Biscuit Fire
Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel Certification Standards Gao ID: GAO-04-426 April 12, 2004In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.
National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to fight the Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a multilevel dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting personnel and equipment are not available locally, resource requests can be elevated to other dispatch centers at the regional and, if necessary, national level. To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires, local dispatch center personnel can contact neighboring centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests. When the first two fires were found on July 13, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient firefighting resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel requested resources from the responsible regional center in Portland, as well as from a dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were immediately available in the region due to other higher priority fires that were threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not request resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in Fortuna, California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity there. State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later said that a Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern California near the first of the five Biscuit fires could have been made available to suppress this fire. However, Forest Service officials working with Fortuna personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter had been needed to fight fires in California. Because no request was made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a request would have been. Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire. Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry the strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and (3) support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews. An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority fires, affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the Biscuit Fire. Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.
GAO-04-426, Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel Certification Standards
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
April 2004:
BISCUIT FIRE:
Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel
Certification Standards:
GAO-04-426:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-426, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire
seasons in the past 50 years”almost 7 million acres burned. These fires
included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century”
the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were
discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3-day period
beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the
Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and
Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO
evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for
acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the
Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures
were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource
management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight
the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key
certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies
and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that
the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with
its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.
What GAO Found:
National policies and procedures were in place and provided the
framework to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center
in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to
fight the Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a
multilevel dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting
personnel and equipment are not available locally, resource requests
can be elevated to other dispatch centers at the regional and, if
necessary, national level. To facilitate the swift suppression of new
fires, local dispatch center personnel can contact neighboring centers
directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating
resource requests. When the first two fires were found on July 13, the
Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient firefighting
resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel requested resources
from the responsible regional center in Portland, as well as from a
dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were immediately
available in the region due to other higher priority fires that were
threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not request
resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in Fortuna,
California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they
believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity
there. State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later
said that a Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern
California near the first of the five Biscuit fires could have been
made available to suppress this fire. However, Forest Service officials
working with Fortuna personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter
had been needed to fight fires in California. Because no request was
made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the
Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is
unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a request would have
been.
Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining
needed personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire.
Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced
management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry
the strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and
(3) support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted
crews. An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority
fires, affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the
Biscuit Fire.
Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for
personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting
wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to
respond to the Biscuit Fire.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-426.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
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[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for
Acquiring Firefighting Resources:
Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to
Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire:
Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and
Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified 28:
Conclusions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Forest Service:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: The Five Types of Incidents:
Figures Figures:
Figure 1: Locations and Final Perimeter of the Five Fires That Became
the Biscuit Fire:
Figure 2: Biscuit 1 Burning on Steep Terrain on July 14, 2002:
Figure 3: Example of an Extended Attack Firefighting Organization:
Figure 4: Illustration of the Flow of Resource Requests between the
Local Dispatch Centers Involved in the Initial Attack of the Biscuit
Fire:
Figure 5: Key Events on July 13 and 14, 2002, Related to the Biscuit
Fire:
Figure 6: New Fire Starts Identified in the Vicinity of the Biscuit Fire
on July 13 and 14, 2002:
Figure 7: Fire Size on Key Dates When Fire Management Teams Were
Requested and Received:
Abbreviations:
CDF: California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection:
NIFC: National Interagency Fire Center:
NWCG: National Wildfire Coordinating Group:
ODF: Oregon Department of Forestry:
Letter April 12, 2004:
The Honorable Greg Walden:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health:
Committee on Resources:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Peter DeFazio:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Scott McInnis:
House of Representatives:
In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire
seasons in the past 50 years. In total, the federal government spent
more than $1.6 billion to suppress fires that burned almost 7 million
acres. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in
the past century--the Biscuit Fire.[Footnote 1] The fire season in 2002
began early, with major fires in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico
draining many firefighting resources out of the Pacific Northwest
during early summer. As a result, when lightning storms hit California
and Oregon from July 12 to 15, there were limited resources available
to fight the hundreds of ongoing fires, including five fires that
eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire. While no lives
were lost, the Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000 acres, including much
of the biologically diverse 180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness. The
Biscuit Fire was not declared extinguished until December 31, 2002,
more than 5 months after it began. In all, the Biscuit Fire destroyed 4
primary residences and 10 other structures, resulted in about 15,000
residents being put on evacuation notice, required thousands of
firefighters and other resources, and cost over $150 million to fight.
All five fires began in the Siskiyou National Forest in southwest
Oregon over a 3-day period, beginning July 13, 2002. On the first day,
two fires were found--one approximately 4 miles north of the
California-Oregon border, named Biscuit 1, and another, the Carter
Fire, 16 miles north of the state border within the Kalmiopsis
Wilderness (see fig. 1). The Carter Fire was the first fire Siskiyou
Forest officials took action to suppress, and it was contained within a
few days. On July 14, the third fire--Biscuit 2--was found near Biscuit
1, and on July 15, the last two fires--Florence and Sourdough--were
found (see fig. 1). The Florence Fire was located almost 30 miles north
of Biscuit 1 and 2, and by early August it had burned 244,000 acres,
about one-half of the total acreage ultimately burned by the entire
Biscuit Fire. The Sourdough Fire was located near Biscuit 1 and 2, and
by July 22, the three had burned together to form one fire. By August
7, the Florence Fire had burned south and merged with the other fires
to form what was later called the Biscuit Fire.
Figure 1: Locations and Final Perimeter of the Five Fires That Became
the Biscuit Fire:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The names of the fires changed as they progressed. Initially,
each of the fire starts was named individually. As these fires burned
together, the names were modified. Ultimately, the fires merged to
become one--the Biscuit Fire.
[End of figure]
Since no one agency alone can handle all wildfires that may occur in
its jurisdiction, especially when large fires like the Biscuit Fire
occur, the United States uses an interagency incident management system
that depends upon the close cooperation and coordination of federal,
state, tribal, and local fire protection agencies. At the federal
level, there are five agencies involved in firefighting efforts--the
Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture; and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the National Park Service, all within the Department of
the Interior. The Forest Service is the predominant firefighting agency
among these in terms of the amount of resources devoted to
firefighting. In addition to the federal agencies, state, tribal, and
local firefighting agencies also play an important role in fighting
wildland fires and share firefighting personnel, equipment, and
supplies to facilitate cost-effective firefighting. Private companies
are increasingly providing contracted crews and equipment to supplement
those of federal, state, and local agencies.
To coordinate the firefighting efforts of these agencies, the National
Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) was established. This group adopted
an interagency incident management system and firefighting standards
for responding to wildland fires. This system provides an
organizational structure that includes command, planning, logistics,
operations, and finance functions to meet the complexity and demands of
wildland fires. Needed personnel, aircraft, equipment, and supplies for
wildland fires are ordered through a system of local, regional, and
national dispatch centers. These dispatch centers are staffed or funded
by federal or state agencies, or a combination of those agencies.
