short run: Increases: 45%; Decreases: 41%;
Long run: Increases: 107%; Decreases: 55%;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Author estimates
causality for fluid milk using data from 1971-1991 and finds it
multidirectional;
Since 1988, different retail price responses (asymmetric) occur 1 and 2
months after the initial farm-level price change. Author notes this may
be due to greater volatility causing difficulties in determining the
"appropriate" price at wholesale or retail;
Asymmetry is not a short-run phenomenon in most other dairy products
including retail butter, wholesale nonfat dry milk, and retail ice
cream.
[End of Emerick]
Author/Study/Year: Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar, Determinants of the Farm-
to-Retail Milk Price Spread, Economic Research Service, USDA, 1994;
Model Description: Type of economic model: Statistical techniques
similar to those used by Hahn's (1989, 1990) markup model in his study
of price transmission. Estimates price transmission for whole milk;
Model Description: Scope of model and price data used:
National average quarterly data, 1983-1990 for farm, wholesale, and
retail levels;
Farm prices: Class I FMMO prices from AMS/USDA plus over-order
premiums;
Wholesale prices: Firm-level private cost-accounting company data for
30 companies across the country;
Retail prices: Bureau of Labor Statistics data based on retail prices
in 91 areas;
Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Unlike
other studies, includes the wholesale market level in the model;
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price
transmission[A]:
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Asymmetric;
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Farm price increases:
wholesale price adjusted in three quarters;
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Farm price decreases:
wholesale price adjusted in one quarter;
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Asymmetric;
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Farm price increases: retail
price adjusted in one quarter;
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Farm price decreases: retail
price adjusted in 10 quarters;
Degree of price transmission: Retail price adjustment: Asymmetric;
Farm price increases: 173%;
Farm price decreases: 92%;
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Wholesale prices
exhibit short-run asymmetric responses to farm prices, while retail
prices exhibit short-run and long-run, or irreversible, price
adjustments;
In this study, wholesale milk price adjustments were more rapid for
farm price decreases than for farm price increases.
[End of Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar]
[A] The degree or level of price transmission is represented by the
percentage of full price pass-through from farm to retail. Some
studies, however, measured instead the elasticity of price
transmission, which is defined as the percentage change in the retail
price of a product due to a 1 percent change in the corresponding farm
price. As noted in the table, some studies do not measure the degree of
price transmission or the elasticity of price transmission and only
report on the timing and symmetry of transmission.
[B] The AAEA is the American Agricultural Economics Association.
[C] IRI stands for Information Resources, Inc.
[D] The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was a pricing program
established by the 1996 Farm Bill that set a minimum price for raw milk
to be used for and sold as fluid milk in the New England states of
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. This program expired on September 30, 2001.
[E] The Milk Income Loss Contract program (MILC) is similar to the
Compact, in that it is based on the Boston raw milk price and provides
a partial subsidy to dairy farmers; however, it is funded through
taxpayers rather than processors.
[F] The New York City price-gouging law (codified at NY Gen. Bus. §396-
rr) imposed a duty on the New York Commissioner of Agriculture and
Markets to determine if prices of fluid milk are unconscionably
excessive whenever the retail price of fluid milk exceeds 200 percent
of the price for Class I fluid milk. The New York State Legislature
passed this law, in part, because of a perceived lack of response in
retail milk prices to decreases in farm prices.
[End of table]
Results on the Extent of Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission and Price
Transmission Asymmetry:
On both national and regional or citywide levels, the majority of the
fluid milk studies that we identified found evidence of farm-to-retail
price transmission asymmetry in price levels. While the studies
estimated a wide range of price transmission levels, in general, the
estimates of price transmission for initial farm price increases were
greater than for farm price decreases.
National Level Results:
The fluid milk price transmission studies that we identified using
national aggregate data estimated a wide range of price transmission
levels and generally found evidence indicating asymmetric price
transmission--farm price increases were more fully transmitted to
retail prices than farm price decreases. Using national average farm
and retail prices for whole milk, Emerick (1994) and Wang (2003)
developed two similar studies that identified the degree of price
transmission nationally. While both studies used similar models, the
Wang study used somewhat more recent data. Taken together, both
studies' short-run results suggest that about 45 percent to 94 percent
of farm price increases were passed along to the retail level, while
only 31 percent to 41 percent of farm price decreases were similarly
passed along. These studies estimated that in the long run,
transmission levels for price increases ranged from 83 percent to 107
percent, while transmission levels for price decreases ranged from 55
percent to 64 percent. Both researchers found price asymmetry in the
long run, but Wang also found price asymmetry in the short run. In his
study of seven metropolitan markets across the country using data from
1994 to 2003, Capps Jr. (2004) also identified price asymmetry in a
majority of selected fluid milk markets for whole and 2 percent milk.
Measuring the level of price transmission by using the elasticity of
price transmission, he estimated elasticities for farm price increases
ranging from 0.23 to 0.58 for whole milk and 0.11 to 0.46 for 2 percent
milk. For farm price decreases, these elasticities were much lower,
ranging from -0.02 to 0.12 for whole and -0.06 to 0.25 for 2 percent,
respectively.[Footnote 116],[Footnote 117] Similarly, in Linkow et al.
(2004), using an asymmetric friction model of 10 metropolitan markets
across the country, the authors found evidence of price asymmetry--
retail prices were more responsive to cooperative farm price increases
than decreases.
Regional and City-Level Results:
Many studies that used regional or city-level data also estimated a
wide range of price transmission levels as well as asymmetric price
transmission. In an econometric model for whole, skim, 1 percent, and 2
percent milk, Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005) estimated farm-to-
retail price transmission for nine metropolitan markets in the Western
United States. Estimated levels of price transmission for all types of
fluid milk combined for the California markets ranged from 56 percent
in San Diego to 122 percent in Sacramento for price increases, and from
49 percent in San Francisco to 110 percent in San Diego for price
decreases. For the non-California markets, for both increases and
decreases, the estimated levels of price transmission were much lower,
ranging from 3 percent in Portland to 72 percent in Seattle for price
increases and 6 percent in Phoenix to 83 percent in Salt Lake City for
price decreases. The authors also noted that none of their price
transmission parameters for all types of fluid milk for Portland was
statistically different from zero, indicating no evidence that retail
prices responded to farm price changes in this market.
Several researchers have also estimated farm-to-retail price
transmission for markets in the Northeast United States. Lass et al.
(2001) estimated price transmission in reference to the Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact for the Boston and Hartford metropolitan
areas. For price increases, they found that the level of price
transmission for a farm price increase was 58 percent for Boston and 48
percent for Hartford. While Lass et al. only found price asymmetry in
the short run, in a subsequent study, using more recent data, Lass
(2004) found price asymmetry in the short run and in the long run.
Using the New Empirical Industrial Organization approach, Chidmi,
Lopez, and Cotterill (2004) found a similar result: a degree of price
transmission of 68 percent for farm price increases for the Boston
market.[Footnote 118] Within the same study, the authors also note that
Cotterill (2003), in other research for Boston, estimated a pass-
through rate of between 20 and 26 percent for price decreases,
suggesting price asymmetry in this market. In another study of the
Boston market, using a two-stage market channel model, Dhar and
Cotterill (2002) found that the firm-specific price pass through rate
was 32 to 47 percent, while industrywide pass through was 88 to 100
percent for price increases.[Footnote 119]
In yet another study of the Northeast market, Romain et al. looked at
price asymmetry before and after the imposition of the New York price-
gouging law in 1991 and tested for price asymmetry using the elasticity
of price transmission. Before the price-gouging law, they found that a
1 percent increase in the farm price translated into a 0.70 percent and
0.62 percent increase in retail prices in New York City and Upstate New
York, respectively, while a 1 percent decrease translated into a 0.30
percent and 0.49 percent decrease in these markets. After the law went
into effect, they found that a 1 percent increase in the farm price
translated into a 0.52 percent increase in retail prices in both New
York City and Upstate New York, while a 1 percent decrease translated
into a 0.43 percent and 0.51 percent decrease in these markets,
respectively. Therefore, long-run price asymmetry was significant in
both regions prior to the price-gouging law, but remained statistically
significant only in New York City afterwards, though at a much lower
level.
Results on Farm-to-Retail Speed of Adjustment and Price Transmission
Asymmetry:
We identified fewer studies that examined the speed of adjustment and
related price asymmetry, or differences in the time required for farm
and wholesale level price increases and decreases to be passed through
to the retail level. Hansen et al. (1994), using national aggregate
price data for whole milk, estimated that it took 3 months after the
wholesale price increased for the retail milk price to increase, but
that it took 30 months for the retail price to adjust to wholesale
price decreases. In another study using national data, Wang (2003),
using a structural model, found that, for farm price increases, retail
prices adjusted more quickly in the first month after the increase and
more slowly in subsequent periods. Conversely, for farm price
decreases, the speed of price adjustment was slower in the initial
month and increased in the following months, implying speed of
adjustment asymmetry.
Nearly all of the studies of regional or metropolitan price
transmission found asymmetry in timing--the price adjustment process
for price decreases much exceeded that for farm price increases. Carman
(1998) found a 1-month lag for price decreases and no lag for price
increases in the California markets. In a later study, Carman and
Sexton (forthcoming 2005) found that for the majority of cities they
analyzed, the time lags estimated for price decreases generally
exceeded those for price increases. For the four types of fluid milk,
Carman and Sexton found that farm price decreases generally took from 1
to 3 months to be transmitted to the retail level, while price
increases took no more than 1 month. In the California markets, the
authors found that, in general, retail prices responded more quickly to
farm price increases than to decreases. Lass et al. (2001) found that
for the Boston and Hartford markets, retail price adjustments to rising
farm prices were much more rapid than similar adjustments to falling
farm prices. Lass (2004) also found evidence of slower price
transmission to the retail level when farm prices were falling. For
markets in the Northeast, Frigon et al. (1999) reported short-run
asymmetry in price adjustment for several markets: price adjustment was
complete in Upstate New York after 2 months and in New York City and
the Northeast United States after 3 months. The authors concluded that
short-run asymmetry seemed to be milder in Upstate New York, because it
lasted for only 2 months. In the long run, after 4 months, the
Northeast United States, Upstate New York, and New York City (after
enactment of the gouging law) markets had fully adjusted, with only the
New York City (before enactment of the gouging law) market not fully
adjusting.
Results for Retail-to-Farm Price Transmission and Price Transmission
Asymmetry:
Using data from 1971 through 1991, Emerick (1994) tested for causality
in fluid milk pricing between the farm and retail levels and found that
it was bidirectional. That is, the author found that for these data, in
addition to farm price changes affecting retail prices, retail price
changes also affect prices at the farm level. However, this
specification resulted in some parameter values for retail-to-farm
price transmission that were inconsistent with economic expectations.
In a later study, Wang (2003) estimated results for retail-to-farm
price transmission. In the short run, which was estimated to be 1
month, the author found that price increases were immediately passed on
to the farm level with a level of transmission of 94 percent, while
price decreases were passed on at a level of 2 percent. However, in the
longer run, which was estimated as 3 months, price increases were
passed through at a level of 40 percent, while price decreases were
passed through at a level of 34 percent. In the long-run specification,
neither increases nor decreases in price were fully passed through.
Thus, while the author found price asymmetry in the short run, she
found price symmetry in the long run for retail-to-farm level price
changes. As in Wang's farm-to-retail analysis, increases in the retail
price were passed through nearly fully in the initial month, and then
decreased substantially. However, although decreases in the retail
price were not passed on initially, they were passed on at an
increasing rate in the following months.
Possible Causes of Asymmetry in the Extent and Speed of Price
Transmission:
Even fewer economic studies have provided evidence on what causes price
transmission and price transmission asymmetry. For the U.S. fluid milk
market in particular, we found few studies that examined factors
affecting the extent of price transmission and price transmission
asymmetry. While two major explanations are cited in the economic
literature as central to explaining price transmission and transmission
asymmetry--noncompetitive markets and adjustment costs--there are
several others cited, including the role of government policies,
spatial market competition, substitution in processing technology,
asymmetric information, economies of scale, and differentiated
products. However, only the presence of noncompetitive markets and the
effects of government policies were examined in the studies of price
transmission that we identified.
Noncompetitive Markets:
In general, economic research has found that a higher degree of market
power can reduce the degree of price transmission.[Footnote 120]
Particularly relevant to the fluid milk market, researchers have also
shown that the number of vertical stages and the extent to which a
market varies from the competitive norm both influence the degree of
price pass through.[Footnote 121] Of the 14 studies that we examined,
only 5 explored the role of competition in combination with the degree
of price transmission and price transmission asymmetry in the milk
marketing chain. In particular, 2 of these studies examined market
power stemming from product differentiation of different milk types.
The evidence from these studies is somewhat mixed. While 1 study did
not find a linkage between market concentration and price transmission,
other studies using a variety of methods did find evidence of either a
lack of price transmission or price transmission asymmetry in markets
that also possessed a degree of market power.
Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005), using multiple analytical
techniques, found that fluid milk markets in the Western United States
that displayed noncompetitive pricing also tended to lack price
transmission and show price asymmetry. Using monthly data from 1999
through 2003, the authors (1) analyzed the effects of horizontal
differentiation among fluid milk types by ranking milk with different
fat contents for different markets based on the costs that would be
predicted under perfect competition, (2) performed correlation analysis
between changes in the monthly farm and retail prices of milk with
different fat contents, with a lack of correlation indicating the
exercise of market power, and (3) analyzed price transmission, along
with the estimated price transmission coefficients, to determine
competition in the market.
In the first analysis, rank values for all milk types did not conform
with price expectations, with the exception of whole milk for all the
months in Seattle. Moreover, except in Portland, they found that the
rankings of retail milk prices for whole, skim, 1 percent, and 2
percent milk provided evidence of not being based on costs, as would be
expected in perfect competition. For the price correlations, the
results indicated that only a few product pairs in the nine markets
have a high degree of interdependence, as one would expect for close
substitutes. Low correlations ranging from nearly complete independence
to moderate independence for at least one pair of products were evident
in each market. For instance, retail price changes for skim milk
appeared independent of other milk prices in Sacramento, Seattle,
Portland, Salt Lake City, and Denver. The authors explained that these
correlations all indicated pricing that was inconsistent with
competitive pricing.
For the price transmission analysis, the estimated results differed
among the California markets, depending on the city and type of milk.
For instance, in certain California markets, such as Los Angeles and
San Diego, farm price decreases lagged farm price increases by 2 to 3
months, depending on the product, indicating price asymmetry in timing.
Some of these price coefficients were consistent with competitive
pricing and others were not. However, price transmission estimates for
other metropolitan regions in the West (Seattle, Portland, Phoenix,
Salt Lake City, and Denver) provided stronger evidence of
noncompetitive pricing, and some also indicated price adjustment
asymmetry, such as Salt Lake City and Phoenix. For these markets, only
3 of the 40 estimated price transmission coefficients were consistent
with perfect competition.
Using another model of horizontal product differentiation, a subsequent
study by Sexton, Xia, and Carman (2004) econometrically estimated the
timing of fluid milk price transmission and tested for market power for
four California and five non-California cities from 1999 to 2003. While
the results were somewhat mixed, hypothesis tests for the cities
indicating oligopoly or monopoly scenarios also displayed more gradual
price transmission results than those indicating more competitive
scenarios, suggesting a link between noncompetitive market structures
and a lack of price transmission.
Chidmi et al. (2004) estimated price transmission and market power for
the Boston fluid milk market using the New Empirical Industrial
Organization approach and data from 1996 through 2000. The empirical
results of the model, in particular the conjectural variation
elasticity, suggest that participants in this market may possess market
power and that supermarkets do not ignore each other's actions.
[Footnote 122] Although the model did not account for speed of
adjustment, the authors estimated a price transmission level of 68
percent, suggesting that market power is associated with incomplete
price transmission. A study by Frigon et al. (1999) includes a measure
of market power, the four-firm concentration ratio, in its model of
price transmission for Upstate New York and New York City. However,
this variable did not prove to be significant. Later, in a similar
study (Romain et al., 2002), the authors explain that their results of
price asymmetry prior to 1991 in New York City were evidence that
middlemen in the fluid milk market were exercising market power prior
to the price-gouging law. The authors found that price asymmetry
decreased after the law went into effect. They acknowledged, however,
that to rigorously address the issue of a noncompetitive market, an
alternative market power model would have to be developed.
Government Policies:
Two studies looked at the effects of national government intervention
on price transmission. Emerick (1994) and Wang (2003) both examined the
question of whether changes in dairy policy, especially the reduction
in the dairy price support level that began in the mid-1980s, had
changed the nature of price transmission for dairy products. Both
authors basically came to the same conclusions. Emerick noted that
asymmetry is more likely to have occurred since 1988, adding that the
greater price volatility may have caused some difficulties for
retailers and wholesalers in determining the "appropriate" price. Wang,
using additional data through 1997, found that reductions in the price
support level tend to have a large impact on the fluid milk and nonfat
dry milk price transmission relationships. In the fluid milk market,
the farm-to-retail price transmission process became asymmetric, with
the greater price volatility in the post-1988 period. While the degree
of price transmission increased for both increases and decreases in
price, it increased proportionately more for increases than for
decreases.
Six of the studies examined price transmission in conjunction with
other state and federal policies and programs, such as the New York
price-gouging law and the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Four
studies, Lass et al. (2001), Lass (2004), Chidmi et al. (2004), and
Dhar and Cotterill (2002), estimated price transmission while the
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was in effect. Lass et al. found
that processors and/or retailers did not fully pass through their price
increases and, in fact, may have absorbed part of the cost of the
Compact's over-order premium. In his 2004 study, Lass explained that
the greater variation in farm prices that occurs without the Compact
would actually lead to higher retail prices because of the larger
estimated impacts on retail prices of increasing farm prices than
decreasing farm prices. Dhar and Cotterill disagreed and contended in
their study that the risk reduction benefit from the Compact was
completely overpowered by a shift toward tacit collusion in the post-
Compact period. In the studies of New York markets (Frigon et al.,
1999, and Romain et al., 2002) that looked at the effect of the price-
gouging law, researchers found that after the law took effect, price
asymmetry was not present or was present at much lower levels.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Effects of Recent Federal Dairy Program Changes and
Alternative Policy Options:
Recent changes in federal dairy programs vary in their effects on
policy considerations that we identified, such as farm income, milk
production, federal costs, price volatility, economic efficiency, and
consumer prices.[Footnote 123] A number of options have been proposed
or discussed to further modify existing programs or introduce
alternative policies, all of which could affect these policy
considerations in different ways. The likely effects of these program
modifications or alternative policies are influenced by prevailing
conditions, such as high and low dairy prices, and may be different in
the short and long terms.
Recent Changes in Federal Dairy Programs Vary in Their Effects on
Policy Considerations We Identified:
Since 2000, three major changes have taken place in federal dairy
programs. First, in response to legislative requirements, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reformed the federal milk marketing
order (FMMO) system. Second, USDA adjusted the relative purchase prices
of butter and nonfat dry milk under the price support program. Finally,
Congress authorized and USDA established the Milk Income Loss Contract
(MILC) program. These changes had mixed effects on the policy
considerations included in our analysis. Reforms to the FMMO system had
mixed effects on farm income, depending on the geographic location of
the farmer, while the overall effects on all farmers are less clear.
Because of their effect on fluid milk prices, changes in the price
support program tended to reduce the level of support for farm income
and reduce federal costs, but increase economic efficiency.
Introduction of the MILC program typically had the opposite effects,
while maintaining production.
Federal Milk Marketing Order Reforms:
In carrying out requirements in the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 to reform FMMOs, USDA conducted extensive research
and held public hearings. Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
officials indicated that as a result of this process USDA implemented
reforms to the FMMO system in January 2000 that were consistent with
the findings of its research. Its major reforms included:
* consolidating the number of marketing orders from more than 30 to
11;[Footnote 124]
* changing the classified pricing structure by creating a new class for
manufactured milk products, Class IV, with the "higher of" the
advanced[Footnote 125] Class III or Class IV skim milk values as the
basis--or mover[Footnote 126]--for Class I prices; reducing the lag
between the Class I and Class III and IV price announcements; and
establishing a fixed differential of $0.70 per hundredweight to be
added to the advanced Class IV skim milk value in determining the price
to be paid for milk used in Class II products;
* introducing a new product formula pricing system; and:
* relaxing restrictions on pooling milk in some marketing
orders.[Footnote 127]
USDA implemented additional reforms to the classified pricing system in
April 2003 that modified aspects of the Class III and IV pricing
formulas.[Footnote 128]
Federal Order Consolidation:
In response to the legislative requirement, USDA reduced the number of
FMMOs to 11, which were typically combinations of pre-existing
orders.[Footnote 129] For example, the Central Order is a combination
of several smaller marketing orders in the central part of the United
States. According to USDA's final regulatory impact analysis for the
order reforms, these consolidation decisions were based on structural
factors such as milk movement, the number of market participants, and
natural boundaries.[Footnote 130]
USDA officials and other dairy experts told us that nationally, the
prices received by farmers for their raw milk did not change much as a
result of FMMO consolidation. One academic study reported that order
consolidation probably increased the economic efficiency of the FMMO
system by more closely aligning areas where raw milk is marketed by
dairy farmers with areas where it is distributed as fluid milk
products. Additionally, the study noted that consolidation helped to
reduce the amount of market distortion created by order regulation.
However, the magnitude of the effects on farm income varied among
orders because, in some cases, the consolidation combined orders that
had substantially different raw milk utilization rates for the
manufactured and fluid products in the various milk classes,
particularly Class I (fluid milk). As a result, some dairy farmers
experienced higher or lower utilization of their raw milk in Class I
products than they had in the past. Changes in utilization rates are
significant because farmers receive a blend price for their milk based
on the utilization rates for the different milk classes within an
order; thus, farmers in orders where Class I utilization rates
increased generally saw their incomes increase, while farmers in orders
where the Class I utilization rates decreased generally had their
incomes reduced.
The changes in utilization rates associated with FMMO consolidation
were particularly evident in the Western Order. When USDA created the
Western Order, it combined the Great Basin and the Southwestern Idaho-
Eastern Oregon Orders. These orders had substantially different Class I
utilization rates. In 1999, the Great Basin Order had a Class I
utilization rate of 51 percent, while the Southwestern Idaho-Eastern
Oregon Order had a Class I utilization rate of 8 percent. When these
orders were combined into the Western Order, the resulting Class I
utilization rate was estimated to be about 23 percent, lowering income
for the farmers in the Great Basin Order who had previously received
much higher blend prices. To address this and other concerns, Dairy
Farmers of America, a cooperative representing a number of farmers in
the Western Order, requested that USDA hold a hearing to reform the
order's provisions. USDA made some changes based on the concerns
presented at the hearing; however, the revised order provisions did not
receive the two-thirds approval necessary to be adopted, and USDA
terminated the order as of April 1, 2004, stating that the continuation
of the existing Western Order would not be in conformance with declared
policy.[Footnote 131]
Elimination of the Western Order has raised concerns that increased
amounts of Idaho milk, which had been pooled on the Western Order,
would be pooled on the Upper Midwest Order. Based on past experience,
this would reduce the Class I utilization rate and lower the blend
price for Upper Midwest farmers. However, dairy experts had mixed views
on whether additional orders would be terminated. In particular, one
industry expert noted that it remains unclear whether farmers in the
former Western Order will be able to receive higher prices for their
milk without their order. Some of these farmers, particularly those
that had been in the Great Basin Order, could benefit by not having to
pool their Class I milk. On the other hand, one source stated that
these farmers could face increased shipping requirements to pool their
milk on a remaining order. Additionally, some experts stated that
without FMMOs farmers and cooperatives do not have the market power to
obtain high prices for their raw milk in negotiations with processors.
Classified Pricing Structure Changes:
FMMO reform changed the structure of the classified pricing system by
creating a new Class IV, representing the minimum price that processors
pay for raw milk used in butter, nonfat dry milk, and other dry milk
powders.[Footnote 132] Additionally, the new mover of Class I prices
became the "higher of" the advanced Class III or Class IV skim milk
values. Use of the "higher of" mover was intended to enable fluid milk
processors to attract milk from butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese
processors by helping to ensure that the blend price would exceed both
the Class III and IV prices. USDA also reduced the lag period--the time
between when the Class I price is announced and the Class III and IV
prices are announced--from approximately 8 weeks, to 6 weeks. Class I
prices are announced in the month preceding the month to which they
apply, based on the "higher of" the advanced Class III and IV skim milk
values.[Footnote 133] However, the Class III and IV prices that
determine the price of raw milk used to manufacture these products are
not announced until the Friday on or before the 5th of the month
following the month to which they apply. Consequently, there is a 6-
week lag between these two price announcements. Further, USDA
established that the minimum prices paid for skim milk used in Class II
products would be the advanced Class IV skim milk and butterfat values,
plus a fixed differential of $0.70 per hundredweight.[Footnote 134] In
its March 1999 regulatory impact analysis, USDA concluded that these
changes would help to eliminate situations in which prices of milk used
in manufactured products rise above the price of milk used in fluid
milk products and thus make the Class I mover more representative of
current market conditions.
Academic researchers and an industry official indicated that the
creation of Class IV continued disincentives that were present prior to
the 2000 reforms to shift milk to its highest-valued use. Previously,
separate minimum prices were established for raw milk used in
manufactured products that are now included in the new Class IV. Raw
milk used in the production of butter was priced under Class III, which
also included cheese and other products. However, nonfat dry milk was
priced in a separate Class III-A. According to AMS officials, the
development of Class III-A was necessary because manufacturers were
unable to sell nonfat dry milk at market prices that would allow them
to pay the Class III minimum price for their raw milk. They noted that
for a classified pricing system to work, the minimum class prices must
be below the market clearing prices for products produced with that raw
milk (taking into account the cost of other inputs to these products).
However, one study found that the creation of Class IV
institutionalized separate pricing for nonfat dry milk.[Footnote 135]
By separating out the price for nonfat dry milk (the lowest-valued
use), the classified pricing system might maintain production of nonfat
dry milk even when market signals indicate that raw milk should be used
to manufacture cheese as the higher-valued use.