Federal, state, local, or tribal agencies or private contractors supply
the firefighting resources dispatched at these centers. If resources in
the local dispatch area close to a wildland fire are insufficient,
dispatch center personnel forward the requests to the responsible
regional dispatch center[Footnote 2] that locates and sends additional
firefighting resources from within the region. If necessary, the
regional dispatch center can forward the request to the National
Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho, which locates and
assigns the closest available resources to the fire. This center is
staffed jointly by Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service
personnel. This incident management system was used to respond to the
Biscuit Fire.
Concerns about the response to the Biscuit Fire surfaced as the fire
rapidly grew and began to threaten lives, homes, and businesses. These
concerns included whether firefighting resources were available across
the border in California, which could have been used during the
critical early days of the fires, and whether better management of
firefighting resources could have improved suppression efforts. In this
context, we reviewed (1) whether policies and procedures were in place
for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of
the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures
were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource
management issues, if any, affected the ability of firefighting
personnel to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire; and (3) what
differences, if any, existed in key personnel certification standards
at federal and state agencies involved in fighting wildland fires--
particularly in Oregon--and whether any such differences affected
efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.
To address these questions, we reviewed firefighting policies and
procedures that included interagency standards for fire and fire-
aviation operations, interagency personnel certification standards,
the national mobilization guide, and the local mobilization guide and
mutual aid agreement for the dispatch center in Grants Pass,
Oregon,[Footnote 3] which was responsible for acquiring resources to
respond to the Biscuit Fire. We interviewed headquarters, regional, and
local firefighting officials from the Forest Service and Department of
the Interior agencies, as well as state officials from California,
Oregon, and five other Western states. We reviewed Biscuit Fire
records, including daily fire reports, resource orders, and transcripts
of key radio transmissions during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
National policies and procedures were in place and provided the
framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants
Pass, Oregon, responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for the
Biscuit Fire. Guided by these policies and procedures, dispatch centers
use a three-tiered dispatching system--local, regional, and national--
to locate and send resources to wildland fires. If sufficient resources
are not available locally, a dispatch center requests additional
resources from its regional dispatch center. If sufficient resources
are not available within the region, the request is then elevated to
the national level. However, to facilitate the swift suppression of new
fires--called the initial attack phase of a fire--these policies also
permit dispatch centers to contact neighboring centers directly for
resources, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating
resource requests to a higher level. For the Biscuit Fire, the Grants
Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient resources available and
took steps to locate resources to fight what began as five separate
fires in the Siskiyou National Forest, found over a 3-day period
beginning July 13, 2002. Grants Pass dispatchers contacted their
regional dispatch center in Portland about the availability of
resources, including helicopters, on the first day of the Biscuit Fire.
There were no resources immediately available due to other higher
priority fires burning in the region. In making these inquiries, Grants
Pass personnel did not request resources from the Fortuna dispatch
center,[Footnote 4]a neighboring center located in the adjoining
dispatch region in Northern California. Grants Pass personnel believed
that Fortuna had no available resources, based on daily fire situation
reports, because Northern California was also fighting numerous fires.
Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials in
California that a helicopter, under the control of the Fortuna dispatch
center, was fighting fires in Northern California near one of the five
fires in the Siskiyou National Forest--Biscuit 1--and could have been
made available to fight it. However, Forest Service and California
state officials working in the Fortuna dispatch center expressed
differing viewpoints on whether they could have provided the helicopter
for the Biscuit Fire, had Grants Pass requested it. State officials at
the dispatch center said that the helicopter could have been sent to
Oregon. However, Forest Service dispatchers disagreed, stating that the
helicopter was needed to fight fires in Northern California. Because no
request was made, there was no discussion on that first day about
whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the
helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a
request would have been.
Following the initial efforts to suppress the Biscuit Fire, fire
officials faced delays obtaining (1) highly experienced management
teams to direct fire suppression strategies, along with sufficient
crews to carry out fire plans; (2) supervisors to manage crews and
equipment; and (3) support staff to monitor the training and experience
of contracted crews. These delays were primarily due to the severe fire
season--there were many higher priority fires within and outside the
region. By the time the most highly experienced type of management team
had arrived at the fire, the fire had grown from a few hundred acres to
almost 200,000 acres. Difficulties in filling supervisory positions for
managing firefighting crews hindered the effectiveness of firefighting
efforts. Insufficient personnel to supervise crews and equipment
resulted in the inability to use crews to carry out planned actions,
and as a result, fire suppression progress was delayed. Insufficient
support personnel meant that thousands of contracted personnel could
not be adequately monitored to determine if they met applicable
training and experience requirements. As a result, some insufficiently
trained or inexperienced contractor crews were not always able to carry
out planned operations, resulting in the need to postpone or alter some
tactical firefighting operations.
Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for
personnel between federal land management agencies and state agencies
responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not
appear to have affected efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire. In
1993, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group--an interagency group
comprising federal and state representatives--established minimum
training and experience standards for personnel assigned to fight
interagency wildland fires outside their home region. Federal land
management agencies, as well as firefighting agencies in five of the
seven states we contacted in and around the Northwest Region, have
adopted these standards as the minimum requirements for all of their
fire personnel. The state firefighting agency in Oregon--the Oregon
Department of Forestry--uses these standards for firefighting personnel
assigned to fight interagency fires outside their home region, although
the state maintains its own certification standards for personnel
assigned to state fires or interagency fires within the Northwest
Region. Finally, the California state firefighting agency--the
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection--has maintained
its own requirements and certification system for fire personnel, but
state officials said that these standards meet or exceed those
established by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. We did not
find any evidence of problems at the Biscuit Fire that stemmed from
these differing standards, based on our review of relevant documents
and interviews with knowledgeable officials.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture
and of the Interior for review and comment. The Forest Service
commented that the report appears to be accurate and the agency
generally agrees with its contents. The Forest Service's comment letter
is presented in appendix II. The Department of the Interior did not
provide comments.
Background:
A severe drought in many Western states set the stage for an early and
intense fire season. By mid-June, several major fires were burning,
including the Rodeo-Chediski Fire in Arizona and the Hayman Fire in
Colorado. These fires siphoned both aerial and ground firefighting
resources from the Pacific Northwest, including helicopters, air
tankers, agency and contract fire engines, smoke jumpers, highly
trained agency crews (called "hot shot" crews), and contract
firefighting crews. By June 21, the National Interagency Fire Center
(NIFC) in Boise, Idaho, was reporting a preparedness level of 5, the
highest level, indicating that the nation had the potential to exhaust
all agency firefighting resources. When lightning storms passed through
California and Oregon on July 12 and 13, igniting hundreds of fires,
including the Biscuit Fire, more than 30 large fires were already
burning across the nation and firefighting resources available for
initial attack were limited.