Additionally, a 2004 study sponsored by the American Farm Bureau
Foundation for Agriculture (American Farm Bureau) reported that
creating a separate Class IV and then basing Class I prices on the
"higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk values, has reduced
the influence that cheese prices traditionally had over other prices in
the FMMO system, and thus partially isolated Class I prices from market
forces.[Footnote 136] For example, in every month from January 2000
through July 2001, advanced Class IV skim milk values were higher than
advanced Class III skim milk values. However, as of 2000, utilization
of milk for Class IV products across all federal orders averaged 7 to 8
percent, while Class III products accounted for about 45 percent of
milk utilization.[Footnote 137] According to the American Farm Bureau
study, without the advanced Class III skim milk value as the mover for
Class I prices, when the Class IV price exceeds the Class III price,
similar price signals are no longer received by farmers in relatively
high Class I utilization markets and in high Class III utilization
markets. This difference occurs because during these times farmers in
high Class I utilization markets are receiving their price signals
based on the high Class IV prices, which are heavily influenced by the
price support program during periods of excess production and low
manufacturing product prices. Therefore, farmers in high Class I
utilization areas receive higher farm prices than would otherwise be
the case, and higher prices encourage increased production by these
farmers. However, the higher production levels of these farmers puts
downward pressure on the Class III prices and causes regional
inequities in farm income.
Furthermore, because Class I prices are now more closely related to the
level at which the price support program sustains nonfat dry milk
prices, proposed changes to the price support program have become much
more controversial. Prior to the 2000 FMMO reforms, Class I prices were
based on the Class III price, which, as noted previously, did not
include nonfat dry milk. However, with the 2000 reforms, the level of
support provided by the price support program for nonfat dry milk
prices directly influences the Class IV price. During periods when the
Class IV price is higher than the Class III price, changing the price
support program in such a way that Class IV prices are reduced will
cause the Class I price to similarly fall, thus having a greater impact
on the overall blend prices received by farmers.
Introduction of a New Product Formula Pricing System:
As part of FMMO reform, USDA introduced a new product formula pricing
system that established minimum prices for raw milk based on milk
component values for butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and other
solids. These values are derived from the wholesale prices of cheddar
cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, and dry whey as announced in weekly
surveys conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics
Service.[Footnote 138] The minimum prices also factor in allowances
based on estimates of manufacturing costs for these products and
product yield factors representing the amount of a particular product
that can be manufactured from specified quantities of the underlying
components. Seven of the 11 orders (primarily the Northern orders)
adopted the new product formula pricing system, while the other four
orders (primarily the Southern orders) use a pricing system that bases
milk prices on skim milk and butterfat.[Footnote 139]
During much of the time that classified pricing has been part of the
federal order system, the formulas used to set minimum prices paid to
farmers were based on competitive pay prices. The pay price was known
as the Minnesota-Wisconsin price, and it represented the results of
state surveys of competitive market prices for Grade B milk paid by
manufacturing plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin. However, with a
reduction in Grade B milk production, this milk was very thinly traded
and the pricing series became less representative of the value of Grade
A milk used for manufacturing.[Footnote 140]
According to a number of dairy experts, the change from a competitive
pay to a product formula pricing system that incorporates fixed
manufacturing allowances has enhanced the effects of price volatility
on dairy farmers.[Footnote 141] As noted in appendix V, there are a
variety of input costs to the manufacturing process, including labor,
energy, and capital. With product formula pricing, manufacturing
allowances, which are supposed to compensate for these other input
costs, and product yield factors are fixed. To the extent that changes
in these other input prices are reflected in the prices at which
manufacturers sell their products, fixed manufacturing allowances will
allow changes in other input costs to more readily affect the minimum
raw milk prices paid to farmers.
Dairy experts also indicated that the fixed manufacturing allowances in
the product pricing formulas reduced economic efficiency by reflecting
raw milk supply and demand conditions less clearly. Moreover, one large
processor stated that the manufacturing allowances in the pricing
formulas are too low and do not adequately represent the costs of
manufacturing.[Footnote 142] Regardless of the market price of cheese,
butter, or nonfat dry milk, the fixed manufacturing allowances provide
manufacturing plants with the same net returns from 100 pounds of raw
milk. Therefore, when market conditions reflect higher prices for one
of these products, relative to the others, manufacturers have less of
an incentive to shift production to the higher-valued use because any
gains they might have realized from selling a higher-priced product
would be negated by the fact that their manufacturing allowance is
fixed.[Footnote 143] The 2004 American Farm Bureau study noted that
prior to the introduction of the new product formula pricing system,
manufacturers that produced butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk
competed more aggressively for raw milk. The study found that if the
prices of nonfat dry milk and butter, for example, were depressed
relative to cheese prices, cheese manufacturers would attract milk away
from the manufacturers of these other products. Therefore, raw milk
would more readily move to its highest-valued use.[Footnote 144]
Further, some dairy experts noted that the additional volatility
introduced by the fixed manufacturing allowances in the new product
formula pricing system, when combined with the disincentives these
allowances and separate manufacturing classes create against shifting
milk to its highest-valued use, might have contributed to negative
producer price differentials[Footnote 145] and de-pooling.[Footnote
146] Negative producer price differentials can occur because with the
6-week lag between the Class I and Class III and IV price
announcements, rapid increases in the manufactured product prices from
which Class III and IV prices are derived can raise these prices above
the Class I price.[Footnote 147] USDA officials noted that the change
to a "higher of" mover for Class I prices and the reduction of the lag
period were designed to reduce the frequency of negative producer price
differentials. However, to the extent that the fixed manufacturing
allowances have introduced additional volatility into the pricing
system, and the disincentives created by these fixed manufacturing
allowances and separate manufacturing classes have prevented raw milk
supplies from moving to their highest-valued use, negative producer
price differentials and de-pooling have continued.
During times when the producer price differential is negative, some
processors of manufactured products who normally receive a draw from
their federal order pool to pay farmers instead have to pay into the
pool. In such circumstances, many of these processors choose to de-pool
because by doing so, they gain a competitive advantage over those that
remain and have to pay into the pool.[Footnote 148] One study on FMMO
pooling issues reported that since June 2003, negative producer price
differentials and de-pooling have become more common.[Footnote 149] The
study noted that the producer price differential in the Upper Midwest
Order was negative from July through November 2003 and reached a record
low level in April 2004 of $4.11 per hundredweight. For example, cheese
prices in the Upper Midwest Order began to rise sharply in mid-July
2003; thus the advanced Class III skim milk value that served as the
Class I mover for August did not include these higher prices. However,
the Class III price that was announced in August did include these
higher prices, creating a negative producer price differential. As a
result, a number of cheese processors de-pooled in August, reducing the
order's Class III utilization, which is usually around 75 to 77
percent, to just 8.4 percent. Nationally, negative producer price
differentials were reported for this month in the 7 FMMOs that used the
new product formula pricing system. For the 11 FMMOs existing at the
time, de-pooling resulted in 33 percent less milk being pooled compared
to the same month in the prior year.
De-pooling reduces the overall value of the federal order pool and
increases differences in the abilities of processors to pay for raw
milk. As a result, dairy farmers do not receive uniform prices. Farmers
marketing milk with processors who are able to de-pool may receive
higher prices and thus an increase in farm income, while farmers
marketing milk with processors who do not de-pool may receive lower
prices. According to the June 2004 University of Wisconsin study, this
situation represents an inequity and is contrary to one of the stated
purposes of the FMMO system: orderly marketing conditions.
Relaxed Pooling Provisions:
In some cases, the 2000 FMMO reforms resulted in more relaxed pooling
provisions. AMS officials noted that when USDA consolidated the
marketing orders, the pre-existing orders each had its own pooling
provisions, such as minimum amounts of raw milk required to be shipped
to processing plants participating in that order's pool to qualify for
its blend price or restrictions on rejoining the pool after de-
pooling.[Footnote 150] AMS officials indicated that where two orders
were combined that had different pooling provisions, USDA applied the
more liberal pooling standard to the combined order to prevent farmers
from being shut out of the consolidated order pool.
According to AMS reports from 2000 and 2001, relaxed pooling provisions
contributed to the pooling of more distant raw milk to receive other
orders' attractive blend prices. Pooling was easier because most of the
milk that was pooled from outside individual federal orders was not
required to actually be shipped to those orders. Therefore, distant
farmers were able to share in an order's blend price without incurring
substantial transportation costs for shipping milk. For example, under
the Upper Midwest Order's pooling provisions, an Idaho dairy
cooperative could choose to ship raw milk from some of its Idaho
farmers to a processing plant that participates in the Upper Midwest
Order. All subsequent milk deliveries of those designated farmers would
be priced under the Upper Midwest Order, even if only one day's
production was actually shipped to the participating processing plant.
Other deliveries from these farmers would stay in Idaho for processing.
In 2001, USDA reported that raw milk from California was pooled on the
Central, Upper Midwest, and Western Orders. However, most of this 4
billion pounds of milk was actually processed in California plants that
are not regulated by the federal order system. Also during 2001, large
volumes of raw milk from Minnesota and Wisconsin were pooled on the
Central, Mideast, and Northeast Orders, while increasing amounts of raw
milk from Idaho were pooled on the Upper Midwest Order.
According to some dairy experts, the increased pooling of milk across
orders has had mixed effects on farm income. Those farmers who were
able to have their milk pooled on distant orders that had higher blend
prices received an increase in their farm income after accounting for
the costs of transporting their milk. However, farmers in the receiving
orders had their farm income reduced as milk from outside the orders
reduced the value of the pool that could be shared among farmers in the
receiving orders. The combination of more milk pooled on these orders
and constant sales of higher-valued Class I and II products decreased
the weighted average value of the orders' pools by decreasing the
utilization rates of the higher-valued classes.
In response to this loss in value, participants in some orders
petitioned USDA to hold hearings to address relaxed pooling provisions.
For example, through the hearing process, the Central and Mideast
Orders tightened their pooling provisions to control the large
quantities of milk from Minnesota and Wisconsin that were being pooled
on these two orders. With these tightened provisions, those seeking to
pool milk on the Central or Mideast Orders have to ship more milk per
year or meet other requirements to become eligible to share in the
receiving orders' blend prices. A number of dairy experts indicated
that these changes have significantly reduced the incentive for distant
pooling on these orders.
2003 Classified Pricing Reforms:
USDA made additional reforms to the classified pricing system that went
into effect in April 2003, modifying aspects of the Class III and IV
pricing formulas. The principal changes in 2003 were increasing the
manufacturing allowance in the formula that established a price for the
other solids component of milk used in Class III products; eliminating
the lower bound of zero on the Class III other solids component
price;[Footnote 151] reducing the product yield for the nonfat solids
components of milk used in Class IV products; and altering the Class
III protein formula to prevent Class III prices from being lowered by
rising butter prices. The 2003 changes were partly the result of a
court-ordered injunction against the implementation of other changes
that USDA had proposed based on the 2000 requirement that USDA
reconsider the Class III and IV pricing formulas.
An analysis by researchers at the University of Wisconsin before
implementation of the changes indicated that the differences from many
of these changes would not be dramatic.[Footnote 152] However, the
researchers estimated that the changes would increase Class III prices
by as much as $0.57 per hundredweight. More specifically, the study
found that the 2003 changes would eliminate the negative effect that
rising butter prices were having on the Class III price. Under the
prior protein price formula, a $0.10 per pound increase in the butter
price would lower the Class III price by $0.04 per hundredweight. The
researchers found that the revised formula instead yields about a $0.04
per hundredweight increase in the Class III price for a $0.10 per pound
increase in the butter price. The study also reported that the new
protein price formula would make it somewhat less likely that the
advanced Class IV skim milk value rather than the advanced Class III
skim milk value would consistently serve as the mover for Class I
prices.[Footnote 153] Increased Class III prices would most likely
benefit farmers in areas where cheese is an important commodity and
where processors do not typically pay premiums in excess of federal
order minimum prices.
Dairy Price Support Program Adjustments:
Since 2000, USDA twice adjusted--or tilted--the purchase prices of
butter and nonfat dry milk as part of its efforts to administer the
dairy price support program. The first tilt occurred in May 2001, when
USDA reduced the nonfat dry milk purchase price by approximately $0.10
per pound (to $0.90 per pound) and increased the butter purchase price
by about $0.20 per pound (to approximately $0.85 per pound). USDA
adjusted the tilt again in November 2002 by reducing the nonfat dry
milk purchase price another $0.10 per pound (to $0.80 per pound) and
increasing the butter purchase price approximately $0.20 per pound (to
$1.05 per pound). USDA took these actions because the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) was accumulating large stocks of nonfat dry milk,
leading to high purchase and storage costs for USDA, as well as
significant market distortions.
As a result of the 2000 FMMO reforms, the federal order class prices
and the level of support provided by the price support program for
nonfat dry milk were tied more closely. Many dairy experts noted that,
subsequently, tilts became more politically controversial because they
can have a greater negative effect on the FMMO class prices. Lowering
the purchase price of nonfat dry milk while raising the purchase price
of butter decreases the overall Class IV price when market prices for
nonfat dry milk are at the level of the purchase price and market
prices for butter are above the level of the purchase price. When the
advanced Class IV skim milk value is serving as the mover for the Class
I price, this reduction in Class IV prices also reduces Class I prices.
Further, because the advanced Class IV skim milk value serves as the
basis for Class II prices, Class II prices are similarly reduced. This
scenario occurred during both the May 2001 and November 2002 tilts. A
representative of one dairy cooperative stated that these impacts were
particularly pronounced in areas with high Class I utilization rates,
such as the Northeast and Southeast.
According to a report published by the International Trade Commission
in May 2004, estimates of the actual impacts of these tilts on farm
prices varied.[Footnote 154] The study presented a USDA estimate that
the November 2002 tilt reduced fiscal year 2003 average milk prices
from $12.10 to $11.90 per hundredweight. While USDA reported that this
decrease lowered the amount of raw milk produced and thus was partially
offset by an increase in butter prices from reduced production, it
still led to a loss in net farm income of $192 million.[Footnote 155]
Alternatively, the study reported that the National Milk Producers
Federation estimated that the two tilts ultimately lowered farm prices
by $0.19 per hundredweight in 2001, $0.48 per hundredweight in 2002,
and $0.76 per hundredweight in 2003. With these price reductions, the
organization projected that farm income would fall by $156 million in
2001, $816 million in 2002, and about $1.3 billion in 2003. Another
study cited by the International Trade Commission's report estimated
that the 2002 tilt could have decreased average milk prices by $0.16
per hundredweight, reducing production by 814 million pounds and farm
income by $371 million. However, that study also found that these
impacts varied substantially, depending upon the assumption of high or
low prices and the effects of other government programs.
While the tilts reduced farm income and raw milk production, a number
of dairy experts indicated that USDA's tilts have increased economic
efficiency and reduced federal costs associated with the dairy price
support program. Additionally, some experts noted that by maintaining
nonfat dry milk prices at artificially high levels, the price support
program was inducing surplus production of nonfat dry milk. In some
cases, nonfat dry milk was produced specifically for sale to the
government at the CCC purchase price. From the beginning of October
2000 through the end of May 2001, the CCC purchased approximately 330
million pounds of nonfat dry milk (more than 40 percent of national
production), and government purchase costs exceeded $340 million.
Furthermore, in 2002, the CCC stocks of nonfat dry milk were equivalent
to two-thirds of domestic production and exceeded annual domestic
consumption by more than 30 percent. By reducing the purchase price of
nonfat dry milk, USDA reduced the incentive to produce surplus nonfat
dry milk. The International Trade Commission study reported that while
production of nonfat dry milk continued to rise between 2001 and 2002,
after the second tilt production declined by about 5 percent between
2002 and 2003. The tilts also helped to reduce federal costs associated
with purchasing and storing nonfat dry milk.
Some sources also indicated that the tilts affected the balance of
trade in dairy products between the United States and its trade
partners. The International Trade Commission study reported that during
the majority of the period from January 1998 to November 2002, U.S.
prices for nonfat dry milk exceeded international market prices by more
than $500 per metric ton. Consequently, domestic manufacturers had an
incentive to import alternative dairy protein products such as milk
protein concentrates. By lowering the purchase price of nonfat dry milk
through the tilts, USDA decreased this incentive because domestic
manufacturers could obtain nonfat dry milk more cheaply.
Introduction of the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program:
With the introduction of the MILC program in 2002, dairy farmers began
receiving payments on milk production up to 2.4 million pounds annually
when the Class I price in Boston dropped below $16.94 per
hundredweight. MILC payments are equal to 45 percent of the difference
between $16.94 and the lower Boston Class I price. From the program's
inception, MILC payments were made every month from the retroactive
start date of December 2001 through August 2003 because there was an
extended period of depressed farm prices, which reached a 25-year low
in early 2003. Prices temporarily recovered from September through
December 2003, so no MILC payments were made in those months; however,
payments resumed during January and continued through April 2004.
During the spring of 2004, farm milk prices reached record highs and
remained strong through the fall of 2004, so no MILC payments were
required for the remainder of fiscal year 2004.
As a result of depressed farm milk prices during 2002 and 2003, federal
costs associated with MILC payments exceeded original estimates. Based
on market conditions in March 2002, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated total federal costs of the MILC program at $963 million over
the life of the program (i.e., about 4 years). However, 1 year later,
the Congressional Budget Office revised its total cost estimate for the
MILC program to $4.2 billion. USDA distributed approximately $1.8
billion in MILC payments to dairy farmers in fiscal year 2003.[Footnote
156] Thus, the cost of MILC through fiscal year 2003 alone exceeded the
previously estimated total costs for the entire 4-year period through
2005 by about $800 million. The Congressional Budget Office's March
2004 estimate for total MILC program costs was $3.8 billion, somewhat
lower than the 2003 estimate because of higher farm milk prices in
2004.[Footnote 157]
Many dairy experts indicated that by providing income support during
low-price periods, the MILC program has helped keep some farmers,
particularly smaller farmers, in business.[Footnote 158] For example,
some academic experts noted that some farmers received MILC checks of
about $20,000 to $25,000, and others said that despite low prices,
fewer farmers exited the market in 2003 than in previous years. USDA
officials indicated that these payments delayed the supply response to
low prices and maintained depressed milk prices over a longer period of
time. By providing direct payments when prices were low, MILC obscured
market signals that would normally cause farmers to decrease
production, and continued high levels of production retained downward
pressure on milk prices. To the extent that these lower farm prices
were passed on through the retail level, consumers may have experienced
lower prices for dairy products.
Despite this effect, dairy experts stated that smaller farmers receive
a net benefit from MILC because those with about 100 to 130 cows can
have all of their production covered under the 2.4 million-pound annual
cap. In contrast, larger farmers do not receive net benefits from MILC
because the negative farm income effects of reduced milk prices are
greater than the payments they receive under the production cap. A
couple of dairy experts noted that the break-even size, at which MILC
payment benefits just offset the negative farm income effects of
prolonged low prices, is about 400 cows. Because the effects of MILC
vary by producer size, they also vary regionally. States with many
small dairy farmers, such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Vermont, have
received greater proportional benefits from MILC. However, the MILC
program has disadvantaged states with larger producers, such as western
states.
Effects of Alternative Dairy Policies Differ under Various Scenarios:
A number of options have been proposed or discussed to further modify
existing programs and policies or introduce alternative ones, all of
which could affect the policy considerations we identified in different
ways. These options span a range of existing and potential federal
dairy programs and policies, including FMMOs, price supports, MILC,
target price deficiency payments, the proposed National Dairy Equity
Act, trade restrictions and export incentives, risk management, and
supply management. Current international trade agreements and ongoing
negotiations can have implications for certain of these policy options,
such as price supports, export incentives, and trade
restrictions.[Footnote 159] The purpose of this analysis is not to take
a position for or against any of these options or to analyze them in
terms of their overall economic impacts, but simply to discuss their
likely effects on the policy considerations we identified. The likely
effects of these alternatives sometimes differ under various scenarios,
such as high or low prices, and may be different in the short and long
terms.
In general, options that increase farm income over the short term also
tend to increase milk production and thus the potential for oversupply
and lower average farm prices over the long term.[Footnote 160] These
options also tend to be costly for the federal government during
periods of low prices. In some cases options that increase the economic
efficiency of federal dairy programs also increase price volatility
because they allow clearer transmission of market price
signals.[Footnote 161] Further, to the extent that price changes at the
wholesale level are passed through to the retail level, a number of
options would likely have mixed effects on consumer prices depending
upon the particular product under consideration (e.g., butter, cheese,
or fluid milk). The potential impacts of the options also vary
according to the size of the producer and region of the country. In
general, options that affect farm income without respect to farm size
or cost of production could further shift production towards larger,
western farms. Production shifts toward larger farms could increase the
potential for oversupply in the market, because such farms have a
greater capacity to increase production in response to policy
incentives. In some cases, options that reduce support for farm income
could have disproportionately negative impacts on smaller farmers, who
often have higher costs of production.[Footnote 162]
Change the Federal Milk Marketing Order Program:
Dairy experts have cited a number of concerns with FMMOs, including
that with the increasing ability to transport milk products longer
distances, the differences in Class I differentials provide incentives
for overproduction in some regions; that recent revisions to the
classified pricing system enhanced the effects of price volatility on
dairy farmers; that changes in pooling restrictions increased the flow
of milk between different regions of the country, which disrupts the
market; that consolidation of the FMMOs combined some areas of the
country that were not part of the same natural "milksheds;" and that it
takes too long to change the federal order system through the USDA
hearing process. A number of options have been proposed or discussed to
modify the FMMO program, including revising the classified pricing
system, making administrative changes such as tightening pooling
provisions, or eliminating FMMOs altogether. Figure 36 shows the
effects of various options to change the FMMO program over the short
and long terms.
Figure 36: Potential Effects of Options to Change FMMOs on Various
Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Revise Classified Pricing:
Academic, industry, and government sources cited a variety of concerns
with recent reforms in the classified pricing system, including that
these changes enhance the effects of price volatility on farmers;
lessen the transmission of market price signals; reduce incentives for
market participants to shift milk to its highest-valued use; discourage
innovation; and contribute to de-pooling during periods of price
volatility. A number of options exist to revise the classified pricing
system, including basing the class pricing formulas on competitive pay
prices instead of product prices, combining Class III and IV into a
single manufacturing class of milk, and changing the Class I mover from
being the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk values to
a weighted average of these prices.
Use Competitive Pay Prices Instead of Product Formula Pricing:
One option to reform the classified pricing system would be to return
to a system of competitive pay prices as the basis for the minimum
prices that manufacturers pay for raw milk. As indicated by AMS
officials, the change to a product formula pricing system has enhanced
the effects of price volatility on the prices that farmers receive for
their raw milk. The AMS officials, as well as academic and industry
sources, noted that competitive pay prices for raw milk would be a
better basis for the minimum class prices. However, the officials noted
that the lack of good data is a major challenge to developing a
competitive pay system that is more broadly based than the old
Minnesota-Wisconsin price series.[Footnote 163]
In an earlier report, we compared the concept of a competitive pay
system to a product formula pricing system, among other
options.[Footnote 164] We found that while a product formula pricing
system would be superior to other mechanisms in reflecting national
prices of manufactured dairy products, the accuracy of price levels
under the system would depend on a number of factors, including whether
the manufacturing allowances--deductions made for the costs of
manufacturing different dairy products--are accurate. Setting accurate
manufacturing allowances is difficult because individual plants could
have different cost structures. As noted earlier, we heard from several
academic, industry, and government sources that the fixed manufacturing
allowances in the current product pricing formulas have negative
impacts on the economic efficiency of the classified pricing system by
reflecting supply and demand conditions less clearly.[Footnote 165]
On the other hand, we found that while a competitive pay system for
Grade A milk was similar to a product formula pricing system in that it
would generally reflect national prices of manufactured dairy products,
it would more readily reflect national supply and demand conditions for
raw milk used for manufacturing. Also, it would more accurately reflect
competitive pressures from the fluid milk market because Grade A milk
is used to meet shortages in areas of the country with high Class I
utilization. Furthermore, we reported that a competitive pay system
would be better than a product formula pricing system at self-adjusting
automatically because the competitive system would be based on actual
reported prices. Therefore, a competitive pay system could improve the
economic efficiency of the classified pricing system by providing
clearer market price signals.
AMS officials stated that if it were possible to obtain adequate data,
returning to a competitive pay system would introduce greater stability
into farm milk prices because basing the price formulas on competitive
pay prices allows manufacturers' margins to be set outside the federal
order system. According to the officials, when manufacturing costs
increase, manufacturers tend to decrease their margins; they then
increase their margins when costs go back down. The AMS officials also
stated that to the extent the effects of price volatility are reduced
by eliminating fixed manufacturing allowances, raw milk production
would increase, holding average milk prices constant.
Combine Class III and IV:
A second option discussed by some of the academic and industry sources
we contacted would be to combine Class III and IV into a single
manufacturing class.[Footnote 166] While an objective of USDA's FMMO
reforms, including developing separate manufacturing classes on which
to base fluid milk prices, was to avoid situations in which the price
of milk used in manufactured products rises above the price of milk
used in fluid products; as we noted earlier, this change has muted
market price signals and has reduced incentives to move milk to its
highest-valued use. However, an academic source indicated that a
potential challenge in combining Class III and IV is identifying an
appropriate formula that considers the products in an expanded class.
In addition, AMS officials cited this issue noting that one barrier
would be finding a way to price the lowest-valued use, nonfat dry milk,
so that manufacturers of this product would be able to afford to pay
the minimum class price to farmers.