The Biscuit Fire began as five separate fires in the Siskiyou National
Forest[Footnote 5] in southwest Oregon. The Siskiyou Forest,
encompassing more than 1 million acres, contains diverse topography,
including the Siskiyou Mountains, the Klamath Mountains, the Coast
Ranges, and the 180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness. Steep terrain,
together with many roadless areas, presented accessibility and
logistical challenges for managers directing fire suppression efforts
at the Biscuit Fire. To complicate the situation, the fires were also
located almost 30 miles apart. As the fires rapidly grew during late
July and early August, the southern fire burned south and crossed the
state border into the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern
California. While the Biscuit Fire burned primarily federal forestland,
by early August, it threatened a number of communities in Oregon and
California. Figure 2 shows Biscuit 1 burning on a steep hill on July
14, 2002.
Figure 2: Biscuit 1 Burning on Steep Terrain on July 14, 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To understand the response to the Biscuit Fire, it is important to
understand the phases of fire suppression efforts and the nature of
interagency wildland firefighting. On a large wildland fire, such as
the Biscuit Fire, fire suppression efforts generally fall into two
phases. The initial attack phase is defined as efforts to control a
fire during the first operational period, usually within 24 hours.
Local fire managers direct these initial firefighting efforts. In
fiscal year 2002, firefighters were successful in suppressing about 99
percent of wildland fires in federal, state, and local jurisdictions
during the initial attack phase. If a fire has not been contained or
will not be contained during this period or additional firefighting
resources are ordered, firefighting efforts move into the extended
attack phase.[Footnote 6] In this phase, key fire management officials
prepare a Wildland Fire Situation Analysis that describes the situation
and objectives, and compares multiple strategic wildland fire
management alternatives. Additional management and firefighting
resources may be requested. Figure 3 shows an example of a firefighting
organization involved in an extended attack, although the specific
positions filled depend on the complexity of the fire.
Figure 3: Example of an Extended Attack Firefighting Organization:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Forest Service and its interagency firefighting partners employ an
incident management system that is designed to provide the appropriate
management and leadership team capabilities for firefighting efforts.
The complexity of the fire determines the type of leadership team and
firefighting resources assigned. There are five types of incidents--
type 1 being the most complex (see table 1). For example, to manage a
type 5 incident, the incident commander may be a local district
employee with adequate experience to direct initial attack efforts on a
small fire with two to six firefighters. In contrast, for a type 1
incident, such as the Biscuit Fire, the incident commander is just one
member of a highly qualified management team. While both type 1 and
type 2 incident management teams have a standard composition of 28
members, type 1 team members receive additional training and experience
in handling the most complex incidents.
Table 1: The Five Types of Incidents:
Type: 5;
Source of incident commander/team: Local;
Description: Up to 10 firefighters.
Type: 4;
Source of incident commander/team: Local;
Description: Up to 50 firefighters.
Type: 3;
Source of incident commander/team: Local;
Description: Up to 100 firefighters.
Type: 2;
Source of incident commander/team: Regional;
Description: Operations personnel normally do not exceed 200 at any one
time.
Type: 1;
Source of incident commander/team: National;
Description: Operations personnel often exceed 500 at any one time.
Source: GAO analysis of National Interagency Fire Center and National
Academy of Public Administration data.
[End of table]
Incident management teams manage a variety of firefighting resources.
These include highly trained "hot shot" crews, agency and contracted
crews, air tankers, helicopters, fire engines, and bulldozers. Federal
agencies, such as the Forest Service, provide a large number of the
personnel that work on fires. These federal agencies rely on a
"militia" strategy to fight wildland fires whereby personnel within
each agency are trained to serve in fire suppression or support roles,
when needed and requested, in addition to performing their normal day-
to-day work responsibilities. However, many factors, including past
downsizing within the federal government, have reduced the pool of
employees qualified to work on fires. Increasingly, private contractors
provide crews and firefighting equipment, including engines and
helicopters.
National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for
Acquiring Firefighting Resources:
National policies and procedures[Footnote 7] were in place and provided
the framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants
Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring firefighting resources
for the Biscuit Fire. Guided by these policies and procedures, dispatch
centers use a three-tiered dispatching system--local, regional, and
national--to locate and send resources to wildland fires. During the
initial attack phase of a fire, these policies also permit dispatch
centers to contact neighboring dispatch centers directly for resources,
including resources in adjacent regions, before elevating resource
requests to a higher level. For the Biscuit Fire, the Grants Pass
dispatch center did not have sufficient resources available and took
steps to locate needed resources to fight what began as five separate
fires in the Siskiyou National Forest. Grants Pass dispatchers
contacted their regional dispatch center in Portland about the
availability of resources, including helicopters, on the first day of
the Biscuit Fire. In making resource inquiries, Grants Pass personnel
did not request resources from the Fortuna dispatch center, a
neighboring center located in the adjoining dispatch region in Northern
California. Grants Pass personnel believed that Fortuna had no
available resources, based on daily fire situation reports, because
Northern California was also fighting numerous fires. Concerns were
later expressed by state and local officials in California that a
helicopter, under the control of the Fortuna dispatch center, was
fighting fires in Northern California, just across the border from the
first of the five Biscuit fires, and could have been provided to fight
it. Forest Service and state dispatchers working in the Fortuna
dispatch center expressed differing viewpoints on whether they could
have provided a helicopter for the Biscuit Fire, had Grants Pass
requested it.
National Policies and Procedures Provide the Framework for Acquiring
Firefighting Resources:
The National Interagency Mobilization Guide includes policies and
procedures to help ensure the timely and cost effective mobilization of
firefighting resources. Federal, state, tribal, and local firefighting
agencies share their firefighting personnel, equipment, and supplies,
following a standardized process to coordinate responses to fires and
mobilize resources. When local dispatch center personnel are notified
of a fire, they send available firefighting resources based on a
preplanned response. If fire managers need additional resources, they
send a request to the local dispatch center identifying the type and
amount of resources needed. If the dispatch center personnel cannot
fill a request locally, they can forward the request to the responsible
regional dispatch center. If the regional center cannot fill the
request with resources from within the region, the request is sent to
the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho, the
primary support center for coordinating and mobilizing wildland
firefighting resources nationally. When requests exceed available
resources, the fires are prioritized, with those threatening lives and
property receiving higher priority for resources. To facilitate the
swift suppression of new fires--called the "initial attack" phase of a
fire--local dispatch center personnel can first contact neighboring
dispatch centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before
elevating resource requests to the regional or national level. For
resource sharing between neighboring dispatch centers in adjoining
regions, a formalized agreement, such as a mutual aid agreement and
local operating plan, is needed.
Existing policies and procedures encourage the sharing of resources
between local dispatch centers. The national guidance states that local
dispatch centers should use mutual aid agreements whenever possible to
obtain resources directly from neighboring units. In the case of the
Biscuit Fire, a regional mutual aid agreement between the state of
California and federal agencies in California, Nevada, and Oregon
establishes the protocols for interagency coordination and cooperation
for wildland fire protection in California, which includes the areas
along the Nevada and Oregon borders.[Footnote 8] Local, state, and
federal agencies jointly develop local operating plans that identify
the specific resources that can be shared under the mutual aid
agreement and the provisions for cost sharing. One of these plans
allows the Grants Pass dispatch center in Oregon and the Fortuna
dispatch center, located in the neighboring region in Northern
California, to request resources directly from each other. (See fig.
4.) The Grants Pass dispatch center operates under a contract between
the Siskiyou National Forest and the Oregon Department of Forestry
(ODF). ODF operates and staffs the center, and the Forest Service
reimburses the department for a portion of the center's operating
costs, according to a Siskiyou official. The Fortuna dispatch center is
operated by the Six Rivers National Forest and the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) and is staffed by
personnel from both agencies.
Figure 4: Illustration of the Flow of Resource Requests between the
Local Dispatch Centers Involved in the Initial Attack of the Biscuit
Fire:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Grants Pass Dispatch Center Personnel Sought a Variety of Firefighting
Resources for the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire:
When the first two fires were found on the afternoon of July 13, 2002,
the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have the firefighting resources
needed locally to fight the fires. Many resources, including the
helicopter normally stationed at Grants Pass, had been sent to other
higher priority fires that were threatening lives and property. The
fires, located in the Siskiyou National Forest, were initially small--
two trees and 1 acre. Biscuit 1 was a few miles north of the
California-Oregon border, and the Carter Fire was about 12 miles north
of Biscuit 1. Figure 5 provides information about the initial attack on
the fires.
Figure 5: Key Events on July 13 and 14, 2002, Related to the Biscuit
Fire:
[See PDF for image]
Note: For the Oregon air reconnaissance, ODF personnel used a Siskiyou
National Forest reconnaissance aircraft.
[End of figure]
Biscuit 1 was the first fire found. At 3:17 p.m. on July 13, a Siskiyou
Forest Service aircraft being used by ODF personnel to perform
reconnaissance spotted Biscuit 1. The aerial observer reported the fire
to Grants Pass dispatch. At 3:53 p.m., air reconnaissance spotted the
Carter Fire 12 miles north of Biscuit 1.
Soon after Grants Pass and Siskiyou officials became aware of the first
fire, firefighting personnel in California also spotted the fires. At
3:51 p.m., a CDF reconnaissance airplane, assisting the Six Rivers
National Forest, spotted smoke columns to the north while circling a
fire in Northern California. The airplane was directing the activity of
a CDF helicopter and crew of six firefighters assigned to a fire in the
Six Rivers National Forest in Northern California, just south of the
California-Oregon border. At the request of a Six Rivers National
Forest official, the CDF airplane flew north to investigate the smoke
in Oregon. Reconnaissance personnel reported Biscuit 1 and the Carter
Fire to the Six Rivers official and to the Fortuna dispatch center--an
interagency center staffed by CDF and Six Rivers National Forest
personnel. Since the helicopter and crew were close to finishing up
their assignment in California, the CDF reconnaissance personnel
suggested to Fortuna dispatch that the helicopter and crew could next
take action on the fire in Oregon. The Forest Service dispatcher at
Fortuna informed the reconnaissance airplane to continue patrolling
while, in accordance with normal dispatching protocol, Fortuna notified
the Grants Pass dispatch center about the fire. Grants Pass told
Fortuna that it already had reconnaissance aircraft in the area.
Because of the lack of communications between the CDF and Oregon
aircraft, the Fortuna dispatch center advised the CDF airplane to leave
the area to ensure air safety. At 4:15 p.m., CDF air reconnaissance
reported another three lightning-caused fires in Northern California,
and at 4:36 p.m., the CDF helicopter and crew were sent to fight these
fires. Figure 6 shows the new fires found in southern Oregon and
Northern California on July 13 and 14.
Figure 6: New Fire Starts Identified in the Vicinity of the Biscuit
Fire on July 13 and 14, 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the request of Siskiyou National Forest officials, Grants Pass
dispatch personnel began to try to locate needed firefighting
resources. At 4:30 p.m., Grants Pass dispatch personnel requested a
helicopter (with a bucket for water drops) from the dispatch center in
Portland, Oregon. Shortly after 5 p.m., Siskiyou officials asked the
Grants Pass dispatch center to check on the availability of smoke
jumpers, rappellers, helicopters, and air tankers. Dispatchers checked
with the regional dispatch center in Portland and were told that no
helicopters or air tankers were available. Dispatchers contacted the
Central Oregon dispatch center and were told that no smoke jumpers or
rappellers were available for the Biscuit Fire for 48 to 72 hours
because of higher priority fires elsewhere. Grants Pass personnel
relayed this information to Siskiyou officials.
By the next morning, July 14, the fires had grown. Shortly after 10:10
a.m., Siskiyou Forest officials directing firefighting efforts departed
on a reconnaissance flight. They flew over the Carter Fire and decided
to staff this fire as soon as possible because of its proximity to a
trail that would allow access to the fire and because there were
natural safety zones for firefighters. A type 2 crew began to hike to
the Carter Fire later that afternoon. Siskiyou officials next flew over
Biscuit 1 and found it was about 7 acres. They also spotted a third
fire, named Biscuit 2, which was about 20 acres and located about one-
half mile from Biscuit 1. Siskiyou Forest officials believed that the
Biscuit 1 and 2 fires would burn together in the afternoon and had a
high probability of getting significantly larger. Due to safety
concerns, limited accessibility, wind and fire behavior, and
insufficient firefighting resources, forest officials decided not to
staff Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2 at that time. Siskiyou officials
requested that Grants Pass dispatch personnel order additional
firefighting resources, including a type 2 incident management team,
air tankers, and other equipment for the fires. However, due to higher
priority fires elsewhere, many of these resource orders could not be
filled by the regional dispatch center in Portland for several days or
longer, and the request for air tankers was never filled.
Shortly before noon, a CDF helicopter and crew were on duty in Northern
California performing reconnaissance and responding to reported fires.
A Six Rivers Forest official helping to direct the helicopter crew's
activities requested that the crew check the fire in Northern
California they had worked the previous day to ensure it was out. She
also requested that the crew, on the way, fly by a campground near the
Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2 fires to ensure no campers were there. None
were seen. The helicopter then landed near the site of the fire they
had worked the previous day in Northern California, and the crew hiked
to the fire to ensure it was extinguished. At 2:17 p.m., the CDF
helicopter reported the fire was cold, and the helicopter was assigned
to another incident in California.
At 6:40 p.m., in response to the July 13 request for a helicopter, a
regional dispatch official in Portland working with officials in the
Northern California regional dispatch center in Redding, the Fortuna
dispatch center, and the Grants Pass dispatch center arranged for a CDF
helicopter with a water bucket to respond to the Biscuit fires, as
allowed under the provisions of the mutual aid agreement. The
helicopter had been working on fires in Northern California. However, a
few minutes later, as the helicopter was en route to Oregon, Siskiyou
officials canceled the request because at that point the fires had
spread to more than 300 acres, and officials stated that the helicopter
would have been of limited use on a fire that size. Officials explained
that without ground resources available to fight the fire, water drops
alone are usually of limited value.