A number of industry and academic sources said that combining Class III
and IV into a single manufacturing class would allow milk to move to
its highest-valued use. With a separate Class IV, processors of butter
and nonfat dry milk can pay less for their raw milk supplies under
certain market conditions, which can stimulate additional allocation of
raw milk into Class IV products. Under such conditions, by reducing
these market distortions, combining Class III and IV might help to
increase the economic efficiency of the classified pricing
system.[Footnote 167] It could also help to limit the decline in market
prices caused by overproduction of nonfat dry milk and thus reduce the
federal costs of CCC purchases of this commodity. Over the long term,
limiting overproduction incentives will help all farmers by maintaining
higher average farm prices. However, these benefits could be limited by
constraints on the extent to which raw milk is free to move between
different uses. Some USDA officials have indicated that manufacturing
capacity for different products varies by region and that manufacturing
plants are often specialized. In addition, fixed supply agreements
within the dairy industry may not allow manufacturers significant
freedom to shift raw milk between uses in response to price signals in
the short term.
Combining Class III and IV could have mixed impacts by region on farm
income because with a combined manufactured product price, high prices
for one particular use of milk would offset low prices for other uses
in creating a weighted average price. Utilization rates for the
different manufacturing uses vary among orders, and farmers whose
average blend prices might be higher based on utilization of their raw
milk for a higher-valued use under a separate class price scenario
could experience lower average returns under a combined class price
scenario if the price of their higher-valued use were weighted down by
the inclusion of the lower-valued use. Conversely, farmers whose
average blend prices might be lower based on utilization of their raw
milk for a lower-valued use under a separate class price scenario could
experience higher average returns under a combined class price
scenario. For example, in regions with higher Class IV utilization, the
loss of a separate Class IV could result in lower average farm income
during periods when Class IV prices would otherwise be higher than
Class III prices. In regions with higher Class III utilization,
however, the loss of a separate Class IV could result in higher average
farm income during periods when Class III prices would otherwise be
lower than Class IV prices.
Change Class I Mover:
If Class III and IV prices are kept separate, a third option to modify
classified pricing would be to use a weighted average of Class III and
IV prices as the mover for Class I prices. This option would tie fluid
milk prices more closely to market related manufacturing prices,
particularly when prices of Class III products are depressed relative
to Class IV products. One academic study that modeled the price
volatility impacts of using a weighted average of Class III and IV
prices to set Class I prices reported that using the weighted average,
rather than the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk
values, slightly decreases the volatility of farm prices, largely
through a more substantial decrease in the volatility of the Class I
price.[Footnote 168] As a result of this reduced volatility, the study
estimated that the average Class I price would decline by roughly $0.40
per hundredweight, causing an average farm price decline of $0.09 per
hundredweight. The study found that there would be essentially no
change in the volatility of other class prices or product prices.
These effects are likely to vary by region. As the Class I price is
expected to decrease more than the average farm price, the effects of
this option could be more significant in regions with high Class I
utilization of raw milk. The reduction in farm prices could cause a
marginal downward supply adjustment over the long term, the effects of
which would also be stronger in high Class I utilization areas. The
effects of reduced prices on farm income could be partially offset by
increased MILC payments as long that program remains in existence.
Increased MILC payments would raise federal costs, particularly during
periods of low prices. However, this option could also help USDA
minimize the costs of the price support program by making it less
controversial to adjust the tilt between butter and nonfat dry milk
purchase prices because these prices would no longer exert as great an
influence on the Class I price.
AMS officials cautioned, however, that this option could increase the
likelihood that manufactured product prices would rise above blend
prices, leading to more frequent negative producer price differentials
and de-pooling.[Footnote 169] The officials noted that the purpose of
implementing the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk
values provision was to reduce the frequency of negative producer price
differentials. They said that implementing an option that reduces blend
prices makes it more likely that the value of one of the manufacturing
class prices will rise above the blend price. The officials also
indicated that consumers may benefit from lower prices to the extent
that the Class I and blend price decreases are transmitted through the
milk marketing chain. One AMS official questioned the extent to which
this option would reduce the volatility of Class I prices, noting that
since January 2000 the volatility of Class I prices would have been
about the same under a weighted average mover.
Change the Administration of FMMOs:
Another set of options to modify FMMOs involves changing their
administration. Pooling provisions could be tightened by increasing the
amount of milk that must be shipped to an order to qualify for that
order's blend price or by placing restrictions on de-pooling.
Alternatively, federal order reform could be reconsidered by splitting
up some of the consolidated orders. Finally, USDA may be able to
shorten the time between a hearing request and implementation of a
final decision.
Tighten Pooling Provisions with Increased Minimum Shipment
Requirements:
Federal order reforms relaxed the pooling provisions of many orders,
which negatively affected some farmers by diluting their Class I
utilization rates and lowering their blend prices as increased amounts
of distant milk were pooled on their orders. In response, participants
in some orders called for hearings to tighten their pooling provisions,
often by increasing the minimum amount of milk that must be delivered
to processing plants participating in their pool to qualify for the
blend price. With the end of the Western Order, the concern that some
milk formerly pooled on that order could be pooled on the Upper Midwest
Order led two groups of dairy cooperatives operating there to request a
hearing to tighten the order's pooling provisions.[Footnote 170]
According to some AMS officials, restricting the pooling of raw milk
through increased shipping requirements would not have a significant
national impact. However, they said there could be mixed regional
effects on farm income and production. Farmers in areas seeking to pool
milk to other orders would generally see a negative impact on their
farm incomes because they would incur greater transportation costs
trying to share in the value of another order's pool and would,
therefore, pool less milk in other orders. However, farmers in the
receiving order could see an increase in their farm income because with
less milk pooled from outside the order, their pool would retain more
of its value and they would receive higher blend prices. In each case,
there could be localized production effects depending upon whether
farmers experience an increase or a decrease in their farm income. The
AMS officials stated that tightening pooling provisions would have
minimal effects on price volatility because the tighter provisions
would not change overall supply and demand conditions. However, the
officials also indicated that the economic efficiency of the FMMO
system would increase to the extent that reducing the amount of milk
pooled on distant orders would reduce the amount of money spent on
transporting milk. Because impacts on national production levels are
likely to be limited, impacts on federal costs would be minimal.
Tighten Pooling Provisions with Restrictions on De-Pooling:
A second option for tightening federal order pooling provisions is to
place additional restrictions on those who choose to de-pool. As noted
earlier, price volatility leading to negative producer price
differentials and de-pooling can negatively affect those who remain in
a federal order pool because the overall value of the pool is
reduced.[Footnote 171] Some orders restrict de-pooling by preventing
milk handlers who choose to de-pool from re-pooling for a specific
period of time.[Footnote 172] One such restriction recently proposed by
cooperatives in the Upper Midwest Order would limit a processor's
pooled milk in any month to a specified percentage of that processor's
pooled milk in the previous month. Under that restriction, if a
processor partially de-pooled in one month, it could only partially re-
pool in the subsequent month. If it fully de-pooled, it would have to
wait a month before it could re-pool.
Restricting de-pooling would have mixed effects on farm income. Because
de-pooling allows some processors to pay farmers higher prices, some
farmers would be harmed if de-pooling were restricted. Conversely,
those farmers who are harmed by de-pooling could benefit if more of the
pool value were retained during periods of volatile prices. While
nonuniform farm prices do not help to achieve orderly marketing,
restricting de-pooling could make this problem worse if it encourages
some processors to leave the order system permanently. In that case,
the reserve supply of milk for fluid production would shrink, and
orders would have to increase minimum shipping requirements for
remaining pooled processors and dairy cooperatives. If restricted de-
pooling actually caused fewer processors to be associated with the
federal order system, volatility in fluid milk prices could increase
because with less milk available in reserve to supply the Class I
market, seasonal or episodic fluctuations in milk supply and demand
could have greater price impacts. However, an AMS official indicated
that in general processors benefit over the long term from being
pooled, and so restrictions on de-pooling would not necessarily
decrease the supply of milk available for fluid milk products. If the
supply of milk available for fluid milk products did not decrease, then
the volatility of fluid milk prices would not increase. The effects of
restricted de-pooling on other policy considerations, such as federal
costs or consumer prices, are unclear.
Split Up Consolidated Federal Orders:
A third option to revise the administration of FMMOs is to split up
some of the consolidated orders where the combination of orders with
different utilization rates of the different classes of milk has
created problems. Many industry, academic, and government sources
stated that federal order consolidation has had some significant
regional effects, including the demise of the Western Order. One source
stated that because of order consolidation, some orders have become so
large that they include milk that would not normally be in the milkshed
for particular marketing areas. This increases the potential that some
farmers' blend prices will decrease with lower utilization rates of raw
milk in Class I products. To address this problem, USDA is currently
considering a proposal to split up the Southeast Order and create a
"Mississippi Valley" Order.[Footnote 173]
Splitting up certain orders could have mixed effects on farm income. In
cases in which experts have cited problems with federal order
consolidation, the problems developed because two previously existing
orders that had largely different Class I utilization rates were
combined. With the additional milk pooled under the consolidated order,
farmers that had been in the order with the higher Class I utilization
rate saw a decrease in their blend price. However, farmers that had
been in the order with the lower Class I utilization rate experienced
an increase in their blend price. Therefore, splitting up the
consolidated orders in these instances would affect farmers differently
depending on the Class I utilization rates of the new orders. AMS
officials indicated that splitting up orders would affect the
distribution of farm income but would not affect overall production and
therefore would have minimal impacts on federal costs. They also noted
that splitting up orders could increase the movement of milk because
having smaller orders makes farm prices more closely reflect local
supply and demand conditions. Therefore, to the extent that smaller
orders would increase the blend prices in some areas, this option could
create incentives to transport more milk to those areas.
Accelerate USDA's Hearing Process:
Some experts suggested that USDA's federal order hearing system is too
slow to effectively respond to problems and changing market conditions.
The American Farm Bureau study reported that it can take 2 or more
years from the time USDA receives a request for a hearing or direction
from the Congress before USDA implements the rules of a final decision.
The study noted that within this long time frame, either the industry
may have struggled under faulty rules or, by the time final rules are
effective, industry changes may have occurred rendering the final rule
obsolete. For example, a couple of industry sources stated that the
dairy industry is changing rapidly, with a number of new products
coming onto the market. They indicated that USDA would have difficulty
regulating these products because it takes too long to get a decision
on the class under which they would be priced.
USDA faces a number of challenges in shortening the time between
receiving a hearing request and implementing the rules of a final
decision, while still ensuring the promulgation of economically sound
regulation.
* The USDA hearing process is set forth by law.[Footnote 174] Before
issuing or amending marketing orders, the Secretary of Agriculture must
conduct a formal on-the-record rulemaking proceeding. USDA must notify
the public and provide an opportunity for a public hearing and
comments. Before an order regulation or amendment to a milk marketing
order can become effective, it must meet certain requirements including
that it be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected dairy
farmers in the order, or dairy farmers who produce at least two-thirds
of the milk produced in that order.
* If individual parties do not agree with the USDA decision, they can
seek review of that decision in federal court. For example, after the
2000 FMMO reforms, several industry groups received an injunction that
prevented USDA from implementing new pricing rules that would have
established separate Class III and IV butterfat prices. In response,
USDA issued a revised decision, but these new rules were not
implemented until April 2003.
* Making informed decisions about changes in complex federal dairy
policy can be time-consuming. For example, such decisions require
thorough analysis and possibly modeling. In addition, AMS officials
indicated that hearing participants are not always ready on time, and
keeping a stricter schedule could result in an incomplete hearing
record. Furthermore, they stated that it is difficult to compile the
hearing transcripts quickly and accurately. However, they noted that
USDA has recently begun evaluating its transcript contracts using an
approach that considers timeliness and accuracy.
* The politicized nature of dairy policy makes it difficult to agree on
proposed changes to FMMOs. Because FMMO provisions affect cooperatives
and processors in different ways, these entities may not always agree
on a proposed change. Moreover, given regional differences in
production and utilization, farmers in different regions may not agree
on changes in federal dairy policy.
AMS officials said that delays are also caused by the lack of available
judges and attorneys who deal with milk pricing issues. The officials
said that increasing the speed of the decision-making process is likely
to increase federal costs because more of these resources would be
required. USDA officials indicated that they do not believe the hearing
process inhibits the ability of FMMOs to respond to changing market
conditions or the marketing of new dairy products.
Eliminate FMMOs or Classified Pricing:
Rather than trying to reform the FMMO system, some dairy experts have
considered the possibility of eliminating FMMOs and thus the classified
pricing system.[Footnote 175] To the extent that manufactured product
prices stay above the level of the price support program, market forces
would set prices for all uses of milk. In a 1988 report on
FMMOs,[Footnote 176] we found that the production and marketing
conditions used to justify federally guaranteed milk prices under
marketing orders no longer existed because most milk being produced is
now Grade A and is eligible to serve the fluid milk market during
periods of supply and demand imbalance.[Footnote 177] Also, our study
noted that improvements in refrigeration and the transportation system
have made it less expensive to rely on milk supplies from other
markets. Further, we reported that the differences in Class I
differentials--which were, in part, intended to represent the costs of
producing and transporting milk from areas with a surplus to areas with
a deficit--actually bear little relationship to differences in either
production or transportation costs for milk, thereby providing
incentives for overproduction in certain regions. A 2002 University of
Wisconsin study argued that this overproduction has hurt farmers in
areas with low Class I utilization through an overall reduction in the
price of milk used for manufacturing purposes.[Footnote 178]
Academic and USDA studies have generally concluded that without the
classified prices established by FMMOs, fluid milk processors would
likely pay lower average prices to farmers, which would decrease farm
income in high fluid milk utilization areas, especially in the short
term. Estimates of impacts on farm prices varied among studies. For
example, the American Farm Bureau study estimated that average farm
prices for raw milk would fall by about $0.50 per hundredweight during
the first couple of years following federal order elimination.[Footnote
179] Another study, published by USDA, estimated that eliminating the
federal order system would decrease Class I prices an average of $0.95
per hundredweight over the period from 2002 through 2007.[Footnote 180]
Further, the 2002 University of Wisconsin study estimated that farm
prices would decrease around $0.05 to $0.10 per hundredweight. AMS
officials indicated that farmers would likely reduce production to the
extent they receive lower average farm prices.
The effects of FMMO elimination could be different based on farm size.
Some of the academic and industry sources we contacted noted that
farmers are at a disadvantage in terms of market power within the dairy
industry. Without the pooling of milk proceeds and the payment of
uniform blend prices, larger farms would have increasing incentives to
establish contracts directly with processors, and processors would
increase their efforts to procure milk directly from larger farms
closer to their own plants. Smaller and more distant farms could be
more likely to be bypassed. Also, to the extent that dairy cooperatives
are unable to cover the costs of balancing and other services they
provide, processors may be able to deflect the costs of these
operations back to farmers.
Studies also indicated that the magnitude of these effects could vary
by region. Without classified pricing, the prices of raw milk used in
fluid milk products are likely to fall, while the prices of raw milk
used in manufactured products are likely to rise. As a result, farmers
in regions with higher utilization of raw milk for fluid purposes, such
as the Northeast, would be worse off without classified pricing, while
farmers in regions with high utilization of raw milk for manufacturing
purposes, such as the Upper Midwest, could be better off without
classified pricing. For example, the American Farm Bureau study
reported that states with less than 20 percent fluid utilization of raw
milk would have higher average farm prices with the elimination of
federal orders, while those states with fluid utilization of raw milk
in excess of 35 percent have higher farm prices with the federal order
system in place.
In the short term, to the extent that lower farm prices paid for raw
milk used in fluid products are passed on to consumers, fluid milk
consumption could marginally increase. The American Farm Bureau study
estimated a 2.5 percent increase in fluid milk demand, while the USDA
study estimated a 2 percent increase. On the other hand, the University
of Wisconsin study reported that the combination of less milk
production and more fluid milk consumption would reduce the amount of
raw milk available for manufactured products and increase manufactured
product prices accordingly.[Footnote 181] To the extent that
manufactured product prices increase, consumers may buy less of these
products.
Over the long term, increased prices for milk used in manufactured
products could limit reductions in both farm income and production
resulting from elimination of FMMOs and classified pricing. In fact,
the American Farm Bureau study found that once a supply adjustment
occurs, average milk prices would return to levels similar to those
prior to FMMO elimination. However, to the extent that farmers in areas
with high manufacturing use experience higher prices for their milk,
the incentive to produce more milk could limit potential increases in
manufacturing product prices. In the end, some decline in production
could be expected over the long term because the overproduction
incentive resulting from the classified pricing system would be
removed.
Eliminating FMMOs and classified pricing could also affect other
federal dairy policies and, therefore, affect federal costs. If MILC
payments were still based on the relationship between what fluid milk
processors pay to acquire milk in Boston and a target price of $16.94,
MILC payments would likely increase in size and frequency.[Footnote
182] At the same time, elimination of FMMOs could decrease federal
costs related to the price support program because an increase in
manufactured dairy product prices resulting from eliminating classified
pricing could reduce the need for dairy commodity purchases by the CCC.
However, it is unclear whether this effect would be large enough to
offset additional payments under the MILC program.
Some AMS officials also indicated that farmers could experience
increased price volatility without FMMOs. In the absence of minimum
class prices, greater price volatility could result, in part, from
seasonal production variation or short-term factors, such as holidays
or weather events. Further, while some sources questioned the extent to
which a state regulatory system, such as California's, could continue
to exist in the absence of the federal classified pricing system,
others indicated that state regulation of milk could increase if the
federal system were eliminated. A couple of industry sources that we
contacted indicated that an increase in the number of states that
regulate milk could make it more difficult for them to do business and
would be a less efficient system of regulation.
On the other hand, eliminating FMMOs and classified pricing could also
provide greater incentives for product innovation. Without classified
pricing, the market would price products more openly based on supply
and demand and would increase the incentives for processors to develop
alternative dairy products. To the extent that alternative products
generate new demand for milk, this innovation could benefit farmers.
For example, a recent study by researchers at Cornell University on the
assignment of new products under a classified pricing system found
significant difficulties.[Footnote 183] The study reported that the
assignment of a new product to a higher-priced class increases farm
income in the short run; however, the incentive to increase production
provided by the use of raw milk in this higher-priced class and reduced
demand for raw milk stemming from these higher prices can offset farm
income gains in the long run. Furthermore, the study found that whether
the new product detracts from sales of existing fluid milk products
could also affect whether assignment to a higher-priced class increases
net revenues to farmers. One USDA representative stated that a number
of new products, such as low-carbohydrate milk beverages, have recently
entered the market. In some cases, according to the representative,
these products are intended to compete with Class I products but are
formulated to avoid regulation as Class I products. Processors seek to
avoid having these products regulated as Class I products because they
would then be required to pay more for raw milk. Conversely, farmers
want these products classified as Class I products so that their raw
milk used in these items will be priced at the higher level.
Some sources suggested that classified pricing could be eliminated
without eliminating FMMOs altogether. In this case, FMMOs might
continue to perform functions such as pooling revenue, auditing,
verifying weights and milk components, and collecting statistical
information. A few dairy experts indicated that these particular
aspects of the FMMO system benefit the dairy industry. While some of
these functions might be picked up by the private sector if FMMOs were
eliminated, they would come at a cost to dairy farmers.
Retaining FMMOs while eliminating classified pricing would probably
lessen the impacts of deregulating raw milk prices but would be
unlikely to change the direction of most effects or who benefits. For
example, while farm income would still fall without classified pricing,
continuing to pool revenues through FMMOs, if possible, could help
cooperatives negotiate over-order premiums because pooling could help
cooperatives maintain their market power relative to processors. Thus,
farm income might fall by less than it would if FMMOs were eliminated
entirely. Moreover, by continuing to pool revenues, retaining FMMOs
could limit increases in price volatility resulting from the
elimination of classified pricing. In addition, the orders would
continue to aim to ensure equitable treatment for producers and
processors. Maintaining orders is not likely to change the fact that
farmers in regions with high fluid milk utilization would experience
greater reductions in farm income from eliminating classified pricing
than farmers in regions with high manufacturing utilization. Production
would still adjust downward in response to lower milk prices, and
retail fluid milk prices would also decrease to the extent that lower
prices for raw milk used in fluid milk products are passed on to the
consumer. However, to the extent that cooperatives are able to maintain
higher over-order premiums by retaining FMMOs, these production and
consumer price effects might be less than they would be if orders were
eliminated entirely. Effects on federal costs would still be mixed.
Change the Dairy Price Support Program:
Dairy experts have raised several concerns about the price support
program in recent years, including that the support level is too low to
adequately support farmers; that the program provides incentives to
overproduce milk and certain commodities purchased by the CCC; that
USDA has not managed the program to maintain the established support
price during periods of low market prices; that there are additional
costs of selling dairy products to the government, which diminish the
effectiveness of the support price; and that the program stifles
innovation in the industry. Accordingly, a number of options have been
discussed to modify the price support program, including raising the
overall level of the support price (and thus the related commodity
purchase prices), making administrative changes such as allowing the
CCC to purchase a wider range of dairy products, and eliminating the
program altogether.[Footnote 184] Figure 37 shows the effects of
various options to change the dairy price support program under low-and
high-price scenarios over the short and long terms.
Figure 37: Potential Effects of Options to Change the Price Support
Program on Various Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Raise the Level of the Support Price:
One option for modifying the dairy price support program is to raise
the support price and the related commodity purchase prices. Many dairy
experts indicated that the support price has fallen below the costs of
production for most farmers and, therefore, is not providing an
effective safety net during periods of low prices. Additionally,
sources cited the reduction in the support price as a factor in
increasingly volatile milk prices. For example, one academician we
contacted stated that recent volatility in milk prices has resulted
from the virtual elimination of the price support system as an
effective price floor during periods of low milk prices. The price
support program also worked to reduce price volatility during periods
of high milk prices by releasing CCC stocks of purchased dairy
commodities when market prices reached 110 percent of the support
price.[Footnote 185] However, without purchasing sufficient quantities
of manufactured dairy products, the program does not perform this
balancing function.
According to an economist with USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA),
raising the support price would increase farm income and, thus, raw
milk production. The economist indicated that this option, by raising
the floor for milk prices, would also reduce price volatility; however,
increased purchases of dairy products would mean higher federal costs
for the price support program. Similarly, the American Farm Bureau
study found that while raising the support price would reduce price
volatility, it could create a situation in which the CCC purchases
surplus dairy products in most years. The FSA economist noted that
these federal costs might be offset, at least in part, by a reduction
in payments under the MILC program. The economist also said that
consumer costs would likely be higher, on average, because increasing
the support price would limit the fall of prices for manufactured
products.
The FSA economist also noted that increasing the support price would
decrease the economic efficiency of federal dairy policies,
particularly to the extent that a higher support price stimulates
increased production. Under this scenario, increased production would
represent an allocative inefficiency because resources would go into
producing milk that is not needed to supply the market. Some sources
cited examples of how high support prices under the program led to
misallocation of resources into surplus milk production. For example,
from 1977 to 1981, the support price for Grade A milk rose from $8.26
to $13.10 per hundredweight, and annual government expenditures on
dairy price supports increased from a few hundred million dollars to
over $2 billion.
Change the Administration of the Price Support Program:
A number of options have been proposed or discussed to change the
administration of the dairy price support program. These options
include allowing the CCC to purchase a wider range of products,
adjusting commodity purchase prices based on market conditions, and
setting commodity purchase prices to reflect cost differences between
selling to the CCC and selling in the marketplace.
Allow the CCC to Purchase a Wider Range of Products:
One potential modification to the administration of the price support
program would be to allow the CCC to purchase a wider range of products
than butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk. Some dairy experts and
studies indicated that by focusing on the purchase of a few specific
commodities, the price support program distorts the market by providing
incentives to overproduce these commodities, while at the same time
dampening incentives for innovation in the dairy industry.
Manufacturers that develop innovative products incur more risk because
they will not be able to sell their products to the government if they
cannot obtain a market price high enough to cover their costs. One
cooperative representative said that while nonfat dry milk contains
protein and calcium--both valuable components that could be used in
other products, such as protein bars--manufacturers continue to produce
nonfat dry milk in excess quantities because that is what the
government is buying. A number of other sources, including industry
representatives, academicians, and a report by the International Trade
Commission, noted that by purchasing nonfat dry milk, the price support
program may be impeding development of a domestic milk protein
concentrate industry by creating disincentives to shift raw milk
supplies to innovative products.
USDA officials cautioned that in order for a product to function well
as a price support product, it must (1) represent a major use of milk;
(2) have enough extra capacity to absorb a substantial amount of milk;
(3) be storable for long periods; and (4) have an active, liquid
wholesale market. Given these conditions, it is questionable whether
some alternative products, such as protein bars, would be effective as
price support products. Furthermore, the officials argued that
requiring the price support program to incur the risk of product
innovation through this approach would alter the fundamental purpose of
the program--supporting farm prices.
If the CCC were to purchase a wider range of products, manufacturers
would have greater incentives to use milk in alternative ways because
the price support program would decrease the risks of trying to produce
and market a greater number of products. Consumers could benefit as
innovative products gained easier access to the market, causing
consumer prices to fall. However, one FSA economist stated that this
option would greatly increase the complexity of the price support
program, potentially increase federal costs, and require new
legislation. Moreover, he noted that this change would require close
coordination between trade policies and the price support program. For
example, without tariff-rate quotas on some products such as milk
protein concentrates, the CCC could end up supporting additional
imports if the purchase prices were set too high. The economist stated
that this option could reduce production of nonfat dry milk but would
be less likely to affect price volatility.
Adjust Commodity Purchase Prices Based on Market Conditions:
A second potential modification would be to adjust--or tilt--commodity
purchase prices based on market conditions. Some dairy experts, as well
as academic studies, reported that because USDA does not tilt CCC
purchase prices frequently enough to maintain a balance between butter
and nonfat dry milk purchase prices that is based on current economic
conditions, the price support program has distorted the market with
unclear price signals and induced surplus production of certain goods
(notably nonfat dry milk). Therefore, some experts indicated that
tilting prices based on established criteria would be better. For
example, one dairy processor recommended changing the balance of butter
and nonfat dry milk purchase prices automatically if the ratio of CCC
purchases of butter and nonfat dry milk falls outside a certain range.
Similarly, the American Farm Bureau study suggested that to achieve the
support program's objectives without distorting the market and
increasing government costs, changes to commodity purchase prices
should be based on market conditions so that they would not be subject
to political pressure.