On July 15, the last two fires that would make up the Biscuit Fire--
Sourdough and Florence--were discovered. The Sourdough Fire was found
near Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2. The Florence Fire was located almost 30
miles north of these fires. Siskiyou officials requested the Grants
Pass dispatch center to order numerous resources on July 15, including
helicopters, engines, and crews. Most of these requests were not able
to be filled for several days or longer. By July 16, the Northwest's
Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland, Oregon, which is
responsible for prioritizing fires and allocating firefighting
resources in the region, ranked the Biscuit Fires as priority 12 out of
18 large fires in the region. The Florence Fire went on to burn almost
250,000 acres before merging with the other fires on August 7.
Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials in
California that a CDF helicopter, fighting fires in Six Rivers National
Forest on July 13, just across the state border from Biscuit 1, could
have been provided earlier to assist on the Biscuit Fire. Grants Pass
personnel explained that they did not request assistance from the
Fortuna dispatch center on July 13 because, based on the daily fire
situation reports, they believed no resources would be available due to
the fires in Northern California. California was also fighting numerous
fires ignited by the same lightning storm that passed through Oregon.
When we asked the Fortuna dispatch center about this issue, the Forest
Service and state of California dispatchers working there expressed
differing viewpoints on whether they could have provided a helicopter
on the first day of the Biscuit Fire if such a request had been made. A
CDF dispatcher working at the Fortuna dispatch center said that if the
Grants Pass dispatcher had requested the helicopter at that time to
launch an initial attack on the Biscuit Fire, he believed he would have
provided it to them. However, a Forest Service official also working at
Fortuna to dispatch firefighting resources had a differing opinion,
saying that even if Fortuna had sent the helicopter to Oregon, he
believes that it likely would have been diverted back to California to
suppress other higher priority fires in Fortuna's direct protection
area. Because Grants Pass dispatch did not request assistance from
Fortuna on the first day of the Biscuit Fire, there was no discussion
at that time about whether this would have been the best use of the
helicopter. In the final analysis, it is unclear what the outcome of
such a request would have been.
Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to
Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire:
Following the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining
needed personnel hampered efforts to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire
in three key ways. First, neither a management team with adequate
experience to strategically plan and manage firefighting efforts nor
sufficient highly trained crews to carry out the plans were initially
available for the Biscuit Fire due to their need on higher priority
fires. By the time a highly experienced management team became
available and was assigned to the Biscuit Fire in late July, the fire
had increased from a few hundred acres to almost 200,000 acres. Second,
key supervisors needed to direct the tactical efforts of firefighting
crews and equipment were unavailable at critical points in July and
August as the fire was growing in size and intensity. As a result, the
ability to implement aggressive fire suppression tactics was
compromised due to concerns about the safety of fire crews. Finally,
some fire support positions, such as contracting technical
representatives, also were unavailable to play a key role in monitoring
contracted crews.
Delayed Availability of a Top Management Team Affected Initial
Firefighting Efforts:
Siskiyou Forest officials directing the firefighting effort had
difficulty obtaining both a highly trained incident management team
with the necessary level of experience to plan and direct firefighting
efforts on the Biscuit Fire, as well as needed crews to carry out such
plans. Within one day after the initial fires were discovered, Siskiyou
district fire managers determined that the fire would likely grow
larger and require a more experienced incident management team to
direct the firefighting effort than was currently available at the
forest. They requested a type 2 team and numerous type 1 crews and
other firefighting resources during the initial days. However, because
of the high level of fire activity both in the Pacific Northwest, as
well as in other Western states, higher priority fires meant that no
type 2 incident management teams or highly experienced crews were
immediately available for assignment to the Biscuit Fire. Siskiyou
officials' request for a team was not filled for 7 days, by which time
the acres burned had grown from about 700 to more than 5,000.
When a type 2 management team assumed command of the Biscuit Fire on
July 21, they quickly realized that the fire had grown beyond the scope
of a type 2 team and that a more experienced type 1 team was needed to
handle the increasingly complex situation. A type 1 team was ordered on
July 22, but the Northwest's Multi-Agency Coordination Group in
Portland prioritized the Biscuit Fire, on this day, as priority 6 of 15
fires burning in the region. This was largely because the Biscuit fires
were not threatening lives and property. As a result, most requests for
management, crews, and equipment for the Biscuit Fire went unfilled.
In the case of the management team, rather than assigning the type 1
team requested, two other type 2 management teams were assigned in late
July to assist in managing firefighting efforts on the southern
fire,[Footnote 9] including the portion that had crossed into
California. As these teams tried to direct the firefighting efforts of
crews and equipment, the fires--especially the Florence Fire in the
north--grew rapidly. Winds and low humidity contributed to the fires'
intensity. Between July 27 and August 1, the size of the Florence Fire
grew from 18,000 acres to 164,000 acres, and the size of the southern
fire--the Sour Biscuit Fire--grew from 7,000 acres to 38,000 acres.
Finally, on July 31, 9 days after first requested, two type 1
management teams arrived and assumed command of fighting the Biscuit
Fire. Type 1 firefighting crews and many other resources continued to
be listed as critical resource needs throughout August. Figure 7 shows
the dates management teams were requested or assumed command, the
personnel and equipment assigned to the fire, and the growth of the
fires.
Figure 7: Fire Size on Key Dates When Fire Management Teams Were
Requested and Received:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The fire size information was not available for July 14.
[End of figure]
The first type 2 incident commander assigned to the Biscuit Fire said
that not having a type 1 management team and other needed resources
slowed the progress of the firefighting effort. He said that while he
understood the Portland group's decision not to assign a type 1 team at
that time, it nonetheless was difficult to effectively fight fires
located almost 30 miles apart with the limited resources available. The
available management and other resources were split between the fires.
He added that the type 2 team's firefighting strategies were the same
as those of a type 1 team--initially to improve access to the site of
the fires. However, without needed resources, tactics had to be
modified, and progress was slower. His operations section chief said
that the complexity of the fire, coupled with:
the lack of a type 1 management team, type 1 crews,[Footnote 10] and
equipment, meant that firefighters could not attack the fire directly
and had to use more indirect methods, such as using bulldozers to build
a firebreak, in an effort to slow the spread of the fire. The incident
commander and operations section chief said that generally, when a fire
is a high priority and qualifies for a type 1 management team, it is
also more likely to be assigned other needed firefighting resources. In
the case of the Biscuit Fire, a type 1 team and additional type 1 crews
and other resources might have improved the chances of stopping the
fire before it burned southeast to an area called Oak Flat, according
to the incident commander. However, Forest Service headquarters
officials said that in a severe fire season such as 2002, difficult
decisions have to be made about where to assign limited resources.