Basing the tilt of commodity purchase prices on market conditions would
increase the economic efficiency of the price support program by
reducing the price distortions that lead to surplus production of goods
that are not required to supply the market. Falling market prices for a
particular commodity suggest that the quantity supplied temporarily, at
least, exceeds the quantity demanded. If the CCC continues to buy the
commodity in significant amounts while the market price remains low, it
distorts the market by providing an incentive to produce that commodity
purely for the purpose of selling it to the government. This incentive
not only delays a market response to the lower commodity price but also
prevents that milk from going toward a higher-valued use. Moreover, a
study by researchers at the University of Wisconsin found that tilts
make it more likely that fluid milk prices will be driven by cheese
prices because the price support program would no longer be supporting
the manufacturing prices of Class IV products above market
levels.[Footnote 186] This study reported that tightening the
relationship between cheese prices and Class I prices improves market
signals to dairy farmers because nationally, as noted earlier, a
greater percentage of raw milk is used in Class III products (cheese)
than in Class IV products (butter and nonfat dry milk).
According to one FSA economist, lowering the purchase price of a
particular commodity in the short term could reduce farm income;
however, by encouraging production levels to respond more quickly to
low price periods, tilting CCC purchase prices to reflect market
conditions could maintain higher farm prices over the long term. The
economist also indicated that this change could decrease federal costs
for purchasing and storing dairy products. The consumer price effects
of market-based tilts are less clear. For example, if market butter
prices are high and market nonfat dry milk prices are low, a market-
based response would indicate that USDA should raise the CCC butter
price and lower the CCC nonfat dry milk price. However, further price
adjustments could result in the CCC purchase price for butter exceeding
the market price, which could trigger CCC purchases of butter and raise
the market price even higher. In such cases, assuming that price
changes at the wholesale level are passed on through the retail level,
consumers would benefit from lower prices on some commodities, while
potentially experiencing higher prices on others. The net effect to
consumers would then depend on the relative price changes for these
products and the quantities of each that were purchased.
Reflect Cost Differences in Selling to the CCC:
A third option to change the administration of the price support
program would be to set CCC purchase prices to reflect cost differences
in selling to the CCC versus selling in the marketplace. In recent
years market prices have fallen below the support price level in some
months. For instance, between July 2002 and June 2003, the Class III
milk price was below the $9.90 target level in 9 months. Although FSA
officials indicated that USDA is required to set product purchase
prices in such a way that only the average annual farm milk price, not
the monthly price, is at the support price, the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill) simply states that the price of
milk should be supported at $9.90 per hundredweight.[Footnote 187]
Concerns over USDA's management of the price support program led to
language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 requiring the
Secretary of Agriculture to more diligently support the farm price of
milk.[Footnote 188] Some dairy experts and studies indicated that one
reason that market prices sometimes fall below the CCC support price is
because there are additional costs of selling to the government that
are not reflected in the commodity purchase prices. Therefore, the
effective support price is actually below $9.90 because with higher
costs of selling to the government, the market price has to fall below
the CCC purchase price before processors are better off selling to the
CCC than to the market. Some of these additional costs include
packaging for longer-term storage, meeting stricter grading standards,
and a time lag between when the product is made and when it is approved
for sale to the federal government. An FSA economist estimated that
these cost differences amount to about $0.04 to $0.05 per pound for
cheese.[Footnote 189]
One option for reflecting the differences in cost between selling dairy
products to the government and selling in the marketplace would be to
raise the CCC purchase prices of these products to reflect the
additional costs of manufacturing product for sale to the
government.[Footnote 190] This would help ensure that manufacturers
receive a price for their products that allows them to return at least
$9.90 per hundredweight (the support price) to farmers. One FSA
economist indicated that this change could cause farmers to marginally
increase production, leading to increased CCC purchases. Increased CCC
purchases, in addition to higher purchase prices, would increase the
federal costs of the price support program and, at the same time,
higher manufactured product prices could translate into higher consumer
prices. However, it is difficult to estimate the added costs of selling
to the CCC because these costs are likely to vary widely among
different manufacturers. Thus, raising the product purchase prices
could provide unwarranted benefits to some manufacturers while still
being insufficient to induce sales to the government by some others. In
addition, according to one academic study, there is no clear evidence
that higher selling costs are the major barrier in selling to the
government. Some experts have put forth the possibility that fixed
contracts between dairy product manufacturers and their buyers may
prevent manufacturers from selling to the government.
An alternative way to reflect the differences in cost between selling
dairy products to the government and selling them in the market place
would be to require the CCC to alter product specifications and payment
terms to conform to those used on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the
Exchange).[Footnote 191] An FSA economist stated that some changes to
product specifications are already being considered and have been put
out for comment to the dairy industry.[Footnote 192] The economist
stated that while these proposed changes will help bring CCC product
specifications into greater conformance with market standards, some
differences would remain. Most notably, the CCC requires that products
be storable for up to 3 years, a longer period than is generally
required in the market. To the extent that this proposal reduces
additional costs of selling manufactured dairy products to the CCC by
more closely aligning product specifications with market standards, it
could induce greater manufactured product sales to the CCC and would
keep market prices higher. Therefore, aligning these specifications
could increase farm income, provide a marginal production stimulus, and
raise federal costs related to additional CCC purchases. Also, this
option would not necessarily prevent the Exchange prices from falling
below CCC purchase prices because if there are barriers other than
costs (such as contractual obligations) that prevent manufacturers from
selling to the government, these barriers would still exist.[Footnote
193]
Eliminate Dairy Price Supports:
Another policy option would be to eliminate the price support program
altogether and rely on alternatives available to farmers to assist them
in managing risk of low and/or highly volatile prices for their milk. A
number of dairy experts have argued that the support price has been set
so low at $9.90 per hundredweight that it is not having significant
impacts. Thus some academicians, as well as USDA, have studied the
potential effects of eliminating the program.
In the short term, eliminating the program would have a greater impact
if market prices were at or below the level of the support price. The
May 2004 USDA study estimated that eliminating the price support
program would cause wholesale prices of nonfat dry milk to decline by
15 to 20 percent over the first couple of years.[Footnote 194] For
subsequent years, the study estimated that prices would recover
somewhat to 10 percent below baseline levels. Further, the study
estimated that the decline in nonfat dry milk prices would encourage
diversion of this milk to alternative uses, leading to lower prices for
these alternative uses. Generally, lower prices would reduce farm
income and potentially lead to lower consumer prices. Farmers would
likely respond to these lower prices by producing less milk.
According to an FSA economist, eliminating the price support program
would increase economic efficiency by allowing market price signals to
be transmitted more clearly. The economist also stated that volatility
in milk prices would increase. He noted that the combination of
increased volatility and reduced farm income would force less efficient
farmers to exit production. This exit would increase the economic
efficiency of national resource allocation by enhancing current shifts
in production to more efficient dairy farms. He added that in the
absence of a price support program, new entrants to dairy production
would likely be larger, more efficient operations. The FSA economist
also said that eliminating the price support program would provide a
cost savings for the federal government because the CCC would no longer
have to purchase or store dairy commodities. These savings would be
greater during periods when farm prices are low because when they are
high, even if the program remains in effect, the government purchases
fewer dairy products and incurs less cost. However, when farm milk
prices are low, savings from eliminating the price support program
could be partially offset by increased payments under the MILC program
for as long as that program continues.
Over the long term, reduced production would mitigate some of the
impacts of eliminating the price support program, because reduced
supplies lead to increased prices (assuming demand stays the same).
However, the USDA study estimated that even with the positive price
effects resulting from reduced production, farm income would still
decrease by approximately $3.5 billion over the long term.
Additionally, without CCC purchases of dairy commodities, USDA would be
unable to balance high market prices by releasing these stocks, thereby
contributing to increased price volatility over the long term.
Extend the Milk Income Loss Contract Program:
The MILC program has benefited many smaller dairy farmers during the
most recent period of low farm prices by providing them income support.
However, by providing support to some farmers who otherwise might have
exited the dairy industry, the program has slowed the normal downward
supply response to lower farm prices and kept aggregate production
higher during this period than it otherwise would have been. The MILC
program is scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005. If it is
not extended in some form, aggregate production is likely to respond
more rapidly to future low-price periods because smaller farmers are
likely to exit production at greater rates than they did during the
most recent period of low farm prices. With this more rapid production
response, farm prices would likely start rising again sooner than in
the recent past when the MILC program has been in place. However,
although production levels in the short term would likely decrease more
during low-price periods, in the long term aggregate production might
not decrease substantially because higher average farm prices would
stimulate additional production from the dairy farmers that stay in
business. In addition, by allowing the MILC program to expire, the
government can avoid the costs of the payments to farmers that the
program provides.
There are several options to maintain the benefits of the MILC program
to some dairy farmers by extending it beyond 2005. One option is to
extend MILC at its current target price and eligible production limit.
A second option, a proposal introduced in the Senate in the 108TH
Congress, would extend MILC through fiscal year 2007 with an increase
in the eligible production cap from 2.4 million pounds to 4.8 million
pounds.[Footnote 195] A third option would extend MILC with a lower
target price but a higher or no eligible production limit. Figure 38
shows the effects of various policy options to extend the MILC program
under low-and high-price scenarios over the short and long terms.
Figure 38: Potential Effects of Options to Extend MILC on Various
Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Extend MILC in Its Current Form:
One analysis conducted by a researcher at the University of Missouri
estimated that compared to a baseline estimate in which the MILC
program expires in 2005, extending the MILC program through 2012 in its
current form would result in greater milk production and lower farm
prices.[Footnote 196] Production was estimated to be 0.8 billion pounds
higher in 2006 and to average 1.4 billion pounds per year higher from
2008 through 2012. The estimated price difference was also greater in
the longer term than initially.[Footnote 197] Greater production and
lower farm prices are consistent with the expectation that extending
the MILC program would keep some smaller dairy farmers in the industry
who otherwise might exit after 2005 if the MILC program is allowed to
expire then. This study also estimated that due to the MILC payments,
farm income would increase if the program were extended, despite lower
farm prices. Initially, in 2006, the estimated increase in farm income
was $0.43 per hundredweight, and even in 2012, when the estimated farm
price was $0.50 per hundredweight below what it would be if MILC
expires after 2005, the estimated increase in farm income was $0.08 per
hundredweight. In addition, extending MILC in its current form would
increase federal costs. This study estimated that, on average, annual
government costs from 2006 through 2012 would be about $1.2 billion
higher than if the MILC program expires after 2005.[Footnote 198]
According to an FSA economist, lower farm prices resulting from
extending MILC in its current form could be passed on as lower retail
prices for consumers. However, the economist indicated that the effects
on price volatility are less clear. He added that the extension of the
MILC program as currently designed would continue to favor smaller
farmers over larger farmers, because a greater percentage of smaller
farmers' production is eligible for MILC payments. Thus, in general,
the MILC program would continue to benefit farmers in the eastern and
upper midwestern states over farmers in the western states. Therefore,
for a given level of milk production and to the extent that larger
farmers in the West are more efficient than smaller farmers in the
East, extension of the MILC program as currently designed would reduce
the economic efficiency of the allocation of dairy production resources
nationally compared to the allocation that would occur if MILC expires.
Extend MILC with a Higher Cap or with No Cap:
An alternative proposal has been introduced in the Senate in the 108TH
Congress that would extend the MILC program at its current target price
but increase the cap on eligible production. The University of Missouri
study examined the impacts of a similar option in which the cap on
eligible production is removed in 2003 and MILC is extended through
2012 without a cap.[Footnote 199] This study estimated that extending
MILC without a cap would result in a larger increase in production and
a larger decrease in farm prices than extending MILC with a cap. For
example, production in 2006 was estimated to be 2.3 billion pounds per
year higher than if MILC is allowed to expire or 1.5 billion pounds
greater than if MILC is continued in its current form. Greater
production and lower farm prices are consistent with the expectation
that making all milk eligible for MILC payments would provide farmers
who might otherwise exit the industry after 2005 (if MILC is allowed to
expire) an even greater incentive not to leave than is provided by
extending MILC in its current form. As with the previous option, this
study estimated that due to MILC payments, farm income would increase
if MILC were extended without a cap despite lower farm prices.
Initially, in 2006, the estimated increase in farm income would be
$0.63 per hundredweight, and even in 2012, when the farm price was
estimated to be $1.05 per hundredweight below what it would be if MILC
expires after 2005, the estimated increase would be $0.18 per
hundredweight. Moreover, this study estimated that farm income would be
higher with this option than with extending MILC in its current form
because the additional payments to farmers due to eliminating the cap
would more than offset the additional farm price reduction resulting
from greater production. Extending MILC without a cap would increase
federal costs even more than extending MILC in its current form. This
study estimated that, on average, annual government costs from 2006
through 2012 would be about $2.5 billion higher than if the MILC
program expires after 2005, more than $1 billion per year more than was
estimated if MILC is extended in its current form.[Footnote 200]
An FSA economist indicated that consumers would likely benefit from
reduced retail prices under this scenario. Additionally, without the
cap on eligible production levels, the equity concerns about MILC would
be eliminated because the program would no longer favor smaller farmers
over larger farmers. However, the FSA economist also indicated that in
addition to the inefficiencies of increased surplus milk production,
this alternative would reduce economic efficiency of milk production
compared to allowing MILC to expire after 2005 to the extent that it
provided incentives for production by smaller producers with higher
costs of production.
Extend with Lower Target Price and Higher or No Cap:
A third alternative, considered in the American Farm Bureau study, is
to extend MILC with a lower target price and a higher or no cap on
eligible production. The study argued that the $16.94 per hundredweight
target price is too high because MILC payments are triggered any time
the Class I mover is less than $13.69 per hundredweight; at this target
price, MILC payments could be expected in most months given that from
1990 through 1999 the Class I mover averaged $12.28 per hundredweight
and was below the $13.69 threshold in 104 of 120 months. The analysis
concluded that a target level for MILC payments of a Class I mover at
$12.00 per hundredweight or lower would help to make the program more
marketbased. Further, expanding the cap or eliminating it completely
would help to make the program more equitable among farmers of
different sizes.
The effects of extending MILC in the absence of a cap on eligible
production depend significantly on the level of the target price. If
the target price were set too high, it would stimulate surplus
production. During periods of low prices, the government would have to
contribute additional MILC payments to counteract the effects of lower
prices. Additional production would also decrease manufactured product
prices, potentially increasing the costs of the dairy price support
program because these prices would be more likely to reach the support
level. At the same time, these lower prices could provide benefits for
consumers. While a lower target price without a cap would treat farmers
with different sized herds the same way, it might not provide enough
payments to keep farmers in areas with high costs of production from
exiting during periods of low prices. Therefore, this option could
increase the economic efficiency of national dairy production, while
also accelerating shifts in dairy production to the West.
Introduce a New Target Price Deficiency Payment Program:
Some dairy experts indicated that in lieu of maintaining both the dairy
price support and MILC programs, operating one new target price
deficiency payment program could be a better alternative.[Footnote 201]
USDA and other dairy experts stated that having both the price support
and MILC programs is problematic, particularly during periods of low
prices. As noted in the American Farm Bureau study, the idea behind
establishing a target price deficiency payment program is to allow
markets to work to clear dairy products at market prices and then, when
the market price is below the target price, to pay farmers based on the
difference between these prices. But with both dairy programs in force,
MILC maintains and encourages surplus milk production that must then be
purchased by the CCC under the price support program. This market
distortion adds to the costs of both programs.
Under a new target price deficiency payment program, dairy farmers
would receive a payment when the market price of Class III milk
products drops below a specific target level. Thus, the program would
establish a floor on farm income through a countercyclical payment to
dairy farmers instead of a floor on manufactured product prices with
purchases by the CCC.[Footnote 202] Instead of providing an incentive
for manufacturers to continue producing a particular product that the
CCC is purchasing, the program would allow the market to clear a
wholesale product price and then pay farmers the difference if the
price were too low. This option would provide manufacturers the
incentive to shift raw milk supplies to their highest-valued use,
further promoting the development of new and innovative products. This
option could also potentially reduce federal costs, depending on the
level of the target price; one expert estimated that with a target
price of $10.50 per hundredweight for Class III milk, the government
would have spent $300 million less than under the MILC program since
its inception in December 2001. With a target price of $10.00 per
hundredweight for Class III milk, these savings would have reached $1.2
billion.
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, dairy experts indicated that
a new target price deficiency payment program could have its own
challenges depending upon how it is designed. In particular, such a
program would require some key decisions regarding price level and
regional differences, and whether to cap program benefits based on
payments or quantities of production.
Set Price Level and Consider Regional Differences:
Some dairy experts said that a problem with the target price deficiency
payment approach is that it would be hard to determine the appropriate
target price without creating distortions in production incentives. If
the target price were set too high, it would have the same effect as
setting the support price too high: it would lead to excess production
by supporting farm income at higher levels than would be available if
farmers received market prices. Long-term overproduction would place
additional downward pressure on market prices and increase federal
costs for the program. If the target price were set at a low level to
avoid stimulating production and increasing government costs, it might
not maintain adequate support for farm income, and could increase price
volatility. Additionally, by influencing domestic production levels,
which in turn influence U.S. market prices, the level of the target
price can affect the incentives of other countries to export
manufactured products to the United States. However, these incentives
are also affected by the export subsidies and lower production costs of
some other countries.
The difficulty in setting the appropriate target price is exacerbated
by regional differences in costs of production. A certain Class III
target price might provide adequate support during periods of low
prices based on the costs of production in one region, but not in
another. However, increasing the target price to provide adequate
support for higher-cost regions would not only support production in
areas where it is less economically efficient to do so, but would also
provide greater benefits to farmers in lower-cost regions. These higher
benefits would increase the incentives to overproduce in those areas.
Given current trends in the United States, this scenario would
encourage the western shift in dairy production.
Place Cap on Payments or Production:
Another challenge in designing a target price deficiency payment
program would be to determine whether to cap the program's benefits
either by limiting the payment a farmer could receive or by limiting
the quantity of milk production on which a farmer would be eligible to
receive payments. The MILC program calls for payments equal to 45
percent of the difference between $16.94 and the Boston Class I per
hundredweight price and has a production cap (2.4 million pounds of
production per dairy operation each fiscal year). These controls have
helped to keep federal costs lower than they otherwise would have been
during periods of depressed prices by limiting incentives for
overproduction. However, the production cap has targeted the program's
benefits primarily to smaller farmers, raising questions of equity.
If a target price deficiency payment program were implemented without
any controls, the risk of market distortions and increased federal
costs from establishing a target price level that is too high could
increase substantially. At the same time, a couple of researchers noted
that establishing the target price deficiency payment program without a
production cap could encourage farmers to enhance the efficiency of
their dairy operations. With a cap limiting eligible production,
farmers have less incentive to adopt new technologies that would
increase production. However, whether or not a cap is placed on
eligible production, the program is likely to confer benefits to
farmers in varying degrees. If the program did not cap eligible
production, farmers who could increase their production efficiency with
new technology might have more of an incentive to do so. But the
farmers who would be most likely to take advantage of this incentive
would be larger farmers who may be more efficient, and might have the
resources and access to capital to undertake such an investment.
Conversely, capping eligible production would target benefits to
smaller farmers in the same way as MILC.
Adopt the National Dairy Equity Act:
To address concerns about the pending expiration of the MILC program
and provide additional support to dairy farmers, the National Dairy
Equity Act of 2004 (NDEA) has been introduced in the House and the
Senate.[Footnote 203] This proposed legislation would change the
federal regulation of milk marketing through the establishment of
regional dairy marketing areas in which boards created to administer
these areas would set minimum prices that processors would have to pay
for raw milk used to make fluid milk products sold in those
areas.[Footnote 204] The NDEA would have a similar effect as the MILC
program in that it might lead to higher incomes for some dairy farmers.
However, concerns have been raised about its impact on farm incomes in
some regions, retail fluid milk prices, coordination of milk prices
across regions, and existing trade agreements. Figure 39 shows the
effects of adopting the NDEA over the short and long terms.
Figure 39: Potential Effects of Adopting the NDEA on Various Policy
Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Elements of the NDEA:
The NDEA would create five marketing areas that together would
encompass the entire nation. States in the Northeast,[Footnote 205]
Southern,[Footnote 206] and Upper Midwest[Footnote 207] regions would
automatically be participating in the marketing area program
established by the NDEA upon enactment of the legislation. States in
the Intermountain[Footnote 208] and Pacific[Footnote 209] regions could
become participating states by providing written notice to the
Secretary of Agriculture. The NDEA would authorize each region's board
to set an "over-order" minimum price for Class I sales that exceeded
the FMMO Class I price in that region, with an initial maximum of
$17.50 per hundredweight, subject to approval by farmers within the
region in a referendum.[Footnote 210] Although the boards would have
discretion in setting the over-order price, the legislation directs the
boards to consider several factors including the:
* balance between production and consumption of milk and milk products
in the regulated area;
* costs of milk production in the regulated area;
* prevailing price for milk outside the regulated area;
* purchasing power of the public; and:
* price necessary to yield a reasonable return to an eligible farmer.
The NDEA would establish a fund in the U.S. Treasury to carry out the
program. During months in which a region's over-order price exceeded
the FMMO Class I minimum price in Boston, processors would be required
to pay the Secretary of Agriculture an amount equal to the difference
between those two prices, known as the over-order premium, times the
quantity of milk purchased for use in Class I products. The Secretary
would deposit these amounts into the U.S. Treasury fund, and the fund
would make payments to each board, which would distribute the payments
to eligible farmers in its region.[Footnote 211] Each month the board
would receive at a minimum an amount equal to the over-order premium
times 50 percent of the milk produced in that region.[Footnote 212] The
proposed legislation would require CCC funds to be transferred to the
fund when necessary to allow the fund to make the required payments;
according to one analysis, such contributions would typically be
necessary because only one of the proposed dairy marketing areas has a
Class I utilization rate equal to 50 percent or higher.
The NDEA also would require boards to compensate the CCC for any
additional costs of CCC purchases of milk products resulting from
increases in milk production that exceed the national average growth
rate. To manage overproduction of milk that could result from the NDEA,
the NDEA would authorize boards to take action, including developing
and implementing incentive-based supply management programs.
In addition, the NDEA would link participation in the dairy marketing
areas with participation in the current MILC program. Farmers who
participate in the new program would not be able to continue to receive
MILC payments. If states in the Intermountain and Pacific regions chose
not to participate in the NDEA program, farmers in those states could
continue to receive MILC payments, and the NDEA would extend the
authorization period for the MILC program until the end of September
2007. States in the other regions, which would become participants upon
enactment of the NDEA, could withdraw their participation. If they did,
farmers in those states could also continue their MILC payments through
the end of September 2007. Individual farmers in states that
participated in the NDEA program could choose not to participate in the
new program and would then be able to continue receiving MILC payments.
However, those farmers would not be able to extend their payments
beyond September 2005 and would not be eligible for subsequent
participation in the NDEA program.
Impacts of the NDEA:
Although the NDEA may lead to higher incomes for some dairy farmers,
academicians and industry participants have raised many concerns about
the proposed legislation's impacts. These concerns include regional
divisiveness due to lower incomes for dairy farmers in some regions,
higher retail prices, reduced coordination of dairy prices across
regions, and potential conflict with World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules.
The NDEA could lead to higher incomes for farmers in participating
states when milk prices are relatively low because processors would
have to pay the over-order prices set by the boards for Class I milk;
however, the total effect on farmers would depend on what happens to
the price of milk used for manufacturing purposes as well.[Footnote
213] To the extent that higher blend prices stemming from higher Class
I prices lead farmers to increase milk production, the result could be
lower prices for Class III and IV milk both in participating and
nonparticipating states. Even if all states participated in the dairy
marketing areas, the large differences in Class I utilization rates
across regions imply that different regions would be affected
differently by the combination of higher Class I prices and lower Class
III and IV prices, and farmers in regions with low Class I utilization
rates might see a decline in their incomes. If some states do not
participate, their farmers would be even worse off because unless these
farmers pool milk in states that are included in the marketing areas,
they would not receive any benefits of higher Class I prices. In a
report that we issued in September 2001[Footnote 214] in which we
analyzed the inter-regional impacts of various scenarios in which some
states were grouped in dairy compacts that functioned like the NDEA's
dairy marketing areas, we reported that one effect of compacts was to
reduce farm income in noncompact regions. We estimated this effect to
be minimal when we examined the impact of the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact because the six New England states included in that
Compact produced only 3 percent of the nation's milk. However, we
estimated that the effect was somewhat greater in a scenario in which
states producing 27 percent of the nation's milk supply were included
in compacts.
To the extent that the NDEA would result in fluid milk processors
paying more to buy their milk from farmers, the NDEA would also lead to
increases in retail fluid milk prices. In our report on compacts, we
reported that several studies concluded that the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact resulted in higher retail prices for fluid milk in New
England, with estimated impacts ranging from $0.03 to $0.20 per gallon.
Higher retail prices could have a greater effect on retail sales in
upcoming years than occurred in the past, as some dairy experts believe
that the demand for fluid milk has become more responsive to price
changes, given the increasing number of beverages that are considered
substitutes for fluid milk, among other reasons. Consequently,
retailers with whom we spoke generally opposed the NDEA. Furthermore,
declines in fluid milk sales would cause more milk to be available for
manufacturing purposes, which would further depress the prices for
Class III and IV milk.
Several academicians told us that they believed the NDEA would also
create regional distortions because price-setting in each dairy
marketing area would be controlled by its board, and prices for raw
milk used in fluid products would no longer be closely linked to prices
for raw milk used in manufactured products. This would be a major
change from the current system in which Class I prices are set based on
differentials added to the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV
skim milk values, with the differentials still somewhat reflective of
the costs of transporting milk from the Upper Midwest, a key dairy
surplus region. Before the 1960s, Class I prices in different orders
were not coordinated, and the resulting disorderly marketing system led
to the coordinated system that we now have. Adopting the decentralized
price-setting system of the NDEA risks losing the advantage of more
orderly marketing that the coordination of the 1960s brought to the
dairy industry.
Concerns about whether the NDEA would make U.S. dairy policy less
consistent with existing agreements under the WTO arise because of the
effects of the NDEA on milk production and, hence, U.S. milk prices. As
indicated previously, recent U.S. commitments under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are leaning in the direction of more
liberalized trade. To the extent that the NDEA provides a subsidy for
U.S. milk production and reduces the prices of manufactured dairy
products, the act would reduce the competitiveness of imported
products.
We identified one study that estimates the effects of the NDEA on milk
production, farm prices, and government costs compared to a baseline
scenario that did not include the NDEA.[Footnote 215] This study
estimated that the NDEA would increase milk production compared to the
baseline by an average of about 7.6 billion pounds per year during the
period from 2006 through 2013. The increased production would result in
estimated declines in Class III and IV prices from the baseline such
that average milk prices would be $1.17 per hundredweight below the
baseline estimate. The estimated annual average increase in federal
costs for payments to the boards was $1.7 billion.[Footnote 216]
Change Trade Restrictions and Export Incentives:
Recent concerns about the effects of imported dairy products, most
notably milk protein concentrates, on U.S. dairy prices have
highlighted the importance of U.S. trade policy--trade restrictions and
subsidy programs--as a foundation for domestic dairy policies. Several
policy options related to international trade in dairy products have
been suggested. As noted previously, current international trade
agreements and ongoing negotiations can have implications for certain
policy options that have been suggested. These options include (1)
increasing trade restrictions, specifically for imports of milk protein
concentrates;[Footnote 217] (2) relaxing trade restrictions; (3)
introducing domestic subsidies for products significantly affected by
international trade competition, specifically establishing a subsidy
program for domestic production of milk protein concentrates; and (4)
changing the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), either by using it
more effectively or by eliminating it. Those options that succeed in
limiting imports or encouraging exports of manufactured dairy products
could support higher farm income, production levels, and consumer
prices. These options may also reduce federal costs if higher farm
prices reduce costs to the price support program to a greater degree
than the cost of these trade options. Figure 40 shows the effects of
options to change trade restrictions and export incentives over the
short and long terms.
Figure 40: Potential Effects of Changing Trade Restrictions and Export
Incentives on Various Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Increase Trade Restrictions/Establish a Tariff-Rate Quota for Milk
Protein Concentrates:
One international trade policy that has been proposed is to increase
trade restrictions within the constraints of existing international
trade agreements. More specifically, a bill entitled the Milk Import
Tariff Equity Act[Footnote 218] has been introduced in the Congress
that would impose tariff-rate quotas on dairy protein products such as
milk protein concentrates and certain casein products. Import quotas
prior to the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture did not cover
milk protein concentrates and casein.[Footnote 219] Therefore, no
tariff-rate quota was established for these products after the
agreement was implemented. The May 2004 report by the International
Trade Commission showed that U.S. imports of some dairy proteins
increased significantly from 1998 through 2000 and then declined. Some
of these protein imports displaced domestic dairy proteins,
particularly those used in making processed cheese products not covered
by the Food and Drug Administration's standards of identity.[Footnote
220]
The International Trade Commission report concluded that imports of
milk protein concentrates to the United States have the effect of
lowering U.S. farm prices either directly or indirectly, depending upon
whether U.S. market prices for manufactured dairy products are above or
at the level of the support price. If U.S. prices are above the support
price, then imports of dairy proteins could directly lower the market
prices of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese to the extent these
proteins can be imported at lower prices than proteins available in the
domestic market. In turn, lower product prices could reduce the prices
received by U.S. farmers for their raw milk. If U.S. prices are at the
support price, then imports of dairy proteins could indirectly affect
U.S. market prices. Increasing imports of proteins when U.S. market
prices for manufactured dairy products are at the support price will
cause the CCC to purchase more nonfat dry milk as this alternative
protein source is displaced in the market. Eventually, these increasing
stocks could cause USDA to lower the purchase price of nonfat dry milk
in an attempt to reduce federal costs. This adjustment would then lower
prices for manufactured dairy products, in turn decreasing the prices
received by U.S. farmers for their raw milk.[Footnote 221]
Because introducing tariff-rate quotas on milk protein concentrate and
casein would likely reduce imports of these products, federal costs due
to CCC purchases and storage of nonfat dry milk under the price support
program would likely decrease. When U.S. market prices are above the
purchase prices established by the price support program, a reduction
in imports could maintain prices of some products, such as cheese, at
higher levels due to reduced domestic supply of dairy proteins used in
these products. Higher product prices could increase farm prices and
thus stimulate additional production. These effects could be more
significant in regions of the United States where raw milk is used to a
greater extent in the manufacturing of Class III products. (If U.S.
trading partners successfully challenge tariff-rate quotas on dairy
proteins, compensation such as increased market access for other
products could be required, reducing the benefits to U.S. dairy
farmers.) Because production adjustments tend to lag behind price
changes, this additional production could delay adjustments to lower
market prices in the future. Therefore, to the extent that the
exclusion of imports masks market price signals that would exist
without the exclusion, this policy option would decrease economic
efficiency. Additionally, to the extent that changes in the
manufacturing prices of dairy products are passed on through the retail
level, consumers could experience higher prices for some products (such
as cheese) and lower prices for other products (such as
butter).[Footnote 222]
Relax Trade Restrictions:
A second option is to relax trade restrictions by reducing or
eliminating tariffs on dairy products. Trade restrictions such as
tariff-rate quotas support domestic programs such as the FMMO
classified pricing system and the dairy price support program by
limiting the available supply of dairy products to take advantage of
higher U.S. market prices. Unilaterally relaxing U.S. trade
restrictions would likely increase imports of manufactured products as
foreign producers seek to take advantage of the higher prices available
in the U.S. market. Despite higher transportation costs for imported
products, some manufacturers might be able to import certain dairy
products from U.S. trading partners at prices below U.S. market prices
either because those partners provide export subsidies (as the European
Union does) or because they have lower milk production costs (as
Australia and New Zealand do). Relaxing trade restrictions such as
tariff-rate quotas is unlikely to increase imports of fluid milk
products because of health restrictions, transportation costs, and the
perishable nature of these products.
Increased imports could put pressure on the CCC to purchase larger
quantities of manufactured dairy products, thereby increasing federal
costs.[Footnote 223] At some point these pressures could become
unsustainable, leading to a reduction in the support price or the end
of the price support program and to a decline in the price of milk used
for manufacturing purposes. Moreover, because the price of milk used in
fluid milk products is based on the price of milk used in manufactured
products, a decline in the prices of manufactured products from
increased imports could lower average farm prices. As long as MILC is
authorized, these lower prices could trigger additional MILC payments
to farmers, further increasing government costs.
In the short term, increased imports could cause U.S. prices to fall,
resulting in a decline in farm income for U.S. dairy farmers. With
reduced farm income, production would also decrease as less efficient
farmers exit production. Over the long term, the decline in production
could cause farm prices to rebound toward the levels that existed
before trade restrictions were relaxed. Similarly, in the short term,
lower farm prices are likely to lead to lower consumer prices for fluid
milk and other dairy products, but as farm prices rise toward their
previous levels due to production decreases, consumer prices for fluid
milk and other dairy products would likely rise as well. Economic
efficiency will increase with relaxed trade restrictions because such
relaxation will allow market price signals to be more visible than with
restrictions in place. These signals will lead to increased imports
when it is cheaper to substitute increased imports for some domestic
dairy production. Additionally, the economic efficiency of U.S. dairy
production resource allocation could increase with relaxed trade
restrictions as the reduction in domestic production is more likely to
come from less efficient domestic farmers.
Subsidize Domestic Milk Protein Concentrate Production:
Another proposed option is to support the development of domestic
casein and milk protein concentrate production. Under the proposed U.S.
Dairy Proteins Incentive Program, the CCC would make subsidy payments,
on a bid basis, to entities that produce and market dairy proteins from
skim milk.[Footnote 224] The proposed legislation would provide, among
other things, that receipt of a payment is contingent upon the end use
of the dairy proteins produced; that no applicant receives a payment if
the contract submitted for review would undercut domestic prices for
milk, nonfat dry milk, or dairy proteins; and that the sale of the
dairy proteins represents a new use of domestically produced dairy
proteins.
This program's potential impact on domestic dairy protein production
depends on the relative profitability of these proteins, which, in turn
depends on production costs and demand. The International Trade
Commission's May 2004 study on milk protein products found that, given
disincentives inherent in the price support program and constraints on
U.S. demand for dairy proteins other than nonfat dry milk, the
profitability of domestic protein production could be limited. For
example, the study reported that the price support program creates a
disincentive for U.S. processors to produce dairy proteins other than
nonfat dry milk because by purchasing nonfat dry milk the price support
program reduces the financial risk of manufacturing that product.
Processors of other proteins would need to invest in production
facilities and then market their product without the benefit of a
standing government offer of support. The study found that only under
the most favorable conditions (high skim milk protein yield[Footnote
225] and low variable costs) would it be beneficial for U.S. processors
to begin producing milk protein concentrate instead of nonfat dry milk.
Even then, positive returns were only for milk protein concentrates
with protein concentrations above 70 or 80 percent.[Footnote 226]
The classified pricing system could create an impediment to the
development of a domestic protein industry depending upon how milk
protein concentrate is classified. Based on analysis presented in the
International Trade Commission's report, classification under a higher-
valued class would require producers of milk protein concentrate to pay
more for their raw milk supplies, thus reducing their profits.[Footnote
227] In addition, the report noted that since May 2002, the CCC has had
a program to provide incentives to convert nonfat dry milk held in its
stocks to casein. Under this program, the CCC accepts competitive bids
for CCC-owned nonfat dry milk stocks for the manufacture of casein.
However, while USDA has accepted some bids, in many cases processors'
bids have been so low that USDA has rejected them.
Finally, the International Trade Commission's report found that while
milk protein concentrate is considered a useful additive to standardize
protein content, the limitation on its use inherent in the Food and
Drug Administration's standards of identity further restrict domestic
milk protein concentrate production. This limitation keeps the market
for milk protein concentrates relatively small in comparison to the
market for other dairy proteins. Given these restrictions, the
International Trade Commission estimated that the total U.S. market for
milk protein concentrate is 40,000 to 50,000 metric tons per year. A
new production facility in New Mexico reportedly is capable of
producing 16,000 tons annually. Therefore, barring a large drop in
imports or changes to the standards of identity, the demand for milk
protein concentrate would have to increase substantially to induce
additional domestic production.
To the extent that the proposed program can overcome these challenges,
it could provide incentives for manufacturers to produce alternative
dairy proteins domestically. Should these proteins replace some nonfat
dry milk production, they could reduce federal costs for the price
support program. However, the overall impact on federal costs would
depend on whether these reductions are offset by the cost of the
subsidy program itself. Various dairy experts disagree as to whether
subsidizing domestic dairy protein production would result in a net
increase or decrease in federal costs. For example, a study that was
published in May 2004 by researchers at Cornell University concluded
that reduced costs to the price support program would not be great
enough to offset the cost of the subsidy program.[Footnote 228]
Conversely, an analysis by the National Milk Producers Federation found
that a protein subsidy program providing assistance up to $2.30 per
hundredweight of skim milk would result in a net cost savings for the
federal government. The study by Cornell University researchers also
estimated that a subsidy program for casein and milk protein
concentrate would raise average milk prices by $0.40 per hundredweight,
yielding an increase in farm income of $913 million. These increases
would have greater impacts on farm income and milk production in areas
of the country with higher Class IV utilization, such as the West.
Also, should these proteins replace some nonfat dry milk production,
the resulting effects on the prices that consumers pay for products
made with dairy proteins could be mixed. If dairy protein prices
increase with reduced imports, consumer prices for those products for
which they are an ingredient (such as cheese), could also increase to
the extent that these price changes are passed through. However,
additional production resulting from higher farm prices could lower
consumer prices for butter. Over the long term, increased domestic
production of casein and milk protein concentrate could lower their
production costs and also the costs of other products for which they
are ingredients. With the subsidy program in place, the economic
efficiency of resource allocation would likely decrease as the
government provides incentives for the production of proteins that
could potentially be supplied more cheaply through imports.
Change the Dairy Export Incentive Program:
Some dairy experts indicated that DEIP can help reduce government
expenditures by allowing USDA to subsidize exports rather than purchase
products and maintain high stock levels through the price support
program. However, in some cases, academic experts indicated that under
current market conditions the impact of DEIP on U.S. prices is limited.
For example, one source noted that with CCC purchases of nonfat dry
milk at over 800 million pounds in 2002, and with over 1 billion pounds
of CCC stocks on hand, DEIP currently has no impact on U.S. prices.
Also, WTO commitments have limited the scope of DEIP. For example, in
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture the United States committed
to reducing the quantity of subsidized exports by 21 percent and the
value of these exports by 36 percent over the period from 1995 to 2000.
Therefore, a couple of alternative policy options have been discussed
with regard to DEIP, using it more effectively or eliminating it
entirely.
Use DEIP More Effectively:
Some dairy experts suggested that the government could make greater use
of DEIP.[Footnote 229] The American Farm Bureau study concluded that
DEIP may be underutilized, noting that it is difficult to develop
foreign markets unless a commitment is made to serving the market. Such
a commitment is more difficult if a given product is made available
only when it is in surplus. The study criticized USDA for (1) being
slow to invite and accept bids and (2) concentrating on products in
surplus. Other dairy experts indicated that invitations for DEIP bids
may be announced too late in the year for potential exporters to
participate in the program due to seasonal sales patterns. To improve
the effectiveness of DEIP, the American Farm Bureau study recommended
three potential changes:
* Exporters should be encouraged to submit bids for products and
countries that offer the greatest potential for longer-term market
development. USDA should use DEIP in conjunction with the Foreign
Agricultural Service to coordinate export assistance programs to fully
develop markets.
* USDA should consider DEIP bids for any eligible products and not base
acceptance primarily on removing surplus products from the domestic
market. Bids should be accepted for products that may have the greatest
market development potential and do not violate WTO subsidization
volume limits.
* USDA needs to act under shorter time frames in reviewing and
accepting DEIP bids to maximize the volume allowable under WTO rules.
USDA indicated that it has announced and awarded subsidies under the
DEIP program up to the limits allowed by WTO rules for nonfat dry milk
and cheese and that DEIP-assisted exports of butterfat have varied
depending on market conditions. USDA also noted that the Foreign
Agricultural Service has worked closely with the dairy industry to
ensure that national and annual DEIP assistance optimizes longer-term
market development prospects and minimizes any potential detrimental
effects on the U.S. market. For example, a Foreign Agricultural Service
official stated that the Service generally tries to wait until the
market for a particular product, such as butterfat, is in surplus
before inviting bids for DEIP export subsidies. The official said that
if the market is not in surplus, subsidized exports would increase U.S.
market prices for products manufactured with butterfat, such as ice
cream. USDA further indicated that expanding the use of DEIP is not
possible as the program is bound by quantitative and monetary caps
under WTO rules. Finally, USDA noted that the bid review and acceptance
process occurs within a time span equivalent to less than one working
day. Specifically, another Foreign Agricultural Service official stated
that USDA responds to all bid proposals by 10: 00 a.m. on the next
business day after the proposals are submitted.
To the extent that USDA could identify ways to make greater use of
DEIP, the effects on the dairy industry of increased exports of U.S.
dairy products could be similar to the effects of an increase in
demand.[Footnote 230] In the short term, greater demand for dairy
products would increase wholesale prices, raising farm prices and, to
the extent that these changes are passed on to consumers, retail
prices. While higher retail prices could cause marginal declines in
domestic consumption, higher farm prices over the long term could
stimulate additional production, which could put downward pressure on
wholesale and retail prices. Under such a scenario, price volatility
could decrease as the government balances swings in domestic
manufactured product prices by adjusting its level of support for DEIP.
However, economic efficiency would decrease to the extent that
increased use of DEIP induces additional production that would not have
occurred without the government program. Finally, in relation to
federal costs, while increased use of DEIP could increase federal costs
for the program, these increases might be offset by decreases in the
costs of purchasing and storing commodities under the price support
program. Further, greater competition for milk supplies used in
manufactured products could increase Class I prices, decreasing MILC
payments while the MILC program remains in existence.
Eliminate DEIP:
Eliminating DEIP could lower U.S. market prices and increase government
costs, specifically for nonfat dry milk.[Footnote 231] For example, the
May 2004 USDA study estimated that exports of nonfat dry milk under
DEIP account for approximately 9 percent of total U.S. production. The
study further found that in comparison to just eliminating the price
support program, eliminating DEIP as well would reduce wholesale nonfat
dry milk prices another 5 percent below baseline levels. Under this
scenario, the study reported that for 2002 through 2007, farm income
would decline by approximately $5.3 billion and payments required under
the MILC program would increase by approximately $900 million.
Therefore, while ending DEIP would eliminate the costs of the subsidies
provided by the program, these cost savings could be offset by
increased MILC expenditures. Also, should DEIP be eliminated without
eliminating the price support program, there would be an increase in
federal costs for purchases of commodities that would otherwise have
been exported.
The American Farm Bureau study reported that in the short term
eliminating DEIP would cause dairy products formerly exported under the
program to be commercially exported. However, the study found that over
the long term dairy product prices in the U.S. market would be too high
relative to world prices to allow formerly subsidized products to move
as commercially exported products. In the short term, a decline in the
prices of some manufactured products formerly exported under DEIP, such
as nonfat dry milk and cheese, would lower the blend prices farmers
receive which, in turn, would cause a decline in milk production. This
reduced production could cause butter prices to increase. However, the
overall effect is a decrease in both average milk prices and milk
supplies. With lower prices for some manufactured dairy products and
higher prices for others, consumer prices may rise or fall depending on
the extent to which these price changes are passed on by retailers. In
other respects, the elimination of DEIP could increase price volatility
because USDA would lose an outlet to help balance surplus production.
However, the supply adjustment could marginally increase economic
efficiency as excess supply is wrung out of the market. Further, to the
extent that DEIP is providing incentives for nonfat dry milk production
rather than production of other dairy products, elimination of these
incentives would also marginally increase economic efficiency.
Facilitate Risk Management for Dairy Farmers:
The increased volatility in farm milk prices has increased dairy
farmers' interest in managing the risk that low prices will reduce farm
incomes. Risk management alternatives to stabilize dairy farmers'
incomes can take many forms. These include, among others, increased use
of forward contracting to guarantee prices, such as through USDA's
Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program;[Footnote 232] revenue insurance
policies that pay farmers when dairy proceeds fall below specified
levels; and tax-deferred savings incentives that encourage setting
money aside during higher income years that could be withdrawn during
lower income years. Figure 41 shows the effects of options to
facilitate risk management under low-and high-price scenarios over the
short and long terms.
Figure 41: Potential Effects of Options to Facilitate Risk Management
on Various Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Continue Dairy Forward Pricing Program:
Forward contracting of milk--entering into a contract with a processor
or cooperative to sell milk in the future at a guaranteed price--is one
way for farmers to manage the risk that volatile prices create for
their income. Although forward contracting may prevent farmers from
benefiting from price increases, this risk management tool stabilizes
their income and ensures that the price they receive does not fall
below the contracted price. In this respect, forward contracting, like
the MILC program, limits the decline in farm income from a fall in farm
milk prices.
Most, but not all, dairy cooperatives offer their members the ability
to enter into forward contracts to guarantee the prices members will
receive for their milk. One option that could allow dairy farmers to
make more use of forward contracting to manage their price risk would
be to extend and expand the Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program to
cover Class I milk. The program was mandated by the Congress in 1999
and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2004.[Footnote 233] Under the
pilot program, farmers are not allowed to enter into forward contracts
for Class I milk. However, if the program were extended or made
permanent, it could also be expanded to allow forward contracting on
all classes of milk.
The forward contracting pilot program offers farmers who sell to
proprietary processors an option to enter into fixed-price forward
contracts by providing processors with an exemption from paying the
otherwise required FMMO minimum prices. (Dairy cooperatives are already
exempt from paying the FMMO minimum prices.)[Footnote 234] Normally,
when either cooperatives or proprietary processors buy milk from
farmers under forward contracts, they can offset their risk that farm
prices might be lower at the end of the contract period (in which case
they would pay more for milk than their competitors who buy later at
the lower price) with a futures market transaction in which they would
gain an amount equivalent to the decrease in the farm price of
milk.[Footnote 235] However, when prices rise during the contract, the
cooperatives or processors will lose money on the futures market
transactions and cannot afford to pay farmers more than the contracted
price. The pilot program encourages proprietary processors to enter
into forward contracts with farmers by exempting these processors from
having to pay farmers the relevant order minimum price for the portion
of their milk that is under forward contract. Without this program,
proprietary firms might not readily enter into forward contracts
because if they offset their risk of a price decline in the futures
market and the prices were to rise above the contract price, they might
have insufficient funds--including their futures market loss--to pay
their forward-contracted farmers the minimum price.
Some cooperatives have opposed proposed legislation that would make
permanent the authority for forward contracting by proprietary
processors on the grounds that allowing those processors to pay farmers
less than the minimum price could undermine the federal order pricing
system. However, one academic analysis of options to address price
volatility indicated that this exemption would not undermine the
federal order pricing system because while proprietary processors could
pay farmers less than the minimum price, these processors would still
have to pay minimum class prices into their federal order
pools.[Footnote 236] Another academician told us that even if allowing
forward contracting on Class I milk caused farmers to receive lower
minimum prices in return for reduced risk, neither that price reduction
nor any other rationale would be a good reason for not making fluid
milk eligible for forward contracting by those farmers who want to
enter into such contracts.
In October 2002,[Footnote 237] USDA released a report that examined the
performance of the pilot program from its inception, in September 2000,
through March 2002. The report found that the average monthly price
received for milk sold under forward contracts authorized by the pilot
program was lower than the average monthly price that would have been
received for that same milk if it had not been under contract by about
$0.50 per hundredweight, but that the variation in price for milk sold
under forward contracts was much less. At times the contract price
exceeded the price that would have been received without the contracts,
and at times it was lower. More recent USDA data show that the contract
price exceeded the price that would have been received without the
contracts in each month from April 2002 through July 2003, but for the
remainder of 2003 the contract price was lower. On average, for the
entire period from April 2002 through December 2003, the contract price
was about $1.40 per hundredweight higher.
Participation in the program during the period covered by the USDA
report was relatively small and was concentrated most heavily in the
Upper Midwest Order, which has a low Class I utilization rate. More
recent USDA data show that participation remained relatively low
through the end of 2003. Farmers in orders with high Class I
utilization rates had less opportunity to participate because Class I
milk was ineligible, so it is uncertain whether participation rates in
those orders would have been higher if farmers were allowed to enter
into forward contracts for Class I milk. One academic source also noted
that even if the program were expanded to include Class I milk, fluid
milk processors might be reluctant to engage in forward contracting for
this milk because there is no good hedge in the futures market for
Class I prices. In addition, the USDA study reported that participating
farmers were generally more accustomed to using risk management tools
than were nonparticipants. Farmer education on using forward
contracting may be important to increase participation.
Provide Revenue Insurance:
Another option to help dairy farmers manage their price risk is revenue
insurance. Revenue insurance allows farmers to protect themselves
against loss of revenue from, for example, low market prices, high feed
prices, or reduced production due to natural disasters. Revenue
insurance can stabilize farm income, reducing the need for direct
payments such as under the MILC program, during periods of low prices.
Whether there would be a savings to the government would depend on
whether the subsidies required to induce farmers to participate in the
insurance program would offset the savings from reduced direct income
support. Overall production could increase with this type of option
because the revenue insurance would step in when prices are low
representing in effect, a countercyclical payment. With this type of
income support, downward supply adjustments during periods of low
prices might not happen as quickly. Consumers would then benefit from
prolonged periods of low prices to the extent that price changes are
passed through the retail level.
USDA's Risk Management Agency currently operates several pilot programs
in selected states, using three different approaches to revenue
insurance. Although none of these programs applies to dairy farming,
they could, in theory, be extended to cover dairy farmers. Doing so
could be difficult, however, because the complexity of the dairy
industry and the variation in management expertise among farmers would
make it hard to estimate the probability of losses, a calculation that
is necessary for pricing the insurance.
Institute Tax-Deferred Savings:
Tax-deferred savings accounts allow farmers to manage fluctuations in
farm income by accumulating cash reserves during higher income years
with deferral of some tax liability. Farmers could then withdraw from
these accounts in lower income years and, in essence, receive tax
benefits if they accumulated funds in these accounts. One study
suggested that farmers might be more comfortable with this risk
management tool than with forward contracting because these accounts
resemble individual retirement accounts and other familiar tax-deferred
savings vehicles.
Similar to revenue insurance, this option has the potential for
reducing direct income support payments from the government, such as
MILC payments, by stabilizing farm income during periods of low prices.
However, whether these accounts worked as a risk management tool would
depend on whether the authorization of these new accounts--with their
tax benefits--led to substantial additional savings by farmers in
higher income years, or whether the new accounts were simply funded
with savings that would have been made anyway in other, not tax-
favored, accounts. Also, like revenue insurance, withdrawals from tax-
deferred savings would represent, in effect, countercyclical payments
during periods of low prices. Thus withdrawals from tax-deferred
savings accounts could maintain overall production by dampening supply
adjustments during periods of low prices. Similarly, consumers would
benefit from the prolonged periods of low prices to the extent that
price changes are passed through the retail level.
Many issues would have to be resolved to start this type of account,
such as the amount that farmers would be allowed to deposit in any
year, whether the government would match any funds deposited, and
whether there would be restrictions on farmers' ability to withdraw
funds from the accounts based on price drops or income losses. Canada
and Australia both offer these accounts, and they were first proposed
in the United States in 1996. Since then, there have been several
proposals to adopt them here, but none has been implemented.