Fires are prioritized, and those presenting the greatest threat to life
and property receive firefighting resources first.
Reduced Availability of Supervisors Slowed Biscuit Fire Suppression
Efforts:
Even as top management teams and increasing numbers of crews and
equipment were assigned to the Biscuit Fire, some critical supervisory
positions were not filled as quickly as needed or remained unfilled at
the end of the fire. In all, over 200 requests for supervisory
positions were never filled. The primary cause for reduced availability
of supervisory personnel was the demand for these staff to work more
than 30 other large fires throughout the nation, including other fires
in Oregon. Fire managers and a Forest Service review[Footnote 11] of
the Biscuit Fire stated that delays in obtaining needed supervisors
affected their ability to implement aggressive fire suppression tactics
or use equipment until sufficient supervision became available. Federal
officials, however, did take some action to mitigate these problems,
including obtaining personnel from Australia and New Zealand to fill
certain supervisory positions. Officials emphasized that the
difficulties in obtaining personnel to serve as supervisors was not a
problem unique to the Biscuit Fire and that such issues have affected
numerous fires in recent years.
Biscuit Fire managers identified a number of key supervisory positions
that went unfilled for a period of time in July or August when the fire
was rapidly growing and that were critical for effective fire
suppression efforts. These included government managers of contracted
helicopters and bulldozers (known as helicopter managers and dozer
bosses); government supervisors directing tactical operations for a
division or segment of crews (known as strike team leaders); and
government supervisors (known as division supervisors) directing the
activities of strike team leaders.
Although it was not possible to measure the specific effect on fire
suppression efforts, such as the number of additional acres burned,
from unfilled supervisory positions, Biscuit Fire managers provided a
number of examples to illustrate the difficulty they faced in carrying
out plans without sufficient supervisors for aircraft or for equipment
and firefighting personnel. For example, an incident commander and an
incident business advisor working at the fire said that some bulldozers
sat idle for a few days and could not be used on fire suppression
efforts because of the lack of a dozer boss to manage and direct the
equipments' use. Interagency requirements state that one dozer boss is
required to safely manage the operations of each dozer. However, dozers
and dozer bosses are ordered separately and may arrive at a fire at
different times. If a dozer arrives first, it may sit idle until a
dozer boss is available to supervise its operation. According to an
interagency Fire and Aviation Safety Team Review,[Footnote 12] it was
appropriate to not use all available resources, including dozers, if
safety would have been compromised because of insufficient supervision.
In the case of helicopters, fire officials told us that for one or two
days several helicopters may have sat idle due to insufficient
helicopter managers. However, fire records indicate, and agency
officials agreed, that the major reason helicopters did not fly was due
to poor visibility as a result of weather or smoke. To minimize the
impact of helicopter manager shortages, fire officials used a waiver
system so that, under certain circumstances, one helicopter manager
could manage two type 1 or type 2 helicopters rather than only one, as
permitted by interagency policy.[Footnote 13] Using this waiver
process, six waivers were granted for helicopter managers working at
the Biscuit Fire. In addition, National Interagency Fire Center
officials requested and received numerous supervisors from Australia
and New Zealand, including eight helicopter managers.
The inability to fill government strike team leader positions also
resulted in delays in fire suppression actions, according to a Biscuit
Fire operations manager. In one effort to mitigate this shortage, three
qualified staff were transferred from a hot shot crew to work as strike
team leaders supervising contracted crews, according to the division
supervisor. The supervisor said, however, this move lowered the
firefighting effectiveness of the hot shot crew. In another case, a
shortage of division supervisors resulted in the inability to provide
adequate supervision in two of the four fire zones for about one week,
according to an operations section chief. The lack of needed
supervision resulted in the inability to use crews to carry out planned
actions, and as a result, fire suppression progress was delayed.
Our findings on the reduced availability of personnel to fill critical
staff positions were confirmed by an internal Forest Service review of
the Biscuit Fire as well as Forest Service reviews of other wildland
firefighting efforts. The Forest Service review of the Biscuit Fire
concluded that opportunities to halt the spread of the fire had to be
abandoned because of limited resources, and as a result, the fire grew
larger and threatened more communities on both the western and eastern
perimeters. The Forest Service's January 2000 report, An Agency
Strategy for Fire Management, highlighted the shortage of federal staff
for both fire suppression and fire support positions. Also, during July
2002, the Northwest Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland,
Oregon, reviewed ongoing fires in the Pacific Northwest, including the
Biscuit Fire, and the effects of the reduced availability of personnel
to fill critical supervisory positions for fire suppression. The group
noted that some crews and equipment had been suspended from fire
suppression efforts because of a lack of appropriate supervision.
Shortage of Personnel to Effectively Monitor Contractors Working on the
Biscuit Fire:
Contracted resources played a key role in the Biscuit Fire--at its peak
over 1,600 contracted firefighters and over 400 pieces of contracted
equipment and helicopters were assigned to the fire. Interagency fire
managers acknowledged, however, that there was little, if any,
monitoring of private contractors to ensure that contracted crews
assigned to the Biscuit Fire met established training and experience
requirements. Instead, fire managers generally relied on contractors to
certify that their crews met these requirements, as stated in their
contract. Despite contractors' assurances that their crew met all
requirements, Biscuit Fire officials told us that some insufficiently
trained or inexperienced contracted crews negatively impacted
firefighting efforts because these crews were not always able to carry
out planned operations. In contrast, contracted engines and other
equipment had fewer problems.
Fire managers participating on the Biscuit Fire said that poorly
trained and inexperienced contracted crews presented significant
operational concerns. They cited examples of contracted crews that were
unable to carry out planned firefighting operations. Managers said that
they postponed or changed some tactical firefighting operations because
it was not safe using these crews in more aggressive fire operations.
Crews that could not be used as planned were assigned minimal
firefighting responsibilities, such as "mop up" activities at a
considerable distance from intensive fire activity. Although the
limitations on how the crews could safely be used likely affected
progress of firefighting, the actual effect cannot be measured.
Communication to and between crews also adversely impacted the use of
contracted crews on the Biscuit Fire. There were instances where crew
and squad bosses for contracted crews were unable to communicate in
English with government supervisors, as required in the interagency
crew agreement. The lack of fluency in English caused safety concerns
and resulted in crews being assigned to far less technical tasks than
planned. Fire managers told us that, even when assigned minimal fire
tasks, some private crews required above normal supervision, which in
turn resulted in supervisors having less time available to plan and
implement higher priority fire suppression tasks.
Under a cooperative arrangement between the federal government and the
states of Oregon and Washington, ODF has oversight responsibility for
private crew contractors in the Northwest. Typically, the monitoring of
crew qualifications should take place before the start of the fire
season. An ODF official, however, said that insufficient funding and
personnel have resulted in few, if any, evaluations of crews'
qualifications prior to the start of the fire season. Alternatively,
interagency support personnel, such as contracting officers or their
technical representatives, can perform contract crew qualification
assessments. We found that during the Biscuit Fire, however, these key
support positions were identified as a critical, but unfilled, resource
need. According to federal firefighting managers, about 90 individuals
have been trained as technical representatives to work with
firefighting management teams, but at any given time during recent fire
seasons, only about 10 percent of these trained technical
representatives were available to serve on incident management teams.