Manage Raw Milk Supplies:
According to one dairy expert, given the long-term declining demand for
fluid milk as well as the increasing productivity of dairy farmers, the
best way to maintain farm income is through some form of effective
supply management. Following periods of excess supply in the 1980s, the
U.S. government introduced supply management initiatives, such as the
Dairy Termination Program.[Footnote 238] Other options, such as
production quota systems, have been tried by different dairy-producing
nations. Thus, a number of options have been discussed to try to manage
dairy supplies, including reintroducing a program similar to the
earlier Dairy Termination Program, or establishing mandatory supply
controls through quota allocations, as has been done in other
countries. Figure 42 shows the effects of options to manage raw milk
supplies under low-and high-price scenarios over the short and long
terms.
Figure 42: Potential Effects of Options to Manage Raw Milk Supplies on
Various Policy Considerations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact
on a policy consideration.
[End of figure]
Reintroduce the Dairy Termination Program:
One option that has been discussed to manage milk supplies is to
reintroduce the Dairy Termination Program.[Footnote 239] This program
was first tried as part of the Food Security Act of 1985. Under the
Dairy Termination Program, farmers submitted competitive bids for the
minimum raw milk price per hundredweight for which they would be
willing to comply with the program requirements. If their bids were
accepted, farmers were required to sell for slaughter or export their
entire herds and not participate in dairying for the next 5 years. The
program was in effect from April 1986 through September 1987 and
resulted in the removal of more than 1 million cows, or about 9 percent
of the national dairy herd in 1985. In total, this culling of the
national dairy herd was estimated to decrease milk supplies by about
39.4 billion pounds between 1986 and 1990 at a cost of more than $1.8
billion.[Footnote 240] California farmers accounted for the largest
portion of this reduced production, but farmers in southeastern states
had the highest rates of participation.
In a 1989 report looking at the effects of the Dairy Termination
Program, we indicated that it was unlikely to have a lasting effect on
milk production, given that some participants would likely return to
production after the 5-year waiting period.[Footnote 241] In the short
term, high market prices resulting from lower levels of production
reduced federal purchases of surplus dairy products. In 1989, we
estimated that these reduced purchases provided a net cost savings to
the government of $2.4 billion for fiscal years 1986 through 1990.
However, over the long term, we predicted that increased production
would bring the return of excess milk supply.
The effects of reintroducing this supply management alternative would
depend on a variety of factors. In particular, the effects on federal
costs and milk production would depend heavily on how much farmers
needed to be paid to terminate their herds and agree not to produce for
a specific period of time. Farmers' decisions about whether to
participate in a new Dairy Termination Program at a certain price would
rest on the individual profitability of dairy farms, the long-term
production outlook of the individual farmer, and the expectation of
certain market conditions. For example, with today's high market
prices, farmers may be unlikely to agree to stop production except at
payment levels that could make the program prohibitively expensive.
During low-price periods, the program could potentially reduce supply
to a level that reduces overall government costs for both the price
support program and the MILC program, as long as the latter program
remains in existence. In either case, the program would likely increase
price volatility and consumer prices, although higher consumer prices
for manufactured products could be mitigated by additional imports.
Given the fact that farmers in southeastern states had the highest rate
of participation in the Dairy Termination Program, a reintroduction of
this program is likely to strengthen western shifts in production. As
compared to western farmers, eastern farmers tend to have lower
profitability and higher costs of production. Consequently, they are
more likely to participate in this kind of program and less likely to
return to production after the program, because their re-entry costs
are higher. Thus, a new Dairy Termination Program could have disparate
regional effects.
Establish a Production Quota System:
A second option that has been discussed for supply management is to
implement a quota system, as has been done in Canada and in the
European Community.[Footnote 242] Under this option, production would
be controlled by allocating production shares, or quota shares,
limiting how much milk each dairy farmer could market. Such quota
shares could be set based on a farmer's historical marketing level. Any
milk marketed over the allocated quota shares would be priced far below
the cost of production. Quota shares could be traded and increased over
time as additional supplies are needed.
A quota system would help manage supply by taking away incentives to
increase production based on the benefits provided by government
programs, such as MILC or the price support program. Moreover, compared
to other supply management alternatives, a quota system has a greater
likelihood of achieving long-term supply management, because production
incentives would continue to be limited by the number of quota shares
available in the system. With more effective supply management, federal
costs for other programs such as MILC and the price support program
would be reduced. Additionally, federal costs for administering a quota
system are relatively low. In the short term, price volatility might
increase, but as the market adjusts to a stabilized production level,
long-term price volatility could be reduced.
Nonetheless, there are some drawbacks to implementing a quota system.
As quota shares reduced production, consumer prices could increase.
While demand for fluid milk products is relatively price inelastic,
higher prices could reduce long-term consumption by providing
incentives to purchase substitute goods. Also, the distribution of
quotas would provide a substantial benefit to current farmers to the
detriment of farmers who might try to enter the system in the future,
entrenching geographical production patterns and stifling incentives
for technological enhancements. Given the high production costs in some
areas and the greater efficiency of larger, newer dairy operations,
this would represent an economic inefficiency because milk would not be
produced and marketed as cheaply as possible. However, this drawback
could be limited to the extent that a well-functioning market is
established to trade quota shares. If participation costs in this
market were kept low, farmers would still realize incentives to adopt
technology enhancements. The most efficient dairy farmers' willingness
to pay for additional quota shares would represent their cost advantage
over less efficient farmers plus some assessment of risk. To the extent
that this willingness to pay was greater than the profits realized by
less efficient farmers, these less efficient farmers would have an
incentive to sell their quota shares to more efficient farmers. Thus,
in the long term, the quota system might not hamper increased economic
efficiency if trade is relatively easy.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE:
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250:
OCT 22 2004:
Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment Team:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW., Room 2T23A:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Dyckman:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report - "Dairy Industry: Information
on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy Options"
dated September 16, 2004. This letter provides a summary of our general
comments on the draft report.
We believe that the information provided on milk prices at the farm,
cooperative, and retail levels is valid. However, we would note that
farm-level milk prices were not "record" low in 2002 and 2003, but
rather the lowest since 1979. In addition, farm-level milk prices
reached a record high in May 2004, which was the primary factor leading
to record high retail prices for fluid milk during the summer of 2004.
For calendar year 2004, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects
the all-milk price will be record high and up more than $3 per
hundredweight from the previous year. We continue to have reservations
regarding the use of prices paid for fluid milk at commissaries as an
indicator of the wholesale price of fluid milk but there seems to be no
viable alternative. It is important that readers of this report are
aware of this weakness in the data.
We largely agree with the discussion on the factors that influence the
price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer and the
characterization of economic studies of price transmission in the U.S.
fluid milk market. USDA's Federal Milk Order Program, the Dairy Price
Support Program, the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and the
Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program affect farm and retail prices
for fluid milk and dairy products. Other USDA programs, such as
domestic and international food assistance programs and tariff rate
quotas on imports of dairy products administered by USDA, also
influence farm and retail prices for milk and dairy products. In many
instances, changing one or more of these programs would alter the
performance of other programs administered by USDA.
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill)
mandated that USDA conduct two studies including an economic evaluation
of the effects of various elements of national dairy policy and of
terminating Federal milk price support and supply management programs
and allowing States to manage milk prices and supply. USDA combined
these two studies into one report to provide a comprehensive economic
evaluation of the effects of alternative dairy policies. That report
combined the work of more that 20 researchers from 10 universities with
information provided by researchers at USDA and was submitted to
Congress on September 10, 2004. The USDA report provides quantitative
estimates of the effects on producers and consumers and the cost of
Federal programs under various policy scenarios.
Appendix VII of the draft report provides a qualitative, indeterminate
discussion of the effects of recent Federal dairy program changes and
alternative policy options. This appendix seems to be a compilation of
policy recommendations that are examined independently and within the
existing program structure. GAO should make it clear to the reader the
caveats of this type of analysis. In some instances, this section of
the report mischaracterizes the operation of current programs and the
effects that changes to current programs or the introduction of new
programs would have on program outlays, producers, and consumers. These
concerns are as follows:
MILC Program - The draft report indicates that producers may maximize
payments by reorganizing their farming operation to increase production
eligible for payments and by choosing the month in which they are
eligible to receive payments. Under the 2002 Farm Bill, USDA is
required to use the same definition of farming operation as used in
previous dairy market loss payment programs. We have no evidence to
indicate that farmers are abusing the program by reorganizing their
farming operations. In addition, USDA regulations prohibit a producer
from selecting a month to receive payments if the month has already
begun or changing a previously selected start month after the 15' of
the month before the month selected. Furthermore, once monthly payments
begin, the producer has no discretion in determining which month or
months to receive payments.
DEIP - The draft report contains several options for improving the
operation of DEIP. However, the reliance by GAO on the American Farm
Bureau study appears to have led to several misconceptions. The DEIP is
administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) - an agency
within USDA. Since 1995, USDA has continually exported under the DEIP
the maximum amount of cheese and nonfat dry milk permitted under World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules, while DEIP assisted exports of
butterfat have varied depending on market conditions. FAS has worked
closely with the dairy industry to ensure that our country and annual
allocations optimize our longer-term market development prospects and
minimize any potentially detrimental effects on our domestic market.
Expanding the use of the DEIP is not a legitimate option. Under the WTO
trading rules, the DEIP is not only bound by quantitative and monetary
caps, but also product-specific restrictions that limit its use to the
current range of eligible commodities. Further, given that the bid
review and acceptance process occurs within a time-span equivalent to
less than one working day, we believe the process is timely and
efficient.
Dairy Price Support Program - We believe the Dairy Price Support
Program has been effective in supporting the price of milk. We continue
to work with the dairy industry to monitor the operation of the program
to ensure that the price of milk is being supported at $9.90 per
hundredweight as mandated by the 2002 Farm Bill. USDA has no authority
to eliminate the program and has not proposed or is not considering any
proposal to eliminate the program. Elimination of the price support
program would require Congress to amend the 2002 Farm Bill.
Federal Milk Order Program - GAO correctly captures an objective of the
Federal Milk Order Program which is to stabilize milk marketing
conditions between farmers and the first buyers of milk. However, it is
a misstatement to suggest that a Federal milk order objective is "to
ensure an adequate level of milk production." That objective is the
objective of the Dairy Price Support Program. Federal milk orders help
assure an adequate supply of milk for fluid use in areas where
demanded, but that supply may come from local or distant producers,
whoever can fill the supply most efficiently. The minimum Federal milk
order prices established at a location under the orders may cover the
costs of an adequate local production or they may not. The minimum
prices are limited by the cost of supplying that market from non-local
sources. Economic forces generate prices above the minimum prices in
most markets.
We agree with GAO that there are several marketing conditions occurring
within the purview of Federal milk orders which can not be considered
orderly. Price inversions and negative producer price differentials,
and the incentives they create to market milk outside of the Federal
milk order system (de-pooling) are noted. We also agree that the cause
of these disorderly marketing conditions is price volatility in
wholesale dairy product markets. However, Federal milk orders cannot
directly address price volatility in wholesale dairy product markets.
Therefore, GAO's options for changing Federal milk orders fail to
address the underlying source of disorderly marketing conditions for
milk and dairy products.
Federal milk orders provide separate classes for milk used in the
production of butter and nonfat dry milk and for milk used in the
production of cheese. Minimum prices for milk in these classes are
priced by product price formulas which include fixed make allowances.
GAO concludes that because of this pricing method, "manufacturers do
not have an incentive to shift production to the higher-valued uses
because any gains they might have realized for selling a higher-priced
product would be negated by the fact that their manufacturing allowance
is fixed." This rationale fails to recognize that in 2002 about 86
percent of nonfat dry milk, 71 percent of butter, and 40 percent of
total cheese was manufactured by cooperatives. Twelve cooperatives,
including the four largest, own all three types of plants. Regardless
of manufacturing costs in the formula, it is in the best interest of a
cooperative and its members if the cooperative shifts milk into the use
that returns the highest value to its membership taking into account
pool draws and product price premiums. While these adjustments may be
slow to occur, they do occur as evidenced by the changing relationship
of the Class III and Class IV prices.
What may retard the shifting of milk to the highest valued use is that
as there are fewer and larger manufacturing plants. As transportation
costs rise, the cost of transporting milk to a plant making higher
valued products may more than offset benefits that would be received
from making the higher valued product. As the use of reverse osmosis
and ultra-filtration technologies expand in the industry, the
transportation cost factor will be substantially reduced.
GAO proposes adopting a competitive pay price to establish class prices
under Federal milk orders. This option was considered prior to
implementation of Federal milk order reform on January 1, 2000. USDA
and a committee of academicians spent considerable time trying to
devise a competitive price series that could be used to establish
minimum class prices under Federal milk orders. However, no such
competitive price series could be identified by either the committee or
USDA, and GAO does not identify or indicate how to create such a price
series.
GAO also proposes combining Class III and Class IV into a single
manufacturing milk class. Again, no specifics are offered as to how
milk in such a class would be priced. Depending upon the price
established for that class, the manufacturers of butter and nonfat dry
milk, or of cheese, occasionally could be required to account to the
pool for a greater value than the value returned by wholesale product
markets which could lead to disorderly marketing conditions.
In the section on eliminating the Federal Milk Order Program, GAO
indicates that an objective of Federal milk orders is to provide for a
local supply of fresh milk. This is not an objective Federal milk
orders. In USDA's response to a 1988 GAO study, we stated: "The
objectives of Federal milk orders are to promote orderly marketing
conditions in fluid milk markets, to improve the income situation of
dairy farmers by establishing minimum milk prices, to supervise the
terms of trade in milk markets in such manner as to achieve more
equality of bargaining between producers and milk handlers, and to
assure consumers adequate supplies of good quality milk at reasonable
prices."
Federal milk orders help assure an adequate supply of milk for fluid
use in areas where demanded, but that supply may come from local or
distant producers, whoever can provide fluid milk most efficiently. The
Class I price surface does in fact reflect the cost of moving milk from
surplus to deficit markets as estimated by academicians at Cornell
University (Pratt, et al, "A Description of the Methods and Data
Employed in the U.S. Dairy Sector Simulator, Version 97.3," Department
of Agricultural Resource and Managerial Economics, Cornell University,
July 1997).
Federal milk orders continue to accomplish their stated objectives and
for that reason the program continues to be supported by the majority
of producers and fluid milk processors. As milk marketing has changed
and marketing problems have developed, the industry has come to USDA to
request amendments to the program to address their concerns. Through
the formal hearing process, orders have continued to evolve and remain
current and vital to the industry. We do not believe that the
rulemaking process inhibits the ability of USDA to respond to changing
market conditions or the marketing of new dairy products.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report. We
request that our letter be cited in the GAO report. Detailed comments
on the draft report by USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, Farm
Service Agency, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural
Service, and Office of the Chief Economist were provided earlier.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
J. B. Penn:
Under Secretary:
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services:
Signed by:
Bill Hawks:
Under Secretary:
Marketing and Regulatory Programs:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Agriculture's
letter dated October 22, 2004.
GAO Comments:
1. We revised the report to reflect that farm prices during 2002 and
2003 were the lowest since 1979.
2. We revised the report to reflect that USDA has estimated that
average 2004 farm prices will be more than $3 per hundredweight higher
than they were in 2003.
3. We agree that there are limitations on the use of commissary data as
a proxy for proprietary wholesale data. However, as noted in USDA's
comments, there seems to be no viable alternative. We revised the
report to further discuss the limitations of using these data.
4. During the course of our work, USDA declined to provide us with a
draft of its study. Although USDA indicates that it submitted its study
to the Congress on September 10, 2004, we were unable to obtain a copy
until early October 2004, well after we had provided a draft of our
report to USDA for review and comment. Because of this timing, we were
unable to fully consider and analyze the results of USDA's study and
related documents. Furthermore, although USDA notes that it developed
quantitative estimates of the effects on producers (dairy farmers) and
consumers and the cost of various federal programs under various policy
scenarios, the scope of USDA's analysis was more limited than the range
of policy options discussed in our report.
5. We agree that the potential effects of various policy options in
appendix VII are examined independently and qualitatively within the
existing program structure. Our discussion of dairy policy options are
not policy recommendations. As stated in the report, to identify these
policy options and their potential impacts we relied heavily on a
synthesis of the views of leading dairy experts and the results of an
extensive literature search, including our review of more than 50
studies and other publications. Time and resource constraints for
completing our work precluded us from developing or contracting for the
use of an economic model that would have provided quantitative
estimates of these potential impacts. In addition, some of the policy
options would have been difficult to model and quantify, such as the
potential impacts of accelerating USDA's hearing and rulemaking process
for amending FMMOs. The report also notes that we compared the policy
options identified against a baseline scenario of policies in place as
of August 2004. This baseline scenario existed at the start of our work
and was needed to provide a consistent context for our analysis.
6. Regarding caveats, as noted in the report, we examined the impact of
federal dairy program changes and policy options on six policy
considerations: farm income, milk production, federal costs, price
volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. We acknowledge in
the report that other stakeholders may have different views on the
importance of these policy considerations or other considerations that
we did not include in our analysis. The report also states that the
potential effects of policy options on these considerations could vary
depending upon economic conditions and other policy decisions. In this
regard, we did not assess the options' overall economic or budgetary
impacts, or their consistency with U.S. international trade commitments
or positions in ongoing negotiations. As indicated in the report, each
option has varying potential impacts on the policy considerations used
in our analysis. Despite these caveats, we believe this analysis is
informative and helpful to congressional decision makers who must weigh
competing interests in determining dairy policy.
7. We have made some technical corrections and clarifications in light
of USDA's comments, but we do not agree that we mischaracterized the
operation of current programs or the effects that changes to current
programs or the introduction of new programs would have on program
outlays, producers (dairy farmers), and consumers. See also our
responses in comments 8 through 19 below.
8. Although during the course of our work, USDA officials suggested
that it was possible that dairy farmers might divide their holdings to
make more of their milk eligible for compensation through the MILC
program, we deleted this discussion from the report in light of USDA's
comment that it has no evidence that farmers have done this.
9. We correctly state in the report that farmers may choose the month
that they begin accepting their payments. However, in response to
USDA's comment we revised the report to clarify that farmers'
discretion on when they receive MILC payments is limited by USDA's
regulations for implementing this program. Specifically, these
regulations prohibit a farmer from selecting a month to receive
payments if the month has already begun, if the month has already
passed, or during which no milk was produced. A farmer also cannot
change a previously selected start month after the 15TH of the month
before the month selected. Once monthly payments begin, a farmer has no
discretion in determining in which month or months to receive payments.
10. The discussion of expanding the use of DEIP in the draft report did
not suggest that WTO rules, including quantitative and monetary caps
and product-specific restrictions, be violated. Rather, this discussion
identified ways in which dairy experts suggested that DEIP might be
used more effectively as a marketing tool. However, we have revised the
language in the report to more fully reflect USDA's views and to
minimize confusion as to what we mean by increasing the use of DEIP as
a marketing tool without exceeding WTO caps.
11. We revised the language in the report to clarify that USDA has not
proposed or considered any proposal to eliminate the Dairy Price
Support Program. However, USDA analyzed the potential effects of
eliminating this program in the study it prepared in response to the
2002 Farm Bill mandate.
12. We agree with USDA that ensuring an adequate level of milk
production is not an objective of the FMMO program. We revised the
report accordingly and added language suggested by USDA to better
describe the FMMO program's objectives.
13. We agree that price volatility contributes to disorderly market
conditions, and we revised the report to better explain the potential
causes of price volatility. We also agree that FMMOs cannot directly
address price volatility in wholesale dairy markets. However, by
setting minimum prices that must be paid to farmers for raw milk, the
FMMOs can affect the extent to which price volatility is reflected in
the prices that farmers receive.
14. We revised the report to reflect that cooperatives owning the
capacity to produce multiple products may still have an incentive to
shift milk to the higher-valued use, in order to provide greater
returns to their members. We also expanded our discussion of other
factors that might influence how milk is used, such as transportation
costs and changes in processing technology.
15. We acknowledge that the report does not explain how a competitive
pay price series could be created for use in the FMMO program. However,
this option was identified by stakeholders during the course of our
work. Other options discussed in the report also may present
challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report
discusses those issues. Nonetheless, we revised the report to reflect
that USDA and a panel of academicians attempted to devise a competitive
pay price series but ultimately were unsuccessful. We also revised the
report to note that a key difficulty in developing a competitive pay
price series is the need for data that are not already influenced by
the FMMO classified pricing system.
16. We acknowledge that the report does not explain how, after
combining Class III and Class IV, milk would be priced in the expanded
class. However, this option was identified by stakeholders during the
course of our work. Other options discussed in the report also may
present challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report
discusses those issues. Nonetheless, we revised the report to reflect
that a barrier to combining Class III and IV is identifying an
appropriate pricing formula that considers the products in an expanded
class.
17. We revised the report to reflect this clarification and added
language suggested by USDA to better describe the FMMO program's
objectives.
18. We agree with USDA that any area's supply of fluid milk can come
from local or distant farmers. USDA noted that the Class I price
surface, generated from different minimum Class I prices in different
locations, reflects the cost of moving milk from surplus to deficit
markets. However, as we pointed out in a 1988 report, when the price
surface does not also account for regional differences in production
costs, it can result in incentives for overproduction in certain
regions. Furthermore, the Class I price surface that resulted from the
2000 federal order reform differs from USDA's recommended option.
19. The report accurately reflects the views of some stakeholders that
the slowness of USDA's hearing and rulemaking process used to modify
FMMOs inhibits the agency's ability to respond to changing market
conditions or the marketing of new products. The report also discusses
challenges USDA faces to improving this process while ensuring the
promulgation of economically sound regulation. Further, the report
notes that USDA has made efforts to improve the hearing process,
particularly in the way it evaluates its contracts for hearing
transcripts.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contacts:
Lawrence J. Dyckman, (202) 512-3841;
James R. Jones, Jr., (202) 512-9839:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, Jay Cherlow, Barbara El
Osta, Joshua Habib, Eileen Harrity, Christopher Murray, and Cynthia
Norris made key contributions to this report. Important contributions
were also made by Beverly Ross, Jena Sinkfield, and Amy Webbink.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Dairy Industry: Estimated Economic Impacts of Dairy Compacts.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-866]
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001.
Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market
Structure.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-561]
Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001.
Fluid Milk: Farm and Retail Prices and the Factors That Influence Them.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-730T]
Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2001.
Dairy Products: Imports, Domestic Production, and Regulation of Ultra-
filtered Milk.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01- 326]
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2001.
Dairy Industry: Information on Prices for Fluid Milk and the Factors
That Influence Them.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-4]
Washington, D.C.: October 8, 1998.
Dairy Industry: Information on Marketing Channels and Prices for Fluid
Milk.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-98-70]
Washington, D.C.: March 16, 1998.
Dairy Programs: Effects of the Dairy Termination Program and Support
Price Reductions.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OCE-93-1]
Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1993.
Federal Dairy Programs: Insights Into Their Past Provide Perspectives
on Their Future.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-90-88]
Washington, D.C.: February 28, 1990.
Milk Pricing: New Method for Setting Farm Milk Prices Needs to Be
Developed.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED- 90-8]
Washington, D.C.: November 3, 1989.
Dairy Termination Program: An Estimate of Its Impact and Cost-
Effectiveness.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-89-96]
Washington, D.C.: July 6, 1989.
Milk Marketing Orders: Options for Change.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-88-9]
Washington, D.C.: March 21, 1988.
Overview of the Dairy Surplus Issue--Policy Options for Congressional
Consideration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-85-132]
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1985.
Effects and Administration of the 1984 Milk Diversion Program.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-85-126]
Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1985.
(360384):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Dairy cooperatives are member-owned organizations that assist
producers in marketing their milk. Cooperatives provide a variety of
services for their members such as ensuring adequate raw milk supplies
to meet processors' needs, transporting milk, quality assurance, and
standardizing milk composition.
[2] Wholesale milk processors include bottlers and major retail food
chains with bottling plants, and cooperatives that process, package,
and distribute fluid milk for sale to retailers. Our review did not
include other entities that market milk at the wholesale level.
[3] In this report, farm prices are the prices paid for raw milk
supplies. After the milk has been processed into a fluid milk beverage,
references to "milk prices" are retail milk prices.
[4] Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
[5] A hundredweight is a unit of measure equal to 100 pounds of, in
this case, raw milk. Approximately 11.6 gallons of fluid milk can be
made from 100 pounds of raw milk.
[6] Recent evidence suggests that retail milk prices have also begun
rising with the recovering farm prices.
[7] There can be different kinds of economic efficiency effects.
Government policies may be more or less economically efficient
depending upon the extent to which they prevent the transmission of
market price signals and lead to a misallocation of resources into
excess production. Policies may also be more or less efficient
depending upon the extent to which they affect the distribution of
production between farmers with high or low costs of production.
[8] GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market
Structure, GAO-01-561 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001).
[9] The beginning of our period of analysis corresponds to the end of
the data presented in our previous report, GAO-01-561. The end point
represents the most recent month for which data were available from all
of our sources.
[10] We were unable to obtain actual data on the prices received by
wholesale milk processors because these data are considered
proprietary. As a proxy for these data we used data obtained from the
Defense Commissary Agency on the prices at which it sold milk.
Commissary prices reflect a 5 percent markup above the prices at which
the commissaries purchase milk from wholesale suppliers. We obtained
data from 39 different commissary locations near the 15 markets in our
analysis.
[11] This estimate is based on USDA data for the month of November for
selected years between 1991 and 2001, which were the most recent data
we could obtain.
[12] USDA/Agricultural Marketing Service, Raising the Minimum Nonfat
Solids Standard to the National Average in Raw Milk: A Study of Fluid
Milk Identity Standards (Washington, D.C.: August 2003).
[13] USDA, Economic Effects of U.S. Dairy Policy and Alternative
Approaches to Milk Pricing, (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). This study
combined the results of work by more than 20 researchers from 10
universities, as well as information provided by researchers at USDA.
[14] Under the FMMO program, a classified pricing plan provides
different classes and minimum prices for milk depending on how it is
used. Milk used in fluid products is placed in Class I. Milk used for
various manufactured products is placed in Classes II through IV. Class
II includes soft products, such as cottage cheese, ice cream, and
yogurt. Class III includes spreadable and hard cheeses. Class IV
includes butter and dried milk products, such as nonfat dry milk.
[15] This report does not specifically address consolidation and
concentration trends in the dairy industry and what is known about the
impact of concentration on milk prices, as the 2001 report did.
However, the report discusses market concentration as one of the
factors that influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to
the consumer. (See app. V.)
[16] Portions of some of these market areas lie in adjacent states.
[17] This estimate is based on USDA data for the month of November for
selected years between 1991 and 2001. It was the most recent data we
could obtain.
[18] Under the federal milk marketing orders, a classified pricing plan
provides different classes and minimum prices for milk depending on how
the milk is used. Milk used in fluid products is placed in Class I,
which is the highest-priced class. Milk used for various manufactured
products is placed in lower-priced classes.
[19] Handler is the federal order term for cooperatives, processors, or
dealers of milk who commonly purchase raw milk and sell pasteurized
milk and milk products. See 7 C.F.R. §1000.9 for a more complete
definition.
[20] The mailbox price information collected by the California
Department of Food and Agriculture does not account for all of the
various factors that influence farm prices. As a result, it does not
provide as good a measure of the price that farmers receive based on
the value of their milk as the AMS adjustment does for the FMMO markets
where it is available.
[21] The 39 commissary locations were selected either because they were
within the marketing area for one of our 15 selected markets (as
defined by our source for retail pricing data, Information Resources,
Inc.), or because they were the closest location available.
[22] In addition to shipping the products to stores, some wholesalers
provide in-store services, including unloading the milk on the store
dock, restocking the dairy case, and removing outdated or leaking
containers.
[23] For San Diego, we used prices that were adjusted for 2 percent
milkfat and 10 percent nonfat milk solids so that they were comparable
with the prices of retail milk sold in California.
[24] We used a regression procedure for each market to determine
whether the price could be reliably predicted as a function of time for
both farm-level and retail prices. This procedure allowed us to
estimate initial and final prices for farm-level and retail prices that
take into account the variability in these price series during the 44-
month period. This regression procedure was done on time and time-
squared because we observed that prices generally fell for part of the
period and then rose. Including the time-squared variable in the
regression provided a better fit for the data. A statistically
significant relationship indicates that we found a consistent
association, either up or down, between price and time. For
statistically significant relationships, we calculated a final price
estimate (computed for the last month of our data series) and compared
to an estimated price calculated for the first month. In the absence of
a statistically significant relationship-when no consistent
association was found-we treated initial and final estimates of price
the same, even if actual beginning and final prices differ.
[25] Federal government sources included officials from USDA's AMS,
Economic Research Service, and Farm Service Agency.
[26] Cooperatives we contacted included Dairy Farmers of America;
California Dairies, Inc; Agri-Mark; Land O'Lakes, Inc; and Prairie
Farms.
[27] Fluid milk processors and processors of manufactured dairy
products that we contacted included HP Hood LLC and Leprino Foods, as
well as cooperatives and retailers that process and manufacture these
products.
[28] Retailers that we contacted included Wal-Mart, Albertsons, the H.
E. Butt Grocery Company, and Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.
[29] Industry groups that we contacted included the National Milk
Producers Federation, the International Dairy Foods Association, and
the Food Marketing Institute.
[30] Academic dairy experts that we contacted included professors from
Cornell University, North Carolina State University, Ohio State
University, Texas A&M University, University of Connecticut, University
of Wisconsin-Madison, and the University of California-Davis.
[31] These figures represent unweighted averages of the percentages for
each market.
[32] See explanatory note (a) to table 1. In some places (3 out of 15
markets), retailers experienced negative returns.
[33] The price spread of a commodity represents differences in prices
between two levels of the marketing chain. These differences reflect
the costs incurred and profits received through adding value by
processing, transporting, and distributing a commodity.
[34] The values used to calculate the changes in farm and retail prices
in table 2 are based on statistical estimates of initial and final
prices for these two levels, not the actual prices recorded in the
first and last month of the period for which we have data. The method
for calculating these estimates is described in appendix I. The changes
in the farm-to-retail price spread are the differences between the
changes in retail and farm prices from October 2000 to May 2004 and
consequently are determined from the statistically estimated initial
and final prices for the retail and farm levels.
[35] As discussed in appendix I, farm prices were estimated by
subtracting out certain cost factors, provided by USDA, from the
announced cooperative Class I prices. To the extent that these factors
do not change much over time, it would be expected that price changes
at the farm level would closely correlate with price changes at the
cooperative level, except for San Diego. As discussed in appendix I, we
estimated the farm and cooperative prices differently in San Diego
because California is not part of the federal milk marketing order
system. The approach that we used for San Diego would not be expected
to generate a similarly close correlation between farm and cooperative
prices. Because farm prices for raw milk used for fluid purposes are
not directly observed but are derived from cooperative prices,
correlations of wholesale and retail prices with cooperative prices
provide a better picture of the price relationship across levels in the
milk marketing chain.
[36] Each year the United States processes about 7 billion gallons of
the approximately 20 billion gallons of raw milk into fluid milk
products, such as flavored milks, buttermilk, whole, 2 percent, 1
percent, and skim milk. The rest of the raw milk supply is used to
produce manufactured products, such as butter, ice cream, yogurt,
powdered milk, and cheese.
[37] Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as
mad cow disease, is a degenerative neurological disease affecting the
central nervous system in cattle.
[38] Operating costs include major inputs such as feed, veterinary
services and medicine, bedding and litter, marketing, fuel, lubricant,
electricity, repairs, and interest on operating expenses.
[39] Ownership costs include the annualized cost of maintaining the
capital investment (depreciation and interest) in dairy facilities and
equipment, and costs for non-real estate property taxes and insurance.
[40] This labor estimate includes salary, benefits, and all employer
taxes for hired labor. If family labor were also included, labor would
represent over 12 percent of total production costs.
[41] S.D. Short, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Characteristics and
Production Costs of U.S. Dairy Operations. Resource Economics Division,
Economic Research Service, Statistical Bulletin Number 974-6, February
2004.
[42] The USDA study defined low-cost producers as the 25 percent of
milk producers with costs of $12.17 or less per hundredweight of milk
sold. High-cost producers were defined as the 25 percent of milk
producers with costs of $18.79 or more per hundredweight of milk sold.
[43] Price elasticity of supply refers to the percentage change in the
quantity supplied relative to a percentage change in the price received
for a product, in this case raw milk. Supply is price elastic when a
proportional change in the quantity supplied of a product exceeds the
proportional change in its price; supply is price inelastic when a
proportional change in the quantity supplied of a product is less than
a proportional change in its price.
[44] Demand for raw milk is also influenced by the costs of
transporting, processing, and marketing raw milk to produce dairy
products for retail sale.
[45] Price elasticity of demand refers to the percentage change in the
quantity demanded relative to a percentage change in the price of a
product, in this case fluid milk products. Demand is price elastic when
a proportional change in the quantity demanded of a product exceeds the
proportional change in its price; demand is price inelastic when a
proportional change in the quantity demanded of a product is less than
a proportional change in its price.
[46] According to USDA officials, a decline in the restaurant business
began in mid-2001 and may have been related to other economic factors,
such as falling stock market values and corporate scandals.
[47] Canadian feedlot operators have filed a class-action lawsuit
against the United States under the North American Free Trade
Agreement.
[48] "Dairy Markets Adjust, But Are Expected to Remain Tight,"
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook, ERS, LDP-M-120, June 2004.
[49] USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service indicated that
use of bovine somatotropin (bST) typically increases average milk yield
by 10 pounds per cow per day over the course of the cow's entire
lactation, or as long as bST continues to be used.
[50] "Meat Markets Roiled by Disease Outbreaks," Livestock, Dairy, and
Poultry Outlook, ERS, LDP-M-116, February 2004.
[51] Poor quality feed can reduce milk production and may require
farmers to supplement their feed, thereby raising overall feed costs.
[52] This initiative is funded by an assessment of $0.05 per
hundredweight of milk that participating farmers market. The National
Milk Producers Federation estimates a $0.59 per hundredweight increase
in farm income from the program through September 2004. However, while
some dairy experts indicated that the program has reduced raw milk
supplies and thus benefited farmers' income, they also indicated that
this estimate could be overstated.
[53] According to USDA, the objectives of FMMOs are to promote orderly
marketing conditions in fluid milk markets, to improve the income
situation of dairy farmers by establishing minimum milk prices, to
supervise the terms of trade in milk markets in such manner as to
achieve more equality of bargaining between farmers and processors, and
to assure consumers adequate supplies of good quality milk at
reasonable prices.
[54] The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended and reenacted in
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, established the
federal marketing order agreements.
[55] Dairy farmers sell two grades of milk. Grade A may be used for
fluid consumption or in manufactured products. Grade B may be used only
for manufactured products. Farmers producing Grade A milk must adhere
to higher sanitation requirements than for Grade B milk. Prior to World
War I, much of the milk marketed by farmers did not meet Grade A
standards. However, by 1999, only about 3 percent of all milk marketed
in the United States did not meet Grade A standards.
[56] Basing Class I and II prices on the advanced Class III and IV skim
milk values ensures that minimum prices of raw milk used in these
products will be known in the month preceding the month to which they
apply.
[57] Farmers not located in a federal order can also ship their milk
into a federal order. While farmers can ship milk independently,
generally it is dairy cooperatives acting on behalf of their farmer
members that assemble and ship milk to processors.
[58] Each order has its own requirements, such as the minimum amount of
raw milk required to be shipped to processing plants participating in
that order to qualify for its blend price. Entities regulated by the
FMMO program have the ability to petition USDA for a hearing to amend
order regulations, including the requirements that outside farmers must
meet when shipping their milk to another order.
[59] The term "pool" is used interchangeably to refer to both the
amount of money generated by applying the minimum federal order class
prices to the amount of milk used in each class within an order and the
raw milk associated with the order for which farmers and processors are
able to share payments from the amount of money generated by the order
system.
[60] The dairy price support program was established by the
Agricultural Act of 1949, legislation that also expanded the CCC's role
as a government-owned entity to carry out price support activities for
a variety of agricultural commodities.
[61] The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
required that the support price be reduced $0.15 per year from $10.35
in 1996 to $9.90 per hundredweight in 1999.
[62] In fact, most of the butter manufactured in the United States is
produced independent of nonfat dry milk; however, the assumption
correctly implies that the relative price relationship between butter
and nonfat dry milk must conform to relative yields from raw milk.
[63] Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-624 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §7251(d)). Butter/nonfat dry milk tilts
were common in the early 1990s--several tilts were made between April
1990 and July 1993--to account for market conditions in which butter
was in surplus relative to nonfat dry milk.
[64] The MILC program, also known as the National Dairy Market Loss
Assistance Payment program, was authorized in the Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002. USDA began accepting applications for the
MILC program in August 2002 (payments were made retroactively to
December 1, 2001) and will continue to do so until September 30, 2005.
[65] This price is the same price that was in place when the Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact was effective. The compact included the six
New England states--Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Legislative authority for the compact
expired at the end of September 2001. MILC serves as an alternative to
regional dairy compacts and ad hoc emergency payments to farmers.
[66] However, this discretion is limited. USDA regulations prohibit a
farmer from selecting a month to receive payments if the month has
already begun, if the month has already passed, or during which no milk
was produced. A farmer also cannot change a previously selected start
month after the 15TH of the month before the month selected.
Furthermore, once monthly payments begin, the farmer has no discretion
in determining which month or months to receive payments.
[67] Between January 1998 and June 2004, U.S. prices remained above
average international market prices reported by USDA's Foreign
Agricultural Service for four dairy commodities whose prices are
tracked internationally: butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, and whole
milk powder. During this time, U.S. prices averaged between 103 to 125
percent higher for butter, 44 to 58 percent higher for cheese, 24 to 35
percent higher for nonfat dry milk, and 62 to 74 percent higher for
whole milk powder.
[68] The Dairy Export Incentive Program was introduced in the Food
Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, Title I, §153 (1985)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §713a-14) and has been reauthorized since then
in successive farm bills. Most recently, the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 extended the program to 2007.
[69] As is the case with other export subsidy programs, the degree to
which demand is increased under a program such as DEIP depends on the
degree to which the exports under the program are additional to those
that would have occurred in the absence of the program.
[70] However, the Congressional Research Service study also noted that
while DEIP may help to raise farm prices when milk markets are
relatively balanced, the program would not be likely to have such
impacts when supplies are relatively tight because the industry would
not be willing to give up products for export that were needed to
supply the domestic market. Geoffrey S. Becker, "Agricultural Export
Programs: The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP)," Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, September 18, 2002.
[71] This testimony was for the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Department Operations,
Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry.
[72] DEIP assisted exports of butterfat have varied depending on market
conditions.
[73] In some years, such as 1998 and 1999, actual shipments appeared to
exceed the World Trade Organization (WTO) maximum. This excess occured
because of provisions that enabled unused quantities from previous
years to be rolled over into future years. Limits established by U.S.
trade agreements are explained in greater detail in appendix VII.
[74] Dairy farmers who produce the raw milk used in fluid and
manufactured products can (1) market it through dairy cooperatives, (2)
sell it directly to wholesale milk processors, or (3) process it for
direct sale to consumers.
[75] See GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Prices for Fluid Milk and
the Factors That Influence Them, GAO/RCED-99-4 (Washington, D.C.:
October 8, 1998) and GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Marketing
Channels and Prices for Fluid Milk, GAO/RCED-98-70 (Washington, D.C.:
March 16, 1998) for more information on the role of cooperatives and
other entities in the marketing of fluid milk.
[76] Typically, these agreements are self-renewing.
[77] K. Charles Ling, Marketing Operations of Dairy Cooperatives, 2002,
USDA/Rural Business-Cooperative Service, Research Report 201, February
2004.
[78] We could not identify any recent studies that have examined milk
processing and distribution costs on a national level.
[79] T.J. Dalton, G.K. Criner, and J. Halloran, "Fluid Milk Processing
Costs: Current State and Comparisons," Journal of Dairy Science, Vol.
85, No. 4 (2002): 984-991. The study used cost-engineering methods to
look at four state-of-the-art fluid milk processing plants in Maine
ranging from 335,000 gallons per week to 600,000 gallons per week.
[80] Supply-chain management is an attempt to coordinate processes
involving producing, shipping, and distributing products, generally
performed only by large corporations with large suppliers.
[81] Dean Foods Company, Presentation at the Consumer Analyst Group of
New York Conference, Scottsdale, Arizona, February 17, 2004. Available
online at http://www.deanfoods.com/investors.
[82] Dean Foods Annual Report (2001), 18.
[83] Aseptic packaging, commonly called "drink boxes," is the result of
a beverage and liquid food system that allows perishable food products
to be distributed and stored without refrigeration for periods up to
six months or more. It is used to preserve and package everything from
milk, juice, and drinks of all kinds to scrambled egg mix, tomato
sauce, soups, and other liquid foods.
[84] Structural change is characterized by broad and long-term changes
in key industry characteristics, frequently including consolidation and
changes in concentration, methods of vertical coordination, and the mix
of products and services offered by firms in an industry.
[85] Don P. Blayney and James J. Miller, "Concentration and Structural
Change in Dairy Processing and Manufacturing," Paper presented at the
10TH Annual Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, Memphis,
Tennessee, April 2003.
[86] See GAO-01-561, appendix VI, for more information on consolidation
at the wholesale milk processor level.
[87] As a result of a divestiture plan stemming from the Dean-Suiza
merger, the second largest fluid milk processor, the National Dairy
Holdings Group, was created.
[88] We estimated the four-firm concentration ratio using expert
opinion from conversations with dairy experts at USDA on the leading
four fluid milk processing firms, estimates of company sales from the
August 2003 Dairy Foods Magazine, "The Dairy 100: The List," and the
total value of shipments from the 2002 Economic Census, Industry Series
(September 2004) for fluid milk manufacturing. We also adjusted company
sales listed in Dairy Foods, per company annual statements and expert
opinion, for the percent of sales that would account for products such
as ice cream and cheese. To make our estimate consistent with the 1997
Economic Census four-firm concentration ratio, we also included the
same categories for fluid milk manufacturing, such as cottage cheese
and yogurt, along with fluid milk processing, that went into this
calculation. This figure does not include the sales that firms may have
from various joint ventures.
[89] See T.J. Dalton, G.K. Criner, and J. Halloran, "Fluid Milk
Processing Costs: Current State and Comparisons," Journal of Dairy
Science, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2002, 984-991. Also, Day 3 of the Hearing on
Pacific Northwest and Arizona/Las Vegas Producer-Handlers, September
25, 2003, including the exhibit on "Cost Structure of Fluid Milk Plants
of Various Sizes."
[90] One study that we identified, however, that separated market power
and cost-efficiency effects on the prices in 33 food processing
industries from 1972 to 1992, found that the market power effect
dominated in fluid milk manufacturing. Rigoberto A. Lopez, Azzedine M.
Azzam, and Carmen Liron-Espana, "Market Power and/or Efficiency: A
Structural Approach" Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 20, March
2002: 115-126.
[91] The Food Marketing Institute is a trade association that
represents segments of the retail food industry such as supermarkets.
The Food Marketing Institute does not represent convenience stores.
[92] As table 29 shows, the category "other operating costs" is
somewhat larger than "employee benefits," but according to the Food
Marketing Institute, it is a catch-all category including items such as
travel, equipment rentals, communication, and services purchased.
[93] The gross margin is a firm's sales revenue minus the costs of
acquiring products, expressed as a percentage of sales.
[94] George Criner, "Milk Retail Costs and Margins." Paper presented at
the Northeast Dairy Policy Summit Meeting, November 17-18, 2003,
University of Connecticut, Storrs.
[95] For most other products, Wal-Mart officials said that the retailer
maintains a network of approximately 30 food distribution centers.
[96] Private label refers to products that are "store brands" and have
labels that represent the retailer. These products may be produced by
manufacturers that also produce national brands or by retailers who own
their own manufacturing operations.
[97] Different retailers may define the dairy case differently
depending on the market that they serve. The dairy case may include
products such as fluid milk, cottage cheese, creamers, yogurt, butter,
and eggs as well as a variety of new "value added" dairy products. A
recent study by Cornell University on dairy case management found that,
on average, stores used approximately 37 different milk products in
their dairy cases.
[98] Oral Capps, Jr., "Demand and Marketing Analyses for Fluid Milk
Products by Type and by Package Size." Presentation at the 2004 Dairy
Forum, Boca Raton, Florida, January 2004.
[99] If products are substitutes, an increase in the price of one would
increase the demand for the other. A complement in consumption means
that the products are consumed in conjunction with one another. An
increase in price for one product would decrease the demand for the
complementary product.
[100] Tirtha Dhar and Tom Cox, "Strategic Implications of Retail
Pricing in the U.S. Fluid Milk Market." Paper prepared for presentation
at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting,
Montreal, Canada, July 27-30, 2003.
[101] Economic studies of the relationship between price and market
concentration in food retailing have found mixed results. Carolyn
Dimitri, Abebayehu Tegene, and Phil R. Kaufman, U.S. Fresh Produce
Markets: Marketing Channels, Trade Practices, and Retail Price
Behavior, Agricultural Economic Report Number 825, Economic Research
Service, USDA, September 2003.
[102] These were defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as Metropolitan
Statistical Areas. See GAO-01-561, appendix VI, for more information on
concentration among retail firms.
[103] Sales by Wal-Mart and other super centers and mass merchandisers
are not included in the supermarket category. Super centers are defined
as a large combination supermarket and discount general merchandise
store, with grocery products accounting for up to 40 percent of selling
area.
[104] The four-firm concentration ratio in a market is the share of
sales made by the four largest sellers.
[105] William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization,
3RD ed. Prentice Hall, 1990. While a useful tool for categorizing the
degree of competition in a market, a numerical cut-off of a
concentration index, such as the four-firm concentration ratio, is not
generally considered a precise demarcation between various categories
of the degree of competition in a market. The Federal Trade Commission
and Department of Justice use an index of market concentration, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, in combination with a number of other
market factors, in determining the potential anticompetitive effects of
a proposed merger. Economic studies of various markets, however, have
found that the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index are highly correlated.
[106] While very similar, some of the 15 market areas for our 2001
report for retail concentration in 1998 did not exactly match those in
our present data for 2003 due to a realignment of MarketScope's
metropolitan market area definitions.
[107] Wal-Mart super center sales for 2003 were taken from Supermarket
News, SN's Top 75 (supplement), January 12, 2004. The estimate of
grocery sales was provided by USDA. These grocery sales represent about
40 percent of total super center sales.
[108] "ACNielsen Study Finds Grocery Stores Continuing to Lose Share of
Customer Shopping Trips," news release, ACNielsen, May 4, 2002,
http://www.acnielsen.com/news/american/us/2002/200220504.htm (accessed
September 9, 2004).
[109] Todd M. Schmit, Harry M. Kaiser, and Chanjin Chung, The Dairy
Case Management Program: Does It Mooove More Milk? National Institute
for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation, Department of Applied
Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, January
2004. Specifically, this study evaluated the Dairy Case Management
Program operated by the American Dairy Council in the Northwestern
Hudson Valley Market in New York State.
[110] More generally, a recent article in the economics literature
looking at 77 consumer and 165 producer goods suggested that asymmetric
price transmission is a broad phenomenon, and that prices rise faster
than they fall in about two-thirds of the markets that were examined.
See S. Peltzman, "Prices Rise Faster than they Fall," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 3, 466-502.
[111] Other factors identified included the costs of changing prices,
government policies, spatial market competition, asymmetric
information, economies of scale, and differentiated products.
[112] James P. Houck, "An Approach to Specifying and Estimating
Nonreversible Functions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59
(1977): 570-572. In the Houck model (1977), changes in the retail price
are linked to increases and decreases in the farm level price as well
as changes in other marketing costs. Also, the estimated parameters on
the farm-level price increases and decreases can be tested to determine
if retail price movements in response to farm price changes are
symmetric or asymmetric.
[113] H.W. Kinnucan and O.D. Forker, "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price
Transmission for Major Dairy Products," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 69 (1987): 285-292. Kinnucan and Forker combine
the mark-up model proposed by Heien (1980) and the approach used by
Houck (1977) to estimate asymmetric functions using a dynamic approach
for fluid milk, cheese, butter, and ice cream.
[114] A recent study by von Cramon-Taubadel and Fahlbusch (1994) points
out that in the case of cointegration between two time series, an error
correction model, extended by the incorporation of asymmetric
adjustment terms, provides for a more appropriate specification for
testing for asymmetric price transmission. See S. von Cramon-Taubadel
and S. Fahlbusch, "Identifying Asymmetric Price Transmission with Error
Correction Models." Poster session at the European Association of
Agricultural Economists European Seminar in Reading, UK, 1994.
[115] Short-run asymmetry occurs when increasing and decreasing prices
have different immediate responses when the farm price is changed.
Long-run asymmetry occurs when increasing and decreasing farm prices
have different responses over the full adjustment period. For most of
the studies that we examined, both the short run and long run
represented fairly short time horizons. For example, the short run
typically extended from the current month to one month out, while the
long run was usually from 2 to 4 months. Nevertheless, in most of the
studies, the long run was the time required for the lag structure to
run its course.
[116] The elasticity of price transmission from the farm to retail
level is the percentage change in the retail price of a product due to
a 1 percent change in the corresponding farm price.
[117] While these elasticity estimates are ones obtained from using the
Houck method, the author found similar results, although smaller, using
a time-series, cointegration approach: the error correction model (see
table 33).
[118] The New Empirical Industrial Organization is an approach that
focuses primarily on the relationship between prices and marginal costs
that has been used to identify and estimate the degree of oligopoly
market power in a market. Specifically, the Chidmi et al. study is a
structural oligopoly model that measures market power, demand, marginal
cost, and the farm-to-retail price transmission.
[119] This approach is a cost-pass through model consisting of a two-
stage vertical market system where there are two processors at the
first stage and two retailers at the second stage. Within these stages
the authors assume different conduct and game theoretic assumptions.
This study, however, did not address price asymmetry because it did not
estimate the extent to which price decreases were passed through.
[120] S. McCorriston, C. W. Morgan, and A. J. Rayner, "Processing
Technology, Market Power, and Price Transmission," Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, 185-201. Steve
McCorriston, "Why Should Imperfect Competition Matter to Agricultural
Economists?" European Review of Agricultural Economists, Vol. 29, No.
3, 2002, 349-371.
[121] Steve McCorriston and Ian M. Sheldon, "The Effect of Vertical
Markets on Trade Policy Reform." Working paper, September 1994. Also,
S. M. McCorriston and I. M. Sheldon, "Agricultural Policy Reform in
Successive-Oligopolistic Markets: A General Framework," University of
Exeter and Ohio State University, December 1995.
[122] For this model, the conjectural variation elasticity, a measure
of market conduct and firm interdependence within the market, was
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
[123] There can be different kinds of economic efficiency effects.
Government policies may be more or less economically efficient
depending upon the extent to which they prevent the transmission of
market price signals and lead to a misallocation of resources into
excess production. Policies may also be more or less efficient
depending upon the extent to which they affect the distribution of
production between farmers with high or low costs of production.
[124] The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
required USDA to consolidate the number of marketing orders. Two
marketing orders were discontinued between 1996 and 1999, so 31 orders
were actually consolidated.
[125] Basing Class I and II prices on the advanced Class III and IV
skim milk values ensures that minimum prices of raw milk used in these
products will be known in the month preceding the month to which they
apply.
[126] The mover links the dairy price support program to the FMMO
system, so that changes in one program are reflected in the other. The
dairy price support program maintains the prices of manufactured
products throughout the United States regardless of whether a
particular area is part of the FMMO system. By using these manufactured
product prices as the basis for other milk class prices, the FMMO
system aims to ensure that its minimum prices will reflect the level of
support provided by the price support program.