The ODF official having oversight responsibility for contracted crews
in the Northwest concluded that because of these shortages and the
significant numbers of contracted crews, it is likely that there was
minimal monitoring of contract crews at the fire. Finally, we noted
that these shortcomings in the monitoring of contracted crews were not
limited to the Biscuit Fire. The importance of monitoring crew training
and experience was also cited in an interagency fire and aviation
safety report issued in 2002.[Footnote 14] The review stated that
deficiencies in the physical fitness and job skills of crews raised
concerns about the validity of qualifications of some contracted
resources.
Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and
Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified:
There are some differences in certification standards for personnel
between state and federal wildland firefighting agencies, but these
differences did not appear to have affected efforts to respond to the
Biscuit Fire.
In 1993, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)--an
interagency group comprising federal and state representatives--
established minimum training and experience standards[Footnote 15] for
personnel assigned to fight interagency wildland fires outside their
home region. These standards, which were updated in 2000, have been
adopted by five federal land management agencies, including the Forest
Service.[Footnote 16] Five of the seven states that we contacted in and
around the Northwest Region have also adopted these standards as the
minimum requirements for all their firefighting personnel.[Footnote 17]
The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) meets these standards for
personnel on interagency wildland fires outside the Northwest Region.
For fires under state management and for interagency fires within the
region,[Footnote 18] ODF has maintained its own certification
standards. These standards are nearly identical to the 1993 version of
NWCG standards.[Footnote 19] In 2000, NWCG added some course and
experience requirements. ODF officials are currently working to
incorporate many, but not all, of these changes into state standards.
For example, ODF requirements for many positions rated type 2 or below
will meet NWCG standards. For type 1 positions, including incident
commander, some of the most advanced courses will not be required. An
ODF official explained that he believed, for state-managed fires, these
additional courses were not necessary. The California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) has maintained its own firefighting
certification system for its firefighting personnel. CDF shares many of
the same standards as those established by NWCG, including the
combination of coursework and experience requirements for firefighting
certification,[Footnote 20] but requires state-specific
courses for some positions. Under an agreement with federal land
management agencies, California state personnel assigned to interagency
fires in supervisory roles within the state are required to be
certified to a level equivalent to NWCG standards.[Footnote 21] For
national mobilization, NWCG requires that participating agencies
certify that their personnel meet the established interagency
qualification standards. In the case of California, CDF officials
stated that state certification requirements meet or exceed the
standards established by NWCG. In addition, National Interagency Fire
Center officials said they have no concerns about the adequacy of the
standards used by CDF.
There was no apparent impact on the response to the Biscuit Fire as a
result of different agency firefighting certification standards. As
with other interagency fires, personnel that were dispatched to fight
on interagency fires outside their home region were required to meet
these standards. Within the Northwest Region, ODF maintains its own
standards for state fires and interagency fires, although only NWCG-
qualified personnel were dispatched to the Biscuit Fire, according to
an ODF official. While CDF utilizes an independent set of requirements,
NIFC officials said they had no concerns about the adequacy of the
certification system used by CDF. In addition, for the portion of the
Biscuit Fire that was located in California, CDF supervisory personnel
assigned to the fire were required by agreement to be certified to a
level equivalent with NWCG standards. Finally, our review of relevant
documents and discussions with knowledgeable federal, state, and local
officials did not identify any evidence that the differences between
these systems created difficulties during the response to the Biscuit
Fire.
Conclusions:
The cornerstone of wildland fire policy is interagency cooperation and
coordination among federal, state, tribal, and local firefighting
agencies. Central to that cooperation and coordination is a system that
includes managers and personnel from many different agencies and that
crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Such a system is facilitated by good
communication between personnel at all levels to help ensure clarity of
firefighting goals, strategies, and tactics. Communication is also
important for those working in various dispatch centers to obtain
firefighting resources. These personnel must communicate in a timely--
sometimes immediate--fashion to other dispatch centers the resources
they need to fight new or ongoing fires in their area. In the case of
the Biscuit Fire, Grants Pass dispatch personnel did communicate
resource needs to their regional dispatch center in Portland, but no
resources were immediately available due to other higher priority fires
in the region. However, personnel did not communicate the need for
initial attack resources to a neighboring dispatch center in Fortuna,
California, although this was an option available to Grants Pass
personnel. Whether this would have resulted in any resources being
provided for the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire is unclear because
personnel in the Fortuna dispatch center disagree on whether any
resources could have been spared, given that fires were also burning in
Northern California at the time. Since no request was made, the
priority of the Biscuit Fire relative to other ongoing fires within the
Fortuna dispatch center's direct protection area was not discussed on
the first day of the Biscuit Fire, and the outcome of such a request,
had it been made, remains unclear.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture
and of the Interior for review and comment. The Forest Service
commented that the report appears to be accurate and the agency
generally agrees with its contents. The Forest Service's comments are
presented in appendix II. The Department of the Interior did not
provide comments.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to other interested congressional committees. We
will also send copies to the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of
the Interior; the Chief of the Forest Service; the Directors of the
Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and other
interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about his report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Barry T. Hill:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether policies and procedures were in place for
acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the
Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures
were followed when the fire was first identified, we reviewed national
policies and procedures that included the National Interagency
Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations and the National
Interagency Mobilization Guide. We reviewed the interagency
mobilization guides in 9 of the 11 regions.[Footnote 22] We also
reviewed the local mobilization guide covering the Grants Pass dispatch
center and the mobilization guides for three other local dispatch
centers.[Footnote 23] We reviewed the mutual aid agreements governing
resource sharing for the Siskiyou National Forest. We spoke with
officials at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise,
Idaho; Forest Service headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Forest Service
Regions 5 and 6 regional offices; Bureau of Land Management, Oregon
State Office and the Medford District Office; the Siskiyou and Six
Rivers National Forests; the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF); and
the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF). We
visited three dispatch centers in Oregon (the Grants Pass Interagency
Fire Center, the Medford Interagency Fire Center, and the Northwest
Interagency Coordination Center in Portland) and one in California (the
Fortuna Interagency Emergency Command Center) to discuss dispatch
center operations. We also reviewed Biscuit Fire records stored at
Siskiyou National Forest headquarters in Medford, Oregon, and records
kept at Fortuna, including resource orders and transcripts of key radio
transmissions during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire. The Forest
Service provided the data used to generate the fire progression maps.
We took steps to assess the reliability of the mapping data and
determined that it was sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
To determine what resource management issues, if any, affected the
ability of firefighting personnel to effectively fight the Biscuit
Fire, we reviewed a variety of information, including resource orders
and daily incident reports showing firefighting resources requested and
obtained, incident action plans showing firefighting strategies and
tactics, close-out reports discussing firefighting progress and
problems, and Forest Service reviews of the Biscuit Fire. We
interviewed a number of federal and state personnel knowledgeable about
the Biscuit Fire, including officials from the Siskiyou and Six Rivers
National Forests, ODF, and CDF, and the management teams and other key
support staff that were assigned to the Biscuit Fire. We discussed
resource management issues, their effect on the fighting of the Biscuit
Fire, and the reasons for these issues or problems. We also reviewed
assessments of other wildland fires to determine if the issues
identified were limited to the Biscuit Fire or were more widespread.
To determine what differences, if any, existed in key personnel
certification standards at federal and state agencies involved in
fighting wildland fires--particularly in Oregon--we reviewed the
interagency qualification standards established by NWCG. We also
contacted officials from Oregon and California, where the Biscuit Fire
burned, and five other states--Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and
Washington--to discuss the certification standards they use, and
whether they differ from those established by NWCG. In addition, we
reviewed state firefighting standards for ODF and CDF and compared them
with those established by NWCG. To determine what effect any
differences may have had on the response to the Biscuit Fire, we spoke
with federal officials with NIFC, the Forest Service, the Bureau of
Land Management, and the National Park Service; officials with the
National Association of State Foresters; and state and local officials
in Oregon and California, including officials from ODF, CDF, and the
California Office of Emergency Services.
We conducted our work from April 2003 through February 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Forest Service:
United States Department of Agriculture
Forest Service
Washington Office
14TH & Independence SW
P.O. Box 96090
Washington, DC 20090-6090:
File Code: 1420
Date: Apr 5, 2004:
Mr. Barry T. Hill:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hill:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled, "BISCUIT FIRE:
Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel
Certification Standards," GAO-04-426. In general, the Forest Service
agrees with the contents of the draft report. Any issues or concerns
raised previously have been adequately addressed. The report appears to
be accurate and represents a substantial effort on the part of GAO. The
report contains no recommendations for further action.
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Sandy Coleman,
Agency Audit Liaison, at 703-605-4940.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
DALE N. BOSWORTH, Chief:
cc: Laura L Perrett, Sandra Cantler, Alice R Forbes, Ron Knowles:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Barry T. Hill, (202) 512-3841 or h [Hyperlink, hillbt@gao.gov]
[Hyperlink, hillbt@gao.gov] illbt@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Andrea W. Brown, John Delicath, Cliff Fowler (retired), Janet Frisch,
Molly Laster, Paul E. Staley, Stanley G. Stenersen, Amy Webbink, and
Arvin Wu made key contributions to this report.
(360319):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Federal agencies select names for wildfires based upon nearby
geographic features. For example, the Biscuit Fire started near Biscuit
Creek in southern Oregon.
[2] There are 11 regional dispatch centers nationwide, called
geographic area coordination centers, each of which serve a specific
geographic portion of the United States.
[3] In the case of the Biscuit Fire, the local dispatch center was the
Grants Pass Interagency Fire Center in Grants Pass, Oregon. The
Siskiyou National Forest has contracted with the Oregon Department of
Forestry (ODF) to operate this center. ODF personnel staff the center,
but the operating costs are shared between ODF and the Forest Service.
The regional dispatch center responsible for the Biscuit Fire was the
Northwest Interagency Coordination Center in Portland, Oregon.
[4] The Fortuna Interagency Emergency Command Center, which we will
refer to as the Fortuna dispatch center, is an interagency center
staffed by Forest Service and California Department of Forestry and
Fire Protection (CDF) personnel. The center serves Six Rivers National
Forest, Redwood National Park, the CDF Humboldt-Del Norte Unit, and the
Hoopa Indian Reservation.
[5] The Siskiyou National Forest and the Rogue River National Forest
are separate forests but are administered jointly. However, because the
Biscuit Fire burned only in the Siskiyou Forest, we will only refer to
the Siskiyou National Forest.
[6] Fire managers may order more experienced leadership immediately
based on the initial assessment if it appears that the fire will become
a more complex incident.
[7] National Interagency Mobilization Guide (Feb. 1, 2002).
[8] This mutual aid agreement, the Cooperative Fire Protection
Agreement, involved the Bureau of Land Management, California and
Nevada; National Park Service, Pacific West Region; Forest Service,
Regions 4, 5, and 6; and California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection.
[9] The southern fire resulted from the merging of the Biscuit 1,
Biscuit 2, and Sourdough Fires. The southern fire was named the Sour
Biscuit Fire.
[10] A crew normally consists of 20 persons.
[11] Final Draft Biscuit Fire Review, USDA Forest Service, PNW Region
(Jan. 31, 2003).
[12] Final Report: Fire & Aviation Safety Team Review of Northwest
Geographic Area (July 19 through Aug. 1, 2002).
[13] According to the Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide (January
2002), two type 1 or type 2 helicopters may be designated as "limited
use" and managed by one qualified helicopter manager when (1) a second
qualified helicopter manager is on order, and there are active efforts
to fill the position; (2) both helicopters are physically side-by-side
at the same helibase; (3) a helibase manager is assigned; (4) aerial
supervision is provided; and (5) approval has been granted by the
appropriate agency aviation manager.
[14] Final Report: Fire & Aviation Safety Team Review of Northwest
Geographic Area (July 19 through Aug. 1, 2002).
[15] This system is the Wildland and Prescribed Fire Qualifications
System, commonly referred to as 310-1.
[16] The Forest Service has supplemented NWCG (310-1) standards with
additional requirements that apply only to Forest Service personnel.
[17] We spoke with wildland firefighting officials in California,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
[18] A 1998 agreement between Oregon, Washington, and federal land
management agencies recognizes each agency's standards as reasonable,
prudent, and acceptable for firefighting on lands under private, state,
or federal protection.
[19] Although Oregon standards differ from those set by NWCG,
approximately 70 percent of the state's roughly 600 permanent
firefighting personnel are certified in one or more interagency
incident command positions, according to an ODF official. In addition,
another roughly 300 seasonal employees are brought in each year that,
by their job duties, must be interagency certified.
[20] California's Office of Emergency Services coordinates the sharing
of local emergency personnel, including wildland firefighters, through
the state's municipal aid program. The standards used are based on NWCG
standards, and these personnel are shared with interagency efforts.
[21] A May 2002 agreement between California and federal land
management agencies specifies that supervisory personnel responding to
interagency fires in the state and some adjacent areas shall meet
either NWCG training requirements or those of the California Incident
Command Certification System, which is based on NWCG standards. The
agreement also provides recommended qualifications for engine crews.
[22] These were the Northwest, Northern California, Southern
California, Western Great Basin, Eastern Great Basin, Southwest,
Northern Rockies, Rocky Mountain, and Eastern regions.
[23] These dispatch centers were the Central Washington Interagency
Communications Center, the Casper Interagency Dispatch Center, and the
North Dakota Interagency Dispatch Center.
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