[127] In addition to these major reforms, USDA made other changes,
including modifying the system of differentials used to determine Class
I prices. USDA increased Class I differentials in 21 markets, ranging
from $0.01 per hundredweight in New England (Boston) and New York/New
Jersey (New York City), to $0.50 per hundredweight in the Upper Midwest
(Minneapolis). Class I differentials in 4 markets were not changed.
Class I differentials in 8 markets were reduced, ranging from $0.04 per
hundredweight in the Ohio Valley (Columbus) to $0.18 in Eastern
Colorado (Denver). In general, these changes retained the existing
Class I pricing surface in markets east of the Rocky Mountains. USDA
originally proposed an alternative set of differentials, but the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000 required adoption of the
differentials noted above.
[128] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000 also required USDA to
reconsider the Class III and IV pricing formulas that were implemented
with the 2000 reforms. USDA conducted a hearing on the issue in May
2000. The reforms implemented in April 2003 stemmed from the changes
USDA proposed as a result of this hearing.
[129] In some cases the new orders included areas previously
unregulated by the FMMO system.
[130] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Federal Milk Marketing Order
Reform: New England et al., Final Decision, Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Dairy Programs, March 1999.
[131] After USDA holds a hearing, it may decide to issue proposed
amended regulations for notice and comment. At the end of the
administrative process, USDA issues a final rule, and those covered by
the order must vote to adopt the order in its amended form. The amended
order must be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected dairy
farmers, or dairy farmers who produce at least two-thirds of the milk
produced in that order. In addition, the amended order will not become
effective until the handlers of at least 50 percent of the milk covered
by the order have signed a marketing agreement, or until a hearing has
been held and the Secretary of Agriculture makes particular
determinations that the marketing order should nonetheless be
effective.
[132] Over time, the number of classes has varied by order, from at
least two, to seven or eight. Class I use has consistently been defined
as the milk going into fluid milk products. Class II includes soft
manufactured products such as ice cream and yogurt, Class III includes
cheese, and Class IV includes butter and nonfat dry milk.
[133] Advanced values are derived from formulas that use weighted
average prices of butter, cheese, dry whey, and nonfat dry milk
reported by the National Agricultural Statistics Service on the Friday
on or before the 23RD of the month preceding the month to which the
prices apply. There is a 1-week lag in reporting by the Service, so the
advanced values are usually based on the commodity prices for the first
two weeks of the preceding month.
[134] Class II butterfat is priced by adding $0.007 per pound to the
monthly Class III/IV butterfat price. Consequently, Class II skim milk
is advanced priced but Class II butterfat is not.
[135] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "The Butter-Powder Tilt," Marketing and
Policy Briefing Paper Number 72, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2001.
[136] David Anderson, Bob Cropp, Wilson Gray, Joe Outlaw, and Mark
Stephenson, "Milk Pricing Policy Options and Consequences," an Analysis
for the American Farm Bureau Foundation for Agriculture, February 2004.
[137] According to a USDA official, Class IV use averages about 12
percent across all federal orders and is much higher than 12 percent in
several orders.
[138] Whey is the water and solid components of milk that remain after
the curd is removed in cheese-making. It contains about 93.5 percent
water and 6.5 percent lactose, protein, minerals, enzymes, water-
soluble vitamins, and traces of fat.
[139] Raw milk quality is also factored into the pricing formulas in
all but two orders.
[140] As a result of declining Grade B milk production, the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price was replaced by the basic formula price in the mid-
1990s. The basic formula price established the minimum prices for raw
milk by updating the Minnesota-Wisconsin competitive pay price series
with wholesale product price information on the value of cheese,
butter, and nonfat dry milk. This system was in place from June 1995
through December 1999.
[141] This is not to say that the FMMO classified pricing system is
causing additional volatility in milk prices. As noted by AMS
officials, an historical review of milk prices shows that price
volatility existed well before the product pricing formulas were
introduced in 2000. AMS officials indicated that there are several
causes of price volatility including: the level of support provided by
the price support program, exposure to international trade, and the
responses to changes in prices by farmers and consumers. However,
according to a number of dairy experts, the fixed manufacturing
allowances in the new product formula pricing system have more readily
transmitted price volatility within the classified pricing system and
thus enhanced its effects.
[142] AMS officials indicated that USDA has been working with
researchers at Cornell University to collect manufacturing plant costs,
which these officials believe will assist them in establishing the
proper level of manufacturing allowances should the dairy industry
propose a change.
[143] Other factors that could affect the incentive to shift milk to a
higher-valued use include transportation costs and changes in
processing technology. In addition, when cooperatives own the capacity
to produce butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk, they may still have an
incentive to shift milk to the higher-valued use despite fixed
manufacturing allowances, in order to provide greater returns to their
members.
[144] One source also noted that by not providing incentives to shift
milk to its highest-valued use, the product formula pricing system
could discourage the development of innovative dairy products.
[145] The producer price differential represents the difference between
the value of milk established by the classified pricing system as paid
by processors and the weighted average value of milk as paid to farmers
for milk components (butterfat, protein, and other solids). The
producer price differential is calculated by multiplying the volume of
each class of milk used in the order by its announced price to obtain a
total classified value of milk for that order, and then subtracting the
total value of milk paid to farmers for butterfat, protein, and other
solids on a per hundredweight basis.
[146] This presumes that minimum prices are the effective prices.
[147] Rapidly rising Class IV prices are a remote possibility at this
time due to the surplus of nonfat dry milk.
[148] Processors may remain in a federal order pool despite negative
producer price differentials for a variety of reasons. For example,
Class I processors are not allowed to de-pool under FMMO regulations.
[149] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "Federal Milk Marketing Order Pooling,
Depooling, and Distant Pooling: Issues and Impacts," Marketing and
Policy Briefing Paper Number 85, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2004.
[150] Because these provisions are established on an order-by-order
basis, the minimum shipping percentages vary by order. In federal milk
orders with relatively high Class I use, such as the Southeast and
Florida Orders, the shipping percentage requirements are higher than in
orders with relatively low Class I use, such as the Upper Midwest
Order. Shipping requirements may also vary by months of the year. In
orders where milk production tends to vary a lot seasonally, the
minimum shipping requirements may be greater during low production
months.
[151] The Class III other solids component price (per pound) is
calculated by taking the difference between the dry whey price reported
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service and a manufacturing
allowance of $0.159, multiplied times a product yield factor of 1.03.
The lower bound of zero, or "snubber," was designed to prevent the
price of other solids components from being negative should the market
price for dry whey fall below the manufacturing allowance. Removing
this lower bound created the possibility that the other solids
component price could actually lower the Class III price during periods
of low market prices for dry whey, which in fact, occurred from April
to June of 2003. However, because other solids comprise a small
percentage of the overall component value of Class III milk, the effect
of this change was minor.
[152] Bob Cropp, Brian Gould, and Ed Jesse, "Federal Milk Marketing
Order Reform: November 2002 Final Decision on Class III/IV Formulas,"
Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper Number 79, Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
November 2002.
[153] However, the study noted that Class III prices would have been
the driver in only one additional month between January 2001 and
November 2002.
[154] U.S. International Trade Commission, Conditions of Competition
for Milk Protein Products in the U.S. Market, Publication 3692
(Washington, D.C.: May 2004). The U.S. International Trade Commission
is an independent federal agency. Its purpose is to assist in the
administration of trade laws and to protect U.S. industry, as well as
to provide advice and research on trade issues.
[155] The USDA estimate also factored in the benefits provided by the
introduction of the Milk Income Loss Contract program.
[156] This included retroactive payments made for production in fiscal
year 2002.
[157] The $3.8 billion estimate comprises actual outlays of about $1.8
billion in fiscal year 2003 and forecasts of $935 million in fiscal
year 2004, $963 million in fiscal year 2005, and $77 million in fiscal
year 2006. Some MILC payments will extend into fiscal year 2006 for
milk produced in fiscal year 2005. USDA noted that its estimate of MILC
payments for fiscal year 2004 is $300 million, much less than the
Congressional Budget Office's estimate.
[158] While MILC has helped some farmers to weather low price periods,
USDA officials stated that the program has not necessarily changed the
long-term strategy of farmers to exit production. When making a
decision to remain in production, farmers have to weigh a number of
considerations in addition to MILC payments, particularly costs and
market conditions.
[159] In the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Trade Organization (WTO) members,
including the United States, made commitments to improve market access,
reduce export subsidies, and limit and in some cases reduce trade-
distorting domestic agricultural supports. For example, Uruguay Round
commitments on domestic agricultural subsidies include annual aggregate
ceiling levels for certain types of direct government support, which
include price supports for dairy products. The United States and other
WTO members are currently engaged in another round of multilateral
trade negotiations that began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, where they
reaffirmed their commitment to agricultural trade liberalization, and
in July 2004, WTO members agreed on a framework to guide negotiations
on agriculture. The U.S. negotiating position has emphasized
harmonizing, reducing, and further disciplining agricultural
subsidies. In the interim, existing Uruguay Round commitments will
continue at established levels. WTO members found to be in violation of
these commitments can be subject to retaliatory measures, such as
punitive tariffs on exports.
[160] Small surpluses or shortages in the short term may be the result
of market corrections and may not represent inefficiencies in the
allocation of production resources.
[161] The level of price volatility could influence both the supply and
demand for milk products. For example, manufacturers of products using
dairy ingredients might purchase larger quantities of these ingredients
if prices are more stable.
[162] To evaluate the impacts of various options on policy
considerations such as farm income, milk production, and federal costs,
we compared these options against a baseline scenario of the policies
in place as of August 2004: FMMO regulations, a MILC program that is
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005, a price support
program at $9.90 per hundredweight, a Dairy Export Incentive Program
(DEIP), trade restrictions, and milk regulatory policies in some
states.
[163] With declining Grade B milk production, any alternative
competitive pay system would have to include Grade A milk.
Consequently, a key challenge in developing a good competitive pay
price series is obtaining data that are not already influenced by the
FMMO classified pricing system. AMS officials noted that during FMMO
reform and consolidation, AMS commissioned a blue-ribbon committee of
academics to evaluate various milk pricing methods. Although the
committee's preference was for a competitive pay price series, they
were unable to develop or suggest a way of creating such a series.
[164] GAO, Milk Pricing: New Method for Setting Farm Milk Prices Needs
to Be Developed, GAO/RCED-90-8 (Washington, D.C.: November 3, 1989).
[165] Another alternative modification to the classified pricing system
would be to raise the manufacturing allowances; however, the accuracy
of any adjustment that does not change according to market forces would
eventually decrease. Further, the problem of trying to develop an
allowance that adequately represents costs of production in an
environment of widely varying cost structures would still exist.
[166] Class I includes fluid milk products, Class II includes soft
manufactured products such as ice cream and yogurt, Class III includes
cheese, and Class IV includes butter and nonfat dry milk.
[167] As discussed later in this appendix, this distortion could also
be reduced by changing the price support program.
[168] Charles F. Nicholson and Thomas Fiddaman, "Dairy Policy and Price
Volatility." Paper presented at the 10TH Annual Workshop for Dairy
Economists and Policy Analysts, Memphis, Tennessee, April 2003.
[169] AMS officials noted that other alternatives, not discussed in
this appendix, that could prevent negative producer price differentials
include eliminating the advanced Class I price announcement and setting
minimum prices for all classes in advance.
[170] This hearing took place in August 2004.
[171] Changes in federal dairy policy that reduce price volatility,
such as increasing the level of support provided by the price support
program, would help to reduce instances of negative producer price
differentials and de-pooling.
[172] Handler is the federal order term for cooperatives, processors,
or dealers of milk who commonly purchase raw milk and sell pasteurized
milk and milk products. See 7 C.F.R. §1000.9 for a more complete
definition.
[173] Also under consideration are alternative proposals that would
merge the Southeast and Appalachian Orders, as well as add areas to the
merged orders.
[174] 7 U.S.C. §608(c).
[175] This would be such a major change in federal dairy policy that
its impacts are uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in the
differences in the estimated impacts of various empirical studies that
considered this alternative. AMS officials indicated that without the
FMMO system of minimum prices set for milk based on wholesale dairy
product prices, it is unclear whether or not a structure would evolve
that similarly transmits wholesale price signals to farmers.
[176] GAO, Milk Marketing Orders: Options for Change, GAO/RCED-88-9
(Washington, D.C.: March 21, 1988).
[177] Dairy farmers sell two grades of milk. Grade A may be used for
fluid consumption or in manufactured products. Grade B may be used only
for manufactured products. Farmers producing Grade A milk must adhere
to higher sanitation requirements than for Grade B milk. The FMMO
system was developed to ensure an adequate supply of Grade A milk to
meet the fluid milk needs of consumers.
[178] Tom Cox, Bob Cropp, Randy Fortenbery, and Ed Jesse, "Rethinking
Dairyland Chapter 3: The Effects of Federal Dairy Programs on the
Competitiveness of Dairying in Wisconsin," Marketing and Policy
Briefing Paper Number 78C, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, September 2002.
[179] This analysis assumed that a fluid milk premium of $0.50 per
hundredweight would remain nationally and that California would make no
changes to its state milk marketing system. If the assumption of a
fluid milk premium is dropped, the study showed a farm price decrease
of closer to $0.70 per hundredweight during the first couple of years
following FMMO elimination.
[180] J. Michael Price, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Effects of U.S.
Dairy Policies on Markets for Milk and Dairy Products, Market and Trade
Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Technical Bulletin
Number 1910, May 2004. This analysis assumed a national fluid milk
premium of $1.30 per hundredweight. According to the USDA study, this
change is in the effective Class I price. Since Class I prices and
prices for raw milk used for manufacturing purposes would move in
opposite directions with elimination of the FMMO program, the change in
average prices would be less than $0.95 per hundredweight.
[181] The May 2004 USDA study estimated that manufactured product
prices would increase by 2 percent above the study's baseline estimate
for the period 2002 through 2007.
[182] Should the MILC program not be extended beyond fiscal year 2005,
this scenario would only exist in the short term.
[183] Andrew M. Novakovic, Charles F. Nicholson, and Mark W.
Stephenson, "Assignment of New Products Under Classified Pricing: A
Conceptual Dynamic Model of Class Assignment Outcomes," Cornell
University, January 2004.
[184] Changes in the dairy price support program could potentially
conflict with the U.S.'s WTO commitments.
[185] USDA indicated that currently, the price support program allows
the CCC to release its commodity stocks if the market price for a
particular commodity exceeds that commodity's purchase price.
[186] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "The Butter-Powder Tilt," Marketing and
Policy Briefing Paper Number 72, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2004.
[187] USDA also averages the Class III and Class IV prices in
determining if the $9.90 per hundredweight support price has been met.
[188] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 required the Secretary
of Agriculture to more diligently support the farm price of milk at the
farm bill-mandated support price of $9.90 per hundredweight or lose
funding for the administration of the program. Pub. L. No. 108-199
§780.
[189] The FSA economist also stated that there are minimal cost
differences for Class IV products (butter and nonfat dry milk). An
academic expert indicated that with the exception of April to June
2003, the Class IV price has not dropped below the support price.
[190] The National Milk Producers Federation has asked the CCC to
increase its purchase prices for cheese by $0.056 per pound.
[191] The Chicago Mercantile Exchange is a central marketplace with
established rules and regulations where buyers and sellers trade
agreements known as futures contracts to, for example, buy or sell a
commodity at a future date.
[192] USDA put the proposed draft Announcement Dairy 6 out to the dairy
industry for comment on April 5, 2004. The proposal includes a number
of changes such as increasing lot quantities for manufactured dairy
product purchases, as well as changing commodity, packaging, and
marking specifications.
[193] Another proposed alternative would be to have the CCC place bids
for commodity purchases on the Exchange as a better way to provide a
price floor for manufactured products. However, because the CCC cannot
entirely change its product standards to conform to industry
requirements, an FSA economist indicated that this alternative is not
feasible.
[194] The study established a baseline assumption whereby CCC purchases
of nonfat dry milk averaged approximately 17 percent of total U.S.
production over the period 2002 through 2007. Purchases of other
commodities were assumed to be minimal. However, this assumption was
based on a nonfat dry milk purchase price of $1.01 per pound. The
actual purchase price was lowered to $0.80 per pound and, thus, the
study may overstate the effects of eliminating this program.
[195] The draft legislation is known as the Milk Income Loss Contract
Extension, S. 2609 (2004). A bill that would extend authorization for
the MILC program to 2007, but would not increase the eligible
production cap, has been introduced in the House, H.R. 3990 (2004).
Additionally, a separate bill, S. 2825 (2004), was introduced in the
Senate. Section 426 of this proposed legislation would extend
authorization for the MILC program to 2007, increase the target price
for the MILC program from $16.94 per hundredweight to $17.10, and
eliminate a provision for determining whether producers are on separate
dairy operations for purposes of determining payment eligibility.
However, the bill would not change the MILC program's eligible
production cap of 2.4 million pounds.
[196] Scott Brown, "The Effect on the United States Dairy Industry of
Removing Current Federal Regulations," Report Number 03-03, Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute, University of Missouri, April
2003. Both the baseline estimate and the estimate for the MILC
extension scenario are based on the assumption that the price support
program, federal milk marketing orders, import restrictions, and the
Dairy Export Incentive Program remain in effect.
[197] Although, as discussed above, one might expect that the price and
production differences would become smaller over time, according to the
author of this study the model assumes competitive markets and,
therefore, does not fully capture long-term adjustments.
[198] However, the baseline assumption for farm milk prices was lower
than the prevailing prices of the past few months and, according to the
study's author, with higher assumed farm prices, the effect on
government costs of extending the MILC program would be less. The
accuracy of the other estimates also depends on the accuracy of the
market prices assumed in the baseline.
[199] Because the University of Missouri study's baseline included a
MILC program through 2005, its results can only be used as estimates of
the impact of extending MILC with a higher cap compared to letting MILC
expire for years beyond 2005. The study's results comparing this option
with the study's baseline for 2003 through 2005 are estimates of the
difference between having a MILC program with no cap and one with the
current cap.
[200] However, the baseline assumption for farm prices was lower than
the prevailing prices of the past few months and, according to the
study's author, with higher assumed farm milk prices, the effect on
government costs of extending the MILC program would be less. The
accuracy of the other estimates also depends on the accuracy of the
market prices assumed in the baseline.
[201] The MILC program is a target price deficiency payment program.
[202] A countercyclical payment is a payment provided during periods of
low prices.
[203] This proposed legislation was introduced in the 108TH Congress as
S. 2525 and H.R. 4597.
[204] In earlier legislation, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996, Congress authorized the six New England states to
enter into an agreement called the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact,
which was implemented in July 1997. The Compact functioned similarly to
the proposed dairy marketing boards of the NDEA in that it supplemented
the FMMOs and state programs by setting the monthly minimum price to be
paid for raw milk used for fluid milk marketed in the six-state area.
The authorization for the Compact expired on September 30, 2001.
[205] States in this region include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
[206] States in this region include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia,
and West Virginia.
[207] States in this region include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
[208] States in this region include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
[209] States in this region include Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
and Washington.
[210] The NDEA would allow the maximum to increase over time in
accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department
of Labor.
[211] Other payments from the fund would include compensation for
administrative costs that USDA or the boards incur in carrying out the
program, increased costs of specified federal nutrition programs that
might result from the program, and increased costs that the states
might occur due to the program in carrying out the Child Nutrition Act
of 1996. Boards could also collect assessments from processors in their
region not to exceed $0.03 per hundredweight to cover the boards'
administrative costs.
[212] Each month the board would receive the greater of (1) this amount
or (2) the amount of payments made by processors to the fund for
purchases of Class I milk that will be sold in the region during the
month.
[213] Even the extent to which income from Class I sales might rise
from the NDEA is hard to estimate because it is unclear to what extent
the over-order premiums that processors would be required to pay for
Class I milk might be replacements for market-driven over-order
premiums that would exist without the NDEA.
[214] GAO, Dairy Industry: Estimated Economic Impacts of Dairy
Compacts, GAO-01-866 (Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001).
[215] Scott Brown, "An Introductory Examination of the National Dairy
Equity Act," in Dairy Policy and Product Innovation, 11TH Annual
Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, April 15-16, 2004.
[216] These estimates were developed under a particular set of
assumptions, including that all states would participate in the NDEA
and that over-order prices were set relatively high. These estimates,
as acknowledged in the study, are likely to cause the estimated effects
of the NDEA to be larger than if, alternatively, it had been assumed
that few states participated and the over-order prices were relatively
low.
[217] Milk protein concentrate is a concentrated milk protein product
that contains both of the major forms of protein found in milk: casein
and whey. The protein content of this product can vary considerably
from 42 to over 90 percent.
[218] This proposed legislation was introduced in the 108TH Congress as
S. 560 and H.R. 1160.
[219] As a result of the agreement, the United States committed to
convert quotas and fees that had been established pursuant to section
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 into tariffs in the form
of tariff-rate quotas. Further, the United States agreed not to use
section 22 in the future against imports from other WTO members.
Virtually all section 22 quotas were converted to tariff-rate quotas in
1995.
[220] Standards of identity were introduced under the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and are enforced by the Food and Drug
Administration. Standards of identity define food products by
establishing what ingredients must or may be used in the food
manufacturing process, as well as the quantity of such ingredients. In
most cases, milk protein concentrate is not accepted for use in cheeses
covered by the standards of identity.
[221] Despite its conclusion that imports of dairy proteins to the
United States could lower manufactured product prices, the
International Trade Commission was unable to conclude that these
imports actually caused USDA to tilt commodity purchase prices in May
2001 and November 2002. The International Trade Commission found that
between 1996 and 2002, CCC stocks of nonfat dry milk grew from zero to
1 billion pounds. However, of this amount, the commission estimated
that only 25 to 35 percent of the stocks came from nonfat dry milk that
had been displaced by imports of dairy proteins. Therefore, 66 percent
of the increase in CCC stocks was due to factors other than imports.
[222] Butter prices could decrease as higher production levels, among
other things, increase the supply of butterfat.
[223] The extent to which increased imports put pressure on the CCC to
increase its purchases depends on the extent to which increased imports
replace commercial sales of domestically produced dairy products.
[224] A bill to create this program was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives as H.R. 4223 on April 27, 2004. The bill defines dairy
proteins as whey, whey protein concentrate, casein, or milk protein
concentrate.
[225] The protein content of raw milk can change with the age of the
cow, seasonally, and with feeding and management practices.
[226] The International Trade Commission reached these conclusions by
estimating the price, cost, and returns for U.S. producers who produce
nonfat dry milk and sell it to the CCC. The Commission then compared
the result with what producers in its survey had earned from producing
and selling milk protein concentrate.
[227] However, USDA officials noted that this may be a moot issue
because they believe milk protein concentrates will be classified as
Class IV products.
[228] Phillip M. Bishop and Charles F. Nicholson, "Dairy Market Impacts
of U.S. Milk Protein Imports and Trade Policy Alternatives," Department
of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell Program on Dairy Markets
and Policy, R.B. 2004-08, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (May 2004).
[229] As an alternative to government export subsidies, the National
Milk Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working Together program
includes, among other things, an export subsidy element.
[230] As is the case with other export subsidy programs, the degree to
which demand is increased under a program such as DEIP depends on the
degree to which the exports under the program are additional to those
that would have occurred in the absence of the program.
[231] The degree to which the U.S. market would be affected depends on
the degree to which the exports under DEIP would be eliminated if the
program were eliminated.
[232] Trading in milk futures and options represents another
alternative for farmers to reduce the risks associated with price
volatility by locking in prices, or setting price floors, for future
production. This alternative would remain available to farmers even if
some dairy programs, such as the dairy price support program, were
eliminated.
[233] Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate to make permanent the authority for
the Dairy Forward Pricing program, H.R. 3308 (2003) and S. 2565 (2004).
[234] As a practical matter, it could be difficult for cooperatives to
continue paying their members less than the regulated minimum price for
an extended period of time because farmers could choose to market their
milk with a different cooperative. However, farmers' ability to switch
cooperatives could be limited by the extent to which individual
cooperatives dominate milk marketing over a wide area.
[235] Most forward contracts for milk are for a base Class III price,
which in multiple component pricing orders, is the sum of milk
component values per hundredweight of milk at standardized test. Class
III milk futures and options contracts are actively traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. To offset their price risk from the
forward contracts to buy milk, proprietary processors and cooperatives
can take an equal but opposite position in the futures market by
selling futures contracts for an equivalent amount of Class III or IV
milk. Then, if the price of farm milk falls during the life of the
contract, when the contract period ends, their gain in the futures
market will equal their loss from buying milk under a fixed-price
forward contract rather than buying after the price fell.
[236] Bob Cropp, "Innovations To Address Price Risk Management and
Price Volatility" in Dairy Policy and Product Innovation, 11TH Annual
Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, April 15-16, 2004.
[237] "A Study of the Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program and Its
Effect on Prices Paid Producers for Milk," prepared for the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and the House
Committee on Agriculture by Dairy Programs, Agricultural Marketing
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
[238] Another initiative was the Milk Diversion Program. Both of these
programs were in effect for only a short time.
[239] The National Milk Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working
Together program, started in July 2003, is an industry-led supply
management initiative. Among other things, it includes a herd
retirement element similar to the Dairy Termination Program.
[240] Over one-third of this cost was funded by an industry assessment.
[241] GAO, Dairy Termination Program: An Estimate of Its Impact and
Cost-Effectiveness, GAO/RCED-89-96 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 1989).
[242] California also has a quota system; however, it does not function
as a supply management program. In California, milk receipts are
pooled, and those farmers who own quota shares get $1.70 per
hundredweight more than the California butter/nonfat dry milk/cheese
price for the number of quota shares they own. The original allocation
of quota shares was made in 1969 based on Class I sales, and because
not many additional quota shares have been allocated, quota shares
currently cover about 25 percent of California's milk production. Most
farmers have some quota shares, but some larger newer operations have
come into the system without a quota. While the California quota shares
are traded through brokers, people are not allowed to purchase them for
investment purposes. Purchasers have to be farmers, and the quota
shares come with minimum shipping requirements. One representative of a
major California dairy cooperative said that the effect of the quota
system is purely a way to distribute the proceeds of California's
classified pricing system.
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